AD-A275 347

REPORT OF THE

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

TASK FORCE

ON

TACTICAL AIR WARFARE

NOVEMBER 1993

Fr.B 0 2 1J94

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY

WASHINGTQN, D.C. 20301-3140

94-03388
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a

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in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301.3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

November 30, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION)

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

Tactical Air Warfare

I am pleased to forward the report of the Defense Science

Board Task Force on Tactical Air Warfare which was co-chaired by

Dr. Alexander H. Flax and Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.

A smaller contingent of this Task Force was convened

originally to respond to the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 1993 which directed that a technical assessment

of particular issues related to the Department of Defense

Tactical Aircraft Modernization Program be accomplished. A

report of that Task Force's findings was forwarded to you last

February.

Subsequently, an expanded Task Force addressed broader

issues related to Tactical Air Warfare as one of the Defense

Science Board's summer studies last August. Key findings are

summarized in the memorandum from the co-chairmen which forwards

the Task Force's report.

Paul G. Kaminski

Chairman

Accesion For NTIS CRA&I

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140

3 0 NOV 1993

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Air Warfare

We are pleased to forward the report of the DSB Task Force on Tactical Air Warfare.

In addressing the findings of this report, we need first to highlight one point. It has to do

with lessons from military conflicts in our country's history, especially lessons not learned. In

every war, both sides are exposed to very costly lessons from mistakes and missed opportunities.

History reveals that, unfortunately, many of the lessons are n learned and the same mistakes

and missed opportunities are repeated in the next conflict. There are many reasons why this

occurs but it doesn't have to continue now. To learn the lessons, actions must be taken to

remove limitations and gain advantages over previous ways of conducting operations and

acquiring new capabilities.

At the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War, the DoD delivered to the Congress the report

"Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992. It is noteworthy that. with respect to Tactical

Air Warfare, that report calls for many of the actions this task force recommends. The lessons

will not be learned until such actions are taken.

In this study the Task Force has emphasized the need to redress in the near term - over

the next five to ten years - the most serious deficiencies in the systems and forces comprising our

tactical air warfare capabilities. The greatest current imbalances in capability are in inadequate

numbers of precision-guided weapons and associated target engagement systems, both on-board

tactical aircraft and off-board sensors and associated data links. Among precision-guided

weapons and platform delivery capabilities, the most important current shortfalls are in allweather and standoff weapons, and we have strongly recommended that development and

procurement of weapons in the latter categories be accelerated. There is substantial payoff for

PGMs in that they require fewer sorties to achieve target destruction. Thus cost savings result

not only from less munitions tonnage that needs to be delivered to the target, but also less fuel

burned for the platforms required to go on the mission, and for the supporting aircraft that are

also required. This payoff will have significant impact on the logistics system needed to supply

particular scenarios.

However, the area in which we found the greatest opportunities for high-leverage

improvements in tactical warfare effectiveness was in the integration of targeting and combat

information systems linking JSTARS and other off-board sources of target information into a

network capable of providing data directly to the weapon delivery platforms. The development

of an effective end-to-end, wide-area surveillance and targeting system for both air-to-air and

air-to-surface targets is essential. These systems should focus around AWACS and JSTARS
respectively and provide for rapid dissemination of multi-source surveillance and targeting data

to all elements of the force structure. This ultimate capability will require improvements and

integration of our current surveillance and targeting systems and the development of a tactical

warfare systems information architecture for effective and timely distribution of the required

data. We also believe that UAV systems should be explored more aggressively now in both

development and joint operational exercises. These systems offer the potential for operations

over hostile territory with reduced vulnerability and risk.

The Task Force emphasized that the need to maintain the balance among weapons,

platform delivery capabilities, and target engagement and information systems will be more

importment in the future than it is currently, and strongly urged that this perspective guide the

overall tactical air warfare R&D programs of the Defense Department Our overall Tactical Air

Warfare capability depends on effective utilization of aircraft, weapons, off-board sensors,

information distribution, and logistics systems. We need to establish the capability to evaluate

trade-offs between different combinations of these systems. It should be noted that substantial

and important near-term gains in our tactical air warfare capabilities do not require new aircraft

programs to be achieved. Such gains can be achieved by equipping our carrent force with

precision weapons and associated delivery systems and improving the surveillance and targeting,

information distribution, and logistics support systems, making those forces much more

effective. We must also exercise the resulting operational systems in realistic environments and

demonstrate that we have learned the lessons of recent conflicts.

We would be happy to discuss the report with you at your convenience.

Alexander H. Flax Jn S. Foster, Jr.

Co-Chairman Co-Chairman
CONTENTS

G lossary ......................................................................................................................... iii

Background

Terms of Reference ............................................................................................ 1

O verview ........................................................................................................ 2

The Legacy Shaping Airpower - Post-World War II ....................................... 3

The Legacy Shaping Airpower - Post-Vietnam .............................................. 4

The Legacy Shaping Airpower - Pre-Desert Storm ......................................... 5

What Will Stay the Same" .............................................................................. 6

Selected "What Should Change" Items .......................................................... 7

Serious Current Deficiencies That Have Known Technical Solutions ............... 8

Serious Current Deficiencies Requiring Research and Development Priority ........ 9

Highest Leverage Items

Highest Leverage Items for Improved TACAIR Warfare Capabilities ................ 11

Equip the Force ........................................................................................... 12

Equip the Force - Surveillance and Targeting ............................................... 13

Equip the Force - UAVs ............................................................................. 15

Equip the Force - Upgrade Existing Aircraft ................................................. 16

Equip the Force - Precision Guided Munitions .............................................. 17

Equip the Force - Vulnerability to GPS Jamming .......................................... 19

Equip the Force - PGM Implementation ........................................................ 20

Equip the Force - Air-to-Air Missiles .......................................................... 21

Equip the Force - Counter Stealth R&D ..................................................... 22

Equip the Force - Platform Technologies ..................................................... 23

Logistics and Industrial Capability - Key Determinants of Readiness

(Problem s) .............................................................................................. 24

Logistics and Industrial Capability - Key Determinants of Readiness

(Recommendations - Wartime Logistics Capability) ................................ 25

i
Logistics and Industrial Capability - Key Determinants of Readiness

(Recommendations - Maintenance Depots) ............................................ 26

Logistics and Industrial Capability - Key Determinants of Readiness

(Recommendations - Industrial Base) ...................................................... 27

Logistics and Industrial Capability - Key Determinants of Readiness

(Recommendations - Aircraft Field Maintenance) ................................... 28

Exercise Our Operational Capability ............................................................. 29

Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture

(Problem ) ............................................................................................. 30

Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture

(Information distribution to shooters can be the next silver bullet) ........... 31

Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture

(W hat is an Architecture?) ...................................................................... 32

DoD Tactical Information Architecture Components of an

Information Distribution System ............................................................ 33

Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture

(W hat's New ?) ....................................................................................... 34

Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture

(DoD Information Technology R&D Strategy) ....................................... 35

Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture

(Recom mendations) ................................................................................ 36

DoD Tactical Information Architecture ........................................................ 37

Capability Trade-Offs .................................................................................. 38

Recommendations

Tactical Air Warfare Summer Study Recommendations ............................... 39

Appendix A - Terms of Reference

Appendix B - Task Force Members and Government Advisors

Appendix C - Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Aircraft Assessment

Appendix D - Comments on the Tactical Air Warfare Task Force Joint Advanced Strike

Technology Program (JASTP)
GLOSSARY

AAA anti-aircraft artillery

AGM air-to-ground munition

A. anti-jam

ALCM air-launched cruise missile

AMRAAM Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASARS Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar System

ASD(C31) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,

Communications and Intelligence)

ASTOVL advanced short take-off vertical landing

ATD advanced technology demonstration

ATE automated test equipment

ATR automatic target recognition

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BDA battle damage assessment

C3 command, control and communications

C31 command, control, communications and intelligence

CAS close air support

CEM combined effects munition

CEP circular error probability

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CINC Commander-in-Chief

CINCCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief, Central Command

CLO counter low observable

CMT critical mobile targets

COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis

DSB Defense Science Board

ECCM electronic counter countermeasures

111
ECM electronic countermeasures

EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development

EMI electro-magnetic interference

EO electro-optical

ERP effective radiated power

FOPEN foliage penetration

G&A general and administrative

GLONASS Russian Satellite Navigation System

GOCO government-owned/contractor-operated

GPS Global Positioning System

HARM High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

IMU inertial measurement unit

INS inertial navigation system

10 inventory objective

IR infra-red

IRCM infra-red countermeasures

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Commander

JOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

JSOW Joint Stand-Off Weapon

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTF joint task force

LO low observable

LPI low probability of intercept

MRC major regional contingency

NEE National Intelligence Estimate

NTM National Technical Means

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

P31 pre-planned product improvement

PGM precision-guided munition

POM Program Objective Memorandum

iv
R&D Research & Development

RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

RF Radio Frequency

SAM surface-to-air missile

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SFW Sensor Fused Weapon

TRANSCOM Transportation Command

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

V
BACKGROUND
TERMS OF REFERENCE

* Concepts for improved effectiveness

• Integration of tactical air assets

* Key leveraging technologies

• Exploit technologies to reduce costs

• Priorities for R&D

* Proper balance (Platforms, sensors, weapons, etc.).

* Key technology trades

* Commonality

• "Readiness"

• Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program

The terms of reference for the Tactical Air Warfare Task Force tasked the Defense Science Board (DSB)

to review a fascinating set of the country's acquisition options for tactical air warfare over the next 10 to

20 years. (See Appendix A for Terms of Reference.) As the force structure is resized and restructured to

meet the challenges of a disorderly new world order there will be opportunities for important new

approaches and perspectives. More specifically, we were charged with exploring promising concepts and

technologies that might provide high leverage in cost and effectiveness against foreseeable threats.

Our task force was organized to review as much of the spectrum of tactical air warfare as time would

permit. Appendix B lists the members and panels. We began by analyzing historic trends in tactical air

warfare. In those efforts we focused on the concepts of operations that were in practice, sought to discern

how the then-current technologies drove us to employ those concepts, and sought to derive where the

trends in operational concepts coupled with technology advancements might lead us.

We were asked to address the commonality issue. Since we addressed that subject in some detail in the

earlier DSB report on Tactical Air Assessment (see Appendix C), we have nothing to add.

We were also asked to comment on the new initiatives specifically applicable to the Joint Advanced Strike

Technology Program. The letter responding to the request for comments on this program is in

Appendix D.
OVERVIEW

"• History

"* Perspective

- What will stay the same?

- What should change?

"* Serious deficiencies

"* Highest leveraged items

"* Recommended actions

We began our analysis by reviewing the history of the kinds of capabilities we asked of tactical airpower

in the past. In that effort we sought to understand how the capabilities supported those times' national

objectives and how they were underwritten by what the current technology could provide then. We used

the understanding gained by that review along with our vision of the direction of future technologies to

suggest what types of programs might be especially valuable in the uncertain world of the future.

Much of our investigation and deliberation merely confirmed that the aggregate result of past decisions

has produced a veiy effective force and most of the programs now in place will, in our opinion, do much

to maintain military capabilities to meet challenges to US. national interests. These in-place programs

support a number of tactical air warfare capabilities for which the need will stay the same in the

foreseeable future.

However, there are areas that we believe require increased attention. These are the "What should

change" items discussed in this report. We have identified deficiencies, some of which we know how

to fix and others that will require additional research and development. From our analysis, we have

developed a set of recommendations, based on technical/military objectives, that we feel address

important areas where a change in approach or greatly increased emphasis is needed.

2
THE LEGACY SHAPING AIRPOWER - POST-WORLD WAR 19

"• National defense guidance - no more protracted land war involvement outside NATO -

nuclear deterrence - more bang for the buck

"• Tactical air focused on the nuclear mission

- Designed for long-range, low-altitude, internal weapons - F-105, F- I 11. A-5

"* Continuing doctrine-capabilities gap for conventional (non-nuc? tar) conflict

- Little attention to conventional support of the land battle

"* NATO orientation - drove USAF and Army thinking about conventional airpower concepts

toward:

- Air superiority over friendly territory

- Interdiction of armored forces

- Emphasis on choke points

"• Little real change identified from Korean War operations

"* Change initiated in late '50s and accelerated with the Kennedy administration - entered

Vietnam in early stage of change

For several years following World War II, the guidance for national defense planning was to concentrate

on protecting our vital national interests in Western Europe and to rely heavily on the nuclear deterrent to

protect interests around the world.

In response to that guidance, the Tactical Air Forces, Air Force and Navy focused on the nuclear mission

to the virtual exclusion of developing the conventional capabilities needed to underwrite air power

doctrine. And to the extent that there was attention on conventional capabilties, it was increasingly

concentrated on the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. Given the formidable multi-layered ground-based

defenses of the Warsaw Pact, U.S. air superiority aspirations were limited to NATO airspace with some

hope for temporary superiority at times and places of our choosing in Warsaw Pact airspace. Ground

attack capabilities had heavy emphasis on helping the ground forces deal with the expected massive attack

by armored forces.

Even though the Korean War was a graphic demonstration of the limitations of the "more bang for the

buck" nuclear deterrent umbrella, and it did lead to more emphasis on lower-yielded tactical nuclear

weapons, that conflict was regarded as an aberration that did not warrant a significant contribution to

improving conventional capabilities to deal with regional contingencies.

By the late 1950s, a number of influential military and civilian thinkers were providing persuasive

arguments in favor of robust conventional capabilities. The Kennedy administration accelerated this trend

but the forces available for the Viemnam conflict were in only the earliest stages of evolving to robust

conventional capabilities.

3
THE LEGACY SHAPING AIR POWER - POST-VIETNAM

Focus on Post-Vietnam capabilities to underwrite air doctrine

* Common Army-Air Force air-land battle doctrine

• Realistic training - Top Gun, Red Flag, National Training Center, Composite Training

Exercises

* High-intensity, nearly simultaneous strategic attack - no recovery time - freedom of

friendly air operations

* Concentration of effective firepower vice just concentrating airplanes - precision

strike/high lethality per sortie

* Rotary-wing firepower integrated with fixed-wing for both the close battle and support of

deeper operations

* Transforming night from an enemy sanctuary to great advantage for U.S. forces

* Introduction of the first families of relatively low cost "smart weapons"

* Commitment to optimized systems for air superiority - essential for theater-wide freedom

of operation for friendly forces

The lessons of Vietnam drove fundamental changes in focus. Senior air and ground commanders saw the

need for a common air-land battle doctrine and began the long, painful process of working it out well

before the end of the Vietnam conflict.

So-called combat ready forces required extensive additional individual and unit training and experience in

the combat theater to become effective. The goal became to be effective on the first mission of the first

day in future conflicts, and high priority programs were initiated to underwrite this goal.

The low lethality of individual attacks produced the need for large force packages to concentrate firepower

and to provide defense suppression and protection against enemy fighter aircraft. The resulting pace of

operations left the adversary with too much recovery capability between attacks. As a result, the strategic

campaign did not achieve its objective. After Vietnam, the goal became the acquisition of capabilities

enabling intense, fast-paced strategic campaigns.

While rotary-wing firepower in the actual conflict was rudimentary and of limited effectiveness, its

potential was demonstrated and air-land battle doctrine and training began to focus on leveraging rotarywing combat power with better integration of fixed-wing support.

Night was a time of virtual sanctuary from other than B-52 carpet bombing. By the end of the conflict, it

was evident that developing technology could begin to meet the need for around-the-clock, high-intensity

operations.

While intensified air combat training improved the performance of U.S. air superiority forces, it became

painfully evident that U.S. fighter designs had been so extensively compromised for multiple missions that

they could not provide the margin of superiority needed to win and maintain superiority over enemy

territory. Poor air-to-air missile performance compounded the deficiency. All this led the Air Force and

Navy to make aircraft optimized for air superiority and fleet air defense and lethal air-to-air missiles their

top Tactical Air priorities. While optimized for the air-to-air role, these aircraft also had significant

potential for strike and attack missions as needed. At the same time, the era of Vietnam and thereafter

saw the introduction of new smart weapons such as laser-guided bombs.

4
THE LEGACY SHAPING AIR POWER - PRE-DESERT STORM

Special focus on Southwest Asia, 1980 to present "* Need for information superiority - surveillance, processing, communications

"* Single CINC-centered air campaign

"* Intense, continuous interdiction to isolate the battlefield

"* More effective support of the close battle - focuseo CAS forces - attention to special demands

for communications, survivability, and accurate weapon delivery "* Bomber, fighter, and rotary-wing aircraft evolved to capabilities cutting across strategic and

tactical mission lines - moved towards seamless air power employment in Desert Storm -

demonstrated as:

- Air Force Special Ops and Army helicopters led the defense suppression effort the first

night of Desert Storm

- "Strategic" bombers provided battlefield air interdiction throughout the air campaign - "Tactical" fighters executed the strategic air campaign

The lessons of Vietnam and the demands of central Europe had much to do with the nature of the forces

available for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. However, following the collapse of the Shah's government in

Iran in 1979, there was also an intense focus on the special demands of Southwest Asia.

The senior leaders in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and its service components were

veterans of the fragmented air effort in Vietnam with not one but six or seven air campaigns under the

loosely coordinated direction of multiple senior commanders. It was clear that kind of fragmentation

would spell disaster in Southwest Asia and, from the earliest exercises, the RD]TF commanders (Marine

and Army) and subsequently CINCCENTCOM insisted on planning for a single CINC-centered air

campaignThe RDJTF's most demanding task was to deploy quickly and hold against a Soviet invasion of Iran.

Given the vastness of the territory and the mission, it was clear that more knowledge of enemy activities

would be an absolute prerequisite for success.

