United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

SPACE 

ACQUISITIONS 

DOD Needs a 

Departmentwide 

Strategy for Pursuing 

Low-Cost, Responsive 

Tactical Space 

Capabilities 

March 2006 

 

GAO-06-449 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2006

SPACE ACQUISITIONS

DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy 

for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive 

Tactical Space Capabilities 

Highlights of GAO-06-449, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

For more than two decades, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has 

invested heavily in space assets to 

provide the warfighter with 

mission-critical information. 

Despite these investments, DOD 

commanders have reported

shortfalls in space capabilities. 

To provide tactical capabilities to 

the warfighter sooner, DOD 

recently began developing

TacSats—a series of small satellites

intended to be built within a limited 

time frame and budget—and

pursuing options for small, lowcost vehicles for launching small

satellites. 

GAO was asked to (1) examine the 

outcomes to date of DOD’s TacSat

and small, low-cost launch vehicle

efforts, (2) identify the challenges 

in pursuing these efforts, and 

(3) determine whether experiences 

with these efforts could inform 

DOD’s major space system 

acquisitions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

assign accountability for 

developing and implementing a 

departmentwide strategy for 

pursuing low-cost tactical

capabilities—both satellite and 

launch vehicles—and identify 

corresponding funding. In 

commenting on the report, DOD 

agreed with the recommendation. 

Through effective management of requirements and technologies and strong 

leadership, DOD was able to deliver the first TacSat satellite in 12 months 

and for less than $10 million. The Office of Force Transformation, TacSat 1’s 

sponsor, set requirements early in the satellite’s development process and 

kept them stable. DOD modified existing technologies for use in space, 

significantly reducing the likelihood of encountering unforeseen problems 

that could result in costly design changes. The satellite was also built within 

DOD’s science and technology environment, which enabled service 

laboratory scientists to address problems quickly, inexpensively, and 

innovatively. The vision and support provided by leadership were also key to 

achieving the successful delivery of TacSat 1. DOD has also made progress 

in developing three additional TacSats and is working toward developing a 

low-cost launch vehicle available on demand.

Despite this achievement, DOD faces several challenges in providing tactical 

capabilities to the warfighter sooner. First, DOD has yet to develop a lowcost, small launch vehicle available to quickly put tactical satellites, 

including TacSat 1, into orbit. Second, limited collaboration between the 

science and technology and the acquisition communities—as well as the 

acquisition community’s tendency to expand requirements after program 

start—could impede efforts to quickly procure tactical capabilities. Securing 

funding for future TacSat experiments may also prove difficult because they 

are not part of an acquisition program. Finally, DOD lacks a departmentwide 

strategy for implementing these efforts, and because key advocates of the 

experiments have left DOD, it is unclear how well they will be supported in 

the future. 

Regardless of these challenges, DOD’s experiences with the TacSat 

experiments thus far could inform its major space system acquisitions. 

DOD’s approach to developing the TacSats—matching requirements to 

available resources, using proven technologies, and separating technology 

development from product development—reflects best commercial 

practices that lead to quicker delivery with less risk. According to some DOD 

officials, the TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles—once they are 

developed—could also provide an avenue for large space system

acquisitions to prove out technologies in the space environment, something 

DOD has avoided because of the high cost of launching such experiments. 

These officials also believe that giving space professionals the opportunity to

manage small-scale projects like TacSats may better prepare them for 

managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions. Finally, these 

officials noted that building small-scale satellite systems and launch vehicles 

could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete for 

DOD contracts and thereby broaden the space industrial base. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-449.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanmj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

DOD Successfully Delivered First TacSat through Managing 

Requirements and Is Moving Forward with Additional Efforts 6 

DOD Faces Several Challenges in Pursuing Responsive Tactical 

Capabilities for Warfighters 12 

Experiences with TacSats May Inform Major Space System 

Acquisitions and Lead to Long-Term Benefits 17 

Conclusions 20

Recommendation for Executive Action 21 

Agency Comments 21 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 23 

Tables 

Table 1: Development Cost and Schedule Estimates and Target 

Launch Dates for TacSats 2, 3, and 4, as of March 2006 9 

Table 2: DOD Current Planning Efforts 16 

Figures 

Figure 1: Overview of TacSat Experiments 5 

Figure 2: TacSat 1 Ready for Vibration Testing at Naval Research 

Laboratory 7

Figure 3: Capability Selection Process for TacSats 3 and 4 10 

Page i GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions
Abbreviations 

ARES Affordable Responsive Spacelift 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

OFT Office of Force Transformation 

ORS Operationally Responsive Space 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

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reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 14, 2006 

The Honorable Terry Everett 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Department of Defense (DOD) satellites and other space-related assets 

provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, missile warning, 

navigation, and other information critical to conducting military 

operations. DOD’s space network is expected to play an increasingly 

important role in military operations. According to DOD, approximately 

70 percent of weapons used in Operation Iraqi Freedom were precisionguided—mostly through global positioning satellites. Yet in each major 

conflict over the past decade, senior military commanders reported 

shortfalls in space capabilities, such as those intended to provide imagery 

data. 

To address such shortfalls and provide tactical capabilities to the 

warfighter sooner, DOD recently began building a series of small satellites, 

referred to as TacSats, within the science and technology environment—

an environment that lends itself to demonstrating technologies within a 

relatively short time frame and small budget. Although small satellites 

offer less performance than large satellites in areas like resolution, 

operational control, and power, the TacSats are expected to quickly 

provide the warfighter with the information needed to conduct operations 

in theater. DOD is also developing a small, low-cost launch vehicle that 

could be used to launch small satellites like the TacSats. 

