Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-1876 | January 31, 2019 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Jay M. Lee

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Laura R. Anderson

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Garrick Twiford, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 31, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-1876

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

20D03-1605-PC-26

20D03-1004-FA-21

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-1876 | January 31, 2019 Page 2 of 19

[1] Garrick Twiford, Jr. appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for 

post-conviction relief. Twiford raises two issues for our review, which we 

restate as follows:

1. Whether the post-conviction court erred when it 

concluded that Twiford was not denied the effective 

assistance of trial counsel. 

2. Whether the court erred when it concluded that he was not

denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] From June to September 2009, Twiford lived with his sister and her husband 

and children, including then six-year-old B.B. On December 29, B.B.’s mother 

and step-father became concerned about B.B. after they had discovered that she 

was doing “inappropriate” things with her brother. Trial Tr. at 65. As a result 

of B.B.’s actions with her brother, B.B.’s mother told B.B. about the boundaries 

of the body, which B.B.’s mother called the “bubble.” Id. At that point, B.B. 

told her mother and step-father that Twiford had “broke[n] her bubble.” Id. at 

52. B.B.’s parents called the police. The next day, police officers interviewed 

B.B. Based on the statements that B.B. had made to officers during her 

interview, the State charged Twiford with two counts of child molesting, as 

Class A felonies (Counts I and II), and one count of child molesting, as a Class 

C felony (Count III), for acts that had allegedly occurred between June 1 and 

September 30. 
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[4] The trial court held a jury trial on March 19 and 20, 2012. During the trial, the 

State called B.B. as a witness. B.B. testified that Twiford had touched her “in 

the wrong spots,” where she “go[es] potty.” Id. at 102. B.B. further testified 

that Twiford touched her “private spot” with his hands in “wrong ways” and 

that it “hurt” her. Id. at 104. B.B. also testified that Twiford’s “wee wee” had 

touched her private area. Id. at 103. She then testified that Twiford “tried to 

put his private part” in hers more than five times. Id. 

[5] Additionally, B.B. testified that, on one occasion while Twiford lived with 

them, Twiford had carried her downstairs to the couch and “took [her] clothes 

off.” Id. at 105. She then stated that Twiford had “tried to have S-E-X with 

[her].” Id. at 106. B.B. also testified that Twiford had taken her hand and 

“made [her] shake his private part.” Id. at 108. 

[6] B.B. also testified that, once, while in the bathroom, Twiford’s “wee wee”

touched “the hole part” of her bottom where she “go[es] P-O-O-P” and that it 

was “super uncomfortable.” Id. at 110. She then testified that Twiford had put

“[w]hite, clear stuff” into her “bottom.” Id. at 139. B.B. testified that Twiford 

had touched her private part with his hand “like ten times,” and that, in total, 

Twiford had touched her “[t]wenty times.” Id. at 108, 113. During the State’s 

direct examination of B.B., the State asked B.B. about the first time that 

Twiford had touched her inappropriately. B.B. stated that, while they lived in a 
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trailer prior to moving to the house,1 Twiford had made B.B. “suck on his 

private part.” Id. at 116. 

[7] Twiford did not object to B.B.’s testimony. After both parties had questioned 

B.B., the jury wrote down questions that they had for her. At that time, the 

court recessed in order to hear counsel’s arguments regarding the jury’s 

questions. 

[8] During the recess outside the presence of the jury, Twiford’s trial counsel

requested a mistrial based on B.B.’s testimony regarding the possible 

molestation that had occurred in the trailer at least one year prior to the date 

range alleged in the charging information. The State objected, and the trial 

court denied Twiford’s motion. Twiford’s counsel then asked for a limiting

instruction that would instruct the jury that it “may only decide the facts on the 

dates that are alleged in the charging Information.” Id. at 129. The court then 

informed Twiford’s counsel that the dates in the information do not control 

unless the defendant has asserted an alibi defense, which was not the case here. 

[9] At that point, the court offered to strike the portion of B.B.’s testimony that 

related to the events that had allegedly occurred in the trailer. Twiford’s 

counsel agreed, but the State objected and asserted that B.B.’s testimony fell 

under an exception to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), which exception allowed

 

1

 It is not clear when B.B. and her family lived in the trailer. But B.B. testified that they had lived in the 

trailer while her mother was pregnant with twins, who were five years old on the date of the trial. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-1876 | January 31, 2019 Page 5 of 19

evidence of prior bad acts to be admitted if that evidence showed a common 

plan or scheme. The court reversed its decision and did not strike the 

testimony. Twiford’s counsel then stated that a limiting instruction that 

informed the jury that it could only use B.B.’s testimony about the incident in 

the trailer to show a common plan or scheme “would be the only suitable 

alternative” to striking the testimony. Id. Twiford’s counsel then specifically 

requested that the court inform the jury that it could only use the trailer 

evidence to show a common plan or scheme instead of as substantive evidence 

of the allegations at issue. 

