T h e M t. J u liet P la n n ing C o m m issio n w a s la te r a d d e d a s a d e fen d a n t. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 9, 200 3 S es sio n STS/ BAC JO INT VENTURE v . THE CI TY OF MT. J ULI ET,

TEN NES SEE ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Wilson Cou nty No. 99205 Charles K . Sm ith, Chan cellor

No. M2003- 00171-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 1, 2004

T h e d ev el o p e r o f ap l an n ed W i l s o n C o u n t y s u b d i v i s i o n s o u gh td am age s fo r at em p o ra ryt ak i n g, c la imi ng that th e Ci ty of Mt

. Julie t in te rf e re d w iththec omp le tio n o f the pr oje c t by arb itr ari ly ref using to g rant ne cessa

ry permits. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt to Mt. J uliet, in part o n th e g r o u n dth a t th e s tatu teo f li mi tati o n s h a dp a s s e do n the developer’ s c laim f o r r e li e f

. We a ff irm. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN , and F R ANK G. C L E ME NT J R ., J J ., joined.
Geor g e A. De an, Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, STS/BAC J oint Venture.
John E. Qu inn , Do ug la s B

. Jann e y I I I , Na sh vil le , Te nn e sse e , fo r the app e lle e s, Th e City of Mt. Julie t, Tenne ssee and the Mt. J uliet Planning Commissi on. OP IN ION
This case beg an whe n t he deve loper of a subdivision fil ed a c omplaint on May 26, 1999, ag ainst the city of Mt . J uliet alleg ing, inte r a lia , that the city , throug h its planning commission, had 1 arbitra rily and illeg ally

denied a pprovals for further development of the project, thereby depriving the deve loper of be nefic ial use of his prope rty in violation of the taking s clause s of both the United States Consti tution and the Tennessee Const itution. The developer alleg ed that fr om late 1995 or early 1996, the city

either de n ied applications for permits or delay ed ac tion on such applications.T h e re le v a n t f a c ts a re ta k e n fro m fil ing s m a d e in su p p o rt o f an d o p p o sitio n to d isp o sitive m o tio n s fil e d b y a ll 2
p arti es a t va riou s t i m es.

T h e Ci t y M an ag er ’ s a f

f i dav i t s t at ed t h at h i s l et t er r ef er r ed on l y t o t h e W i l s on Coun t y z on i n g r eg u l at i on s , n ot 3
to a ll o f W ilso n C o u n ty’s l a n d us e re g u la tio n s.

-2- The c ase w as eve ntually

dismiss ed by

final orde r g ranting the city ’s motion f o r sum mary j u d g m e n ta n dt h e c o m m i s s i o n ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s
. In t h a to r d e r t h e tr i a l c o u rth e l d , “ S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Court f

inds that Plaintiff’ s claims ag ainst Def endants arebarr ed by

the statute of limitations and applicable law.”
I. A P L ANNE D S UB DI VI S I ON
Th e pr op ert y in di sp uteis a 24 0- 25 0 a c retr a c t of

la ndin Wi lso n Co un ty

wh ic h N a sh vil le L and Partne rs ac quired for the purpose of

cre ating a lar g e re sidential development to be c ompleted in p ha se s. Th e plan w a s to div idethepr op e rty , c a lle d the Park Gl e n su bd ivi sio n, int o 7 40 se pa rate 2 lots, to be service d by

a new infrastruc ture of r oads and utilities. A preliminary subdivision pl an wa s prese nted to the Wils on CountyPlanning Commission and approved on May 14, 1987.
At the time of the approval and there afte r, Wil son County had a subdivision reg ulation that stated, “a pproval of the preliminary plat shall lapse unless a

final plat base d there on is submit ted within one-y ear

from the date of such approva l. .

. .” Another reg ulation in eff ect madeit clear

that “appr oval of the pr eliminary plat by the Planning Commi ssion sha ll not constit ute ac ceptance of the final plat.”
Na sh vil le L a ndPartne rs a sk e d th e City of Mt. Julie t to e xten d its sa nit ary se we r s y ste m to Park Glen. O n J uly

13, 1987, Nashville L and Partne rs and the Mt. Juli et Sewer Boa rd sig ned an ag ree ment allocating the costs and oblig ations of the sew er e x tensions betwee n the parties. The owner also urg ed the City

of Mt. J uliet to annex the subdivi sion property

. On Novembe r 10, 1987, Danny Fa rmer, Mt Juli et’s City

M anag er w rote a

brief le tter to Nashville L and Partne rs that re ad: The policy

of the Cit y o f M t

. J u liet, in reg ard to the annexation of the above ref ere nced subdivision into the city , is that it will be allowed to c on fo rm t o t he curr ent Wils on Countyzoning since the preliminary plot (sic) has be en appr oved by theWils on Cou nty

Pla nn ing Com mis sio n and wo rk ha s c omm e nc e d on thepr oje c t. The leg al ef

fec t of that letter became a point of c ontention betwee n the parties. I n November 3 of 1987, the subdivision property was annexed by

the city , transfe rring authority over the subdivision to the M t. Jul ie t P lan n in g Co mm is s io n
. A t th e ti meo f th e a n n e xa ti o n , M t. Ju li e t, li k e Wil son County , had a subdivision reg ulation pr oviding that if a final plat for a subdivision t hat has re ceive d preliminary

approva l is not submitt ed within twe lve months of the preliminary plat approva l, then the pre liminary plat is null and void and must be resubmitted for preliminary approva l a g ain. A final plat was submitted to the Wil son CountyPlanning Commission, butwas de nied by that commissionT h e m e m b e rs o f t h e jo int v e n tur e a re the N a sh v ill e C o rp o ra tio n , In c . an d a n ind ivid u a l na m e d B re n t C a m p b e ll. 4

