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97–266PDF 2015

RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 22, 2015

Serial No. 114–110

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Doug Farah, President, IBI Consultants ........................................................ 4

Vladimir Rouvinski, Ph.D., Director of the CIES Interdisciplinary Research 

Center, Universidad Icesi in Colombia ............................................................... 18

Constantino Urcuyo, Ph.D., Academic Director, Centro de Investigacio ́n y 

Adiestramiento Polı ́tico Administrativo in Costa Rica ..................................... 26

Diana Villiers Negroponte, Ph.D., Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars ....................................................................... 36

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Doug Farah: Prepared statement .................................................................... 7

Vladimir Rouvinski, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 20

Constantino Urcuyo, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 28

Diana Villiers Negroponte, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................... 38

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 56

(1)

RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will 

come to order. I now would like to recognize myself for an opening 

statement. 

This subcommittee hearing is the third in a series of hearings 

that we have held to examine the presence and activities of certain 

countries operating here in the Western Hemisphere. In February, 

we looked at Iran and Hezbollah’s presence in the region, the failure of the State Department to prioritize these actors in view of a 

potential Iran nuclear deal and the limited U.S. intelligence capabilities focused on these issues. 

In July, we examined China’s extensive engagement with the region through trade and the investment of hundreds of billions of 

dollars, energy cooperation, infrastructure projects and a range of 

security activities including satellite cooperation, arms sales, and 

military exchanges. 

So today we will meet to consider Russia’s engagement in Latin 

America and Caribbean. Following the Cold War, Russia began 

taking more of a pronounced interest in the region especially during the 2008 crisis in Georgia. When the U.S. responded to Russia’s 

aggression in Georgia by sending naval forces to the Black Sea, 

Russia deployed nuclear-capable bombers to the Caribbean and a 

four-ship naval flotilla to conduct military exercises with the Venezuelan navy and make port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua. 

Let there be light. 

Russia also stepped up its diplomatic outreach with a visit to the 

region from then-President Medvedev, and subsequent visits from 

the Presidents of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador to 

Moscow. Following Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine in 2014, Russia again ushered in another wave of military and diplomatic activities with particular emphasis on anti-American and undemocratic countries, those with close proximity to U.S. borders, or those 

with unique capabilities of interest to Russia. 

2

Last year proved a very eventful year for Russia in the Western 

Hemisphere. Reportedly, Russia began talks on Nicaragua, Cuba 

and Venezuela about establishing bases for resupplying Russian 

warships and potentially refueling Russian long-range bombers. In 

April, the U.S. observed two Russian ships operating in waters 

close to Cuba near the U.S. naval station in Mayport, Florida. That 

same month, the Russian foreign minister visited Nicaragua, Cuba, 

Peru and Chile. 

In June, NORAD reported it had scrambled two F–22s and two 

F–15s after seeing a fleet of Russian bombers off the coast of Alaska and California. In July, Russian President Putin traveled in the 

region to visit Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and Brazil. At that 

time, Russia forgave 90 percent of Cuba’s debt, and reportedly Russia and Cuba agreed to reopen the Lourdes base only 150 miles 

from the United States coast. 

End of September, U.S. intercepted Russia fighter jets and tankers in airspace near Alaska, and just in November of last year, 

Russia announced that it had planned to send its long-range bombers to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. The United States did 

very little in response to all these developments. 

Subsequently, this past January, Russia sent a ship to Cuba on 

the eve of Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobsen’s visit. This was 

followed by a visit from the Russian foreign minister to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in February, and a visit from the Russian defense minister to Cuba, Colombia, Nicaragua and Guatemala in 

March. 

Most recently, as Russia has deepened its military efforts in 

Syria, reportedly Cuban troops have been sent to Syria to operate 

Russian tanks. Such Russian overreach in its own region, in the 

Middle East, and now in the Western Hemisphere does not send 

a positive message to the United States and our freedom-loving allies. Indeed, in view of Russia’s aggression in its own neighborhood, 

violations of arms control treaties, cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure, and continued partnerships with Iran, Syria, Cuba and Venezuela, Russian actions do not signal an interest in peace nor of 

global stability. 

In the Western Hemisphere, Russia’s engagement appears driven 

primarily by geopolitical and security considerations rather than 

solely economic interest. After all, in 2013, Russia’s bilateral trade 

with the region was only $18 billion, 14 times less than China’s 

trade with the region. 

In contrast, from 2001 to 2013, Russia sold Latin America almost 

$15 billion in arms which amounts to 40 percent of the arms purchased by the region from external actors. Similarly, from 2008 to 

2011, Russia sold more than 3,000 surface-to-air missiles to the region, and multiple countries also have Russian helicopters. 

Beyond arms sales Russia has sought positions of influence. Reportedly, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Argentina have all 

granted Russia access to their airspace and ports. Russia’s only 

transoceanic shipping line to South America runs from Russia to 

Ecuador, and multiple countries have agreed to or are considering 

participating in Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system. 

Furthermore, Russia seems to have prioritized relations with countries close to U.S. borders. Russia has provided armored vehicles, 

3

aircraft missiles and helicopters to Mexico, and assistance in Mexico’s fight against criminal organizations. 

Several of El Salvador’s leaders received training in the Soviet 

Union, and Nicaragua has agreed to host a new Russian 

counterdrug center, Russian munitions disposal plant, and a 130 

Russian counternarcotics trainers who conduct joint patrols with 

the Nicaraguans. In addition, Russia has cultivated a strategic alliance with Brazil and a strategic partnership with Argentina as 

Russia’s top two trading partners. Furthermore, Russian engagement in Peru has resulted in strong military ties with that country, 

counterdrug cooperation, and reportedly the planning and executing of joint strategic operations. 

Today, Venezuela remains a key linchpin for Russia activity in 

Latin America, and in return Russia has provided Venezuela with 

arms sales, a $2 billion loan, and energy cooperation in the Orinoco 

River Basin. 

In conclusion, Russia’s engagement in the Western Hemisphere 

is deeply troubling. At a time when Russia is flexing its geopolitical 

muscles in other parts of the world, its power projection in our very 

region should be met with U.S. strength, resilience and clarity. In 

2009, President Putin called cooperation with Latin American 

states one of the key and very promising lines of Russian foreign 

policy. The United States should recognize this and adapt accordingly in our response. 

So I will look forward to hearing from the expert panelists on 

this topic. And I want to just emphasize that this is just a series 

of hearings that we are having focused on not only the involvement 

of other countries in this hemisphere, but I want to emphasize the 

lack of U.S. engagement in this hemisphere, and so I would love 

for the panelists to touch on that as well. 

With that I will turn to the ranking member Mr. Sires for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. Thank 

you for our witnesses for being here today. 