[10] After the jury returned, the court admonished the jury as follows:

I am hereby admonishing you that you may consider evidence 

concerning prior sexual contact between the defendant and the 

alleged victim which occurred at the trailer only insofar as it 

demonstrates a plan to exploit and sexually abuse the child and 

not as independent evidence of a separate crime.

Id. at 138.

[11] At the conclusion of the evidence, the court entered judgment in favor of 

Twiford on Count II. The trial court then submitted Counts I and III to the 

jury. At that time, the trial court provided the final instructions to the jury. 

Among the instructions was final instruction #13, which provided: “The State 

is not required to prove that the crime charged was committed . . . on the 

particular date or during a particular time period as alleged in the information.” 

Id. at 200. The jury found Twiford guilty of both Counts I and III, and the trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-1876 | January 31, 2019 Page 6 of 19

court entered judgment of conviction on those counts. Thereafter, the court 

sentenced Twiford to an aggregate term of forty years in the Department of 

Correction. 

[12] On direct appeal, Twiford argued only that the State did not present sufficient

evidence to support his conviction for child molesting, as a Class A felony. 

Twiford v. State, No. 20A04-1205-CR-284, 2013 WL 182745, at *1 (Ind. Ct. 

App. Jan. 13, 2013). But finding that the evidence was sufficient, this Court 

affirmed his conviction. Id. 

[13] On June 30, 2017, Twiford filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief 

in which he alleged that he had been denied the effective assistance of trial 

counsel because his trial counsel: failed to object to B.B.’s testimony regarding 

the possible molestation that had occurred at the trailer, which testimony 

permitted the jury to draw a forbidden inference of his guilt; requested an 

admonishment that linked the prior bad act to the allegations at issue; and 

failed to object to a jury instruction that reinforced the forbidden inference of 

the prior bad act. Twiford also alleged in his petition that he had been denied 

the effective assistance of appellate counsel because his appellate counsel had 

raised only the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence on appeal instead of 

the admissibility of B.B.’s testimony regarding the prior bad act that had 

occurred in the trailer. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Twiford’s 
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trial counsel testified,

2

the post-conviction court entered findings of fact and 

conclusions of law denying Twiford’s petition for relief. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

[14] Twiford appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Our standard of review is clear:

The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden 

of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004) 

(citations omitted). When appealing the denial of postconviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one 

appealing from a negative judgment. Id. To prevail on appeal 

from the denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show 

that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably 

to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction 

court. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). 

Further, the post-conviction court in this case made findings of 

fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana PostConviction Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the postconviction court’s legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s 

findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of 

clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 

729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).

Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 273-74 (Ind. 2014) (alteration original to 

Campbell).

 

2

 Twiford’s appellate counsel did not testify at the hearing. 
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Issue One: Effectiveness of Trial Counsel 

[15] Twiford first contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial 

counsel.

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we 

apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Helton v. 

State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). To satisfy the first 

prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance: 

representation that fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant 

did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 

McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052). To satisfy the 

second prong, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable 

probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052).

Id. at 274. The “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.” 

French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). And “most ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone.” Id.

There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment. Counsel is afforded 

considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and these 

decisions are entitled to deferential review. Isolated mistakes, 

poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do 

not necessarily render representation ineffective.

Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746-47 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-1876 | January 31, 2019 Page 9 of 19

[16] Twiford specifically alleges that his trial counsel committed three errors, 

namely: his counsel failed to object to B.B.’s testimony regarding the acts that 

had occurred in the trailer, which testimony Twiford contends allowed the jury 

to make a forbidden inference of his guilt; his counsel requested a jury 

admonishment that specifically linked the trailer evidence to the allegations at 

issue; and his counsel failed to object to a jury instruction that reinforced the 

forbidden inference of the prior bad act. We address each contention in turn. 