A pp ar ent l y ST S/ B A C i ni t i al l y t oo k t he po s i t i on i t ha d onl y pur cha s ed l ot s , not t he devel op ment , whi ch was 5

r el eva nt t o re s po ns i bi l i t y for i nf r as t r uct ur e. -3- on No ve mbe r 1 2, 19 87

. With in on e y e ar of theMay 19 87 app ro va l of

Park Gl e n’ s p re lim ina

ry plat, Nashville L and Partne rs s ubmitted a final plat for some phases or se ctions of the subdivision, and approva l for those plats wa s g rante d by the Mt. J uliet Planning Commissi on since annexation had occur red. Muc h of the subdivision wa s n ot cover ed by these fina l plats. No final plat for the re m ai n de r o f the su bd ivi sio n w a s e ve r s ub mitte d to theMt. Julie t Plann ing Com mis sio n b y Na sh vil le L a ndPartne rs
. Na sh vil le L a ndPartners def ault e d o n it s o bli g a tio ns , andits le nd e r w a s p la c e d in to rec eivers h i p , with the Fe dera l Deposit I nsuranc e Corporation seiz ing its asse ts in 1991. A joint venture called STS/BAC (“ develope r”) purcha sed the disputed prope rty i n a De cembe r 1993 4 fore closure sa le. By that time, the property consisted of 47 platted and de veloped lots in Sections 5 1, 2, and 3 of the subdivision, and additional unplatted acr eag e.
At so me po in t aft er th e pu rcha se, S TS /BAC began effo rt s to dev elo p mo re of P ark G len . By letter dated Marc h 31, 1995, the city informed STS/BAC that the c ommissi on had not appr oved a p r e li mi n ary

p lan f o r Ph a s e I I , Se c ti o n s 1 a n d2 o f Pa rk G le n Su b d iv is io n
. T h e le tt e r c o ntinued,

“ B a se d o n y ou r dis c us sio n w iththeCom mis sio n o n M arc h 1 6, 19 95 , a ne w p re lim ina

ry plan mu st be submitted and appr oved by the Planning Commission.”
The de veloper

place d on thea g e n d a

for the A pril 1995 commission m eeting the orig inal 1987 prelimi n ar y

plat for Par

k Glen subdivision for pre liminary approva l, but withdrew it after staff indicated it would rec ommend ag ainst approva l be cause of noncompliance with co m m ission require ments reg arding a conc ept plan.
I n May of 1995, STS/BAC submitt ed for preliminary

approva l a sec tion of the Park Glen subdivision (L ots 82-132 in Sec tion 3)

. Preliminary approva l w as g rante d by the commission and on November

30, 1995 , final appr oval for spe cified lots cove red by that preliminary

plat was g rante d.
Prior to the commission’s J une 27, 1996, mee ting, the de veloper reque sted approval of a conce pt plan, but did not subm it a preliminary plat for the subdivision. The next ac tivityref lected in the rec ord wa s a commission meeting on J anuary 15, 1998, wher ein the deve loper told the commission itwas the dev el o p er ’s p osition t hat no new pr eliminary subdivision pl at had to be submitt ed for approva l be causeof the 1987 a pproval by

the Wils on County

Planning Commission. Ba sed upon an opinion fr om counsel, the c ity eng ineer ag ain t o o k t h e p o sition t hat the appr oval g rante d by

the Wils on County P l an n i n g Commi ssion had lapsed one y ear later. Thecommission continued to adhere to its interpre tation of t he reg ulation, to conclude the re w as no valid pre liminary plat, and to r equire that the develope r submit a new preliminary plat for the subdivision as a w hole.A s a c o n se q u e n c e , so m e o f th e c la im s a n d r e q u e sts fo r re lief inc lud e d in the c o m p la int w e re re n d e re d m o o t, 6 le a v ing o n ly th e ta k ing s c la im a t issu e
. S C A C h em i ca l W a st e S erv i ce s, In c. v. K o n i g sb erg , 636 S. W

. 2d 430 ( T en n
. 1982) (holdi ng t hat where cl ean ai r p erm i t w as i ss ued a f t er ap p eal p erf

ect ed , the act i o n was mo o t as t o request fo r orde r t o i ss ue p erm i t ).

G o v e rn m e n t ac tio n tha t d e n ie s a lan d o w n e r a ll u s e o f h is p ro p e rty fo r a p e rio d o f t im e , i f suc h a c tio n is

7 d e te rm ine d to b e a tak ing , i s c o m p e n sa b le

. F irst E n g lish E v a n g e lica l C h u rc h o f G le n d a le v . C o . L o s A n g e le s, 482 U

. S. 3 0 4 , 3 0 4 , 1 0 7 S . C t. 2 3 7 8 , 2 3 8 8 ( 1 9 8 7 ) (h o ld ing “w h e re the go v e rn m e n t’s ac tio n s h a v e a lre a d y w o rk e d a tak ing o f all
u s e of pr oper t y , n o s u bs equ en t a ct i on by t h e g ov er n men t ca n r el i ev e i t of t h e du t y t o pr ov i de compe n s at i on for t h e per i od dur i ng wh i ch t he t aki ng was ef fect i ve. ”)

-4- The minutes of the J u l y 16, 1998 meeting of the Commission reflect that the de veloper appea red and stated he ha d submit t ed a pr eliminary plat for another sec tion of Park Glen and reque sted i t b e p lace d on the ag enda. A g ain, Commiss ion staff re iterate d its posit ion that the d ev el o p er m ust submitan pre liminary plat for the subdivision as a w hole as a prer equisite to any further development of