Today we are examining Russia’s engagement in Latin America 

and the Caribbean. Russia has been involved in Latin America 

since its support for Cuba and Nicaragua during the Cold War. The 

post-Cold War era saw a decline in Russian engagement, but as 

Russia-U.S. relations have become tenser in recent years, Putin is 

reviving these old ties to the Western Hemisphere. Russia has had 

a series of high profile state visits, proposed investment and most 

important an increase in military sales and military exercise in the 

region. 

According to General John F. Kelly, commander of the U.S. 

Southern Command, Russia has courted Cuba, Venezuela and 

Nicaragua to gain access to airbases and ports for resupply of Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the Western 

Hemisphere. Putin’s high level visit included travel to Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina and Brazil, while the Russian prime minister has 

also made trips to Cuba and Nicaragua. 

Russia’s interests in the region are to increase military cooperation, find new partners in the wake of U.S. and EU sanctions on 

Russia’s economy, and try and promote the perception that they 

are a global power. Though these high level visits and proposed 

4

agreements are just for the Russian investment in the region, experts doubt Russia’s ability to fulfill its economic commitment. 

What concerns me is Russia’s continued arms sales to the region, 

especially on the heels of their support for ruthless dictators like 

Syria’s Bashir al-Assad. Now we are seeing reports of the Cuban 

military on the ground in Syria assisting Russia in bombing innocent civilians and moderate anti-government forces. 

For too many years the United States has focused on other parts 

of the world which has led to the neglect of our neighborhood. We 

must remain vigilant on what the long-term consequences might be 

and reaffirm our own commitment to the region. And I look forward to hearing from our panelists today. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Wow. That was a short opening statement. 

Mr. SIRES. I want to hear what they have got to say. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I appreciate the ranking member. I do as well. The 

bios are in your binders and so I won’t do the bios. I will just start 

with recognizing each member will have 5 minutes. There is a light 

system, so when it gets close to running out of time you will have 

yellow and then red, and then if you could wrap it up when the 

red light comes on. 

So Douglas Farah, welcome back. You have been a great panelist 

in the past and a tremendous asset for me. I have learned a lot 

from you. I look forward to learning more from you today. You are 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DOUG FARAH, PRESIDENT, IBI 

CONSULTANTS 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, I appreciate your 

kind words. And thank you, Ranking Member Sires and members 

of the committee for the opportunity to discuss Russia’s——

Mr. DUNCAN. Now if you could pull that microphone just a little 

closer. We are recording this and I want to make sure we get it 

all. So thank you. 

Mr. FARAH. Is that better? Okay, thank you. 

Over the past 3 years, as you have noted, President Putin has 

made no secret of his desire to create a multipolar world where the 

United States is not dominant. Leaders of the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have responded to Russia’s growing global 

assertiveness by singling out Russia as the primary military and 

strategic threat to the United States, particularly following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and other hostile activities. However, that threat assessment is seldom applied to Latin America. 

Yet, given its current positioning one could argue that Russia now 

has more influence in Latin America than ever before, even including the height of the Cold War. 

This will likely remain true despite the recent announcement of 

the normalization of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the 

United States. During most of the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s 

only reliable ally in Latin America was Cuba, which in turn helped 

sponsor insurgent movements across the hemisphere. With the 

1979 triumph of the Sandinista Revolution, the Kremlin gained a 

second state partner, but when the Berlin Wall fell 12 years later, 

Russia’s regional influence ebbed to almost nothing. 

5

But since 2005, riding the wave of radical anti-U.S. populism 

sponsored by the late President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Russia 

is now firmly allied with the ranks of Latin America’s populist, authoritarian and strongly anti-American leaders of the Bolivarian 

Alliance bloc known as ALBA. The Putin government is providing 

all the nations with weapons, police and military training and 

equipment, intelligence technology and training, nuclear technology, oil exploration equipment, financial assistance, and an influential friend in the United Nations Security Council and other 

international forums. With Russia’s help the once shared hemispheric values of functioning and democratic systems are being replaced by a toxic mix of anti-democratic values, massive corruption, 

and a doctrine that draws on totalitarian models. 

The ALBA bloc embraces terrorism and terrorist groups such as 

the FARC in Colombia, Hezbollah, and the Spanish ETA and its 

military doctrine includes the justification of the use of weapons of 

mass destruction against the United States. In return, these allies 

are shielding Russia from international isolation, providing political and diplomatic support, and opening access to financial markets for sanctioned Russian banks and companies. 

Russia has also helped create an important regional media and 

social media network offering coordinated messages of unstinting 

support for Putin while casting the United States as the global aggressor. At the same time, ALBA countries are increasing Russia’s 

military access to the hemisphere’s ports and airspace and ultimately increasing Russia’s sphere of influence in a region where 

the United States has seldom been so directly challenged. 

As noted in his July visit, President Putin made multiple gifts 

to his friends in the region, including the forgiveness of Cuban 

debt, declaring a strategic alliance with Argentina, and discussing 

nuclear energy agreements over dinner with Argentine President 

Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Putin also promised President 

Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua Russia’s military protection for the 

canal which will likely never be completed, but would provide Russia with coveted deep sea seaports. 

It is worth noting that with the establishment of these strategic 

alliances, delegations of senior Russian military and foreign relations officials routinely travel through the region, including individuals under sanctions by the United States and the European 

Union. As noted, General Kelly is aware of this issue and has said 

that over the past three decades, ‘‘It has been over three decades 

since we last saw this type of high profile Russian presence in 

Latin America.’’ He added that under Putin we have seen a clear 

return to the Cold War tactics. 

It is not that the nature of the Russian state is not understood. 

In March 2015, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper labeled Russia a ‘‘threat actor’’ and an example of a nation where 

‘‘the nexus among organized crime, state actors, and business blurs 

the distinction between state policy and private gain.’’

While one can observe the accuracy of this assessment of Russia’s intentions and capability in many parts of the world, the 

growing mixture of Russian state presence, business ventures, soft 

power overtures, criminal activity and proxy activities in Latin 

America have gone largely unexamined. One repeat visitor to Latin 

6

America who provides a particularly useful lens to understand Russian activities in the region is General Valery Gerasimov, chief of 

staff of the Russian Federation and chief architect of the 

Gerasimov Doctrine. The influential doctrine posits that the rules 

of war have changed and that there is a ‘‘blurring of the lines between war and peace.’’ He advocates an asymmetrical series of actions in a permanently operating front through an entire territory 

of the enemy state. 

This is the prism through which the Russian’s engagement in 

Latin America should be viewed. This is how and why Russia is engaging with select Latin America states. If you look closely at what 

they are doing they are focusing on four distinct areas. As noted, 

the sale of weapons; also police, military and intelligence assistance; access to financial institutions, which I detail in my written 

testimony at some length; and creating this counter-narrative 

which I talked about before where the United States is constantly 

portrayed as the aggressor and Russia as an alternative to that. 