The same was true of the need to get the maximum leverage from rapidly deploying air power to slow the

Soviet advance and add to the combat power of engaged ground forces.

The distances involved and the formidable task of stopping an invading force on the ground led to special

emphasis on integrated planning of the use of all available air power, strategic bombers with gravity and

stand-off weapons, Air Force, Navy, and Marine tactical fighters and Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army

rotary wing aircraft. From Korea to Desert Storm we saw the result of a long evolution towards the

seamless integration of all air power that can add to the theater commander's combat power.

5
WHAT WILL STAY THE SAME?

h enee to:

* Know the enemy (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance)

• Emphasize compatible joint doctrines, C3, and joint exercises

* Focus on readiness to deploy rapidly and sustain contingency forces

* Maintain decisive technical superiority in the face of proliferation

* Capitalize on the value of stealth

* Make incremental improvements in airframes, engines, avionics, etc., that provide leverage

As suggested earlier, here are a few important items from a far longer list where the current technical

emphasis is on target and should be continued.

In the past we had a principal target for our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. We

cannot identify tomorrow's adversaries today, but our inability to do so does not diminish the "war"

requirement to know the enemy. History has repeatedly provided evidence of how critical that knowledge

is. We must have the resources that can be focused to acquire the information we need in a timely manner.

Also high on our list of areas for increased emphasis and smarter ways to leverage technologies is

developing, proving, propagating, and practicing effective joint doctrine, command and control, and

training. We have seen good progress on more effective joint doctrines, some progress in C31, and far

better understanding of the importance of Joint Task Force (TMF) level joint training and exercises. We

will say more later about the promise of advanced distributed simulation in these areas.

The end objective of the C3 system is to provide the timely information needed for intelligent decisions at

all levels, and to provide a rapid, effective target location and attack cycle. Technologies are available.

Persistent focus and direction is needed. We also need some significantly different approaches to deciding

priorities.

The current Defense leadership is focused on the essential elements that produce force readiness today,

and modernization for force readiness tomorrow. We need to stay with that balanced approach.

Today, advanced technologies are available to any country with sufficient resources to pay the tab -

wimess the facilities and equipment that have been discovered in Iraq. In addition, the American public

has been conditioned in two ways by the Desert Storm experience. First their expectations in the future

will demand quick, decisive victories, and second, they believe (quite correctly) that the technological

superiority brought to bear in that conflict was a prime contributor to the decisive win. Thus, we have

proliferation of advanced technology weapons and a demand for technological solutions to cope with

them. This confluence of factors requires us to maintain im edge over the capabilities residing in a diverse

set of potential enemies.

Operational stealth successes in the Gulf War validated the ivitial judgments of those who supported

development of this technology and its associated tactical werfare employment doctrine. Continued

pursuit of this characteristic is important for vehicles that are to ce operated in the face of enemy air

defenses.

Incremental improvements in existing systems can make significant contributions to tactical air warfare

capabilities. However, with current and projected fiscal constraints, new avionics, engines, weapons, etc,

will be constrained to those that exploit new sets of technology in ways that make an essential difference

in force capability.

6
SELECTED "WHAT SHOULD CHANGE" ITMS

"* Know the capabilities of many potential enemies

"* Emphasize capability to find and destroy ground targets "* Overcome institutional resistance to necessary tradeoffs

Improved vs. new systems

Multi-mission vs. single-mission platforms

Weapons and sensors vs. platforms

Logistics vs. weapon performance

"* Emphasize a responsive integrated information architecture

And change, because we have some key deficiencies

In the past, we had a well-defined threat on which we could focus our intelligence and surveillance

resources. Today, although no enemy is as formidable as the former Soviet Union, they are more

numerous and we cannot focus on any single one. We saw in Desert Storm the value of having

information superiority over our adversary. We will need those same advantages in any future conflict and

must now acquire the capabilities to achieve the requisite knowledge about a variety of potential enemies.

The capability to find ground targets under a range of environmental and tactical circumstances has not

kept pace with the remarkable advances made in aircraft platform and precision guided weapon

performance. In addition, current guided weapons do not provide all-weather capability. Destroying

ground targets surely and efficiently, even under adverse weather conditions, offers great leverage in

affecting the outcome of the military and political situation. We believe priority should go to the target

location end of the tactical air warfare system. Further, current plans for investment in precision guided

weapons are not commensurate with their high payoff. This justifies some shift in TacAir programs

investment away from the more traditional focus on the aircraft platform and its performance.

The DoD "institutional bias" heavily favors new systems with more emphasis on latf ams than

on architectures for information flow, sensor improvements and weapons programs. Also, logistics does

not claim the attention of the operational decision makers that dominate the requirements process. Still,

there are any number of reasons for shifting attention from new systems to improved systems and

logistics. In most areas, there is significant growth potential left in the latest existing systems, especially

when viewed from an end-to-end system perspective. We can afford only a few new systems and the time

required to field new systems also argues for attention to improvements.

The payoff from precision guided weapons needs no further proof although continued emphasis on

acquisition programs is necessary. That payoff shifts the dominant challenge from lethality against

targets, which now is technologically well in hand for most targets, to target location/identification and

battle damage assessment (BDA). Hence the need for focus on sensors and C3 systems. The keystone for

success across the board, from acquisition decision to combat effectiveness, lies in a fully responsive,

integrated Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture.

We also have additional deficiencies that we have grouped into two types: serious ones that have known

technical solutions and serious ones requiring research and development priority.

7
SERIOUS CURRENT DEFICIENCIES THAT HAVE KNOWN TECHNICAL

SOLUTIONS

* Lack of integrated battlefield surveillance/reconnaissance - Off-board sensors and data links to improve targeting

* Vulnerabilities of critical sources of information (GPS, JSTARS, AWACS, E-2C, etc.)

• Inadequate quantities of PGMs and their delivery systems

* Inadequate quantities of standoff weapons

0 Lack of a joint exercise environment that integrates simulators, wargames, and distributed

live forces

* Lack of superior air-to-air missile

It is clear that there is no technical barrier that prevents us from fielding a battlefield surveillance/

reconnaissance/targeting system that collects the data acquired by different platforms and different

sensors, integrates it, fuses it, and passes it via links to shooters. Though there is no technical barrier, our

fighting forces do not yet have this needed capability.

As the large information and C3 platforms become more important to the effectiveness of our forces,

countering them will become more important to adversaries. Given the proliferation of Russian long

range air-to-air and surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) as well as electronic warfare systems, we need intense

focus on making our systems more survivable and resistant to electronic countermeasures.

In the future, with digital communications, packaging, and information systems making it possible to

have robust, cooperative systems that are more robust because of their using both on- and off-board

elements and UAVs, these large platforms can become less vulnerable and less lucrative targets for our

enemies.

The principal issue with precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and cruise missiles is the need to accelerate

procurement rates and make the delivery systems, fighters, and bombers compatible with the weapons and

capable of adequate target acquisition and MI.-STD-1760 wideband bus weapon delivery. Incremental

improvements in planning responsiveness and delivery capabilities can make a very significant difference.

A second PGM issue is the urgent need for an adverse-weather capability against fixed, mobile, and

moving targets; laser-guided weapons can have disabling problems in all but quite clear conditions.

Challenges to national interests inevitably will demand high-risk missions while, at the same time, there

will be low tolerance for high losses. At least in the early phase of attacks, stand-off weapons are likely to

become the weapon of choice more often than in the past. There is a need to increase precision, lower

collateral damage, and shorten mission preparation time.

Of great importance is accelerating the introduction of advanced distributed simulation technology to

leverage joint force training and exercises. Those technologies will provide significant enhancement to

live force training in the field of a size that is affordable and appropriate to the training areas. The

technology also will allow individuals at distributed locations (such as National Guard Armories or in

regional virtual simulation training facilities) to participate through connected virtual simulations. It will

allow the use of virtual simulations and computer-driven forces and wargames to expand the challenge to

the brigade, division, or JTF.

The final bullet of the chart concerns the fact that our currently-operational air-to-air missiles do not have

performance characteristics that make them clearly dominant over foreign counterparts. Technology is

available that could be fielded in the near-term to rectify this situation and should be incorporated as part

of the AIM-9X program and AIM-120 product improvement.

8
SERIOUS CURRENT DEFICIENCIES REQUIRING RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT PRIORITY

" Inability to: - Locate/destroy critical mobile targets

- Locate/destroy Tactical Ballistic Missiles - Destroy hardened, buried, and tunneled facilities

"* Theater and ship air defense against low-observable cruise missiles

"* Vulnerabilities of a commercially-based information distribution system

In Desert Storm, the unreliable and inaccurate Iraqi tactical ballistic and crmse missiles achieved more

psychological and propaganda value than military impact. But, the proliferation of far more effective

classes of these systems is inevitable. It is a difficult problem. But, there are a number of potential

technological solutions or contributors to the solution that ought to be receiving high priority.

We see militarily significant facilities in countries around the world being hardened. buried, or sited in

tunnels and caves In particular, vital command and control capabilities are likely to be deeply buried,

denying our forces the ability to strike very-higb-payoff targets. There are deep penetration concepts that

ought to be pressed harder to mitigate this deficiency.

Over time, some significant capability to exploit low-observable (LO) technology inevitably will

proliferate. As evidenced by the Stark incident, the French EXOCET, possessed by and available to many

Third World countries, presents significant challenges to our target acquisition and engagement systems.

Cruise missiles are particularly well suited to LO) treatments and are likely to lead the way in reduced

observability and be an increasing threat to our forces.

And finally, as DoD increasingly migrates the information distribution workload to a commercial base,

concerns about vulnerabilities of commercial systems must be addressed. Commercial satellite

communications vendors are not building anti-jam or data integrity features into their systems.

Commercially-developed computers, networks, and software are vulnerable to viruses and other forms of

information tampering and intrusion, especially when used in the geographically distributed

configurations that the tactical air community will require. Ensuring flexible access to needed data in the

right place, at the right time, and at an appropriate security level will require access controls and

information protection not offered routinely by today's commercial vendors. The government and

commercial sectors are currently conducting limited research into promising security concepts. This R&D

effort should be expanded significantly to reduce the vulnerability associated with a commercially-based

information distribution system, both to prevent denial of service as well as to prevent information

leakage.

9
HIGHEST LEVERAGE ITEMS
HIGHEST LEVERAGE ITEMS FOR IMPROVED TACAIR WARFARE

CAPABILITIES

* Equip the force

* Improve logistics effectiveness and efficiency

* Exercise our operational capability

• Define and implement a tactical warfare systems information architecture

• Perform capability trade-offs

We now address the highest leverage items shown above. First, under equipping the force, we examine

problems and potential solutions concerned with the lack of an end-to-end, wide-area surveillance, not

enough aircraft equipped to use advanced PGMs, acquisition of PGMs, and the vulnerability of Global

Positioning System (GPS) receivers to jamming. In the logistics and industrial capability section, we

address problems and potential solutions related to deficiencies in wartime capabilities, excess industrial

capacity, unnecessary specialization of aircraft field maintenance systems, and the inadequate exercising

of our logistics capability. We then address the need to exercise our operational capability and follow that

with the necessity to define and implement a tactical warfare systems information architecture suited to

the new defense environment. Finally, we address the need to define and perform wade-offs among

different categories of weapons, systems, and platforms.

11
EQUIP THE FORCE

Problems:

• Lack of an effective end-to-end (detection-to-destruction), wide-area surveillance and

targeting system

* Too few combat/strike aircraft have capability to use advanced PGMs

* Planned PGM acquisition rates and total buys are inadequate

* GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming

There are a number of deficiencies and problems associated with the current Tactical Air Warfare force

structure.

The high leverage offered by employment of precision-guided weapons is restricted by the C3H infrastructure

for acquiring targets on the battlefield, identifying them, locating them in GPS coordinates with accuracy

suitable for weapon launch, and disseminating targeting data to the shooters in a timely manner. Military

forces currently lack an effective end-to-end, wide-area surveillance and detection-to-destruction targeting

system, and current plans will not provide this capability.

Insufficient numbers of existing combat/strike aircraft are equipped with the capability to deliver PGMs.

The projected acquisition rate and total buys for targeting pods are inadequate to redress this deficiency.

For example, less than half the F-16 force will be equipped by 2000, none of the AV-8B fleet has PGM

targeting pods, and the planned acquisition rate of targeting pods for the F/A-18 is too low.

Both the projected acquisition rates and total buys for future precision-guided weapons are inadequate. The

Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JS0W) acquisition programs are on

such a slow pace that militarily significant quantities will not be available until well after fiscal year 2000.

The impact of these deficiencies, if a major contingency occurs, is that both greater numbers of sorties will

be required per target killed and there will likely be higher aircraft and aircrew attrition.

Most tactical aircraft and weapons will employ some form of GPS navigation. GPS has the potential to

provide a substantial advance in accurate, all-weather delivery capability. However, GPS receivers are

uniquely vulnerable to jamming since the satellite transmitter is three orders of magnitude further away than

likely jammers. Modest (few watt) GPS jammers can deny acquisition at very long ranges (hundreds of

kilometers).

12
EQUIP THE FORCE - SURVEILLANCE AND TARGETING

Recommend:

Develop an end-to-end, wide-area surveillance and targeting acquisition system

- Develop JSTARS as control center for targeting

- Improve JSTARS SAR resolution by at least 3 to 1

- Develop SAR/GPS relative targeting concept - Transition some Warbreaker technologies for CMT targeting

- Continue work on reduction of NTM data timelines to shooters (Talon Sword/Talon

Zebra) - Improve sensor systems for theater surveillance in denied/defended areas (e.g., UAV

SAR systems)

As noted on the previous page, our present theater C31 is inadequate to meet the timeliness challenges

presented by today's battlefield, let alone tomorrow's. Part of this infrastructure resides in theater

surveillance assets such and Rivet Joint, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and

the TR-1, but these systems need integration into an overall theater targeting system, to make their

timeliness operationally suitable. Additionally, we need the communications infrastructure for data and

imagery transmission to shooter platforms.

We recommend making JSTARS a control center to integrate selected data from off-board sources [e.g.,

National Technical Means (NTM), Rivet Joint, Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS)] and

ground target attack. We need to establish a data link from JSTARS to strike aircraft to pass target data

and even high-resolution images.

Current JSTARS resolution is inadequate for target identification in the synthetic aperture radar (SAR)

mode. We need to improve it at least 3 to 1 to enhance capability for identifying time-critical targets

(roughly $100M R&D plus $100-150M procurement).

Many of our high-quality attack aircraft have SAR capability that can be modified to permit JDAM-like

weapons to be used against mobile but non-moving targets, by using SAR-derived target location data to

define a local GPS coordinate system for both the aircraft and weapon, which eliminates the normal GPS

target location error. If the attack can be prosecuted during the time interval when the same set of GPS

satellites are in view, the weapon accuracy can be as little as five meters. More important, this can

provide the ability for mobile target kill prior to the time terminal sensors might be available for the

weapons themselves. (This capability could be achieved at roughly $25M R&D per aircraft type.)

These surveillance assets have limited capability to provide target data in denied or defended areas. At

present, we must rely upon NTM to provide coverage, which though useful, is not the continuous coverage

necessary for may types of targets (e.g., SCUD launchers). A penetrating, air-breathing sensor platform

could provide the coverage, e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with low probability of intercept (LPI)

SAR, or a bi-static SAR system. Although it might be post-2000 before we get such a capability, it is

important to get it started now.

The ARPA Warbreaker program is a key source of concepts and sensor systems to prosecute attacks on

critical mobile targets (CMT). Probably the most critical technical issue is to develop automatic target

recognition (ATR) techniques with performance adequate to maintain acceptable false-alarm rates, when

surveying large land areas. Warbreaker's objectives include finding targets that are concealed and\or

camouflaged, and in foliage. However, there are many targets that are much easier to find (e.g., SAM

sites), particularly when cueing information is available. We recommend the transition of certain selected

Warbreaker Technologies now - e.g., ATR algorithms for targets in clear areas, specialized ATR for

13
strictly limited sets of very important mobile targets (this would require approximately $25M in R&D

cost.)

Demonstration programs (e.g., Talon Sword, Talon Zebra) have shown that the C3 infrastructure can

enable timely utilization of national assets. These efforts should be accelerated with emphasis on

useability of national sensors for mobile targeting.

14
EQUIP THE FORCE - UAVs

"• Develop and assess UAV-based surveillance and targeting systems, and deployment concepts

utilizing existing vehicles - Use computer emulation and CINC participation to evolve sensor payload characteristics

"• Pursue three classes:

- A high-altitude, long-endurance platform for long-range surveillance and target II), as

an adjunct to JSTARS - A low-altitude platform with EO/IR, laser designator, and with FOPEN SAR sensor

system option - A short-range, small-payload UAV (already in low-rate production) "* Develop and have users evaluate brassboard prototype sensor systems "* Procure limited number of UAV systems for operational tactical user performance evaluation

(joint exercises) "* ARPA should explore the possibilities of UAVs in air-to-air combat through simulations and

modeling to discover promising concepts

We believe UAV systems may not be sufficiently exploited by the Servicet i spite of the current joint

UAV programs. With the sensor and laser technology available tod~y, existing UAV systems could

leverage contingency force operations with reduced vulnerahility and risk. Several classes should be

explored aggressively.