Park Glen. The d ev el o p er again arg ued that the 1987 a pproval of the preliminary

plat was still effe ctive and no ne w pre liminary plat was re quired.
Ac c or din g to a ff

idavit s d a te d A ug us t of

20 00 , at th a t po int

the reha d b e e n n o o the r e ff orts by the deve loper to obtain commission approval f or further de velopment of the s u bdivision. No preliminary

plat for the subdivis i o n as a w hole had be en submitted. The subdivision had been de ve lop e d to thee xten t pe rm itt e d b y app ro ve d andre c or de d p lats.
Whe n th e de ve lop e r f

ile d th is a c tio n in May

of 19 99 , it a lle g e d th a t a ft e r l a te 19 95 or e arl y 19 96 , c on str

uc tio n on the de ve lop me nt c a me to a ha lt b e c aus e thede ve lop e r w a s u na bleto o btain nece ssary ap p roval for additional plans and pe rmits from the Mt. J uliet Reg ional Planning Com mis sio n. Whil e thelit ig a tio n w a s p e nd ing , a pp ro va ls fo r fu rthe r d e ve lop me nt w e reg ive n in 2001. At the t i m e of the fina l judgment, the only issue befor e the tria l court wa s whether the 6 develope r’s c laims to compensatory damag es for

a temporary taking of its property prior to 2001 7 sh ou ld b e dis mis se d o n s ub stanti ve or statut e of lim itatio ns g ro un ds

. II. T HE L A W O F G OV ERN M ENTA L T AKI NGS
Th e de ve lop e r’ s c omp la int wa s br ou g ht pu rs uant to 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 andc ha ra c te ri zedMt. J uliet’s ref

usal to g rant the reque sted permits as ar bitrary and ca pricious ac tions that worked a ta king (a te mpo ra

ry takin g in vie w of e ve ntu a l app ro va l) of the de ve lop e r’ s pr op e rtywi th ou t j ust compensation, i n v i o l at i o n of the both the Te nnessee and United States Constituti ons. The complaint soug ht $ 2 milli on in c ompensatory damag es and attorne y s’ fe es in ac cordance w ith 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 8. B e caus e th e tria l c ou rt dis mis se d th e c omp la int un de r e ith e r, or

bo th, app lic able s u b s t an t i v e l aw an ds t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s gro u n d s , s o m e di s cu s s i o n o f th e la w o f r egu l at o ryt ak i n gs i s n e c e s s ary.
The sec ond clause of the F ifth Amendment to the Unit ed States Consti tution, called the Taking s Clause or the Just C ompensation Clause, provides “ nor shall private property be take n for-5-

public use, without just compensation.” This clause is predicated on the p ro p o s i t i o n that the g overnme nt should pay

for private prope rty it has taken for its own use. Its purpose is to preve nt the g ov e rn me nt fr om fo rc ing a n in div idu a l or g ro up of ind ivi du a ls a lon e to b e ar b ur de ns “ wh ic h, in a ll fairne ss and justice, should be borneby the public as a

whole.” Palazzolo v . Rhode Island , 5 33 U. S. 6 0 6 , 6 1 8 , 121 S. Ct . 2448, 2457-58 (2001) ; Do lan v . Ci ty of T iga rd , 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Armstrong v. United States , 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. C t. 1563 (1960).
Th e Ta kin g s Claus e of the Un ite d State s Con sti tutionwa s g e ne rally un de rs too d to app ly

on ly to phy sical t aking s until the United States Supreme Court held in Pennsylv ania Coal C o. v. Mahon , 26 0 U .S. 39 3, 41 5, 43 S. Ct

. 15 8 (1 92 2) that “ wh ile pr op e rty may be re g ulate d to a c e rt a in e xten t, i f re g ulation goe s too far it will be re cog nized as a taking .” The Court did not then, and has not s in c e , e s ta

b li s h e da f o r mu la f o r d e te r mi n in g w h e n r e g u lati o n “ g o e s to o f ar.” Tah oe -S ie rra Preserv ation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re gional Planning Agency , 53 5 U .S. 30 2, 32 6- 37 , 1 22 S. Ct

. 1465, 1481 (2002). I nstead, the Court ha s consistently held that in c ases i n v o l v i n g reg ulatory taking s, examination of multiple factor s is necessa ry
. Id. Where the alleg ation is one of re g ulatory taking , neither public use nor phy sical appr opriation of the land is re quired. Id. , 535 U.S. at 326, 122 S. Ct . at 1481.
The one exception to the ge nera l balancing of fa ctors appr oach is wh er e a governmental reg ulatory

action perm an en t l y eliminates all ec onomic value f rom an e ntire piec e of pr operty by prohibiting a ll economically benef icial use. In that s i t u at i o n, a “pe r se” taking has occ urre d, and “total re g ulatory

taking s” must be compensated unl ess the g overnme nt can show that the proscribed uses wer e not part of the owne r’s intere sts under st ate property and nuisanc e law. Tah oe -S ie rra P re s e r v a t i o n Co u n c il , 53 5 U. S. at 32 4 n .1 9, 33 2, 12 2 S. Ct. a t 14 79 n. 19 , 1 48 4; Luc as v . S ou th Car oli na Coa sta l Co un c il , 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S. C t. 2886, 2895 (1992) (holding “whe n the owner of re al prope rty

has bee n called upon to sa crific e all e c on omi c a lly

be ne fi c ia l us e s inthename of the c ommon good, that is, to leavehis property economically

idle, he has suf

fer ed a ta king.” ) Absent a total taking , the ana ly sis established in Pe nn Ce nt. Tra ns p. Co. v . Ne w York

City , 438 U. S. 104, 98 S. C t. 2646 (1978), will be applied in a fact s p ecific inquiry