In addition, IBI Consultants research has mapped out an interesting and opaque network of former senior military and KGB officials operating in Central America. This network deserves extensive more research. Russia’s rise underscores, as Chairman Duncan 

said, the significant loss of Washington’s ability to shape events in 

a region close to home and of significant strategic interest. While 

the U.S. position remains preeminent due to geographic proximity, 

cultural ties and trade ties, it is eroding more quickly than is often 

understood. 

In a time of resource scarcity, Russia has managed to leverage 

a small amount of resources into significant gain. The Russia agenda is aided and abetted by the ALBA bloc of nations in which there 

is no independent media and where the official media magnifies 

each statement and donation. The United States needs a much 

more visible return to the region to counter the perception and the 

reality that Russia is again a major strategic influence in the region. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. Before I recognize Dr. Rouvinski, I 

want to thank you and Dr. Urcuyo for traveling from Costa Rica 

and Colombia. You all have traveled quite a distance and we are 

glad we are able to make this hearing happen today. So thank you 

for that and on behalf of the committee. And Dr. Rouvinski, you 

are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR ROUVINSKI, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF 

THE CIES INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSIDAD ICESI IN COLOMBIA 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and the other esteemed committee members, for the 

opportunity to speak today before the committee. Let me begin my 

testimony by sharing some general observations with regard to the 

Russian presence in Latin America, placing a particular emphasis 

on the evolution of Russian goals and objectives in the Western 

Hemisphere from the beginning of the 1990s until now. 

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political and military, economic and cultural contacts between Russia and Latin 

America declined sharply. But during the first decade of the 21st 

century, the situation changed dramatically. Already by 2008, Russian trade with Latin America had doubled in comparison with 

1996. The same year, in a new vector, Russia declared its foreign 

policy to be a strategic partnership with Latin America. By 2015, 

Russia is maintaining diplomatic relations with all countries in the 

Western Hemisphere. 

With many of these countries the Russian Government signed a 

visa-free agreement allowing greater ease of travel between the regions. Taking into consideration the dynamic relations between 

Russia and Latin America, the political leaders in Russia began to 

talk about the Russian return to Latin America, referring to similarities between the current state of affairs and the policy promoted 

by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, characterizing 

the Russian presence in the Western Hemisphere as a ‘‘return’’ is 

inaccurate, since the Russian objectives only partially match those 

pursued by the Soviet Union. 

The current Russian strategy in the Western Hemisphere is to 

strengthen diplomatic relations with all Latin American countries 

while promoting economic cooperation and the arms trade, as well 

as military contact with some of the countries. 

Three groups of countries in the region can be distinguished in 

light of these efforts. The first group consists of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, which have offered full support to Russia in the 

Ukrainian and Syrian crises. These countries benefit from Russian 

cooperation in the energy sector, have been recipient of Russian aid 

and are major buyer of Russian arms. Their political contacts with 

Moscow pave the way for military cooperation, thus explicitly challenging the United States in its ‘‘near abroad.’’ Russia also seems 

to expand the area of cooperation with this group by offering collaboration in sensitive issues such as drug trafficking and international organized crime. 

The second group includes Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, the 

most economically important countries for the region, as well as 

several other Latin American nations. While the leaders of these 

19

countries may not fully collaborate with the Kremlin’s international agenda, Russia still counts on their support in various 

multilateral arrangements including the United Nations, BRICS, 

and G–20. 

The third group of countries has strong ties with the United 

States and are unwilling to risk their relations with the West, but 

do not want to antagonize Russia either. An example is Colombia, 

which is maintaining its alliance with the United States while 

avoiding confrontation with Russia. 

The current Russian economic presence in the Western Hemisphere is very significant if comparing to the state of Russian commerce and trade with the region in the 1990s. However, the Russian economic engagement with Latin America is rather modest in 

comparison of some other extra-hemispheric actors, firstly, the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, it is important to underline that 

Russia’s capacity to further build up its presence in the Western 

Hemisphere is limited because of the low price of petroleum on 

international markets and the effect of economic sanctions imposed 

on the country by the United States and Europe. 

While the relations between Russian leaders and many of their 

Latin American counterparts can be characterized as strongly sympathetic, some of them lack a long-term commitment and may 

crumble under new leaders. In addition, in the challenging global 

geopolitical context, Russia has managed to maintain stable relation with all Latin American countries and therefore effectively undermined the efforts of the United States and its allies to isolate 

Moscow in order to pressure the government of Vladimir Putin to 

change its current policy in Europe. 

I would like to invite the United States House of Representatives 

to consider the following: The Russian re-engagement with Latin 

America is evidence that the processes that are taking place in 

Latin America and the Caribbean are part of the changing global 

geopolitical landscape, and the answers to the challenges posed to 

the United States economic and security interests as a result of the 

Russian return to the region are to be considered from a global perspective. 

It is also important to open possibilities for a more comprehensive study of the Russian presence in Latin America by academic 

institutions and think-tanks in the United States. Whereas in recent years, research activities concerned, for example, with China’s 

presence in the region have been booming, the Russian presence in 

Latin America has been mostly neglected. However, to better understand the Russian long-term interest in this part of the world, 

support for academic research is pivotal. Thank you for your time, 

and I look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rouvinski follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much for your testimony. 

Dr. Urcuyo, is that microphone on? 

Mr. URCUYO. Yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Make sure it is pointed right at your mouth 

too. That will be good. 

STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINO URCUYO, PH.D., ACADEMIC DIRECTOR, CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIO ́ N Y ADIESTRAMIENTO 

POLI ́TICO ADMINISTRATIVO IN COSTA RICA 

Mr. URCUYO. Okay. Thank you for the invitation. Russia has 

been present in the region in a new way since the last decade, although Moscow did have great activity during the Cold War. This 

inheritance will play a role in the current phase because thousands 

of Latin Americans were trained in the USSR. What is happening 

in what the Russians call their ‘‘near abroad’’ is interacting in real 

time with events in Latin America. Russia’s diplomatic and military penetration in Latin America is a response to what it sees as 

an excessive presence of the U.S.A. and NATO in what it considers 

its influence area. 

Besides, Russia is nostalgic for having lost the Soviet empire and 

wants to show the world that it still a member of the major powers 

and capable of projecting power in its main adversary’s backyard. 

On the other hand, Putin plays to his domestic audience. The resurgence of great Russian nationalism is fostered by the audacity 

of its leader. From the perspective of Russian Grand Strategy, forays into the region may not provide significant immediate returns 

in terms of the global scenario, but in the event of a more generalized future conflict they could enable Russia to use regional internal conflicts to its advantage. 