Failure to Object to B.B.’s Testimony

[17] Twiford first contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because 

counsel did not object to B.B.’s testimony that Twiford had made her “suck on 

his private part.” Trial Tr. at 116. Twiford asserts that his trial counsel should 

have objected to B.B.’s testimony because that testimony was inadmissible 

under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), which provides that “[e]vidence of a 

crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 

order to show that on a particular occasion, the person acted in accordance 

with the character.” 

[18] Twiford specifically contends that B.B.’s testimony regarding the act that had 

occurred while at the trailer was inadmissible evidence of a prior bad act 

because the alleged incident had occurred over one year prior to the date range 

alleged in the charging information. He also asserts that the testimony was not 

admissible as an exception under Evidence Rule 404(b)(2), which allows 

otherwise inadmissible evidence to be admitted if it demonstrates a common 

scheme or plan, because his identity was not at issue and because “too great a 
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span of time had elapsed” between the trailer incident and the incidents in the 

timeframe alleged. Appellant’s Br. at 18. 

[19] But we need not decide whether B.B.’s testimony was inadmissible under 

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). Even if Twiford is correct that his trial counsel

could have raised a successful contemporaneous objection to B.B.’s testimony, 

his trial counsel’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing establishes that he 

made a strategic decision not to object. Twiford’s trial counsel testified that he 

generally objects to testimony from a child “more delicately” and “where 

there’s an actual break” in the testimony “so that it doesn’t look like I’m 

jumping up and trying to hide something that would, ultimately, be bad for my 

client.” P-C. Tr. at 13. Twiford’s counsel further testified that he did not object 

to B.B.’s statements at the time she made them but, rather, waited until there 

was a break in her testimony so that the jury did not view his actions as 

“bullying” B.B. or otherwise convict Twiford “based on the way [the jury] 

feel[s] about me or the way that I am bullying a child.” Id. at 20. Additionally,

Twiford’s counsel testified that he lodged his objection outside the presence of 

the jury because objecting in front of the jury is “like re-ringing the bell over and 

over.” Id. at 31. Instead of objecting, Twiford’s trial counsel took the first 

opportunity when there was a natural break in B.B.’s testimony to request a 
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mistrial outside the presence of the jury, which motion the trial court 

considered but ultimately denied.3 

[20] Based on Twiford’s trial counsel’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing, it is 

clear that Twiford’s counsel made a strategic decision not to object to B.B.’s 

testimony because he was concerned that the jury would disapprove of his 

actions and impute their dislike of him onto Twiford and because he did not 

want to “re-ring[]” the bell and highlight B.B.’s testimony to the jury. We 

cannot say that trial counsel’s strategic decision not to object in the presence of 

the jury but, instead, seek a mistrial outside the presence of the jury was “‘so 

deficient or unreasonable as to fall outside the objective standard of 

reasonableness.’” State v. Miller, 771 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 

(quoting Potter v. State, 684 B.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 1997)). Accordingly, 

Twiford has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective on this 

issue. 

Jury Admonishment

[21] Twiford next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective when his counsel

requested that the trial court admonish the jury that it could only consider the 

evidence of prior sexual conduct between Twiford and B.B. that had occurred 

at the trailer “only insofar as it demonstrates a plan to exploit and sexually 

abuse the child and not as independent evidence of a separate crime.” Trial Tr. 

 

3

 On appeal, Twiford does not suggest that the outcome would have been different had his trial counsel

objected to the testimony instead of moving for a mistrial. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-1876 | January 31, 2019 Page 12 of 19

at 138. Twiford specifically contends that his counsel’s request for that 

admonishment amounted to ineffective assistance because it improperly linked 

B.B.’s testimony regarding the act that had occurred at the trailer, which he 

contends was inadmissible, to the allegations at issue. But, again, even 

assuming for the sake of argument that Twiford is correct that B.B.’s testimony 

was inadmissible, we cannot say that his counsel’s actions amounted to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

[22] Here, the record demonstrates that, after B.B. had testified regarding the acts 

that had occurred in the trailer, his trial counsel moved for a mistrial because 

B.B.’s testimony “dealt with . . . possible molestation at a trailer which would 

have had to be at least . . . a year before the charged dates.” Trial Tr. at 126. 