. Tah oe -S ie rra Preserv ation Council, 535 U.S. at 332, 342, 122 S. Ct . at 1484, 1489 (holding that the question of whet h er a 32-month moratorium on deve lopment while mandated land-use policies w ereadopted constituted a taking was not to be answe red by any cate g orica l rule, but, instead, by relianc e on the familiar Pe nn Ce ntr

al app ro a c h) ; Pa lazzo lo , 533 U.S. at 617, 121 S. Ct. at 2457. Where g overnme nt reg ulation does not repr esent a total takin g, s u ch a c ase “ nece ssarily entails complex factual assessments of the pur

poses and e conomic ef

fec ts of g overnme nt action.” Brown v. Legal Foundation of W

ashington , 5 38 U. S. 2 16 , 2 34 , 1 23 S. Ct . 1 40 6, 14 18 (2 00 3) ; Tah oe -S ie rra Pre se rv ati on Cou nc il , 5 35 U. S. at 32 3, 12 2 S. Ct. a t 14 65 ; Y ee v . Escondido , 503 U.S. 519, 523, 112 S. Ct . 1522 (1992).
Under Penn Central , reg ulatory taking s claims require “ad hoc, fa ctual inquiries” involving a b a lan c in g o f th e p u b li c a n d p r iv a te in te r e s ts in v o lv e d in th e p arti c u la r c a s e
. T h e f

a c to r s to be considere d include (1) the economic impact of the reg ulation, (2) the deg reeto which the re g ulation-6-

has inte rf e r e d w it hth eo w n e r’s re asonable “distinct investment-bac ked” e x pectations concerning the property , and (3) the c hara cter of the re g ulatory

action. Penn Central , 4 38 U. S. at 12 4- 25 ; 98 S. Ct

. 2646. Othe r r e le v a n t f

a c to r s may a ls o b e c o n s id e r e d

. T h e a n a ly s is , h o w e v e r , mu s t f o c u s o n “the parc el as a

whole.” Tah oe -S ie rra Pr e se rv ati on Cou nc il , 535 U.S. at 326-27, 122 S. Ct. at 1481; Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 130- 131, 98 S. Ct. 2646. “[W] herean owne r possesses a full ‘bundle’ of rig hts, the destruction o f o n e ‘s t rand’ of the bundle is not a taking .” Tahoe-Sierra Prese rvation Cou nc il , 5 3 5 U. S

. at 3 2 7 , 1 2 2 S

. C t

. at1 4 8 1 , q u o t i n g An dr us v . A lla rd , 44 4 U .S. 51 , 6 5- 66 , 1 00 S. Ct. 318 (1979).
Th us , th e Sup re me Cou rt ’s re g ulatory takin g s ju ri sp ru de nc e “ is c ha ra c te ri zedby

‘e sse nti a lly ad hoc, f actua l inquiries,’ desig ned to allow ‘ca ref ul e x amination and weig hing of all the re levant circ umstances.’ ” Legal Foundation of W ashington , 5 38 U. S. at 23 3, 12 3 S. Ct. a t 14 17 -1 8; TahoeSie rra Pre se rv ati on Cou nc il , 5 3 5 U. S

. at3 2 3 , 1 2 2 S

. C t

. at1 4 6 5 , q u o t i n g Pa lazzo lo , 533 U.S . at 636, 121 S. Ct . at 2467 (O’ Connor, J ., concur ring ). Additionally , even w hen something less than all economically viable use has be en destroy ed, or whe n the owner

has not bee n denied a ll economically viable use of

his land, g overnme nt re g ulatio n may

sti ll c on sti tut e a

takin g if su c h r e g ulatio n “d oe s not sub stanti a lly a dv a nc e le g iti mate state intere sts.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Montere y, Ltd. , 526 U. S. 687 , 704 , 1 19 S. Ct. 16 24 , 1 63 6 ( 19 99 ); Agins v. Tiburon , 4 47 U. S. 2 55 , 2 60 (1 98 0) ; Do dd v . H oo d R iv e r Co un ty , 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) . Thus, land use re g ulation can e ffe ct a taking if such re g ulation does no t su bs ta nti a lly

a dv a nc e le g iti mate state int e re sts or de nie s a n ow ne r e c on omi c a lly via bleus e of his land. Key sto ne Bi tum ino us Coa l A sso c . v . D e Be ne dic tis , 480 U.S. 470, 485, 107 S. Ct . 1232 (1987) (re aff irming the Agins test). Almost all of the Sup remeCourt’s holdings on re g ulatory taking s involve the adoption of ordinanc es, re g ulations, or ot her leg islation that limit development or reg ulate land use . Howeve r, in at least one c ase the Court has found that other g overnme ntal reg ulat o ry ac t i v i ty constituted a taking . I n Del Monte Dunes , 526 U.S. at 687, 119 S. Ct . at 1624, the Court consider ed ac tions by a l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t , t ak e n o v e r f i v e ye ar s , d e n yi n g l a n d o w n e r s p e r m i s s i o n t o d e v e l o p t h e i r p r o p e rt y.
I n that case , the landowne rs submitted their initial plan in 1981 in conformance with exi sting zoning and g ener al planning require ments, proposing substantially fe we r units than exis ting re qu ir e me nts wo uld a llo w. Th e plann ing c omm iss ionde nie d th e app lic a tio n, bu t su g g e ste d th a t a proposal for

a spec ified smaller numbe r of units would rec eive f avora ble consider ation. When the landowner s submitt ed a revised proposal meeting those sug g estions, the commission again denied the application and sug g ested an even g reater re duction in the scale of the de velopment, ag ain stating a spec ific number of

units. The landowner s tried ag ain, submitti ng a re vised plan for the num ber of un its su g g e ste d. Th e c omm iss ion a g a in de nie d the a pp lic a tio n. Th e la nd ow ne rs app e a le d to thec ity c ou nc il, wh ic h o ve rr

