Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Generic Communications > Information Notices > 1994 > IN 94-13

Information Notice No. 94-13: Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and

Other Components due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment

 UNITED STATES

 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

 February 22, 1994

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-13: UNANTICIPATED AND UNINTENDED MOVEMENT OF FUEL

 ASSEMBLIES AND OTHER COMPONENTS DUE TO

 IMPROPER OPERATION OF REFUELING EQUIPMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to potential problems resulting from inadequate

oversight of refueling operations and inadequate performance on the part of

refueling personnel. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Vermont Yankee Events

The Vermont Yankee facility was in a refueling outage with fuel movement in

progress on September 3, 1993, when an irradiated fuel assembly became

detached from the grapple after being lifted out of its position in the

reactor core. The assembly fell approximately 2.4 m [8 ft] back into its

original location in the reactor core. The licensee suspended fuel handling

and investigated the event. The licensee determined that the grapple had not

properly engaged the lifting bail on the fuel assembly and that the personnel

performing the fuel handling activities had failed to verify proper grapple

engagement. After completing the investigation and taking corrective actions,

the licensee resumed fuel handling activities on September 7, 1993.

On September 9, 1993, a fuel assembly that was being moved to a fuel sipping

can was inadvertently lowered, instead of raised, striking another core

component. The potentially damaged fuel assembly was then moved to the fuel

sipping can and the licensee again suspended fuel handling activities. The

NRC dispatched an augmented inspection team (AIT) on September 9, 1993, to

investigate the fuel handling incidents.

The AIT documented its findings in NRC Inspection Report 50-271/93-81, issued

October 21, 1993. The AIT concluded that mistakes made by refueling personnel

9402150182.

 IN 94-13

 February 22, 1994

 Page 2 of 5

were the immediate causes of both events. In addition, weaknesses in the

human factors aspects of the controls for the fuel handling equipment

contributed to the event in which a fuel assembly was lowered rather than

raised. The controls for the fuel handling equipment had been modified

shortly before this event occurred. The team concluded that the root cause of

the events was a significant weakness in management oversight of fuel handling

activities. Weak management oversight had allowed many of the measures

intended to prevent a fuel handling accident to be neglected. The AIT found

that (1) design changes were not transmitted to allow timely and accurate

training on modifications to the refueling bridge, (2) procedures were not

always used and, when they were used, they were not always adhered to, and

(3) supervisors did not ensure that procedures were followed. In addition,

the AIT found that training was not effective in that operators were not aware

of certain key procedure steps in most instances. Specifically, the personnel

monitoring the fuel handling activities were not aware of the requirement to

visually verify grapple closure when engaging and lifting fuel assemblies.

The AIT found that management did not communicate expectations and provide

proper oversight of fuel handling activities.

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Peach Bottom Events

With Unit 3 shut down for refueling on September 23, 1993, a fuel assembly

could not be fully inserted into its spent fuel rack cell. It was thought

that the fuel assembly had swelled due to irradiation in the core, and the

fuel assembly was successfully placed in a different cell. It was further

postulated that there might be some debris in the cell, and that the cell

should be checked at some future date. On September 24, 1993, another fuel

assembly became stuck in its spent fuel rack cell. The licensee evaluated the

material condition of the fuel assembly, calculated an allowable lifting

force, and conferred with the fuel vendor. The licensee increased the load

limit of the refueling hoist and the fuel assembly was freed from the rack

with no damage to the fuel assembly. Subsequent examinations revealed that

sections of local power range monitor instrument strings that had previously

been cut up were in the bottoms of three cells in the rack, including the two

cells with which difficulties were experienced. The licensee believes that

the debris may have fallen into the cells during a fuel pool cleanup effort

conducted during the previous summer.

The licensee is currently investigating why the debris was in the spent fuel

pool and why the refueling personnel did not ensure that the spent fuel rack

cells did not contain any debris prior to inserting the fuel assemblies.