But, based on an objection by the State, the trial court denied his motion for a 

mistrial. Twiford’s counsel then asked for a limiting instruction that would 

instruct the jury that they “may only decide the facts on the dates that are 

alleged in the charging Information.” Id. at 129. But the court informed 

Twiford’s counsel that the dates in the information do not control unless the 

defendant has asserted an alibi defense, which was not the case here. Twiford’s 

counsel then agreed to the trial court’s proposed solution to strike B.B.’s 

testimony. But after the State again objected, the trial court decided not to 

strike the testimony. At that point, Twiford’s counsel concluded that the “only 

suitable alternative” was to ask the court to give a limiting instruction to the 

jury. Trial Tr. at 136. 
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[23] The testimony of Twiford’s trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing 

demonstrates that he made a strategic decision to request the admonishment. 

Indeed, Twiford’s counsel testified that, because jurors cannot unhear 

testimony, he had requested the jury admonishment because “[i]t was as 

appropriate . . . as I was, potentially, going to get.” P-C. Tr. at 34. He further 

testified that he “had already made [his] objection to, potentially, preserve that 

issue; and, at that point, a limiting instruction . . . would at least tell the jury 

that they can’t use that as part of . . . the elements of . . . any of those crimes.” 

Id. 

[24] It is clear that Twiford’s trial counsel requested that admonishment because the 

jury had already heard B.B.’s testimony about acts that had occurred in the 

trailer, because the trial court had denied his motion for a mistrial, because the 

trial court had effectively denied his first request for an admonishment 

instructing the jury that it could only decide the facts on the dates alleged, and 

because the trial court had declined to strike the portion of B.B.’s testimony 

regarding the trailer. At that point, Twiford’s counsel made a strategic decision 

to ensure that, at the very least, the jury was informed that it could not use 

B.B.’s testimony about the events that had allegedly occurred in the trailer to 

prove the elements of the charged crimes. We cannot say that Twiford’s 

counsel’s strategic decision to request that jury admonishment was 

unreasonable. See Miller, 771 N.E.2d at 1288. Twiford has not demonstrated 

that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on this issue. 
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Failure to Object to Jury Instruction

[25] Twiford further asserts that his trial counsel’s performance was ineffective 

because he failed to object to final jury instruction #13, which provided: “The 

State is not required to prove that the crime charged was committed . . . on the 

particular date or during a particular time period as alleged in the Information.” 

Trial Tr. at 200. According to Twiford, the evidence of acts that had occurred 

in the trailer years at a date prior to the charged offenses “tended to only show 

the defendant’s proclivity to commit the offenses for which he was being 

charged.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. And Twiford asserts that, “[b]y allowing this 

Instruction, the State was able to neutralize the years between the undiscovered 

disclosure and the charged offenses and circumvent the Rules of Evidence.” Id. 

at 20-21. 

[26] But we need not determine whether Twiford’s trial counsel’s failure to object to 

that jury instruction amounted to deficient performance because Twiford has

not shown that, but for his counsel’s failure to object, there is a reasonable 

probability that the result of his trial would have been different. At trial, B.B. 

testified to numerous incidents that had occurred while Twiford was staying 

with them between June and September 2009. Indeed, B.B. testified that 

Twiford had touched her “private” area where she “go[es] potty.” Trial Tr. at 

102. B.B. also testified that Twiford had “tried to put his private part” in hers 

more than five times. Id. at 104. Additionally, B.B. testified that, on one 

occasion, Twiford took her clothes off and “tried to have S-E-X” with her. Id. 

at 106. Further, B.B. testified that Twiford had touched her private part with 
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his hand “like ten times.” Id. at 108. B.B. also testified that Twiford had 

“made [her] shake his private part.” Id. And B.B. testified that Twiford had 

put “[w]hite, clear stuff” into her “bottom.” Id. at 139. In all, B.B. testified that 

Twiford had touched her “twenty times.” Id. at 113.

[27] Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, we cannot conclude that 

B.B.’s testimony about the act that had occurred in the trailer prejudiced 

Twiford to the extent that the outcome of his trial would have been different 

had his trial counsel objected to final instruction #13 and had the jury not been 

instructed that the State was not required to prove that the crime charged was 

committed on the particular date as alleged in the information. See Bradford v. 

State, 988 N.E.2d 1192, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that, under the 

circumstances of all of the evidence presented in the case, the Court could not 

conclude that the outcome would have been different had the defendant’s 

counsel objected to the final instruction at issue and had the jury not been told 

that it could consider prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence). 

Stated another way, Twiford has not demonstrated that the jury would not have 

convicted him even if it had been instructed not to consider B.B.’s testimony 

about acts that had occurred in the trailer. Twiford has not demonstrated that 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue. 

Issue Two: Effectiveness of Appellate Counsel 

[28] Twiford also contends that he was denied the effective assistance of his 

appellate counsel. “We apply the same standard of review to claims of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as we apply to claims of ineffective 
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assistance of trial counsel.” Montgomery v. State, 21 N.E.3d 846, 854 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014). “[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must demonstrate both that his counsel’s performance was deficient 

and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance.” Id. at 853. 

“Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.” Id. at 854. 

[29] Ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally fall into three categories: 1) 

denial of access to an appeal; 2) waiver of issues; and 3) failure to present issues 

well. Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 270 (Ind. 2014). Here, Twiford asserts 

that his appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal that was 

clearly stronger than the one sufficiency issue she did raise. When evaluating a 

claim than an appellate attorney should have raised certain issues on appeal, we 

must determine “whether an unraised issue was significant and obvious from 

the face of the record” and “whether the unraised issue was ‘clearly stronger’

than the raised issue or issues.” Graham v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091, 1099 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Ind. 2004)). 

[30] Counsel is very rarely found to be ineffective when the issue is failure to raise a 

claim on direct appeal. See Montgomery, 21 N.E.3d at 854. That is because 

“‘the decision of what issues to raise is one of the most important strategic 

decisions to be made by appellate counsel.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler v. State, 690 

N.E.2d 188, 193 (Ind. 1997)). Accordingly, “‘reviewing courts should be 

particularly deferential to counsel’s strategic decision to exclude certain issues 

in favor of others, unless such a decision was unquestionably unreasonable.’” 

Id. (quoting Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 193-94). 
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[31] Here, Twiford contends that his appellate counsel’s performance was deficient

because she failed to raise on direct appeal the “forbidden inference” of his guilt

that Twiford alleges the jury was allowed to make from B.B.’s disclosure about 

the prior bad act that had occurred in the trailer. Appellant’s Br. at 26. In 

essence, Twiford contends that his appellate counsel should have argued on 

direct appeal that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Rule 

404(b) when it admitted B.B.’s testimony. And Twiford contends that the issue 

of the admissibility of B.B.’s testimony was clearly stronger than the sufficiency 

of the evidence issue. Appellee’s Br. at 26. 

[32] However, to succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the 

prejudice prong of Strickland requires [Twiford] to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, the result of his direct appeal would 

have been different.” Martin v. State, 760 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 2002). 

Accordingly, to show prejudice regarding appellate counsel’s failure to raise the 

admissibility of B.B.’s testimony, Twiford is required to show that this Court 

would have reversed his convictions had his appellate counsel raised that issue

on appeal. 

[33] But Twiford has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the result 

of his direct appeal would have been different had his appellate counsel raised

the issue of the admissibility of B.B.’s testimony. It is well settled that “[e]rrors 

in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless 

error unless they affect the substantial rights of the party.” Lewis v. State, 34 

N.E.3d 240, 248 (Ind. 2015). “To determine whether an error in the 
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introduction of evidence affected the appellant’s substantial rights, this Court 

must assess the probable impact of that evidence upon the jury.” Id. 

[34] Here, even if we had held that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

admitted B.B.’s testimony, we would have concluded that any error in that

admission was harmless. As discussed above, B.B. testified at trial to numerous 

incidents that had occurred while Twiford was staying in the same house as 

B.B. from June to September 2009. Indeed, B.B. testified that Twiford had

touched her in her “private area.” Trial Tr. at 102. She further testified that 

Twiford had “tried to put his private part” in hers more than five times. Id. at 

104. Additionally, B.B. testified that Twiford “tried to have S-E-X” wither her. 

Id. at 106. B.B. also testified that Twiford had “made [her] shake his private 

part.” Id. And B.B. testified that Twiford had put “[w]hite, clear stuff” into her 

“bottom.” Id. at 139. In all, B.B. testified that Twiford had touched her 

“twenty times.” Id. at 113. Based on that testimony, we cannot say that B.B.’s 

one statement—which, based on a jury admonishment, was not even admitted 

as substantive evidence—regarding an act that had occurred prior to the date

range alleged in the charging information had a probable impact on the jury. 

[35] Because any error in the admission of B.B.’s statement was harmless, Twiford 

has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the result of his direct appeal 

would have been different had his appellate counsel raised the issue of the 

admissibly of B.B.’s testimony rather than the sufficiency of the evidence. See 

Martin, 760 N.E.2d at 600. As such, Twiford has not demonstrated that he was 

denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. 
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Conclusion

[36] In sum, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Twiford’s petition for 

post-conviction relief. 

[37] Affirmed.

Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.