Defense Science Board 

Task Force 

on 

The Manufacturing 

Technology Program: 

A Key to Affordably 

Equipping the Future Force 

February 2006 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
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___________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. iii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2. THE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM:

AN OVERVIEW ...................................................................................5

CHAPTER 3. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................9

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................32

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE .....................................................................33

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP..............................................................36

APPENDIX C. PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE............................................38

APPENDIX D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 4200.15.............................41

APPENDIX E. ESTABLISHING LEGISLATION FOR THE MANUFACTURING 

TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM ................................................................49

APPENDIX F. OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY MANUFACTURING 

TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS ..............................................................52

APPENDIX G. IMPACT OF THE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM:

SELECTED SUCCESS STORIES ...........................................................68

APPENDIX H. MANUFACTURING READINESS LEVELS ..........................................80

APPENDIX I. MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE....................................................85

APPENDIX J. EXECUTIVE ORDER—ENCOURAGING INNOVATION IN 

MANUFACTURING ...........................................................................90

APPENDIX K. PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON MANUFACTURING 

TECHNOLOGY ..................................................................................93

APPENDIX L. MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 

BUDGET PROFILES............................................................................97

APPENDIX M. COMPARISON OF MANTECH AND OTHER DOD BUDGETS...........99

APPENDIX N. GLOSSARY ......................................................................................100
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________ 

ii 
 

___________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Advanced weapon systems cost too much, take too long to field, 

and are too expensive to sustain. Systems proceed through the 

acquisition process with immature technology and unstable designs, 

which result in higher costs, longer development times, and even 

reduced order quantities—all detrimental to the ultimate goal of 

enhancing warfighting capabilities. 

While these challenges have plagued the Department of Defense 

(DOD) acquisition process for decades, they remain relevant today—

particularly given the level of current investment in weapon systems 

that rely on leading-edge technology. A March 2005 U.S. Government 

Accountability Office report, based on an assessment of 54 weapon 

programs, shows the pervasive nature of the problem. Among their 

conclusions is the need for mature technology, stable designs, and 

production processes that are mature and in control. 

Because acquisition problems are often “designed in,” the most 

successful programs are those where science and technology 

organizations are responsible for maturing technologies, rather than 

program or product development managers. Thus, more 

responsibility for this early effort should fall to the science and 

technology community. With the likelihood of tighter budgets on the 

horizon, reducing the cost of future weapons will become 

increasingly critical. 

In this context, our task force was asked to evaluate DOD’s 

Manufacturing Technology Program (ManTech) and to provide 

recommendations to strengthen and improve its benefits to the 

Department. 

The bottom line of our assessment is that ManTech can address 

critical development, acquisition, and sustainment problems 

associated with advanced weapon systems. The program impacts 

all phases of acquisition, facilitates technology transition, has 

demonstrated significant reductions in cost and cycle time, 
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

iv 

increases reliability, and has demonstrated tremendous return on 

investment. 

The ManTech program is unique in its potential reach. ManTech 

invests in manufacturing research and development projects that can 

build capabilities to solve production challenges in weapon system 

development. But if properly funded and structured, the program 

can also positively impact the rate of technology transition, directly 

improve pre-acquisition processes for new systems, and impact 

sustainment. 

ManTech can address future manufacturing technology 

challenges as well, such as challenges associated with rapid, efficient, 

and affordable low-volume production. In essence, ManTech has the 

capacity to have an impact on all phases of development activities 

and, as such, has a place in both the science and technology and 

acquisition communities —which sets the program apart. 

Moreover, the Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs), 

developed by the ManTech community and discussed in more 

detail later in this report, offer a tool to enhance visibility into 

technological maturity and production readiness—thus improving 

the knowledge on which program decisions are based. More 

specifically, implementation of the MRLs will 

 Enhance transition of producible technologies into 

milestones B and C, in order to enter the production 

phase with an affordable, producible program 

 Promote production-ready, cost-based prototypes 

 Enable acquisition cost and cycle time reduction 

It is important to recognize, however, that ManTech alone 

cannot solve all of DOD’s acquisition problems associated with 

system cost, schedule, and quality. Broader changes—in reality, 

cultural changes—are needed in many areas to include acquisition 

reform, the requirements process, the budget process, and 

legislation. 
 

___________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

v

The task force believes that the benefits of the ManTech program 

can be enhanced. In this report, we identify ten areas that require 

action. These areas fall into three broad categories, as summarized 

below—leadership emphasis, new and enabling initiatives, and 

essential resources. 

LEADERSHIP EMPHASIS

The value of manufacturing technology is not well understood at 

all levels of management in DOD, which impacts the ManTech 

program directly. Today’s management approach and program 

structure does not and will not lead to a coherent DOD 

manufacturing investment strategy. To be more effective, the 

ManTech program needs high-level attention in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) and in the military services, guided by a 

strategic plan that provides a coherent investment strategy for future 

manufacturing capability. 

Importantly, because technology transition is a responsibility of 

the science and technology (S&T) community, manufacturing 

technology concerns must be addressed earlier in the design phases 

of a program. This requires a cultural change in DOD, where 

production and support costs become early design “requirements.” 

To improve program leadership, the task force recommends the 

following actions: 

 The senior leadership in OSD and the military 

services should institutionalize the importance and 

value of manufacturing technology, including the 

ManTech program. 

 The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L])—with 

support from the Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering, the Service Secretaries, and Service 

Acquisition Executives—should publish an annual 

strategic plan and investment strategy for the 

ManTech program. A peer review process for 
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

vi 

ManTech should be established to evaluate the 

program and provide recommendations to the USD 

(AT&L). 

 The ManTech strategic plan should define a 

balanced portfolio that includes technology for cost 

and risk reduction of products, software, and 

processes; long-term, multi-Service needs; and 

disruptive technologies, both product and process. 

 USD (AT&L) should set specific policy that 

manufacturing technology be an integral part of the 

overall science and technology program. The S&T 

leadership in the military services must be 

responsible and accountable for ensuring a robust 

ManTech program. 

NEW AND ENABLING INITIATIVES

An advantage of the ManTech program is its ability to focus 

resources on areas of importance as they evolve over time—

addressing both current needs and conducting research on nextgeneration manufacturing challenges. A major initiative developed 

by the ManTech community is the Manufacturing Readiness Levels, 

which can provide better visibility into and understanding of 

program manufacturing risks and ultimately speed technology 

transition. Another new initiative worthy of consideration involves 

software, given its importance and complexity—with focus on 

systems engineering, modeling, “production,” and sustainment. 

Opportunities also exist to bolster initiatives that could further 

enhance investments and research in manufacturing technology. One 

such initiative is to leverage small-business participation through the 

Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Another is to 

expand collaboration and cooperation with industry—efforts that are 

essential not only in effectively targeting DOD investments in 

advanced manufacturing technology, but also in leveraging industry 

process improvements and accelerating manufacturing technology 

transition. 
 

___________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

vii

Specifically, the task force recommends the following: 

 The USD (AT&L) should require program managers 

to use the MRL tool on all programs. This tool 

should be completed by the end of 2005 and 

introduced into the 5000 series acquisition 

regulation. 

 Because software is so important and complex, USD 

(AT&L) should direct a study of the future software 

development challenge as it relates to DOD and 

recommend specific actions to be taken. 

 USD (AT&L) should direct the Services to expand 

small-business participation in the ManTech 

program through a shift of some of the SBIR 

program resources into ManTech. 

 DOD should improve collaboration with industry 

through various mechanisms: adopt dual-use 

manufacturing; identify incentives for industry to 

incorporate and utilize manufacturing 

enhancements; develop roadmaps to direct research 

and development initiatives to critical areas; and 

sponsor manufacturing test beds. 

ESSENTIAL RESOURCES

Without adequate resources, the ManTech program cannot realize 

its potential. Both expertise in the workforce and program funding 

have declined. The engineering and manufacturing talent in DOD, 

and in its supporting industrial base, is eroding—the career field has 

been largely eliminated in the Department and has weakened in 

industry. Fewer experts mean that fewer people understand the 

processes involved in developing and manufacturing defense 

systems and their importance in producing low-cost, high-quality, 

and reliable systems. 

This in turn impacts policy and resource support for the ManTech 

program. The budget profile for ManTech in recent years, and over 
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

viii 

the past few decades, does not reflect a well-planned and sustained 

strategic investment for more affordable acquisition, technology 

transition, and sustainment. The total planned investment, especially 

without the programs added by Congress, which are common, do not 

match the importance of the need to reduce weapon costs and cycle 

time. 

In the area of resources, the task force recommends the following: 

 The USD (AT&L), with the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness and Service 

Secretaries, must develop strategies to attract and 

retain needed manufacturing-related expertise. 

 The USD (AT&L) should direct a greater and more 

stable funding profile for ManTech, returning the 

total program investment to one percent of the 

research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) 

budget. 

− The ManTech program should include a budget 

line managed by OSD (a “D-line”), and executed 

by the Services, that focuses on multi-Service, 

multi-platform needs; increased investment of 

SBIR resources in manufacturing technology; and 

redirection of resources in the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency for investment in 

disruptive manufacturing technology. 

As stated at the outset, the ManTech program can address critical 

acquisition challenges associated with advanced weapon systems. 

This report identifies specific actions that the task force believes will 

enhance and expand the impact of the ManTech program. There is 

much to do, but with effective leadership, thoughtful planning, and 

adequate resources much can also be accomplished. 

The time to act is now. Like many others, we believe the 

Department is likely to face tighter economic constraints in the years 

to come. In light of fiscal constraints, reducing the cost of future 

weapon systems will be critical.
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The need for a cohesive manufacturing research and development 

investment program is fundamental to rapid acceleration of nearterm technology capabilities to support warfighting operations and to 

long-term support for transition of revolutionary technologies. 

Warfighters need a responsive industrial base with advanced 

manufacturing technologies that reduce risks, costs, and lead times at 

every level and phase of the acquisition process, including design, 

development, production, and sustainment of fielded systems. 

However, weapons acquisition in the Department of Defense 

(DOD) remains a high-risk area. Today’s high-technology weapon 

systems cost too much to buy, take too long to field, and are 

expensive to sustain. Systems proceed through the acquisition 

process with immature technology and unstable designs, which 

result in higher costs, longer development times, and even reduced 

order quantities—all detrimental to the ultimate goal of enhancing 

warfighting capabilities. 

As many acquisition problems emerge during the design process, 

and are thus “designed in,” they must be addressed early in program 

development. As a result, more responsibility for this early effort 

should fall to the science and technology community. With the 

likelihood of tighter budgets on the horizon, reducing the costs of 

future weapons will become increasingly critical. 

GAO STUDIES DOD ACQUISITION CONCERNS

The acquisition challenges facing the Department of Defense 

cannot be overstated, as reflected in a March 2005 report by the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office (GAO).1 In its study, GAO notes 

that the DOD is investing heavily in technologically advanced 

weapon systems. Specifically, the study assessed 54 weapons 

 

1. Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapon Systems, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, March 2005. 
 

CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

2 

programs to gain a greater understanding of potential risks. Among 

its conclusions, the report identifies three characteristics of successful 

acquisition programs: mature technologies, stable designs, and 

production processes in control. Further, in successful programs, 

science and technology (S&T) organizations are responsible for 

maturing technologies rather than program or product development 

managers. 

The impact of pushing immature technologies too quickly into 

development is significant, as shown in table 1. GAO reported that 

total research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs for 

programs with immature technologies increased 41 percent, as 

compared to 9 percent for programs with mature technologies. 

Similarly, acquisition unit cost increased 21 percent and schedules 

slipped an average of 13 months. Not only are technologies 

immature, there is often little program visibility or knowledge of the 

maturity level. Thus, many programs are proceeding too quickly 

through the development process with immature technology, and 

there is not adequate understanding that this condition exists. It is 

this failure of knowledge that must be addressed. 

Table 1. Impact of Immature Technology in System Development 

TECHNOLOGY STATUS AT BEGINNING 

OF DEVELOPMENT

MATURE IMMATURE

RDT&E Cost Increase 9% 41% 

Acquisition Unit Cost 

Increase < 1% 21% 

Average Schedule Delay 7 months 13 months 

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2005. 

Design instability also leads to cost increases and schedule delays. 

Of the programs evaluated by GAO that had held design reviews, 

only 42 percent had design stability at that time. Programs that did 

not have stable designs experienced “combined development cost 

increase of 46 percent and an average schedule increase of 29 months 

since the first full estimate.” Design stability cannot be attained 

without mature technologies. When looking ahead, among the nine 
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

3

programs scheduled to hold design reviews next year, only two 

expect new technologies to be mature by that time. 

HOW MANTECH CAN HELP—THE BOTTOM LINE

The Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Program, chartered 

by Congress in title 10 U.S.C., can address multiple DOD 

acquisition challenges, as the program is unique in its potential 

reach. ManTech invests in manufacturing research and development 

projects that can build capabilities to solve production challenges in 

weapon system development. But if properly funded and structured, 

the program can also positively impact the rate of technology 

transition, directly improve pre-acquisition processes for new 

systems, and impact sustainment. 

ManTech can address future manufacturing technology 

challenges as well, such as challenges associated with low cost, 

efficient, and rapid low-volume production. In essence, ManTech has 

the capacity to have an impact on all phases of development activities 

and, as such, has a place in both the science and technology and 

acquisition communities —which sets the program apart. 

Moreover, the Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs), 

developed by the ManTech community and discussed in more 

detail later in this report, offer a tool to enhance visibility into 

technological maturity and production readiness—thus improving 

the knowledge on which program decisions are based. More 

specifically, implementation of the MRLs will accomplish the 

following: 

 Enhance transition of producible technologies into 

milestones B and C, in order to enter the production 

phase with an affordable, producible program 

 Promote production-ready, cost-based prototypes 

 Enable acquisition cost and cycle time reduction 
 

CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

4 

It is important to recognize, however, that ManTech alone 

cannot solve all of DOD’s acquisition problems associated with 

system cost, schedule, and quality. Broader changes—in reality, 

cultural changes—are needed in many areas to include acquisition 

reform, the requirements process, the budget process, and 

legislation. 

THE DSB CHARTER

In recognition of the importance and potential contributions of the 

Manufacturing Technology Program, the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) requested 

that the Defense Science Board convene a task force to evaluate the 

program.2 In particular, the task force was asked to provide 

recommendations as to how the ManTech program can be 

strengthened to improve its benefits to the Department of Defense in 

general, and the military services in particular. Specifically, the task 

force was asked to evaluate the following areas: 

 Investment strategy 

 Program balance 

 Programmatic and funding concerns 

 Program ownership 

 Acquisition impact 

The remainder of this report details the results of the task force 

study. These recommendations evolved from information received 

during background briefings on the ManTech program and other 

related activities inside DOD and in commercial industry as well as 

from internal deliberations of the task force.3 The report begins with a 

brief overview of the ManTech program followed by the detailed 

findings and recommendations of the task force. 

 

2. Appendix A contains the complete terms of reference for the Defense Science Board Task 

Force on the Manufacturing Technology Program. Appendix B contains the task force 

membership. 

3. Appendix C lists the presentations received by the task force. 
 

_________________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF MANTECH PROGRAM

5

CHAPTER 2. THE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 

PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW

The ManTech program offers tremendous value to the 

Department of Defense. Program investments address many 

challenges involved in weapon system acquisition, technology 

transition, and manufacturing technology development.4 The overall 

objective of the ManTech program is to enable DOD to obtain lowercost, high-quality equipment more rapidly and in the smaller 

quantities likely to be ordered. 

As established in title 10 U.S.C., the ManTech program was 

chartered to develop and apply advanced manufacturing 

technologies and processes that will accomplish the following:5 

 Reduce the acquisition and supportability costs of 

defense weapon systems 

 Reduce manufacturing and repair cycle times across 

the life cycle of such systems 

 Improve the quality, productivity, technological 

capability, and practices of businesses and workers 

To effectively accomplish these goals, manufacturing technology 

should be a key element of S&T responsibility for technology 

transition. By focusing on technology maturity earlier in program 

development, ease of production can be “designed in” enabling 

programs to stay on time and within budget. 

The success of the ongoing transformation effort in DOD depends 

on industry capability to rapidly develop and manufacture nextgeneration military systems at low cost, and (in most cases) in small 

quantities. ManTech is one of many activities that can help build 

needed capability in the industrial base. The program uses Service 

 

4. The ManTech program is described in detail in Department of Defense Directive 4200.15, 

which can be referenced in appendix D. 

5. Appendix E contains the title 10 language establishing the ManTech Program. 
 

CHAPTER 2 __________________________________________________________________ 

6 

funding, leveraged by industry and other agency funding, to ensure 

that the U.S. industrial base can provide, in a timely, reliable and 

affordable manner, the military equipment needed by U.S. armed 

forces. 

Appropriations for the ManTech program in fiscal year 2005 

totaled $249.0 million. The Army has the largest portion of the 

program at $91.9 million. Investments total $60.4 million for the 

Navy, $57.5 million for the Air Force, and $39.5 million for the 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).6 Over the past few decades, 

funding for the ManTech program has fluctuated significantly, with a 

generally downward trend as illustrated in figure 1. Further, the 

planned DOD ManTech budget has fallen significantly, with the 

program’s top line bolstered, in some years by a considerable 

amount, during the Congressional appropriation process—with 

projects that may or may not serve the Department’s interests well. 