"* One class is a long-endurance UAV that normally operates at medium altitude, to see beyond

JSTARS coverage, with a duration of 12+ hours. It will need radar to see through the clouds

and another payload for foliage penetration (FOPEN). The sensor package should be based

on currently available technology; a demonstration air vehicle can be one that is already

developed. "* The second class is a UAV that operates below clouds to supplement penetrating tactical

reconnaissance. It has electro-optical/infra-red (EO/IR) sensors and lasers to designate

targets for attack with laser-guided weapons, and could have FOPEN SAR if necessary. It

should be derived from available technology. Again, existing platforms should be able to

accommodate the needed payload. "* The third class of UAV already exists. These are short-range UAVs under the cognizance of

Army/Marine commanders. We need open-minded tests and evaluation by users to

determine their utility and approaches to exploit their current capabilities.

DoD should initiate programs to develop and field improved sensor packages to meet these needs, as soon

as the concepts are validated. Early user involvement is essential, including simulation and joint

exercises, to refine and evolve the design and operational employment doctrine and tactics.

ARPA should explore the possibilities of UAVs in air-to-air combat through simulation and modeling to

discover promising concepts for prototyping and demonstrations.

15
EQUIP THE FORCE - UPGRADE EXISTING AIRCRAFT

* In Desert Storm POMs were 12-20 times more effective than dumb bombs, but based on

POM 94, <45% of TacAir will have adequate PGM capability Recommend:

"• Accelerate buys of targeting pods and other essential aircraft modifications so more F- 16Cs,

F/A-18Cs, and AV-8Bs can employ current and developing PGMs effectively "* Provide F-14D, F-15C, and F-22 interceptor and air superiority aircraft with effective air-tosurface PGM capability

In a "zero-sum" budget environment, DoD should emphasize leveraging upgrades to existing aircraft over

new aircraft development. For example, less than 45% of DoD's air-to-surface aircraft have adequate

PGM delivery capability from medium altitudes and, with current weapon acquisition and aircraft

modification/acquisition plans (POM 94), this will not change until well after FY 2000 (when

JDAM/JSOW should begin to become available in quantity).

"* Widely proliferated man portable SAMs and AAA drive most air strikes to medium altitudes

"• In Desert Storm, PGMs were 12-20 times more effective than dumb bombs

At least five additional wings of F-16s need PGM pods and PGM delivery capability, which includes the

wideband 1760 bus (about $2 to $3 billion, FY 1995-02).

Pod procurement rates should be accelerated for the F/A-18C/D (from the planned low rate of 20 to 40

pods per year to about 80 per year, adding 160 pods for about $350M, FY 1995-99).

Given the proliferated MANPADS threat, the AV-8B will need a capability for accurate weapon delivery

from beyond 15,000 ft slant ranges. At present, no pods are planned for the AV-8B fleet, inhibiting its

ability for target acquisition and PGM delivery (e.g., LGB, JDAM, JSOW). We recommend adding about

100 pods and related aircraft modifications for effective PGM delivery capability (about $400M, FY 1995-

00).

We support plans to modify F-14D, F-15C, and Fy22 aircraft (currently focused on air-to-air capabilities)

to enhance their air-to-surface PGM capability, thereby enabling these assets to be more valuable once air

superiority is established. The F-22 should incorporate air-to-surface capability from the start and F-14D

and F-15C modifications should be accelerated (about $100-150M R&D per aircraft, plus modest

recurring cost).

16
EQUIP THE FORCE - PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS

* PGM acquisition plans for fighters and bombers are inadequate in the near term (prior to

FY 2000) - Only 50% of PGM air-to-surface weapon inventory objective will be met by FY 1999 - Only about 5% of PGM inventory will be all-weather capable (excluding HARMs) BQQco d:

"* Increase buy of PGMs in near-term weapon acquisition plans - Accelerate PGM procurement rate to buy inventory objective by FY 2000 and increase

acquisition rate of all-weather PGMs - Higher priority for longer range, stand-off, all-weather PGMs - OSD and Services review the PGM inventory objective - Field contingency quantities of JDAM earlier than planned for initial user evaluation - Develop and buy guided dispenser for accurate medium-altitude cluster munitions

delivery

"* Increase emphasis on the development of improved stand-off, all-weather precision attack

capabilities, including integration of target acquisition, target engagement and weapons for

fixed, mobile, and moving targets.

We compared planned Air Force and Navy/USMC weapon inventories in FY 2000 with weapon inventory

objectives (lOs) based on new Post-Cold War requirements and found PGM acquisition plans for fighters

and bombers are inadequate in the near term (i.e., prior to FY 2000). Desert Storm has had a minimal

effect on Service plans to increase PGM inventory levels. Even the Service's modest objectives are not

being bought. For example, only half of the PGM air-to-surface 10 (POM 94) will be met by FY 1999 and

only 5% of the PGM inventory will be capable of effective all-weather target kill. We believe that Service

1Os for PGM quantities are too low, but we did not examine Service weapon inventory methodologies in

detail.

PGMs could reduce wartime logistics requirements. In some contingencies, wide use of PGMs could

result in fewer sorties and/or shorter conflicts, thus reducing logistics needs. For example, Gulf War

experience showed that for many types of targets, a ton of PGMs typically replaces 12-20 tons of unguided

munitions on a tonnage per target kill basis. Correspondingly, taking into account the totality of air

operations, as much as 35-40 tons of fuel per ton of PGMs delivered may be saved.

DoD should accelerate acquiring a weapons inventory much more focused on PGMs:

"* Given the scarcity of stealth aircraft for the foreseeable future, leverage the 2,000-3,000

aircraft in the force by placing a higher priority on longer range, precise standoff weapons

and targeting capabilities, including operating effectively in all-weather.

". Accelerate fielding of contingency quantities (1,000-2,000) of JDAM by using a fast-track

acquisition approach, including early user testing and employment prior to formal

Operational Test and Evaluation.

* Increase procurement rates of existing PGMs, especially PAVEWAY 3, AGM-130, and

SLAM in FY 1995-99.

PAVEWAY 3 guidance is needed for all 1-2000 bombs in order to control impact angle and avoid their

breakup on impact. PAVEWAY 3's small circular error probability (CEP), 10 ft., makes it valuable for a

wide range of tactical targets as well as those strategic targets that require small CEPs. A modest buy

would include 20,000 PAVEWAY 3 kits at about $SB, 300-500 additional SLAMs at about $250-400

million, and 300-500 additional AGM-130 at $150-250 million, FY 1995-00.

17
Using a fast-track approach, develop and procure contingency quantities of a guided

dispenser for medium-altitude accurate delivery of sensor fused weapons (SFWs) and

combined effects munitions (CEMs) from all air-to-surface platforms, and place them in the

hands of operators for experimentation and possible contingency use (e.g., about $100

million for R&D and 1,000 weapons).

DoD should accelerate the development of a standoff, all-weather, precision air-to-surface weapon.

18
EQUIP THE FORCE - VULNERABILITY TO GPS JAMMING

Problem:

• Current GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming in acquisition mode at very long range

from low power jammers and will lose track at moderate range for reasonable jammer threats

Recommend:

0 Provide at least half the strike aircraft platforms with improved GPS ECCM capability

(selective receivers, GPS/INS coupling, adaptive antennas)

* OSD should perform a critical review of the impact of GPS ECM vulnerability on JSOW and

other weapon mission effectiveness . Create an independent GPS vulnerability assessment group led by OSD

• Aggressively pursue countermeasures to adversaries' use of GPS

Most tactical aircraft and weapons will employ some form of GPS navigation. GPS has the potential to

provide a substantial advance in accurate all-weather-delivery capability However. GPS receivers are

uniquely vulnerable to jamming since the satellite is three orders of magnitude further away than the

jammer. A small, few-watt jammer can be cheap and easily deployable, while a few hundred-watt ERP

jammer can be relocatable. Jammers in the few-kilowatt-ERP range start to become high-value targets.

Modest (few watt) GPS jammers can deny GPS acquisition at very long ranges (hundreds of kilometers).

GPS receivers should not attempt acquisition under conditions where jamming is likely.

Tactical aircraft delivering GPS-aided weapons require significant levels of electronic counter

countermeasures (ECCM) improvement if they are to avoid GPS track loss and property initialize their

weapons. Tighter coupling of GPS/fnertial navigation system (INS), improved selectivity receivers, and

adaptive antennas each will provide anti-jam (AJ) improvements. If all of these techniques are employed,

strike aircraft can be made invulnerable to almost all potential GPS jammers.

For shorter-range missiles, such as JDAM and JSOW, a jammer could break GPS track. DoD should

carefully review the JSOW ECCM issue to determine whether the proper balance has been struck among

ECCM vs inertial measurement unit (IMU) quality vs. standoff range in an electronic countermeasures

(ECM) environment.

Modem weapon systems will be dependent on the GPS system. The vulnerability of any system to denial

of GPS must be considered a first-order issue in decisions associated with the design, procurement, test,

evaluation, and deployment of the system. A high-level DoD group should be established to assess the

vulnerability of future systems to the denial of GPS. Also, because there will be extensive world-wide

proliferation/use of GPS for navigation, DoD should pursue development of countermeasures to potential

adversaries' use of GPS/GLONASS.

19
EQUIP THE FORCE - PGM IMPLEMENTATION

The combination of an integrated end-to-end surveillance and targeting system and the expanded

use of PGMs will improve Tactical Air Warfare effectiveness more quickly than any other set of

measures.

* Implementation cost is approximately $1 B/year for 5 years

* For a major conflict, this investment could pay for itself through reduced sorties per target

killed, shortened combat time, reduced aircraft and aircrew attrition, and lower wartime

logistic costs

* Upgrading existing combat aircraft with POM capability makes it much more probable that

the planned reduced tactical air force structure could conduct two MRCs simultaneously

* Near-term sources of funds are attainable by modest rescheduling of tactical air related

programs

Desert Storm showed the great potential of wide-area surveillance and targeting, as well as the weaknesses

in our current capabilities. Desert Storm also showed that a small fraction of our assets (mostly F-I 17s, FI ls, and A-los) accounted for a majority of the strategic and tactical battlefield targets that were

destroyed. Most other aircraft, dropping unguided ordnance from medium altitudes (to avoid the low

altitude threats), were largely ineffectual.

The highest payoff near-term action DoD can take to increase the air-to-ground effectiveness of our

tactical air forces is to: 1) define, field, and evolve an effective end-to-end target surveillance and

targeting system; 2) expand our PGM delivery vehicle capability; and 3) buy enough PGMs for a

reasonable campaign.

The cost of these upgrades is about $lB per year for a 5-year period. This amount represents a small

fraction of the life-cycle cost of that force and could yield an effectiveness increase of a factor of ten to

twenty.

For a major conflict, this investment could pay for itself through drastically reduced sorties per kill,

shortened combat time, reduced aircraft and aircrew attrition, and lower wartime logistic costs. Moreover,

this investment makes it much more likely that our reduced tactical air force structure could effectively

conduct two major regional contingencies (MRCs) simultaneously.

20
EQUIP THE FORCE -AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES

"* Our curent capabilities are not superior to our foreign counterparts "* Improved versions of both our short-range and medium-range missiles will not be available

until the late 90's and beyond

"• Move forward on AIM-9X program to get enhanced range, maneuverability, and ECCM

capability "* Increase priority upgrades for AMRAAM to enhance capability to counter combination of

LO and eudgame countermeasures

Gaining and maintaining air superiority - hopefully air supremacy - is the first priority of our air forces,

achievement of which enables our surface forces to operate without fear of air strikes. If our Offensive

CounterAir and Attack Operations missions do not succeed in "pinning in" enemy combat aircraft, our air

forces will need to conduct air-to-air combat. Even with the benefit of our likely superior off-board

warning and control assets (e.g., AWACS, Rivet Joint, etc.), which should enable our air superiority

aircraft to position themselves favorably, our combat aircraft may be forced into air-to-air combat.

Should that occur, our air forces may be "outgunned," because presently the U.S. does not enjoy a position

of technical and military superierity over all foreign air-to-air missiles. This is particularly true for the

short-range IR guided missiles (AIM-9M), for which the U.S. basically abandoned new missile

development approximately 15 years ago due to international development agreements. Russian and

French missiles substantially outclass the AIM-9 kinematically, operationally, and in infra-red

countermeasures (IRCM) resistance. In the medium-range (AMRAAM) missile arena, advanced versions

of the Russian AA-10 missile have a longer range capability than ours.

Our new short-range missile program (AIM-9X) seems to be moving in the correct direction, but at a pace

that is inconsistent with our perception of the seriousness of the deficiency. We recommend a faster

acquisition program focused on enhanced range, maneuverability and ECCM.

To make AIM-9X "better" than the AA-l 1, MICA and Python might add $200-300M to the $1-1.2B

likely AIM-9X RDT&E cost and probably $75-10pK per missile (approximately $250K each instead of

$150K to $175K each). But one cannot look at round cost alone. One must add in the effect of fewer lost

"Blue" aircraft, to offset the extra cost of the round (one F-15 saved - at $50M each - pays for the likely

difference in cost of 500 missiles).

We believe the AMRAAM preplanned product improvement (P31) program, intended to result in

substantially improved kinematics and ECCM, is moving at a too leisurely pace. We recommend a more

aggressive acquisition program.

Furthermore, we believe there is a major future issue of how best to deal with a combined thrust of LO and

endgame countermeasures. When employed with LO vehicles, noise jamming waveforms can deny use of

range and Doppler resolution. Purely seeker-based solutions to this problem are very complex and

expensive, and may not even work, particularly in obtaining all-weather, all-aspect capability. We believe

a study of how best to deal with this problem, which strikes a proper balance between faster autopilot

response time, maneuverability, new warhead technology, and seeker complexity, is needed to define the

appropiate long-term P31 solution.

21
EQUIP THE FORCE - COUNTER STEALTH R&D

* How to avoid technical surprise and maintain contractor competence - Lack of near-term technology transition opportunities discouraging sponsors

* Need to maintain vigorous Counter-Low Observable (CLO) hedge program

Need flying testbeds with operationally oriented demonstration objectives

It is our belief that TACAIR force elements eventually will have to face up to a reduced observables threaL

The impact of reduced radar cross-section on important weapon systems such as AWACS, F-15,

AMRAAM, etc., can be devastating. In recognition of this possibility, substantial effort and money has

been spent over the past several years to develop options for dealing with the LO threat. The threat has

not yet manifested itself in a serious way, and might not do so for an indefinite time.

In the current budget environment, it is difficult to predict the circumstances in which we would transition

acquisition programs such as those for air defense components with substantially improved CLO

capability (e.g., a new AWACS) from Milestone I - Concept Development Phase to Milestone U1 - Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. As a consequence, there is little opportunity

for the current CLO technology programs to transition to EMD, and this is discouraging to current

sponsors of those programs in the existing fiscally constrained environment.

We believe it is important to continue the technology development in this area beyond those threats

contemplated in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and without pressures for transition to EMD

that the current climate dictates. In particular, this critical technology area needs a "hedge" program to

avoid technical surprise (in the programmatic sense). We fear that if current R&D efforts were

discontinued or reduced to component R&D efforts, our ability to respond to the appearance of a

significant LO threat would be lengthened by at least 4 years, because the contractors would have lost

their technical edge. Substantial demonstration activity would have to be repeated.

Because much of the "art" in achieving CLO capability involves system integration issues, we believe that

a continuing technology base and advanced development programs utilizing a series of flying testheds are

needed to maintain and extend technological competence. Also, a continuing series of demonstration

objectives with strong operational flavor is required to focus the programs. The ACTD concept recently

espoused by OSD is applicable here.

This is an inexpensive suggestion, though the conversion of the current R&D efforts into a long-term

"hedge" effort will require serious thought about restructuring them into a fiscally sustainable program.

22
EQUIP THE FORCE - PLATFORM TECHNOLOGIES

Embic :

* Proected DoD budget limitations do not permit acquisition of varied types of new tactical

aircraft at rates sufficient to maintain the planned force structure

RECGmmnd:

"* Near-term, focus on common engines, avionics, weapons, and support

"* Longer-term, explore potential advances in system design and manufacturing technology to

achieve a viable common tactical aircraft

"* Continue ASTOVL technology demonstration

- Develop suitable exit criteria

- Develop rational performance goals

Multi-ServlcelMult-Mission Common Aircraft/Common Components:

There are recurring pressures to procure tactical aircraft that can be effectively employed by all Services.

A common aircraft is one that, from an acquisition standpoint, has a single design that employs a

common airframe and engine, although some removable modules, such as avionics, may differ.

Conversely, aircraft that have different airframe designs, although incorporating many identical

components, are not considered common aircraft.

There are many reasons why inter-Service commonality has not been achieved. Service operational

requirements and design specifications are developed in separate organizations and thereby optimized to

different perceptions of need. Historically, Service replacement milestones for aircraft of similar type have

not coincided, and the benefits and penalties of full commonality have not been quantified in a way to

allow a convincing cost-effectiveness rationale. Indirectly, industrial and technology base considerations

also mitigate enthusiasm for such an airplane.

While a fully common tactical aircraft may be an achievable long-term goal and a concept worthy of

exploration, we believe that the near-term focus should change from a fully common tactical aircraft to a

substantially common airplane that employs common engines, avionics, and test and support equipment,

but may have some airframe differences to accommodate unique Service needs. The Task Force's

comments on the recently initiated JAST Program, which includes advanced development platform

technologies, are contained in Appendix D.

Advanced Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (ASTOVL):

In project development, ARPA has understandably endeavored to make the ASTOVL demonstration

aircraft as relevant as possible to future Service requirements, leading to its frequent description as "the

prototype for a common Service strike-fighter." We are concerned that this characterization may prove

misleading, since an advanced technology demonstration (ATD) does not attempt to meet the milestone

requircments of an acquisition program, such as validation of an operational requirement or "surviving" a

Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA).

To optimize the ASTOVL ATD, we recommend that the ARPA project goals be clearly stated and include

an explanation of how their attainment will contribute to future Service aircraft program development.