I will focus on Nicaragua due to Russia’s importance to this 

country as well as the potential consequences of its activity for 

Costa Rica and the rest of Central America. Russia has a historical 

background of close relations with Managua. Currently, though, 

collaboration links have become closer. The Russian ministers of 

defense and foreign affairs visit frequently and a Russian anti-drug 

training center has opened near Managua. 

Russia has also shown interest in deploying satellite stations in 

Nicaragua for their global positioning system. Russia’s focus on 

anti-drug cooperation is paradoxical if one considers that the drugdealing routes that go through Nicaragua are not headed to Moscow. Some observers interpret it as a form of covert and strategic 

expansion. Russia’s intention could be to obtain military bases or 

to trade political military assets as it did during the Cuban missile 

crisis. 

On the other hand, Nicaragua’s ongoing maritime conflict with 

Colombia suggests that its rearmament is aimed more at the confrontation with this country than the fight against organized crime. 

Such remilitarization has raised concerns. There is great unease 

about its consequences for the regional balance of forces. 

The link between Russia and Nicaragua goes beyond military 

issues. It involves the diplomatic arena. Since 2008, Nicaragua recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in alignment with Russian diplomacy. The alignment was repeated when Nicaragua voted 

against the disapproval Crimea’s annexation at the United NaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:48 Dec 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\102215\97266 SHIRL
27

tions. The Russian military and diplomatic presence in Central 

America is a factor of regional instability. It is threatening for 

Costa Rica because the country does not have an army and has a 

border dispute with Nicaragua. If a conflict arises with Colombia, 

Bogota’s level of armament and military training will escalate its 

dimensions, threatening peace throughout the Caribbean Basin. 

Conclusions and recommendations. Russia is trying to transfer 

its conflict with the U.S. to Latin America while profiting from 

weapons sales and challenging and provoking the U.S. Latin American countries must be aware that they cannot be trapped in a Russian conflict. Russia’s regional old friends and new allies provide a 

haven for extra-hemispheric powers that seek to counterbalance 

the power of the U.S.A. by strengthening anti-imperialist nationalism. 

Russia’s overtures revolve around the military and not around 

human development. That Russian activity raises apprehension in 

Washington is understandable. However, the answer cannot be unilateral. It must emerge from a dialogue with Latin American countries that considers all national interests and defines multilateral 

political partnerships. 

China’s active economic cooperation frees some of Moscow’s Latin 

American allies from economic pressures enabling Russian military 

and diplomatic penetration. The recent Chinese-Russian partnership could develop in the future through greater coordination in the 

hemisphere. There are speculations about the likely participation of 

Russia in the defense of the Nicaraguan Canal by the Chinese. 

Russian actions in Central America demand a more detailed accounting of its intense military cooperation with Nicaragua. Russia 

actually is trying to play a new role in Central America becoming 

an observer member of the Central American Integration System. 

Some Latin American countries have given a positive response to 

Vladimir Putin’s initiatives, which shows that inter-American relations have shifted qualitatively. It is important, last, to develop a 

shared and strategic doctrine in the Americas adapted to the new 

architecture of the international system. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Urcuyo follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. 

Dr. Negroponte, for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DIANA VILLIERS NEGROPONTE, PH.D., PUBLIC 

POLICY SCHOLAR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL 

CENTER FOR SCHOLARS 

Ms. NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sires, for the opportunity to present ideas this afternoon. Having listened to my three colleagues I am going to adapt somewhat 

my remarks this afternoon, but I have left with you a written testimony. 

I wish to look at the issue of Russian engagement in a somewhat 

distinct way and analyze why Russia has become more active in 

this hemisphere. I would argue there are three reasons. First, Russia needs markets, markets for its military equipment, its heavy 

industrial goods, and its growing IT sector. It was interesting when 

President Putin visited Nicaragua last year and it was at the last 

moment that he asked Nicaragua to sell fruits, vegetables, coffee, 

and meat given that Russia had banned the import of these important products from its natural and normal sources. Markets, I 

would argue, is one of the reasons why Russia has expanded its interest and its presence. 

Secondly, Russia needs friends. It needs friends at the U.N. General Assembly. It needs friends who will vote with it against the 

United States when we condemn the annexation of Korea and activities in Ukraine. 

The third reason for Russia is as the West has expanded its presence in the Baltics, in Ukraine and Poland, Russia has sought to 

meddle in what might be called by some ‘‘our backyard.’’ The response from both Nicaragua and Cuba has been interesting because of its distinctiveness. In the case of Nicaragua, as Dr. Urcuyo 

has pointed out, Daniel Ortega is playing high risks. He discusses 

the purchase of MiG-29s, eight of them, from Russia. He has developed a training center for military helicopters and there are no 

funds to pay for this. 

So there is a lot of rhetoric and hype, but the reality on the 

ground is that we are bumbling along. What is not bumbling along 

and what is of interest to the Central Americans is the development of the regional training center for anti-drug cooperation, and 

that is useful for the Hondurans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans. 

Were the United States to be more effective and more general in 

its anti-drug and its anti-narcotics program, those countries would 

have less reason to look toward Russia. 

In the case of Raul Castro, he is more cautious and more calculating than Daniel Ortega. Raul Castro has been blind-sided by the 

Russians and previously the Soviet Union. You will recall 1962. 

And in 2008, a similar by Russia to place missile systems in Cuba 

was found out only later by Raul Castro much to his disapproval 

and irritation. Therefore, on the part of Raul Castro, there is skepticism and care in dealing with Russia. He is not going to be blindsided again. 

What is the recommendation for us in the United States? We 

should pass the billion-dollar program to support Central America. 

The underlying problems of the region are poverty and unequal disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:48 Dec 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\102215\97266 SHIRL
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tribution of wealth. If we are not to show that we care about these 

underlying problems exacerbated further by the drug trade, exacerbated further by the presence of military weapons, then we should 

expect that others will fill that space. I sincerely hope that space 

is not filled by Russia. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Negroponte follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank all the panelists, great testimony. And 

now we will enter into the questioning phase and I will recognize 

myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

First one, how does Russia cultivate ties with Latin American 

countries? Mr. Farah. 

Mr. FARAH. It cultivates them largely through, as was mentioned 

numerous times, weapons sales and a constant stream of high profile visitors going through to give the impression that they care a 

great deal. You see the defense minister, you see the foreign minister, you see the head of counternarcotics, you see the head of Parliament, all parading through there multiple times a year. So, and 

they also offer a lot of things that aren’t delivered, as I think Dr. 

Negroponte said. They create the illusion of doing more than what 

they do. But they also have an echo chamber that they have created with the ALBA nations particularly where that is never reported, and you hear the constant great things that the Russians 

are doing. 