Susquehanna Events

The Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 was shut down with defueling in

progress on October 6, 1993, when the personnel performing the fuel handling

activities removed an incorrect fuel assembly from a peripheral location in

the core. The personnel involved realized they had removed the wrong assembly

and they inappropriately decided to return the assembly to its prior position

in the core. The appropriate action, per licensee procedures, would have been

to place the bundle in the spent fuel pool and secure fuel handling activities

until the cause of the error was determined and corrected.

.

 IN 94-13

 February 22, 1994

 Page 3 of 5

On October 26, 1993, while lowering a fuel assembly into the core during

refueling, an unexpected drop of 25 to 38 cm [10 to 15 in] of one of the

sections of the fuel handling mast occurred. The fuel assembly was not

released and it did not strike the vessel internals. Subsequent testing

reproduced mechanical binding of the mast, and a bend in the mast was

observed. The binding temporarily restrained one section of the mast while a

lower section extended. Eventually weight or motion caused the bound section

to release and drop down a limited distance. The licensee subsequently

determined that the mast had been bent by an impact with the flange protector

for the reactor vessel while traversing through the "cattle chute" between the

core and fuel pool, because the mast was not raised high enough. The Unit 2

refueling bridge was transferred to Unit 1 and, after satisfactory completion

of surveillance testing, refueling was resumed.

On October 27, 1993, while transferring a double blade guide to the spent fuel

pool, the blade guide hit the side of the reactor vessel because it was not

raised high enough to clear the vessel. The licensee suspended refueling

activities, revised the associated procedure, and inspected the mast. The

core reload was resumed after surveillances on the fuel handling equipment

were successfully conducted. On October 28, 1993, while attempting to grapple

a new fuel assembly in the fuel pool, the personnel performing the fuel

handling activities heard two loud bangs and observed bubbles in the pool for

5 to 10 seconds. Subsequent inspection revealed that one section of the mast

from Unit 2 was bent. The licensee believes that the mast was weakened by the

impact with the reactor vessel that occurred during the October 27 event.

On October 29, 1993, the NRC dispatched an AIT to the site to review the

events. The AIT documented its findings in Inspection Report 50-387/93-80,

issued on December 21, 1993. The AIT concluded that facility management did

not maintain proper oversight of refuel floor activities and that inadequate

corrective actions were implemented in the past for problems with the fuel

handling equipment. The AIT also concluded that the licensee fuel handling

procedures were adequate for the proper completion of the fuel handling

activities, although certain improvements could be made to increase the

awareness of the operators concerning potential problems.

Nine Mile Point Event

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was shut down with refueling in progress on

November 1, 1993, when a blade guide was moved from the core into the spent

fuel pool. The contractor refueling operator disengaged the grapple and

observed the correct light indication on the bridge. There was no procedural

requirement to visually verify disengagement or for the Senior Reactor

Operator Limited to Fuel Handling (LSRO) or the spotter to verify

disengagement. The refueling operator noticed increased drag after the

refueling bridge crane had been moved approximately 23 cm [9 in] toward the

next location. At that time, licensee personnel determined that the blade

guide was still engaged on the grapple. The bridge was returned to its

previous position, the blade guide was lowered and disengaged (positive

verification was obtained this time), and the operator proceeded to move the

next component, which was a fuel assembly. While lowering that fuel assembly

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.

 IN 94-13

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 Page 4 of 5

into the core, the refueling operator noticed that the mast was binding. At

this point, the LSRO became involved and directed that the fuel assembly be

returned to the fuel pool. While lowering the fuel assembly into the rack in

the fuel pool, the inner section of the mast dropped between 61 and 76 cm [24

and 30 in]. However, the fuel assembly was not released. After the fuel

assembly was lowered, the grapple was disengaged and the LSRO halted further

fuel movement. The licensee subsequently determined that the mast was bent

and that the blade guide was not damaged. After the licensee reviewed the

event, modified the procedure, and repaired the fuel handling equipment, fuel

movements were resumed on November 4, 1993.