Figure 1. DOD ManTech Budget 

(millions of constant fiscal year 2005 dollars) 

 

6. Appendix F provides a brief overview of the Service ManTech programs. 

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

300

325

350

375

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Planned

Approp
 

_________________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF MANTECH PROGRAM

7

As mentioned previously, there have been many successful outcomes 

from ManTech investments. Though these successes are often not 

well known, many ManTech projects have more than paid for 

themselves in return on investment. In its early years, ManTech 

investments laid the foundation for revolutionary manufacturing 

technologies such as numerically-controlled machine tools, 

microelectronics manufacturing, processes that led to precision laserguided missiles and munitions and night vision capability. 

ManTech investments also led to establishment of the Lean 

Aerospace Initiative—a consortium of DOD, industry, the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and labor unions—that was 

instrumental in implementing and accelerating the use of lean 

manufacturing techniques in the defense industrial base. 7

Program impacts include improvements in affordability, 

capability, reliability, and readiness. The following success stories are 

but a few examples of the impact of ManTech investments on 

warfighting capability. 

 Affordability and Capability 

− Advanced, affordable lightweight body armor 

saving hundreds of lives in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 

(Army) 

− Superior (longer range) night operations 

capability for hostile situations achieved with 

60 percent cost savings (Navy) 

− Improved C-17 survivability for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom with large aircraft infrared 

countermeasures (LAIRCM) and 30 percent 

reduction in cost (Air Force) 

− Force multiplier for tank battles; 65 percent 

M-1 cannon accuracy improvement (Army) 

 

7. Appendix G provides further discussion of these early program successes, lean 

manufacturing impacts on acquisition and depot repair, and describes numerous 

examples of successful ManTech projects. 
 

CHAPTER 2 __________________________________________________________________ 

8 

− 35 time cost reduction brought modern radar 

multi-target tracking capability to the 

battlefield (Air Force) 

− Reduced cost for Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle 

structure by 46–60 percent (Missile Defense 

Agency) 

 Readiness 

− Created replacements for obsolete 

microcircuits—375 systems helped (DLA) 

− Established JDAM thermal battery 

manufacturing capability for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom; 

7,400 per month production increase (Navy) 

− Shorter depot repair time through lean 

manufacturing practices freed 22 F-15s (a 

squadron-equivalent) for mission duty (Air 

Force) 

The ManTech program should serve as a complement to both 

science and technology and acquisition programs—addressing DOD 

and Service needs for manufacturing technology improvements. Its 

impact can begin early in research and extend throughout the many 

phases of a program’s development. That said, ManTech cannot be 

the sole repository or sole bill payer for all matters of affordability 

and manufacturing. A focus of the program is to contribute to the 

development of manufacturing capabilities for key defense systems 

and components that are under development and can, with relatively 

low risk, rapidly and affordably transition into manufacturing. Still, 

responsibility exists throughout the program life cycle—from initial 

design and development through acquisition and long-term 

support—for ensuring that DOD programs are producible. 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9

CHAPTER 3. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The bottom line of our assessment is that the Manufacturing 

Technology Program can address critical development, acquisition, 

and sustainment problems associated with advanced weapon 

systems. The program impacts all phases of acquisition, facilitates 

technology transition, has demonstrated significant reductions in 

cost and cycle time, increases reliability, and has demonstrated 

tremendous return on investment. The task force believes that the 

benefits of the ManTech program can be enhanced. Ten areas 

require action: 

1. Leadership 

2. Strategic planning 

3. S&T responsibility 

4. Balanced portfolio 

5. Manufacturing readiness 

6. Workforce expertise 

7. Software 

8. Small-business participation 

9. Industrial leverage and incentives 

10. Funding 

1. LEADERSHIP

For the ManTech program to be successful there needs to be clear 

recognition and action on the part of DOD leadership—in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense and the Services—that the program is 

important and deserves attention. This is not the case today. In fact, 

the program receives inadequate attention at all management levels. 

As a result, there is a lack of understanding of what the program 

does, what it contributes to weapon system development, and, in 

particular, what it could contribute if the recommendations of this 

study are fully implemented. The ManTech program is often viewed 

as a production support program—a perspective that fails to realize 

its broader applications. 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

10 

As a result of this view, the S&T community, in general, does not 

recognize cost and manufacturing technology as part of its core 

program, especially in its 6.1 (basic research), 6.2 (applied research), 

and 6.3 (advanced technology development) programs. Emphasis on 

cost as a program requirement and design driver has not been 

typically considered during the early stages of program development 

but must, through a major change in culture, become a concern long 

before a weapon reaches production. Such a change in culture must 

begin at the highest levels in the Department. 

Certainly, the current approach to managing the ManTech 

program does not result in a coherent DOD manufacturing 

investment strategy. And the relative small size of the total 

investment—in spite of its large potential impact—makes the 

program easily overlooked in comparison to most acquisition 

programs. 

Many of the recommendations discussed in the remainder of this 

chapter could help to enhance the leadership of the program. For 

example, by providing strategic guidance for the program and 

managing funding for multi-Service initiatives and for disruptive 

technologies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) can better 

promote the importance and value of the program, encourage the 

same out of the Service leadership, and hold them accountable for 

results. Such leadership can enhance cohesion in the program while 

at the same time allow the individual Services to invest in unique 

needs. 

However, ultimate success of the ManTech program will result 

from attention at the highest levels. Collectively, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics; the Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E); the Director, Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Networks and Information Integration (ASD [NII]) as well as the 

Service Secretaries and Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) should 

institutionalize the importance and value of manufacturing 

technology—including the ManTech program. With such support, it 

will be possible to attract the resources necessary to execute a 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11

strategic investment plan that includes both Department- and 

Service-level manufacturing technology projects. 

Evidence from the Army’s experience shows that with high-level 

attention, the ManTech program is taken seriously. Encouraged by 

OSD, the Army leadership provided strategic focus, enhanced and 

protected program funding, and involved the warfighter in 

investment decisions—in all, leading to increased investments and a 

vastly improved program. Lessons from their experience can be of 

value to the other Services. 

Leadership 

Recommendations 

Collectively the Deputy Secretary of Defense, USD (AT&L), 

DDR&E, DARPA Director, ASD (NII), Service Secretaries, and 

SAEs should clarify the importance and value of manufacturing 

technology—including the ManTech program. 

 Implement a strategic plan and investment strategy for 

the ManTech program 

 Establish responsibility, in the S&T community, for 

manufacturing technology and hold it accountable for 

results 

 Define an integrated management structure and 

processes 

 Maintain flexibility for Service-unique investments 

 Ensure adequate resources to execute 

 Lead cultural change in emphasizing the importance of 

designing for low acquisition cost early in development 

2. STRATEGIC PLANNING

DOD does not have a long-term strategic investment plan to 

provide for future manufacturing capability. As a result, the 

ManTech program lacks strategic focus and tends to be viewed as a 

grab bag of programs. The program is managed differently in each 

Service, so it is difficult for decision makers to understand the goals 

and benefits of the program. These circumstances often lead to 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

12 

disconnects between the S&T community and the ManTech programs 

in the individual Services and agencies. In turn, the program suffers 

in the budget process within the Services and OSD. 

Strategic and Investment Planning 

More explicit strategic planning for the ManTech program is 

needed. In the past, DOD prepared a five-year plan for the ManTech 

program that served as strategic guidance and against which to 

measure program compliance. However, such a plan is no longer 

required. The task force recommends that the USD (AT&L) take the 

lead in publishing an annual strategic plan for the ManTech program, 

in collaboration with the Service components, defense agencies, and 

industry, and with the support of the DDR&E and the Service senior 

acquisition executives. Participation must include the technology, 

acquisition, and logistics communities. 

The strategic plan must be accompanied by an investment 

strategy that reflects a balanced portfolio of individual and multiService programs, research in “disruptive” manufacturing 

technologies, as well as manufacturing programs that engage small 

business through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 

program. Overall, the ManTech program needs to balance projects 

that support current, near-term, and future needs as well as balance 

small and large firm participation. 

The USD (AT&L) must not only publish a strategic plan, but also 

ensure its implementation with periodic reviews of the plan’s 

execution. 

Strategic Planning 

Recommendation 

USD (AT&L), with support from the DDR&E, the Service 

Secretaries and Service SAEs, should publish an annual 

strategic plan and investment strategy for the ManTech 

program. 

 Collaborate with Service components, defense agencies, 

and industry. 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

13

 Include the technology, acquisition, and logistics 

communities. 

 Define a balanced portfolio of individual and multiService programs, research in “disruptive” technologies, 

and SBIR programs. Balance current, near term, and 

future needs as well as small and large firm participation. 

 Ensure implementation with periodic reviews of plan 

execution. 

Peer Review 

As part of the process for developing a strategic plan and strategy, 

a capability is needed to ensure effective and efficient use of all 

ManTech funds—both those proposed by the DOD and by Congress. 

One approach is to establish a peer review process to evaluate the 

balance among the projects in the program’s portfolio against the 

objectives set out in the strategic plan. In addition, this group should 

evaluate how well individual projects (including projects added by 

Congress) meet strategic and investment objectives. The group 

should report its findings and recommendations to the USD (AT&L). 

The membership of the review group should include 

manufacturing experts from DOD, former defense industry experts, 

and representatives from commercial industry and academia. 

Peer Review Process 

Recommendations 

USD (AT&L) should establish a peer review process for the 

ManTech Program. The process should: 

 Evaluate the following 

- Balance among ManTech projects against the strategic 

plan 

- How well individual ManTech projects (including 

Congressional adds) meet overall program objectives 

 Provide recommendations to the USD (AT&L) 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

14 

3. S&T RESPONSIBILITY

While the ManTech program is executed within the science and 

technology community, it is not viewed as an S&T program, nor does 

the S&T leadership generally take ownership of the program. While 

the reach of ManTech extends throughout the many phases of 

program development, and thus it is not purely focused on research, 

to be effective the program must have an anchor and legitimacy in 

the S&T community. 

Technology transition is the responsibility of the science and 

technology community. Immature technologies and manufacturing 

challenges have a significant impact on the ability to rapidly and 

affordably transition technology to the warfighter. Furthermore, it is 

increasingly important for cost to be a real consideration early in 

program development. Therefore, the S&T community, including 

DARPA, must be responsible for “designing in” affordable 

production costs early in the design phases of a program. 

Manufacturing technology must become an integral part of the 

overall science and technology program. Specific policy guidance is 

needed to clarify ownership of the ManTech program and its 

relationship to both the science and technology and acquisition 

communities. ManTech must become integrated within the S&T 

management process and linked to acquisition management—a 

responsibility, the task force believes, of the DDR&E and the Service 

S&T managers. In fact, the ManTech program should become a 

required tool to achieve rapid, affordable technology transition. In 

order for this to be realized the Service S&T leadership must be 

responsible and accountable for ensuring a robust ManTech program. 

S&T Responsibility 

Recommendations 

The USD (AT&L) should set specific policy that manufacturing 

technology be an integral part of the overall S&T program. 

 The ManTech program should become a required tool to 

achieve rapid, affordable technology transition 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

15

 DDR&E and the Service S&T managers must ensure that 

ManTech is integrated within the S&T management 

process and linked to acquisition management 

 Service S&T leadership must be responsible and 

accountable for ensuring a robust ManTech program 

4. BALANCED PORTFOLIO

Because of resource constraints, ManTech program investments 

have been focused primarily on support for current programs and on 

manufacturing hardware and components. While these are important 

investments, the program needs a more balanced portfolio. Too little 

emphasis is placed on projects with a longer-term focus such as the 

following: 

 Technology for cost and risk reduction of products, 

software, and processes 

 Long-term multi-Service needs 

 Disruptive technologies (both products and 

processes) 

In general, the overall program lacks strategic perspective and 

integration. 

Technology for Cost and Risk Reduction 

In order to achieve the objective of lower cost equipment, 

manufacturing concerns must be addressed earlier in the program 

life cycle. Production and support costs need to become a component 

of key technical design requirements, before the final stages of 

development when technologies are released for prototyping. The 

importance of manufacturing concerns in prototype fabrication, as 

compared to rate production, is often not well understood or even 

recognized within the S&T and research, development, test, and 

evaluation communities. 

S&T program managers often believe that affordability and 

manufacturing issues are not relevant concerns in 6.3 programs, 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

16 

focusing instead on fabrication of test and evaluation and prototype 

articles. But this line of thinking leads to higher costs later in a 

program, when manufacturing concerns are addressed after technical 

designs are considered “ready.” As a result, major programs risk 

formidable hurdles moving from design to prototype to production 

when there is less design flexibility to attack major cost or production 

problems, or insert new technology. 

Essentially, at that point, a high-cost and difficult-to-produce 

solution has been “designed into” the system. It is not appropriate to 

rely on the ManTech program to “save the day” when affordability 

and manufacturing concerns have been ignored in the early 

development phases. What is needed is consideration, during new 

system design, of innovative strategies that can contribute to lower 

cost, faster response, and higher performance. Furthermore, 

programs in 6.3 need a manufacturing transition strategy; the 

Manufacturing Readiness Level tool (discussed below) can be used to 

define exit criteria and encourage the consideration of manufacturing 

concerns throughout program development. 

Making unit production cost a key military “requirement” will 

encourage proper attention to affordability and producibility early in 

design and will align unit cost targets with small quantity 

production. In addition, “evolutionary acquisition” (also known as 

spiral development) will support more effective technology transition 

and bring the customer into the process—iterating with the customer 

to obtain feedback on prototypes and new technologies, and then 

quickly inserting them into a system. 

While the Department has put greater emphasis on systems 

engineering, continued vigilance is needed. New systems—and, 

increasingly, new systems-of-systems—need to be initially analyzed 

from both a performance and total cost perspective. This practice is 

common in commercial industry, but needs to be applied in all DOD 

systems. Essentially, the concept is to take a broad, integrated view of 

cost and performance—a systems engineering view—when 

approaching a new system’s (or system-of-system’s) design, rather 

than a sub-optimization of each element of the system. The result can 

be a dramatic reduction in overall system cost, ease of production, 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

17

and a significant improvement in reliability and maintenance—often 

achieved in combination, through a simplification of the system’s 

design, without any degradation in performance. 

Technology for Cost and Risk Reduction 

Recommendations 

To accelerate initial operational capability, the Milestone 

Decision Authority should enforce existing directives to 

 Make unit production cost a key military “requirement” 

- Encourage proper attention to affordability and 

producibility early in program design 

- Design for small-volume production 

 Require “evolutionary acquisition” and use of 

manufacturing readiness levels 

USD (AT&L), along with the DDR&E, must establish systems 

engineering as a top acquisition priority 

 Require explicit production cost/performance trades as 

part of milestone exit criteria (especially milestones B 

and C) 

Long-Term, Multi-Service Needs 

To support longer-term, multi-Service needs, a portion of the 

ManTech funding should be managed in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. Service ManTech funds would still pay for problems unique 

to an individual Service, but a “D-line” would exist to focus on 

manufacturing challenges with wider application, such as multiService, multi-platform programs. Funding for these programs would 

be added to current program funding levels, not conducted at the 

expense of current Service investments. As for execution, the task 

force believes that the individual Services should manage the projects 

selected for investment. Examples of such programs include batteries, 

radio-frequency identification devices, direct digital manufacturing, 

and standards and protocols. 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

18 

Long-Term, Multi-Service Needs 

Recommendation 

OSD should provide additional resources under the ManTech 

program (a “D-line”) to fund multi-Service, multi-platform 

programs 

 Add resources to current ManTech funding levels 

 Services execute projects 

Disruptive Technologies 

ManTech funding should balance longer-term strategic 

requirements as well as near-term program requirements. Thus, 

greater emphasis is needed in research and development of 

disruptive technologies—both product and process. 

The question of how to affordably manufacture products based on nextgeneration disruptive technologies is as important as establishing the 

technical capability. DOD invests far more on research and 

development of new product technologies as compared to its 

investments in process technologies. But investment is needed in the 

capability to manufacture products that incorporate emerging, 

disruptive technologies—such as nano-based products—which offer 

promise for a quantum difference in warfighting capability within the 

next decade. With more emphasis on production concerns early in 

development, such capabilities could be fielded quicker and more 

economically. Identifying such technologies is challenging, but could 

be informed by the peer review process previously mentioned. 

In addition, DOD needs to invest in disruptive manufacturing process 

technologies—in particular, in timely access to affordable low-volume, 

state-of-the-art production capabilities. Solutions such as dual-use 

(civil and military) production or automated, multi-product “flexible 

manufacturing” need to be considered. Investments need to be made 

in prototypes and advanced concept technology demonstrations that 

address affordability (low cost) and rapid production of smallquantity production. 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

19

All 6.3 programs should have exit criteria based in part on 

manufacturing issues and 6.2 program managers should develop 

early strategies for manufacturing as well. The typical 6.1 project 

leader will be more concerned with technical feasibility, but a 6.1 

program directed specifically at low-cost manufacturing research or 

science could provide great leverage. 