uledthec omm iss iona ndre fe rr e d th e plan b a c k to thec omm iss ionwi th ins truc tio ns to c on sid e r a pr op os a l f

or e ve n f e we r u nit s.-7-

The landow ners onc e ag ain re duced the number of units to be included in the development to c o mp ly w ith th e c o u n c il ’ s in s tr u c ti o n s a n d s u b mi tt e d f

o u r s p e c if

ic , d e tail e d s ite plans. The commission, nonetheless, ag ain re jected the proposal. The city council ag ain over

ruled the commission, “finding the proposal conc eptually sati s fa ctoryand in conf

ormanc e with the city ’s previous dec isions reg arding , inte r a lia , density , number of units, location on the property , and a c c e ss. ” 52 6 U .S. a t 69 6, 11 9 S. Ct. a t 1632

. Th e c ou nc il ap pr ov e d one of thesit e plans , s ub

je c t to sp e c if ic c on dition s, a ndg rante d an 1 8- mon th c on dition a l us e pe rm it f or thede ve lop me nt.
T h e l a n d o w n e r s s u b m i t t e d a f i n a l p l a n a d d r e s s i n g a l l t h e c o n d i t i o n s s p e c i f i e d b y t h e c i t y. The c ity ’s ar chit ec t u ra l re view committee a pproved the plan, and the sta ff of the planning commission recommende d approva l of the plan as satisfy ing the city ’s conditions. The commission reje cted the r ecommendation of its st aff and denie d approva l of the deve l o p ment plan. The landowner s ag ain appe aled to the city council which denied the final plan, de clined to spec ify what other mea sures the landowner s could take, and re fu s ed t o extend the conditional use permit. The Supreme Court stated that the council did not base its decision on the landowne rs’ failure to meet any of t he specific conditions earlier re quired by the city , but made g ener al finding s as to the plan’s inadequa cies that we re unsupported by the fa cts. The jury found therewas a

taking based on jury

instructions that it shoul d fi n d for the la nd ow ne rs if it fo un d e ith e r that the la nd ow ne rs ha d be e n d e nie d a ll e c on omi c a lly via bleus e of its p r o p e rt y o r t h a tt h e c i t y ’ s r e

j e c t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t i f

f ’ s d e v e l o p m e n tp r o p o s a l d i dn o ts u b s ta nti a lly advanc e a le g itimate public p u rp o s e. 5 2 6 U.S. at 700, 119 S. Ct . at 1634. Ther e wa s sufficient evidenc e for

the jury to conclude that the city ’s purporte d rea sons for denying the development application were invalid and that the city unfairly intended to fore stall any

rea sonable de velopment of the prope rty . 526 U.S. at 703, 119 S. Ct . at 1635.
The c ity ’s ac tions in De l Mont e Du nes wer e desc ribed a s shifting in the nature of the demands madeand its final denial a s inconsistent with it s profe ssional s t aff and its own previous decisions. 526 U.S. at 706, 119 S. Ct. at 1637. There w as also proof that the city

had long been interested in a cquiring the prope rty itself. Id.
I n Del Monte Dunes the Court car efully distinguished the ci t y ’s conduc t in that case f rom other “ routine re g ulatory

decisions.” 526 U.S. at 706-07; 119 S. C t. at 1637. Se e als o Ta ho e -S ie rra Pre se rv ati on Cou nc il , 535 U. S. at 3 34 , 1 22 S. Ct . at 14 85 (d ist ing uis hin g thedil ig e nt andg oo d f a ith eff orts of the board in that c ase from the “stalling ” in Del Monte Dunes ). Further, in Pa lazzo lo , the Co u rt c it ed De l Mo nte Dunes for the statement that, “Gove rnment authorities, of c ourse, may not b u r d e n p r o p e rty

b y imp o s itio n o f

r e p e ti ti v e o r

u n f a ir lan d

- u s e p r o c e d u r e s ino r d e r to a v o ida

f in al decision.” 533 U .S. at 621, 121 S. C t. at 2460.
In f a c t , t h e C o u rt h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n s ar i s e “ i n t h e c a s e o f n o r m a l d e l a ys in obtaining building permits, chang es in zoning ordinanc es, variance s, and the like.

. . .” See TahoeSie rra Pre se rv ati on Cou nc il , 53 5 U. S. at 32 9, 12 2 S. Ct. a t 14 82 ; First Englis h Evange lical Church , 482 U.S. at 321, 107 S

. C t

. at 2378. The Court ha s long r ecog nized the police power of loca l-8-

g overnme nts and has stated that such g overnme nts “may , consistent with the Taking s Clause, aff ect pr op e rty va lue s b y re g ulatio n wi tho ut inc ur ri ng a n ob lig a tio n to c omp e ns a te - - a re a lity [the Cou rt ] acknow ledg e[s] expli citly with respec t to the full scope of th e S t at e’s police power .” Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1023, 112 S. Ct . at 2897.
The de veloper

has not alleg ed a total r eg ulatory taking , and cannot makesuch an a lleg ation in view of the te mporary

nature of the de nial of permits. Further, the develope r has not show n that development or

all economic useof the prope rty was pre vented. Althoug h the deve loper ha s alleg ed that the re fu sal to g rant further pe rmits was arbitra ry , it has not specifica lly alleg ed that the Commi ssion’s decision did not substantially advanc e g overnme ntal interests. The de veloper has not sp e c if ic a lly re fu te d th e Com mis sio n’ s p ro of that it s d e nials w e reba se d o n i ts in te rp re tatio n o f i ts re g ulatio ns re g ard in g t he laps e of a pr e lim ina