Given the potential these efforts may offer in changing the way DOD does 

business, you asked us to (1) examine the outcomes to date from the 

TacSat experiments as well as from efforts to develop small, low-cost 

launch vehicles, (2) identify the challenges in pursuing TacSats and the 

launch vehicles, and (3) determine whether DOD’s experiences with 

TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles could inform major space 

system acquisitions. 

Page 1 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
To conduct our work, we interviewed DOD officials in the Office of Force 

Transformation, Air Force Space Command, Space and Missile Systems 

Center, the Air Force and Navy research labs, and in other cognizant 

offices, and analyzed documents obtained from these officials. We also 

interviewed industry representatives involved in developing large space 

systems and small commercial launch vehicles. We analyzed a number of 

GAO and DOD studies that discuss acquisition problems and associated

challenges, including our work on best practices in weapon system 

development that we have conducted over the past decade. We conducted 

our review from June 2005 to March 2006 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. For more on our scope and

methodology, see appendix I. 

DOD delivered the first TacSat satellite in 12 months and for less than 

$10 million.1

 A number of elements enabled this achievement. First, the 

Office of Force Transformation, as TacSat 1’s sponsor, effectively 

managed the satellite’s requirements by reaching consensus on 

requirements early in the development process and keeping them stable. 

Second, DOD incorporated existing technologies and adapted them for 

new uses in space, significantly reducing the likelihood of encountering 

unforeseen problems that could result in costly design changes. Third, 

DOD built the satellite within the science and technology environment, 

enabling scientists at DOD’s service labs to address problems quickly, 

inexpensively, and innovatively. Finally, DOD leadership provided a 

motivating vision, prompt funding, and high-level support throughout the 

experiment—a key factor in positioning new development efforts for 

success. DOD has made progress toward developing three additional 

TacSats—expected to be launched in May 2007, summer 2007, and April 

2008—and is working toward developing a low-cost launch vehicle. 

Results in Brief 

While DOD delivered the first TacSat on time and within its overall budget, 

the department faces several challenges in providing tactical capabilities 

to the warfighter sooner. First, while DOD is working to demonstrate a 

low-cost small launch vehicle to quickly put the tactical satellites into 

orbit, it has yet to deliver such a vehicle. As a result, TacSat 1 has not been

launched. Second, the procurement of tactical capabilities in the future 

could be hindered if collaboration between the science and technology 

and acquisition communities is limited and the acquisition community 

 1

In addition to the $10 million, available surplus hardware valued at $5 million was used to 

build the satellite. 

Page 2 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
expands requirements after program start—as has been the case in the 

past. Third, it may be difficult to secure continued science and technology 

funding for future TacSat experiments since they currently are not part of

an acquisition program. Finally, DOD lacks a departmentwide strategy and 

leadership for implementing efforts in this area. Because key advocates of

the experiments have left DOD, it is unclear how well the experiments will 

be supported in the future. 

DOD’s experiences with TacSats thus far may inform major space system 

acquisitions, and some DOD officials and industry representatives believe 

there are potential long-term benefits. The approach to developing TacSats 

reflects best practices—managing requirements to match available 

resources, using relatively mature technologies, and keeping additional 

technology development separate from product development—that larger 

space system programs could emulate to achieve quicker delivery of more 

robust systems that meet program objectives with less risk. In addition, 

according to some DOD officials, the TacSats could provide an avenue for

incremental capabilities as well as a venue for large space system 

acquisitions to prove out technologies in the space environment— 

something DOD has avoided because of the high cost of conducting such 

experiments. These officials also believe that giving space professionals 

the opportunity to manage small-scale projects like TacSats may better 

prepare them for managing larger, more complex space system

acquisitions in the future. Finally, these officials noted that building smallscale satellite systems and launch vehicles could create opportunities for 

small, innovative companies to compete for DOD contracts and thereby 

broaden the space industrial base. 

To help ensure low-cost tactical capabilities continue to be developed and 

delivered to the warfighter quickly, we are recommending that DOD assign 

accountability for developing and implementing a departmentwide 

strategy for pursuing low-cost, responsive tactical capabilities—both 

satellite and launch—for the warfighter, and identify corresponding 

funding. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred 

with our findings and recommendation (DOD’s letter is reprinted in 

app. II). 

The TacSat experiments and efforts to develop small, low-cost launch 

vehicles are part of a larger DOD initiative: Operationally Responsive 

Space (ORS). In general, ORS was created by DOD’s Office of Force 

Transformation (OFT) in response to the Secretary of Defense’s 

instruction to create a new business model for developing and employing

Background 

Page 3 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
space systems. Under ORS, DOD aims to rapidly deliver to the warfighter 

low-cost, short-term joint tactical capabilities defined by field 

commanders—capabilities that would complement and augment national

space capabilities, not replace them.2

 ORS would also serve as a test bed 

for the larger space program by providing a clear path for science and

technology investments, enhancing institutional and individual knowledge, 

and providing increased access to space for testing critical research and 

development payloads. ORS is a considerable departure from the 

approach DOD has used over the past two decades to acquire the larger 

space systems that currently dominate its space portfolio. These global

multipurpose systems, which have been designed for longer life and 

increased reliability, require years to develop and a significant investment 

of resources.3

 The slow generational turnover—currently 15 to 25 years—

does not allow for a planned rate of replacement for information 

technology hardware and software. In addition, the data captured through 

DOD’s larger space systems generally go through many levels of analysis 

before being relayed to the warfighter in theater.