The licensee determined that there were several personnel performance issues

that needed to be addressed. The refueling operator had been trained to

verify disengagement after releasing each component, although the procedure

only required verification of ungrappling when handling fuel assemblies.

Disengagement was to be verified by raising and rotating the mast. The

refueling operator did not verify disengagement after releasing the blade

guide. In addition, the refueling operator did not notify the LSRO of the

unanticipated equipment response (remaining connected to the blade guide while

traversing the bridge). Also contributing to the event was the fact that the

LSRO was observing a refueling bridge trolley bearing about which he was

concerned, rather than the handling of the blade guide. Licensee review

determined that management expectations regarding the supervision of refueling

activities had not been clearly expressed to the LSROs.

Discussion

Refueling activities are safety-significant operations that are not conducted

on a routine basis. In addition, fuel handling activities are often performed

by contractor personnel under the supervision of licensee personnel. As a

result, fuel handling personnel may not be familiar with the fuel handling

equipment or may feel that their experience in fuel handling operations

permits them to ignore some requirements for procedural use and adherence.

Either of these situations could require increased management attention and

oversight by the licensee to ensure proper and safe performance of fuel

handling activities.

Appendix B to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR 50) requires licensees to have appropriate procedures to control

activities affecting quality (such as the actions to be taken during operation

of refueling equipment), and that the procedures are used and followed. In

addition, 10 CFR 50.120 requires licensees to implement a training program for

various categories of nuclear power plant personnel to ensure that those

personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform their

assigned jobs competently. This rule applies to the personnel (including

contractors) who operate or supervise the operation of the refueling

equipment. The cases discussed in this notice include situations in which the

licensees failed to conduct appropriate training in the use of their refueling

equipment, particularly with respect to design modifications made to the

controls for the fuel mast. These events also demonstrated that the fuel

 .

 IN 94-13

 February 22, 1994

 Page 5 of 5

handling personnel involved in certain instances were variously not aware that

management expected them to identify deviations from expected results, cease

operations when an unexpected or abnormal condition is encountered, and notify

operations and/or plant management of unexpected or abnormal conditions.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below, or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

 ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

 Brian K. Grimes, Director

 Division of Operating Reactor Support

 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: P. L. Eng, NRR E. M. Kelly, RI

 (301) 504-1837 (215) 337-5183

 J. R. White, RI L. E. Nicholson, RI

 (215) 337-5114 (215) 337-5128

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

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Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Generic Communications > Information Notices > 1994 > IN 94-13, Supplement 1

Information Notice No. 94-13, Supplement 1: Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel

Assemblies and Other Components due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

June 28, 1994

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-13, SUPPLEMENT 1: UNANTICIPATED AND UNINTENDED

 MOVEMENT OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES AND

 OTHER COMPONENTS DUE TO IMPROPER

 OPERATION OF REFUELING EQUIPMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice supplement to alert addressees to an event involving unauthorized

movement of a defective spent fuel rod. It is expected that recipients will

review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions

contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Background

The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 94-13, "Unanticipated and Unintended

Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of

Refueling Equipment," to alert addressees to problems that could result from

inadequate oversight of refueling operations and inadequate performance on the

part of refueling personnel. IN 94-13 described various refueling events that

occurred at Vermont Yankee, Peach Bottom, Susquehanna, and Nine Mile Point.

These events demonstrate the importance of proper controls over, and operation

of, refueling equipment during use. A recent event at the Waterford Steam

Electric Station (Waterford) demonstrates the potential for fuel damage or

personnel hazards which could result from fuel-handling equipment that is not

properly stored and not secured from unauthorized use.