ry plan a ft e r o ne y e ar andthede ve lop e r’ s r e fu sa l to submit a new pre liminary plan. These fac ts certainly distinguish the Commiss ion’s acts he re f rom those of the city

in the De l M

on te Du ne s c a se
. I n ad dition , the y are re le vant to the de ve lop e r’ s c la im of ar bitrariness and to any

question of leg itimate gove rnmental intere sts.
Whil e we ha ve se ri ou s do ub ts abo ut the de ve lop e r’ s abil ity to e sta bli sh the elem e nts ne c e ssa ry to a c omp e ns ablete mpo ra

ry takin g , w e no ne the le ss d e c lin e to d e c idethat Mt . Juli e t is e nti tle dt o j u d g m e n ta s a m a t t e r o f s u b s t a n t i v e t ak i n g s l a w b a s e do n t h e r e c o r db e f o r e u s. Ad dition a lly , we be lie ve it is mor e lik e ly thetria l c ou rt ’s dis mis sa l w a s b a se d u po n th e c ity ’s statut e of limitations arg ument. Fr om their brief s, the parties sha

re that interpretation.
III. S TA TU TE O F L I M I T AT I ONS
Th ere i s an ot her r equ ir eme ntof t aki ngs l aw t hatis rel evan t t o o ur d is cus si on of t he ap pl icable statut e of li mi tations . Atakin g of pr op e rty fo r p ub lic us e vio late s th e Ta kin g s Cl aus e on ly

if jus t c omp e ns a tio n is no t paid. “ Th e F if th A me nd me nt d oe s n ot p ro sc ri be thetakin g of pr opert y , it proscribes taking with o u t compensation.” W illiamson C ounty Regional Planning Commission v. Ha mi lto n B an k

of J oh ns on City , 473 U.S. 1 7 2 , 1 94, 105 S. Ct . 3108, 3120 (1985). I f no compensation is due, there is no constitutional violation. Legal Foundation of W ashington , 5 38 U. S. at 240, 123 S. Ct. at 1421.
S i m i l ar l y , t h e r e i s n o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n i f t h e g o v e r n m e n tp r o v i d e s a n a d e q ua te postdeprivation re medy for the property loss and jus t compensation is receive d. Del Monte Dunes , 526 U.S. at 714-15, 119 S. Ct. at 1641.
The F ifth Amendment does not prosc ribe the taking of property ; it proscribes taking wi tho ut j us t c omp e ns a tio n. No r d oe s th e Fift h A me nd me nt r e qu ir e that ju st compensation be paid in advanc e of or conte mporane ously with, the taking ; all that is require d is that a ‘re asonable , ce rt ai n and adequate pr ovision for obtaining compe n s ati o n ’ e xis t a t th e ti me o f th e ta k in g
. I f th e g o v e r n me n t h a s p r o v id e d an a de qu a te pr oc e ss fo r ob ta ini ng c omp e ns a tio n, a nd if re so rt to that pr oc e ss ‘ y ie ld[s ] jus t c omp e ns a tio n, ’ the n th e pr op e rty ow ne r ‘h a s no c la im a g a ins t th e Go ve rn me nt”T he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on i n Ar t i cl e I, S ec t i on 8 provi des t hat “ no man s hal l be .

. . depri ved of hi s l i fe, 8 l i b ert y , or p rop ert y , but b y t he judgm ent of hi s p eers o r the la w o f th e land.” A rt i cl e I, Sec t i o n 21 pro vi d es t hat “ no m a n ’s p a rtic u la r ser v ic e s sh a ll b e d e m a n d e d , o r p ro p e rty ta k e n , o r ap p lied to p u b lic use , w itho u t the c o n se n t o f h is
r epr es en t at i v es or w i t h ou t j u s t compen s at i on bei n g m ade t h er ef or
. ” T h es e pr ov i s i on s appl y t o g ov er n men t al t ak i n g of p ro p e rty. B arge v. Sad l er , 7 0 S .W .3 d 6 8 3 , 6 8 7 n.4 (T e n n . 2 0 0 2 ); Far TowerSi t es , LLC v

. Knox Co. , 126 S. W

. 3d 52, 6 2 -6 3 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 3 ); C ro ss v. M cC u rry , 85 9 S.W

. 2 d 34 9 , 35 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 19 9 3 ).

T h e sa m e vie w is t a k e n o f th e T a k ing s C la u se o f th e U n ited S ta te s C o n stitutio n : i t affirm s the go v e rn m e n t’s 9

au t ho rit y t o co nfi sca t e p rivate p ro p erty, b ut i m p o ses two co nd i t i o ns: t he t ak i ng m ust be fo r a p ub l i c u se, and just
c o m p e n sa tio n m u st b e p a id

. Le gal Foundat i on of Was hi ngt on , 538 U

. S. a t 231- 32, 123 S. Ct

. a t 1417. -9- for a taking

. Thus, we have held that taking claims ag ainst the Fe dera l Governme nt are premature unti l the property owner has availed itself of the proc ess provided by theTu c ke r A c t, 2 8 U .S. C. § 14 91 . Si mil arl y , if a State pr ov ide s a n a de qu a te proce dure f

or seeking just compe nsation, the property owner cannot c laim a violation of theJust Co mpe ns a tio n Cl aus e un til it ha s use d th e pr oc e du rea ndbe e n d e nie d ju st compensation.
W ill iam so n Co un ty , 473 U.S. at 195, 105 S. Ct. at 3120-21 (citations omitted). The r equire ment that a landowne r pursue state re medies for just compensation befor e bringing a claim based on violation of the F ifth Amendment is a ri peness r equire ment applicable to fede ral c ourts. Id. Howeve r, the Supreme Court’s discussion of Te nnessee proce dures f or see king c ompensation for a reg ulatory taking is instructive, along wi t h Tenne ssee holding s, in determining the appr opriate statute of lim itatio ns
. I n W ill iam so n Co un ty , the Court found that t h e p l aintiff’s c laim was not ripe f or re view beca use it had not soug ht jus t co m p en sation pursuant to Tenne ssee law . The Court found that Tenne ssee’ s inverse c ondemnation statutes and proce dures allowed r ecove ry for a taking , including one “e ffe cted by

restric tive zoning laws or de velopment re g ulations,” i.e ., a reg ulatory taking