But I also think the more dangerous element, and I will be very 

brief on this, is the cultivation of much more significant intelligence ties and the providing of much more sophisticated intelligence apparatuses to the ALBA nations. You see it particularly in 

the newest member in El Salvador. You see a great deal of Russian 

equipment coming in. Nicaragua has it. Venezuela has it. Greatly 

increasing the power of the intelligence services which are geared 

entirely to monitoring their own people and suppressing dissent, 

and I think that is an incredibly dangerous but it is an enticing 

element. 

And the reason they have some success in the weapons and other 

things is they attach no conditions. So if you are going to give them 

a lot of toys and no conditions, they would prefer that to getting 

issues from the United States where they may have to account for 

how they use those things. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So in your opinion, Russia is getting something of 

value in return for their involvement? Are they getting what they 

want? 

Mr. FARAH. I think that they wouldn’t keep doing it if they 

weren’t, sir. And I think that if you look at their, and I have a 

great deal in my testimony, particularly in the financial sector 

where they have made great inroads into the banking system to 

avoid international sanctions that the United States and the European Union have provided to them. I think that is very significant 

to their well-being. I think as others have mentioned, the ability 

to offload for some profit, aging arms systems that they can’t really 

unload anyplace else but are useful in regions like Central America. 

And as several other panelists have mentioned, friendship. They 

have a group of people who will support them against any charges 

in the United Nations and elsewhere, and whom they will protect. 

When Venezuela is up on human rights issues who is going to veto 

that in the Security Council? It is going to be Russia. They have 

culled to this a mutually beneficial relationship, yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Do you think Russia is seeking to provide 

political or military challenge to the United States in the Western 

Hemisphere? I will ask one of the others that. Dr. Rouvinski, do 

43

you think Russia is seeking to provide a political or military challenge to the United States in this hemisphere? 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. I think Russia has pursued different interests if 

we take into consideration the period before the war in Georgia in 

2008 and after the war. I think before the war, Russian interests 

in Latin America were mostly linked with the possibility to promote the interests of their Russian private and state enterprises. 

And we have seen actually the efforts not only directed toward the 

arms sales, but also to promote the interest of the Russian energy 

companies and oil companies in Latin America. 

However, after the Georgian crisis of 2008, I think, following the 

support obtained by Russia from Nicaragua and Venezuela, Russia 

started to reevaluate its policy and objective in Latin America and 

started looking for more opportunities from that perspective. So I 

think definitely there are some signs that Russia is challenging the 

United States, building strong military ties with the group of countries that I was mentioning, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba, 

though I would agree with Dr. Negroponte that Cuba seems to be 

much more cautious in dealing with Russia than Nicaragua was. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And just to kind of summarize what you said if I 

heard you correctly, early on since 2008 with Georgia, Russia basically said you meddle in my neighborhood, I am going to come over 

and meddle in your neighborhood. And is that sort of a simplified 

summation of what you are saying? 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. I would agree with you. And also I think it is 

very important the recognition that what even by Nicaragua of the 

breakaway republics at present South Ossetia, because Russia was 

actually facing a great trouble in getting any recognition of those 

breakaway republics, and it seemed that Daniel Ortega offer of recognizing those republic came with no previous consultation. So I 

would agree it was a certain risk there on his behalf, but Nicaragua also quickly obtained some important benefits from Russia. 

Russia supplied some aid to Nicaragua in recognition of its support 

of the Russian state. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I agree. From what I have learned about Nicaragua, it concerns me probably more than Venezuela here in October 2015. 

Doug, we have seen all this naval activity and air space incursions, what do you think Russia is up to? Why do you think we are 

seeing them sail so close to our shores, come into the Gulf of Mexico, come close to our airspace both on the east coast and west 

coast? What do you think they are up to, in your opinion? Yes. 

Mr. FARAH. I think they are very explicit if you read their own 

literature. And I was fortunate in a project I was doing to work 

with a Russian analyst who spoke both Russian and Spanish who 

was able to read a lot of their media and their papers, academic 

papers. They are very explicit, as I think Dr. Negroponte said, the 

idea they are very upset that we are, that they view the United 

States as in their backyard and they want to come in our backyard. 

And they have this doctrine, the Gerasimov Doctrine, of creating 

this constant state of conflict in every sphere, not just military, economic and counternarcotics, all of these things. And if you see 

where they move into the region it is to directly challenge what the 

44

United States does best and has been in the region for. That is why 

I think they put in the counternarcotics center. 

I disagree a little bit with Dr. Negroponte in that it is a benefit 

to a lot of countries. It is primarily—I have been to the center there 

and the training is not of high quality at all and everybody acknowledges that. But what they do do is select out from there their 

best elements and take them back to Moscow and train them and 

then send them back into the region gaining access to a great deal 

of intelligence and operational capacity in the region. 

So I think that there are multiple reasons that feed into their 

view that they need to be another superpower, regain their superpower status. And I think this doctrine, and it is fascinating because it is the basis of what Russia does all over the world and 

they are very explicit about it. This isn’t some dark secret. They 

view conflict as a permanent state and we don’t. We generally 

think if you overcome a certain conflict then you are in peace. 

And this doctrine explicitly says you are going to be in constant 

conflict in an asymmetrical way until you are able to overcome the 

enemy, and you see that in a lot of what they do in Latin America. 

It is not military, but it is certainly in this sphere of the social 

media and the other media they control and the training they are 

giving and the recruitment they are doing is a very different type 

of thing. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, my time is expired. The ranking member is 

younger than I am, but this really seems like a throwback to the 

Cold War and what we experienced when I was growing up with 

then, the Soviet Union and their incursion and probing and what 

not. So I will turn to the ranking member for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SIRES. Chairman, you would be surprised how old I am. Dr. 

Negroponte, did I detect a sense that Russia is really more interested in markets than the military? 

Ms. NEGROPONTE. Yes. Russia needs markets for its newly developed and sophisticated military equipment. It participates in military shows in Chile and in Peru in order to show what it has produced and for it not to be treated as some 1950 industrial base. So 

show is important, sales are important, and as of now, income is 

even more important. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. Dr. Urcuyo, did you say that you felt that 

Americas are excessively in South America and Central America in 

the Western Hemisphere in your comments? And that is why the 

Russians——

Mr. URCUYO. Excessively what? Excuse me. 

Mr. SIRES. That is the word you used because I wrote it down. 

Mr. URCUYO. No, but I didn’t follow your question. 

