# Official Journal C 150/2019

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 150 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 622 May 2019 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 150

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 622 May 2019

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2019/C 150/01 | Euro exchange rates | 1 |
| 2019/C 150/02 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 14 November 2018 regarding a draft decision relating to Case M.8792 — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL — Rapporteur: Belgium | 2 |
| 2019/C 150/03 | Final report of the Hearing Officer — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL (Case M.8792) | 3 |
| 2019/C 150/04 | Summary of Commission Decision of 27 November 2018 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case M.8792 — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL) (notified under document number C(2018) 7768)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| 2019/C 150/05 | Summary of European Commission Decisions on authorisations for the placing on the market for the use and/or for use of substances listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2019/C 150/06 | Electronic identification schemes notified pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market | 11 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2019/C 150/01

Euro exchange rates

1

2019/C 150/02

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 14 November 2018 regarding a draft decision relating to Case M.8792 — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL — Rapporteur: Belgium

2

2019/C 150/03

Final report of the Hearing Officer — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL (Case M.8792)

3

2019/C 150/04

Summary of Commission Decision of 27 November 2018 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case M.8792 — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL) (notified under document number C(2018) 7768)
   (
  1
  )

(notified under document number C(2018) 7768)

1

5

2019/C 150/05

Summary of European Commission Decisions on authorisations for the placing on the market for the use and/or for use of substances listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  )

(Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)

1

10

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2019/C 150/06

Electronic identification schemes notified pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market

11

---

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2019/C 150/07 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.9307 — Onex/AEG/JV) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 14 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2019/C 150/07

Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.9307 — Onex/AEG/JV) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

14

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

---

IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 2.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/1

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

30 April 2019

(2019/C 150/01)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,1218 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 124,93 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4646 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,86248 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 10,6350 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,1437 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | 136,20 |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,6678 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,659 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 322,97 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2868 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,7596 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 6,6913 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,5911 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,5075 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 8,8007 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6805 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,5263 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 308,01 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 16,0224 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,5541 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,4130 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 15 953,68 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,6314 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 58,125 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 72,2099 |
| THB | Thai baht | 35,802 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 4,4050 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 21,2829 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 78,0615 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,1218

JPY

Japanese yen

124,93

DKK

Danish krone

7,4646

GBP

Pound sterling

0,86248

SEK

Swedish krona

10,6350

CHF

Swiss franc

1,1437

ISK

Iceland króna

136,20

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,6678

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,659

HUF

Hungarian forint

322,97

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2868

RON

Romanian leu

4,7596

TRY

Turkish lira

6,6913

AUD

Australian dollar

1,5911

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,5075

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

8,8007

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6805

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,5263

KRW

South Korean won

1 308,01

ZAR

South African rand

16,0224

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,5541

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,4130

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

15 953,68

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,6314

PHP

Philippine peso

58,125

RUB

Russian rouble

72,2099

THB

Thai baht

35,802

BRL

Brazilian real

4,4050

MXN

Mexican peso

21,2829

INR

Indian rupee

78,0615

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 2.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/2

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 14 November 2018 regarding a draft decision relating to Case M.8792 — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL

Rapporteur: Belgium

(2019/C 150/02)

Concentration

| 1. | The Advisory Committee (nine Member States) agree with the Commission that the notified transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the ‘Merger Regulation’) (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee (nine Member States) agree with the Commission that the notified transaction has an EU dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Market definition

| 3. | The Advisory Committee (nine Member States) agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission in the draft Decision in relation to the definition of the relevant product and geographic market for the retail supply of mobile telecommunications services in the Netherlands. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Competitive assessment

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment that the notified concentration would not significantly impede effective competition as a result of horizontal non-coordinated effects in the market for the retail supply of mobile telecommunications services in the Netherlands. Eight Member States voted in favour. One Member State voted against. |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee (nine Member States) agree with the Commission’s assessment that the notified concentration would not significantly impede effective competition as a result of horizontal coordinated effects in the market for the retail supply of mobile telecommunications services in the Netherlands. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Compatibility with the internal market and the Agreement on the European Economic Area

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified concentration must therefore be declared compatible with the internal market and the Agreement on the European Economic Area (2) in accordance with Article 2(2) and 8(1) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Eight Member States voted in favour. One Member State voted against. |
| --- | --- |

6.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3.