The current 6.1 basic research program in DOD, the Services, and 

DARPA (in excess of $1 billion in annual investment) is essentially 

devoid of manufacturing research or science. At one time, DOD did 

support a 6.1 Manufacturing Science Program of approximately $10 

million per year. The ability to cost-effectively manufacture 

disruptive technologies, such as nanotechnology, depends on basic 

research to lay the foundation that will enable technology and 

product development for affordable defense capabilities. The 

National Science Foundation sponsors a small 6.1-like manufacturing 

science program under its Manufacturing Process and Equipment 

Systems Cluster Investment initiative with selected investments in 

the following: 

 Manufacturing machines and equipment 

innovations 

 Materials and process manufacturing concepts 

 Nanomanufacturing innovations 

As it has with nanotechnology 6.1 investments, DOD could 

significantly leverage even a modest 6.1 manufacturing science 

investment (of perhaps $20–50 million per year). Several leading 

universities have the capability to conduct world-class, peerreviewed research in this area and focus attention on basic problems 

of specific interest to the DOD.

Research on both aspects of disruptive technologies could 

appropriately be led by the DDR&E through DARPA. About a 

decade ago, DARPA made numerous investments in advanced 

manufacturing development programs, but such programs have 

declined as part of the DARPA portfolio in recent years. A portion of 

DARPA’s investment portfolio should be redirected toward 

manufacturing research and development (R&D), as such 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

20 

investments offer tremendous value to the defense and the national 

industrial base. 

Disruptive Technology 

Recommendation 

DDR&E should take the lead on research and development of 

manufacturing-related disruptive technology 

1. How to affordably manufacture products based on nextgeneration “disruptive” technologies 

2. Disruptive manufacturing process technologies for faster 

and affordable low-volume production 

DDR&E should establish a separate 6.1 manufacturing science 

thrust within S&T 

DARPA should reinstitute a significant advanced 

manufacturing technology program 

5. MANUFACTURING READINESS

Better visibility into and understanding of program 

manufacturing risks is critical to rapid and affordable technology 

transition. Program managers often lack sufficient knowledge of 

program technologies, design, and production risks in assessing 

manufacturing readiness. Cost increases, schedule delays, and 

production shortfalls are a common result. A related concern in 

acquisition programs is facilitating technology transition during 

program development—being able to more rapidly move technology 

from the laboratory to the field. Today’s high risk/high payoff 

systems require manufacturing breakthroughs alongside technology 

R&D solutions. 

At milestone decision points, the level of manufacturing readiness 

is just as important as that of technology maturity or design stability.

Determining that a technology can be produced on schedule, reliably, 

and affordably is as critical as determining that the technology can 

provide the desired warfighting capability. Similar to the Technology 

Readiness Level (TRL) concept that has helped to define the readiness 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

21

and risk associated with the introduction of new technology into 

weapon systems production, the Joint Defense Manufacturing 

Technology Panel (JDMTP) Manufacturing Readiness Levels are a 

major innovation for defining the maturity of manufacturing 

processes and techniques (including a focus on their affordability). 8 

Completion and introduction of the Manufacturing Readiness 

Level process can support the ManTech objective of achieving lower 

systems’ cost. MRL assessments should be given the same degree of 

emphasis as given the TRL assessments in determining the readiness 

of a technology for transition and should be an integral part of 

weapon system program reviews. The MRL and TRL processes must 

work in parallel, as shown in figure 2, with the TRL technology 

assessments serving as key inputs to the MRL process in defining the 

need for ManTech investments. 

Figure 2. Manufacturing Readiness Level Implementation 

When completed, the MRLs will be a significant tool in assisting 

weapon system development managers in both DOD and industry to 

 Reduce acquisition technical, cost, and schedule risk 

 

8. An overview of the MRL process is in Appendix H. 

TRL 9

Mission

Proven

TRL 8

System 

Qualification

TRL 7

Prototype

in 

Operational

Environment

TRL 6

Prototype

in Representative

Environment

TRL 5

Breadboard

in Representative

Environment

TRL 4

Breadboard

in 

Lab

TRL 3

Proof 

of 

Concept

TRL 2

Concept

Formulated

TRL 1

Basic 

Principles

Observed

MRL 10

Lean 

Manufacturing 

Processes

----------

FRP actual 

unit cost 

meets goal

MRL 9

Manufacturing 

Processes

Proven

----------

LRIP actual 

unit cost 

meets goal

MRL 8

Process

Maturity 

Demo

----------

Unit cost 

estimates 

meet goal

MRL 7

Prototype 

Manufacturing

System

----------

Unit cost 

estimated 

and in range 

of goal

MRL 6

Critical 

Manufacturing

Processes

Demonstrated

----------

Unit cost 

goal set

MRL 5

Manufacturing

Processes 

Developed

----------

Subsystem

cost goals 

set; cost 

drivers 

identified

MRL 4

Manufacturing

Processes

Identified

MRL 3

Manufacturing

Concepts

Identified

TRL 9

Mission

Proven

TRL 8

System 

Qualification

TRL 7

Prototype

in 

Operational

Environment

TRL 6

Prototype

in Representative

Environment

TRL 5

Breadboard

in Representative

Environment

TRL 4

Breadboard

in 

Lab

TRL 3

Proof 

of 

Concept

TRL 2

Concept

Formulated

TRL 1

Basic 

Principles

Observed

MRL 10

Lean 

Manufacturing 

Processes

----------

FRP actual 

unit cost 

meets goal

MRL 9

Manufacturing 

Processes

Proven

----------

LRIP actual 

unit cost 

meets goal

MRL 8

Process

Maturity 

Demo

----------

Unit cost 

estimates 

meet goal

MRL 7

Prototype 

Manufacturing

System

----------

Unit cost 

estimated 

and in range 

of goal

MRL 6

Critical 

Manufacturing

Processes

Demonstrated

----------

Unit cost 

goal set

MRL 5

Manufacturing

Processes 

Developed

----------

Subsystem

cost goals 

set; cost 

drivers 

identified

MRL 4

Manufacturing

Processes

Identified

MRL 3

Manufacturing

Concepts

Identified

Production & 

Deployment

System Development 

& Demonstration

Technology 

Development Concept Refinement Production & Deployment

System Development 

& Demonstration

Technology 

Development Concept Refinement

A B C
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

22 

 Define key ManTech investments needed for a 

weapon system program to proceed to full-scale 

development (during the pre-milestone B 

assessment) 

 Identify, during pre-milestone C assessments, key 

risk areas and define the investments to 

manufacturing development required to reduce 

risks 

 Foster technology transition 

The USD (AT&L) should require program managers to use the 

MRL tool on all programs. In fact, MRLs should be explicit exit 

criteria for milestone decision points. In particular, 6.3 technology 

demonstrations within the S&T program should have specific exit 

criteria, at MRL level 5 or 6, before transition to a weapon program. 

MRLs can promote production-ready, cost-based prototypes; that is, 

prototypes that establish that a system is affordable and producible 

as well as demonstrate technical capability. 

To institutionalize the use of MRLs, the task force recommends 

that the MRL tool be completed by the end of 2005 and introduced 

into the 5000 series acquisition regulation. 

Manufacturing Readiness 

Recommendation 

USD (AT&L) should require program managers to use the MRL 

tool on all programs 

 Establish as an explicit exit criteria for milestone decision 

points 

 Clarify that prototyping includes affordability and 

producibility as well as technical capability 

Complete MRL tool by 2005 year end and introduce into the 

5000 series acquisition regulation 

 Integrate into Technology Readiness Assessment 

document 

 Ensure MRL process parallels TRL process 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

23

6. WORKFORCE EXPERTISE

As responsibility for program risk has been increasingly 

transferred to industry contractors, robust in-house manufacturingrelated expertise in OSD and the Services has diminished. As a result, 

engineering and manufacturing talent in the DOD workforce is 

declining; it is declining as well in the Department’s supporting 

industrial base. What was once a promising career field in the 

military services—with promotion paths, training, and professional 

development—has been systematically eliminated over the past few 

decades. Manufacturing career paths in industry have similarly 

weakened. 

Furthermore, not enough people—at both the working level and 

in leadership positions—understand the processes involved in 

developing and manufacturing defense systems, including software. 

Fewer people are capable of conducting production readiness 

reviews, evaluating industry’s work on programs, and staying 

abreast of industry research and development. 

This knowledge deficiency impacts many areas—policy support 

for programs such as ManTech; the ability to develop an effective 

strategic plan and investment strategy for manufacturing technology; 

the ability to implement the MRL tool; and the ability to effectively 

and affordably acquire low-cost, high-quality weapon systems. 

 The declining government skill base needs to be reversed, the 

importance of manufacturing expertise recognized, and staffing 

strategies developed to attract and retain needed expertise. Support 

for such efforts must come from the senior leadership in the 

Department, with efforts led by the Under Secretaries of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and for Personnel and 

Readiness (USD [P&R]). 

One near-term strategy that could be pursued is increased 

rotation between industry and government of personnel with 

required expertise, along the lines of the PL-313 program. Similar 

strategies should be pursued in the Services with rotations among the 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

24 

ManTech program offices, the laboratories, and weapon program 

offices. 

In addition, it is essential to revitalize the manufacturing career 

field by creating positions with promotion potential for people with 

manufacturing expertise. Further, as mentioned previously in this 

report, if ManTech begins to address software challenges, personnel 

with software expertise must be recruited into the program. In 

addition, the Defense Acquisition University needs to evaluate its 

curriculum to expand the focus on manufacturing technology. 

Workforce Expertise 

Recommendations 

USD (AT&L), together with the USD (P&R) and Service 

Secretaries, must develop recruiting strategies to attract needed 

expertise 

 In the near term, increase rotation of industry personnel 

with required expertise 

 Implement similar rotation strategy in the Services 

between ManTech program and laboratories 

 Charge the Defense Acquisition University to increase 

focus on manufacturing technology in curriculum 

 Create positions with promotion potential for people 

with manufacturing expertise 

 Recruit people with software expertise into the ManTech 

program 

7. SOFTWARE

Increasingly, major schedule, cost, performance, and reliability 

issues in DOD systems are being driven by software. The Future 

Combat System, for example, will have more than 35 million lines of 

code that is intensive, complex, and integral to system capability. To 

date, the Manufacturing Technology program has not traditionally 

addressed software, but could make a significant contribution. In the 

future, the task force believes that consideration should be given to 

include initiatives in the ManTech program to reduce software cost 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

25

and cycle time, as well as make it more producible. Such initiatives 

might include “software factories,” automated programming, 

software self-testing, and open systems. 

An example of the type of concept that could be funded under the 

ManTech program is a revolutionary concept called Model Driven 

Architecture (MDA). This emerging approach to the way modern 

systems are specified, designed, implemented, tested, and supported 

has the promise to realize significant reductions in both acquisition 

and life cycle costs, and order of magnitude reductions in cycle time. 9

ManTech should fund “pilot programs” to demonstrate the speed, 

cost, and interoperability benefits of this software development 

approach. 

If software development becomes an explicit part of the ManTech 

program, sufficient expertise must exist in the staffs to assure 

adequate technical oversight. 

Software 

Recommendations 

Because software is so important and complex, USD (AT&L) 

should direct a study of the future software development 

challenge as it relates to DOD 

 Focus on systems engineering, modeling, “production,” 

and sustainment aspects 

 Determine appropriate manufacturing investments (and 

others) for DOD 

 Recommend alternatives for ManTech (and other DOD 

R&D) activity 

Model-driven architecture provides an opportunity for big 

impact 

 Fund “pilot programs” to accelerate and expand 

applications of MDA to realize speed, cost, and 

interoperability benefits 

 

9. A summary of the model driven architecture concept is in Appendix I. 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

26 

8. SMALL-BUSINESS PARTICIPATION

After nearly two years, the President’s Executive Order directing 

manufacturing emphasis for the Small Business Innovation Research 

and the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs is not 

being adequately addressed.10 Observed involvement by the DOD 

manufacturing community appears to be significantly short of that 

required to achieve executive intent. The current response is limited 

largely to database keyword searches that are not representative of 

the range of relevant manufacturing technologies. Nor does the 

manufacturing component of the SBIR/STTR program have adequate 

involvement by the Service and agency ManTech organizations. 

To encourage small businesses to focus on the objectives of 

ManTech, a larger percentage of the SBIR program in DOD should be 

focused on ManTech objectives. Small and medium-sized companies 

tend to be hungrier and more competitively driven to succeed. They 

cannot afford to have too many failed projects or they risk going out 

of business. While utilizing small and medium-sized businesses, 

ManTech should be allowed and encouraged to leverage SBIR 

programs to reduce development, production, and support system 

costs and to promote state-of-the-art manufacturing technology. 

Since the DOD SBIR annual program is now about $1 billion, the 

task force recommends that manufacturing technology projects grow 

to about $100 million per year. Furthermore, the ManTech 

community, in OSD and the Services, should have responsibility for 

selecting, planning, and executing the manufacturing-oriented SBIR 

topics. Such is not the case as the program is executed today, which 

hampers effective targeting of these investments. 

 

10. Appendix J contains the Executive Order on Encouraging Innovation in Manufacturing. 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

27

Small-Business Participation 

Recommendation 

USD (AT&L) should direct the Services to expand smallbusiness participation in the ManTech program 

 Focus a larger percentage of the SBIR program in DOD 

on ManTech objectives (e.g., 10 percent) 

 Assign ManTech community (OSD and Services) 

responsibility for selecting, planning, and executing the 

manufacturing-oriented SBIR topics 

9. INDUSTRIAL LEVERAGE

The Department of Defense needs to maintain effective 

coordination and collaboration with industry to leverage 

manufacturing process improvements, to better target its own 

investments in advanced manufacturing technology, and to rapidly 

meet surge requirements. 

Yet, the extent to which DOD stays abreast of industry plans and 

investments and collaborates on technology transition is deficient. 

Today, industry process improvements are not effectively leveraged 

in developing defense acquisition and support programs. Moreover, 

investments are not being made in high-risk, high-cost projects 

related to disruptive technologies that could have significant 

leverage. 

The Department expends little effort to provide incentives that 

will speed manufacturing technology transition. DOD needs to 

identify incentives for defense manufacturing base contractors to 

incorporate and utilize manufacturing enhancements. Programs such 

as value engineering proposals and single-process initiatives, for 

example, should be reinstituted. 

The task force supports the intent of the proposed amendment 

drafted by the Senate Armed Services Committee to enhance 

manufacturing technology strategies (see appendix K), which calls for 

public-private partnership incentives, industry roadmaps for new 

manufacturing and technology processes, test beds for technology 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

28 

transition, and other cooperative programs. While this proposal 

provides a starting point, it needs to go further to address the wider 

range of topics identified in this report. 

An important area of exploration is dual-use manufacturing; that 

is, integrated civil and military operations. The ability to produce 

both civilian and military products on a single line should be adopted 

to the maximum extent possible. The potential rewards are many: 

increased responsiveness, lower costs for small-volume production, 

expanded surge capabilities, and the ability to leverage state-of-theart manufacturing technologies and process improvements. 

The task force encourages collaboration between DOD and 

industry in developing roadmaps that identify critical defense 

manufacturing areas. These roadmaps should be used by DOD to 

design its own research and development initiatives and, as 

appropriate, shared with industry as a basis for possible independent 

R&D or capital investments. This approach will assure ongoing 

manufacturing technology advances in critical and promising defense 

technology areas. Further, the military services could usefully 

sponsor manufacturing test beds to facilitate and support widespread 

development and deployment of innovative manufacturing 

technologies. 

Industrial Leverage 

Recommendations 

DOD should, to the maximum extent possible, adopt dual-use 

manufacturing 

Identify incentives for defense manufacturing base contractors 

to incorporate and utilize manufacturing enhancements 

Collaborate with industry to develop manufacturing technology 

roadmaps in order to ensure ongoing technology advances 

Sponsor manufacturing test beds to facilitate and support 

widespread development and deployment of innovative 

manufacturing technologies 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

29

10. PROGRAM FUNDING

The ManTech budget has fluctuated significantly over the past 

few decades, with a generally downward trend (see figure 1). In some 

of the Services—namely the Navy and Air Force—the ManTech 

budget has declined significantly; and the total appropriated budgets 

reflect significant funding added by Congress. 11 Overall, this budget 

profile does not reflect a well-planned and sustained strategic 

investment for more affordable acquisition, technology transition, 

and sustainment. The total ManTech investment, especially without 

the Congressional adds, does not match the importance of the need to 

reduce weapon costs and development cycle time. 

In general, the program needs a greater and more stable funding 

profile within the Services and overall—funding that, over a five year 

period, returns ManTech-related investments to one percent of the 

RDT&E budget. As shown in figure 3, this increase aligns with the 

level of manufacturing technology investment in the early 1980s. 

Figure 3. DOD ManTech Investment as a Share of RDT&E 

 

11 Appendix L contains funding profiles individual Service ManTech programs, both 

planned and appropriated. 
 

CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

30 

The task force recommends increased investments in the following 

areas: 

 A “defense-line” managed by OSD should be 

created, beginning with $50 million in fiscal year 

2007. 

 Funding for investments in manufacturing 

technology, within the overall SBIR program, should 

increase to $100 million by fiscal year 2010. 

 By fiscal year 2010, DARPA should invest approximately $50 million in manufacturing research for 

disruptive technologies—investments in the manufacture of products using disruptive technologies as 

well as investments in disruptive manufacturing 

process technology. This amount reflects a redirecttion of less than two percent of the DARPA budget. 