Mr. SIRES. That you felt that the Americas were excessively in 

the Western Hemisphere and that is why 

Russia——

Mr. URCUYO. No, no. Not at all. I think that the U.S. has been 

distracted in all the theaters of action and of war so you haven’t 

been paying enough attention to what is happening in the Western 

Hemisphere. And suddenly you find out that there is vacuum, and 

that that vacuum has been occupied by China, economically speaking, and by Russia that tries to fill that vacuum. But I wouldn’t 

be that dramatic. 

45

And it may be I didn’t explain myself in my first presentation, 

but I think that there is space for the strategic expansion of Russia 

but not in absolute terms. 

Mr. SIRES. Because that is how I feel. I feel we haven’t focused 

enough on the Western Hemisphere over the years, so when you 

said that it sort of struck a key in my head here. There is an awful 

lot of talk about how the Russians were so magnanimous and forgave Cuba its debt of $20 billion or whatever it was. First of all, 

Cuba could have never paid that debt. 

Mr. URCUYO. Yes. 

Mr. SIRES. So, I mean, this magnanimous effort by Russia, it 

really is nothing more than reality that Cuba can’t pay whatever 

they owe Russia. So I would love to read that in the press how they 

play that up as something so big. 

I have a comment here from SOUTHCOM Commander General 

Kelly. He has referred to the Russian’s activity in Latin America 

as more of a nuisance as opposed to a threat, but has noted that 

the Russian presence underscores the importance of the United 

States remaining engaged with its partners in the region. Is it a 

nuisance or is it a threat? Dr. Negroponte? 

Ms. NEGROPONTE. Ranking Member Sires, I believe that I support what General Kelly has said that it is a nuisance. There is so 

much hype, so much rhetoric, but when you come down to the real 

practical answer, who pays? Russia? Russian banks? They are not 

in a position to. Nicaragua? Nicaraguan banks? They are not in a 

position to. Cuba? The same. We have a term and a time of pragmatism in Cuba which does not permit Cuba to become a recipient 

of highly expensive equipment. So how did they pay for it? 

Those restructuring of loans were undertaken in order to reduce 

the interest payments and then at the same time lease Ilyushin 

and Tupolev aircraft so-called to develop the tourist trade. I can 

understand Russians want to leave Russia in January, February 

and March, but the cost of those aircraft to carry tourists has been 

the reduced interest payments on those Cold War debts. 

Mr. SIRES. Anybody else like to do that, whether it was a threat 

or——

Mr. URCUYO. Well, I was—in my original testimony there is a 

quote from a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences trying 

to explain where they are in Latin America at this moment and he 

says we are playing on Washington nerves. So for me, they are 

playing deliberately to irritate the region with their presence, but 

I will say there is a natural dramatic threat in this moment. But 

of course they are placing their dates and their points in the region 

looking for the median or long term, but I don’t think that the immediate moment, an immediate term, Russia is a threat to the 

United States because of its activities in the Western Hemisphere. 

Maybe in the future, yes, taking into account this actual situation. 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. Yes, I think we have to understand now what 

motivates Russia, do what Russia do with the military exercises, 

with the visits of the strategic bombers and with the navy. 

Latin America, in the recent years transformed to be a very useful instrument for the Russian propaganda inside the country. 

More Russians worry about Latin America, and the image of Latin 

America I think it is quite different from reality. I have been living 

46

in Latin America and I had a chance to travel extensively. But because of this constructed image, Russian authorities are capable of 

taking advantage of these actions to show actually the capacity 

that perhaps not mesh exactly what Russia can do in real terms 

as a threat to the United States, but to show actually the Russian 

authority, Russian army is capable to mitigate the United States 

in the near abroad. So I think there is a great value for the Russian propaganda machine attached to what Russia is doing. 

Mr. SIRES. My time—sorry, Mr. Farah, but my time has just expired. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the ranking member. Good line of 

questioning. I knew Cuba would be the thrust of your questioning 

and Russia’s involvement there. I am going to go to the gentle lady 

who is now chair of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee and former chairman of the full committee, chairwoman 

of the full committee, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member. And thank you to my colleagues to my right. Thank you 

for bringing the spotlight on this expanding activities of Russia in 

our hemisphere. Putin’s careful engagement seeks to create geopolitical allies in the region that support Russia’s expansionist policies. It is not a coincidence that Argentina, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela were some of the very few nations voting against the U.N. 

resolution declaring Crimea’s independence referendum null and 

void. 

The Russian Federation’s activities in Latin America have a clear 

intent, eroding U.S. influence in our region, increasing military cooperation with the adversaries of democracy, of transparency, of 

the rule of law in Latin America. By forming military alliances and 

increasing defense cooperation, Russia has effectively gained power 

projection of forces right in our backyard. 

According to the Russian defense minister, supersonic bombers 

are regularly patrolling the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico 

to ‘‘monitor foreign military powers, military activities and maritime communications.’’ And have on occasion made landings in 

Venezuela just as they did precisely 2 years ago today. 

Earlier this year, a Russian intelligence vessel, as we know and 

you have talked about it, docked in Havana the day before the 

U.S.-Cuba talks were due to be held. And in testimony before the 

House Armed Services Committee, as Mr. Sires has pointed out, 

General John Kelly has asserted that the very same vessel has conducted operations in the Gulf of Mexico and the U.S. east coast. 

And we cannot forget that press reports from months ago stated 

that Russia intends to reopen the Lourdes spy facility in Cuba. We 

are hearing rumors that Cuban armed forces are helping to fight 

alongside Russian soldiers in Syria to come to the rescue of the 

murderous Assad regime. 

But this provocation from Russia to seek to spy on our interests, 

to undermine our national security does not stop in Cuba. This 

year, Ortega agreed to allow Russia to establish a satellite station 

in Nicaragua, and Nicaragua recently expressed an interest in acquiring top of the line MiG-29 fighters to be used in counternarcotics operations, fueling fears that the Russians may have a 

continuous military footprint so close to our nation. 

47

Russia has invested heavily in the development of Latin America, from the development of a nuclear plant in Argentina, 

Gazprom’s gas ventures in Bolivia, technology transferred to the 

Nicaraguan Canal to the construction of a weapon factory in Venezuela. And the economic engagement, sir, which I read in your 

written testimony, Mr. Farah, has pointed out, in the past has 

opened the door for Russian organized crime to engage in new markets. 

The Venezuelan regime, similarly, has a tradition of mixing business with criminal activities, and one example of this has been the 

Cartel de los Soles which had significant influence over senior officials in the Venezuelan regime. So I would ask you, sir, what impact, if any, has Russian organized crime had in the region, and 

are these groups working with organizations such as the Cartel de 

los Soles or perhaps the Mexican drug cartels? Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Farah. 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you. I think that it is clear from what the Colombian law enforcement and intelligence communities are seeing 

in the Central Americas that there is a great deal of unaccounted 

for Russian shipping activity. I think that we don’t pay a great deal 

of attention to it because it comes off the Pacific Coast of Central 

America and then goes to Russia. It doesn’t come to the United 

States, so it is not something that we monitor very closely. But 

there are several new tuna fishing fleets who declare their primary 

market for tuna is Russia, which is economically irrational, and it 

is unlikely that they will be inspected as they come and go. 