Description of Circumstances

On February 18, 1994, the Waterford plant was operating at 100-percent power

when a senior reactor operator found an unknown object hanging from the

fuel-handling machine in the fuel-handling building. Health physics

technicians measured radiation levels in the spent fuel pool area and found

them to be normal. Licensee personnel remotely secured the object with vise

grips and determined that underwater radiation levels were .2 to .7 Sv/hr

[20 to 70 R/hr] at 15 centimeters [6 inches] from the object. A Combustion

Engineering employee identified the object as a fuel rod encapsulation tube.

No visual damage was apparent on the tube. The licensee posted a security

guard in the spent fuel pool area and reported the event to the NRC.

9406220075. IN 94-13,

Supplement 1 June 28,

1994 Page 2 of 3

The licensee reviewed fuel storage records and determined that the tube

contained a defective fuel rod that had been removed from an irradiated fuel

assembly several years earlier. At that time, the tube had been placed in a

center guide tube in a grid cage stored in the spent fuel racks. The licensee

reviewed computer access records for the fuel-handling area and interviewed

relevant personnel about the event. Personnel who may have had access to the

fuel-handling machine completed questionnaires regarding the event. The

licensee determined that the refueling director had used the fuel-handling

machine the day before the object was discovered and had parked the

fuel-handling machine at a location directly over the fuel rod encapsulation

tube. However, the refueling director had not used the hoist and was not sure

that he would have noticed if the encapsulation tube was hanging from the

hoist at the time he used the machine. Surveillance records indicated that

the fuel rod encapsulation tube must have become attached to the fuel-handling

tool sometime between February 11 and 18, 1994.

Design drawings of the cap of the fuel rod encapsulation tube showed that the

outer diameter of the cap was about equal to the inner diameter of the end of

the fuel-handling tool. Apparently, the cap had become bound in the

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fuel-handling tool when the hoist was lowered to the top of the spent fuel

rack and, when the hoist was raised, the tube was completely removed from the

grid cage.

Although contractors had performed the fuel-handling operations for previous

refueling outages, Waterford personnel were scheduled to perform the fuel

handling for the March 1994 refueling outage. The licensee speculated that

one of the people assigned to fuel-handling activities for the March outage

may have inadvertently lifted the encapsulation tube while practicing the use

of the hoist. Personnel were required to notify health physics staff before

accessing the refueling machine; however, health physics records showed that

no one had made such a notification during this time. No keys or special

knowledge was needed to access the controls of the fuel-handling machine.

Electrical power could be obtained by closing two electrical breakers and

pushing one switch that were located on the machine. The licensee questioned

several employees, but no one admitted to unauthorized use of the

fuel-handling machine.

As an interim corrective action, the licensee deenergized the computer that

controls the fuel-handling machine by opening a breaker in a locked power

control center. The licensee planned to (1) develop a means to prevent the

fuel rod encapsulation tube from being inadvertently lifted by the

fuel-handling tool, (2) add a precaution to the operating procedure warning

operators not to lower the fuel-handling tool over the storage location, and

(3) add hoist manipulations to the lesson plans for proficiency training.

Discussion

Procedures governing the use of equipment for handling fuel and core

components may not prevent unauthorized or unintended operation of that

equipment. Precautions such as locking out breakers that energize the

fuel-handling equipment and the placement of placards in highly visible areas

declaring that unauthorized operation of fuel-handling equipment is forbidden

. IN 94-13, Supplement

1 June 28, 1994

Page 3 of 3

may help ensure that the equipment is not used without proper authorization.

