[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 37 (Friday, February 26, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 11634-11641]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-03906]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

 Copyright Office

37 CFR Part 201

[Docket No. 2020-10]


Modernizing Recordation of Notices of Termination

AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress.

ACTION: Final rule; statement of policy.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Copyright Office is amending certain regulations governing 
the recordation of notices of termination to improve efficiency in 
processing. This final rule adopts regulatory language set forth in the 
Office's June 2020 notice of proposed rulemaking and notification of 
inquiry with some modifications in response to public comments. The 
Office also addresses public comments submitted in response to the 
subjects of inquiry published in the notification of inquiry.

DATES: Effective March 29, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Regan A. Smith, General Counsel, by 
email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#10627577717e6350737f606962797778643e777f66"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="86f4e3e1e7e8f5c6e5e9f6fff4efe1eef2a8e1e9f0">[email protected]</span></a>, Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General Counsel, 
by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ee858f838b9cae8d819e979c8789869ac0898198"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1378727e766153707c636a617a747b673d747c65">[email protected]</span></a>, or Nicholas R. Bartelt, Attorney-
Advisor, by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#214f48434061424e515853484649550f464e57"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="bad4d3d8dbfad9d5cac3c8d3ddd2ce94ddd5cc">[email protected]</span></a>. Each can be contacted by 
telephone at (202) 707-8350.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The Copyright Office is in the midst of a multi-year modernization 
of its services and systems. One component of this comprehensive 
modernization initiative is the development of an online electronic 
system to process documents submitted for recordation, including 
notices of termination. In April 2020, the Office launched a limited 
pilot of this new system to allow pilot participants to submit certain 
transfers of ownership and other documents pertaining to copyright for 
recordation. Since then, the Office has recorded over 900 documents 
through the system while expanding functionality for the growing number 
of pilot users. Before implementing features to permit electronic 
recordation of notices of termination, the Office issued a notice of 
proposed rulemaking on June 3, 2020 (the ``NPRM'') to update its 
regulations governing recordation of notices of termination, clarify 
examination practices concerning terminations relating to multiple 
grants, and to solicit public comment on two related subjects of 
inquiry.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Modernizing Recordation of Notices of Termination, 85 FR 
34150 (June 3, 2020) (notice of proposed rulemaking; notification of 
inquiry).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Current Rules and Practices for Recording Notices of Termination

    In enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress created a process 
for authors to reclaim previously-granted rights in their works by 
terminating grants after a period of years has elapsed. As explained in 
the NPRM, authors may accomplish this by selecting an effective date of 
termination within a five-year window that is set by statute, preparing 
a notice of termination containing this date and other information 
necessary to identify which grant(s) of rights in which work(s) are 
being terminated,

[[Page 11635]]

serving the notice on the grantee(s) or successor(s) in title, and 
recording a copy of the notice with the Copyright Office.\2\ 
Recordation of the notice with the Office ``before the effective date 
of termination'' is ``a condition to its taking effect,'' and such 
``notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with 
requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by 
regulation.'' \3\ More broadly, section 702 of the Act authorizes the 
Register to ``establish regulations . . . for the administration of the 
functions and duties made the responsibility of the Register under 
[title 17],'' and section 705(a) requires the Register to ``ensure that 
records of . . . recordations . . . are maintained, and that indexes of 
such records are prepared.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 85 FR 34150-51 (citing 17 U.S.C. 203, 304(c)).
    \3\ 17 U.S.C. 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4). These provisions also apply 
to section 304(d)(1), another termination provision, which 
incorporates section 304(c)(4) by reference. Id. at 304(d)(1).
    \4\ Id. at 702, 705(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In establishing regulations under this authority, the Office has 
long held the view that the ``required contents of the notice must not 
become unduly burdensome to grantors, authors, and their successors,'' 
who may lack knowledge of certain information, such as the applicable 
dates.\5\ Therefore, to the extent permitted by the statute, the Office 
generally seeks to avoid outright rejection of termination notices 
submitted for recordation on grounds of technical noncompliance with 
Office regulations. Instead, the Office will often correspond with 
remitters to assist them in bringing deficient submissions into 
compliance with the relevant regulations \6\--for example, by supplying 
required information omitted from the original submission. This general 
policy in favor of recordation is particularly appropriate in light of 
the asymmetrical consequences associated with the determination of 
whether or not to record a notice.\7\ As the Office's regulations 
state, recordation is ``not a determination by the Office of the 
notice's validity or legal effect'' and ``is without prejudice to any 
party claiming that the legal or formal requirements for effectuating 
termination (including the requirements pertaining to service and 
recordation of the notice of termination) have not been met.'' \8\ By 
contrast, a refusal to record can ``permanently invalidate a notice of 
termination that is otherwise legally sound,'' and thereby deprive the 
copyright owner of the ability to reclaim rights in her work.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Termination of Transfers and Licenses Covering Extended 
Renewal Term, 42 FR 45916, 45918 (Sept. 13, 1977) (``[W]e remain 
convinced that the required contents of the notice must not become 
unduly burdensome to grantors, authors, or their successors, and 
must recognize that entirely legitimate reasons may exist for gaps 
in their knowledge or certainty.''); id. at 45917 (``The preparation 
of notice[s] of termination will be occurring at a time far removed 
from the original creation and publication of a work and, in many 
cases, will involve successors of original authors having little, if 
any, knowledge of the details of original creation or 
publication.''); id. at 45918 (recognizing that ``it will commonly 
be the case that the terminating author, or the terminating renewal 
claimant . . . will not have a copy of the grant or ready access to 
a copy'').
    \6\ See, e.g., Modernizing Copyright Recordation, 82 FR 22771, 
22771 (May 18, 2017) (notice of proposed rulemaking) (summarizing 
the Office's document recordation process, which ``can . . . involve 
considerable correspondence with remitters to remedy deficient 
submissions before they can be recorded''); U.S. Copyright Office, 
Compendium of Copyright Office Practices sec. 2310.7 (3d ed. 2021) 
(``Compendium (Third)'') (Where a notice does not comply with 
recordation requirements, a ``recordation specialist may communicate 
with the remitter, may refuse to record the notice, or may refuse to 
index the notice as a notice of termination.'').
    \7\ The Office previously observed that adopting a permissive 
recordation policy is consistent with the statutory purpose of 
allowing authors to exercise their termination rights. See U.S. 
Copyright Office, Analysis of Gap Grants under the Termination 
Provisions of Title 17 3 (2010) (``Gap Grant Analysis'') (citing 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 108 
(1975)).
    \8\ 37 CFR 201.10(f)(4); see Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 
F.3d 1109, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that validity and effect 
of notices can only be determined by a court of law, not the 
Copyright Office).
    \9\ Gap Grant Analysis at ii n.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. The Final Rule