The Russians have very good access to Puerto Corinto into several ports. They just won the licitation for the port near San 

Miguel in El Salvador, where they are able to now come and go 

without much supervision. I think that the proximity of—the cocaine is produced largely the FARC and the FARC’s ability to move 

the cocaine is largely dependent on the Cartel de los Soles. So if 

they are acquiring as they seem to be significant amounts of cocaine, it would have to be through that lineup. There is very little 

other way they could get significant amounts of cocaine out with 

impunity as the way they are doing. 

And my understanding of the operation is that it largely goes to 

Nicaragua. It goes out Puerto Corinto. They have now opened up 

Puerto Corsain in El Salvador which is a government-controlled 

port, and they have free access there and they have declared it a 

military installation, although it is not a military installation. So 

no one can get in and out without permission of the President 

which is very difficult to acquire. So I think the contours are 

known, but I think that the details are something that require a 

lot more research. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir, and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you to my colleagues. 

Mr. DUNCAN. You are welcome. The chair will now go to Mr. 

Yoho from Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panel 

being here. Let’s see here. Dr. Urcuyo, will Russia have more presence and influence in Cuba, Central and South America with the 

48

Obama administration’s attempt to relax sanctions in Cuba, in 

your opinion? 

Mr. URCUYO. No, I don’t think so. This has structural causes. 

First the inheritance of the past, for example, all the people that 

were trained by the USSR during the Central American wars. They 

are now in my—in the ’60s and ’50s. And, for example, we in Costa 

Rica have this guy that he went to the Frunze Military Academy, 

he graduated as a colonel, and he is part of the equivalent right 

now of the Communist Party of Costa Rica that has 70 years of existence. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, let me broaden my question and this will be for 

everybody. Do you see Russia having more presence in Cuba and 

Central and South America with the lack of response to Russia’s 

invasion and annexation of Crimea, with no credible response from 

the U.S., or the red lines drawn by our administration in Syria on 

the use of chemical weapons, with no response from us once we 

found out those happened, calls for regime change and we did not 

act, and the Iran nuclear deal where we operated from a position 

of weakness and really got not a whole lot out of that but Iran got 

a whole lot? What is your opinion on those negotiations of those 

things I just laid out, allowing Russia to expand more? And we will 

start with Dr. Farah if we can, or Dr. Negroponte, you are ready. 

Go ahead. 

Ms. NEGROPONTE. Thank you very much, Congressman Yoho. I 

think we must make clear distinctions between Russian expansionism in Central Europe, in Georgia and in Syria with its activities within the Western Hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere has 

traditionally been an area protected by the United States. Our distraction——

Mr. YOHO. That is going to lead to one of my other questions, so 

go ahead. 

Ms. NEGROPONTE. Very good. Our distraction by events in the 

Middle East as serious as they are have taken us away from recognizing that the Western Hemisphere is our border. Travel to and 

from is plentiful and permanent. If we do not invest in interests 

in Central America, in developing our trade ties with South America, we should only expect that mischief makers will come to seek 

to take our place. 

Mr. YOHO. Dr. Rouvinski. 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. Thank you very much. I think in terms of Russian relations with Cuba it has been difficult for Russia to find a 

way to go back to the level of relationship in the 1990s when Cuba 

perceived Russia as a traitor, and abandoning of the Russian aid 

to Cuba actually caused a lot of trouble for the Russian political 

leaders. However, I think after the war with Georgia in 2008, Russia realized that because of the certain abandonment by the United 

States of Latin America it has a window of opportunities. And I 

think what they will do during that time and especially in the context of the crisis in Ukraine is actually a benefit on that possibilities that they have, and the forgiveness of the Cuban debt to Russia falls within this context. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Farah. 

Mr. FARAH. I think one has to distinguish between what the Russians gain at a state level with the ALBA nations particularly and 

49

what the popular perception, what people actually believe on the 

ground. So I think that the perception that the United States is not 

engaged is very widespread. 

I think that while Russia is very engaged, and I think they are 

doing some dangerous things in the region, it is a very, I would 

say, shallow engagement. It is with the elites of regimes that—Ortega is very ill; he probably won’t be around much longer. The Castro brothers can’t live forever, one thing. Sanchez Ceren in El Salvador is very ill. And so you have a series of very personal relationships and past relationships that are allowing Russia to do a great 

deal now, but it is not that Russia is popular in the region or that 

people think that they would rather align on a macro level with 

Russia. It is a narrow and deep engagement with elites, and I 

think in very dangerous ways, but something that doesn’t affect 

how people view the United States. 

Mr. YOHO. Do you see a need to reinstate something like the 

Monroe Doctrine, since John Kerry said it was gone, it is no longer 

there? And I think that is a misstep on our foreign policy that we 

are just saying we yield, basically. 

Mr. Chairman, I am over my time so I don’t know how you want 

to handle that. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. I will now go to Mr. Byrne 

from Alabama. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate being included in this very important hearing. I am a member of the House 

Armed Services Committee, not a member of this committee. 

Dr. Rouvinski, I have just come back from your country, Colombia, had a 4-day trip with Congressman Gallego, and we learned 

that within the last year or so, Russian military aircraft had 

transited Colombian airspace without Colombian permission. First, 

is that your understanding as well, and if so who are the Russian 

sending a message to, the United States or Colombia, and what is 

that message? 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. Yes, in fact, Russian strategic bombers, Tu-160, 

penetrated the Colombian airspace twice without the permission of 

the Colombian authorities. And the explanation that was given by 

Russia that the pilot did it by mistake, but they did it twice, and 

they flew from Venezuela to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua to Venezuela. 

So in Colombia it was a very difficult situation for the Colombian 

Government to deal with it because it was widely perceived by the 

Colombian public that it was a message to support the Nicaragua 

stance in the territorial dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua 

over the San Andres Island in the Caribbean Sea. The Colombian 

Parliament had the special hearings on that respect, but finally 

they accepted the apology of the Russian side because I think Russians were not interested in jeopardizing their relation with Colombia. Colombia is very important for Russia because it does not belong to those groups of the country that are especially close with 

Russia. 