The TacSat experiments aim to quickly provide the warfighter with a 

capability that meets an identified need within available resources—time, 

funding, and technology. Limiting the TacSats’ scope allows DOD to trade 

off reliability and performance for speed, responsiveness, convenience, 

and customization. Once each TacSat satellite is launched, DOD plans to 

test its level of utility to the warfighter in theater. If military utility is 

established, according to a DOD official, DOD will assess the acquisition 

plan required to procure and launch numerous TacSats—forming 

constellations—to provide wider coverage over a specific theater. As a 

result, each satellite’s capability does not need to be as complex as that of 

DOD’s larger satellites and does not carry with it the heightened 

consequence of failure as if each satellite alone were providing total 

coverage. DOD currently has four TacSat experiments in different stages 

of development (see figure 1). 

 2

Smaller satellites would become a node within a tiered network of sensors that would 

include larger space systems, unmanned aircraft, and air and surface assets. 

3

In fiscal year 2006, DOD plans to spend almost $20 billion to develop and procure major 

satellites and other space-related systems.

Page 4 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
Figure 1: Overview of TacSat Experiments 

Tactical mission capabilities/requirements

· Tactical radio frequency payloads

 and ultra-high-frequency

 cross-platform link

· Low-resolution visible and

 infrared cameras

· Payload scheduling and data

 access via the Secret Internet

 Protocol Routing Network

· Common Data Link X-band radio

 to send data directly to theater

· Tactical imaging and radio

 frequency

· Science payloads

· Payload scheduling and data

 access via the Secret Internet

 Protocol Routing Network

· Hyperspectral imaging sensor for

 tactical targeting of camouflaged

 and hard-to-detect targets

· Secondary space

 communications payload for data

 exfiltration/infiltration to

 warfighter

· Mobile Data Communication

 services

· Data relay from terrestrial sensors

· Friendly forces tracking

· Payload scheduling and data

 access via the Secret Internet

 Protocol Routing Network

 Mission selection process

Mission selected based on 

knowledge of specific combatant 

command’s need

Mission selected based on existing 

Air Force Research Laboratory 

demonstration satellite

Mission selected through Air Force 

Space Command formalized 

process

Mission selected through Air Force 

Space Command formalized 

process

Primary developer and intended user

Office of Force 

Transformation/Naval Research 

Laboratory for U.S. Pacific 

Command

Air Force Research Laboratory for 

U. S. Strategic Command

(sponsors include Air Force 

Research Laboratory, Director of 

Defense Research and

Engineering, and a joint Advanced 

Concept Technology

Demonstration)

Air Force Research Laboratory for 

U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, and other 

combatant commands

(sponsors include Air Force 

Research Laboratory, Office of Force 

Transformation, Army and Office of 

Naval Research)

Naval Research Laboratory for U. S. 

Strategic Command

(Office of Force 

Transformation/Office of Naval 

Research satellite sponsors; Air 

Force launch sponsor)

Source: Naval Research Laboratory and Air Force Research Laboratory.

TacSat 1 TacSat 2 TacSat 3 TacSat 4

According to Naval Research Laboratory officials, TacSat 2’s delay is 

primarily the result of overestimating the maturity of its main payload—an 

off-the-shelf imager that was being refurbished for space use. Officials also 

noted that the contracting process, which took longer than expected, used 

multiple and varied contracts awarded under standard federal and defense 

acquisition regulations. 

DOD is also using the TacSat experiments as a means for developing 

“bus” standards—the platform that provides power, attitude, temperature 

control, and other support to the satellite in space. Currently, DOD’s 

satellite buses are custom-made for each space system. According to DOD 

Page 5 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
officials, establishing bus standards with modular or common components 

would facilitate building satellites—both small and large—more quickly 

and at a lower cost. 

To achieve one of the TacSat experiments’ goals—getting new capabilities 

to the warfighter sooner—DOD must secure a small, low-cost launch 

vehicle that is available on demand. Instead of waiting months or years to 

carry out a launch, DOD is looking to small launch vehicles that could be 

launched in days, if not hours, and whose cost would better match the 

small budgets of experiments. A 2003 Air Force study determined that 

DOD’s current class of launchers—the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle—would not be able to satisfy these requirements. 

DOD delivered the TacSat 1 satellite within cost and schedule targets. To 

develop the first TacSat, DOD effectively managed requirements, 

employed mature technologies, and built the satellite in the science and 

technology environment, all under the guidance of a leader who provided 

a clear vision and prompt funding for the project. DOD is also moving 

forward with developing additional TacSats; bus standards; and a small, 

low-cost launch vehicle available on demand. 

In May 2004, 12 months after TacSat 1 development began, the Naval 

Research Laboratory delivered the satellite to OFT at a cost of about 

$9.3 million, thereby meeting its targets to develop the satellite within 

1 year and an estimated budget of $8.5 million to $10 million. 4 Once 

TacSat 1 is placed into orbit, it is expected to provide capabilities that will 

allow a tactical commander to directly task the satellite and receive data

over DOD’s Secure Internet Protocol Router—a need identified by the 

warfighter. 

DOD Successfully 

Delivered First TacSat 

through Managing 

Requirements and Is 

Moving Forward with 

Additional Efforts 

TacSat 1’s Development 

Approach Enabled 

Successful Delivery 

 4

In addition to the $10 million, available surplus hardware valued at $5 million was used to 

build the satellite. 

Page 6 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
Figure 2: TacSat 1 Ready for Vibration Testing at Naval Research Laboratory 

Source: DOD.

Before TacSat 1’s development began, OFT and the Naval Research 

Laboratory worked together to reach consensus on known warfighter 

requirements that would match the cost, schedule, and performance 

objectives for the satellite. Our past work has found that when 

requirements are matched with resources, goals can be met within 

estimated schedule and budget. To inform the requirements selection 

process, the Naval Research Laboratory used an informal systems 

engineering approach to assess relevant technologies and determine 

which could meet TacSat 1 mission objectives within budget and schedule.