Table 2 shows the proposed ManTech budget profile from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010. The 2010 profile reflects the task force 

recommended projections and a total program that is one percent of 

the planned RDT&E budget.12

Table 2. Proposed ManTech-Related Funding for Fiscal Years 

2007–2010 (millions of dollars) 

2007 2008 2009 2010 

Service 

ManTech 318 385 452 528 

D-Line 50 50 50 50 

SBIR* 60 80 100 100 

 Total 428 515 602 688 

 

DARPA** 30 40 50 50 

* Part of SBIR budget 

** Part of DARPA program budget 

 

12 Historical and projected funding profiles showing the ManTech budget as a percentage 

of RDT&E and S&T budgets are contained in Appendix M. 
 

_________________________________________________ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

31

Funding 

Recommendations 

USD (AT&L) should direct greater and more stable funding for 

the ManTech program in the individual Services and overall 

 Return total program investment to 1 percent of RDT&E 

budget 

 Phase in over five-year period 

Add funding, beyond the current level of $249 million in fiscal 

year 2005, for the following: 

 Multi-Service, multi-platform initiatives (D-line) 

 SBIR investments in manufacturing technology 

 Service-unique projects 

Redirect part of DARPA program budget for investment in 

disruptive technologies—increasing to $50 million by 2010 
 

CHAPTER 4 __________________________________________________________________ 

32 

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION

As stated at the outset of this report, advanced weapon systems 

cost too much, take too long to field, and are too expensive to sustain. 

In general, we believe that with high-level support, the ManTech 

program has the potential to significantly alleviate these problems. 

The program impacts all areas of acquisition, facilitates technology 

transition, has demonstrated significant reductions in cost and cycle 

time and increases in reliability, and has demonstrated tremendous 

return on investment. While the task force clearly recognizes that 

many broader actions are needed to address the depth of the 

Department’s acquisition concerns, ManTech has an important 

contribution to make. 

This report has identified specific actions in ten areas that the task 

force believes will enhance and expand the impact of the ManTech 

program: leadership, strategic planning, S&T responsibility, balanced 

portfolio, manufacturing readiness, workforce expertise, software, 

small-business participation, industrial leverage, and funding. There 

is much to do, but with effective leadership, thoughtful planning, and 

adequate resources much can also be accomplished. 

The time to act is now. Like many others, we believe the 

Department is likely to face tighter economic constraints in the 

years to come. In light of fiscal constraints, reducing the cost of 

future weapon systems will be critical. 
 

__________________________________________________________ TERMS OF REFERENCE 

33

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

301 0 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SEP 1 7 2004 ACQUISITION,

TECHNOLOGY

AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Ternls of Reference -Defense Science Board Task Force on the Manufacturing

Technology Program

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force to evaluate the

Department of Defense (DoD) Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Program. ManTech

matures and validates manufacturing processes for emerging, defense-critical technologies,

driving the timeline, affordability, and technology producibility level while shortening upgrade

and deployment cycle time for key weapons, subsystems, and components.

The need for a cohesive manufacturing research and development investment program is

fundamental to rapid acceleration of near-term technology capabilities to support warfighting

operations, as well as long-term support for transition of revolutionary technologies. Warfighters

need a responsive industrial base with advanced manufacturing technologies that reduce risks,

costs, and lead times at every level and phase of the acquisition process, including design,

development, production, and sustainment of fielded systems.

The Task Force should review the following and provide recommendations as to how the

ManTech Program can be strengthened to improve its benefits to the DoD and the Military

Services:

Investment Strategy: Evaluate the extent to which ManTech investments and funding

plans for each Military Service and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) support

near-term, warfighting operations, the industrial base, and longer-range revolutionary

technologies. Assess Service and DLA manufacturing process needs for militarydriven requirements and impact on defense-unique industrial base capabilities.

.

Program Balance: Assess the adequacy of technical investments across manufacturing

process disciplines (e.g., processing and fabrication needs for electronics, metals, and

composites) and support for both Joint Warfighting Capabilities and revolutionary

technologies. Spiral integration of revolutionary technologies should include

concurrent development of technologies, manufacturing processes, and related

enterprise management improvements.

.

. Programmatic /Funding: Appraise funding for manufacturing research and

development, including mechanisms to support both Service/Agency requirements

(e.g., for ships, aircraft, tracked vehicles, logistics centers) and cross.,.cutting

initiatives (for example, in power and battery technologies). For a level of investment,
identify how funding models and mechanisms utilized by commercial industry to

speed transition of technology from laboratory to market might be utilized by DoD.

. Program Ownership: Evaluate relevant organizational structures to ensure the

ManTech Program is appropriately postured both technically and resource-wise to

mature and transition science and technology from the laboratory to the production

floor.

Acquisition Impact: Consider adequacy of manufacturing process guidelines for the

5000-series acquisition process. Assess mechanisms by which producibility issues

are considered within the preferred approach of an evolutionary acquisition strategy.

.

The Study will be sponsored by me as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

(Advanced Systems & Concepts). Dr. Jacques Gansler will serve as TaskForce Chairman.

Dan Cundiff, Oversight Executive for ManTech, ODUSD(Advanced Systems & Concepts), will

serve as the Executive Secretary. LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA will serve as the DSB Secretariat

representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P .L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory

Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into

any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it

cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

,c::OI'[..

Michael W. Wynne

Acting
 

APPENDIX B _________________________________________________________________ 

36 

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CHAIRMAN

NAME AFFILIATION

Hon. Jacques Gansler University of Maryland 

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Maj Gen Pat Condon, USAF (Ret) Dayton Aerospace, Inc. 

Dr. Lance Davis National Academy of Engineering 

Dr. Gary Denman Private Consultant 

Dr. Pamela Drew Boeing 

Mr. Noel Longuemare Private Consultant 

Mr. Jim Mattice Universal Technology Corporation 

Mr. Anthony Mulligan Advanced Ceramics Research, Inc. 

Mr. Herman Reininga Rockwell Collins 

Maj Gen Bill Usher, USAF (Ret) Private Consultant 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Mr. Dan Cundiff ODUSD (AS&C) 

Ms. Adele Ratcliff ODUSD (AS&C) 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA Defense Science Board 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Col Charles Bailey, USAF Air Force Acquisition 

Mr. John Carney Office of Naval Research 

Mr. John Christensen Defense Logistics Agency 

Ms. Carol Gardinier Army Research, Development and 

Engineering Command 

Mr. Steve Linder Missile Defense Agency 

Dr. Mike McGrath DASN (RDT&E) 

Ms. Mary Miller Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology 

Mr. John Mistretta Air Force Research Laboratory 

Mr. James Reaser Air Force Acquisition 

Mr. Doug Schaefer Missile Defense Agency/ 

Manufacturing and Producibility 

Mr. John Todaro ODUSD (AS&C), Director, Office of 

Technology Transition 
 

_______________________________________________________ TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

37

STAFF

Ms. Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ms. Deborah Jermunson Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
 

APPENDIX C _________________________________________________________________ 

38 

APPENDIX C. PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE

DECEMBER 17, 2004 

Name Topic 

Ms. Sue Payton 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD), 

Advanced Systems & Concepts (AS&C), OSD 

Perspective on ManTech Program 

Mr. Dan Cundiff 

Associate Director, 

Office of DUSD, AS&C, OSD

Transitioning Affordable Combat 

Power to Our Warfighters 

Ms. Carol Gardinier 

Program Manager, Army ManTech, 

Research, Development & Engineering 

Command

Army ManTech Program Overview 

Mr. John Carney 

Acting Director, Navy ManTech, Office of 

Naval Research 

Navy ManTech Program Overview 

Mr. John Mistretta, 

Chief, ManTech Division, Air Force Research 

Laboratory 

Air Force ManTech Program 

Overview 

Mr. John Mistretta 

Chairman, Joint Defense Manufacturing 

Technology Panel

Joint Defense ManTech Panel 

FEBRUARY 16, 2005 

Dr. Lewis Sloter 

Office of DUSD, Science & Technology (S&T) 

ManTech in Small Business 

Innovation Research 

Mr. John Christensen 

Chief, Industrial Capabilities, Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA ManTech Perspective 

Dr. Tony Tether 

Director, Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) 

DARPA View on Manufacturing in 

R&D 

Dr. Richard Mirsky 

Program Manager, Defense Production Act 

III Program, OSD (AT&L)

Title III of the Defense Production 

Act 

Dr. Ann Marie Surprise 

Director, Best Manufacturing Practices 

Center of Excellence

Best Manufacturing Practices Center 

of Excellence 
 

________________________________________________PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE

39

Mr. Dave Stieren 

National Institute of Standards & 

Technology , Manufacturing Engineering 

Laboratory 

National Science & Technology 

Council Interagency Working Group 

on Manufacturing Research & 

Development 

Mr. Doug Shaefer 

Director, Producibility & Manufacturing, 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

MDA Manufacturing Investments 

MARCH 23-24, 2005 

Mr. Arun Seraphin 

Member, Senate Armed Services Committee 

Staff

ManTech Congressional 

Perspectives 

Mr. Egils Milbergs 

Center for Accelerating Innovation 

Innovation Ecosystems: 

Implications for the Defense 

Industrial Base 

Mr. William Bonvillian 

Chief Counsel, Senator Lieberman’s Staff Defense Manufacturing Base Issues 

Mr. Jean Reed 

Member, House Armed Services Committee 

Staff 

Congressional Perspective on the 

Defense ManTech Program 

Mr. Jack Taylor 

Associate Director, Office of DUSD (S&T) 

Energy & Power Technology 

Initiative: Capacitor ManTech 

Program 

Mr. Bart Moenster 

Director, Advanced Manufacturing R&D, 

Boeing 

Boeing ManTech Program: 

Partnership for Technology 

Development & Insertion 

Dr. Nancy Spruill 

Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis, 

Office of Under Secretary of Defense, 

Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 

Metrics & Performance Measures in 

the Acquisition Environment 

Mr. Les Andersen 

Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology 

Panel, Manufacturing Readiness Levels 

Development Working Group 

Current Status and Plans On the 

Evolution, Refinement, And 

Deployment Of DOD Manufacturing 

Readiness Levels 

Mr. Jim Gucinski, 

Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Crane Power 

Systems Executive 

JDMTP Battery Manufacturing Gap 

Study 

Dr. Dave Shaver 

MIT Lincoln Laboratory 

Moving Technology from R&D to 

Military Systems 

Mr. John McKeown 

Technical Director, Joint Strike Fighter 

Program 

Joint Strike Fighter Program 

Overview 

Dr. Toni Marechaux 

Director, Board on Manufacturing and 

Engineering Design, The National Academies

Manufacturing at the National 

Academies 
 

APPENDIX C _________________________________________________________________ 

40 

MAY 24-25, 2005 

Dr. Ron Sega 

Director, Defense Research & Engineering DDR&E Update 

Mr. James Thompson 

OUSD (AT&L)/Defense Systems 

Manufacturing in Acquisition: 

Guidelines & Mechanisms 

Ms Dawn Vehmeier 

Acting Director, Industrial Base 

Assessments, Office of DUSD (Industrial 

Policy)

Defense Industrial Landscape 

Maj Gen William Usher, USAF (Ret) 

Private Consultant ManTech Study 

Mr. John Mistretta 

Chief, ManTech Division, Air Force Research 

Laboratory

Case for Re-Building the Air Force 

Manufacturing and Quality 

Assurance Infrastructure 

Mr. John Ouellette

Sustainment Project Coordinator, U.S. Army 

Unmanned Aircraft Technologies

Army ManTech for Future Combat 

Systems 

Lt Gen Richard Scofield, USAF, (Ret) 

Private Consultant

Delivering Combat Capability at 

Home & Abroad 

Dr. Charles Holland 

DUSD (S&T) 

Captive Foundry & Radiation 

Hardening 

Dr. Gerry Graves 

ATI

Next Generation Manufacturing 

Technology Initiative 

JULY 26, 2005 

Mr. Andy Summers 

DD(X) Ship Design Manager, NAVSEA

Japanese Kongo Class Comparison 

to USS Arleigh Burke 

Mr. Bob Whalen 

Chairman, Advanced Development 

Operations, Titan 

Titan Experience on Design 

Manufacturing of X-Craft, Affordable 

Weapon, & Affordable Phased 

Arrays 

Mr. Jim Gucinski 

NAVSEA Power Systems Executive Battery Brief 

Mr. Steve Linder 

Senior MDA Representative, 

Joint Defense ManTech Panel 

JDMTP MRL Update 

Mr. Jack Harris 

Director, Advanced ManTech, Rockwell 

Collins 

Predicting Manufacturing 

Performance 

Dr. Mike McGrath 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Navy (RDT&E) 

Integration of Commercial & Military 

Manufacturing in 2010 and Beyond 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2005 

CAPT Jeffery Wilson, USN 

Technical Director, Joint Single Integrated 

Air Picture, System Engineering Organization

Use of Model Driven Architecture in 

the Acquisition Process 
_______________________________________________________ DOD DIRECTIVE 4200.15 

41

APPENDIX D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 

4200.15 
Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 4200.15

September 19, 2002

DDR&E

SUBJECT: Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Program

(a) DoD Instruction 4200.15, "Manufacturing Technology Program," May 

24, 1985 (hereby canceled)

(b) Section 2521 of title 10, United States Code

(c) Section 2374 of title 10, United States Code

(d) DoD 7000.14-R, "Department of Defense Financial Management 

Regulations," June 2000

(e) through (g), see enclosure 1

1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive:

1.1. Cancels reference (a).

1.2. Implements references (b) and (c) to establish policy and assign responsibility 

for DoD Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Program activities.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military 

Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the 

Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the 

DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of 

Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

1
3. POLICY

It is DoD policy to rely on private sector investment and the "free enterprise" system to 

provide the manufacturing technology necessary to produce DoD materiel. There are 

cases, however, when qualified segments of industry cannot or will not commit private 

funds to establish manufacturing technology and make it available on a timely basis in 

support of DoD requirements. Accordingly, ManTech investments shall be directed at 

improving the quality, productivity, technology, and practices of businesses and workers 

providing goods and services to the Department of Defense. In addition, investments in 

ManTech shall:

3.1. Aid in the economical and timely acquisition and sustainment of weapon 

systems and components.

3.2. Ensure that advanced manufacturing processes, techniques, and equipment are 

available for reducing DoD materiel acquisition, maintenance, and repair costs.

3.3. Advance the maturity of manufacturing processes to bridge the gap from 

research and development advances to full-scale production.

3.4. Promote capital investment and industrial innovation in new plants and 

equipment by reducing the cost and risk of advancing and applying new and improved 

manufacturing technology.

3.5. Ensure that manufacturing technologies used to produce DoD materiel are 

consistent with safety and environmental considerations and energy conservation 

objectives.

3.6. Provide for the dissemination of Program results throughout the industrial 

base.

3.7. Sustain and enhance the skills and capabilities of the manufacturing work 

force, and promote high levels of worker education and training.

3.8. Meet other national defense needs within the guidance contained at enclosure 

2.

DODD 4200.15, Sept. 19, 2002

2
4. RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering under the authority, 

direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, shall:

4.1.1. Provide centralized guidance and direction for the ManTech Program 

within the Department of Defense and ensure that it is executed in accordance with this 

Directive and references (b) through (g);

4.1.2. Develop and maintain a joint planning process, and use that process in 

preparing centralized program guidance.

4.1.3. Prepare an annual five-year plan as defined by reference (b).

4.1.4. Ensure coordination between the ManTech Program and industrial 

preparedness and similar manufacturing programs of the Department of Defense, other 

Departments and Agencies, and the private sector.

4.2. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

4.2.1. Organize and execute a ManTech Program in accordance with the 

provisions of this Directive and supplemental guidance published by the Director, 

Defense Research and Engineering; and

4.2.2. Provide an adequately staffed ManTech Program management structure 

responsible for promoting and achieving ManTech Program objectives.

4.2.3. Ensure coordination between ManTech projects and industrial 

preparedness programs, and similar manufacturing projects of the Department of 

Defense, other Departments and Agencies, and the private sector.

5. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

5.1. The DoD Components shall provide budget (detailed and summary) 

information to OSD in accordance with reference (c).

5.2. The DoD Components shall prepare a technical report describing deliverables 

received and activity conducted for each ManTech project for which funds have been 

expended. This report shall be submitted to the Defense Technical Information Center.

DODD 4200.15, Sept. 19, 2002

3
5.3. Each DoD Component shall submit ManTech Program information as needed 

to develop the annual five-year plan and to support other information requirements 

needed to satisfy reference (b).

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

Enclosures - 2 

E1. References, continued

E2. Guidance for the ManTech Program

DODD 4200.15, Sept. 19, 2002

4
E1. ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(e) DoD Directive 5000.1, "The Defense Acquisition System," October 23, 2000

(f) DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," April 5, 

2002

(g) DoD 5000.2-R, "Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 

(MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition 

Programs," April 5, 2002

DODD 4200.15, Sept. 19, 2002

5 ENCLOSURE 1
E2. ENCLOSURE 2

GUIDANCE FOR THE MANTECH PROGRAM

E2.1. INVESTMENTS

ManTech Program investments shall be directed toward areas of greatest need and 

potential benefit. Individual ManTech Program investments shall be selected by 

addressing the following:

E2.1.1. Projected requirements emerging from science and technology programs 

anticipated entering the systems acquisition process.