Additionally, storing the fuel-handling machine in an area where accidental

movement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or other

components may contribute to the prevention of inadvertent fuel movement or

damage. Management attention and oversight of the operation of fuel and core

component handling equipment is important to ensure that fuel and core

components are protected from damage or unauthorized movement and that plant

personnel are protected from unnecessary exposure to radiation.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/s/'d by AEChaffee

 Brian K. Grimes, Director

 Division of Operating Reactor Support

 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV

 (817) 860-8195

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 22, 2015

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Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Generic Communications > Information Notices > 1994 > IN 94-13, Supplement 2

Information Notice No. 94-13, Supplement 2: Control And Oversight of Contractors During

Refueling Activities and Clarification of Applicability of Section 50.120 of Title 10 of the Code Of

Federal Regulations to Contractor Personnel

 UNITED STATES

 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

 November 28, 1995

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-13, SUPPLEMENT 2: CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF

 CONTRACTORS DURING REFUELING 

 ACTIVITIES AND CLARIFICATION OF

 APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 50.120

 OF TITLE 10 OF THE CODE OF

 FEDERAL REGULATIONS TO CONTRACTOR

 PERSONNEL

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice supplement to alert addressees to recent plant events that involved

inadequate control and oversight of contractor activities and to advise

licensees of the applicability of NRC regulations on personnel training and

qualification to contractor personnel. It is expected that recipients will

review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions

contained in this information notice supplement are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Background

The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 94-13, "Unanticipated and Unintended

Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of

Refueling Equipment," on February 22, 1994, to alert addressees to problems

that could result from inadequate oversight of refueling operations and

inadequate performance on the part of refueling personnel. Following its

issuance, the NRC received numerous informal comments from licensees

indicating that a statement in IN 94-13 implied a broader applicability to

contract personnel than was supported by the regulation at Title 10, Code of

Federal Regulations, Part 50.120. One purpose of this supplement of IN 94-13

is to clarify this point.

IN 94-13 described various refueling events at the Vermont Yankee, Peach

Bottom, Susquehanna, and Nine Mile Point plants. These events demonstrated

the importance of proper controls over, and operation of, refueling equipment

during use. IN 94-13, Supplement 1, issued on June 28, 1994, described an

event at the Waterford Steam Electric Station that demonstrated the potential

for fuel damage or personnel hazards that could result from fuel-handling

equipment that is not properly stored and not secured from unauthorized use. 

9511210402. IN 94-13, Supp. 2

 November 28, 1995

 Page 2 of 4

Since Supplement 1 was issued, events have occurred at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear

Plant, Units 1 and 2, that demonstrate the potential for equipment damage and

personnel hazards as a result of inadequately supervised contractor activities

on the refueling floor. A second purpose of this supplement of IN 94-13 is to

address these events.

Description of Circumstances

At Hatch Unit 1, on December 28, 1994, seven shroud head bolts that had been

replaced during the November 1994 refueling outage were being removed from the

Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) by contract personnel for shipment off site. As

the first bolt was rigged and lifted about 1 foot above the water surface, the

rigging failed and the bolt fell back into the SFP, puncturing the stainless

steel liner of the SFP. Water from the SFP drained into the area between the

stainless steel liner and the outer concrete wall causing the SFP water level

to drop about 3 inches. Operations personnel were not initially informed of

the dropped bolt but after determining that the liner was punctured, closed

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the outer concrete structure tell-tale drain valve, which stopped most of the

SFP water leakage to the reactor building drains.

A review of this event (NRC Inspection Report 50-321/94-31, dated 

February 2, 1995) indicated that a licensee supervisor was not present on the

refueling floor when the bolt was dropped. In preparation for the bolt

removal activity, seven rigging slings were fabricated on site. Some of the

rigging slings were fabricated incorrectly by contract personnel who were not

trained or qualified to construct them. The steps required to correctly

fabricate rigging slings were provided through vendor-supplied instructions

rather than by plant procedures.

In another event at the Hatch plant, on November 11, 1994, contract personnel

were preparing spent control rod blades for shipment off site. Highly

radioactive stellite ball bearings were removed and transported through the

transfer canal, to be placed in a storage cask in the cask pit. Not finding

the correct tool to unbolt the storage cask lid, the contract foreman decided

to transfer the bearings into a different container and continue the

collection process. The licensee refueling floor supervisor, who was

contacted at home, concurred with the plan. However, this container transfer

occurred in the transfer canal rather than in the cask pit and several

bearings were dropped onto the transfer canal floor, producing a high

radiation field in the adjacent accessible area beneath the transfer canal. 