Once TacSat 1’s requirements were set, OFT did not change them. To meet 

its mission objectives, OFT sought a capability that would be “good 

enough” for the warfighter, given available resources—rather than 

attempting to provide a significant leap in capability. OFT and the Naval

Research Laboratory agreed to limit TacSat 1’s operational life span to 

1 year, which allowed the laboratory to build the satellite with lower 

radiation protection levels, less fuel capacity, and fewer backups than 

would have been necessary for a satellite designed to last 6 years or 

longer. 

Page 7 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
The use of existing technologies for the satellite and the bus also helped to

keep TacSat 1 on schedule and within cost. For example, hardware from 

unmanned aerial vehicles and other aircraft were modified for space flight 

to protect them in the space environment, and bus components were 

purchased from a satellite communications company. Using items on hand 

at the Naval Research Laboratory—such as the space ground link system 

transponder and select bus electronics—resulted in a savings of about 

$5 million. Using and modifying existing technologies provided the 

laboratory better knowledge about the systems than if it had tried to 

develop the technologies from scratch. According to a laboratory official, 

the TacSat 1 experiment also achieved efficiencies by using the same 

software to test the satellite in the laboratory and fly the satellite. 

Developing the TacSat within the science and technology environment 

also helped the experiment meet its goals. As we have stressed in our 

reports on systems development, the science and technology environment 

is more forgiving and less costly than the acquisition environment. For 

example, when engineers encountered a blown electronics part during 

TacSat 1’s full system testing, they were able to dismantle the satellite, 

identify the source of the problem, replace the damaged part, and rebuild

the satellite—all within 2 weeks of the initial failure. According to the 

laboratory official, this problem would have taken months to repair in a 

major space acquisition program simply because there would have been 

stricter quality control measures, more people involved, and thus more 

sign-offs required at each step. Moreover, the contracting mechanism in 

place at the Naval Research Laboratory allows the laboratory to respond

quickly to DOD requests. Specifically, the center used several existing 

engineering and technical support contracts that are competed, generally, 

at 5-year intervals, rather than competing a specific contract for TacSat 1.

According to a number of DOD officials, the ultimate success of the 

TacSat 1 procurement was largely the result of the former OFT director, 

who 

• provided the original impetus and obtained support for the experiment 

from high levels within DOD and the Congress; 

• negotiated a customized mission assurance agreement with Air Force 

leaders to launch TacSat 1 from Vandenberg Air Force Base at a cost 

that was affordable given the experiment’s budget; 

Page 8 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
• empowered TacSat 1’s project manager at the Naval Research

Laboratory to make appropriate trade-off decisions to deliver the 

satellite on time and within cost; and 

• helped OFT staff develop an efficient work relationship with the Naval 

Research Laboratory team and provided the laboratory with prompt 

decisions. 

DOD Is Working on 

Developing Future TacSats 

and Low-Cost Launch 

Vehicles 

DOD is currently working on developing three additional TacSat 

experiments—along with bus standards—and a low-cost, on-demand 

launch vehicle. These efforts are generally in the early stages. DOD 

expects to launch TacSat 2—which began as an Air Force science and

technology experiment and was altered to improve upon TacSat 1’s 

capability—in May 2007. TacSat 3, which will experiment with imaging 

sensors, is in the development phase. TacSat 4, which will experiment 

with friendly forces tracking and data communication services, is in the 

design phase. Table 1 shows the development cost and schedule estimates 

and the target launch date for each satellite. 

Table 1: Development Cost and Schedule Estimates and Target Launch Dates for 

TacSats 2, 3, and 4, as of March 2006 

Development 

cost estimate

Development 

completion Target launch

TacSat 2 $39 million 29 months May 2007

TacSat 3 $40 million 18 months Summer 2007

TacSat 4 $41 million 24 months April 2008

Source: Naval Research Laboratory and Air Force Research Laboratory. 

With TacSat 3, the Air Force began to formalize the process for evaluating

and selecting potential capabilities for the TacSats, leveraging the 

experiences from the first two TacSats. The selection process, which 

currently takes 3 to 4 months, includes a presentation of capability gaps 

and shortfalls from the combatant commands and each branch of the 

military, and analyses of the suitability, feasibility, and transferability of 

the capabilities deemed the highest priority. According to DOD officials, 

this process allows the science and technology community to obtain early 

buy-in from the warfighter, thereby increasing the likelihood that 

requirements will remain stable and the satellite will have military utility. 

Obtaining warfighter involvement in this way represents a new approach 

for the TacSat series. See figure 3 for a more complete description of this 

evolving process. 

Page 9 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
Figure 3: Capability Selection Process for TacSats 3 and 4 

Representatives from services and combatant commanders identified their 

top-ten capability shortfalls. These representatives consolidated and ranked 

the capability gaps using selection criteria—need and urgency, joint value, 

and the user/sponsor commitment—and provided this information to

representatives from the service labs and academia.

The labs matched payload candidates to the capability gaps and applied 

criteria—suitability, feasibility, and transferability—to those payloads. The labs

applied system engineering to the remaining payload candidates.

A joint capability senior officer review panel reviewed the labs’ analysis and 

identified the top three payload candidates.

A flag officer committee reviewed these evaluations and made the final 

payload selection.

The flag officer committee provided the final payload selection to the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force.

The labs assessed performance, cost, and schedule for the three payload 

candidates to evaluate which best met the TacSat’s suitability, feasibility, and 

transferability criteria.

Source: DOD.