    With this background and these policies in mind, the Office 
proposed several amendments to its regulations governing notices of 
termination to facilitate recordation and compliance with regulatory 
requirements. The Office received ten comments in response.\10\ 
Commenters generally supported the broad goal of modernizing 
recordation of notices by improving efficiency and clarifying the 
Office's processes.\11\ At the same time, comments also emphasized the 
importance of recordation to grantees, consistent and reliable 
examination practices, and encouraging preparation of notices that 
clearly communicate accurate information about the grants and works 
they identify.\12\ Having considered these comments, the Office issues 
this final rule with modifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See Authors Alliance Comments; Joint Comments of The 
Authors Guild, American Photographic Artists, Songwriters Guild of 
America, Inc., Society of Composers & Lyricists, National Press 
Photographers Association, Professional Photographers of America, 
American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., The American Society 
for Collective Rights Licensing, The North American Nature 
Photography Association, and Graphic Artists Guild, Inc. (``Authors 
Guild et al.''); Linda Edell Howard Comments; Motion Picture 
Association (``MPA'') Comments; Music Artists Coalition (``MAC'') 
Comments; Nashville Songwriters Association International (``NSAI'') 
Comments; National Music Publishers Association (``NMPA'') Comments; 
Recording Academy Comments; Recording Industry Association of 
America (``RIAA'') Comments.
    \11\ See Authors Alliance Comments at 1; Joint Comments of 
Authors Guild et al. at 1-2; Edell Howard Comments at 1; MAC 
Comments at 1; NSAI Comments at 2; Recording Academy Comments at 2.
    \12\ See, e.g., RIAA Comments at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Timeliness

    The Office proposed two updates to the rule governing timeliness. 
First, the Office proposed to relax the existing provision stating that 
the Office ``will refuse'' to record a notice that appears to be 
untimely, substituting the phrase ``may refuse.'' \13\ Until recently, 
the provision said that the Office ``reserves the right to refuse 
recordation of a notice of termination.'' \14\ The 2017 notice 
announcing the amendment of the provision to ``will refuse'' did not 
discuss the basis for that change.\15\ As explained in the NPRM, the 
proposed rule would afford the Office additional discretion to record a 
notice in unusual cases--for example, where there is uncertainty about 
the date of a work's creation that could be relevant to the calculation 
of the termination window.\16\ Most commenters supported giving the 
Office the ability to exercise this discretion, at least where there is 
some uncertainty whether a notice is in fact untimely.\17\ Some 
commenters, however, expressed concerns about the Office recording 
notices that are clearly untimely, arguing that doing so would disserve 
both grantors, who may be able to correct and re-file such notices, and 
grantees, who desire confidence that the Office will not record notices 
that definitively fail to comply with statutory timing provisions.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ 85 FR 34155.
    \14\ See Recordation of Notices of Termination of Transfers and 
Licenses; Clarifications, 74 FR 12554, 12556 (Mar. 25, 2009).
    \15\ See 85 FR 34151.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 3-4; Edell Howard 
Comments at 3; NSAI Comments at 2; Recording Academy Comments at 2; 
MPA Comments at 5-6 (suggesting that if the proposed rule is 
adopted, ``the `may' in the regulation should operate only as a 
safety valve to address particular unusual situations where an 
apparently untimely notice may not actually be untimely''); RIAA 
Comments at 3-4.
    \18\ Copyright Alliance Comments at 2 (taking no position on 
recordation of notices filed late, but commenting that notices that 
are facially premature should be refused to help grantors by making 
them aware the notices are defective and to spare grantees the 
burden of challenging validity in court); MPA at 6 (``[A]bsent 
unusual circumstances, the Office should maintain its practice of 
refusing to record notices that appear on their face to be 
untimely.''); NMPA Comments at 1-3 (commenting that the Office does 
not have discretion to record a notice it ``knows to be untimely''); 
RIAA Comments at 3-4.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 11636]]

    Although the Office is proceeding with this clarifying proposed 
amendment, to address concerns raised by commenters, it takes this 
opportunity to explain that the amendment is not intended to be 
substantive and is being adopted to harmonize the provision with 
regulatory language governing the rejection of documents submitted for 
recordation under section 205 of the Copyright Act.\19\ Moreover, the 
amendment is not intended to alter the Office's examination practices 
for notices of termination. Rather, the Office will continue to examine 
notices for compliance with statutory timing provisions. On this topic, 
the Office recently stated that while it views recordation generally as 
a ``ministerial act,'' it has continued its ``more comprehensive 
review'' of notices of termination submitted for recordation.\20\ Under 
current examination practices, if a notice appears to be untimely, the 
recordation specialist will correspond with the remitter to afford them 
the opportunity to amend, re-serve, and re-file notices where possible. 
If, in the judgment of the Office, a notice is definitely untimely and 
cannot be amended, the specialist will offer the remitter the option to 
record it as a document pertaining to copyright under section 205 of 
the Copyright Act.\21\ Should the remitter refuse this option, the 
Office may then exercise its discretion to reject the notice.\22\ Thus, 
while the Office typically still will decline to record a notice that 
it determines to be untimely and this adjustment signals no change in 
practice in that respect, the additional discretion provided by this 
change helps to advance the broader policy favoring recordation where 
legally permitted.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See 37 CFR 201.4(a) (``The Office may reject any document 
submitted for recordation that fails to comply with 17 U.S.C. 205, 
the requirements of this section, or any relevant instructions or 
guidance provided by the Office.''); id. Sec.  201.4(e)(1), 
(e)(3)(i).
    \20\ See Modernizing Copyright Recordation, 82 FR 52213, 52218 & 
n.68 (Nov. 13, 2017) (interim rule).
    \21\ 37 CFR 201.10(f)(1)(ii)(B) (``If a notice of termination is 
untimely, the Office will offer to record the document as a 
`document pertaining to a copyright' pursuant to Sec.  201.4, but 
the Office will not index the document as a notice of 
termination.'').
    \22\ In a scenario where a notice is timely as to some--but not 
all--works identified, the recordation specialist will typically 
first correspond to provide the remitter an opportunity to amend, 
re-serve, and re-file where possible. Where it is too late to amend 
and re-serve the notice (i.e., the termination window has closed or 
will close in less than two years) or the remitter otherwise 
declines to withdraw the submission, the specialist may record the 
document as a notice of termination, but only index the works for 
which the notice is timely.
    \23\ See 37 CFR 201.10(f)(4) (``Recordation of a notice . . . is 
without prejudice to any party claiming that the legal or formal 
requirements for effectuating termination (including the 
requirements pertaining to service and recordation of the notice of 
termination) have not been met, including before a court of 
competent jurisdiction.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the proposed rule clarified the circumstances under which 
recordation of an untimely notice is barred by statute. In a 2017 
interim rule, the Office amended the regulations to provide examples of 
situations in which a notice will be considered untimely.\24\ One such 
example refers to cases where ``the date of recordation is after the 
effective date of termination.'' \25\ Because the relevant statutory 
provisions provide that ``[a] copy of the notice shall be recorded in 
the Copyright Office before the effective date of termination, as a 
condition to its taking effect,'' \26\ the NPRM proposed to amend this 
example to clarify that a date of recordation ``on or'' after the 
effective date of termination will be considered untimely.\27\ RIAA 
agreed with proposed rule.\28\ Linda Edell Howard and NSAI each opposed 
this change, asserting that a notice may be recorded if it is submitted 
to the Office on the effective date of recordation.\29\ Because that 
interpretation is contrary to the statutory text, however, the final 
rule adopts the proposed amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ 82 FR 52220.
    \25\ 37 CFR 201.10(f)(1)(ii)(A) (emphasis added).
    \26\ 17 U.S.C. 203(a)(4)(A), 304(c)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
    \27\ 85 FR at 34152.
    \28\ RIAA Comments at 5.
    \29\ Edell Howard Comments at 4; NSAI Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Harmless Errors

    The NPRM proposed broadening the harmless errors exception, which 
currently applies only to ``errors in a notice,'' to apply equally to 
immaterial errors in complying with other regulatory provisions 
established by the Office. Under the proposed rule, any error in 
``preparing, serving, or seeking to record a notice'' would be 
considered harmless, provided that the error does not materially affect 
the adequacy of the information required to serve the purposes of the 
termination statutes or ``materially affect . . . the Office's ability 
to record the notice.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ 85 FR 34155.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comments on this proposed change were mixed. Three commenters fully 
supported the rule as proposed.\31\ Another commenter, MPA, ``agree[d] 
with certain principles'' in the Office's proposal, but viewed the 
proposed language as ``overbroad and potentially ambiguous.'' \32\ MPA 
further argued that errors in the manner of service itself should not 
be treated as harmless because as ``a technical procedure . . . strict 
compliance is typically required in the analogous litigation context,'' 
and proposed more narrowly tailored language.\33\ Raising similar 
concerns, NMPA and RIAA opposed expanding the scope of the rule, 
contending that (1) errors in serving a notice are not and should not 
be considered harmless; and (2) the wording of the proposed rule 
suggests that an error that does not affect the Office's ability to 
record the notice may be considered harmless even if the error 
materially affects the ability of the notice to serve the purposes of 
the statute.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Edell Howard Comments at 5; NSAI Comments at 3; Recording 
Academy Comments at 2.
    \32\ MPA Comments at 6.
    \33\ Id. at 6-7.
    \34\ NMPA Comments at 4-5; RIAA Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Office will proceed with expanding the scope of the 
current harmless errors rule, it agrees that the language could more 
precisely describe its intended application. Therefore, the Office 
modifies the final rule as follows.
    First, although an error in ``serving'' the notice would likely not 
be considered harmless because it would materially affect the notice's 
ability to serve the purposes of the statute, the Office has revised 
the provision to clarify that harmless errors in a statement of service 
shall not render a notice invalid.\35\ The final rule also specifies 
that errors in ``indexing information,'' whether provided 
electronically or using a cover sheet such as the current Form TCS, may 
be harmless. In other words, if the cover sheet or electronic indexing 
information deviates in immaterial ways from the information provided 
on the notice itself, such errors may be harmless provided that the 
information in the notice itself adequately serves the purposes of the 
statute. Thus, the revised language clarifies that the harmless error 
provision extends only to immaterial errors in the notice, statement of 
service, or indexing information provided to the Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See MPA Comments at 6 (proposing language similar to that 
adopted by the final rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, because the final rule now expressly includes the statement 
of service and indexing information in this harmless error provision, 
it strikes the proposed language that certain errors may be harmless so 
long as they ``do not materially affect, in the Office's discretion, 
the Office's ability to record the notice.'' This language was intended

[[Page 11637]]

to account for a situation where an error in a submission would not 
materially affect the adequacy of the information required to serve the 
purposes of the statute, but would affect the Office's ability to 
record the notice. For example, if a notice that complied with the 
statutory and regulatory requirements was timely served on the grantee, 
but the remitter subsequently failed to include the date of service in 
the statement of service submitted to the Office, the purposes of the 
statute would be served because the grantee would have adequate notice, 
yet the omission of the date of service would hamper the Office's 
ability to examine the notice for timeliness. Two commenters, NMPA and 
RIAA, contended that the proposed language could be read to suggest 
that an error could be considered ``harmless'' so long as it does not 
affect the Office's ability to record the notice even if the error does 
materially affect the information required to serve the statutory 
purpose.\36\ The Office did not intend this interpretation of the 
proposed provision, and agrees that it is unnecessary to reference the 
statutory purpose in this provision in light of the newly added 
language specifying where a harmless error may occur--i.e., ``in a 
notice, statement of service, or indexing information.'' Instead, 
reference to the statutory purpose remains part of the broader 
definition of what makes an error ``harmless.'' The final rule 
accordingly provides that ``an error is `harmless' if it does not 
materially affect the adequacy of the information required to serve the 
purposes of 17 U.S.C. 203, 304(c), or 304(d), whichever applies.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See NMPA Comments at 4-5; RIAA Comments at 6.
    \37\ To reiterate, although the regulations provide that 
harmless errors shall not render a notice invalid, the Office's 
decision to record a notice is not a determination that any errors 
that the submission may contain are, in fact, harmless or that the 
notice itself is valid. See 37 CFR 201.10(e)(1), (f)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Manner of Service

    To modernize how service of notices may be effected, the Office 
proposed two additional permissible manners of service: (1) By 
reputable courier (e.g., FedEx, UPS, DHL); and (2) by email where the 
grantee expressly consents.\38\ With respect to the first change, 
commenters unanimously supported allowing notices to be delivered to 
grantees by reputable couriers.\39\ The final rule accordingly adopts 
this proposal.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ 85 FR 34155.
    \39\ See Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 6; Copyright 
Alliance Comments at 2-3; MPA at 7-9; Edell Howard at 5; NMPA at 6; 
Recording Academy at 2; RIAA at 6-7. While supporting expanded 
physical delivery options, the Copyright Alliance observed that 
delivery services that require a signature may not be appropriate 
because of the risk that a delivery may not be accepted. Copyright 
Alliance Comments at 2-3. Although this is a valid concern, the 
Office retains the language that a notice be delivered by courier 
service because the grantor is in the best position to rectify any 
delivery issue.
    \40\ Some commenters proposed that the Office eliminate first 
class mail as an acceptable manner of service and instead allow only 
trackable mailing options such as priority or certified mail. See 
Copyright Alliance Comments at 2-3; MPA Comments at 8; NMPA Comments 
at 6; RIAA Comments at 6-7. While the Office acknowledges the 
benefits of using trackable services, it will retain first class 
mail as an acceptable manner of service because it remains an 
affordable, widely accessible option. Moreover, the Office is 
disinclined to eliminate first class mail as an option while it 
remains an acceptable method in federal courts to notify a defendant 
that an action has been commenced and request the defendant waive 
service of the summons. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). The Office, 
however, encourages terminating parties to serve notices using 
trackable delivery options where feasible, agreeing with RIAA's 
observation that using these options ``would help avoid unnecessary 
disputes as to whether a grantee has received a termination notice 
and/or where the notice was sent.'' RIAA Comments at 7; see also MPA 
Comments at 7 n.11 (``[T]he benefits of having a clear record of 
service including, for example, the avoidance of litigation over 
whether service was properly effected are enormous, potentially 
representing many thousands of dollars in legal fees.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to email service, the proposed rule stated that 
service by email would be considered acceptable where the grantee or 
successor-in-title being served ``expressly consents to accept service 
in this manner.'' \41\ Most commenters supported permitting email 
service, at least in principle, while raising concerns about how this 
option might function in practice and offering alternative 
proposals.\42\ A number of commenters questioned what ``express 
consent'' would entail and how it might be sought from and given by 
grantees. Three commenters considered obtaining express consent to be 
too burdensome for the terminating party,\43\ and Authors Guild et al. 
recommended that the remitter instead be allowed to ``self-certify'' 
that the notice was sent to an email address, such as ``an alias 
dedicated to receiving legal notices,'' found after a ``reasonable 
investigation.'' \44\ Several commenters--both in support of and 
opposed to email service--noted that any consent must be provided from 
a person with authority to do so,\45\ and sufficiently close in time to 
when a notice is served.\46\ Others urged the Office to require 
safeguards to prevent notices from being sent to outdated emails or 
filtered out as spam or junk email.\47\ Commenters proposed various 
requirements to address these concerns, including that the Copyright 
Office be copied on notices served by email,\48\ that a terminating 
party obtain an acknowledgment of receipt from the grantee,\49\ and 
that a physical courtesy copy be sent to the grantee.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ 85 FR 34155.
    \42\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 5; Edell Howard 
Comments at 5; MPA Comments at 8; NMPA Comments at 6-7; NSAI 
Comments at 4; Recording Academy Comments at 2.
    \43\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 5; Edell Howard 
Comments at 5 (commenting that ``requiring express consent for 
service by email is burdensome and onerous''); NSAI Comments at 4 
(``[R]equiring express consent by the grantee to accept service in 
one manner or another inappropriately shifts control to the grantee, 
who has no legal right to make the author's termination 
burdensome.'').
    \44\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 5.
    \45\ See NMPA Comments at 6 (``[T]he Office should consider how 
grantees should designate the person(s) authorized to consent to and 
receive email service on behalf of the grantee.''); RIAA Comments at 
8 (``Any consent to email service by a company must be clearly and 
affirmatively given by a duly authorized legal officer.'').
    \46\ See MPA Comments at 8 n.12 (noting that ``an email address 
that is valid at the time of the original grant is unlikely to 
remain valid several decades later, when notice of termination may 
be served''); RIAA Comments at 7 (proposing ``consent be obtained 
close in time to the date of service (e.g., no more than 30 days 
prior to service), but in advance of (not simultaneous with) actual 
service'').
    \47\ See Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 5; Copyright 
Alliance Comments at 3; MPA Comments at 8; NMPA Comments at 6; RIAA 
Comments at 7.
    \48\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 5.
    \49\ Edell Howard Comments at 5; NMPA Comments at 6-7; RIAA 
Comments at 7.
    \50\ RIAA Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on these comments, the Office has revised the proposed rule 
to further specify conditions by which the terminating party may obtain 
consent from the grantee, and also to establish two alternate, blanket 
options by which grantees may signal their acquiescence to email 
service from any potential terminating parties. With respect to the 
direct authorization option, the final rule requires the terminating 
party to (1) obtain express consent in writing from the grantee, 
successor-in-title, or agent thereof who is duly authorized to accept 
service on its behalf; (2) within thirty days before service of the 
notice is made; and (3) send the notice to an email address provided to 
the terminating party by the grantee or successor-in-title. The first 
added requirement responds to commenter concerns that consent be given 
by someone with the appropriate authority. The Office has found a 
similar approach in a different context to be successful, namely 
permitting email service of notices of intention and statements of 
account under section 115 with the consent of the copyright owner or 
its authorized agent.\51\ Since this practice