Criteria should be developed for use at milestone reviews to adjust ATD performance objectives (such as

supercruise and LO) or exit the project. Subject to these criteria, we believe this ATD has potential payoff

and should be continued.

23
LOGISTICS AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY - KEY DETIRMINANTS OF

READINESS

* Long-term, persistent, and serious deficiencies in wartime capabilities

* Excess private and public sector industrial capacity

* Unnecessary specialization of aircraft field maintenance systems (e.g., automatic test

equipment) and inaccurate troubleshooting

* Inadequate exercising of logistics capability

Logistics is a key to readiness. It prepares us for battle, gets us to war, and keeps us operating. In the

Gulf War, our aircraft were well supported and, except for some sand damage to helicopter components,

sustained high operational readiness rates throughouL

Yet, we have some long-term, persistent, and serious deficiencies in our capability that hamper our ability

to plan and support contingency operations. They include inabilities to rapidly plan and execute

deployments of large forces, to track shipments of cargo to the theater of operations, to move material

from the ports and airfields of top military units, and to effectively manage munitions. These lessons were

learned from the Vietnam experience. Twenty years later, still uncorrected, they were lessons to be learned

again in the Gulf War.

We also have an industrial base, in both DoD's maintenance depots and in the private sector, that far

exceeds DoD's needs. DoD pays the cost of that excess capacity.

By addressing overspecialization of field maintenance systems and troubleshooting problems, we have

some opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of aircraft support, making it both more

affordable and better suited to contingency operations.

Finally, we do not exercise our logistics capabilities sufficiently enough during peacetime to understand

their limitations and effects on military operations.

24
LOGISTICS AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY - KEY DETERMINANTS OF

READINESS

ReconmmiMdationg - Wartime Logistics Capabilily: " Assure continued attention, funding, and priority to correct deficiencies in: - Planning and executing deployments

- Tracking shipments

- Distributing material in the theater of operations

- Managing munitions

" Use capabilities routinely in peacetime operations or exercises/simulations

With today's technology, we should be able to determine our needs and have complete situational

awareness of our material: where it is; where it needs to go; how and when it will get there (just like

Federal Express). We do not have that capability.

In the Gulf War, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) failed during the most

critical fist three weeks. We could not keep track of shipments. Of 40,000 containers sent to the Gulf,

25,000 had to be opened to identify thei- cr itents. Containers were stacked up in theater with no effective

system for distributing equipment and supplies. We failed at such elementary tasks as having munitions

quantities, production rates, cap? citi -s, and lead times at our fingertips.

The greatest leverage in improving support to tactical air units is in correcting these long-standing,

persistent deficiencies.

The Joint Staff and TRANSCOM have made good starts. But after every war, good starts on fixing these

identical problems have faded. Thus, history tells us not to expect the "normal" management system to

follow through in correcting these wartime problems.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense should assure that the status, progress, and funding of corrective actions

for these chronic deficiencies in wartime logistics capability are reviewed every six months until satisfied

that fixes are in place and either used routinely in peacetime operations or exercised regularly.

25
LOGISTICS AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY - KEY DETERMINANTS OF

READINESS

Recommendations - Maintenance Dep[ot:,

* Define core requirements

• Compete all other current depot workload

* Consolidate all remaining organic effort by closing excess capacity

• Explore further application of GOCO depots

Considerable savings can be achieved by reducing DoD' s organic depot capacity to the minimum "core"

necessary to meet readiness and responsiveness requirements and placing the remainder of the depot maintenance work in the private sector. This requires, first, defining minimum core requirements consistently across the military Services and obtaining release from congressional constraints on placing the remainder in the private sector. (Definitions of "core" now vary considerably, but in any case are

considerably less than the 60 percent of depot maintenance that must be performed organically by Congressional mandate.)

Second, work not specifically part of the core should be competed among qualified private sector firms. In

doing so, DoD should be aware that the motivation for such action is to reduce costs to DoD, not to sustain

the industrial base; it is unlikely that the prime contractors whose design, system integration, and

manufacturing skills are critical to long-term technical superiority would win competitive maintenance

contracts due to their higher indirect costs. If they did, they would be unlikely to perform them with the

same management, work force, or facilities used for new aircraft design and manufacture.

Third, the core workload should be allocated (perhaps by competition among government depots) to the minimum number of facilities. The others should be dosed. "Indirect7 and "G&A" costs of existing organic depots are high (about 40 percent) and insensitive to decreasing workload. They can be best

reduced by base consolidation.

Note that we have not endorsed competition between Government and industry as the means for allocating work between them. Rules of competition can never create a truly "level playing field." For example, they cannot take into account the fact that when contractor performed work is complete, labor costs to the

Government cease. This is not true in the case of organic depots, where the people performing a specific maintenance effort continue on the payroll, even though the facility may be operating considerably below

capacity. Cost overruns also manifext themselves much differently.

Finally, DoD should examine the feasibility of converting one or more of the government aviation-related

depots to a government-owned/contractor-operated (GOCO) facility. This could provide the control and

responsiveness essential for the core work plus the long-term flexibility in adjusting work force that is so

difficult to obtain in a government organization.

26
LOGISTICS AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY -KEY DETERMINANTS OF

READINESS

Recommendations - Industrial Base:

• Lay out the characteristics of DoD's future air forces and consequent industrial support

requirements

• Continue communications with industry CEOs on DoD's outlook for necessary downsizing

of the industrial base

DoD faces the difficult problem of needing to downsize its industrial base and at the same time maintain

critical capabilities to meet future national security needs. Clearly, DoD's future aircraft procurement is

insufficient to maintain the more than a dozen plants now capable of fabricating military aircraft The

costs of excess capacity are enormous, even with today's workload. Overhead costs total more than 50

percent of current military aircraft sales. Thus, the number of plants in operation - as distinct from the

number of firms - needs to be reduced. (For example, Lockheed's purchase of General Dynamics, Fort

Worth, eliminated one competitor, but has not yet reduced excess capacity).

At the same time, low observable material design and manufacturing, as well as the use of composite

materials for greater high stress structural application, must continue to be developed and improved. The

subsystem vendor base also must be examined carefully to ensure that critical capabilities are retained,

such as RF and IR sensors, navigation and guidance equipment, and munitions and their sensors.

The Air Force and Navy have benefited from decades of fighter engine competitions between Pratt &

Whitney and General Electric. If technical demonstrations are to be the hallmark of a continuing DoD

advancement in high technology, these critical design teams will have to be paired with sufficient

manufacturing skills to produce prototype or preproduction aircraft to verify the achievement of

producibility and cost goals, not just performance. Clearly, an examination should be made to provide

minimum and maximum capabilities at all industrial tiers down through the lowest vendors and suppliers.

Thus, DoD should lay out for industry leaders the details of DoD's aeronautical programs/force plans (and

related weapons and C31) for the next ten years so industry will have the full, factual picture of the

magnitude and nature of the decline in defense development and procurement plans. Concurrently, it

should determine the characteristics of the air forces that the nation will need ten to twenty years from

now and decide the magnitude of the technology and acquisition programs required to maintain the

desired capabilities. Finally, it should conduct periodic roundtable discussions with industry CEOs to

assess the status and impediments to industry's efforts to reduce capacity.

27
LOGISTICS AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY -KEY DETERMINANTS OF

READINESS

Recommendations - Aircraft Field Maintenance:

" Common Support - Establish policy to use common families of automated test equipment - Commit R&D resources to continued modernization of common families of test

equipment - Include common test modules and testing technology in the Joint Advanced Strike

Technology Program

" Integrated Weapon System Diagnostics/Prognostics

- Establish technology development program to focus powers of telecommunications,

expert systems, and automation on aircraft troubleshooting - Explore technologies for predicting imminent component failures

Common SURad

It is increasingly clear that specialization of test equipment, test manuals, training, etc., is no longer

necessary nor affordable. Opportunity exists to create support systems that serve a variety of aircraft, thus

reducing acquisition and support costs, enabling simplification and consolidation of support

organizations, and facilitating cross-Service support when necessary.

The most immediate payoff appears to be in the automated test equipment (ATE) used for testing avionics.

In the last decade, DoD has invested over $35B in such equipment. Developing a standard family of ATE

costs about the same as developing peculiar ATE but would then permit large buys of the common

equipment. Procurement of standard ATE could save DoD billions of dollars.

DoD should establish as policy the use of common families of ATE, commit sufficient R&D resources to

improve reliability and deployability and meet new technology needs, and include ATE in the Joint

Advanced Strike Technology Program.

n Weapn Sym Diagnostcs/PrgntUcs:

Although avionics reliability is improving, troubleshooting remains difficult. For example, 20-30 percent

error rates in identifying faulty components are copmnon. False-alarm rates of built-in-test equipment on

aircraft run 25-40 percent. These troubleshooting problems ripple through the entire logistics system,

creating maintenance workloads at bases and depots and increasing spares requirements.

New technologies offer promise for improving troubleshooting. They include, for example, digital

maintenance aids (substitutes for today's technical manuals) that interface with the aircraft's on-board

system and lead the technician through the most efficient troubleshooting path and telecommunications

systems that can link the flight line technician to base or depot databases or experts.

DoD should establish a technology development program to bring the full powers of telecommunications,

"expert systems, and automation to aircraft troubleshooting. It also should explore, through R&D and

demonstrations, the feasibility and value of predicting imminent failures (sometimes termed

"prognostics").

28
EXERCISE OUR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

Problem:

During peacetime, we do not realistically exercise important elements of the joint force

capability due to cost, preparation time, and required facilities

- Operational exercises incorporating live forces, simulators, and computer wargames can

help integrate and evaluate:

-- Training

- Doctrine and tactics

-- Force configuration

-- Logistics

"* Increase involvement of senior warfighters in guiding the development of an exercise

environment

"* Conduct comprehensive exercises, including simulations, of joint forces air/land/sea

operations, including force deployments

In Desert Storm we deployed individual combat units in a high state of readiness, but it took months to

bring the joint operational force to an acceptable state of readiness. It is unlikely that we will again enjoy

the twin advantages of a massive joint exercise area for the deployed forces and ample time to correct the

deficiencies. Unfortunately, many of the joint arrangements developed in Desert Shield/Desert Storm

were ad hoc and short lived after the conflict.

If, as is likely, future contingencies allow us less time and space to prepare the joint force, realistic

exercises during peacetime are the means to assure that the total Tactical Air Warfare System is ready and

capable.

We have discussed the potential of advanced distributed simulation to leverage field training and exercise

opportunities, to practice logistics support that cannot be adequately tested ý" the field, short of actual

deployment, on a scale that cannot be accommodated on live training ranges.

We have and must exploit the technology to build an exercise environment that will enable us to

realistically practice war and that will serve all the purposes shown here. One of last summer's DSB

studies focused on that requirement and provided some very specific recommendations. Many are now

being implemented, but fruition will require persistent attention.

It is particularly important that the prospective users of this environment - the operational commanders -

be heavily involved in guiding its development so that it will support their war readiness needs.

29
TACTICAL WARFARE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

Probl aa:

0 DoD lacks a comprehensive Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecurem

DoD lackrs a comprehensive Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture, thereby limiting our

Tactical Air Warfare effectiveness. This architecture should be embedded in an overall DoD Information

Architecture.

In addition to improving our current ways of conducting air warfare - which are based on information

superiority - a comprehensive Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture would provide better

and more flexible ways of distributing information, and would permit trading off the assignment of

functions. For example, if precise targeting information were to be transmitted to a weapons-carrying

platform, that platform would not need expensive sensors to rederive that information.

The principal impediments to enjoying these benefits are not technological, but derive from the lack of an

overall game plan. Because there has been no effective development and management of a Tactical

Warfare Systems Information Architecture, today's systems are largely independently procured. No

provision was made, for example, to connect JSTARS data in near real time to Navy or Air Force or Army

platforms and weapon systems. Similarly, the three Services, despairing of the likelihood of the

intelligence dissemination system sufficiently respecting tactical timelines, developed their own systems.

The result is that each community gathers information redundantly. When inter-connections are needed,

they are made in an ad hoc manner, often at the last minute. Opportunities for balanced investment and

tradeoffs among warfighting components are thereby lost.

30
TACTICAL WARFARE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

Information distribution to shooters can be the next silver bullet:

" Benefits:

- Improves targeting

- Improves survivability (situational awareness) - Improves command and control reconfigurability for differing conflicts - Addresses combat identification

- Permits tradeoffs

"* Consequences of no overall game plan are: - Unnecessary costs and limited performance gains " Each community gathers information redundantly

"* Ad hoc connections between stovepipes

"* Opportunities lost for balanced investment in weapons, avionics, and sensor systems

We believe that our next silver bullet can be improved information distribution to shooters. Relatively

small investments in information distribution appear to have greater leverage than similar investments in

platforms, weapons, or on-board sensors.

The chart shows the five expected benefits. In addition to improving our current ways of conducting air

warfare - which are based on information superiority - better and more flexible ways of distributing

information enable trading off the assignment of functions to platforms. For example, if precise targeting

information can be transmitted to a weapons-carrying platform, that platform will not need expensive

sensors to rederive that information.

The principal impediments to enjoying these benefits are not technological, but derive from the lack of an

overall game plan. Each community despairs of receiving timely information from another community,

and develops its own stovepipe systems. The necessary interconnections are made at the last minute, and

the opportunities for system trades are lost.

31
TACTICAL WARFARE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

What is an Architecture?

• An information architecture

- Includes data formats, protocols, message standards, interfaces, etc. - Enables open systems - permits individually developed subsystems to interoperate - Spans a designated user/server community - Provides flexibility in who gets what, when, where, and why

* A communications architecture is not an information architecture

• An information architecture is designed to support the warfighters' information needs

An information architecture is a coherent structure of data formats, protocols, interfaces, and other

standards that guides the design and implementation of information subsystems and applications. Adherence to this architecture allows these subsystems and applications to be conceived and developed independently but function as parts of an integrated, open system that serves a wide variety of user needs.

Tactical Air Warfare comprises many communities and is dependent on information architectures of these

and external communities. Examples are: Services, Intelligence, Weapons, and Command and Control

(e.g., Mission Planning, Tactical Data Links). A TACAIR Warfare Information Architecture will include

a Communications Architecture.

32
DoD TACTICAL INFORMATION ARCHITEU COMPONENTS OF AN

INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Components of an Information Distribution System

Information Generation • - AWACS - TAC Recce - JSTARS

- NTM - E2C - AEGIS - Patriot

Information - CC

Processing & _ - Intelligence

Transformation - Execution Control - Mission Planning

Storage/Management ]

of Distributed - DBMS Systems

Information

Longhaul Transmission MilStar - DSCS - UHF Satcom

~r~s isst~~ -Commercial

Shorthaul Distribution- JTIDS - Link 11/4A - SCDL - CHBDL

Information - Voice - HUD - Terminal - Workstation

Presentation & Format Laptops

Security - Multi-level Security Network & Data

An information distribution system consists of numerous functional elements with corresponding system

components for carrying out the functions. Today's military information distribution system has been

gradually built over many years, with a high sunk cost. To convert this system to one that has the ability

to handle more data and confidently distribute data while assuring quality and timeliness will require an

evolutionary process, conducted within a standard architectural framework. This framework must be

designed to allow the military to take advantage of the commercial subsystem advances in each of the

functional areas shown on this chart, while carefully managing the costs of transitioning old systems to

the new architecture, and interfacing old and new systems so that they interoperate.

33
TACTICAL WARFARE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

"* Commercial Telecommunications - High bandwidth

- Global cellular

- Private networks

"* Commercial Data Management Systems for managing data sharing with data concurrency - Distributed electronic financial transactions - Truck/rail shipment tracking

"* Widely used commercial software standards

- Local area networking

- Display generation

- File transfer

- Query languages

- Network protocol

"* Processes for evolving commercial standards - IEEE, ANSI, ISO:, OSF

"* Low cost, integrated commercial products and systems - Display technology (flat panels, HDTV) - Automotive "avionics" (engine control, navigation)

DoD should use commercial technology and products when implementing a Tactical Warfare Systems

Information Architecture.

Commercial industry has moved rapidly within the last 5-10 years to introduce a broad array of computer

hardware, high-bandwidth communications products and protocols, distributed database structures,

standard user interfaces, application development tools, and object-oriented software tools. A state-of-theart Tactical Air Warfare Systems Information Architecture would incorporate many of these features.

The key advantages offered by commercial products lie in the areas of cost, availability, and technology

insertion. DoD could avoid nonrecurring costs in development and upgrade, as well as recurring costs in

maintenance and testing since commercial interests would already incur these as part of a market-driven

investment. Other advantages in acquisition cost accrue through the existence of a large user base.

Finally, the commercial market, reacting to competitive pressures, will introduce advanced technology

expeditiously.

34
TACTICAL WARFARE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

DoDInfrmaionTechnology R&D Strategy:

"* Understand present and likely future commercial capabilities and match to evolving needs

"* Give priority to the special set of information technologies stressed by military applications

- Data and transmission availability, integrity, and security

- Application-specific data compression

- Searches through massive unstructured data

- EMI suppression related to commercial and military systems

- Data links to mobile platforms

"* Participate with the commercial sector in mutually required information technologies

- System management tools for.

-- large heterogeneous distributed commercial systems

-- distributed mixed military/commercial systems

- Network vulnerabilities

- Special human-machine interfaces and data visualization

- Object-oriented software technologies

Although the use of commercial technology and products by DoD in implementing a Tactical Air Warfare

Information Architecture offers strong and distinct advantages over a purely Department development

approach, it must be recognized that there may be a downside to the extensive use of commercial products

in military systems. Consequently, a DoD Information Technology R&D Strategy is necessary.