The Air Force has also begun to create plans for procuring TacSats for the 

warfighter should they prove to have military utility. The Air Force has 

developed a vision of creating TacSat reserves that could be deployed on 

demand, plans to establish a program office within its Space and Missile 

Systems Center, and plans to begin acquiring operational versions of 

successful TacSat concepts in 2010. 

Page 10 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
DOD is also working to develop bus standards. Establishing bus standards 

would allow DOD to create a “plug and play” approach to building 

satellites—similar to the way personal computers are built. The service 

research labs, under the sponsorship of OFT, and the Space and Missile 

Systems Center are in the process of developing small bus standards, each

using a different approach. The service labs expect to test some 

standardized components on the TacSat 3 bus, and system standards by 

prototyping a TacSat 4 bus. The Space and Missile Systems Center is also 

proposing to develop three standardized bus models for different-weight 

satellites, one of which may be suitable for a TacSat. The service labs 

expect to transition bus standards to the Space and Missile Systems 

Center in fiscal year 2008, at which time the center will select a final 

version for procurement for future TacSats. 

Both DOD and private industry are working to develop small, low-cost, ondemand launch vehicles. DOD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA), along with the Air Force, established FALCON, a joint 

technology development program to accelerate efforts to develop a launch 

vehicle that meets these objectives. Through FALCON, DARPA expects to

develop a vehicle that can send 1,000 pounds to low-earth orbit for less 

than $5 million with an operational cost basis of 20 flights per year for 

10 years. FALCON is expected to flight-test hypersonic technologies and 

be capable of launching small satellites such as TacSats. DARPA is 

currently pursuing two candidates for its FALCON launch vehicle—

AirLaunch, a company that expects to launch rockets that have been 

ejected from the back of a C-17 cargo airplane, and SpaceX, whose twostage launch vehicle will include the second U.S.-made rocket booster 

engine to be developed and flown in more than 25 years, according to the 

company’s founder.5

 DARPA could transition the AirLaunch concept to the 

Air Force after its demonstration launch in 2008. TacSat 1 is contracted to 

launch for about $7 million on SpaceX’s vehicle. In addition, in 2005, the 

Air Force began pursuing a hybrid launch vehicle to support tactically and

conventionally deployed satellites. The project is known as Affordable 

Responsive Spacelift, or ARES, and the Air Force has obtained internal 

approval to build a small-scale demonstrator that would carry satellites 

about two to five times larger than TacSats. 

 5

Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). 

Page 11 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
DOD has several challenges to overcome in pursuing a responsive tactical 

capability for the warfighter. Although DOD and others are working to 

develop small, low-cost launch vehicles for placing satellites like the 

TacSats into space, such a vehicle has yet to be developed, and TacSat 1 

has waited nearly 2 years since its completion to be launched. Transferring 

knowledge from the science and technology community to the acquisition 

community is also a concern, given that these two communities have not 

collaborated well in the past. Further, it may be difficult to secure funding

for future TacSat science and technology projects since DOD allocates the 

majority of its research and development money to acquisition programs. 

Finally, there is no departmentwide vision or strategy for implementing 

this new capability, and the recent loss of leadership makes it uncertain to

what extent efforts to develop low-cost, responsive tactical capabilities 

such as TacSats will continue to be pursued. 

While DOD has delivered TacSat 1 on time and within budget, the satellite 

is not yet operational because it lacks a reliable low-cost—under 

$10 million—small launch vehicle to place it in orbit. TacSat 1’s original 

launch date was in 2004 on the SpaceX’s first flight of its low-cost small 

launch vehicle. However, because of technical difficulties with the launch 

vehicle and launch facility scheduling conflicts, the TacSat 1 launch has 

been delayed 2 years and more than $2 million has been added to the total 

mission costs. 6 SpaceX now plans to use a different small satellite for its 

first launch.

DOD Faces Several 

Challenges in 

Pursuing Responsive 

Tactical Capabilities 

for Warfighters 

DOD Has Yet to Provide a 

Low-Cost, Small Launch 

Vehicle 

Placing satellites in orbit at a low cost has been a formidable task for DOD 

for more than two decades because of elusive economies of scale. There is 

a strong causal relationship between satellite capabilities and launch lift. 

As capabilities and operational life are added, satellites tend to become 

heavier, requiring a launch vehicle that can carry a heavier payload. With 

longer-lived satellites, fewer launches are needed, making per unit launch 

costs high. In addition, the high cost of a large launch vehicle can only be 

justified with an expensive, long-living multimission satellite. Ultimately, 

the high cost of producing a complex satellite has created a low tolerance 

for risk in launching the satellite and a “one shot to get it right” mentality. 

Over the past 10 years, DOD and industry have attempted to develop a 

low-cost launch vehicle. Three launch vehicles in DOD’s inventory—the 

Pegasus, Taurus, and, to some extent, the Minotaur—were designed to 

 6

Mission costs include spacecraft, launch, equipment, ground station preparation, and 

1 year of flight operations. 

Page 12 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
provide space users with a low-cost means of quickly launching small 

payloads into low-earth orbit. 7 DOD expected that relatively high launch 

rates, from both commercial and government use, would keep costs down, 

but the market for these launch vehicles did not materialize. For example, 

since its introduction in 1990, Pegasus has launched only 36 times, an 

average of 3 launches per year; Taurus has been launched only 7 times 

since it was introduced in 1994. The average cost of these launch vehicles

is $16 million to $33 million. To provide another avenue for launching 

small satellites, the Air Force has proposed refurbishing part of its fleet of

decommissioned intercontinental ballistic missiles—450 of which have

been dismantled. The cost of retrofitting the missiles and preparing them 

for launch is about $18 million to $23 million. However, one Air Force 

official questioned whether these vehicles are too large for current 

TacSats. 