---

| 2.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/3

---

Final report of the Hearing Officer (1)

T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL

(Case M.8792)

(2019/C 150/03)

Introduction

| 1. | On 2 May 2018, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which Deutsche Telekom AG (‘DT’), through its indirect wholly owned subsidiary T-Mobile Netherlands Holding B.V. (TMNL), would acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation (2), sole control over Tele2 Netherlands Holding N.V. (‘Tele2 NL’) (the ‘Proposed Transaction’). For the purpose of this report, DT, TMNL and Tele2 NL are jointly referred to as the ‘Parties’. |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | The Commission’s first phase investigation raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the Proposed Transaction with the internal market as regards the market for retail mobile telecommunications services and the market for wholesale access and call origination services in the Netherlands. On 12 June 2018, the Commission adopted a decision to initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. DT submitted its written comments to that decision on 27 June 2018. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Statement of objections

| 3. | On 12 September 2018, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (the ‘SO’), which was notified to DT on the same day. Tele2 NL received a (redacted) copy of the SO. According to the SO, the Commission came to the preliminary view that the Proposed Transaction would significantly impede effective competition in a substantial part of the internal market within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation as a result of horizontal non-coordinated effects in the overall market for the supply of retail mobile telecommunications services in the Netherlands as well as in the market segment for the supply of retail mobile telecommunications services to private customers in the Netherlands. |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | The time-limit for replying to the SO set by Directorate-General for Competition (‘DO Competition’) was 26 September 2018, extended to 28 September 2018 by DO Competition. The Parties responded to the SO on 28 September 2018. In their response to the SO, the Parties requested to be heard orally. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Access to file

| 5. | The Parties were first granted access-to-file on 13 September 2018. Subsequently, DT raised several queries regarding further access to the Commission’s file. DT also complained that certain documents did not allow it to verify the existence and extent of redactions vis-a-vis the corresponding confidential documents, for which reason it was not able to determine whether there could be grounds for it to request further access to the underlying information. |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Both at my behest and at its own initiative, DO Competition provided further access to file, on a rolling basis, as regards certain better or less redacted versions of relevant documents as well as through restricted disclosure of certain information to DT’s external advisers only in a data room. |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | By decision of 12 October 2018, I found that DT had received access to all the materials (either directly or by means of its external advisers) to which I considered DT was entitled under Article 7 of Decision 2011/695/EU. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Interested third persons

| 8. | I admitted four competitors of the Parties as interested third persons in these proceedings. Each of them was provided with a non-confidential version of the SO and given a time-limit within which to submit their observations. They submitted written comments and requested the opportunity to express their views orally during the oral hearing, to which requests I acceded. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Formal oral hearing

| 9. | The formal oral hearing was held on 8 October 2018. It was attended by the Parties, with their external legal and economic advisers, the interested third persons, relevant Commission services and the competition authorities of seven Member States (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland and the United Kingdom). The Parties requested and were granted closed sessions for parts of their presentations. There were no procedural problems or complaints raised in relation to the hearing. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Decision

| 10. | Following its investigation, the Commission concludes in the decision that the Proposed Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it. The decision therefore declares the Proposed Transaction compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Conclusion

| 11. | Overall, I consider that the effective exercise of procedural rights has been respected throughout the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Brussels, 16 November 2018.

Joos STRAGIER

---

(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (the ‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1) (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

2

---

| 2.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/5

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 27 November 2018

declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement

(Case M.8792 — T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL)

(notified under document number C(2018) 7768)

(Only the English version is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2019/C 150/04)

On 27 November 2018 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (1), and in particular Article 8(1) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision, as the case may be in the form of a provisional version, can be found in the authentic language of the case on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html.

I.   THE PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 2 May 2018, the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) received notification of a concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation (2) by which Deutsche Telekom AG (‘DTAG’ or the ‘Notifying Party’, Germany), through its indirect wholly owned subsidiary T-Mobile Netherlands Holding B.V. (‘TMNL’, Netherlands), acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control over the entire undertaking Tele2 Netherlands Holding N.V. (‘Tele2 NL’, Netherlands) (the ‘Transaction’) (3). TMNL and Tele2 NL are collectively referred to as the ‘Parties’. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | Based on the phase I investigation, the Commission concluded that the Transaction raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market and adopted a decision to initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation on 12 June 2018 (the ‘Article 6(1)(c) Decision’). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

| (3) | On 20 June 2018, the second phase investigation period was extended by 15 working days at the request of the Notifying Party pursuant to the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 10(3) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