So for Russia it is really a possibility to demonstrate that Russia 

can keep its diplomatic relationship not only with those country 

that ideologically are very close to Vladimir Putin, but also with 

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fairs Lavrov paid a visit to Colombia to celebrate 18th anniversary 

of the establishment of the diplomatic relation between Colombia 

and Russia, and he met with President Santos and the minister of 

foreign affairs. So I think it is the explanation. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. Dr. Negroponte, I have a question for 

you about American relations with Cuba. I would say our country 

has made, or the President has made some unilateral efforts to upgrade the relationship between our two countries. There is a lot of 

suggestions that Congress should lift the trade embargo. We wonder about your view on that. 

Should we request, or demand, before we lift the trade embargo 

that we have a clear understanding and agreement and forceful 

agreement with Cuba that they will not be a staging ground for 

foreign military actions or foreign intelligence actions against our 

country, and we will not be a staging ground against them? Do you 

think that is something we should require before we lift the trade 

embargo? 

Ms. NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Congressman. I do not see it as a 

necessary part of the very tough negotiations that are taking place 

and will take place within this distinguished body over the lifting 

of the U.S. trade embargo. I think within the trade embargo, trade 

rules themselves, we have a number of very difficult issues and I 

am not sure that introducing the military element is necessarily 

going to aid either one side or the other. 

However, I would note Foreign Minister Lavrov made it very 

clear in July this year that Russia welcomes the normalization of 

relations with the United States, that is Cuba and the United 

States, on two conditions. One is the sovereignty of Cuba, namely 

Guantanamo; and secondly is the lifting of the embargo. My reading of the discussions between the administration and the Cuban 

Government is that Guantanamo is not up for negotiation, and the 

issue of the embargo is an issue which this illustrious body will discuss, not Russia. 

So that leaves Foreign Minister Lavrov and his boss to determine 

whether they are going to exert pressure on Raul Castro to concede, or whether Raul Castro has the ability to say thanks, Mr. 

Putin, this is an issue between Cuba and the United States and 

within the United States and the Congress of the United States, 

and would you please butt out. Thank you. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Farah, do you want to take a quick stab at that? 

Mr. FARAH. It is not honestly my area of expertise, Congressman. 

I don’t think it would be harmful to include the conditions as you 

laid them out of not being a foreign intelligence staging area and 

we agree not to do it to them. I don’t think it is realistic to expect 

that any country in the region including that one would actually 

agree to that, so I am not sure that introducing that would bring—

I don’t find it unreasonable, but I don’t think it is probably very 

realistic. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentleman. Not a member of 

the subcommittee, but a valuable member of our full committee 

and I appreciate his input. 

And I am not a conspiracy theorist by nature, but I am a conspiracy theorist by nature. If you look at Google Earth and you go 

51

to the northeast corner of Nicaragua near the border of Costa Rica 

you are going to see an airbase that—airfield, rather—that is long 

enough to handle pretty much anything. It is in the middle of the 

jungle. It is near Lagoon, Ebo, and Spout Morris, close to the Costa 

Rican border, close to the Atlantic Ocean. 

Why it was built, what it is there for, were the Russians involved, I was told they were. But anyway it is interesting to start 

thinking about the Russian presence in this hemisphere and delve 

into the questions that we have had today. The biggest question is 

why, why they are here, what can we do about it? 

I think because there has been a vacuum of American engagement in this hemisphere over the past couple of decades, if not 

longer, that it provides an opportunity for Russia and China and 

others to come here. I think that is part of what we have been trying to investigate. I think if America gets more engaged with our 

friends and allies and neighbors here in the hemisphere we will all 

be better off and we will be able to thwart some of these incursions 

by Russia and others. 

I don’t have any other questions. I think the ranking member 

wanted to ask one more, so I am going to yield to him for as long 

as he needs. Thanks. 

Mr. SIRES. Yes. I, just out of curiosity, just want to hear what 

you have to say. There are 30,000 Cubans in Venezuela. We have 

a government in Venezuela that is teetering on collapse. There is 

a lot of Russian effort to befriend Venezuela. Do you think that 

Russia would dare try to prop up another dictator in this region if 

the government collapses? I mean, they are building airfields here 

and there. I was just wondering, since I didn’t get a chance to get 

your response before. 

Mr. FARAH. Well, I think that the short answer, I think, is probably not in our hemisphere. I think that the Venezuelan regime 

has survived because of the Cuban intelligence apparatus has allowed it to maintain control in ways that it never would have been 

capable of on its own. I think that just as important to the regime 

survival has been China’s willingness to buy everything with cash 

up front as they need cash, so that now half of Venezuelan’s oil exports don’t generate them any cash because they have already been 

paid for. So I think that there are a series of anomalous events 

that have allowed this regime to last as long as it can. 

I would sincerely doubt because there is no other strategic interest for Russia in the region, and I would assume but you never 

know that that would be a bridge too far for them. And I think that 

that would force the United States to react in ways that they would 

have very difficult times maintaining supply lines and doing all the 

things that they would need to do, and I think that it would generate an enormous backlash in the region. 

But I think that the presence of the Cubans and the Russians’ 

willingness to engage with Venezuela and help them financially 

and with intelligence and with weapons is an important part of 

their ability to stay in power as long as they have. 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. I think in terms of the possibility that Russians 

have an increased presence in Venezuela it is highly unlikely. We 

have seen during several crises in Venezuela that——

52

Mr. SIRES. Is that because Cuba has 30,000 people in Venezuela? 

I mean, they are basically doing the work for the Russians. 

Mr. ROUVINSKI. Yes, I think the Russian presence in Venezuela 

has been because of the first place has stronger personal and sympathies and relations between some strong men in Russia and Venezuela, but I think there also have been some concern about Russian involvement there. I would agree with Mr. Farah that Venezuela is surviving, the Maduro regime is surviving because of the 

Chinese buying everything and because of the intelligence provided 

by Cuba. But Russian involvement, I really don’t see that there 

will be more in recent terms. 

Mr. SIRES. Dr. Urcuyo. 

Mr. URCUYO. I agree with my colleagues in the sense that I think 

what props up Venezuela is the Chinese economic support and also 

the Cuban intelligence through the medics and doctors that are 

helping in the Misiones in Venezuela. But I don’t think that the 

Russians will go boots on the ground in Venezuela or in any other 

country in Latin America. 

Mr. SIRES. How about you, Dr. Negroponte? 

Ms. NEGROPONTE. With the price of oil at under $50 a barrel, 

Russia’s interest in Venezuela is minimal. 

Mr. SIRES. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the ranking member and I want 

to thank the members of the committee. And I thought this was a 

good hearing. I want to thank the panelists. I thought some very 

valuable insight to some of the issues well beyond what I expected. 

I want to thank the witnesses who traveled so far for making the 

time to come and inform Members of Congress so that we can 

make informed decisions going forward on good information. 

We are going to keep the record open for 5 days. If members 

have additional questions, we will submit those to you. And with 

there being no further business for the committee, we will stand 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA


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