. Id ., 473 U.S.at 196, 105 S. Ct. at 3121-22. The Court held t hat because the plaintiff had not shown that the inverse condemnation proce dure was unavailable or inadequate, i ts taking c laim was pre mature until ithad used those pr ocedur es to attempt to obtain just compensation. Id. , 473 U.S. at 197, 105 S. Ct . at 3122.
The Tenne ssee Supreme Court ha s interpre ted the taking s provision of the Tenne ssee Constit ution and the law of inversecondemnation consistentlywith the W illiamson C ounty h o l d i n g. 8 Article I , Section 21 of the Te nnessee Constit ution, the Ten n es s ee taking s clause, ha s been interpre ted as re cog nizi ng the rig ht of eminent dom ai n , b u t also as a limitation on that rig ht “by e nti re ly pr oh ibiti ng thetakin g of private pr op e rty

fo r p ri vate pu rp os e s, a ndby re qu iring jus t compensation when private property is taken for

a public use.” J

ac k so n v . M e tro . Kn oxv ill e Ai rp or t 9 Auth. , 922 S.W .2d 860, 861 (Tenn. 1996)

. The Tenne ssee leg islature has implemente d this constitut ional provision throug h adoption of eminent domain and inverse c ondemnation statutes

. Ed war ds v . H allsd ale -P owe ll U

til . D ist

. , 115In add i t i o n t o t he p rovis i o n dis cuss ed earl i er, T enn. C o d e A n n . § 2 9

- 1 6

- 1 2 4 al so p rovides excep t i o ns 10 i nd i cat i ng know l ed ge o r at l east at t ri b ut ab l e kno wl ed ge i s t he key : “ savi ng, how ever, to u n k n o w n o wners and
no nres i d ent s, t welve (12 ) mo nt hs af t er act ual know l ed ge o f s uch o ccup at i o n, not exceed i ng t hree (3) y ears, and s avi ng t o pe r s on s u n der t h e di s abi l i t i es of i n f an cy a n d un s ou n dn es s of m i n d, t we l v e ( 12) mon t h s a f t er s u ch di s abi l i t y i s r emov ed, b u t no t ex c e e d ing ten (1 0 ) ye a rs .”

-10- S.W. 3d46 1, 46 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Jack son , 922 S.W .2d at 861. B oth statutory proce dures a

re me thods by wh ic h a la nd ow ne r c a n e nf

or c e th e ri gh t to jus t c omp e ns a tio n. I nv e rs e c on de mnatio n “ is a shorthand desc ription of t he manner in which a landowner

rec overs just compensation for a taking of prope rty

when c ondemnation proc eeding s have not be en instituted.” Jack son , 922 S.W .2d at 861- 62. Consequently , inverse c ondemnation is the method to be used to obtain jus t compensation, and the statute of

limit ations applicable to such ac tions is t he appr opriate statute to be applied in the lawsuit befor e us. That st atute, Tennessee Code Annotated Sec tion 29-16-124, re quires landowne rs to “commenc e proc eeding s within twelve (12) m o n t h s after the land ha s been a ctually taken possession of, and the w ork of the pr oposed interna l improvement beg un.”
The de veloper

arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed by ruling that the one- y ear

statute of limitations fo r i nv e rs e c on de mnatio n w a s a pp lic ableto h is c omp la int , b e c aus e the word ing of thestatut e implicates a differ ent scena rio than the one pr esente d by this case. It is true that the lang uag e of the statute envisions a phy sical p o s s essi on or intrusion upon the land rather than a reg ulatory

action pr e ve nti ng us e of the la nd

. Ho we ve r, it is cle ar that inve rs e c on de mnatio n is the app ro priate c aus e of ac tion here and that the one y ear statute of limitations applicabl e t o such ac tions is t he cor rec t statute to use. See Pleasant View Ut i l

. Di s t

. v. Vradenburg, 545 S.W .2d 733, 735 (Tenn. 1977) (holding that wher e an e ntitywith the power of eminent domain “destroy s, interrupts or interfer es wi th the c omm on a ndne c e ssa ry us e of re a l pr op e rty

of a no the r.
. . .” su c h a c tio n c on sti tut e s a “taking ,” and the inverse c ondemnation statute and its related limitations statute apply , even in c ases wh e rethe reis n o a c tual e ntry up on thela nd ). Th e qu e sti on is n ot w he the r the on e y e ar s tatut e ap p l i es , b u t , ra t h er , wh en d o es t h e o n e y ear s t ar tru n n i n g.
Under the statute, the trig g ering event f or the running of the statute is the landow ner’ s kn ow le dg e of

thee ntry on to the la ndor

thebe g inn ing of

theimp ro ve me nt a ff

e c tin g thela nda ndits use. Simi larly , the trig g ering event in a r eg ulatory taking s case is the date the landowner knew that 10 the g overnme nt was depriving it of the e conomic use of its prope rty