| (4) | On 27 June 2018, the Notifying Party submitted its written comments to the Article 6(1)(c) Decision (the ‘Article 6(1)(c) Response’). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | On 10 July 2018, the Commission adopted a decision extending the second phase investigation period by five working days in accordance with the third sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 10(3) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | On 27 July 2018, the Commission adopted a decision pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Merger Regulation, addressed to Tele2 NL, following Tele2 NL's failure to provide complete information in response to a request for information (‘RFI’) from the Commission (the ‘Tele2 NL Article 11(3) Decision’). On the same day, the Commission adopted a second decision pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Merger Regulation, following TMNL's failure to provide complete information in response to a RFI from the Commission (the ‘TMNL Article 11(3) Decision’). Both the Tele2 NL Article 11(3) Decision and the TMNL Article 11(3) Decision compelled their addressees to submit a complete response to the RFIs originally sent by the Commission and had the effect of suspending the time limits referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 10(3) of the Merger Regulation. Tele2 NL complied with the Tele2 NL Article 11(3) Decision on 3 August 2018 and TMNL complied with the TMNL Article 11(3) Decision on 5 August 2018. Thus, since 5 August was not a working day, pursuant to Article 9(4) of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 (the ‘Implementing Regulation’) (4), the suspension of the time limits expired at the end of the following working day, that is on 6 August 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | Based on the second phase investigation which supplemented the findings of the first phase investigation (jointly referred to as the ‘Market Investigation’), the Commission issued a Statement of Objections on 12 September 2018 (‘Statement of Objections’) (5). In the Statement of Objections, the Commission came to the preliminary view that the Transaction would significantly impede effective competition in a substantial part of the internal market within the meaning of Article 2 of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | The Parties submitted their written comments on the Statement of Objections on 28 September 2018 and a supplementary submission based on information made available at the EC premises on 5 October 2018. At the request of the Notifying Party, an oral hearing was held on 8 October 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

II.   THE PARTIES AND THE TRANSACTION

| (9) | Both TMNL and Tele2 NL own mobile and (limited) fixed network infrastructure in the Netherlands, on the basis of which they provide fixed and mobile retail telecommunications services to both private and business customers as well as a number of wholesale services. TMNL is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of DTAG, while Tele2 NL is currently an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tele2 AB (Sweden). DTAG is a telecommunications group with global operations, which is headquartered in Germany and listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; its largest shareholder is the Federal Republic of Germany (31,9 %). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

| (10) | According to a share purchase agreement entered into on 16 February 2018, TMNL has agreed to acquire all the outstanding share capital of Tele2 NL. In consideration of the Transaction TMNL will pay EUR 190 million to Tele2 AB and issue additional shares in the share capital of TMNL to Tele2 AB. The Parties have agreed that TMNL's passive mobile network infrastructure business, which includes assets such as antenna towers and lease contracts for those towers, is outside the scope of the Transaction and will be transferred to Deutsche Telekom Europe B.V. (a wholly owned subsidiary of DTAG) prior to completion of the Transaction (6). Accordingly, as a result of the Transaction: (i) TMNL will hold 100 % of the issued share capital in Tele2 NL; (ii) Deutsche Telekom Europe B.V. and Tele2 AB will hold 75 % and 25 % of the total issued share capital in TMNL respectively; and (iii) the passive network infrastructure will no longer be part of TMNL. Tele2 AB's 25 % shareholding in TMNL would not confer control and, thus, post-Transaction DTAG would retain sole control over TMNL and acquire sole control over Tele2 NL. Therefore, the Transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

| (11) | The Transaction has an EU dimension within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

III.   THE DUTCH MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR

| (12) | In addition to the Parties, two other mobile network operators (‘MNOs’) are active in the Netherlands, KPN and VodafoneZiggo. These players both also provide fixed telecommunications services through their fixed networks. The only network sharing agreement in the Netherlands is passive and it is between the Parties. While Tele2 NL owns its own 4G network, it relies on a national roaming agreement with TMNL for 2G and 3G. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

| (13) | There are also approximately 35 Mobile Virtual Network Operators (‘MVNOs’) active in the Netherlands, which offer mobile telecommunications services without having ownership of a network. These MVNOs collectively have a [5-10] % market share by revenue and [10-20] % by subscribers. Most of them have a very small market presence. The largest MVNOs are Lebara, Lycamobile and Simpel. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

| (14) | The use of mobile data in the Netherlands has substantially increased in the period 2015-2017. Data appears to be the main focus of competition in the provision of retail mobile telecommunication services in the Netherlands. With regard to the different mobile market segments, most customers are private customers (approx. 80 % of mobile lines are private; 20 % are business). Most private customers rely on postpaid mobile services (in 2017, approx. 65 % of private postpaid customers representing 90 % of the revenues). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