DoD's R&D strategy in this area should be to use its limited resources to address the customization of

commercial products to its needs.

R&D in support of DoD information technology must give priority to the special set of information

technologies that are stressed by military applications. Generally, it can be expected that a lower level of

data and network security and survivability will be achievable with commercial technolbgy. Identical

commercial equipment will likely be as available to potential adversaries as to U.S. forces, allowing

knowledge of selected applications approaches as a minimum. Special efforts would be required to protect

and validate software from viruses and "Trojan Horses."

DoD does not drive the commercial market. Therefore, to assure that its needs will be met, DoD must

participate with the commercial sector in the development of mutually required technologies and

standards. For example, the DoD strategy should encourage industry to recognize that with modest

changes, the development of system management tools for large heterogeneous distributed commercial

systems will also support distributed mixed military/commercial systems. For those situations where the

products on the civilian market do not recognize network vulnerability, DoD should use its R&D

resources to address the problem. Finally, DoD must use its R&D resources to address its special humanmachine interface and data visualization requirements that are not otherwise addressed by the commercial

sector.

35
TACTICAL WARFARE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

* Exploit the commercial market to control costs and to stay modem

• Participate in, and influence when possible, evolution of commercial standards

* Establish an early standard architecture now to get things moving - it will change no matter

how long we take

• Transition old systems on an as-appropriate basis; can be very expensive

- Build custom translators as gap fillers when necessary

• Build new systems in conformance with the goal architecture

* Involve end users in a substantial manner so information architecture can follow evolving

warfare system architecture

We believe that the DoD must exploit the commercial market to control costs and to stay modern.

The end users must play a significant role in the processes of establishing the architecture to assure

necessary support of military operations.

Most urgently, a standard architecture, consistent with an overall DoD Information Architecture, is

needed to get things moving. Things will change no matter how long DoD takes to do the job. The

longer it takes the more things will change.

A major problem will be the transition of existing or legacy systems. This must be done carefully. If

improper decisions are made, the transition process can become very expensive.

It may be necessary to build custom translators as gap-fillers. New systems will, of course, be built in

conformance with the goal architecture.

To do this DoD must, among other things, participate in the process that results in the setting of

commercial standards and requirements so that, to the extent possible, the needs of DoD can be

accommodated.

36
DOD TACTICAL INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE

Recommended Kay Roles in mnmentaficaý*

" CJCS sets expectations/establishes requirements for key components of the Tactical Warfare

Information Architecture - Establishes a warfighter-focused organization with technical support

-- Reengineers Military Operations to take advantage of information

-- Harmonizes doctrine and tactics with existing and emerging systems

Validates through simulations and exercises

-- Experiments with commercial components

"* ASD(C31), with Service participation, initiates and oversees design and plan of the end-toend network for dissemination of Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture - Enforces architectural compliance and commercial utilization - Provides tools for implementation, test, and system management

- Uses acquisition reform techniques - Analyzes costs to transition existing systems - Funds existing system modifications as required

Silver Bullet? It's up to us!

We recommend the senior leadership of the warfighter and acquisition communities start work

immediately on a Tactical Warfare Systems Information Architecture consistent with an overall DoD

Information Architecture.

"The JCS should establish a warfighter-based organization, with appropriate technical support, to define

the architecture in accordance with emerging operational concepts. A major part of this organization's

role is to re-engineer military processes to take advantage of information and to validate these changes

through simulations and exercises. This effort should afford appropriate consideration of old DoD

information systems and also the integration of commercial technology and products.

ASD(C31) should assure that Service developments of both new systems and transition of old systems are

performed in accordance with this architecture.

ASD(C31) should design and plan the end-to-end network for distributing Tactical Air Warfare

information. The ASD(C31) must also oversee the data processing activities associated with the Tactical

Warfare Systems Information Architecture. This should not be done as a "grand design" type of effort,

but should be managed through the use of standards, and by evolutionary acquisition.

ASD(C31) should provide implementation tools, define test and system management criteria, and provide

appropriate funds to achieve necessary modifications to existing systems. The Services should be

responsible for implementing the architecture under ASD(C31) oversight.

Architectures themselves do not necessarily lead to systems that meet performance objectives. Such

systems are only built with strong and constant involvement, at every level, by the Operational

community. The JCS and CINCs should validate the architecture through simulations, experiments, and

operational exercises. This type of development has been demonstrated recently in the combined Air Force

and Navy work on the JFACC in the exercises Tandem Thrust 93 and Ocean Venture 93.

37
CAPABILITY TRADE-OFFS

Tradeoffs are rarely conducted between different categories of weapons, systems, and

platforms

- No prevailing practice exists in DoD to strike an appropriate balance among different

ways to perform same function, e.g.:

- Stand-off weapons and/or penetrating platforms

- Missiles and/or aircraft

- Tankers and/or fighter fuel capacity - Narrow look at systems leads to sub-optimization

- Modelling and simulation technology available

RQcQmm d:

"* Establish cross-category trade study process to achieve greatest Air Warfare effectiveness

"* Conduct under OSD auspices with Warfighter participation

Our Tactical Air Warfare assets generally permit us to do the same job in many different ways.

"* Examples are: Standoff weapons and/or deep stealth platforms; platform range-payload

and/or tanker use to enhance range; air interdiction and/or surface-to-surface missiles, etc.

"• Although we attempt to optimize each of our individual system designs, we do a poor job of

tradeoff studies among different categories of weapon systems and platforms to do the same

job "* The technology for making credible trades is available

We strongly recommend that DoD mandate a cross-category trade study process, not only for systems in

acquisition, but also for modernization and resetting of force levels for systems in the inventory. This

should be an OSD function with Warfighter participation.

38
EREJUCOMMENDATIONS
TACTICAL AIR WARFARE SUMMER STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

"* EQUIP THE FORCE:

- Develop wide-area surveillance and targeting system that integrates and fuses multisource data - Exploit UAV systems' potential now - Equip more aircraft for targeting and delivery of PGMs - Accelerate PGM development and procurements - Ensure that GPS has adequate protection against jamming - Increase priority of improving air-to-air missiles - Maintain vigorous CLO hedge program - Continue ASTOVL technology effort - Focus aircraft commonality on common engines, avionics, weapons, and support "* LOGISTICS:

- Fix deficiencies in wartime logistics capabilities for planning deployments, tracking

shipments, distributing material, managing munitions, and exercise the system - Eliminate excess industrial capacity - Develop common aircraft support systems and improve automated diagnostic/

prognostics

"• EXERCISE OUR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY: - Involve operational commanders in development of new exercise environment that uses

distributed, connected live forces and simulation to practice war

"* TACTICAL WARFARE SYSTEMS INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE:

- Establish standards for information architecture now

- Develop end-to-end plan to implement architecture - Exploit commercial standards, products, and practices

"* CAPABILITY TRADEOFFS:

Require cross-category tradeoff evaluations

This chart reiterates our recommendations in summary form. Note that substantial and important nearterm gains in our tactical air warfare capabilities do not require new aircraft ro=grams to be achieved.

Such gains can be achieved by eqfippin_ our current force and improving the surveillance and targeting,

information distribution, and logistics support systems, making those forces much more effective. We

must also exercise the resulting operational systems in a realistic environment.

The development of an effective end-to-end, wide-area surveillance and targeting system for both air-toair and air-to-surface targets is essential. These systems should focus around AWACS and JSTARS,

respectively, and include rapid dissemination of multi-source surveillance and targeting data to all

elements of the force structure. This ultimate capability will require improvements and integration of our

current surveillance and targeting systems and the development of a tactical warfare systems information

architecture for effective and timely distribution of the required data. We also believe that UAV systems

should be explored more aggressively. These systems offer the potential for operations over hostile

territory with reduced vulnerability and risk.

It is critical to our war-fighting capabilities to equip the elements of our tactical air force suicture with

PGMs and the necessary targeting and delivery systems. To accomplish this, we must increase the

acquisition rate and total buys for PGMs and their targeting pods. More aircraft must be equipped with

the capability to effectively deliver PGMs under all operational conditions, particularly when confronted

with jamming of GPS. We must strive to achieve a stand-off all-weather PGM capability on a large

percentage of our tactical aircraft. Most importantly, moving and mobile targets must be addressed in the

detection-to-destruction target engagement cycle through a combination of off-board and on-board sensors

and seeker capabilities in area surveillance systems, delivery platforms, and weapons.

39
It is important to note that there is substantial payoff for PGMs in that they require fewer sorties to

achieve target destruction. In addition to aircrew lives and aircraft saved, cost savings result not only

from less munitions tonnage that needs to be delivered to the target, but also less fuel burned for the

platforms required to go on the mission, and for the supporting aircraft that are also required. This payoff

will have significant impact on the logistics system needed to supply particular scenarios.

It is critical to fix deficiencies in our wartime logistics capability. Logistics is a key to readiness and we

must reduce excess industrial capacity and exercise our logistics capabilities under realistic conditions

during peacetime.

Our overall Tactical Air Warfare capability depends on effective utilization of aircraft, weapons. off-board

sensors, information distribution, and logistics systems. We must have the capability to evaluate tradeoffs

between different combinations of these systems. The capability for effective cross-category trade studies

should be established.

40
APPENDIX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

APR 22 1993.

ACQUISITION

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference--Defense Science Board Summer Study

Task Force on Tactical Air Warfare

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board Summer

Study (DSB) Task Force to review the nation's acquisition options

for tactical air warfare over the next 10 to 20 years as force

structure is drawn down. The DSB should then recommend promising

concepts and technologies to pursue that may have high leverage

cost and effectiveness against forseeable threats. The scope of

your effort should include all warfare elements to include new or

substantially "pgraded combat and direct combat support aircraft

for tactical forces, avionics, weapons and system integration

requirements, operational concepts and plans; target and

information requirements; communications; command and control

interfaces; and air support requirements to include logistics,

and support (tankers). An interim briefing report is requested

by 20 August with a final report to be submitted in the

November/December '93 timeframe.

The DSB recommendations should address the following

questions

- What concepts shouild be pursued to increase the

effectiveness of the resources dedicated to air warfare.

- Are currently planned efforts to operationally integrate

tactical warfare assets adequate? If not, what should

receive increased emphasis?

- What are the key leveraging technologies today that bear

on the effectiveness of tactical air missions?

- Are these technologies being adequately exploited to

reduce the cost of aircraft, or at least to mitigate cost

growth, as well as to enhance performance?

- What technology areas need i:_-reased R&D attention?

- What is the proper balance among weapons, sensors, and

aircraft performance?
Is a Common Tactical Aircraft (CTA) feasible from both

the operational and economical standpoint? Do current

factors (eg, force downsizing and reduced procurements)

make use of common and multi-mission aircraft a preferred

approach?

- What is the most cost-effective approach to tactical

support missions such as reconnaissance, electronic

countermeasures and early warning?

Are the requisite analytic tools and processes and

simulation facilities available to the government to get

answers to the foregoing questions and how can they best

be employed to mak? objective trade-off decisions?

- What are the impli[ations of the recommendations with

respect to industrial base and world competitiveness?

The Utdz.-i oeeteL oy Dof n- muei+tin fr Au t

Director, Tactical Systems will sponsor and fund this study. Dr.

John S. Foster and Dr. Alexander Flax will serve as Co-Chairmen.

The office of the Director, Tactical Systems will provide the

necessary funding and support contractor arrangements. The

Executive Secretary will be Ms. Theresa Atkins and Commander John

Dever will be the Defense Science Board Secretariat

representative. It is not anticipated that this task force will

need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of

Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member

to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

Joh M. Deutch
APPENDIX B

TASK FORCE MEMBERS AND GOVERNMENT ADVISORS
Tacticaal A"r Naziae Tak Vroa. Nembesz and Govermt Advisers

Members

Dr. Alexander H. Flax, Co-chairman

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Co-chairman

Op Concepts/Force Config Panel Target Engage Sys/Weapons Panel

Dr. Werner J. A. Dahm * Mr. Donald N. Fredericksen "• Mr. Robert R. Everett Mr. Everett D. Greinke

Dr. George H. Heilmeier Mr. David R. Heebner

ADM Wesley L. McDonald, USN (Ret) * Dr. Dennis P. Murray

MajGen Jasper A. Welch Jr, USAF (Ret) Mr. Robert E. O'Donohue

"• Gen Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret) Mr. Vince Vitto

C31/Mission Planning Aircraft Systems Panel

Dr. John A. Armstrong RADM Robert Gormley, USN (Ret) "• Dr. Alan Berman * Dr. David E. Mann

"• Dr. Barry M. Horowitz Mr. Robert A. Moore

Mr. Robert F. Nesbit * Mr. Robert N.Parker

Dr. George A. Paulikas LtGen Philip D. Shutler, USMC (Ret)

Mr. H. Greg Tornatore ADM William N. Small, USN (Ret)

Dr. Bruce Wald Mr. John J. Welch

Op, Industrial & Logistics Panel Executive Secretary

"* Mr. Norman E. Betaque Ms. Theresa B. Atkins

"• Gen Russell Dougherty, USAF (Ret)

ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN (Ret)

Mr. Sol Love DSB Liaison/Military Assistant

Mr. Milton A. Margolis

Gen Lawrence A. Skantze, USAF (Ret) CDR Robert C. Hardee, USN

* Panel Co-chairman

Government Advisors

BG Ronald E. Adams, USA Mr. Pete Hoag

CAPT H. Douglas Connell, USN BrigGen Ray Huot, USAF

LtCol Robert Corrie, USAF CAPT Terry Jobe, USN

RADM John J. Donegan, USN COL Sam Kindred, USA

Col Brian Dugle, USAF BrigGen George Muellner, USAF

RADM Bill Fallon, USN MajGen Dick Myers, USAF

CAPT Jim Flaherty, USN Col Doug Pearson, USAF

COL Colbert T. Gautreaux, USA CAPT Howard Petrea, USN

CAPT Tom Hancock, USN LtCol Art Rooney, USAF

MajGen Larry Henry, USAF Mr. Robert Thompson

Col Richard Herrington, USMC CAPT Eric Vanderpoel, USN
APPENDIX C

REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

AIRCRAFT ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

TASK FORCE ON AIRCRAFT ASSESSMENT

FEBRUARY 1993
CONTENTS

Introduction .........------------.... -.......... -----................ a a 1

Purposennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn-----------a-aa-------a-a- ------- nnn-.I

Task Force Approach ---------------------....................... ....... . 1----1

Program Descriptions ------------------------------------------------------ aaa....---.1

Summary .----........................................... a..................a......a 2

Issue 1 Findings: Technical Risk Assessments .............. ---..-.....-...-..... 2

Issue 2 Findings: Prototyping the F/A-ISE/F .................................. 3

Issue 3 Findings: Prototyping the A/F-X ----..........- -.............---.. 3

Issue 4 Findings: Common Aircraft/Avionics Programs ------------------------------ 4

Discussion ........... .............. nnn nnn .. na....aa.. .. a a a 5

Technical Ris... Assessments ...-.............. ............... a...... 5

Common Aixraft/Avionics ................................................. . 7

Prototyping ......................... ......... ... - .naa .. a11

TABLES

1. Aircraft-Mission Match ...aaaaaaaa-..-....................... .............. 9

2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Aircraft/Avionics Commonality ---.....-...-...... 10

3. Flying Prototypes Provide Data to Reduce Technical Risk....-..-...... an......... .. 12

4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Flight Test Prototyping -------....... .... n....-.... 13

5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Competitive Flight Prototyping . -----.. .--........ 13
INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Aircraft Assessment' was convened to respond

to direction received from Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1993, (Public Law 102-484). The Authorization Act requested that the Defense Science Board

address two issues that are related to the DoD Tactical Aviation Modernization Program. The two

issues pertain to (1) potential common aircraft/avionics for use by the Navy and Air Force for

parallel missions, and (2) technical risk assessments for the F-22, F/A-18E/F, and A/F-X aircraft.

The terms of reference (TOR) for the Task Force from USD(A)/DDR&E expanded the issues to

include consideration of the desirability of prototyping the F/A-1SEIF and A/F-X aircraft.2 The

four issues the Task Force addressed are:

Issue 1: Assess the technical risks associated with the F-22, F/A-18E/F, and A/F-X.

Issue 2: Assess the advantages and disadvantages of prototyping the F/A- 18E/F.

Issue 3: Assess the advantages and disadvantages of competitively prototyping the A/F-X.

Issue 4: Assess the ways that current aircraft, upgrades to current aircraft, and new design

aircraft can be modified or otherwise adapted so that a single aircraft type can be

used by both the Air Force and the Navy in parallel

Task Force Approach

The Task r, first met on January 21; OSD requested the report be provided on February 25. During this time the Task Force met seven times. Briefings and information were received

from the military services and OSD, and visits made to Lockheed Aircraft and McDonnell Aircraft

to receive further briefings and information on the F-22 and F/A-I 8E/F programs.3 The members

also made use of other available reports.4

Issues 1, 2, and 3 are of more immediate concern. They are relevant to three specific

programs, the F-22, F/A-18E/F, and A/F-X. Issue 4 is more general and was addressed in the

context of longer-term trends in tactical aviation missions and force structur

Considerable uncertainties exist in future aircraft acquisition planning. Radical changes in

the international scene, and resulting reappraisals of strategy, mission, and force levels are under

way. Because studies being conducted on roles and missions and on the affordability of combat

aircraft forces had not been completed at the time of these assessments, the probable types and

numbers of combat aircraft to be acquired over the next two decades could not adequately be

factored into the Task Force's work.

