alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions 10th Cir. R. 36.3.



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/17/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. ROBERT HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant. No. 95-3401 (D.C. No. 95-CR-40024) (D. Kan.)



### ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, KELLYand LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. SeeFed. R. App. P. Submitted without oral argument. Robert Hernandez pled guilty to possession with int ent to distribute marijuana, preserving his right to appeal the distr ict court’s denial of his motion1 On November 13, 1996, Mr. Hernandez filed a Motion for Appointment of

Counsel which we construe as a motion asking us to replace his present counsel. We deny the motion. -2- to suppress his statement and other evidence. In r eviewing the district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and we are required to uphold the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Smythe , 84 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1996).
The district court denied the motion to suppress ina lengthy Memorandum and Order filed May 18, 1995. Since that time, thi s court decided United States v. Botero-Ospina , 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), which cle arly supports the district court’s conclusion that the stop in the pr esent case was not pretextual. We have reviewed Mr. Hernandez’ other contentions i n light of the record, and we are not persuaded that the district court erred. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court substantially for th e reasons given by the district court in its Memorandum and Order, as modified by o ur opinion in BoteroOspina

. 1 ENTERED FOR THE COURT Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge
909.406-2 Causes for debarment. ( c ) The DOE and NNSA Debarring Official may debar a contractor for any other cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of a contractor. Such cause may include but is not limited to: ( 1 ) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a private contract or subcontract.
( 2 ) Inexcusable, prolonged, or repeated failure to pay a debt (including disallowed costs and overpayments) owed to DOE, provided the contractor has been notified of the determination of indebtedness, and further provided that the time for initiating any administrative or legal action to oppose or appeal the determination of indebtedness has expired or that such action, if initiated, has been concluded.
( d ) The Debarring Official may debar a contractor: ( 1 ) On the basis that an individual or organization is an affiliate of a debarred contractor, subject to the requirements of 48 CFR 9.406-1(b) and 9.406-3(c).
( 2 ) For failure to observe the material provisions of a voluntary exclusion (see 10 CFR 1036.315 for discussion of voluntary exclusion).
[61 FR 39857, July 31, 1996, as amended at 74 FR 36362, July 22, 2009; 76 FR 7691, Feb. 11, 2011]
# c/J• PHANTOM PILOT TRAINING GUIDE Earning Your Stripes Learn More: www.dji.com
#### 922.103 Overtime.
N O T F O RP U B L IC A T IO NIN W E S T ' S H AWA I # I RE P O R T S A N D P A C IF IC RE P O R T E R



### NO. CAAP-21-0000574

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS O F THE STATE OF HAWAI # I
STEPHEN I. ADLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DISCOVERY HARBOUR COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT

( CIVIL NO. 3CCV-20-0000367)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)Upon consideration of self-represented PlaintiffAppellant Stephen I. Adler's ( Adler ) February 16, 2022 Motion for Reconsideration, the papers in support, and the record, it appears that Adler has failed to present any point of law or fact that the court overlooked or misapprehended when it issued its February 9, 2022 Order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction. See Hawai # i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 40(b).

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, February 22, 2022. /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza Chief Judge /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen Associate Judge

Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-21-0000574 22-FEB-2022 08:19 AM Dkt. 107 ODMR
##### 



Exhibit 31-3
  CERTIFICATION
    PURSUANT TO
    RULE 13a-14(a)
    AND 15d-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES
    AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
  I,
    John L. Skolds, certify that:  1.
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on
    Form 10-Q
    of Exelon Generation Company, LLC;2.
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
    statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
    necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
    circumstances under which such statements were made, not
    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
    financial information included in this report, fairly present in
    all material respects the financial condition, results of
    operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the
    periods presented in this report;4.
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are
    responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls
    and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
    Rules 13a-15(e)
    and
    15d-15(e))
    for the registrant and have:  (a)
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
    disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
    supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
    registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
    known to us by others within those entities, particularly during
    the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b)
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
    controls and procedures and presented in this report our
    conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
    and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
    report based on such evaluation; and  (c)
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
    internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
    the registrants second fiscal quarter that has materially
    affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
    registrants internal control over financial
    reporting; and  5.
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have
    disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
    control over financial reporting, to the registrants
    auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board
    of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a)
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
    design or operation of internal control over financial reporting
    which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
    registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
    report financial information; and  (b)
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
    other employees who have a significant role in the
    registrants internal control over financial reporting.  
      172
#### 832.111 Contract clauses for noncommercial purchases.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           1,082
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      453
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,307
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   946
<PP&E>                                          40,800
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  39,974
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,273
<BONDS>                                         14,301
<COMMON>                                         5,137
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      18,257
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    39,974
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,514
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,106
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   536
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 352
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    520
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                520
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    576
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,096
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .21
        

</TABLE>
#### HALL, Respondent, v. NEW YORK, C. ST. L. R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Cor Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Ma 21, 1906.)

Action by George Hall against 1 New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Cc pany.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment and order versed, and new trial ordered, with costs to 1 appellant to abide the event.