E2.1.2. Current industrial improvements in production, maintenance, repair costs, 

and industrial base responsiveness, including enhancement of in-house facilities, e.g., 

depots and shipyards.

E2.1.3. The potential to reduce costs, improve performance and responsiveness by 

advancing manufacturing technology. Maximum potential benefits from each ManTech 

Program investment shall be sought by ensuring that:

E2.1.3.1. There is a well-defined DoD requirement for the technology.

E2.1.3.2. The technology has been demonstrated in the laboratory environment 

as being feasible and can be delivered in time to meet the requirement.

E2.1.3.3. Anticipated investment results are applicable to more than one 

weapon system, component, or end item.

E2.1.3.4. There is a specific plan to implement, transition, and insert the 

results of the investment.

E2.1.3.5. The potential for multi-DoD Component-sponsored investments has 

been investigated.

E2.1.3.6. The proposed investment is not unnecessarily duplicative of other 

activities, both within and outside the ManTech Program.

E2.1.3.7. An assessment is made to determine if manufacturers of 

manufacturing equipment should be involved in projects.

DODD 4200.15, Sept. 19, 2002

6 ENCLOSURE 2
E2.1.3.8. Competitive procedures shall be used in accordance with reference 

(d) for awarding all grants and entering into all contracts, cooperative agreements, and 

other transactions under the program. One of the evaluation factors shall be that the 

transaction provide for the proposed recipient to share in the cost of the project. For a 

project that the Government receives an offer from one offeror, the contracting officer 

shall negotiate a sharing ratio that represents the best value to the Government.

E2.2. RESTRICTIONS

ManTech Program funds may not be used for investments more appropriately funded by 

other means, such as:

E2.2.1. Routine application of existing technology for the production of specific 

equipment, manufacturing systems, or parts.

E2.2.2. Investments specifically intended to change an end item's design.

E2.2.3. Purchase of off-the-shelf capital equipment, unless it constitutes a minor 

portion of the investment and is required to establish the first-case application of the 

ManTech Program deliverable.

E2.2.4. Purchase of capital facilities.

E2.2.5. Implementation of manufacturing technology beyond the first-case 

application.

E2.2.6. A technology application unique to a single weapon system.

E2.3. REQUIREMENTS

The DoD Components shall clearly define project goals, objectives, milestones, and 

implementation plans for each project prior to project execution, and monitor the 

progress during project execution. Expected users of the technology or process shall 

participate in the project monitoring. ManTech Program effectiveness shall be 

evaluated by identifying and quantifying benefits resulting from the implementation of 

ManTech Program deliverables.

DODD 4200.15, Sept. 19, 2002

7 ENCLOSURE 2
_______________________________________________MANTECH ESTABLISHING LEGISLATION

49

APPENDIX E. ESTABLISHING LEGISLATION FOR THE 

MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

UNITED STATES CODE 

TITLE 10--ARMED FORCES 

Subtitle A--General Military Law 

PART IV--SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 

CHAPTER 148—NATIONAL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE, 

DEFENSE REINVESTMENT, AND DEFENSE CONVERSION 

SUBCHAPTER IV--MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 

§ 2521. Manufacturing Technology Program 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a 

Manufacturing Technology Program to further the national security 

objectives of section 2501(a) of this title through the development and 

application of advanced manufacturing technologies and processes that will 

reduce the acquisition and supportability costs of defense weapon systems 

and reduce manufacturing and repair cycle times across the life cycles of 

such systems. The Secretary shall use the joint planning process of the 

directors of the Department of Defense laboratories in establishing the 

program. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 

shall administer the program. 

(b) PURPOSE OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall use the 

program— 

(1) to provide centralized guidance and direction (including 

goals, milestones, and priorities) to the military 

departments and the Defense Agencies on all matters 

relating to manufacturing technology; 

(2) to direct the development and implementation of 

Department of Defense plans, programs, projects, 

activities, and policies that promote the development 

and application of advanced technologies to 

manufacturing processes, tools, and equipment; 

(3) to improve the manufacturing quality, productivity, 

technology, and practices of businesses and workers 

providing goods and services to the Department of 

Defense; 

(4) to focus Department of Defense support for the 

development and application of advanced manufacturing 

technologies and processes for use to meet manufacturing 

requirements that are essential to the national defense, 
 

APPENDIX E _________________________________________________________________ 

50 

as well as for repair and remanufacturing in support of 

the operations of systems commands, depots, air 

logistics centers, and shipyards;

(5) to disseminate information concerning improved 

manufacturing improvement concepts, including 

information on such matters as best manufacturing 

practices, product data exchange specifications, 

computer-aided acquisition and logistics support, and 

rapid acquisition of manufactured parts; 

(6) to sustain and enhance the skills and capabilities of 

the manufacturing work force; 

(7) to promote high-performance work systems (with 

development and dissemination of production technologies 

that build upon the skills and capabilities of the work 

force), high levels of worker education and training; 

and 

(8) to ensure appropriate coordination between the 

manufacturing technology programs and industrial 

preparedness programs of the Department of Defense and 

similar programs undertaken by other departments and 

agencies of the Federal Government or by the private 

sector. 

(c) EXECUTION.— 

(1) The Secretary may carry out projects under the program 

through the Secretaries of the military departments and 

the heads of the Defense Agencies. 

(2) In the establishment and review of requirements for an 

advanced manufacturing technology or process, the 

Secretary shall ensure the participation of those 

prospective technology users that are expected to be the 

users of that technology or process. 

(3) The Secretary shall ensure that each project under the 

program for the development of an advanced manufacturing 

technology or process includes an implementation plan 

for the transition of that technology or process to the 

prospective technology users that will be the users of 

that technology or process. 

(4) In the periodic review of a project under the program, 

the Secretary shall ensure participation by those 

prospective technology users that are the expected users 

for the technology or process being developed under the 

project. 

(5) In order to promote increased dissemination and end use 

of manufacturing technology throughout the national 

defense technology and industrial base, the Secretary 

shall seek, to the maximum extent practicable, the 
_______________________________________________MANTECH ESTABLISHING LEGISLATION

51

participation of manufacturers of manufacturing 

equipment in the projects under the program. 

(6) In this subsection, the term `prospective technology 

users' means the following officials and elements of the 

Department of Defense: 

(A) Program and project managers for defense 

weapon systems. 

(B) Systems commands. 

(C) Depots. 

(D) Air logistics centers. 

(E) Shipyards. 

(d) COMPETITION AND COST SHARING.— 

(1) In accordance with the policy stated in section 2374 of 

this title, competitive procedures shall be used for 

awarding all grants and entering into all contracts, 

cooperative agreements, and other transactions under the 

program. 

(3) Under the competitive procedures used, the factors to be 

considered in the evaluation of each proposed grant, 

contract, cooperative agreement, or other transaction 

for a project under the program shall include the extent 

to which that proposed transaction provides for the 

proposed recipient to share in the cost of the project. 

For a project for which the Government receives an offer 

from only one offeror, the contracting officer shall 

negotiate the ratio of contract recipient cost to 

Government cost that represents the best value to the 

Government. 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

52 

APPENDIX F. OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY 

MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

This appendix provides an overview of the military service and 

defense agency Manufacturing Technology Programs. Summaries 

cover the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency, and 

Missile Defense Agency. 

ARMY MANTECH PROGRAM

The Army ManTech Program supports the development of 

essential manufacturing technologies that will enable more 

producible new technologies with reliable processes and higher yield, 

reduce the risk in transitioning military-unique manufacturing 

processes to production, and provide solutions enabling affordability 

of Future Force weapons systems. 

The primary focus of the Army ManTech Program is the Future 

Combat Systems and the Future Force, through Manufacturing 

Technology Objectives that support Army Technology Objectives. 

The program also will continue to support other weapon system 

projects that are deemed high priority for the Army. The Army 

actively participates in the Department of Defense Joint Defense 

Manufacturing Technology Panel to coordinate ManTech efforts and 

maximize leverage of ManTech funding across the military services, 

Defense Logistics Agency, and Missile Defense Agency. 

The Army ManTech Program supports process prototyping and 

pilot demonstration to develop or modify manufacturing 

technologies to support the production of Army weapon systems. 

Before Army ManTech funds are committed to an effort, the program 

manager of the target application weapon system must demonstrate 

that their acquisition strategy includes a realistic plan to implement 

the technology in the defense industrial base. 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

53

Organization 

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology has overall responsibility for the Army ManTech 

Program. Within this office, the Director for Technology is charged 

with program oversight. 

The Research, Development and Engineering Command 

(RDECOM), a subordinate command of the Army Materiel 

Command, has been further designated as the Army’s ManTech 

Program Manager. The Systems of Systems Integration organization 

within RDECOM performs this function with a small staff that 

provides direction to the Army’s four Research, Development and 

Engineering Centers (RDECs), the Natick Soldier Center (NSC), and 

the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). The ManTech managers at the 

RDECs, NSC, and ARL are responsible for detailed program management and execution of individual ManTech projects in coordination 

with the Army Technology Objective managers. This approach 

allows the Army to take advantage of technical expertise within the 

RDECs, NSC, and ARL and to maintain close contact with both the 

acquisition managers and the corresponding technology managers. 

Investment Areas 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and 

Technology has funded the most critical areas for ManTech 

investment to address Future Combat Systems/Brigade Combat 

Team requirements for the Future Force. The areas include the 

following: 

 Sensors. To include dual-band cooled focal plane 

arrays, low-cost uncooled infrared sensors, and 

flexible display manufacturing. 

 Electronics and Power Systems. To include pulsed 

power for advanced protection systems, compact 

power and energy storage, high current silicon 

carbide switches, phase shifters for phased radar 

arrays, and software defined radios. 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

54 

 Armor. To include affordable lightweight structural 

and appliqué armor, and titanium for lightweight 

armament and ground vehicles. 

 Munitions. To include low-cost, high-g force, high 

accuracy inertial measurement units based on 

microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) 

technology, durable gun barrels and armaments, 

and MEMS safe-and-arm for fuse technology. 

The Army ManTech Program uses contracts with industry, 

cooperative research and development agreements, cost sharing 

arrangements, other transaction agreements, and DOD 

manufacturing centers of excellence to execute its manufacturing 

technology objectives. 

 Website 

The URL for the Army Manufacturing Technology Program 

website is: http://www.armymantech.com. 

NAVY MANTECH PROGRAM

Managed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Navy 

ManTech Program provides a mechanism for developing enabling 

manufacturing technology and for implementing this technology for 

the production, repair, and maintenance of Navy weapon systems to 

support the fleet. The program is aimed at achieving affordability in 

weapon systems acquisition by inserting manufacturing process 

solutions early in the design phase in order to reduce life-cycle costs, 

improve schedules, and ensure quality. 

By providing seed funding for the development of moderate to 

high-risk process and equipment technology, the ManTech Program 

permits contractors to upgrade their manufacturing capabilities. 

Working with defense contractors, the Naval Research Enterprise, 

and academia, the Navy ManTech Program promotes the 

development of improved processes and equipment, successful 

implementation on the factory floor for the affordable production of 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

55

defense materiel, and rapid transition to the fleet to support Navy 

warfighters. The program is structured to provide maximum 

dissemination of the results of manufacturing technology projects 

and to promote early implementation to strengthen the defense 

industrial base. 

The Navy ManTech program supports the fleet by focusing 

resources on key, high-priority acquisition platforms; developing 

critical manufacturing, repair, and sustainment to support those 

platforms; involving relevant industry partners upfront to identify 

technical needs, schedule, and requirements for implementation; and 

focusing on transition as a key measure of success. 

Objectives 

The overall objective of the Navy ManTech Program is to 

significantly improve the affordability of Department of the Navy 

systems by engaging in manufacturing initiatives that address the 

entire weapon system life-cycle and to transition that technology to 

industry and the fleet. More specifically, DOD 4200.15 states 

investments should accomplish the following: 

 Transition emerging S&T results to acquisition 

programs 

 Improve industrial capabilities in production, 

maintenance, repair, and industrial base 

responsiveness 

 Advance manufacturing technology to reduce cost, 

improve performance, and responsiveness 

Customers of the Navy ManTech Program are many. They range 

from the acquisition system program executive officers and program 

managers responsible for transitioning major Navy weapon systems 

from development into production, to the logistics managers at the 

naval depots and shipyards responsible for repair, overhaul, and 

remanufacture of major weapon systems. Other customers of the 

Navy ManTech Program include the other Services, industry, and 

academia. 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

56 

Centers of Excellence 

The Navy ManTech Program has established centers of excellence 

(COEs) to provide focal points for the development and technology 

transfer of new manufacturing processes and equipment in a 

cooperative environment with industry, academia, and the Naval 

Research Enterprise. The COEs perform the following functions: 

 Serve as corporate residences of expertise in 

particular technological areas 

 Collaborate with the program executive offices and 

industry to identify and resolve manufacturing 

issues 

 Develop and demonstrate manufacturing 

technology solutions for identified Navy 

manufacturing requirements 

 Provide consulting services to naval industrial 

activities and industry 

 Facilitate the transfer of developed manufacturing 

technologies

Planning and Execution 

To support the evolving needs of naval forces and make wise 

investments, the ManTech Program Office restructured operations in 

fiscal year 2004. The ManTech Program implemented the Naval 

Integrated Systems Investment Strategy. The majority of yearly 

program resources support this new strategy, with the balance 

supporting diversified, long-term corporate investments. The 

Integrated Systems Investment Strategy ensures that the Navy 

ManTech investment aggressively addresses the highest priority 

manufacturing issues of select high-priority acquisition programs. 

Investments are focused on those systems earlier in the 

development cycle for maximum impact. Rather than supporting 

every program with funding that falls short of the level where 

ManTech can be productive, ManTech now concentrates on a select 

few systems with a series of focused investments. While naval 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

57

weapon systems not included on the Navy ManTech investment list 

do have important manufacturing needs, there are insufficient 

resources to have maximum impact for all. 

This sharply focused investment strategy will ensure that 

technology is transitioned to those higher priority systems to benefit 

Navy warfighters. Implementation of the new Integrated Systems 

Investment Strategy began in fiscal year 2004 concentrating on three 

initial program executive offices (PEOs) and platforms: PEO(Ships) 

for DD(X); PEO(Carriers) for CVN 21; and Joint Unmanned Combat 

Air System. For fiscal year 2005 the Littoral Combat Ship was added 

to the Integrated Systems Investment Strategy resulting in the 

configuration shown in figure F-1. 

Figure F-1. Fiscal Year 2005 Navy ManTech Integrated Systems 

Investment Strategy 

Additionally, ManTech will be working more closely with ONR's 

Future Naval Capabilities on requirements-driven, transitionoriented 6.3 and late stage 6.2 programs of interest to the targeted 

PEOs. Often these S&T programs have promising technology in need 

of process advancements before transition can be achieved. Where 

complementary, ManTech can provide expertise in solving these 

process technology issues associated with the new Future Naval 

Primary Emphasis 

PEO (Subs) 

SSN 

SSGN 

PEO (T)

F-18 Family 

EA-18G

PEO (IWS)

Missiles 

Weapons 

Munitions 

PEO (Ships) 

DD(X) Family 

PEO (Carriers)

CVN 21 

PEO (Ships)

LCS

Primary investment strategy supports key naval assets 

PEO (Ships)

LPD 17 

DDG 51 

J-UCAS

J-UCAS 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

58 

Capability products, particularly those issues with an impact on 

product affordability and, therefore, successful transition to the fleet. 

To coordinate planning and execution efforts, Navy ManTech has 

identified ManTech liaisons for each PEO thrust area. These liaisons 

work closely with the PEO representatives and ONR S&T liaisons, as 

well as the centers of excellence and key system integrators 

(industry), to ensure that ManTech is focusing its investments on the 

highest priority needs and that progress is being made towards 

successful and timely transition to the fleet. 

AIR FORCE MANTECH PROGRAM

The ManTech program is chartered by U.S.C. Title 10, section 2521 

and implemented by DODD 4200.15. The purpose of the program is 

to enable a robust industrial base for affordable warfighter weapon 

systems, and provide advanced manufacturing capabilities to 

multiple weapon systems. The goals of the program are to reduce 

acquisition and sustainment costs; reduce cycle time for technology 

transition, manufacturing, and repair; and improve quality, 

productivity, and business practices. The program focuses 

investments on those beyond the normal risk for industry and system 

program offices. ManTech directly supports administration, 

Congressional, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force 

industrial base policies. 

Organization 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems 

and Concepts provides DOD policy and program oversight for the 

ManTech program, on behalf of USD (AT&L). Within the Air Force, 

program management responsibility is assigned to Air Force Materiel 

Command (AFMC), with execution performed centrally by the 

Manufacturing Technology Division, Materials & Manufacturing 

Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/MLM), Wright 

Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. AFRL/MLM also executes OSD’s 

Defense Production Act Title III program, Defense Production Act 

Title I, Air Force Industrial Base Assessments program, and AFMC 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

59

Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages 

program, as an integrated Air Force Industrial Preparedness 

Program. 

Requirements and Planning 

Technical requirements, priorities, and investment planning are 

developed in partnership with AFRL, Air Force program executive 

officers (PEO), ALCs, major commands, and industry. Technology 

transition requirements are identified and developed in partnership 

with AFRL. Acquisition and sustainment requirements are identified 

and developed through integrated product teams in each customer 

“sector”: aeronautical; sustainment; armament; directed energy; 

command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and 

space. Key criteria for investment decision are warfighter capability 

impacts, pervasive system applications, and stakeholder 

implementation commitment. Requirements and plans are 

coordinated and approved by HQ AFRL, HQ AFMC, and SAF/AQR. 

Future investments for the Air Force ManTech program will be 

focused in four key areas: 

 Manufacturing readiness investments for advanced 

technology demonstration programs to expedite 

technology transition 

 PEO program affordability and producibility 

investments to solve pervasive manufacturing issues 

and reduce acquisition program risk 

 Sustainment and readiness investments to improve 

costs and cycle time for both repair and supply 

missions 

 Industry partnership investments to resolve critical 

industrial base issues for entire industry segments 

throughout the acquisition life cycle 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

60 

Recent Impacts for Air Force Warfighters 

The ManTech program has had significant influence in the Air 

Force, improving warfighter capability in many areas, as the 

examples below illustrate. 

 Enabled JDAM production to meet warfighter 

requirement by establishing “lean” efficiencies at 

several key JDAM suppliers. As a result surge 

production increased from 300 to 3,000 per month. 

This increased capability helped meet warfighter 

needs and improved quality. 

 Increased number of F-15’s and C-5’s available for 

mission by reducing programmed depot 

maintenance cycle times at WR-ALC. As a result of 

the shorter maintenance time, an additional 

squadron of mission capable F-15s is now available 

to the warfighter. In addition, C-5 on time delivery 

increased from 25 to 100 percent. F-15 on-time 

delivery increased from 12 to 80 percent. 

 Improved manufacturing of Viper Laser for Large 

Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures program enabled 

early fielding of 12 C-17s in direct support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, 28 million in 

savings were realized, with production costs 

reduced by 40 percent. In addition, improved power 

output and reliability increased aircraft 

survivability. 

 Established second source for panoramic night 

vision goggles image intensifier tubes. The second 

source increased industrial base capacity to meet 

DOD demand. Goggle acquisition cost was reduced 

20 percent. 

 Partnered with program office to develop and 

implement lean production processes at Joint 

Programmable Fuze contractor facility. The process 

improvements that were implemented had a direct 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

61

impact on a successful first article acceptance test 

(before Air Force ManTech involved, prior 3 tests 

failed). Production ramped up to 500 per month 

providing the Air Force and Navy with more 

capable munitions (before Air Force ManTech 

involved, production was 0/month). 

 Resolved JASSM production bottleneck by 

developing a new missile body process yielding 25 

percent throughput increase as well as $19 million 

cost reduction. 

 Resolved B-2 low observable coating issue, which 

eliminated the number one B-2 maintenance issue 

and increased fleet mission availability by 50 

percent. 

 Increased FOD damage resistance of F101 (B-1) and 

F119 (F/A-22) engines via new laser shock peening 

treatment for blades. This process reduced the risk 

of engine losses and reduced field inspections for 

F101 that powers the B-1B. As a result, a costly 

redesign of F119 engine that powers F/A-22 was 

avoided. 

Examples of On-Going Investments 

The following are examples of on-going investments in the Air 

Force ManTech program. 

 Active electronically scanned array radar. Making nextgeneration radars affordable and reliable for air and 

space applications; $650M total cost reduction target 

across F/A-22, F-35, F-15, B-2, others. 

 Data links. Developing production capability for 

affordable, highly-available ground stations, high 

band-width optical transceivers, and multi-access 

space terminals. Provides global situational 

awareness for existing and planned weapon systems 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

62 

and simultaneous distribution of sensor data for 

shorter, more efficient kill chain. 

 Engine rotor life extension. Establishing nextgeneration “retirement for cause” technology at 

depots, which will extend parts life to engine service 

life for over 45,000 F100 and F110 engine 

components; cost avoidance of ~$550 million over 

next 20 years. 

 Affordable precision guided munitions components. 

Developing improvements for affordable and 

producible critical common components of nextgeneration precision guided munitions; targeting 

choke points such as thermal batteries, fuzes, 

guidance, and seeker systems. 

DLA MANTECH PROGRAM

The Defense Logistics Agency is the DOD’s combat support 

agency for logistics, providing the military services with food, 

clothing, medical, energy, barrier material, and weapon system spare 

parts. The agency’s R&D program is aligned to the major supply 

chains that support these critical warfighting capabilities. The DLA 

Manufacturing Technology Program is organized along the different 

supply chains that provide materiel for the Services as shown in table 

F-1. 

Table F-1. ManTech Program Supply Chain Alignment 

Supply 

Chain 

Clothing 

& Textiles Subsistence Const/Equip Maritime Land Aviation 

Electronics Acquisition

Castings ManTech 

Program 

Apparel 

Research 

Network 

Combat 

Rations 

Network Forgings 

Each supply chain has its own particular manufacturing 

challenges and the programs are individually tailored to address 

these needs. Two of the chains, clothing and textiles and combat 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

63

rations, are supplied by industries that are totally dependent on DOD 

business. The castings and forgings supply chains are typically 

second- or lower-tier suppliers to the end item producers, who are 

often also small businesses. The DLA Electronics Availability 

program focuses on obsolescence mitigation by partnering with a 

U.S. microcircuit foundry to create a source for otherwise obsolete 

integrated circuits. 

DLA’s ManTech program has achieved great success since its 

inception, as described in the following examples: 

 The clothing and textiles program has successfully 

integrated 3-D whole-body scanning into the recruit 

induction process as well as achieved complete 

supply-chain integration for recruit clothing. The 

result has been a dramatic increase in supply 

availability while achieving $87 million in inventory 

reductions. 

 The combat rations program has significantly 

improved the delivery of rations by increasing 

quality, surge, manufacturability, and the cost 

effectiveness of an increasingly wide variety of 

rations. 

 The acquisition electronics program has broken the 

obsolescence cycle that results when non-procurable 

microcircuits cause costly weapons system 

redesigns. ManTech developed a flexible 

manufacturing capability that has delivered over 

75,000 form, fit, and function devices to 375 

operating systems. 

 The castings program has developed technology that 

has supported 96 weapon systems with over 950 

part-types that, before ManTech, had extremely long 

production lead times. The program has directly 

supported 63 military program offices and 

laboratories with problem solving and education on 

the proper application of casting technology. It also 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

64 

enjoys the strong support of every U.S. casting 

association. 

 The forgings program has developed and populated 

a national commercial database of forging tools that 

are required to produce military spare parts. The 

availability of this data has resulted in significantly 

lower lead times and cost avoidance. It has also 

contributed to higher-level assembly forging issues 

at the weapons-system level. 

The DLA ManTech Program has an excellent track record of 

providing solutions to difficult DLA supply-chain problems and 

supporting industries that are critical to DOD’s warfighting 

capability. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 

AND PRODUCIBILITY PROGRAM

The Directorate for Producibility and Manufacturing Technology 

(MDA/MP), in the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), is responsible for 

system-wide producibility analysis and manufacturing risk 

assessment and mitigation for the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS). MP provides MDA a corporate organization that identifies 

common BMDS program risks and methods for reducing those risks 

and inserting lower-cost, more producible components into BMDS 

systems. The directorate’s focus provides production-ready 

technologies to BMDS elements in support of the MDA’s near term 

capabilities-based acquisition strategy. 

MP’s emphasis is on near-term measures that respond to 

changing BMDS requirements. With the initial deployment of the 

Ground Based Interceptor, there is a keener focus on BMDS element 

life cycle cost and on developing a BMDS with sufficient versatility to 

meet the evolving threat. This goal is achieved by concentrating on 

technologies that have demonstrated producibility, are applicable to 

multiple elements, have the potential to be inserted into elements in 

the near-term (one to three years), and support open system design 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

65

architecture. The Directorate also serves as the MDA focal point for 

manufacturing and industrial base issues. 

Investment Strategy 

MP provides manufacturing assurance to the BMDS. MP–funded 

and leveraged investments have helped reduce the cost and improve 

the quality and reliability of PAC-3, GMD, SM-3 and THAAD. MP 

plays an important role in National Security Space industrial base 

activities. Joint efforts with AF/SMC and OGA have identified top 

priority, common issues that will impact future space systems and 

formulated plans for the way ahead. 

To achieve the mission set forth for the Directorate, MDA/MP has 

identified key investment areas where SBIR topics and MDA/MP 

core-funded projects are complemented. A process is in place that 

provides a continuous and stable budget for these key investment 

areas, while preserving the MDA/MP goal for near-term insertion 

and integration of mature projects into the BMDS. 

By managing investments through the structured approach of key 

investment areas, MP can access, synthesize, and analyze data from 

various sources; identify and interact with key industry, Service and 

government laboratory participants; and formulate MP program 

guidance. The Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Levels 

(EMRLs), developed within MDA/MP, assist the key investment area 

teams in assessing the maturity of funded technologies in order to 

ensure the successful transition/insertion of the manufacturing 

improvement or technology into the BMDS. 

MP has implemented incentives for improving quality and 

producibility. MDA and the BMDS elements now use Engineering 

Manufacturing Readiness Levels (EMRLs) as a program metric. MDA 

elements have also adopted the use of supply chain tools, web-based 

intelligent specifications and standards, and lean enterprise practices. 
 

APPENDIX F _________________________________________________________________ 

66 

Small Business Innovation Research Leverage 

MP has recognized that substantial benefits are gained by 

leveraging SBIR/STTR investment in manufacturing and 

producibility. MP is credited by many of the BMDS Elements as 

being responsive to their needs in supporting investments in areas 

that provide affordable solutions to common problems. The 

combination of using core funding with SBIR/STTR investment helps 

reduce risk and mature technology to increase the likelihood of 

technology/product transition to a prime or OEM is increased. MP 

will continue to use this model to help insure a viable industrial base 

with the ability to supply affordable, high quality products to the 

BMDS. 

MDA/MP provides topics to the SBIR office to include in the 

overall MDA solicitation. The number of topics varies by offering 

year and the content of each topic is designed to complement the key 

investment areas. MDA/MP has a vested interest in this program as a 

promising source of technology and invites companies to share both 

Phase I and II projects with prime contractors at industry days, 

organized by MDA/MP. This venue provides a technical exchange 

between the small business and prime contractor that aids in 

facilitating the transition of SBIR projects into BMDS systems. 

Summary 

MDA’s Manufacturing Technology and Producibility Directorate 

is a unique organization in the DOD. The small cadre of individuals 

which comprise MP provide vision and leadership, strategic 

planning, program/project architecture, and policies and procedures. 

MP’s connections with BMDS element, prime and subcontractors, 

suppliers, and possible suppliers have taken years to develop. The 

key investment area approach of grouping issues and opportunities 

has allowed MP to make leveraged investments using both 

technology push and system demand pull to upgrade portions of the 

BMDS elements. Table F-2 shows the fiscal year 2005 program related 

to manufacturing technology and producibility for MDA/MP. 
________________________________________ OVERVIEW OF SERVICE AND AGENCY PROGRAMS

67

Table F-2. MP–Leveraged Budget for Fiscal Year 2005 

BUDGET CATEGORY MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

MP Core Funding 33.270 

Congressional Adds 3.850 

SBIR/STTR 35.000 

Title III (Cost Match) 6.500 (27.0) 

Other 22.500 

 Total 101.120 

MP’s key investment areas tackle the issues others are concerned 

about, but have difficulty dealing with across the entire 

manufacturing enterprise. Examples include batteries, production 

improvements, identifying alternative sources for lost manufacturing 

capability, and driving competition into all levels of BMDS 

acquisition. 
 

APPENDIX G _________________________________________________________________ 

68 

APPENDIX G. IMPACT OF THE MANUFACTURING 

TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: SELECTED SUCCESS 

STORIES

This appendix provides further detail on the impact of the 

Manufacturing Technology Program with brief summaries of selected 

success stories. It includes examples of Service and agency ManTech 

projects as well as examples of some of the successes achieved in the 

early years of the program that had major impact in both DOD and 

industry. 

THE EARLY YEARS

A number of important advances in manufacturing technology 

began with ManTech Program investments. The following are a few 

examples: 

 The numerically-controlled machine tool industry. In the 

1950s, ManTech provided funding to the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology to develop 

the first numerically-controlled machine tool and 

associated programming language. These machines 

are now vital to every weapon system. 

 Laid the foundation for the current microelectronics 

industry. During the 1960s, ManTech funded key 

technologies that led to the production of Texas 

Instrument’s first integrated circuit calculator. Other 

investments supported development of numerous 

key processes and equipment for microelectronics 

manufacture. 

 Accelerated the development of smart weapons. ManTech 

teamed with the S&T community in the 1970s to 

develop processes that led to precision laser-guided 

missiles and munitions. 
_____________________________________________________ MANTECH SUCCESS STORIES

69

 Night vision capability. Early investments in image 

intensifier tubes led to a comprehensive night vision 

development program for surveillance, 

reconnaissance, and target acquisition. 

Lean Manufacturing 

 The implementation of “lean manufacturing” in DOD and its 

supporting industrial base can trace its roots to ManTech 

investments. In 1993, Air Force ManTech collaborated with the 

Commander of the Aeronautical System Division, industry, and the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology to establish the Lean Aircraft 

Initiative (LAI). The purpose of the initiative was to learn about, and 

adapt to aircraft development and production, the lean methods that 

Toyota had been using so successfully to reduce the cost and lead 

time for developing and producing high-quality automobiles. 

LAI has been extremely successful in developing and adapting 

lean practices and tools and sharing lessons learned. Most members 

would credit LAI with accelerating by many years their progress in 

adopting lean techniques. LAI remains strong in 2005 and continues 

without ManTech funding. 

Many projects have been funded by the Air Force and Navy 

ManTech programs to expand and validate lean practices in military 

applications. Investments exceed $70 million and have been beneficial 

to all of DOD and the defense industrial base. Success stories of lean 

manufacturing applications that benefited from ManTech 

investments, directly or indirectly, are numerous. The following are a 

few examples: 

 The Navy’s Lean Pathways program has 

successfully promoted lean practices in a variety of 

applications that range from on-board aircraft 

handling of spare parts to streamlining the supplier 

base for acquisition programs such as the SLAM-ER. 

 JDAM has experienced a 63 percent reduction in cost 

as compared to initial estimates for a savings of $2.6 
 

APPENDIX G _________________________________________________________________ 

70 

billion. In addition, surge capacity at nine key 

suppliers increased ten fold from 300 to 3,000 per 

month. 

 For the F-15, shorter depot repair times returned 22 

aircraft for mission duty (equivalent of one full 

squadron). 

 M1 Main Battle Tank maintenance was 40 percent 

short of customer need (6 per week versus 10). With 

the application of lean techniques customer needs 

are being met and an 85 tank backlog eliminated 

within original budget estimates. 

 C-17 unit price decreased 30 percent on final 80 

aircraft ($6.5 billion savings). 

 Recapitalization on the HMMWV line sped up 

sharply, from 12 to 200 vehicles per month. 

 For the ATLAS program, launch vehicle lead time 

reduced 63 percent (from 48.5 to 18 months). 

ARMY

Composite Body Armor 

Army investments in the late 1990s enabled PM Soldier and the 

Marine Corps Systems Command to consider composite body armor 

as an affordable solution. The Army demonstrated processing of 

silicon and boron carbide materials, reducing plate cost (from $850 to 

$350) and improving manufacturing throughput. The weight of the 

armor was also reduced by 50 percent. Once the initial body armor 

system was fielded, demand for the system grew quickly; today, 

production is in the hundreds of thousands. The Army ManTech 

invested $450,000 in this program. 

Affordable IR Sensors 

The Army ManTech program has led to improved night vision 

capabilities that are important to the survivability and lethality of 
_____________________________________________________ MANTECH SUCCESS STORIES

71

deployed combat units. This work has had an impact on numerous 

systems, with examples as follows: 

 The Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance 

System (LRAS3) provides the ability to distinguish 

enemy vehicles beyond ranges of other systems. 

Improvements have been made in manufacturing 

processes and reliability for the Dewar and focal 

plan array subsystems, increasing identification 

range for targets and improving resolution. The 

system was reliable with most crews running it 24 

hours a day for weeks at a time during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. 

 The Javelin command launch unit has been used as a 

primary surveillance and night vision device for 

light forces in Afghanistan. ManTech investments in 

the Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly and 

Linear Drive Coolers have doubled the reliability of 

Javelin coolers and reduced acquisition costs by an 

estimated $38 million. 

For these initiatives, ManTech invested $9.7 million from 1990 

through 1999. A more recent example is the Army ManTech work in 

the production of uncooled focal plane array, which has resulted in 

increased surveillance and target ranges at lower cost. Improved 

manufacturing processes are now being inserted directly into the 

lines producing Driver Vision Enhancer and Thermal Weapon Sights. 

These systems are in extremely high demand in the Afghanistan and 

Iraqi theater of operations and ManTech investments are significantly 

reducing the cost of these systems. The uncooled focal plane array 

cost is presently $4,000 and is on track to meet the goal of $2,000. 