[[Page 11638]]

was instituted in 2014, the majority of copyright owners have consented 
to service by email.\52\ The Office welcomes future feedback on how 
this provision operates in practice from both terminating parties and 
grantees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See 37 CFR 201.18(f)(6) (outlining process by which list of 
works identified in a notice of intention may be submitted by email 
if the ``copyright owner or authorized agent states that such 
submission will be accepted''); id. Sec.  210.6(g)(1)-(2) 
(permitting electronic service of monthly statements of account ``on 
either the copyright owner or an agent of the copyright owner with 
authority to receive Statements of Account on behalf of the 
copyright owner''); id. Sec.  210.7(g)(1)-(2) (same process for 
annual statements of account).
    \52\ See Public Notice Regarding Timing Provisions for Persons 
Affected by COVID-19, U.S. Copyright Office, https://www.copyright.gov/coronavirus/ (``In practice, the Office 
understands that a majority of copyright owners have generally 
elected electronic delivery, but a minority receive NOIs and SOAs by 
paper, either because they simply have not opted into electronic 
delivery, or, for a smaller minority, because they have 
affirmatively expressed a preference for paper.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In establishing this provision, the Office notes that the 
requirement that consent be obtained within thirty days before a notice 
is served ensures that terminating parties obtain consent close in time 
to serving a notice and affords grantees greater predictability about 
when they can expect to receive the notice. If for any reason a grantee 
does not reply to a request for or declines consent, the terminating 
party continues to bear the burden of serving the notice in acceptable 
manner, provided there is still time within the statutory framework to 
do so.\53\ For this reason, terminating parties seeking consent to 
serve a notice by email should afford sufficient time to arrange for an 
alternate method of service. Finally, the third added requirement--that 
the terminating party serve the notice to an email address provided by 
the grantee--protects both terminating parties and grantees from the 
risk that notices could be filtered as spam or sent to inactive or 
unmonitored email addresses. In this respect, service by email may be 
more reliable than physical service because mailed notices need only be 
sent to the last known address for the grantee, which may not be up-to-
date.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ The RIAA proposed that ``[t]he regulations should state 
that failure of a grantee to respond to a consent request shall 
constitute a refusal to consent and that grantors will be held to 
the statutory timeframes notwithstanding any delay caused by the 
failure to respond at all or in a prompt manner.'' RIAA Comments at 
8. Although the Office agrees that grantors bear the risk that a 
grantee may not respond to a request, it sees no need to further 
regulate compliance with governing statutory timeframes.
    \54\ See RIAA Comments at 2-3, 6-7 (noting that because ``a 
grantee's last known address is not necessarily the current owner's 
up-to-date address . . . the service requirements do not guarantee 
that the current rights owner will have actual (or timely) knowledge 
of a purported termination'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to providing an avenue for express consent in this 
manner, the final rule establishes two other ways that grantees may 
generally opt in to accept email service for notices. First, a grantee 
or successor-in-title may designate and publicly post on its website an 
email address either for service of process in general or for service 
of notices of termination specifically.\55\ Should a grantee no longer 
wish to accept service of notices by email, it can modify its policy or 
website accordingly. Because a grantee may update its policies or its 
website at any time, however, it would be prudent for the terminating 
party to verify the grantee's current policies and contact information 
by checking its website immediately prior to serving a notice by email.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Cf. 37 CFR 201.18(a)(6) (providing that ``a copyright owner 
or an agent of a copyright owner with authority to receive Notices 
of Intention may make public a written policy that it will accept 
Notices of Intention to make and distribute phonorecords pursuant to 
17 U.S.C. 115 . . . delivered by means (including electronic 
transmission) other than [by mail or reputable courier]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the final rule will enable a grantee to opt in to email 
service in the event the Copyright Office establishes a public 
directory for these purposes and the grantee registers an email address 
in accordance with Office instructions. Two commenters proposed such a 
registry, akin to the directory the Office established and maintains 
for designated agents under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.\56\ 
Although the Office has no immediate plans for creating this option, it 
is taking this opportunity to establish the regulatory framework to 
facilitate such a directory in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See id. Sec.  201.38; MPA Comments at 8-9; RIAA Comments at 
7. The Office observes that this option is also akin to other 
filings administered by the Office, such as its list of transmitting 
entities publicly performing pre-1972 sound recordings requiring 
direct notice under the Music Modernization Act. See 37 CFR 201.36; 
Directory of Notices of Contact Information for Transmitting 
Entities Publicly Performing Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, U.S. 
Copyright Office, https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-soundrecordings/notices-contact-information.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Identification of a Work

    Under the current rule, a title is required to identify each work 
in a notice, and the original registration number is to be provided 
``if possible and practicable.'' \57\ The NPRM proposed to amend this 
provision to allow works to be identified by title, registration 
number, or both.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 37 CFR 201.10(b)(1)(iii), (2)(iv).
    \58\ 85 FR 34154-55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Most commenters supported the overall goal of encouraging 
terminating parties to include registration numbers for works 
identified in a notice.\59\ Several expressed concern, however, that 
allowing a work to be identified solely by registration number might 
lead to material errors and make it more difficult for grantees to 
identify works.\60\ NMPA noted that ``catalogues of many music 
publishers include the titles of works, but do not always include 
registration numbers,'' \61\ while RIAA observed that using a 
registration number alone may be inadequate to identify a sound 
recording that was registered as part of an album.\62\ Commenters also 
questioned why the rule change was needed, as almost all grantors who 
have the registration number for a work would also have its title, 
particularly because a certificate of registration includes both.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 6; Edell Howard 
Comments at 5-6; MPA Comments at 9; NMPA at 8; Recording Academy 
Comments at 2.
    \60\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 6; Copyright 
Alliance Comments at 3-4; MPA Comments at 9-10; NMPA Comments at 8; 
RIAA Comments at 8-9.
    \61\ NMPA Comments at 8.
    \62\ RIAA Comments at 8-9.
    \63\ See Copyright Alliance Comments at 3-4; MPA Comments at 10; 
RIAA Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of the public comments, the Office concludes that the 
benefit of providing flexibility about how works may be identified in a 
notice is outweighed by the negative consequences that could flow from 
permitting a work to be identified by registration number alone. The 
final rule accordingly removes this proposed change. The Office will 
continue to require that each work in a notice be identified by title 
and, where possible and practicable, by the original registration 
number.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Because the Office instituted this rulemaking, in part, to 
make compliance with its regulations governing notices of 
termination less burdensome, it declines to obligate parties to 
include both the title and registration number or include other 
identifying indicia, as some commenters proposed. See Edell Howard 
Comments at 5-6; RIAA Comments at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Date of Recordation

    Under the proposed rule, the date of recordation for a notice of 
termination would be determined by the date when the notice is received 
by the Office, irrespective of when the accompanying fee and statement 
of service are received.\65\ The Office proposed this change because 
assigning a later date of recordation due to a fee miscalculation or 
immaterial filing error could deprive a terminating party of the 
opportunity to exercise their rights if the date assigned falls on or 
after the effective date of termination.\66\ In support of the

[[Page 11639]]

proposed rule, some commenters offered justifications similar to the 
Office's reasoning in the NPRM.\67\ For example, Linda Edell Howard 
said the proposed change would avoid the ``harsh consequences that can 
result where a submission is missing a required element,'' which may 
not be discovered until after the effective date of termination.\68\ 
Other commenters opposed the proposed rule, primarily out of concern 
that remitters will submit the required elements to record a notice 
``piecemeal.'' \69\ While NMPA did not oppose allowing remitters to 
retain their date of recordation when correcting ``nonmaterial 
errors,'' it expressed concern that the proposed change could result in 
parties failing to comply with the statutory service requirements and 
recommended that the statement of service be received before the 
effective date of termination.\70\ Both MPA and RIAA opposed assigning 
a date of recordation before the effective date of termination if any 
element is received by the Office after the effective date.\71\ As an 
alternative, MPA proposed that an ``incomplete package'' should be 
promptly recorded as a ``document pertaining to a copyright'' under 
section 205 of the Copyright Act, the record annotated with the missing 
and/or pending element(s), and a thirty-day time limit imposed for the 
remitter to provide the missing element(s).\72\ Under MPA's proposal, 
if any missing elements were received after the effective date of 
termination, the Office should refuse to record the notice.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ 85 FR 34155.
    \66\ Id. at 34153.
    \67\ Edell Howard Comments at 5-6; NSAI Comments at 4 (noting 
``it is not uncommon for errors to be made or documents to be 
omitted during the filing'' and the ``termination window may close 
before the filer is even given notice that something is missing, 
inadequate or incorrect''); Recording Academy Comments at 2 (noting 
there are ``innumerable clerical errors, unintended omissions, and 
other mistakes that could delay the timely recordation of a 
termination notice and force an author to lose the ability to 
effectuate termination'').
    \68\ Edell Howard Comments at 5-6.
    \69\ MPA Comments at 10; see also RIAA Comments at 10-11.
    \70\ NMPA Comments at 8-9.
    \71\ MPA Comments at 10-14; RIAA Comments at 10.
    \72\ MPA Comments at 14.
    \73\ Id. at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering these comments, the Office is proceeding with the 
substance of the change proposed in the NPRM. The Office continues to 
believe that delinking the date of recordation from receipt of a 
complete submission is appropriate in order ``to mitigate the harsh 
consequences that can result where a submission is missing certain 
required elements.'' \74\ To respond to the concerns of commenters who 
opposed this change, the Office clarifies its examination practices 
regarding incomplete recordation submissions. Where the statement of 
service is missing, the recordation specialist will correspond with the 
remitter to request it.\75\ Likewise, where no fee is received or there 
is a balance resulting from underpayment (e.g., the remitter 
miscalculated the number of works identified in the notice), the 
specialist will correspond.\76\ In any event, whenever a recordation 
specialist corresponds with a remitter--whether to correct an 
immaterial error, obtain a statement of service, or ensure the fee is 
paid in full--a response must be received within forty-five days or the 
submission may be closed, i.e., the document will not be recorded by 
the Office. In addition, remitters must certify under penalty of 
perjury that the recordation submission is ``complete to the best of 
[the remitter's] knowledge, information, and belief, and is provided in 
good faith.'' To the extent a remitter attempts to ``lock in'' a date 
of recordation by intentionally submitting elements piecemeal, he or 
she presumably would be running afoul of this requirement. Thus, 
existing procedural safeguards help to minimize abuse and ensure that 
recordation submissions are not held open indefinitely. The Office will 
monitor the effect of this adjustment as it administers the recordation 
system for notices of termination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ 85 FR 34153.
    \75\ Responding to NMPA's concern about ``grantors improperly 
submitting notices to the Office prior to serving them on 
grantees,'' see NMPA Comments at 8-9, the Office agrees that such a 
submission would be improper because it would not comply with 
requirement that the copy of the notice ``must be, be and certified 
to be, a true, correct, complete, and legible copy of the signed 
notice of termination as served.'' See 37 CFR 201.10(f)(1)(i)(A) 
(emphasis added).
    \76\ The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office exercises similar 
discretion by permitting the fee to be submitted after the filing 
date of a patent application. See 35 U.S.C. 111(a)(3), (b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the final rule makes one modification to the proposed 
rule by adding the phrase ``a copy of'' before ``notice of 
termination.'' This change, recommended by Authors Guild et al., aligns 
the regulation with the statutory language requiring ``a copy of'' the 
notice to be submitted for recordation and dispels any potential 
confusion that the original notice should be submitted to the 
Office.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Statements of Policy on Subjects of Inquiry

    As part of the NPRM, the Office sought public comments on two 
additional subjects of inquiry: (1) Whether the Office should develop a 
sample form or template for use in preparing notices of termination; 
and (2) how the Office might address defective or untimely notices 
filed by third-party agents. In addition, some commenters offered 
proposals for regulatory change on various other termination-related 
matters. The Office addresses the comments received on these topics as 
follows.

A. Sample Form or Template

    Many commenters supported the development of an optional, fillable 
form for use in preparing notices of termination.\78\ For example, 
Authors Alliance offered its ``wholehearted support'' for a form, 
noting that termination rules are ``complicated and formalistic,'' 
while Authors Guild et al. opined that ``[a]n online form that creators 
could fill out to generate a letter would be ideal.'' \79\ One 
commenter, however, opposed such a form, concluding that although ``75% 
of the boilerplate language in the notices is conducive to the benefits 
of a template . . . the `meat and bones' of the actual notice . . . is 
so fact-sensitive that trying to fill in blanks in specific sections of 
a form notice would prove futile and onerous.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ See Authors Alliance Comments at 1; Joint Comments of 
Authors Guild et al. at 6-7; Copyright Alliance Comments at 4; MPA 
Comments at 15; NSAI Comments at 10; NMPA Comments at 10; RIAA 
Comments at 12-13.
    \79\ Authors Alliance Comments at 1-2; Joint Comments of Authors 
Guild et al. at 6.
    \80\ Edell Howard Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the specific nature of such a form, several 
commenters urged the Office to include detailed instructions and 
guidance ``to help creators understand what information is required, 
where to find the required information, and how to proceed where there 
is uncertainty.'' \81\ Others provided additional suggestions. NMPA 
recommended that the form distinguish between required and optional 
information.\82\ MPA stressed that it should be made clear that use of 
any form supplied by the Office to create a notice would not be 
determinative of a notice's validity or legal effect, which could still 
be challenged by any party

[[Page 11640]]

claiming the legal or formal requirements have not been met.\83\ And 
the Copyright Alliance noted that grantors who elect not to use a 
sample form should not be penalized or disadvantaged.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Authors Alliance Comments at 2; see also NMPA Comments at 
10 (``[The form] could also be accompanied by clear and detailed 
instructions and guidance as to a remitter's obligations under the 
Copyright Act and under the Office's regulations, and could clearly 
state the requirements for service as well as the timeline for 
service, effective date of termination, and recordation''); RIAA 
Comments at 12-13 (suggesting a form follow the approach of 
questionnaires found in sections 2310.13(A)-(C) of the Compendium).
    \82\ NMPA Comments at 10.
    \83\ MPA Comments at 15.
    \84\ Copyright Alliance Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM also inquired whether the Office should consider the 
development of other types of templates to assist terminating parties, 
such as an online notice builder that would allow parties to input 
information pertaining to the terminable grants, which would then be 
prepopulated into a draft notice. Commenters were generally supportive 
of this idea, though some expressed concerns about consequences 
stemming from user or system error. For example, NMPA observed that 
grantors may blame the notice builder for errors in notices and request 
``leniency in complying with their obligations under the statute or 
regulations due to that reliance on the Copyright Office.'' \85\ Noting 
similar concerns, the Copyright Alliance supported a notice builder 
with the caveat that ``there should be a prominent statement making 
grantors aware of the associated risks . . . and those who choose to 
use it should be required to assume those risks.'' \86\ Authors Guild 
et al. likewise proposed a disclaimer if a ``fillable form'' were to be 
integrated into the electronic recordation system, adding that the 
Office could ``program[ ] automated alerts that would pop up if any 
information entered by the user in the termination form conflicts with 
information in the registration record'' so that the remitter could 
correct any errors.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ NMPA Comments at 10; see RIAA Comments at 13 (``While we 
understand the potential appeal of an online notice builder, we are 
concerned that efforts will be made to blame the notice builder if 
grantors provide incorrect or inadequate information and the notice 
builder creates a deficient notice.'').
    \86\ Copyright Alliance Comments at 4.
    \87\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Office will consider these helpful comments in connection with 
its development of further public guidance, such as developing a sample 
form and/or other online information or tools to assist in preparing 
notices of termination, together with enhanced educational materials. 
Meanwhile, the Office currently provides information about preparing, 
serving, and recording notices of termination--including charts that 
may be used to calculate the statutory windows for service and 
recordation under sections 203 and 304(c)--in the Compendium and on a 
dedicated web page.\88\ The Office encourages interested parties to 
consult those existing resources and stay tuned for future information. 
The Office plans to continue stakeholder outreach to assess the extent 
to which additional help text or other resources could be integrated 
into the online recordation system as development proceeds.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See Compendium (Third) sec. 2310; Notices of Termination, 
U.S. Copyright Office, https://www.copyright.gov/recordation/termination.html.
    \89\ For information about collaboration and testing 
opportunities relating to the electronic recordation system pilot, 
contact the Office by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#433126202c312722372a2c2d6e332a2f2c3703202c333a312a242b376d242c35"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b4c6d1d7dbc6d0d5c0dddbda99c4ddd8dbc0f4d7dbc4cdc6ddd3dcc09ad3dbc2">[email protected]</span></a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Third-Party Agents

    In the NPRM, the Office noted stakeholder concerns regarding third-
party agents who fail to comply with legal requirements when serving or 
recording termination notices on behalf of copyright owners. Noting 
that such failures can jeopardize termination rights if not discovered 
in a timely manner, the Office requested comment on whether any 
regulatory changes should be considered to address these concerns.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ 85 FR at 34154.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The comments reflected some disagreement as to the pervasiveness of 
the problem and the appropriate means to address it. NMPA and RIAA 
suggested that the scope of the problem is unclear and cautioned 
against any regulatory change that would excuse untimeliness or other 
noncompliance with legal or regulatory requirements.\91\ In their view, 
the proper recourse for parties harmed by the actions or inaction of 
their agents is to seek redress through malpractice or other claims 
under agency law. Linda Edell Howard and NSAI, however, cited several 
examples of third-party agents who apparently failed to respond to 
Office correspondence about defective or incomplete filings with the 
result that the issues were not, and could not be, resolved before the 
termination window expired.\92\ To address the issue, NSAI proposed 
requiring third-party agents to provide complete contact information 
for the grantor, which would be verified by return-receipt mail upon 
receipt of the notice by the Office, and for the Office to copy the 
grantor on any subsequent correspondence with the agent.\93\ Similarly, 
Edell Howard proposed revising Form TCS to allow remitters the option 
to provide contact information for any terminating party, for the 
Office to provide return receipts for notices submitted for 
recordation, and for the Office to copy the terminating party on any 
correspondence sent to the remitter.\94\ Edell Howard and NSAI further 
suggested that the Office could make in-process recordation submissions 
publicly available.\95\ Authors Guild et al. suggested that Office 
could consider ``a process whereby grantors may periodically designate 
and certify third-party agents using the [Electronic Copyright 
System].'' \96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ NMPA Comments at 11; RIAA Comments at 13; see also MPA 
Comments at 15-16.
    \92\ See Edell Howard Comments at 6-7; NSAI Comments at 2-3, 5-
7.
    \93\ NSAI Comments at 7; see Copyright Alliance Comments at 4 
(supporting NSAI's proposal).
    \94\ Edell Howard Comments at 9.
    \95\ Id. at 9; NSAI Comments at 7.
    \96\ Joint Comments of Authors Guild et al. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering these comments, the Office proposes no additional 
regulatory changes to address harm resulting from filing errors made by 
third-party agents. Instead, the Office will update its forms and 
practices by adding an optional field in both Form TCS and the 
electronic recordation system that remitters may use to provide email 
contact information for any terminating party. This contact 
information, like all information provided as part of a recordation 
submission, will be included in the public record. Where party contact 
information is provided, recordation specialists will copy the party on 
any correspondence with the remitter about errors or omissions as well 
to inform them when the certificate of recordation is issued. The 
Office declines to make the provision of this information mandatory 
because the Office understands that some parties may retain agents in 
part because they do not want their contact information to be made 
public.\97\ The Office likewise declines to require Recordation staff 
to affirmatively notify terminating parties by return receipt that a 
notice has been filed, as such an obligation would add to the existing 
administrative burden of processing paper notices, thereby undermining 
the efficiency of the process for participants. Additional commenter 
proposals to make in-process notices publicly available, to allow 
terminating parties to designate agents, or to notify terminating 
parties when a notice is submitted for recordation will be considered 
as development of the online recordation

[[Page 11641]]

and public record pilot systems continues.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ NSAI suggested that ``[t]o avoid the concern of disclosing 
personally identifiable information in the public record, grantor 
contact information should be redacted in the record and available 
only to the Copyright Office for administration purposes.'' NSAI 
Comments at 7. Rather than selectively redact information provided 
as part of a recordation submission, which would make administration 
of this feature more onerous and thus expensive to remitters, the 
Office instead plans to make this field optional.
    \98\ Public comments included several other proposals to 
modernize various aspects of the recordation process that are 
outside the scope of the proposed rule and subjects of inquiry. See, 
e.g., Authors Alliance Comments at 3 (proposing that the Office 
``consider developing or integrating tools that help authors 
understand the complex timing provisions governing notice and 
termination windows''); Edell Howard Comments at 3, 9, 10 
(proposing, inter alia, that the Office allow the public to view 
recorded notices online and download certificates of recordation); 
NMPA Comments at 10 (proposing that works identified in notices be 
linked to the registration record); NSAI Comments at 8 (proposing, 
inter alia, that the Office might notify authors of when termination 
rights may be maturing or closing by using registration records). 
The Office will consider these proposals as its further regulatory 
and technology modernization efforts proceed, to the extent they are 
permitted by law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects in 37 CFR Part 201

    Copyright, General provisions.

Final Regulations

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Copyright Office 
amends 37 CFR part 201 as follows:

PART 201--GENERAL PROVISIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 201 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  17 U.S.C. 702.


0
2. Amend Sec.  201.10:
0
a. By revising paragraphs (d)(1) and (e)(1);
0
b. In paragraph (f)(1)(ii)(A):
0
i. By removing ``will'' from the first and second sentences and adding
0
ii. By adding ``on or'' after ``the date of recordation is''; and
0
c. In paragraph (f)(3), by removing ``all of the elements required for 
recordation, including the prescribed fee and, if required, the 
statement of service, have been'' and adding in its place ``a copy of 
the notice of termination is''.
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  201.10   Notices of termination of transfers and licenses.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (1) The notice of termination shall be served upon each grantee 
whose rights are being terminated, or the grantee's successor in title, 
by:
    (i) Personal service;
    (ii) First class mail sent or by reputable courier service 
delivered to an address which, after a reasonable investigation, is 
found to be the last known address of the grantee or successor in 
title; or
    (iii) Means of electronic transmission to:
    (A) An email address designated for service of notices of 
termination and/or legal process that is listed as such on the website 
of the grantee or successor in title in a location accessible to the 
public;
    (B) An email address provided to the terminating party by the 
grantee or successor in title, provided that the grantee, successor in 
title, or an agent thereof who is duly authorized to accept service on 
behalf of the grantee or successor in title expressly consents in 
writing to accept service at the address provided within thirty days 
before such service is made; or
    (C) An email address for the grantee or successor in title provided 
in accordance with instructions provided on the Office's website in a 
public directory that the Office in its discretion may establish and 
maintain.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (1) Harmless errors in a notice, statement of service, or indexing 
information provided electronically or in a cover sheet shall not 
render the notice invalid. For purposes of this paragraph, an error is 
``harmless'' if it does not materially affect the adequacy of the 
information required to serve the purposes of 17 U.S.C. 203, 304(c), or 
304(d), whichever applies.
* * * * *

    Dated: February 8, 2021.
Shira Perlmutter,
Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office

    Approved by:

Carla D. Hayden,
Librarian of Congress.
[FR Doc. 2021-03906 Filed 2-25-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1410-30-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>