The personnel involved in this activity failed to inform the refueling floor

coordinator (RFC), their immediate supervisor, the HP supervisor, or the

control room operators that the bearings had been dropped.

A review of this event (NRC Inspection Report 50-321/94-31, dated 

February 2, 1995) indicated a deficiency in management oversight of refueling

floor activities. Contract personnel failed to immediately inform supervision

when abnormal conditions exist. In addition, plant procedures did not contain

steps detailing how the stellite ball transfer should be conducted, nor did

they contain any precautions for personnel protection.. IN 94-13, Supp. 2

 November 28, 1995

 Page 3 of 4

In a third incident at the Hatch plant on November 8, 1994 (NRC Inspection

Report 50-321/94-28, date December 29, 1994), during a routine "quality check"

and subsequent surveys, the licensee discovered approximately 50 pieces of

contaminated scaffolding in the scaffolding yard, which is not a

radiologically controlled area. The material had been passed through the

automated materials frisker (AMF) by contract personnel.

A review of this event by the licensee determined that the contract personnel

responsible for operating the AMF were not fully trained or qualified to

perform the task. In addition, plant procedures did not provide specific

instructions for performing the frisking activities. An inspection of the

equipment indicated that the material frisker contained damaged detectors and

that the setpoint had drifted. Although the equipment damage and malfunctions

contributed to this event, they did not result from contractor actions. 

Discussion

Contract personnel frequently perform activities that are safety significant

but that are not conducted on a routine basis. These activities are often

performed by contractor personnel at the direction of the licensee, but

frequently not under the direct supervision of licensee personnel. As shown

by the events described above, licensee supervision of fuel handling

personnel, including contractors, proved to be inadequate to ensure proper and

safe performance of safety significant activities. 

Questions have arisen concerning the applicability of Section 50.120,

"Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel," of Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.120) to contractor personnel. The

rule requires that nine categories of nuclear power plant personnel be trained

by programs developed, implemented, and maintained using a systems approach to

training (SAT). As discussed in the supplementary information section of the

publication of the final rule (58 FR 21904), this rule applies to the licensee

personnel who operate or supervise the operation of the refueling equipment

and applies to the training and qualification of some categories of contractor

personnel. "Qualification" in the context of the training rule means

demonstration by an individual for evaluation purposes of the ability to

successfully perform specific tasks, including operation of refueling

equipment.

Contractor personnel occupying regular positions and working independently

within the licensee organization take the place of licensee personnel and,

therefore, are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.120. Short-term

contractors, if assigned to work independently, must be qualified to perform

the assigned tasks. Short-term contractor personnel assigned to work under

the direct supervision of licensee personnel are not required to comply with

the requirements for SAT-based training identified in 10 CFR 50.120.. IN 

 November 28, 1995

 Page 4 of 4

In the original IN 94-13, in the second paragraph of the discussion section,

the statement, "This rule applies to the personnel (including contractors) who

operate or supervise the operation of the refueling equipment," thus should

read, "This rule applies to the personnel, which may include contractors, who

operate or supervise the operation of the refueling equipment."

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The cases discussed in IN 94-13 included instances of licensees failing to

conduct appropriate training in the use of refueling equipment, particularly

with respect to design modifications made to the controls for the fuel mast. 

These cases also indicated that fuel-handling personnel, including

contractors, were occasionally not aware that licensee management expected

them to identify deviations from anticipated results, cease operations under

unexpected or abnormal conditions, and notify the licensee operations or plant

management staff of those conditions.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

 /S/'D BY BKGRIMES/FOR

 Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

 Division of Reactor Program Management

 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Mary Ann Biamonte, NRR

 (301) 415-1073

 Vern Hodge, NRR

 (301) 415-1861

 Bob Holbrook, RII

 (912) 367-9881

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 22, 2015

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