Program Descriptions

F-22 Program

The mission of the F-22 airraft is theater air superiority. It is an essentially new aircraft

that incorporates multiple advanced features, including low-observable characteristics in a highly maneuverable supersonic aircraft, supersonic cruise capability, two-dimensional vectoring engine

I "be Task Foce membe are listed in Apendix A.

2 lwe congressiona language is in Appendix B and the Ims of reference me in Appendix C.

3 The Tak Fore sahedule is psented in Appendix D.

4 TMre x• m listedmW Appadix E
nozzles, software-intensive integrated avionics, and an extensive use of composite and lowobservable materials. The F-22 has been in Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD)

since August 1991. The advanced nature of the F-22 should be put into the context of the risk

reduction achieved prior to E&MD start. An extensive Demonstration and Validation (Dem/Val)

program was performed with competitive flying prototypes of the airframe/engine configurations

and avionics flying testbeds including brass board components.

F/A-18 Program

The F/A-18FJF is a multi-role fighter/attack aircraft for the Navy. It has been in E&MD

since May 1992. In contrast to the F-22, the F/A-18E/F is an evolutionary development based on

the F/A-18C/D. The F/A-18E/F airframe is a scaled-up version of the F/A-I8CPD with a new

engine derived from the A-12 program and other recent engines. The avionics are planned to be

almost a direct carry-over from the F/A-18CJD. Important performance goals are increases of 30

percent mission radius and 60 percent bring-back weight, and enhanced survivability including

reduced signatures, relative to the F/A-18C/D.

A/F-X Program

The A/F-X is being designed as a multi-role attack/fighter aircraft for the Navy and a deep

interdiction aircraft for the Air Force in response to a joint operational requirements document. The

A/F-X is expected to have a new airframe configuration that incorporates advanced low-observable

and associated materials technologies. The engine will be from a new generation of engines

exemplified by significant improvements in thrust-to-weight ratio and operation at high levels of

turbine inlet temperature. The aircraft's avionics suite is expected to draw heavily on the integrated

avionics from the F-22 program. The A/F-X is being prepared to enter Dem/VaL

SUMMARY

Issue 1 Findings: Technical Risk Assessments

The Task Force reviewed the technical risks associated with the three tactical aircraft

programs. Because technical risk cannot be entirely separated from schedule and cost risks, the

Task Force also examined those aspects of the programs. Sources of cost risk that all programs are

currently exposed to are the growth in overhead costs as a consequence of decreases in the

business bases of the prime contractors and suppliers, reductions in planned production rates, and

disruption of planned funding profiles for programs.

Both the F-22 and F/A-18E/F programs could become budget-driven rather than eventdriven and may therefore encounter further difficulties. Funding of risk reduction efforts in E&MD

must be maintained for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F aircraft programs if program milestones and

technical risk reductions are to be achieved without undue increases in overall program risk. A

more detailed discussion of specific risk areas is included in the Discussion section.

F-22 Program

The Task Force views the area of highest technical risk in the F-22 program as the

integrated avionics and its associated integration software. Other risk areas include low-observable

materials and structures, engine durability, and weight and drag management. The Task Force

believes that the critical risk areas have been clearly identified, are being addressed to the extent

commensurate with their importance and are being adequately managed. Particular note is taken of

the extensive avionics flying testbed program. The compounding of the technical challenges,

potential adverse economic factors, and cost uncertainties, as described in the first paragraph of

these findings, could pose serious risk to the program. The F-22 program was recently

rescheduled for funding and other reasons. The first flight date was delayed 11 months. Further

2
schedule delays at this time due to reduced E&MD funding are unlikely to reduce risks and will

increase costs.

F/A-18EIF Program

Risks are seen as relatively low in the F/A-18EAF program due to the evolutionary

development nature of the aircraft. Risk areas include weight management, airframe materials, and

the new larger engine that is an outgrowth of the A-12 engine. The F414 first-engine-to-test will be

in May 1993. Again, the Task Force believes that the critical risk areas have been clearly identified,

are being addressed to the extent commensurate with their importance, and are being adequately

managed. As is the case with the F-22, the F/A-18E/F first flight has recently been rescheduled,

being extended by two months due to lower than planned appropriations. The previous discussion

of schedule and cost risk implications of program delays due to funding reductions is equally relevant to the F/A- lE/F program.

A/F-X Program

Because the A/F-X program is still undergoing a design competition before Dem/Val, it is

simply too early for the Task Force to make a technical risk assessment of the A/F-X aircraft. The

A/F-X mission requirements for both the Navy and Air Force appear to be achievable, and the

Navy is managing the program at this time to ensure adequate performance margins, including

carrier suitability. Tradeoffs of cost, performance, and other requirements have been important

elements of the current phase of the program. Once prototype designs are submitted, a meaningful

assessment of the AIF-X aircraft's technical risk can be made. The planned Dem/Val program

appears to be structured to accommodate a substantial risk reduction effort.

Issue 2 Findings: Prototyping the F/A-18E/F

The Task Force could not find any basis for prototyping the F/A-I SE/F aircraft. The

F/A-18E/F is not a high-risk program in terms of concept, design, performance or operational

suitability. In many ways the F/A-18C/D can be considered a prototype of the F/A-I8E/F. The

aerodynamic and structural concepts for the F/A-18E/F arm essentially the same as those of the

FIA-18C/D. Aerodynamic and other design models and tools used in the F/A-18EIF program have

been calibrated and validated using data from earlier F/A-18 flight testing. This has provided

information of the kind that would be available from a flying prototype. Technical risks remaining

in the program (e.g., weight) can only be confronted in the E&MD program with E&MD-designed

hardware including flight-test articles. E&MD flight testing using the first two flight-test articles

can provide sufficient information to assess important performance parameters prior to large production funding commitments. The additional costs (in time and money) of disrupting the

E&MD program and building additional flying prototypes far outweigh the value of any potential

risk reductions.

Issue 3 Findings: Prototyping the A/F-X

Current A/F-X requirements call for a level of design innovation that justifies a flying

prototype before the start of E&MD. The A/F-X program is planned to follow an acquisition

strategy for competitive prototyping of the aircraft during Dem/Val. If the design competition

leading to Dem/Val provides a clear winner, then a single design could be prototyped. Because the

A/F-X is likely to employ avionics concepts and common equipment from the F-22 program, avionics prototype testing in a flying testbed may be required only for selected components,

systems integration and software.

3
Issue 4 Findings: Common Aircraft/Avionics Programs

Aircraft used by more than one service can result in lower development, production and

support costs. Multi-role aircraft within a service achieve the same ends. The components of an

aircraft system (airframe, engine, and avionics) may also be modified to adapt to a new mission or

to modernize the system. For example, avionics, which in recent years have on average been

modernized within a 10- to 15-year cycle, may account for up to one-third of a fighter/attack

aircraft's system acquisition costs. The measures of merit to use in deciding whether to design a

new aircraft (or modify an existing aircraft) for multi-role or multi-service applicatioui should be

mission effectiveness and life-cycle cost of the force.

Factors that affect these decisions include (1) mission assignments of force elements within

the operational force structure, (2) size and composition of forces required to meet national

strategies and objectives in the face of anticipated threats, (3) timing and phasing of aircraft

programs, and (4) the current trend toward longer operational life of aircraft, including upgrades.

In spite of the potential advantages of common aircraft, each service has had compelling

reasons to acquire some aircraft with characteristics primarily designed for its most demanding missions, with minimum compromise for multi-role or multi-service use. Navy aircraft must be

carrier-suitable and the requisite structural and aerodynamic features must be pan of the design

from the beginning. Although these features impose weight, performance, and cost penalties over a

simila aircraft designed for land operation only, historically, variations in ship- and land-based

versions have led to workable solutions for near-common missions.

The economic dimension to acquisition decisions is enlarged upon in the subsequent

discussions. In the future, the greater economic constraints and lower rates and quantities of

combat aircraft to be acquired will tend to make the use of common aircraft and/or component

subsystems more attractive than it has been in the past, although this may require some

compromise in mission capabilities.

Although the A/F-X is still in an early stage of development, the Navy and Air Force are

succeeding in arriving at a high degree of compatibility in the aircraft characteristics to meet their

respective mission requirements. It is also planned that this aircraft will incorporate avionics having

a substantial degree of commonality with the F-22.

The multi-role F/A-18E/F is planned for acquisition by the Navy only. Although

geometrically similar in configuration to the F/A-18C0D, the F/A-18E/F has a larger airframe and

engine and is linked to the F/A-18C/D mainly by common avionics. The F/A-18E/F could be

employed by the Air Force for operation from land bases. However, it is substantially heavier and

more costly than the aircraft the Air Force envisions as a replacement for its multi-role fighter/attack

aircraft (currently the F-16). A new multi-role fighter/attack aircraft is not expected to be required

to become operational for perhaps 20 years. The Air Force, however, has proposed that the Navy

join it in examining the possibility of a joint program to acquire such an aircraft, the Multi-Role

Fighter (MRF) in this longer time frame.

4
DISCUSSION

Technical Risk Assessments

The Task Force was asked to assess the technical risks of the F-22, F/A- 18FYF, and A/F-X

aircraft programs. Technical risk is a subjective assessment regarding the likelihood or probability of not achieving a specific objective by the time established and with the resources provided or

requested. It is also usually a relative assessment in that one program can be viewed as lower or

higher risk than another. Since it is difficult to completely separate technical risk from schedule and

cost risks, the Task Force also considered those aspects of the programs to the extent that they might have significant impact on technical risks. For instance, sources of cost risk that all

programs are currently exposed to ame the growth in overhead costs as a consequence of decreases

in the business bases of the prime contractors and suppliers, reductions in planned production

rates, and disruption of planned funding profiles for programs.

The F-22 incorporates revolutionary advances in airframe, low-observable technology, maneuverability, engines, materials, and integrated avionics systems. The F/A-I8EF, on the other

hand, is an evolutionary development of a scaled-up F/A-I8C/D multi-role fighter/attack aircraft.

While the overall airframe structure is almost completely new, the aerodynamic performance is

relatively well-understood because of extrapolation from the performance of the F/A-18C/D

design. Also, avionics is the same as on the F/A-18C/D, and the F414 engine, although a new

design, is derived from earlier engines, primarily the F412 designed for the A-12.

A great deal of risk reduction had already taken place in both the F/A-18E/F and F-22

programs before their respective E&MD starts. The F-22 E&MD was preceded by an extensive

Dem/Val program specifically designed to prototype the highest risk technical areas with

competitive ground and flying prototypes of the airframes, engines, and avionics (including flying test beds). The F/A-1SF.F benefits from the application of F/A-18C0D experience, wind-tunnel

testing, and engine component testing. The following subsections contain comments on each

program concerning challenges that have been revealed during E&MD. Also noted are the schedule

and cost risk impacts of program changes which have affected both developments.

The Task Force believes it is too early to make a technical risk assessment of the A/F-X

aircraft because the design concept is not firm. However, it is not too early to comment on the

relative technical ambition of the AF,-X program implied by its mission requirements.

F-22 Program

The F-22 E&MD program has experienced difficulties typical of aircraft programs in

E&MD. Airframe design refinements have had negative impacts on weight and drag. In particular, "bumps" resulting from the repackaging of internal systems have caused increased drag. However, there is still margin in currently estimated levels of weight and drag to meet the System Operational Requirement Document (SORD) and Approved Program Baseline (APB) performance goals. Lockheed Aircraft has identified areas for additional fuel tankage as a hedge against possible increases in weight, drag and specific fuel consumption (SFC) at mission design points.

The F119 engine began ground testing in December 1992. Difficulties revealed in ground testing included performance shortfalls in the fan and turbine and high stresses in the second fan

blade and low-pressure turbine blade. Lower-than-expected fan efficiency presents a risk in

meeting subsonic SFC specifications. However, with identified planned improvements for several

components, SFC is predicted to surpass specifications. Overall engine weight is below

specification, but the nozzle is above its allocation; because of the nozzle's aft location, this may have implications for the aircraft's center of gravity (CO). The new materials technology associated

with the nozzle may present durability problems.

5
The highest technical risk in the F-22 program stems from a new concept in aircraft

avionics--a highly integrated avionics functionality expected to reduce pilot workload substantially

and provide the pilot with unprecedented situation awareness. During the Dem/Val phase of this

program, algorithms for data fusion and software development were examined, and a flying

testbed was used to reduce the risk for some elements of the avionics. During E&MD a new

computer processor is being designed, considerable software will be written and ground tested,

and avionics system and software integration will be accomplished on the flying testhed before

integration into the F-22 aircraft. The newness of the concept (compared to the avionics

architecture of what is flying now) and the extensiveness of the integration represent a technical

risk that warrants continuing aggressive management attention.

Low-observable and other new composite materials present another area of risk, as is the

case in most advanced low observable aircraft. The radar radome, which is part of the aircraft's

integrated forebody, requires relatively risky materials/manufacturing concepts that deal with the

offsetting requirements of radar detection range, aerodynamic performance, and radar crosssection.

The F-22 program was recently rescheduled due to funding shortages. The rescheduling

resulted in an Il-month delay in the first flight date (to 59 months from E&MD start, twice as long

as average recent experience) and an 18-month delay in the planned Milestone M date. These

delays should not be misconstrued as further reducing risks since resource shortages are not

allowing known technical risks to be attacked as soon and as aggressively as they could be. An

important exception is in the area of software and processing, where the contractor has maintained

the original schedule and staffing plans.

Because certain fixed costs are associated with development programs over their duration,

the schedule expansion will probably result in increased E&MD program costs. As in other current

programs, additional decreases in the business base of F-22 contractors due to the cancellation or

extension of other programs would result in additional cost risk; such a decrease could adversely

impact overhead burdens on the F-22 program.

F/A-18E/F Program

The F/A-I 8EIF has experienced typical development difficulties. The most serious technical

problem encountered is a shortfall in predicted maneuver performance at high angles of attack. This

shortfall was discovered in wind-tunnel testing in June 1992. The problem has been addressed

through redesigned fuselage leading edge extensions (LEX) and attendant modification to other

affected parts of the aircraft. Unfortunately, a weight penalty of about 250 pounds is associated

with the new design; this represents a considerable portion of the 450-pound E&MD (pre-first

flight) margin for empty weight. Although avionics software is a low-risk area for the F/A- 18E/F

program (because most of it is carried over from the F/A-18C/D), software growth of

approximately 15 percent has already been experienced in the combined F/A-i 8C/D and F/A- 1 8E/F

effort. Low-observable and other somewhat new composite materials present another area of risk.

Component testing is well underway in the engine program for the F/A- 1 8E/F. The first

F414 engine to test is scheduled for May 1993. Testing to date indicates that thrust and SFC

performance should be met. One problem that emerged during testing was a shortfall in predicted

fracture mechanics life of the stage-one disk. This problem can be addressed through shortened

inspection intervals (1,000 flight-hours versus the specification of 2,000 flight-hours) or through

design changes with small weight penalties.

The previous discussion of schedule and cost risk implications of program changes for the

F-22 is equally relevant to the F/A-i8EF program. The F/A-18EIF's first flight date has only been

stretched-out two months so far during E&MD from 42 months to 44 months. Additional program

changes due to insufficient funding could increase program risks.

6
A/F-X Program

Because the A/F-X program is still undergoing a design competition before DemJVal, it is

simply too early for the Task Force to make a technical risk assessment of the A/F-X aircrft. The

A/F-X mission requirements for both the Air Force and Navy appear to be reasonable and

achievable, and the Navy is managing the program at this time to ensure adequate performance

margins, including carrier suitability. Tradeoffs of cost., performance, and other requirements have

been important elements of the current phase of the program. Once prototype designs become firm,

a meaningful assessment of the A/F-X aircraft's technical risk can be made. However, the planned

Dem/Val program including prototype flight tests appears to be structured to accommodate a

substantial risk reduction effort.

Summary

The Task Force considers the F-22 to have higher technical risk than the F/A-18E/F. It is

the judgment of the Task Force that the F-22's and F- l8EIF's critical risk areas have been clearly

identified, are being addressed to the extent commensurate with their importance and are being

adequately managed. There is a danger that both the F-22 and FIA- l8E/F programs may become

budget-driven rather than event-driven and may thereby encounter further difficulties. Full funding

of E&MD for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F aircraft programs is required if program milestones and

technical risk reductions are to be achieved.

Common Aircraft/Avionics

Multiple applications of aircraft/avionics and other major components are fundamentally

related to cost-savings or affordability issues but the effect of such a strategy on the effectiveness

of the force structure relative to other options must be carefully weighed. Key factors affecting

cost-effective choices of aircraft systems include:

" mission assignments of force elements within the operational force structure,

"" size nd composition of forces required to meet rational strategies and objectives in the

face of anticipated threats,

" timing and phasing of aircraft programs, and

the current trend toward longer operational lives of aircraft, including upgrades.

With the radical changes taking place in the international community, and the reappraisals

of force levels and compositions in light of these changes, the studies of roles and missions and of

affordability of aircraft force structures under way will have a major effect on the types and

numbers of aircraft to be acquired over the next several decades.

Common Aircraft and Parallel Missions

The use of common aircraft has two dimensions-the use of common aircraft for parallel

missions across military services and the use of common aircraft within a service for multiple

missions. Both uses can reduce overall development, production, and support costs. Aircraft may

be adapted or designed in several versions from the outset to perform multiple missions within a

service or parallel missions across services. The mea:. ires of merit to use in deciding whether to

design a new aircraft (or modify an existing aircraft) - multi-role or multi-service applications

should be mission effectiveness and life-cycle cost of the force.

Critical mission requirements and design considerations can dictate whether a particular

aircraft has the potential for other missions within a service or similar missions across services.