| (15) | The demand for multiple play bundles including a mobile component has been growing in the recent years in the Netherlands and is expected to grow further in the future. The Notifying Party estimates that around 35 % of mobile subscriptions are purchased as part of multi play bundles. The Dutch telecoms regulator (the Authority for Consumers & Markets) finds a lower figure (around 15 % of all SIMs) and also expects a slower growth (around 25 % of all SIMs by 2020). Today, the two main players providing fixed-mobile convergence (‘FMC’) bundles are KPN and VodafoneZiggo. Tele2 and TMNL, respectively, have either no or a very limited FMC proposition. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

IV.   RELEVANT MARKETS

| (16) | The Transaction concerns the provision of retail mobile telecommunications services and wholesale services for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks in the Netherlands. The relevant product and geographic markets for these services are defined as follows |
| --- | --- |

(16)

1.   Retail market for mobile telecommunications services

| (17) | The Commission considers that, in line with its decisional practice, mobile telecommunications services constitute a separate market from fixed telecommunications services. Further, the Commission considers that WiFi cannot be considered as a substitute for mobile telecommunication subscription since; in particular, the quality of WiFi connection is not consistent across the whole of the Netherlands. Likewise the Commission considers that mobile services and over the top services (‘OTT’) are not substitutable as at the very least a mobile data connection is required to access OTT instant messaging and voice services. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

| (18) | As regards the market for the retail provision of mobile telecommunications services to end customers, consistent with its previous decisional practice, the Commission concludes that there is one overall product market for the provision of retail mobile telecommunications services, without it being necessary to define separate product markets on the basis of the: (1) type of end-customer (business vs private), (2) type of contract ((i) pre-paid vs post-paid and (ii) SIM only subscriptions vs handset subscriptions), (3) type of technology (2G, 3G and 4G), and (4) type of service (voice, SMS and data). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

| (19) | Further, in this case, the Commission concludes that a further segmentation between customers of stand-alone mobile services and customer that purchase mobile services as part of a bundle is not appropriate in light, in particular, of the mixed and inconclusive results of its market test on the extent to which switching occurs between multiple play and mobile-only offers. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

| (20) | In line with previous Commission decisions, and in line with the view of the Notifying Party, the Commission concludes that the relevant geographic market for the assessment of this case is national, corresponding to the territory of the Netherlands. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

2.   Wholesale market for access and call origination on public mobile network

| (21) | In line with previous cases, the Commission concludes that the relevant product market for the assessment of the present case is the market for wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks. The Commission concludes that the geographic scope of the market is the territory of the Netherlands. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

| (22) | Based on Tele2 NL's very limited activities in the provision of wholesale mobile access services, the Commission has found that the Transaction does not raise competition concerns with respect to this market. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

3.   Other relevant markets

| (23) | In addition to the two aforementioned markets, the Transaction also concerns other relevant markets, in relation to which the Parties' activities overlap or are vertically linked. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

| (24) | The Commission identified and defined relevant markets for: (1) wholesale international roaming services and (2) wholesale services for mobile call termination. The Commission has found that the Transaction does not raise competition concerns with respect to any of these markets. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

| (25) | The Commission also identified and defined a number of retail and wholesale markets for fixed telecommunication services which constitute relevant product markets. Based on the limited fixed activities of the Parties, the Commission has found that the Transaction does not raise competition concerns with respect to any of these markets. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

V.   COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT

| (26) | The only horizontally affected market is the market for retail mobile telecommunication in the Netherlands. The private customer segment would also be affected individually. However, the business customer segment would not and, for this reason, it is not assessed separately in the Decision. There is no vertically affected market. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

1.   Non-coordinated horizontal effects on the market for retail mobile telecommunication services in the Netherlands

| (27) | TMNL and Tele2 NL are respectively the third and fourth largest MNOs in the retail market for the provision of mobile telecommunications services in the Netherlands. Tele2 NL has a limited market share of approximately [5-10] % both in terms of revenues and subscribers. Post-Transaction, the merged entity would have a share of [20-30] % by subscribers and [20-30] % by revenues, making it the third largest player in the Dutch retail mobile market after KPN and VodafoneZiggo in terms of revenues but the second largest player by a small margin before VodafoneZiggo in terms of subscribers. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