McLennan, P. j., and NASH, J.,

vote : reversal, on the ground that plaintiff, as mat of law, failed to establish freedom from contr utory negligence. SPRING and WILLIAS: JJ., vote for reversal on the ground that 1 verdict is contrary to the evidence, both as the negligence of the defendant and contribute negligence of the plaintiff. KRUSE J., dissen and votes for affirmance.
#### UNITED STATES of America v. Gerald D. HARRIS, Appellant.

No. 06-3699.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) Oct. 30, 2007.

Filed: Nov. 7, 2007.

*172Robert L. Eberhardt, Office of United States Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee.

Stanley W. Greenfield, Greenfield & Kraut, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellant.

Before: RENDELL and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and VANASKIE,* District Judge.

*

 Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie, District Judge for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

OPINION

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Because our opinion is wholly without precedential value, and because the parties and the District Court are familiar with the facts underlying this appeal, we offer only an abbreviated recitation of the background necessary to explain why we will affirm.

After the District Court denied appellant Gerald D. Harris’ motion to suppress physical evidence, Harris pleaded guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), but he reserved the right to appeal the ruling on his suppression motion.

In support of his appeal, Harris first argues that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to approach, stop and detain him. He is wrong. It is axiomatic that a police officer may conduct a pat-down search for weapons when he or she reasonably suspects that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he or she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. Harris had been observed by other police officers putting a handgun into the waistband of his pants. He was visibly nervous when approached and could not produce a driver’s license when asked. This information clearly provided the officers with a “reasonable suspicion” at the time of the pat-down search.

Contrary to Harris’ second argument, the police also had probable cause to arrest him. The officers found illegal nar*173cotíes on him. The officers had knowledge from colleagues that Harris was armed. Finally Harris attempted to flee the scene. All this provided the necessary probable case for his arrest.

Harris’ contention that he did not consent to the search of the van in which the firearm was found need not detain us long. The record indicates that Harris voluntarily gave police permission to search the van. After being asked by the police if they could search the van, Harris told them to “go ahead” and “go ahead, you can search it.” He was even asked by the police officers if “he was sure” they could search the vehicle and Harris replied “yes.” Even had Harris not consented, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle incident to Harris’ arrest. Harris was arrested after being seen leaning into a van and placing something into it. Hence, the search was incident to his arrest and was, therefore, valid.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Table

Mesa

SRMA

Castle Hot Springs MU

located on Map 2-16

Fria

River

Black Canyon

Corridor SCRMA

Black

Mesa

ACEC

Agua

Bureau of Land Management

Phoenix District Office

Phoenix, AZ

October 2006

Note: Land Status legend located

on Map 1-1

Note: The Bureau of Land Management

(BLM) conducts land use planning only

in the areas administered by BLM. BLM

has no planning authority under the

municipal or county planning legislation

of the State of Arizona.

No warranty is made by BLM for the use

of this map for purposes not intended by

BLM, or to the accuracy, reliability or

completeness of the information shown.

Spatial information may not meet National

Map Accuracy Standards. This information

may be updated without notification.

±

Map 2-47

Black Canyon

Management Unit

Multiple Resource Allocations &

Special Area Designation

Alternative C and D

0 1 2

Miles

Interstate

Highway

Bradshaw-Harquahala

Planning Area

Major Road

Minor Road

Major River, Streams or

Wash

Agua Fria

National Monument

Planning Area CORDES

JUNCTION

Lake Pleasant

Regional Park

PEORIA

BLACK

CANYON

CITY

AGUA FRIA

NATIONAL

MONUMENT

!"c$

New River

Castle Creek

Wilderness

County Boundary

Bradshaw-Harquahala

Planning Area

Management Unit

Special Recreation

Management Area (SRMA)

Wilderness Characteristics

Special Cultural Resource

Management Area

(SCRMA) - Public Use

Area of Critical

Environmental Concern

Special Area Designation
§ 1.10 Authentication under Departmental Seal and certification of records. ( a ) *In general.* Requests seeking either authenticated or certified copies of records will generally be processed under the FOIA. FOIA search, review, and duplication fees, where applicable, may also apply. However, because the costs for authenticated and certified copies are outside of the FOIA, the provisions of § 1.12 that call for the automatic waiver of FOIA fees under $25.00 do not apply.
( b ) *Authentication of records.* ( 1 ) Authentication provides confirmation by a USDA officer that a certified copy of a record is what it purports to be, an accurate duplicate of the original record.
( 2 ) When a request is received for an authenticated copy of a record that the component determines may be made available, under the FOIA, each component will send an authentic (*i.e.,* correct) copy of the record to the Assistant General Counsel in the OGC Division responsible for the applicable component program or other designee of the Secretary of Agriculture. The Assistant General Counsel for the applicable component program or other designee of the Secretary of Agriculture will confirm the authenticity of the record and affix the seal of the USDA to it.
( 3 ) The Hearing Clerk in the Office of Administrative Law Judges may authenticate copies of records for the Hearing Clerk. The Director of the National Appeals Division may authenticate copies of records for the National Appeals Division. The Inspector General is the official who authenticates copies of records for OIG.
( 4 ) When any component determines that a record for which authentication is requested may be made available only in part, because certain portions of it are exempt from release under the FOIA, the component will process the record under the FOIA and make any needed redactions, including notations on the record as to the FOIA exemption(s) which require(s) the removal of the information redacted. In such an instance, the component will supply a copy of the record both in its unredacted state and in its redacted state to the party authorized to perform authentication, along with a copy of the proposed determination letter regarding the withholding of the information redacted.
( 5 ) The cost for authentication of records is $10.00 each.
( c ) *Certification of records.* ( 1 ) Certification is the procedure by which a USDA official confirms that a copy of a record is a true reproduction of the original.
( 2 ) When a request is received for a certified copy of a record that the component determines may be made available under the FOIA, each component will prepare a correct copy and a statement attesting that the copy is a true and correct copy.
( 3 ) When any component determines that a record for which a certified copy is requested may be made available only in part, because certain portions of it are exempt from release under the FOIA, the component will process the record under the FOIA and make any needed redactions, including notations on the record as to the FOIA exemption(s) which require(s) the removal of the information redacted.
( 4 ) The cost for certification of records is $5.00 each.
Exhibit 4.1