Some new developers in the space industry are cautiously optimistic about 

the small satellite market. For example, SpaceX signed seven contracts to 

launch various small satellites, including TacSat 1. Despite this optimism, 

SpaceX’s first launch of its new vehicle has yet to occur—in part because

it lacks a suitable launch facility. The launch facilities located in the 

United States cannot readily accommodate quick-response vehicles. 

Vandenberg Air Force Base—one of two major launch sites in the United 

States—has lengthy and detailed scheduling processes and strict safety 

measures for preparing for and executing a launch, making it difficult to 

launch a small satellite within a tight time frame and at a low cost.8

SpaceX’s launch of TacSat 1 at Vandenberg was put on hold because of the 

potential risks it posed to a billion-dollar satellite that was waiting to be 

launched from a nearby pad. In addition, the Air Force licensed the use of

another nearby pad at Vandenberg to a contractor for larger-scale 

launches. Given the proximity of the launch pads, SpaceX’s insurance 

premium increased 10-fold, from about $50,000 to as much as $500,000, 

which added $2.3 million to TacSat 1’s total mission costs. Because of 

these delays, SpaceX decided to carry a different experimental satellite on

its first launch and to use a launch facility on Kwajalein Atoll, in the 

Pacific Ocean.9

 The potential effect of changes—such as increased 

 7

Pegasus, Taurus, and Minotaur launch vehicles are built by Orbital Sciences Corporation. 

8

The other launch facility, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, is currently not expected to be

used for TacSats launches.

9

The tentative launch window for the first flight of SpaceX’s launch vehicle is March 20

through 25, 2006. 

Page 13 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
premiums or the need to transport satellites to distant locations—on 

efforts to keep costs low and deliver capabilities to the warfighter sooner 

is unknown. 

The Air Force is beginning to examine ways to better accommodate a new 

generation of quick-response vehicles. For example, Air Force officials are 

examining the feasibility of establishing a location on Vandenberg 

specifically for these vehicles that is separate from the larger launch 

vehicle pads. Officials are also assessing the suitability of other locations, 

such as Kodiak Island, for quickly launching small satellites. 

Procurement of TacSats by 

DOD’s Acquisition 

Community May Be 

Hindered by Limited 

Transfer of Knowledge and 

Requirements Instability 

To achieve a low-cost, on-demand tactical capability for the warfighter, 

the TacSat experiments will need to be transitioned into the acquisition 

community. We have previously reported that DOD’s acquisition 

community has been challenged to maximize the amount of knowledge 

transferred from the science and technology community, and that DOD’s 

science and technology and acquisition organizations need to work more 

effectively together to achieve desired outcomes. Many of the space 

programs we reviewed over the past several decades have incurred 

unanticipated cost and schedule increases because they began without 

knowing whether technologies could work as intended and invariably 

found themselves addressing technical problems in a more costly 

environment.10 Although DOD recently developed a space science and 

technology strategy to better ensure that labs’ space technology efforts 

transition to the acquisition community, the acquisition community 

continues to question whether labs adequately understand acquisition 

needs in terms of capabilities and time frames. As a result, the acquisition 

community would rather use its own contractors to maintain control over 

technology development. 

According to DOD officials, action has been taken to improve the level of 

collaboration and coordination on the TacSat experiments. Officials from 

DOD laboratories involved in TacSats and acquisition communities agree 

that they are working better together on the experiments than they have 

on past space efforts. However, in pursuing a low-cost, on-demand tactical 

capability, the science and technology and acquisition communities have 

moved forward on somewhat separate tracks, and it is unclear to what 

 10GAO, Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy 

Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More

Robust, GAO-05-155 (Washington D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005). 

Page 14 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
extent the work and knowledge gained by the labs will be leveraged when 

the TacSat experiments are transferred to the acquisition community. For 

example, the Air Force and Navy labs are working to develop bus 

standards for the TacSat experiments that are scheduled to be transitioned 

to the Space and Missile Systems Center, the Air Force’s acquisition arm, 

in fiscal year 2008. Yet, the Space and Missile Systems Center, working 

with the Aerospace Corporation, has proposed three different options for 

standardizing the bus. While two of the options are generally larger—and 

are intended for larger space assets—one of the proposed designs may be 

suitable for TacSats, although it will likely be costlier than a lab-generated 

counterpart.

In addition, our past work has shown that DOD’s space programs—as well 

as other large DOD programs—have been unable to adequately define 

requirements and keep them stable, and seldom achieve a match between 

resources and requirements at the start of the acquisition. One factor that

contributes to poorly defined and unstable requirements is that space 

acquisition programs have historically attempted to achieve full capability 

in a single step and serve a broad base of users, regardless of the design 

challenge or the maturity of technologies. Given this track record, some 

DOD officials expressed concern over Space and Missile Systems Center’s 

ability to adopt the TacSat approach of delivering capabilities that are 

good enough to meet a warfighter need within cost and schedule 

constraints. Air Force officials identified the center’s organizational 

culture of risk avoidance and the acquisition process as two of the most 

significant barriers to developing and deploying space systems quickly. 

Short-Term Funding for 

Upcoming TacSats 

Uncertain 

TacSats 1 and 2 have been fully funded within DOD, and TacSats 3 and 

4 were recently funded. However, funding is uncertain for TacSats beyond

3 and 4. While the Congress added funding to DOD’s 2006 budget to 

support TacSat efforts, such as developing bus standards, DOD did not 

request such funding. According to a DOD official, there would not be an 

effort to develop bus standards if funding had not come from the 

Congress. 

Historically, DOD’s research and development budget has been heavily

weighted to system acquisitions—80 percent of this funding goes to 

weapon system programs, compared with 20 percent going to science and 

technology. In addition, science and technology funding is spread over 

thousands of projects, while funding for weapon system programs is 

spread over considerably fewer, larger programs. This funding distribution 

can encourage financing technology development in an acquisition 

Page 15 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
program. However, as we have previously reported, developing 

technologies within an acquisition program typically leads to cost and 

schedule increases—further robbing the science and technology 

community and other acquisition programs of investment dollars. 

Lack of DOD-wide Strategy 

and Loss of Leadership 

DOD currently has no departmentwide strategy for providing a responsive 

tactical capability for the warfighter. Without such a strategy, it is 

unknown whether and to what degree there may be gaps or overlaps in 

efforts. DOD efforts to develop low-cost satellite and launch capabilities 

are moving forward under multiple offices at different levels (see table 2). 

Table 2: DOD Current Planning Efforts 

DOD organization Planning action 

National Security Space Office 

(primarily aligned with the Secretary 

of the Air Force as Executive Agent 

for Space) 

• Developing a responsive space 

investment architecture and road 

map 

U.S. Strategic Command 

(primarily aligned with the Secretary of 

Defense via the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 

• Developing a joint capabilities 

document 

Air Force Space Command (primarily 

aligned with U.S. Strategic Command) 

• Developing four initial capabilities 

documents 

• Planning for establishment of an 

acquisition office 

• Developing Enabling Concept 

Document 

Space and Missile Systems Center 

(primarily aligned with Air Force Space 

Command) 

• Planning for establishment of an 

acquisition office 

• Planning for establishment of an 

office that coordinates the transition 

of experiments to acquisition 

programs 

Source: DOD. 

Since these efforts are occurring simultaneously, it is unclear how and if 

they will be used to inform one another. Moreover, there are different 

visions for the roles of low-cost, responsive satellites and launch vehicles

in DOD’s overall space portfolio. For example, one Air Force official 

stated his office is looking for direction from the Congress on how to 

move forward rather than from somewhere within DOD. Further, when 

interviewed, other Air Force officials were not in agreement over how the 

Air Force’s vision for using TacSats fits in with OFT’s proposed use of this

capability for DOD. 

Page 16 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
In addition to the lack of a DOD-wide strategy, the recent departure of key 

personnel may have created a gap in leadership, making it uncertain to 

what extent efforts to develop tactical capabilities such as TacSats will be

pursued. As we reported in November 2005, program success hinges on 

whether leaders can make strategic investment decisions and provide 

programs with the direction or vision for realizing goals and alternative 

ways of meeting those goals.11

One official involved in developing the overall architecture described the

pursuit of these capabilities as a “grassroots effort,” underscoring the 

importance of having enthusiastic individuals involved in moving it 

forward. According to a number of DOD officials, the former OFT director 

was widely respected within and outside the agency and served as a 

catalyst for transformation across DOD, and was credited with

championing and pursuing innovative concepts that could sustain and 

broaden military advantage. With the departure of the OFT director and 

other key advocates of the TacSat concept, service lab officials told us 

they are concerned about the fate of the TacSat experiments. DOD 

officials we spoke with acknowledged that there is no agreement on who 

should ultimately be responsible for deciding the direction of the TacSat 

experiments and other efforts to develop low-cost responsive tactical

capabilities for the warfighter. 

DOD’s experiences developing a tactical capability for the warfighter 

through TacSats may be used to inform the way major space systems are 

acquired. Specifically, DOD’s process for developing TacSat 1 reflects best 

practices that larger space system programs could employ to achieve 

better acquisition outcomes. In addition, some DOD officials believe that 

these efforts—focusing on delivering capabilities to the warfighter through 

TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles—could lead to long-term 

benefits, including providing opportunities for major space systems to test 

new technologies, enhancing the skills of DOD’s space workforce, and 

broadening the space industrial base. 

Experiences with 

TacSats May Inform 

Major Space System 

Acquisitions and Lead 

to Long-Term Benefits 

 11GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to

Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2005). 

Page 17 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
Our past work has shown that commercial best practices—such as 

managing requirements, using mature technologies, and developing 

technology within the science and technology community—contribute to

successful development outcomes. TacSat 1 confirms that applying these

practices can enable projects to meet cost and schedule targets. While 

TacSat 1, as a small experimental satellite with only a few requirements, is 

much less complex than a major space system, we have reported that 

commercial best practices are applicable to major space system 

acquisitions and recommended that DOD implement them for such 

acquisitions. Despite our recommendation, DOD’s major space system 

acquisitions have yet to consistently apply these best practices. 

• Manage requirements. DOD’s major space acquisition programs have 

typically not achieved a match between requirements and resources 

(technology, time, and money) at program start. Historically, these 

programs have attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, 

regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of technologies 

needed to achieve the full capability. As a result, these programs’ 

requirements have tended to be unstable—that is, requirements were 

changed, added, or both—which has led to the programs not meeting 

their performance, cost, and schedule objectives. We have found that 

when resources and requirements are matched before individual 

programs are started, programs are more likely to meet their 

objectives. One way to achieve this is through an evolutionary 

development approach, that is, pursue incremental increases in 

capability versus significant leaps. 

• Use mature technologies. DOD’s major space acquisition programs 

typically begin product development before critical technologies are 

sufficiently matured, forcing the program to mature technologies after 

product development has begun. Our reviews of DOD and commercial 

technology development cases indicate that demonstrating a high level 

of maturity before new technologies are incorporated into product 

development puts those programs in a better position to succeed. 

• Develop technology within the science and technology environment.

DOD’s space acquisition programs tend to take on technology 

development concurrently with product development, increasing the 

risk that significant problems will be discovered late in development 

and that more time, money, and effort will be needed to fix these 

problems. Our reviews have shown that developing technologies 

separate from product development greatly minimizes this risk. 