| (28) | The Commission considers that TMNL has acted as an important competitor on the retail mobile telecommunications market in the Netherlands. Indeed, TMNL has recently moved towards a more aggressive strategy and, in particular, it was the first player to introduce unlimited data tariffs in the Netherlands. TMNL has also rolled out the best network in the Netherlands that offers the highest network quality. The Commission has no reason to believe that TMNL's current competitive constraint is likely to deteriorate absent the Transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

| (29) | With respect to Tele2 NL, the Commission concludes that, in the framework of the forward looking analysis which has to be carried out under the Merger Regulation, Tele2 NL cannot be considered an important competitive force within the meaning of paragraphs 37-38 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines on the retail mobile telecommunications market in the Netherlands. Indeed, even though Tele2 NL's entry as an MNO was initially accompanied by aggressive commercial offers and constituted an important reason for the decline in price, which has been observed in the Netherlands, Tele2 NL has only been able to achieve limited market share growth ([0-5] % in subscribers and [0-5] % in revenues since its entry as an MNO in November 2015) and, more recently, Tele2 NL has been competing less aggressively for new customers. In addition, Tele2 NL's network is inferior to that of its MNO competitors (Tele2 NL has less spectrum and less sites) which results in particular in lower network quality. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

| (30) | Based on its Market Investigation, the Commission also finds that, even though it is likely that Tele2 NL would continue operating as MNO in the Dutch market in the absence of the Transaction, its competitive strength will likely deteriorate. More specifically, the Commission finds that, the network quality gap between Tele2 NL and the other three MNOs will likely further increase. Additionally, the Commission notes that the other Dutch MNOs are likely to improve their network quality in the coming years. Even if Tele2 NL's network quality was to deteriorate only in a limited extent, the gap in performance with the other MNOs would therefore still further increase. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

| (31) | With respect to the competitive constraint exercised by the other market players, the Commission concludes that both KPN and VodafoneZiggo exert a strong competitive force. As regards the MVNOs' ability to compete, consistent with previous cases, the Commission considers that this ability is very limited in several aspects. First, this ability crucially depends on the access conditions that MVNOs obtain at the wholesale level, conditions that are controlled by the MNOs themselves. Second, MVNOs have limited bargaining power to negotiate better wholesale access conditions. Third, most MVNOs are small niche players, with a small presence on the market and little ability to differentiate themselves from MNOs. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

| (32) | The evidence in the Commission's file indicates that pre-Transaction TMNL and Tele2 NL are close competitors. However, it is expected that the gap in network performances between Tele2 NL and TMNL will further increase in the coming years therefore casting doubts on Tele2 NL's ability to sustain the close competition that it currently exercises on TMNL through its unlimited offer. Taking into account this element as well as Tele2 NL's small market share and hence small increment brought about by the Transaction, the current closeness between TMNL and Tele2 NL is therefore insufficient to find significant anticompetitive effects to arise from the Transaction, in particular in the form of price effects. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

| (33) | In the context of its assessment of non-coordinated horizontal effects, the Commission has specifically assessed a number of related theories of harm that were put to it by third party complainants. The Commission considers that all these complaints can be dismissed for the following reasons:






  a) | MVNO complaints. Based on concerns raised by Dutch MVNO Simpel, the Commission found that TMNL's incentives in relation to the provision of wholesale access services vis-à-vis its own wholesale customers are likely to change post-Transaction which could lead to a further reduction of the already limited competitive constraint exerted by MVNOs. The Commission concluded that the Transaction is likely to have a negative impact on the wholesale conditions of Simpel which would in turn additionally deteriorate the competitive pressure that Simpel is likely to exert at the retail level. However, the Commission has also come to the conclusion that the effect on competition in the retail market for mobile telecommunication services will not be significant since (i) already pre-Transaction the competitive constraint exerted by MVNOs is very limited, and (ii) the size of the price effect is very limited. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(33)

a)

MVNO complaints. Based on concerns raised by Dutch MVNO Simpel, the Commission found that TMNL's incentives in relation to the provision of wholesale access services vis-à-vis its own wholesale customers are likely to change post-Transaction which could lead to a further reduction of the already limited competitive constraint exerted by MVNOs. The Commission concluded that the Transaction is likely to have a negative impact on the wholesale conditions of Simpel which would in turn additionally deteriorate the competitive pressure that Simpel is likely to exert at the retail level. However, the Commission has also come to the conclusion that the effect on competition in the retail market for mobile telecommunication services will not be significant since (i) already pre-Transaction the competitive constraint exerted by MVNOs is very limited, and (ii) the size of the price effect is very limited.

| b) | Spectrum asymmetry. The Commission dismisses this complaint raised by the two competing MNOs, KPN and VodafoneZiggo on the ground that the spectrum aggregation that the merged entity would obtain from the Transaction would not significantly impede KPN's and VodafoneZiggo's ability to compete. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Spectrum asymmetry. The Commission dismisses this complaint raised by the two competing MNOs, KPN and VodafoneZiggo on the ground that the spectrum aggregation that the merged entity would obtain from the Transaction would not significantly impede KPN's and VodafoneZiggo's ability to compete.

| c) | Distributor complaints. The Commission dismisses this complaint on the ground that, even if the reduction of the number of players in the retail market may have a negative impact on independent distributors, these players do not exert a competitive constraint on MNOs. Therefore any possible negative impact on independent distributors would unlikely have an impact on the price for end customers. In addition, the Commission has no evidence on file to suggest that the Transaction would significantly reduce the merged entity's incentive to use indirect sales channels. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Distributor complaints. The Commission dismisses this complaint on the ground that, even if the reduction of the number of players in the retail market may have a negative impact on independent distributors, these players do not exert a competitive constraint on MNOs. Therefore any possible negative impact on independent distributors would unlikely have an impact on the price for end customers. In addition, the Commission has no evidence on file to suggest that the Transaction would significantly reduce the merged entity's incentive to use indirect sales channels.

| (34) | Overall, the Commission considers that the elimination of the competitive constraints exerted by the Parties pre-Transaction, both on each other and on other competitors is not likely to significantly weaken competition and induce significant price increases as well as reduce incentives to innovate and invest in network quality and a reduction in innovative pricing strategies. This conclusion is in particular based on the limited growth that Tele2 NL has been able to achieve despite competing aggressively and the Commission's finding that the competitive constraints exercised by Tele2 NL relative to the competing MNOs is likely to decrease going forward. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

| (35) | The Commission has also undertaken an in-depth quantitative assessment of the likely price effects of the elimination of competition in the retail market. Overall, the quantitative analysis performed by the Commission produced mixed results, which do not clearly indicate that the Transaction is likely to result in significant price increases. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

| (36) | The Commission considers that its quantitative analysis supports the conclusions reached by the qualitative market investigation. In the Commission's view, the Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition as a result of horizontal non-coordinated effects in the market for retail mobile telecommunication services in the Netherlands. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

2.   Coordinated horizontal effects on the market for retail mobile telecommunication services in the Netherlands.

| (37) | The Commission concludes that several features of the Dutch retail market for mobile telecommunications services may be conducive to coordination. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

| (38) | However, the Commission concludes that the Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition as a result of horizontal coordinated effects, in particular given the asymmetry between the merged entity on the one hand, and KPN and VodafoneZiggo on the other, which would not be materially eliminated by the Transaction and the significant uncertainties as to the ability of Tele2 NL to remain as aggressive a competitor in the coming years. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

3.   Efficiencies

| (39) | The Commission considers that the efficiency claim put forward by the Notifying Party whereby as a consequence of the Transaction the roaming fee that Tele2 NL currently pays to TMNL for providing access to the 2G and 3G network to its customer base will be internalised by the merged entity satisfies the three cumulative criteria required under the Merger Guidelines of benefit to consumers, merger specificity and verifiability. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

| (40) | With respect to the further efficiency claims, the Commission leaves open the question whether they satisfy these three criteria given that the Transaction does not give rise to a significant impediment to competition on the relevant markets even without accepting any of these further efficiency claims. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

VI.   CONCLUSION

| (41) | The Decision concludes that the Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

| (42) | Consequently, the Decision declares the Transaction compatible with the internal market, in accordance with Articles 2(2) and Article 8(1) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1. With effect from 1 December 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) has introduced certain changes, such as the replacement of ‘Community’ by ‘Union’ and ‘common market’ by ‘internal market’. The terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout this Statement of Objections.

(3)  OJ C 162, 8.5.2018, p. 27.

(4)  OJ L 133, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(5)  Commission's document C(2018) 6038.

(6)  Also Tele2 NL's M2M business is carved-out from the Transaction. See Form CO, paragraph 71.