Baseline cost is $16,000 per unit. The total ManTech investment for 

this focal plane array production effort is $15.3 million. 

Stryker Turret Gunner Protection 

With investments from the ManTech program, the Army has 

fielded titanium Stryker cupola shields to support operations in Iraq. 
 

APPENDIX G _________________________________________________________________ 

72 

Funded from fiscal year 2001–2006 at $10.3 million, this project 

specifically addresses material cost and manufacturing processes for 

single-melt titanium, robotic welding, and laser hybrid welding. 

Using approximately 100,000 pounds of titanium plate and the 

technology advancements developed under the ManTech program, 

the Army RDECOM Armaments Research, Development and 

Engineering Center is manufacturing low-rate initial production 

quantities in house. A total of 406 sets, plus spares will outfit all six 

Stryker brigades. Without ManTech’s investment, this solution would 

not have been affordable. 

Cannon Tube Reshaping 

Under the Cannon Tube Reshaping Manufacturing Technology 

Objective, the Army demonstrated a process to measure and 

straighten M1 tank barrels to a “fleet zero,” that is accurate across the 

entire inventory of M1 tanks. With this improvement, the tanks can 

shoot rounds on target with much greater accuracy. This 

improvement has led to the greatest increase in the “loss-exchange 

ratio” (the ratio of enemy to friendly tanks destroyed) in more than 

20 years—since the introduction of night vision technology in the 

1980s. The program has developed a system that will be installed at 

Benet Labs/Watervliet Arsenal and a mobile system that will allow 

in-theater reshaping. The total Army ManTech investment was $7.4 

million. 

NAVY

PRC-112 Survival Radios 

The AN/PRC-112 is a small, hand-held transceiver that provides 

voice and covert transponder identification and serves as well as a 

navigational aid. The modules were originally designed as throwaway items containing proprietary components, which was both 

expensive (at over $1,200 each) and led to delivery delays due to long 

lead times of four to six months. Difficulties in fielding the radios to 

Army and Navy units in Afghanistan led CECOM to request 

assistance from the Electronics Manufacturing Productivity Facility 
_____________________________________________________ MANTECH SUCCESS STORIES

73

(EMPF) to engineer a rework procedure for repairing faulty 

transmitter modules found in the radios. 

With less than $5 in off-the-shelf replacement components and 

approximately $120 in labor (per module), radios with a faulty 

module were returned to the field at one-tenth the cost and much 

more rapidly than replacement through new module procurement. 

The identified rework procedure has become common practice at 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, and meets the 50 percent recovery goal for 

module refurbishment. Of 156 radios needing repair, 80 were 

successfully repaired in a two-month period; following that time 

about 50 percent of an additional 250 radios were successfully 

repaired. The procedure continued in use until the PRC-D model 

radio was made available. 

Range Finder 

The monoblock laser is a key enabling component in the U.S. 

Army’s COBRA Multi-Function Laser System for the Land Warrior 

Program. The typical manufacturing process for laser transmitters 

incorporates a large number of components that are individually 

fabricated, machined, mounted, and precisely aligned by skilled 

labor—making these components highly costly and available in 

limited production quantities. In a joint Service effort with the Army, 

the Navy Electro-Optics Center optimized the manufacturing process 

critical to producing reliable and cost-effective monoblock laser 

assemblies. With this new process, the cost of the range-finder 

transmitter has been reduced by over 65 percent, from $6,300 to less 

than $2,000, with production quantities for new systems at 50,000. In 

addition, 25 units were successfully integrated on the M119A1 gun, 

providing range information that increased the percentage of first 

round hits. These systems have been sent to both Afghanistan and 

Iraq. 

Night Vision 

Night vision systems are limited in their effective range, requiring 

operators to get close to their target. A Navy ManTech project was 
 

APPENDIX G _________________________________________________________________ 

74 

initiated to provide a longer-range capability for night vision systems 

with the goal of improving mission performance and optimizing 

manufacturing processes to reduce system costs. Optical Systems 

Technology, Inc., with guidance from the Electro-Optics Center, 

designed and developed three new night vision components; made 

manufacturing improvements for the Universal Night Sight; 

integrated a high-performance, uncooled infrared focal plane array 

into a hand-held shared aperture dual band sensor; and developed a 

long-range lightweight lens for use on nighttime surveillance systems 

for the next generation of components for night sight programs. The 

Universal Night Sight is now produced at 60 percent of its original 

cost and provides longer-range capability. This improved system is 

currently in use by special operations forces in both Afghanistan and 

in Iraq. 

Thermal Batteries 

The military uses thermal batteries to power sonobuoys, guided 

artillery, missiles, guidance systems, and countermeasure devices. 

Current thermal battery manufacturing practices do not meet the 

Navy’s cost and production requirements, thereby limiting the 

number of weapon systems that can be purchased and deployed by 

the Navy. The objective of this ManTech project was to reduce the 

battery cost and improve the manufacturing process and quality. 

Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock, Eagle Picher, and the 

Navy Metalworking Center identified the cost drivers associated with 

manufacturing thermal batteries. Technologies that reduce cost and 

improve the manufacturing process and thermal battery quality were 

designed, manufactured, and implemented on the thermal battery 

that powers the JDAM guidance kit and other weapon systems. These 

included a battery cell component-stacking device, press features for 

improved die fill and reduced powder leakage, hopper system, 

tooling materials, and coatings. The estimated cost reduction per unit 

is 22 percent. This reduction translates into a cost avoidance of $29 

million over a five-year period for the sonobuoy program and $24 

million over the lifetime procurement of the JDAM, JSOW, and 

Paveway. In addition, the increased production capacity results in 
_____________________________________________________ MANTECH SUCCESS STORIES

75

availability of an additional 7,400 AN/SSQ-62E or 2,900 JDAM per 

month. 

AIR FORCE

Anti-Missile System 

Air Force ManTech, under contract with Northrop Grumman, has 

successfully developed and deployed significant cost saving 

procedures in the manufacture and assembly of the ViperTM MidInfrared (IR) Laser. The ViperTM Mid-IR Laser is one of the primary 

components in the Large Aircraft IR Countermeasures system, 

designed to protect C-17s, C-130s and other large aircraft from IRguided surface-to-air missiles. The improvements are expected to 

result in a net savings of $4.2 million in the acquisition costs alone—a 

200 percent return on the ManTech investment of $2.1 million. This 

cost savings is accompanied by reliability improvements and a 

dramatic increase in yield, which are expected to result in reductions 

in life cycle costs and increased system availability. Most important, 

ManTech investments made this LAIRCM capability upgrade 

available to outfit 12 C-17 aircraft in time for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom increasing the survivability of these critical assets and their 

crews. 

C-17 Landing Gear Doors 

An increase in failure rates for C-17 main landing gear doors has 

become a major contributor to reduced mission capability of the 

aircraft. The AFRL Materials and Manufacturing Directorate and Air 

Vehicles Directorate, in cooperation with The Boeing Company, have 

successfully developed and implemented a durable composite C-17 

main landing gear door that resolves the C-17s number one airframe 

maintenance problem, saves more than $6 million in life cycle costs, 

and increases mission readiness days by 90 per year. A result of the 

Composites Affordability Initiative (CAI) C-17 technology transition 

demonstration program, the new main landing gear doors 

incorporate several advanced manufacturing technologies and an 

improved design that will increase reliability by 40 percent. 
 

APPENDIX G _________________________________________________________________ 

76 

Turbine Engine Components 

Historically, methods for predicting the life of gas turbine engine 

rotor components have resulted in a conservative estimate of useful 

life. The “retirement for cause” program developed, integrated, and 

deployed advanced inspection and life-estimating technologies that 

are in use today at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center permitting 

longer service life for many safety-critical, high-value components on 

the F-15, F-16, B-1B, and B-2. 

This program—a collaboration between Air Force ManTech, 

materials S&T, and logistics centers—is also credited with enhancing 

safety, increasing inspection throughput, and introducing damage 

tolerance and probabilistic concepts-of-life management for engines. 

The program has realized more than $1 billion in cost savings. A 

related ManTech effort, Engine Rotor Life Extension, is currently 

working to create and implement the technology to further extend 

the life of these components and address the more complex rotor 

geometries of advanced engines for the F/A-22 and F-35, for an 

additional $550 million in savings. 

Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar 

Advanced aircraft require active array radar to detect and track 

multiple targets. These radars also offer improvements in reliability, 

lower maintenance cost, and reduced size and weight. Active element 

phased array systems using transmit/receive modules was a 

promising technology for ground-based, airborne, and space-based 

radar applications. Air Force ManTech investments with Hughes 

Aircraft accelerated the transition of this technology from S&T into 

production and fielding. The program reduced the transmit/receive 

module assembly time by a factor of 200, reduced the number of 

interconnects by almost 90 percent, and decreased test time from 17 

hours to less than 10 minutes. Collectively, these improvements 

reduced the cost of the most expensive component of AESA radars by 

a factor of 35, making them practical for application to the F/A-22 

and other DOD aircraft such as the F-15. Newer generations of AESA 

radar are now on the drawing board. A current ManTech effort is 
_____________________________________________________ MANTECH SUCCESS STORIES

77

working to assure that these technologies affordably move from 

laboratory to the field without delay. 

Lean Depot Repair 

The Lead Depot Repair project was established to determine 

whether lean methods could be adapted to the depot repair 

environment. Air Force ManTech partnered with Warner Robins Air 

Logistics Center to revolutionize the programmed depot maintenance 

lines for F-15 and C-5 aircraft, reducing cycle time and cost. As a 

result, critical warfighting assets are more quickly moved from 

maintenance to fully operational status. 

Specifically, on-time return of C-5 aircraft increased from 25 

percent in FY 2000 to 100 percent in FY 2004. The average flow time 

for depot maintenance on C-5s at the Air Mobility Command was 

reduced from 339 days in FY 2000 to an average of 240 days in FY 

2004. On-time return of F-15 aircraft increased from 12 percent to 80 

percent between FY 2000 to 2004. As a result, 22 additional F-15s (the 

equivalent of an additional squadron) were freed for operational use. 

Due to the success of this effort, lean depot practices are rapidly 

expanding across DOD, including Army arsenals and depots, Navy 

air depots, and shipyards. 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Acquisition Electronics 

In 1985, DLA’s Acquisition Electronics program began in an effort 

to meet logistics support requirements for electronics systems. 

Alternatives available to program managers to replace electronic 

systems—life-of-type buys, board-level redesign, or after market 

purchases—each had significant drawbacks that did not effectively 

meet requirements. 

Working with Sarnoff Corporation, an integrated design and 

manufacturing system to provide a continuing source of form, fit, 

and function replacements for nonprocurable microcircuits was 
 

APPENDIX G _________________________________________________________________ 

78 

developed and implemented. The system relies on a set of Bi-CMOS 

gate arrays and a single process line that is flexible and cost effective. 

Devices are manufactured to existing weapon system documentation 

and meet the specifications of the original devices, including 

physical, electrical, and environmental requirements. With this 

approach, parts can be used without time consuming and costly 

board-level qualification testing. 

The F-15 program used this technology to keep mission readiness 

at acceptable levels as an older radar system was replaced with a 

new-generation radar. In all, the program has supplied over 75,000 

failure-free devices to 375 weapon systems. As microcircuit 

technology continues to rapidly advance, the electronics acquisition 

program tracks new families of obsolescence, thereby assuring a 

continuing supply of qualified replacement parts into the future. 

Combat Rations 

The DLA Combat Rations Program has focused on improving 

meals, ready to eat (MRE), used primarily by ground forces when 

garrison feeding is not feasible. The production base for MREs is 

small and military specific. Companies do not have the incentive or 

resources to undertake the kind of manufacturing process 

development needed to meet military requirements for user 

acceptance. 

In the past, MRE entrees were limited to “pumpables”—casseroletype foods such as beef stew, chicken a la king, and creamed beef—

and could not include whole muscle meats, which would be 

preferable to soldiers. DLA’s Combat Rations Program developed the 

horizontal “form, fill and seal” technology that allows whole muscle 

meats to be reliably included in the MRE menu. Current MREs now 

contain grilled beefsteak, pork chop, frankfurter, and chicken breast 

entrees. 

The Combat Rations Program also developed equipment to 

automatically and reliably accomplish 100 percent inspection of MRE 

pouches, replacing an error-prone, labor-intensive, manual 

inspection. This process ensures that the meals are safe and 
_____________________________________________________ MANTECH SUCCESS STORIES

79

nutritious. The program works closely with the U.S. Army, the 

industrial base, and leading universities to continuously improve the 

quality and desirability of combat rations. 

Castings Program 

Castings are widely used in weapon systems whenever designers 

need a complex metal shape that is lightweight, durable, and cost 

effective. DLA’s casting program is creating new technologies that 

will produce high-quality, cost-effective castings for replacement 

parts in older weapon systems, as well as new parts for emerging 

weapon systems. The program combines parts problem solving, 

research, and education in a comprehensive effort that helps the 

casting industry meet DLA and DOD requirements. 

The program addresses metal casting procurement problems that 

threaten warfighter readiness. In the early phases of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, demand for M1-A1 tank treads surged beyond any 

previous level. A key component of the tread is a die cast aluminum 

heat sink molded into the rubber shoe. The die for the heat sink 

would crack after 30,000 heat sinks were cast. The DLA Casting 

Program introduced a new, rapid tooling technology that reduced 

tooling lead time from 26 weeks to four and increased die life from 

30,000 to 150,000 castings. With this new technology, DLA suppliers 

were able to meet the high demand for tank treads. Overall, the 

program has improved the reliability and lead time of over 950 DLAmanaged parts, supporting 96 weapon systems. 
 

APPENDIX H _________________________________________________________________ 

80 

APPENDIX H. MANUFACTURING READINESS LEVELS

Support to the warfighter is suffering as a result of consistent 

problems within the DOD acquisition process. The U.S. Government 

Accountability Office and other sources have pointed out that many 

program managers lack sufficient knowledge of their program's 

technologies, design, and production risks when making decisions to 

transition into production. As a result, programs experience cost 

increases, schedule delays, and production shortfalls. The Joint 

Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel (JDMTP) is developing a 

new tool that will give program managers better visibility into their 

program's risks before they have to make important decisions. 

The DOD vision is to develop and institutionalize a set of 

Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs), described in table H-1. This 

tool is consistent with current DOD 5000 acquisition doctrine, 

practice, and milestone decision points. These MRLs will be 

reconciled with DOD Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs), 

reconciled with MDA Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness 

Levels, and aligned with NASA TRL/MRL evolution. The potential is 

for DOD MRLs to serve as the basis for a government-wide standard. 

 The Technology Transition Working Group, comprised of 

government and industry representatives, developed an initial set of 

MRLs. In June 2004, the JDMTP chartered an MRL Working Group to 

refine initial definitions, evolve the supporting body of knowledge, 

and develop plans to institutionalize MRLs within the AT&L 

community. 

To date the working group has developed the definitions of 

MRLs, how they interface with TRLs and milestone decisions points, 

and how they operate within the 5000 series process. The group has 

identified numerous key threads that transition through the 

manufacturing portion of the acquisition process and identified key 

risk identifiers at each MRL/milestone for each thread. 
MANUFACTURING

____________________________________________________________ READINESS LEVELS

81

These threads cover such manufacturing transition topics as 

technology and the industrial base, design, materials, cost and 

funding, process capability and control, quality management, 

manufacturing personnel, facilities, and manufacturing management. 

These nine basic threads are further subdivided into twenty two subthreads to allow visibility into risk areas. This approach provides risk 

visibility across the entire acquisition process schedule from the Pre 

Concept Refinement phase through the Production and Sustainment 

phase. 

To enable the MRL concept, a web-based tool is being developed 

that can be used by a program office or acquisition official. The tool 

will allow program officials to pose appropriate manufacturing riskrelated questions in order to gauge the risk potential against a 

standard, at any point within the acquisition process. 

The tool in no way takes the authority away from decision makers 

but points out potential risks that exist and need to be taken into 

account during the decision-making process. The intent is to have the 

tool in the hands of program managers before the end of 2005. 
 

APPENDIX H _________________________________________________________________ 

82 

Table H-1. Manufacturing Readiness Levels 

MRL DEFINITION DESCRIPTION PHASE

1-3 Manufacturing 

concepts 

identified. 

Identification of current manufacturing 

concepts or producibility needs based 

on laboratory studies. 

Assumed that all corresponding TRL 

requirements are met for each MRL 

below. 

Pre Concept 

Refinement 

4 Manufacturing 

capability to 

produce the 

system, 

component, or 

item in a 

laboratory 

environment. 

Conceptual design completed. 

Requirement validation underway and 

there are large numbers of 

engineering/design changes. Required 

investments, such as MANTECH 

identified. Component physical and 

functional interfaces have not been 

defined. Processes to insure 

producibility, manufacturability and 

quality are in place and are sufficient to 

produce technology demonstrators. 

Manufacturing cost drivers emerging. 

Producibility assessments have been 

initiated. Key technologies at least at 

TRL 4. 

Concept 

Refinement 

leading to a 

Milestone A 

decision 

5 Manufacturing 

capability to 

produce the 

system, 

component, or 

item in an initial 

productionrepresentative 

environment. 

Majority of manufacturing requirements 

have been preliminarily defined and 

validated, but there are still significant 

engineering/design changes. 

Component physical and functional 

interfaces have not yet been defined. 

Materials, machines and tooling, 

personnel skills, and inspection and test 

equipment have been demonstrated in 

a relevant environment but most 

manufacturing processes and 

procedures are in development (or 

MANTECH initiatives ongoing). 

Producibility assessments ongoing. 

Design-to-cost cost drivers identified. 

Technology 

Development 

Phase 
MANUFACTURING

____________________________________________________________ READINESS LEVELS

83

6 Manufacturing 

capability to 

produce the 

system, 

component or 

item in a 

productionrepresentative 

environment. 

Majority of manufacturing requirements 

have been preliminarily defined and 

validated, to include key characteristics, 

but there are still significant 

engineering/design changes. 

Preliminary design of critical 

components completed. Component 

physical and functional interfaces have 

not yet been defined. Materials, 

machines and tooling, personnel skills, 

and inspection and test equipment have 

been demonstrated in a relevant 

environment but most manufacturing 

processes and procedures are in 

development (or MANTECH initiatives 

ongoing). Producibility assessments 

ongoing. Production cost drivers/goals 

analyzed. System level design-to-cost 

goals set. Long-lead needs and key 

supply chain elements identified. 

Technology 

Development 

leading to a 

Milestone B 

decision 

7 Manufacturing 

capability 

maturing to 

produce actual 

system, 

component or 

item in low-rate 

initial production. 

Engineering/design changes decreasing. 

Physical and functional interfaces clearly 

defined. All raw materials are fully 

understood, in production, and available 

to meet planned low-rate initial 

production (LRIP) schedule. 

Manufacturing processes and 

procedures in final validation test. Initial 

producibility improvements should be 

underway. Design-to-cost estimates and 

detailed production estimates being 

established. Producibility risk 

assessments ongoing and trade studies 

conducted. Supply chain being 

validated. System transitioned to formal 

configuration control. Long-lead 

readiness plans in place. 

System 

Development 

& Demonstration 

leading to 

Design 

Readiness 

Review 
 

APPENDIX H _________________________________________________________________ 

84 

8 Manufacturing 

capability in place 

to begin low-rate 

initial production. 

Design sufficiently stable to enter into 

low-rate initial production. Physical and 

functional interfaces clearly defined. All 

materials are in production and 

available to meet planned LRIP 

schedule. Manufacturing and quality 

processes and procedures have been 

proven, are under control and ready for 

low rate initial production. Initial 

producibility risk assessments 

completed. Production cost estimates 

meet design-to-cost goals. Supply chain 

established and stable. Key 

technologies at least at TRL 8. 

System 

Development 

& Demonstration 

leading to a 

Milestone C 

decision 

9 Manufacturing 

capability in place 

to begin full-rate 

production. 

During LRIP all systems 

engineering/design requirements are 

met and there are only minimal system 

engineering/design changes. Materials 

are in production and available to meet 

planned production schedules. 

Manufacturing processes and 

procedures are established and 

controlled in production to three-sigma 

or some other appropriate quality level. 

Personnel, machines and tooling, and 

inspection and test equipment deliver 

three-sigma or some other appropriate 

quality level in production. Production 

risk monitoring is ongoing. LRIP actual 

costs meet estimates 

Production & 

Deployment 

leading to a 

Full-Rate 

Production 

Decision 

10 Manufacturing 

capability in place 

to achieve lean 

production. 

This is the highest level of production 

readiness. There are minimal 

engineering/design changes. System, 

component or item is in production or 

has been produced meeting all 

engineering, performance, quality and 

reliability requirements. All materials, 

manufacturing processes and 

procedures, inspection and test 

equipment, controlled in production to 

six-sigma or some other appropriate 

quality level in production. A proven, 

affordable product able to meet 

required schedule. Actual production 

costs meet estimates 

Full-Rate 

Production/ 

Sustainment 
____________________________________________________ MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE

85

APPENDIX I. MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE

INTRODUCTION

Model Driven Architecture (MDA) is a revolutionary approach to 

the way modern systems are specified, designed, implemented, 

tested, and supported. It affects all aspects of this process, and 

promises enormous reductions in both acquisition and life cycle 

costs, as well as orders of magnitude reduction in cycle time. Rarely 

has such a profound change in methodology emerged. The full 

impact of this revolution is just beginning to be realized and 

appreciated. 

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

Today’s digitally enabled systems are becoming more and more 

dependent on software in virtually all of their functions. This 

phenomenon has resulted in vast improvements in performance, has 

enabled implementation of new capabilities, and is driving the trend 

toward network centric operations as the key discriminator on the 

battlefield. Software design, development, testing, and support are 

consuming an ever-larger share of DOD budgets. Model Driven 

Architecture is about to have a huge impact on this process. 

In the classical approach to systems design, a set of paper 

requirements is developed that envision the desired system behavior 

and performance. These requirements are used by the system 

designer to formulate the necessary architecture, algorithms, and 

detailed signal and data flows. Models and simulations are often 

used to verify and optimize the detailed system design. Once this 

process is completed, the system design is provided to the software 

engineers who reduce the design to practice, generally employing a 

higher order language such as C++ or the like. Ultimately the 

engineers compile this into code for the host computing and 

processing platforms. 
 

APPENDIX I __________________________________________________________________ 

86 

One of the most costly and often time-consuming steps in this 

process is systems test and integration, where the operation of the 

system is verified and compared with the desired behavior. A 

significant portion of the time is usually spent identifying 

discrepancies that have been introduced between the systems design 

specifications and implementation of the software design process. 

THE MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE PROCESS

The MDA process changes this entire approach. Instead of paper 

specifications and requirements, the very first step generates a highfidelity model of the desired system behavior, using an emerging tool 

known as Executable Universal Modeling Language (X-UML). This 

model is used to verify and optimize performance until the desired 

behavior is attained. So far, this approach is not too different from 

current practice. It is at the next step that the value of MDA emerges. 

Once a suitable model has been constructed, a compiler is used to 

convert the UML model into software code in whatever language is 

appropriate to the host computing or processing platform chosen for 

the system. In most cases, there are other portions of the system with 

which the computing complex must interface. The model process is 

used to specify these details such that a complete description of the 

software functionality is captured. Once expressed in X-UML, the 

software is generated in a totally automated machine process. 

Several advantages are immediately evident with this approach. 

Most significantly, the step of handing off the system design to a set 

of software engineers to redesign and manually convert into software 

is eliminated. Eliminating this step not only offers huge time and cost 

savings but also avoids the inevitable introduction of errors and 

“software designer’s choice” discrepancies that are inherent to the 

manual process. Testing is also facilitated. Performance of the 

evolving software load can be readily verified using the faithful 

model representation that is fundamental to this approach. A 

significant issue in the current process is maintaining configuration 

control between the system designer’s models and the actual system 

as it evolves. Since any design modifications based on MDA are first 
____________________________________________________ MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE

87

performed by changing the X-UML model, one-to-one 

correspondence is assured. 

SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS NETWORKING AND 

INTEROPERABILITY

A significant and yet unsolved problem with today’s vast array of 

military platforms is lack of true interoperability, which is 

fundamental to the concept of network centric operations. The 

emergence of MDA offers a method for achieving true network 

centric operations. 

Rather than provide paper specifications to each participant in a 

system of systems to individually interpret and implement, an XUML platform independent model (PIM) is generated that exhibits 

the desired network centric behavior. Once a suitable PIM is derived, 

it is provided to each participating platform design team, who in turn 

generate platform-specific versions applicable to their specific 

equipment and needs. An adaptation layer is generally used to adapt 

the core capability embodied in the PIM to each platform, addressing 

unique interface aspects and other platform peculiar needs. The key 

factor provided by MDA is that the same software code contained in 

the PIM core is essentially run on every member platform in the 

system-of-system’s network, thus assuring data consistency and true 

interoperability. 

SUPPORTABILITY BENEFITS

Not only is the initial design process greatly improved, there is 

even greater potential benefit in the software support area. Since 

system configuration control, when using MDA, revolves around a 

validated model rather than the software code, the impact of software 

changes and upgrades on the overall system and on system-ofsystems performance can be readily verified at the design stage. 

Further, as long as interfaces are not affected, changes can be 

disseminated to participating platforms in the form of changes to the 

PIM, which can then be incorporated into specific systems using the 
 

APPENDIX I __________________________________________________________________ 

88 

machine code generation capabilities of MDA. Experience has shown 

that software changes that previously would take months and often 

years to manually develop and incorporate can be done in a matter of 

days. This is especially important for network centric systems, where 

an entire fleet of platforms can be modified or upgraded in a 

synchronized process at comparatively low cost. This approach also 

has implications for large savings in total ownership cost. 

OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING MDA 

MDA is still at an early stage of development. Many of the XUML tools required must be further refined and expanded to cover 

the needs of the myriad potential applications that are emerging. 

Industry has already recognized the benefits and is rapidly moving to 

exploit them. As software design migrates to an MDA approach for 

the various constituent parts of modern systems, modeling and 

simulation will take on a totally different and expanded role. 

Classically, model generation has been a stand-alone effort 

generally funded as an adjunct task to the detailed design process, 

often performed by a separate group dedicated to modeling and 

simulation. Issues constantly arise as to how precisely the models 

represent an actual system. Quite often these models differ in 

substantive ways due to variations in the assumptions made, to 

simplifications introduced (to speed run time, for example), and to 

the practical problem of maintaining configuration control 

synchronization. 

Almost all of these issues are avoided by using MDA. Models 

move from a side activity to the mainstream, since the basic, detailed 

designs are fundamentally one-to-one dependent on the models that 

specify them. No extra funding is required to generate models, since 

design funds are directly applied—and with reduced amounts being 

required. Model and system configuration synchronization is also 

assured at no extra effort. 

A powerful new capability is possible once this process is 

implemented. Since in the limit every part of the software system is 
____________________________________________________ MODEL DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE

89

described by high fidelity, interoperable models, the feasibility of 

readily putting together combinations of these models to emulate the 

behavior of a new system becomes practical. Thus, in the not too 

distant future, detailed behavior of complex new systems may well 

be modeled in an unprecedented short time and with a very high 

degree of fidelity. This capability can make it possible to rapidly field 

new capabilities and is a key to attaining true network centric 

operations. 

SUMMARY

Model Driven Architecture is an emerging new process that 

affects virtually every stage of the system life cycle. The benefits in 

total ownership cost reduction and time to field are so significant that 

both government and industry are rapidly adopting and refining this 

process as they apply MDA to an increasing number of uses. 

Suppliers of Universal Modeling Language tools are also rapidly 

enhancing, broadening, and enriching the required tool sets and 

related compilers as the process is applied to an increasingly wide 

range of problems and domains. MDA represents a truly 

revolutionary improvement in the design of future systems. It 

supplies the key missing interoperability ingredient that will make 

complex network centric operations possible. 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT – FOR DSB USE ONLY 

 

APPENDIX J __________________________________________________________________ 

90 

APPENDIX J. EXECUTIVE ORDER—ENCOURAGING 

INNOVATION IN MANUFACTURING
Cl$k to Print 

thts domment 

For Immediate Release 

Oftice of the Press Secretary 

February 24,2004 

Executive Order Encouraging lnnovation in Manufacturing 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Small 

Business Act, as amended (1 5 U.S.C. 631 et seq.), and to help ensure that Federal agencies properly and effectively assist the 

private sector in its manufacturing innovation efforts, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. Policy. Continued technological innovation is critical to a strong manufacturing sector in the United States economy. 

The Federal Government has an important role, including through the Small Business lnnovation Research (SBIR) and the Small 

Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, in helping to advance innovation, including innovation in manufacturing, through 

small businesses. 

Sec. 2. Duties of Department and Agency Heads. The head of each executive branch department or agency with one or more 

SBIR programs or one or more STTR programs shall: 

(a) to the extent permitted by law and in a manner consistent with the mission of that department or agency, give high priority 

within such programs to manufacturing-related research and development to advance the policy set forth in section 1 of this order; 

and 

(b) submit reports annually to the Administrator of the Small Business Administration and the Director of the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy concerning the efforts of such department or agency to implement subsection 2(a) of this order. 

Sec. 3. Duties of Administrator of the Small Business Administration . The Administrator of the Small Business Administration: 

(a) shall establish, after consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, formats and schedules for 

submission of reports by the heads of departments and agencies under subsection 2(b) of this order; and 

(b) is authorized to issue to departments and agencies guidelines and directives (in addition to the formats and schedules under 

subsection 3(a)) as the Administrator determines from time to time are necessary to implement subsection 2(a) of this order, after 

such guidelines and directives are submitted to the President, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 

for approval and are approved by the President. 

Sec. 4. Definitions. As used in this order: 

(a) "Small Business lnnovation Research (SBIR) program" means a program to which section 9(e)(4) of the Small Business Act 

(15 U.S.C. 638(e)(4)) refers; 

(b) "Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program" means a program to which section 9(e)(6) of the Small Business Act 

(15 U.S.C. 638(e)(6)) refers; 

(c) "research and development" means an activity set forth in section 9(e)(5) of the Small Business Act (1 5 U.S.C. 638(e)(5)); and 

(d) "manufacturing-related" means relating to: (i) manufacturing processes, equipment and systems; or (ii) manufacturing 

workforce skills and protection. 

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of 

the Office of Management and Budget with respect to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals. 

(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to require disclosure of information the disclosure of which is prohibited by law or by 

 PROPOSED LEGISLATION

_________________________________________________ ON MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY

93

APPENDIX K. PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON 

MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY



_____________________________________________________ MANTECH BUDGET PROFILES

97

APPENDIX L. MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 

BUDGET PROFILES

Army ManTech Budgets

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Planned

Approp

$Million

(Current Dollars)

Navy ManTech Budgets

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Planned

Approp

$Million

(Current Dollars)
 

APPENDIX L__________________________________________________________________ 

98 

Air Force ManTech Budgets

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Planned

Approp

$Million

(Current Dollars)

DLA ManTech Budgets

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

Planned

Approp

$Million

(Current Dollars)
__________________________________________________ MANTECH BUDGET COMPARISONS

99

APPENDIX M. COMPARISON OF MANTECH AND OTHER 

DOD BUDGETS

Figure M-1. DOD ManTech and Other Budget Comparisons 

(millions of then year dollars) 

DOD

MANTECH

BUDGET

DOD R&D

BUDGET

DOD

MANTECH 

AS % OF 

R&D 

DOD S&T 

BUDGET

DOD

MANTECH 

AS % OF 

S&T 

1980 142 14,021 1.01 2,885 4.92 

1981 149 17,363 0.85 3,257 4.57 

1982 206 20,848 0.98 3,757 5.48 

1983 136 23,673 0.57 4,063 3.34 

1984 151 27,935 0.54 4,394 3.43 

1985 183 31,978 0.57 4,595 3.98 

1986 184 35,000 0.52 4,780 3.84 

1987 126 37,136 0.33 5,568 2.25 

1988 153 38,126 0.40 5,720 2.67 

1989 168 38,578 0.43 6,438 2.60 

1990 175 37,869 0.46 5,843 2.99 

1991 255 37,209 0.68 6,970 3.66 

1992 180 37,779 0.47 7,181 2.51 

1993 239 38,848 0.61 8,731 2.74 

1994 281 35,510 0.79 7,660 3.66 

1995 227 35,349 0.64 7,924 2.86 

1996 179 35,783 0.49 7,534 2.37 

1997 196 37,238 0.52 7,506 2.61 

1998 162 37,569 0.43 7,715 2.09 

1999 185 38,888 0.47 7,597 2.43 

2000 185 39,960 0.46 8,269 2.23 

2001 197 42,740 0.46 8,861 2.21 

2002 236 49,877 0.47 9,874 2.39 

2003 201 59,296 0.33 10,729 1.87 

2004 255 65,948 0.38 12,081 2.11 

2005 249 70,929 0.35 13,071 1.90 

2006 

(proj.) 694 69,356 1.00 13,500 5.13 
 

APPENDIX N _________________________________________________________________ 

100 

APPENDIX N. GLOSSARY

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command 

AFRL/MLM Air Force Research Laboratory, Materials & Manufacturing 

Directorate 

ARL Army Research Laboratory 

ASD (NII) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

COE Center of Excellence 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DSB Defense Science Board 

EMRL Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Level 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 

JDMTP Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel 

LAI Lean Aircraft Initiative 

LAIRCM Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure 

LRIP Low-Rate Initial Production 

ManTech Manufacturing Technology 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MDA Model Driven Architecture 

MDA/MP Missile Defense Agency, Directorate for Producibility and 

Manufacturing Technology 

MEMS Microelectromechanical Systems 

MRE Meals Ready to Eat 

MRL Manufacturing Readiness Level 

NSC Natick Soldier Center 

ONR Office of Naval Research 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PEO Program Executive Officer 

PIM Platform Independent Model 

R&D Research and Development 

RDEC [Army] Research, Development and Engineering Center 

RDECOM [Army] Research, Development and Engineering Command 

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

S&T Science and Technology 
__________________________________________________________________ GLOSSARY

101

SAE Service Acquisition Executive 

SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 

STTR Small Business Technology Transfer 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics 

USD (P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Production and Readiness 

X-UML Executable Universal Modeling Language