 


Amendment #1 of Employment Agreement


 


This amendment #1 is entered into on June
1, 2017 by and between Ziv Aviram (the “Executive”) and Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd. a private limited
liability company incorporated under the laws of the State of Israel with head offices at 13 Hartom Street, Jerusalem, Israel (the
“Company”), hereinafter together the “Parties”.


 


WHEREAS the Executive and the Company
entered into an employment agreement on March 1, 1999, which was replaced by another employment agreement on July 24, 2014 (the
“Employment Agreement”); and


 


WHEREAS on March 12, 2017 Mobileye
N.V., parent of the Company, entered into a purchase agreement with Intel Corporation and Cyclops Holdings, Inc. (“Purchase
Agreement”); and


 


WHEREAS the Parties wish to clarify
certain terms of the Employment Agreement;


 


NOW THEREFORE THE PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS:


 


		1.	Notwithstanding the terms of the Employment Agreement, or any agreement or arrangement between
the Executive and the Company or any of its Subsidiaries, in the event the employment of the Executive is terminated for any reason
(including due to voluntary termination and resignation), following the closing of the Purchase Agreement (other than for Cause
as defined in the Employment Agreement), the Company options then-held by the Executive shall automatically and immediately accelerate
and vest in full upon such termination.



 


		2.	All other terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement remain unaffected and continue to prevail.



 




     


     


    

  


	Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd.	
        Executive

         

	
        Name: Amnon Shashua

         
	Name: Ziv Aviram
	
        Title: Authorized Signatory

         
	Title: President and Chief Executive Officer
	
        Date: June 1, 2017

         
	Date: June 1, 2017
	
        Signature: /s/ Amnon Shashua

         
	Signature: /s/Ziv Aviram
#### § 1032.85 Assessment for order administration.

See § 1000.85.
The State of TexasAppellee/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 24, 2014

No. 04-13-00300-CR

Richard M. LOPEZ,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009CR5395

Honorable Ron Rangel, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellant’s brief was original due December 20, 2013. On December 3, 2013, we 

granted appellant an extension and order him to file his brief by February 20, 2014. Appellant 

has now requested another extension of time to April 21, 2014, more than 120 days from the 

original deadline. We GRANT appellant’s motion in part and ORDER appellant to file his brief 

by March 21, 2014. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 24th day of February, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Maurice A. Straub, as Executor of Hilda S. Straub, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Village of Livonia, Appellant, and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation et al., Respondents. Janet-Rose Straub, Plaintiff, v. Village of Livonia, Appellant, and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation et al., Respondents.

Judgments and order unanimously reversed on the law and facts, with costs, and motion denied, without costs. Memorandum: The complaint in both actions alleges that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant-appellant village “in not properly maintaining Big Tree Street in a reasonably safe condition and in permitting the utility pole to be placed and maintained too close to the paved portion of” the street. The allegations of negligence asserted against the defendants-respondents utility companies are in placing and maintaining the pole “ at a point so close to the edge of the traveled portion of Big Tree Street as to constitute a danger to the vehicular users of said street.” The cross complaint of the village asserts that the cause of the accident was the negligence of the utility eomnanies in the placing and maintaining of the pole and that if plaintiffs were to recover for this reason, and without any negligence on the part of village, it should have judgment over against the utility companies. An examination of the main complaints, as well as the cross complaint, indicates that the negligence of the village may be purely passive in “permitting” the pole to remain where installed by the utility companies. Both complaints, and particularly the third-party complaint, should be liberally construed at the pleading stage. Under these circumstances the fate of the cross complaint should await the determination of the factual issues upon the trial *(Jackson*v. *Associated Dry Goods Corp.,*13 N Y 2d 112, 117; *Sigismondi*v. *Lewis,*18 A D 2d 762; *Brady*v. *Weiss & Sons,*6 A D 2d 241, 244; *Ruping*v. *Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,*283 App. Div. 204, 206). (Appeal by defendant, Village of Livonia, from judgments and order of Monroe Special Term dismissing the cross claims of defendant against defendants, Rochester Telephone Corporation and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Henry, Noonan and Del Vecchio, JJ.