---

| 2.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/10

---

Summary of European Commission Decisions on authorisations for the placing on the market for the use and/or for use of substances listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)

(Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (1)
  )

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2019/C 150/05)

Decisions granting an authorisation

| Reference of the decision (2) | Date of decision | Substance name | Holder of the authorisation | Authorisation number | Authorised use | Date of expiry of review period | Reasons for the decision |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2019) 2941 | 24 April 2019 | Bis(2-methoxyethyl)ether (diglyme)
  EC No 203-924-4;
  CAS No 111-96-6 | Life Technologies AS, Ullernchaussen 52, NO-0379, PO Box 114 Smestad, NO-0309, Oslo, Norway | REACH/19/20/0 | Use as a process chemical in the manufacture of Dynabeads® | 22 August 2029 | — | Risk is adequately controlled in accordance with Article 60(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006. |

Reference of the decision (2)

Date of decision

Substance name

Holder of the authorisation

Authorisation number

Authorised use

Date of expiry of review period

Reasons for the decision

C(2019) 2941

24 April 2019

Bis(2-methoxyethyl)ether (diglyme)

EC No 203-924-4;

CAS No 111-96-6

Life Technologies AS, Ullernchaussen 52, NO-0379, PO Box 114 Smestad, NO-0309, Oslo, Norway

REACH/19/20/0

Use as a process chemical in the manufacture of Dynabeads®

22 August 2029

—

Risk is adequately controlled in accordance with Article 60(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006.

| — | There are no suitable alternatives. |
| --- | --- |

—

There are no suitable alternatives.

---

(1)  OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1.

(2)  The decision is available on the European Commission website at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about/index_en.htm

---

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 2.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/11

---

Electronic identification schemes notified pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (1)

(2019/C 150/06)

| Title of the scheme | eID means under the notified scheme | Notifying Member State | Level of assurance | Authority responsible for the scheme | Date of publication in the Official Journal |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| German eID based on Extended Access Control | National Identity Card
  Electronic Residence Permit | Federal Republic of Germany | High | Federal Ministry of the Interior |
| Alt-Moabit 140, 10557 Berlin |
| GERMANY |
| DGI2@bmi.bund.de |
| +49 30186810 |

Title of the scheme

eID means under the notified scheme

Notifying Member State

Level of assurance

Authority responsible for the scheme

Date of publication in the Official Journal

German eID based on Extended Access Control

National Identity Card

Electronic Residence Permit

Federal Republic of Germany

High

Federal Ministry of the Interior

Alt-Moabit 140, 10557 Berlin

GERMANY

DGI2@bmi.bund.de

+49 30186810

26.9.2017

SPID — Public System of Digital Identity

SPID eID means provided by:

| — | Aruba PEC S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

—

Aruba PEC S.p.A.

| — | Namirial S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

—

Namirial S.p.A.

| — | InfoCert S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

—

InfoCert S.p.A.

| — | In.Te.S.A. S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

—

In.Te.S.A. S.p.A.

| — | Poste Italiane S.p.A |
| --- | --- |

—

Poste Italiane S.p.A

| — | Register.it S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

—

Register.it S.p.A.

| — | Sielte S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

—

Sielte S.p.A.

| — | Telecom Italia Trust Technologies S.r.l. |
| --- | --- |

—

Telecom Italia Trust Technologies S.r.l.

Italy

High

Substantial

Low

| AgID — Agency for Digital Italy |
| --- |
| Viale Liszt, 21-00144 Roma |
| ITALY |
| eidas-spid@agid.gov.it |
| +39 0685264407 |

AgID — Agency for Digital Italy

Viale Liszt, 21-00144 Roma

ITALY

eidas-spid@agid.gov.it

+39 0685264407

10.9.2018

National Identification and Authentication System (NIAS)

Personal Identity Card (eOI)

Republic of Croatia

High

| Ministry of Public Administration, Republic of Croatia |
| --- |
| Maksimirska 63 |
| 10000 Zagreb |
| CROATIA |
| e-gradjani@uprava.hr |

Ministry of Public Administration, Republic of Croatia

Maksimirska 63

10000 Zagreb

CROATIA

e-gradjani@uprava.hr

7.11.2018

Estonian eID scheme: ID card

Estonian eID scheme: RP card

Estonian eID scheme: Digi-ID

Estonian eID scheme: e-Residency Digi-ID

Estonian eID scheme: Mobiil-ID

Estonian eID scheme: diplomatic identity card

| — | ID card |
| --- | --- |

—

ID card

| — | RP card |
| --- | --- |

—

RP card

| — | Digi-ID |
| --- | --- |

—

Digi-ID

| — | e-Residency Digi-ID |
| --- | --- |

—

e-Residency Digi-ID

| — | Mobiil-ID |
| --- | --- |

—

Mobiil-ID

| — | Diplomatic identity card |
| --- | --- |

—

Diplomatic identity card

Republic of Estonia

High

| Police and Border Guard Board |
| --- |
| Pärnu mnt 139 |
| 15060 Tallinn |
| ESTONIA |
| eid@politsei.ee |
| +372 6123000 |

Police and Border Guard Board

Pärnu mnt 139

15060 Tallinn

ESTONIA

eid@politsei.ee

+372 6123000

7.11.2018

Documento Nacional de Identidad electrónico (DNIe)

Spanish ID card (DNIe)

Kingdom of Spain

High

| Ministry of Interior — Kingdom of Spain |
| --- |
| C/Julián González Segador, s/n |
| 28043 MADRID |
| SPAIN |
| divisiondedocumentacion@policia.es |

Ministry of Interior — Kingdom of Spain

C/Julián González Segador, s/n

28043 MADRID

SPAIN

divisiondedocumentacion@policia.es

7.11.2018

Luxembourg national identity card (eID card)

Luxembourg eID card

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

High

| Ministry for Home Affairs |
| --- |
| BP 10 |
| L-2010 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| minint@mi.etat.lu |
| secretariat@ctie.etat.lu |
| +352 24784600 |

Ministry for Home Affairs

BP 10

L-2010 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

minint@mi.etat.lu

secretariat@ctie.etat.lu

+352 24784600

7.11.2018

Belgian eID scheme FAS/eCards

Belgian Citizen eCard

Foreigner eCard

Kingdom of Belgium

High

| Policy & Support Federal Public Service (BOSA)/Directorate-General Digital Transformation |
| --- |
| Simon Bolivarlaan 30, 1000 Brussel |
| BELGIUM |
| eidas@bosa.fgov.be |

Policy & Support Federal Public Service (BOSA)/Directorate-General Digital Transformation

Simon Bolivarlaan 30, 1000 Brussel

BELGIUM

eidas@bosa.fgov.be

27.12.2018

Cartão de Cidadão (CC)

Portuguese national identity card (eID card)

Portuguese Republic

High

| AMA — Administrative Modernisation Agency |
| --- |
| Rua Abranches Ferrão |
| n.o 10, 3o |
| 1600-001 Lisbon |
| PORTUGAL |
| ama@ama.pt |
| +351 217231200 |

AMA — Administrative Modernisation Agency

Rua Abranches Ferrão

n.o 10, 3o

1600-001 Lisbon

PORTUGAL

ama@ama.pt

+351 217231200

28.2.2019

GOV.UK Verify

GOV.UK Verify eID means provided by:

| — | Barclays |
| --- | --- |

—

Barclays

| — | Experian |
| --- | --- |

—

Experian

| — | Post Office |
| --- | --- |

—

Post Office

| — | SecureIdentity |
| --- | --- |

—

SecureIdentity

| — | Digidentity |
| --- | --- |

—

Digidentity

United Kingdom

Substantial

Low

| Government Digital Service |
| --- |
| The White Chapel Building |
| 10 Whitechapel High St |
| London E1 8QS |
| UNITED KINGDOM |
| eidas-support@digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk |
| +44 78585008654 |

Government Digital Service

The White Chapel Building

10 Whitechapel High St

London E1 8QS

UNITED KINGDOM

eidas-support@digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk

+44 78585008654

2.5.2019

---

(1)  OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73.

---

V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 2.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/14

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.9307 — Onex/AEG/JV)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2019/C 150/07)

1.

This notification concerns the following undertakings:

| — | Onex Corporation (‘Onex’, Canada), |
| --- | --- |

—

Onex Corporation (‘Onex’, Canada),

| — | Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. (‘AEG’, USA), controlled by The Anschutz Corporation (USA). |
| --- | --- |

—

Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. (‘AEG’, USA), controlled by The Anschutz Corporation (USA).

Onex and AEG acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of a newly created company constituting a joint venture (the ‘JV’), which will be called ASM Global (‘ASM’).

The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture.

2.

—   for Onex: a private equity business engaged in the provision of investment management services to a number of investment funds. Onex controls a number of portfolio companies which are active across multiple industry sectors,

—   for AEG: sports and live entertainment.

The JV will combine the venue management division of AEG, AEG Facilities LLC, and venue management business of Onex, SMG US Parent, Inc.

3.

Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified:

M.9307 — Onex/AEG/JV

Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:

| Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu |
| --- |
| Fax +32 22964301 |
| Postal address: |
| European Commission |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postal address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

1

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

2

---