Page 18 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
DOD officials and industry representatives we spoke with also noted that 

some long-term benefits could result from focusing on delivering 

capabilities to the warfighter quickly. 

• First, small, low-cost, responsive satellites like the TacSats could 

augment major space systems—provided there is a means to launch the

satellites. Because TacSats do not require significant investment and 

are not critical to multiple missions, the consequence of failure of a 

TacSat is low. In contrast, major space systems typically are large, 

complex, and multimission, and take many years to build and deliver. If 

a major space satellite fails, there are significant cost and schedule 

consequences. Ultimately, the already long wait time for the warfighter 

to receive improved capabilities is extended. 

• Second, developing small, low-cost launch vehicles could provide an 

avenue for testing new technologies in space. According to DOD 

officials, less than 20 percent of DOD’s space research and 

development payloads make it into space, even while relying heavily on 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Space Shuttle, 

which was most recently grounded for 2 1⁄2 years. We recently reported 

that DOD’s Space Test Program, which is designed to help the science 

and technology community find opportunities to test in space relatively 

cost-effectively, has only been able to launch an average of seven 

experiments annually in the past 4 years.12 According to industry 

representatives and DOD officials, efforts to develop a small, low-cost 

launch vehicle could improve the acquisition process because testing 

technologies in an operational environment could lower the risk for 

program managers by providing mature technologies that could be 

integrated into their acquisition programs. 

• Third, giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale 

projects like TacSats from start to finish may better prepare them for 

managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions in the future. 

According to Navy and Air Force lab officials, managing the TacSat 

experiments has provided hands-on experience with the experiment 

from start to finish, unlike the experience provided to program 

managers of large systems at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems 

Center. 

 12GAO-05-155. 

Page 19 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
• Finally, building low-cost, responsive satellites and launch vehicles 

could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete 

for DOD contracts and thereby increase competition and broaden the 

space industrial base. In April 2005, over 50 small companies sent 

representatives to the Third Responsive Space Conference, an effort 

hosted by a small private launch company. An industry representative 

stated that a number of small companies are excited about developing 

TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles and the potential to garner 

future DOD contracts, but he cautioned that it would be important to 

maintain a steady flow of work in order to keep staff employed and 

preserve in-house knowledge. Other industry representatives told Air 

Force officials that they are receiving mixed signals from the 

government regarding its commitment to these efforts—there has been 

a lot of talk about them, but relatively little funding. In addition, 

another industry representative stated that requirements must be 

contained; otherwise, costs will increase and eventually squeeze small 

companies back out of the business. 

For more than two decades, DOD has invested heavily in space assets to 

provide the warfighter with critical information needed to successfully 

conduct military operations. Despite this investment, DOD has been 

challenged to deliver its major space acquisitions quickly and within 

estimated costs. TacSat 1—an experimental satellite—has shown that by 

matching user requirements with available resources, using mature 

technologies, and developing technologies separate from product 

development, new tactical capabilities can be delivered quickly and at a 

low cost. By establishing a capabilities selection process, the TacSat 

initiative has also helped to ensure that future TacSats will address highpriority warfighter needs. At the same time, the TacSats may demonstrate 

an alternative approach to delivering capabilities sooner—that is, using an 

incremental approach to providing capabilities, rather than attempting to 

achieve the quantum leap in capability often pursued by large space 

systems, which leads to late deliveries, cost increases, and a high 

consequence of failure. By not optimizing its investment in TacSat and 

small launch efforts, DOD may fail to capitalize on a valuable opportunity 

to improve its delivery of space capabilities. As long as disparate entities 

within DOD continue moving forward without a coherent vision and 

sustained leadership for delivering tactical capabilities, DOD will be 

challenged to integrate these efforts into its broader national security 

strategy. 

Conclusions 

Page 20 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
To help ensure that low-cost tactical capabilities continue to be developed 

and are delivered to the warfighter quickly, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense assign accountability for developing and 

implementing a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low-cost, responsive 

tactical capabilities—both satellite and launch—for the warfighter, and 

identify corresponding funding. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD 

concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated where appropriate. DOD’s letter is reprinted as 

appendix II.

We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional committees. We 

will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report 

will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to the report are Arthur Gallegos, Maricela 

Cherveny, Jean Harker, Leslie Kaas Pollock, Noah B. Bleicher, and Karen 

Sloan. 

Sincerely yours, 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 21 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 22 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the outcomes to date from the TacSat experiments and efforts to

develop small, low-cost launch vehicles, we interviewed Department of 

Defense (DOD) officials in the Office of Force Transformation, 

Washington, D.C.; Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, 

Colorado; Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, 

California; Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New 

Mexico, and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; U.S. Naval Research 

Laboratory, Washington, D.C.; and the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, Virginia, via written questions and responses. We also 

analyzed documents obtained from these officials. In addition, we 

interviewed industry representatives involved in developing large space 

systems and small commercial launch vehicles. 

To understand the challenges to DOD’s efforts and to determine whether 

DOD’s experiences with TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles could 

inform major space system acquisitions, we analyzed a wide body of GAO 

and DOD studies that discuss acquisition problems and associated 

challenges, including our work on best practices in weapon system 

development that we have conducted over the past decade. In addition to

having discussions with officials at the Office of Force Transformation, the 

Air Force Space Command, the Space and Missile Systems Center, and the 

Air Force and Navy research labs, we spoke with officials from the 

National Security Space Office, Virginia, and the Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington, D.C. We conducted our review from June 2005 to March 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 23 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

(120457) Page 24 GAO-06-449 Space Acquisitions 
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