The services' experience has been that some, but not all missions demand aircraft whose design is

strongly focused on a single mission with minimum multi-role compromise. The two most notable

examples are theater-level air superiority (dominating airspace over hostile territory and over

7
friendly territory) and deep strike. In both cases, life-cycle cost must consider outside support

required to perform the mission effectively--air refueling, defense suppression, escoirt, airborne

surveillance support, and overhead support. Since both missions must be performed deep in

hostile territory, outside support can be difficult and costly to achieve and may result in high

attrition in supporting forces.

The specialized aircraft that fulfill the most demanding missions (e.g., theater airsuperiority and autonomous deep strike) make up the high end of the force mix. Multi-role and

multi-service aircraft have been successfully employed in the less-demanding aspects of both airto-air and air-to-ground missions; these aircraft constitute the low-end of the force mix. Within

their own domains (CLe., air-to-air or air-to-ground), the high-end aircraft could fulfill most of the

less-demanding missions. However, because low-end multi-role aircraft have historically cost half

as much as high-end aircraft (e.g., F-16 vis-a-vis F-15), they have provided a much more

affordable means of providing an adequate force structure.

Modem aircraft designed for the air superiority role have been successfully adapted to the

air-to-ground mission to include part of the deep-strike mission. The high thrust-to-weight ratio

and low to moderate wing-loading characteristics of an air superiority design provide the ability to

carry significant ordnance loads while preserving the maneuvering performance needed to enhance

survivability. The avionics suite needed for a modern air superiority aircraft provides flexibility to

adapt to air-to-ground demands. Both the Navy and the Air Force adapted the F-4, originally

designed as the Navy's primary air warfare aircraft, to an air-to-ground role. However, the reverse

is not true: deep strike or attack optimized aircraft cannot be modified to an air superiority/air

warfare role.

Similarly, naval aircraft must be designed first and foremost to be suitable for aircraft

carrier operations. The requisite structural and aerodynamic features must be part of the design

from the beginning. These features impose weight, performance and cost penalties over similar

aircraft designed for land operations only. Carrier-suitable Navy aircraft have been successfully

used by the Air Force in the middle range of mission demands (the F-4 and A-7 are notable

examples), but there are no examples of Air Force aircraft being modified to Navy carrier-suitable

missions.

The most unsuccessful common use attempt was the effort to field a truly common, multirole, multi-service aircraft, the F-Ill program, which attempted to span too large a range of

disparate missions. In the end, the aircraft was considered unsuitable for both Navy carrier

operations and Air Force multi-role operations. After extensive and costly modification, the aircrafh

became the most capable deep-strike aircraft. In the end, the common, multi-role design became the

Air Force's most specialized, single service, single-role aircraft fulfilling what was the original AM

Force mission requirement for the F- 11IA (although it was later modified again to the EF- 11).

Another trend of importance has been a significantly extended useful operational life foi

fighter aircraft. Up to the 1970s, fighter aircraft tended to become obsolete in their primary desigr

mission in five to ten years. In contrast, the F-15 and F-14 have served as the Air Force and Nay)

primary air superiority/air warfare aircraft for almost twenty years and must continue to serve tha

role for at least another ten years. The F-22 will then assume that role for the Air Force. Th(

previous plan was for a naval variant, the NATF, designed for carrier operations, with commoi

engines, avionics, and low-observable and airframe technology, to serve the Navy's future high

end air superiority needs. The A/F-X is currently planned to complement the F/A-18E/F in tht

Navy's air warfare missions.

Table 1 presents past, present and future Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force tactical aircraf

and possible future options of upgrades and new designs as they relate to missions. In the 1970s

there were approximately two dozen aircraft types in this matrix; now there are about one dozen

As the table indicates, possible future options might result in further reductions in type, althougi

such reductions should not be judged on the basis of commonality alone. Compromises are mad

in mission effectiveness to achieve aircraft/avionics commonality.

8
Table 1. Aircraft-Mission Match

2020s

Mission 1970s 1990s Modern Aging n='•, Air SUMd'o,-iX

Air Force F-15, F-102, F-15A/C F-22 F-15C ?

F-104, -P106,

F-101B

Navy&arte F-14, I-4. F-B F-14A/D FIA-1EIF, A/F-X 1-14 ?

Air Form F-ill, F-100, F-15E. F-117, A/F-X F-15E, F-117

F-105, A-7, A-10 F-111, A-10

Navy/Mine A-6, A-4, A-7, A-64 AV-8B A/F-X

AV-8A

Air Force F-4 F-16A/C MRF F-16C ?

Navy/Maine F-4 F/A-lgA/C FIA-18E FA/-18C ?

Equally important with the application of common aircraft, the application of common

aircraft components provides opportunities for life-cycle cost savings. Major components (engines,

airframes, avionics, and weapons) may be integrated in differing overall system configurations.

For tactical fighter/attack aircraft, engine Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)

and unit flyaway costs may account for 15-20 percent of total vehicle system cost, with avionics

typically accounting for 25-35 percent. Thus, it is possible that up to 50 percent of vehicle system

RDT&E and flyaway costs may be based on common component development and production

even with differing airframe configurations. There are many examples of successful common

component applications, particularly a long history of multiple engine applications going back to

the first generation of J33 and J35 turbojets. The TF-30 engine was used in the F- 11, A-7 and

F-14A. More recently, the F100 engine was used on models of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft, and the

Fl10 engine, on models of the F-16 and F-14 aircraft. Numerous similar examples exist for

electronics/avionics equipment.

Possible Common Aircraft/Avionics Options

The cost-effectiveness of using common aircraft/avionics for a specific application will

depend upon the degree to which costs savings and other commonality advantages are offset by the

disadvantages inherent in commonality.

Program managers, if given the choice between off-the-shelf or new common aircraft

equipment will usually make a decision from a program perspective and not the full life-cycle view

of the system user or the overall DoD budget impact. It is essential that the technical "price" of

using common items be carefully evaluated in relation to the full life-cycle cost savings

implications. The ability of common items to ease system integration, reuse software, avoid

development duplication, lower production cost, and reduce support cost must be fully weighed

against the inefficiencies (lower performance, higher weight, etc.) that may be introduced by using

common items. Table 2 lists some advantages and disadvantages of aircraft/avionics commonality.

9
Table 2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Aircraft/Avionics Commonality

Advantages Disadvantages

" Decreased development cost and technical risk a Airciatfaviomics mission performanc, weight,

through reduction in systems, subsystems or nd volume will be less than optimum for a

components that must be developed given application

"* D ed production cos through eonies • Military application of technology may not

of scale advace as rapidly

" Decreased opeaming and support costs by • Administrative burden to adceve an effective

reduced spares costs and test equ4ient needs common equipznet program acoss weapon

"* Reduced avionics software and integration costs platforms amd across services may be significant

and technical risks through use of standard * Sam loss of inkdstrial inhastructure may occu

inmtrfes and proncols provided by common with fewer suppliers

modules and by incresed sontwareuse e Specific problemsin design. manufaurem and

"* R&D technology base funds can be better operaou nca affect more program

focused on critical technology issues by the • Cross-service logistic infrastructure requirenent

reduction of duplication of systenssubsystems may increase costs

The area of avionics needs careful examination with regard to upgrades of existing systems

in the future. Electronics technologies can provide a common integrated architecture and allow

commonality at the module level while still achieving technology advances in selected modules

through pre-planned product improvements. Such a standard architecture has been defined by the

Joint Integrated Avionics Working Group (JIAWG). Within-platform avionics commonality is

more readily achieved, as exemplified by the wide application of JIAWG common modules within

the F-22, because it is generally consistent with the contractor and government program managers'

objectives. Across-program commonality (such as applying F-22 avionics modules to the A/F-X)

is more difficult because it requires coordination across program offices and makes the following

program dependent on subsystems and technology that may be viewed as obsolescent and less

subject to control by the program manager.

The potential for the cost-effective application of almost identical aircraft and components

for a variety of missions and in varying environments depends in large measure on how dissimilar

the missions the aircraft is intended to perform are. Also important is the degree of overlap or

complementarity of other aircraft types inclqded in the overall force structure in which the specific

aircraft is to be included. Major factors influencing costs are the numbers to be produced for each

mission category or service environment and the timing and phasing of programs. If small

numbers of aircraft are to be produced for each mission or service, then the relative advantage from

RDT&E costs in common will offset to a considerable extent the potentially higher unit costs

("tchnical price" and non-optimized unit cost) of a single aircraft system or component to perform

well in multiple missions and multiple environments. Another important factor is the phasing of

force modernization across the services and mission areas. Although a new aircraft design may

have the potential for application across missions or services, there may be no near-term need for a

new aircraft in more than one application.

The Task Force has identified several possible future options for common aircraft in both

the high and low ends of the aircraft performance spectrum, for subsystem upgrades to current

aircraft, and for new design aircraft, although most of the options do not reflect current

requirements or planned acquisitions of this service.

For Upgrades to Current Aircraft:

- Navy F/A-18E/F upgraded with modernized avionics for future Air Force multi-role

fighter (air superiority and ground attack) for the low end of the force mix.

10
- Air Force growth F-l6 upgraded with modernized avionics for Air Force multi-role

fighter for the low end of the force mix.

For New Aircraft:

- A/F-X for the Navy and Air Force high end of the force mix to serve as the future

ground attack and interdiction aircraft. In its multi-role Navy version it would also

serve as the Navy's future air warfare aircraft. The Navy and Air Force are working

jointly on this Navy-led program. The A/F-X avionics can be derived from F-22

JIAWG-type avionics.

- Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) is being considered for the low end of the Air Force

tactical air force mix for both air superiority and ground attack. The MRF program

is intended to start toward the end of this decade or beginning of the next decade. It

could also serve the Navy as a replacement for the FIA-18 if designed from the

outset for carrier suitability. (Airframes might differ to a considerable degree but

this is not a given, however. Both services could use the same engine and

avionics).

- F-22 upgrade to perform the Air Force high end of the tactical aviation ground

attack role (similar to F-15E upgrade from F-15C) and/or F-22 avionics upgrade to

perform an electronic combat role.

The current common-use aircraft program, the A/F-X seems reasonably well on track.

Although both services seem committed to a common-use design, it is far too early in the program

to make judgments about the outcome. Both services will clearly need a follow-on deep strike

aircraft to replace the aging A-6 and F-I11 and eventually the F-117 and F-15E.

That leaves the possibility of a multi-role common-use design as a follow-on to the F-16

and FIA-18. Again, it is far too early to make judgments about the prospects but past experience -gives some indicators of the prerequisites for, and likelihood of success. If, as is likely and

prudent, the requirement includes advanced low-observable characteristics, the follow-on would

need to be a very significant departure from either aircraft. At the same time, the follow-on needs to

be significantly lower in cost (nominally half) than the F-22 or the AIF-X to provide an affordable

force. Given that aggregate force mission effectiveness and life-cycle cost are the relevant measures

of merit, the development cost savings from common aircraft use may not be sufficient when

measured against total force life-cycle cost and mission effectiveness considerations. It is too early

to make decisions about commonality and effectiveness tradeoffs, prior to a design competition of

competing concepts.

Prototyping

A common definition of a prototype as a representative working model used (1) to reduce

technical risks in a new system or subsystem, (2) to answer design questions to some degree, and

(3) to provide necessary confidence before moving to the next phase of a system acquisition with

better technical, schedule, and cost information and estimates for the system.

Both ground and flight prototype testing in the DemIVal Phase reduce the technical risk of a

program, thereby reducing the schedule and cost risks in proceeding to E&MD (and production).

Prototyping does not eliminate technical, schedule, and cost risk-t-hat is why there is an E&MD.

Prototypes cost money and take time-sometimes they are justified and sometimes not, depending

on the degree of technical advance sought in a system or subsystem, the nature of the technical

risks and the costs of risk reduction at various stages of an E&MD program.

Flying prototypes may fulfill a number of requirements in a development program and

provide data in a variety of ways to reduce technical risks, as listed in Table 3.

11
Table 3. Flying Prototypes Provide Data to Reduce Technical Risk

Flying Avionics

Characteristic Aircraft Engines Testbed

Aodynmiic Performanoe Substantial Substantial N/A

Weight Data Limited LI hited LI mited

Flight Control Functions Substantial (FBW)a Substantial (FADEC)b N/A

Avionics Functions Limited Limited Substantial

Engine Peufmam Substantial Substantial N/A

Signatme PossibleiSubstantial PossibldSubstantialc Possible

Airframn Integration

Stuctamue Somec Some0 N/A

System Some Some N/A

Durability Limited LTmited LImited

Producibility Some Some Some

Softwale Some Some Some

a FBW stands for fly-by-wire.

b FADEC stands for full authority digital engine control.

C Limited in recent prototypes.

d Boilerplate strucMe often used.

In some cases, prototypes may demonstrate and validate certain system performance and

mission capabilities or indicate their deficiencies early enough to permit design revisions before

large expenditures are committed to E&MD. However, the more complete and representative of the

final production system the prototypes are to be, the more of the total detailed design and preflight

development and integration effort (including extensive ground testing of components) must be

completed before prototype construction and the greater the cost incurred. Carried to the limits of

completeness and verisimilitude, a prototype can be essentially equivalent to the flight test aircraft

in the E&MD program.

Pre-E&MD prototypes in the recent past (the YF-16, YF-17, and YF-22) have not been

complete system prototypes but rather have been bare air vehicles. They have served to verify

aerodynamic and flight control characteristics, and airframe-engine interactions affecting flight

vehicle performance and operation. They did not demonstrate or validate mission avionics and

weapons-delivery capabilities, nor, for the most part, did they validate the structural integrity or

weight of the final production aircraft since their structures were not completely representative nor

was there sufficient intensity and repetition of loading of the airframe to establish long-term

durability and fatigue life of the aircraft. Ground tests typically carried out as part of an E&MD

program provide the only development tools available for establishing long-term structural integrity

of the airframe and durability of the engine before accumulating thousands of hours on operational

aircrafL Pre-E&MD prototype vehicles whose aerodynamic configuration and flight control

characteristics are very similar to the final aircraft can validate, and may in some cases modify and

improve the accuracy of magnitude and distribution of flight loading (steady, vibratory, acoustic,

and transient) to which the structure must be designed. Also, aerodynamic interactions of the

airframe and engines can be assessed with greater accuracy than provided by wind-tunnel and

ground engine test cells. The likelihood that these characteristics will be significantly different in

prototype flight test from those derived from engineering analyses, wind-tunnel, and ground test

depends on the degree to which airframe and engine depart from prior recent design configuration

and operating regime experience.

Prototyping of various systems and subsystems may be considered for reasons other than

technical risk reduction. These include permitting preliminary testing or demonstration of

12
operational utilization and in some cases obtaining technical information needed in development

(e.g., qualification testing) earlier and at lower cost than by alternative means. There are also

reasons why pre-E&MD flight prototyping may not be desirable, particularly when technical risk is

relatively small and time and money is better used in the E&MD program addressing the overall

development process. Table 4 summarizs advantages and disadvantages of flight test prototyping.

Table 4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Flight Test Prototyping

Advantages Disadvantages

"* Reduces teclnical risk in testbed features • Up-fmnt investmecan be substamtial

"* Provides beter technical. schedule, and cost - Schedule to Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

information and estimates of testbed features can be longer

"* Allows joint ventures and design and • Slows momentum of program

management teams to work together early in the • Flight data may not significantly alter windprogram munnel and engine ground test dia-actstics for

"* Can provide data on flight envelope not conventional designs

available from wind-tunnel tests (aeodynanic - Final E&MD design may differ substantially

and engine perfornance. flight controls, * Critical structural and other life-cycle

airframe/engine interface). chActaistics of aircraft and engine not

validated by prototype flight tests

Whether competitive prototypes (which, unless substantial contractor financial participation is forthcoming, are more costly) should be used may be more an issue of acquisition strategy in a

particular program than a question of technical risk reduction. On the other hand, it may be both

necessary and desirable to pursue evaluation of competitive prototypes as an important element of

an acquisition program, particularly if they embody significant departures from recent design experience and also differ substantially from one another. Table 5 summarizes advantages and

disadvantages of competitive prototyping of flight vehicles.

Table 5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Competitive Flight Prototyping

Ad vantages Disadvantages

"* Expands the choices for the govermment; could • Increases development cost

result in better product- (best of two versus best . Increases length of schedule

of one) - GoveRnnnt/ConUam inmt-acon less focused

"* Product coild be less expensive 0 Re puients growth herde to control

SContrites to industrial base maintenance - Myd=ime momt icas r k dctil • Encouraes,,test efforts" by cu tcxtems * May detract frmmmone citical risk reduction

efforts on critical subsystems in ground tests e Increases chances of solving key problems and simulations.

a F-22 was result of extraordinary effort by Lockheed late in the program. Without YF.23 competitive pressare.

YF-22 prototype program would likely have accomplished considerably less. However, this competition was

conducted under fixed price conacts and involved considerable contractor funding of the effort.

Lessons From Recent Prototyping Experience

When significantly new versions of airframe and flight control system configurations are to

be developed, pre-E&MD prototypes serve as a powerful tool for risk reduction. However, for

aircraft systems similar to already flown and operational airframe and control configurations and

subsystem characteristics using existing engines or derivatives or modest incremental modifications

of such engines, the benefits of pre-E&MD prototypes may not always justify the price in cost and

schedule delay (which can also translate into cost). Thus, for example, there was no pre-E&MD

prototype for the F-1 5 and little indication that such a prototype would have served a useful

13
purpose. Most of the development and operational problems encountered with the F-15 would not

have been revealed during test of a pre-E&MD prototype. (The FlOO engine for the F-15 was a

significant step in engine technology and had a competitive ground test prototype program before

full-scale development).

On the other hand, the F-16 embodied radically new aircraft stability interactions with

electronic flight control (fly-by-wire) in combination with novel aerodynamic configuration

features. Clearly the F-16 could be said to require a prototype test. Similarly, the F-22 represented

a pioneering effort to integrate low-observable characteristics into a supersonic and highly

maneuverable airframe configuration, and incorporated a number of aerodynamic and engine

integration features outside the realm of previous aircraft design experience. Again, prototype flight

testing was a prudent step in the development. The point is that air vehicle prototypes are not

uniformly cost-effective as risk reduction tools in a development program. Their relative value

depends on the degree to which the airframe configuration and engine installation features depart

from the domain of recent experience.

Within the context of this knowledge, the Task Force examined possible prototyping

strategies for the F/A-18E/F and the A/F-X.

Prototyping the F/A-18E/F

The Task Force could not find any basis for introducing flight vehicle prototype into the

FIA-1SE/F aircraft at the present stage of its E&MD program. The FIA- 18E/F is not a high-risk

program in terms of concept, design, performance or operational suitability. In many ways the

F/A-I8C/D can be considered a prototype of the FIA-I8E/F. The aerodynamic and structural

concepts for the F/A- I8F-JF are essentially the same as those of the F/A- I SC/D. Aerodynamic and

other design models and tools used in the FIA-1EIF program have been calibrated and validated

using data from earlier F/A- 18 flight testing. This has provided information of the kind that would

be available from a flying prototype. Technical risks remaining in the program (e.g., weight) can

only be confronted in the E&MD program with E&MD flight-test articles. The additional costs (in

time and money) of disrupting the E&MD program and building early flying prototypes far

outweigh the value of any potential risk reductions.

Milestones and exit criteria within the FIA-18E/F's E&MD phase can serve as necessary

control points ýor committing large amounts of funding to production and significant production

quantities. The Navy Program Review-I (NPR-I) is the first program milestone associated with

the commitment of long-lead production funding. The Navy plans to have completed an early

operational assessment of the aircraft design based in part on flight performance of the first two

E&MD aircraft prior to NPR-1. While some schedule adjustments may be needed to NPR-l to

accomplish this, the program phasing should continue to allow for sufficient evaluation of flight

test and other data to provide sufficient confidence in the aircraft design and mission performance

prior to commitment to production funding.

Prototyping the A/F-X

Current A/F-X requirements call for a level of design innovation that justifies a flying

prototype before the start of E&MD. The A/F-X program is planned to follow an acquisition

strategy that could accommodate competitive prototyping of the airframe and engine during

Dem/Val. If the design competition leading to Dem/Val provides a clear winner, then only a single

design might be prototyped. Because the A/F-X is likely to employ avionics concepts and common

equipment from the F-22 program, avionics prototype testing in a flying testbed may be required

only for selected components, systems integration and software.

14
APPENDIX A

TASK FORCE MEMBERS
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

AIRCRAFT ASSESSMENT

Dr. John S. Foster, Co-cbair, Dr. Akxma Flax, Co-luchk,

TRW Inc. National Acm&d y of Enginring

Mr. Robert R. Everet Mr. Robert F. Nesbit

The MITRE Cop. Technical Directr, The MITRE Cap.

Mr.DonaldN. Frederi Mr. Rober N. Pare

Hickm & Associates, Inc.

Mr. David R. Heebe• LL Gen. Robeut E. Pursley,

Vim Ozaiman of the Baud USAF (Ret.)

Science Appiations Internatonal Corp.

Mr. Milton A. Margolis Dr. Ridcsad J. Sylvesaw

LogisticsManagamentInstitute Fellow, Tbe MITRE Corporation

Adm. Wesley L McDonald, GaL. Laiy D. Welch, USAF (Ret.)

USN (Ret.) Pmrskk Institute for Defense Analyses

Executive Secretary Government Representatives

Capt. Eric Vaderpoel. USN. Dr. Spiros Pallas

OUSD(A) Tactical Systmn OUSD(A)/Tacical Systens

Maj. Gen. Richard B. Myers Directx, Fighter, C2 and Weapons Programs.

ASAF(Acquisidon)

DSB Liaison

CDR Stephen Wiley, USN, Col Brian C. Dugle

OUSD(A) Defense Sdce Board Depety Chief. Figher Div.

Fightr, C2 and Wexons Program s Direct• ASAF(Acquisiion)

Mr. Larry Kid=

Offrc of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy

(Research Development and Acquisito)

Working Group

Dr. J. Richard Nelson Mr. Robert Thompson

Ast. Dirae r, Cost Analysis and Reearch Office of the Assistant Setaey o the

Division, ntit for Defense Analysm Navy (Resemzv Develomnent and Acquisition)

Mr. Bruce R. Humon Mr. Brian Long

Institute for Defense Analyses Defense Intelligenc Agency

Mr. Joseph W. Stahl Mr. Paul Scheurich

Institute for Defense Analyses Defense Intellifenc Alternc
APPENDIX B

EXCERPT FROM THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

AUTHORIZATION ACT
CONGRESSIONAL LANGUAGE

Defense Authorizadon Act for Fiscal Year 1993

(PL 102-484)

Section 902 Tactical Aircraft Modernization Programs

(a) Funding Lmitauion Pending Certain Actions,

(3) The Secretary of Defense has submitted to the congressional defense

committees the technical assessments of the Defense Science Board that are specified in

subsection (d).

(b) Applicability-Subsection (a) applies to the following actical aircraft programs:

(1) The F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program of the Air Fore.

(2) The F/A-18FE1F fighter program of the Navy

(3) The A-X medium attack aircraft program of the Navy.

(d) DSB Technical Assessment.-Tle technical assessments to be undertaken by the

Defense Science Board for purposes of subsection (a)(3) are the following:.

(1) An assessment of the ways that current aircraft, upgrades to current aircraft, and

-w design aircraft can be modified or otherwise adapted so that a single airaft tye can

be used by both the Air Force and the Navy in parallel mison,.

(2) An assessment of the technical risks associated with the the tactical aircraft

specified in subsection (b).
APPENDIX C

TERMS OF REFERENCE
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

WASHINGTON. DC 20301-3010

5 JAN 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference -- Defense Science Board Task Force

on Aircraft Assessment

Section 902(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1993, Public Law Number 102-484, provides as follows:

"(d) DSB Technical Assessment.- The technical assessments

to be undertaken by the Defense Science Board for the

purposes of subsection (a)(3) are the following: (1) An assessment of the ways that current aircraft,

upgrades to current aircraft, and new design aircraft can be

modified or otherwise adapted so that a single aircraft type

can be used by both the Air Force and the Navy in parallel

missions.

(2) An assessment of the technical risks associated with

the three tactical aircraft in subsection (b)."

Additionally, page 210 of the Senate report on the

Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1993, Report 102-408,

requests that the Department provide:

" (d) the results of an examination of the advantages and

disadvantages, especially in terms of program cost, schedule, and technical risks, of prototyping the F-18E/F

and of competitive prototyping of AX; this examination must

be conducted by an independent organization in no way connected with the Navy;"

I request you organize a Defense Science Board Task Force to

conduct these technical assessments. Copies of the appropriate sections of the Public Law and report language are attached.

The scope of the Task Force effort should include the

following considerations:

1. AX. F-22. & F/A-I8E/F: The DSB shall examine the

programs, plans, schedules, funding, and the maturity of the level of technology associated with AX, F-22,

and F/A-18E/F programs and assess their feasibility of

meeting their stated technical and programmatic

objectives. AX and F/A-18E/F COEA and AX Development Options Studies will be briefed by the Navy as part of

the review of the requirements. Level of technology
for stealth, avionics & sensors, airframe, and engine

features will be viewed in terms of meeting schedules,

costs, and requirements. Competitive prototyping on

A-X and prototyping of the F/A-18E/F will be assessed

to determine its impact on risk reduction with regard

to potertial cost implications.

2. Current Aircraft: The Navy and Air Force will brief

the DSB on Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P31) and

major Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) planned for

current tactical attack/fighter aircraft. Included for

current aircraft will be the F-15, F-16, AV-8B, F-14,

F-117, P-111, A-10, A-6, and F/A-18 aircraft. Some

upgrades/modifications will include new or improved

avionics and engines. The DSB will assess the

technical merits of further modifying these aircraft to

meet other service needs, the attained risks, and the

overall feasibility and desirability of such

commonality. In performing tasks I and 2 above, the

DSB will consider the current and projected threat; the

current and projected force structure along with

aircraft and missions as indicated by the Joint Staff

report. The DSB will report whether the technology and

potential threats warrant any reconsideration of the

aircraft missions in light of potential cost savings

and/or enhanced warfighting capability, afforded by new

technology.

In order to meet the requirements of section 902(d), the DSB

should submit its final report by February 24, 1993. The report

should be so constructed that it can be submitted to congress

without compromising any proprietary data or competition sensitive

information.

The Director, Tactical Systems will sponsor this Task Force.

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. and Dr. Alexander Flax will serve as CoChairmen. CAPT Eric Vanderpoel, USN will be the Executive

Secretary and CDR Stephen N. Wiley, USN will be the DSB

Secretariat representative. The Director, Tactical Systems will

make arrangements and provide funding for a support contractor,

should one be required, and will fund all necessary travel.

Victor H. Reis

Attachments
APPENDIX D

TASK FORCE SCHEDULE
TASK FORCE SCHEDULE

21 January 1993 Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA

0830 Kick-off - Dr. Foster

0830-0845 Standards of conduct Brief - Mr. Cal Voss

0845-0915 Executive Session - Led by Dr. Foster

0915-0930 Terms of Reference - Mr. Frank Kendall

0930-0945 Break

0945-1145 Missions and Requuments-USN&USAF

1145-1245 Lunch

1245-1445 Missions and Requirements-USN&USAF

1445-1500 Break

1500-1630 F-22 Program-Program 1b.amager

1630-1730 Executive Session

22 January 1993 Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA

0800-0830 Executive Session

0830-1000 F/A-18 Program-Program Manager

1000-1015 Break

1015-1130 Other Navy Upgrade Programs/Activities

1130-1145 Working Lunch Set Up

1145-1300 Other Air Force Update Programs/Activities

1300-1430 AX Program

1430-1445 Break

1445-1615 AX Program-Program Manager

1615-1700 Executive Session

4 February 1993 Lockheed, Atlanta, GA (F-22 Program)

0800-1230 Group Morning Session & Working Lunch

1230-1730 Split Technical Sessions

5 February 1993 McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, MO (F/A-18E/F Program)

0800-1230 Group Morning Session & Working Lunch

1230-1730 Split Technical Sessions

11 February 1993 Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA

0830-0930 Executive Session

0930-1030 Ge- Larry Welch on parallel mission areas

1030-1100 1 ," Alternative Mission Discussions

1100-1300 JAWG Briefing

1230-1300 Working Lunch

1300-1400 USAF View on Commonalty (F-16 to MRF)

1400-1500 Executive Session

1500-1515 Break

1515-1730 Executive Session

I
TASK FORCE SCHEDULE (CONT'D)

12 February 1993 Institute for Defense Analyses; Alexandria, VA

0800-0930 A/F-X SubGroup I Briefing in IDA SCIF (Foster, Flax, Welch,

Sylvester & Military Advisors

0945-1000 Executive Session

1000-1030 Affordability-USAF&USN Cost Data [AP&PI]

1030-1200 DSB Executive Session

1200-1230 Woking Lunch

1230-1700 DSB Executive Session

18 February 1993 Institute for Defense Analyses; Alexandria, VA

0800-1500 DSB Members Review DSB Report and Prepare Briefing

2
APPENDIX E

REFERENCES
REFERENCES

[1] Conventional Systems Committee. "Integrated Program A s nt, F/A-18/F."

Secret, 27 April 1992.

[2] Conventional Systems Committee. "Advanced Tactical Fighter Technical Risk

Assessmea t" Secreu/Proprietary Information, June 1991.

[3] DIA, "The Fixed-Wimg Tactical Air Threat-Worldwide for 2000-2005." Secret

[4] "Independent Review of F/A-l EF." Briefing.

[5] Harmon, B. R., L. K Ward, and P. R. Palmer. "Assessing Acquisition Schedules

for Tactical Aircraft." Institute for Defense Analyses, Paper P-2105, February 1989.

[6] Harmon, B. R., J. R. Nelson, N. L Om, J. M. Sater, and A. W. Salerno. "Schedule

Risk sents for Tactical Aircraft Programs." Institute for Defense Analyses, Document D-1214, December 1992.

[7] Tyson, K. W., J. R. Nelson, D. C. Gogerty, B. R. Harmon, and A. W. Salerno.

"Prototyping Defense Systems." Institute for Defense Analyses, Document D-1097,

December 1991. -

[81 Nelson, I. R., B. L Retterer, and H. A. Cloud. "Organizational Options for Common

Electronics Management." Institute for Defense Analyses, Document D-1159,

December 1992.
APPENDIX D

TACTICAL AIR WARFARE TASK FORCE COMMENTS ON THE

JOINT ADVANCED STRIKE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (JASTP)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301-3140

CEE Q ENCE DCl 1993

BOARD

HE-.ANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION)

TrRU: CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Tactical Warfare Panel Comments on Joint Advanced

Strike Technology Program (JASTP)

This memorandum responds to your request for comments on the

Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program (JASTP). We welcome

this opportunity, since we share your desire and strongly support

your efforts to establish a structure that will provide needed

focus for technologies that could support development of new

strike systems. We agree that JASTP is an appropriate vehicle to

provide that focus. In this memorandum we will (1) relate to you

our understanding of what JASTP is, (2) describe some additional

factors you may wish to consider about the program's framework

and relations to ongoing exploratory and advanced development activities, and (3) offer some suggestions with regard to

management of the program.

We understand that JASTP will focus on bringing to fruition

the aircraft oriented technologies that will support development of new strike platform(s) to include demonstrations of critical

components and subsystems. Also to be included are air-launched

weapon and delivery capabilities and surveillance/target

engagement system interfaces necessary for effective strike

system operations.

Future military situations will be more varied and less

predictable than those we anticipated in the past in dealing with

a Soviet threat. We believe that substantially different systems

are required to provide a diverse array of options for dealing with this new defense environment. We believe too that advanced

technologies could at the same time provide us with alternatives

that lead to very different technical-military opportunities. With new and different system requirements and new and different

technologies available for incorporation in new systems, we

believe an exceptional opportunity now exists to explore the

options more fully to seek to develop the most effective and

affordable solutions.

We believe that development of the next strike system must

consider a broad rar:ýe of concepts for accomplishing strike

warfare missions. Consideration must be given to a broad range

of alternatives, for instance, a mix of off-board and on-board
sensors and information processing. Further, there should be a

full exploration and development of strike system technologies

focused on designing for producibility/supportability/

deployability.

The JASTP needs explicit attention to the development of

operational concepts. Development and advancement of operational

concepts should be equal in priority to advancement of

technology. We, therefore, recommend that development and

demonstration of operational concepts should be a key objective of the demonstration prototypes. It would also be helpful to

establish a focal point for operational concepts in each Service.

Sustainment of program support and interest requires the

definition of specific goals. These goals should be products associated with a well-defined schedule. For initiating the

program, we would suggest the following interactive processes be

carried out to define and plan the program leading to component and subsystem advanced developments and demonstrations:

* Definitions of alternative operational concepts to

achieve needed capabilities,

. Identification of preferred system concepts,

Identification of the technologies that support preferred system concepts.

In particular, in setting up prototype demonstrations,

discipline should be exercised to limit the scope of any demonstration to one or at most two major innovations.

The Task Force considered the relationship of JASTP to a number

of ongoing programs that are aimed at next-generation aircraft

and associated a-,ionics and weapons that would feed into,

complement, or be complemented by JASTP. For example, the

Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IEPTET)

Program is a comprehensive engine technology program spanning 6.2

and 6.3 activities and intended to provide major improvements in

aircraft engine performance by the turn of the century.

Similarly, the Joint Integrated Avionics Working Group

(JIAWG) is intended to establish compatible architectures and a

common modular approach to aircraft avionics. Although at

present the long-term success of this approach across the

spectrum of aircraft systems is not apparent (it having been

implemented mainly in F-22 avionics), the general concept appears to have merit and it should continue to be pursued with such

modifications as may be found necessary. JIAWG does not

encompass major sensors such as radars, and JASTP should assure

adequate coverage of these major subsystems as well as other

components particularly with respect to their application to lowobservable platforms. JASTP should, especially initially, extend

and help provide focus for such programs as technologies advance

toward maturation and application. The technology programs
should provide roadmaps to JASTP indicating the proper

relationship between their ongoing and planned activities and

JASTP.

Finally, we note that the planned management of JASTP is

based on estabalishing a lead-service for the total program to be

rotated every three years among the services. Thus far the

nature and scope of this overall management function does not

appear to have been defined. It seems to us that there is little

to be gained by integrating detailed program management of such

diverse technologies as propulsion and avionics and such diverse

advanced components as radars and jet engines in a single office

until such time as the integration into development of particular

aircraft systems is imminent. We would suggest that the JASTP

overall management serve primarily for resource allocation,

delineation of requirements and standards, and overall program

planning and coordination and that this joint program management

function report directly to the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. This overall joint program management should serve as a

focal point for JCS/CINC and service views on operational factors

and requirements. Specific major technology and component

programs should be managed separately by joint offices with lead

responsibilities and rotation cycles (if any) assigned to

particular services as appropriate to the nature and schedules of

applications, relationships to other ongoing technology programs,

and the availability of the technical and management resources

needed in program offices.

We would be happy to discuss our thoughts with you at your

convenience.

cotn S. Foster, Jr.

Co-Chairman

AlexanderwFlax

Co-Chairman