. I n the ca se bef ore us, that e vent oc c ur re d wh e n the Com mis sio n de nie d the de ve lop e r’ app lic a tio n fo r fu rthe r de ve lop me nt andhe ld that th e de ve lop e r w a s r e qu ir e d to fi le fo r app ro val a ne w p re lim ina

ry plat f or thesu bd ivi sio n a s a wh olea s a

pr e re qu isi te to f

urthe r d e ve lop me nt.
A tho ro ug h re vie w of the re c or d in the tria l cou rt sh ow s that the de ve lop e r’ s p ri mary dis pu te wi th the Com mis sio n wa s the Com mis sio n’ s po sit ion that the orig inal app ro va l by Wils on Cou nty of the pre liminary

plat had lapse d and, conse quent l y , t h e d eveloper wa s require d to submita newA ltho u g h the d e v e lo p e r m a d e so m e a sse rtio n s b e lo w tha t t h e C o m m issio n so u g h t t o re q u ire it to c o m p ly with 11

new s u bdi v i s i on r eg u l at i on s , n o s pec i f i c ex ampl es h av e bee n g i v en
. W e i n t er pr et t h e as s er t i on s as r ef er r i ng t o t he
r equ i r eme n t t h at t h e dev el oper s u bmi t a n ew pl at for pr el i mi n ar y a ppr ov al t h at c ompl i ed wi t h M t

. J u l i et s u bdi v i s i on regul at i o ns. A ny dif

fere n c e b e tw e e n M t Juli et regul at i o ns and W i l son C o unt y regul at i o ns exi st i ng at t he t i m e o f t he
o rig ina l p re lim ina ry a p p ro v a l ha s n o t b e e n p o inte d o u t.

T h e m e rits o f th e p a rtie s’ r e sp e c tive in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e r e g u la tio n s a n d th e ir a p p lica tio n to the se fac ts is 12

n o t b e fo re us
.

T he devel op er ’ s ac t i on i n J ul y 199 8 i n app ear i ng b efore t he C om mi s s i on t o r ei t er at e i t s arg ument t hat no new 13
p re lim ina ry p la t wa s re q u ire d d id no t re -star t t h e ru n n ing o f t h e sta tute o f lim itatio n s. T h e C o m m issio n ha d p re v io u sly
m ad e a f i nal rul i ng on t he i ss ue, and t he l and o wner co ul d not ext end i t s t i m e fo r bri ngi ng a t aki ngs act i o n by ma ki ng a renewed argument agai nst t hat rul i ng. -11- preliminary

plan. The develope r took the position that it did not have to submit a new preliminary plan. 11
The de veloper

was a war e of the C o m mission’s int erpr etation and a pplication of the ordinanc es and r eg u lations to P ark G len in at least Mar ch of 1995 w hen the c ity informed the d e v e l o p e r , a f

f i r m i n g d i s c u s s i o n a tt h e M ar c h m e e t i n g o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n , o f

t h e r e q u i r e m e n t

. In fa c t, the de ve lop e r’ s c omp la int a lle g e s that “f

ro m late19 95 or

e arl y 19 96 ,” thec ity

de nie d p e rm its for f urther de velopment. I n hi s d eposi tion, Mr. Campbell indicated that he be came awa re of the alleg ed “ta

king” of his property

rig ht in late 1995 or ea

rly 1996. The Commission’s posi tion was later r eaf firmed in a me eting on J anua ry 1 5 , 1998, wher e the deve loper a

ppear ed and stated its positi on that no new preliminary plan need besubmitt ed for approva l an dt h e C o m m i s s i o n ad h er ed t o i t s i n t erp re t at i o n o f t h e r egu l at i o n s
. Be ca use the de veloper 12 claims that the Commissi on’s dec ision to require the developer to submit a new pr eliminary plan was the ar b itrary and illeg al ac tion that prevente d development, the time f or the de veloper

to file an action beg an to r

un, at the latest, on J anuary 15, 1998. This la wsuit w as filed May 26 , 1 9 9 9, 13 bey ond the one y ea r s t at ute of limitations. C onsequently , it is t ime barr ed and the trial court c or re c tly g rante d th e c ity ’s a ndtheCom mis sio n’ s d isp os iti ve motion s a nddis mis se d th e la ws uit

. On appe al, the deve loper a rg ues that eve n if the one y ear inverse co n d em n at ion statute of limit ations wereapplicable , the entire caseshould not have bee n dismiss ed bec ause the denial of pe r m i t s w a s a n o n g o i n g d e p r i v a t i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p e r ’ s f u l l u s e o f i t s p r o p e rt y
. C o n s e qu e ntl y , it arg ues, the c ity is still liable for a temporary taking from May 26, 1998, one y ear befor e the f

iling of the c omplaint, until J une of 2001, when development was pe rmitted. We disagr ee. T he ac tion by the Commiss ion that preve nted furthe r d ev el o p m ent until the developer complied with the re qu ir e me nt o f a

ne w p re lim ary plat wa s cle ar, de fi nitive , an d fin a l. Th is is not a situatio n, lik e in Del Monte Dunes , wher e the c ity kept chang ing the require ments and stalled on a f inal decision.
Once the Commiss ion decided that approva l of a new preliminary plat was re quired be fore any further development c ould be appr oved, the de veloper had a choice of ac tion. I t did not decide to file the re quired plat. It did not decide to se ek judicial re view of the merits of the Commission’s-12-

interpre tation. I nst ea d , i t wa i t ed for more than a y ear and filed a

lawsuit seeking to compel the C o m m i s s i o n t o i s s u e p e r m i t s a n d a s k i n g f o r d a m a g e s f

o r d e l a y i n t h e i s s u a n c e o f

s u c h p e r m i t s
. It simplywaited too long , and the a ction is tim e bar red.
IV. C ONCL US I ON
W e af fi rm t h e trial c ourt’s dismissal of the ac tion. Cost s of this appea l are taxed to the appellant, STS/BAC Joi nt Venture

.

___________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE