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and the Strategic Studies Department

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to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about Joint Special Operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and Special Operations Forces’ 

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JSOU is a subordinate organization of the US Special Operations 

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the Joint Special Operations University is to educate SOF executive, senior 

and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international 

security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, 

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JSOU provides education to the men and women of Special Operations 

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JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

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• Enhancing homeland security

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 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff 

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Joint Special Operations University

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President

Dr. Brian A. Maher

Vice President

Strategic Studies Department

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director

James D. Anderson

Director of Research
JSOU Report 05-3

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2005

Theoretical 

Perspectives of 

Terrorist Enemies 

as Networks

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Jessica Glicken Turnley
ii

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the Joint Special 

Operations University. 

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Division, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

This pamphlet and other JSOU publications can be found on the SOF 

Education Gateway at https://jsou.socom.mil/gateway/. Click on 

“Highlighted Research” to view. The Strategic Studies Department, 

JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact Mr. 

Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-

1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest 

in the JSOU Press. 

ISBN 0-9767393-4-8
iii

Foreword

This perspective of terrorist enemies as networks by two distinguished associate fellows of Joint Special Operations University follows as a result of its recent initiative to support 

USSOCOM strategic planning for the Global War on Terrorism. The 

paper is a manifestation of JSOU’s goals for contributing products 

that will advance SOF strategic art and generating strategic outreach 

to the military, civilian, and academic communities in order to enrich those products. 

Dr. Robert Spulak and Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley presented 

the findings of this paper to assembled strategic planners from 

USSOCOM, other combatant commands, and interagency players 

at the Center for Special Operations plan development conference, 

September 2005, in Tampa, Florida. At that meeting the authors 

put forward a number of helpful planning concepts based on their 

professional studies in science and the humanities and their experiences in government and business.

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is pleased to facilitate 

the association of USSOCOM strategic planners with civilian expertise and insights that can broaden military thought and encourage 

planning decisions directly relevant to the changing global environment. Through JSOU’s strategic outreach initiative, experts in many 

professional disciplines have signaled their willingness to support 

the Nation’s counterterrorism efforts. In that spirit, JSOU is proud 

to commend this paper to SOF readers and appreciates the support 

of Dr. Spulak and Dr. Turnley.

 Lt Col Michael C. McMahon

 Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
iv

Jessica Glicken Turnley, Ph.D.

Dr. Turnley serves as President of Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc., a consulting firm in Albuquerque, NM. She also holds an appointment on the 

Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board.

Dr. Turnley provides services in the national security arena, strategic business planning, organizational development, corporate culture 

change, policy analysis, and economic development to clients in the public and private sector. She worked with Sandia National Laboratories on 

a range of projects, including the development of computational models 

of social organization and their possible relevance to the national war on 

terrorism. In other areas, she has helped the EPA develop approaches to 

assess social, cultural, and economic impacts at Superfund sites, participated in regional economic development efforts, and engaged in organizational audits and development projects for local organizations. 

Dr. Turnley has a B.A. in Anthropology and English Literature from 

University of California Santa Cruz, an M.A. in Social Anthropology from 

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and a Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology/Southeast Asian Studies from Cornell University. She was a Fulbright 

Scholar in Indonesia. A full resume can be found at the Galisteo website 

at www.galisteoconsulting.com

Robert G. Spulak, Jr., Ph.D.

Dr. Spulak is Manager of the Strategic Studies Department at Sandia National Laboratories. He is also an associate Fellow of Joint Special Operations University.

As a senior and principal analyst in the Sandia Systems Analysis 

Center, an independent and objective studies group, participated in studies on topics including technologies, weapon systems, defense policy, 

terrorism, and international relations. He has published policy papers in 

Strategic Review and Parameters. 

Dr. Spulak has invested significant time with operational components, observing training, operational planning, and field and fleet 

exercises. He was one of the first members of the USSOCOM Future 

Concepts Working Group (FCWG) and is a member of the Naval Special 

Warfare (NSW) FCWG. He has contributed to SOF doctrine such as the 

SOF Vision, Desired Operational Capabilities, and SOF Attributes. 

Robert Spulak received a B.A. in Physics with Highest Honors from 

the University of Northern Iowa in 1977 (with the “Purple and Old 

Gold” award for the outstanding physics graduate), an M.S. in Astronomy 

in 1978 and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering in 1980 from the University 
1

Spulak and Turnley

Executive Summary

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks

The term network is used to describe a wide variety of phenomena including terrorist groups. Networks are structures that are used to manage dispersion and are described by nodes 

(things dispersed) and relationships (or links) between nodes. There 

are many reasons for dispersion, including vulnerability, limits on 

operational capabilities, and service to geographical areas. Military 

forces throughout history have become more dispersed due to increased lethality of weapons and improved communications.

Theory is used to describe and explain the world and guide our 

thinking about it. There is a difference between physical science 

theory and social science theory. Physical science theory works for 

things that are measurable, repeatable, and can be tested. It uses 

simplification and reductionism to create predictions of future experiments and the ability to predict the behavior of complicated systems 

constructed of well-understood components. Social science theory 

describes human behavior. Many important aspects of human behavior and motivation are not observable, measurable, or capable 

of division into simple portions that can be solved. Furthermore, 

human phenomena, including behavior and people themselves, are 

not identical across time and space and so cannot be subject to the 

same type of manipulation that physical phenomena can. Social science theory can explain but cannot predict human behavior. In fact, 

there may be several plausible, even contradictory, explanations of 

the same behavior that cannot be tested. 

Networks can have both technical and human links and nodes. 

Most network analyses use the physical science perspective to attempt to predict the effect of actions against the links or nodes (even 

for purely social networks of humans). From the physical perspective 

there are several ways to attack a network: overwhelm everything, 

interdict critical nodes or links, establish operational superiority to 

attack when necessary, or isolate and degrade part of the network. 

This is likely to work better for technical parts of networks. Attacking networks throughout history seems to indicate that the human 

parts of networks have been critical in determining the effectiveness 
2

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and response of networks to these attacks. These are the things that 

cannot be confidently predicted.

The concept of individuals as nodes and social interactions as 

links leads to the inappropriate use of physical science methods to 

analyze and propose attacks on human networks. Humans and their 

relationships are complicated phenomena. To fully understand them 

we must include physiology, psychology, social relationships, and 

the value (e.g., cultural interpretation) placed on behavior. Network 

approaches focus primarily on social relationships, often failing to 

consider the other contributing factors to behavior. Furthermore, 

our attempts to understand them rely a great deal on our own assumptions and perspectives.

We can view terrorists as networks for many reasons, only one of 

which is their organization for security. Other reasons include dispersion of their targets, tactics of simultaneous attacks, dispersion 

of resources including their recruiting base, and their desire to serve 

a dispersed constituency. Identifying a terrorist network identifies a 

specific enemy against which to wage international war and helps 

justify the use of the military against terrorism. WMD terrorism may 

require a more formal social network and greater integration with 

physical networks than other types of (lower-tech) terrorism. These 

more formal and physical networks could be more observable and 

contain critical links and nodes that would be more suitable to attack from the physical science perspective.

Social science theories of terrorism historically have not focused 

on organizational networks to explain development, recruitment, 

and action. They have focused more on the psychology of individual 

terrorists, the socialization of individuals in terrorist groups, and terrorism as communication or as a tool to obtain power and resources. 

These theories represent different valuable perspectives but cannot 

be used to direct actions against terrorism with predictable results.

It will be difficult to measure the effectiveness of the war on terrorism since the fundamental human motivations and behavior cannot be observed or measured. A historical perspective of attacking 

networks suggests that we should expect that the war against terrorism will require a campaign that will not in the short term destroy 

the functioning of the network outright, we will not be able to attack 

the technical and human portions of the network separately, and we 

will underestimate the terrorists’ ability to adapt. The greatest effect 
3

Spulak and Turnley

may be to divert terrorist resources to defense or repair and we may 

have greater success against isolated portions of the network.

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 

(NMSP-WOT) defines terrorist organizations as a network, identifies components of the network, and defines a strategy to attack it. 

Taken literally, there are several network models that could be constructed, from a purely social network of leaders and foot soldiers to 

a complicated structure that contains many human and technical 

links and nodes. There are many assumptions and perspectives we 

must define to give meaning to the NMSP-WOT network. Analysis of 

a network model (via physical science methods) may be useful for 

attacking technical parts of the network, but the human parts will 

determine the effectiveness of attacks and the response of the network. Various social science perspectives will be more important in 

attacking the human parts of the networks, but they cannot be applied to confidently predict the results. The problem of destroying or 

rendering ineffective networks of terrorists requires a combination of 

physical and social approaches.

Robert G. Spulak, Jr., Ph.D.

Jessica Glicken Turnley, Ph.D.

5

Spulak and Turnley

Theoretical Perspectives of 

Terrorist Enemies as Networks

Robert G. Spulak, Jr., Ph.D.

Jessica Glicken Turnley, Ph.D.

Abstract. We use a synthesis of physical and social science perspectives to 

discuss terrorist enemies in the context of technical and human networks. 

Social and physical networks have many similarities, and many differences. 

And while network analysis can be useful for defeating an adversary’s physical networked infrastructure, such as power grids or transportation systems, 

it is only a piece of a larger toolkit when working with a human system. 

Indeed, human will and adaptability are critical aspects of a network that 

might otherwise be viewed as purely technical. We compare and contrast approaches from the physical and social sciences, using networks to highlight 

the advantages and disadvantages of using the same analytic perspective for 

significantly different targets. We conclude with a discussion of the networks 

suggested by the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism.

“On both the individual and collective levels, war is therefore 

primarily an affair of the heart. It is dominated by such irrational factors as resolution and courage, honor and duty and 

loyalty and sacrifice of self. When everything is said and done, 

none of these have anything to do with technology, whether 

primitive or sophisticated.”

— Martin van Creveld, Technology and War.

Introduction

The network concept is widely used in modern military thought. 

Enemies, including terrorists, are conceptualized as networks 

to provide a basis to discuss attacking them. Our forces are 

described as networks to discuss more effective ways of employing 

them. The overall purpose of this paper is to provide a broad theoretical discussion of the application and limitations of networks, especially as applied to military action against terrorists. This discussion 

can then be used to place operational concepts in context and assess 
6

 JSOU Report 05-3

their potential effectiveness as well as assess the scope of the terrorist enemy that may lie outside the network model or operational 

concepts.

We first briefly describe the pervasiveness of the idea of networks 

in military thought. We introduce the idea of networks and their 

characteristics and show that the idea is not new but can be applied throughout history. To introduce a theoretical discussion of 

networks, we discuss the nature of physical and social science theories. We produce a classification of technical and human networks 

and discuss how to attack a network, consistent with most current 

thought that uses the physical science perspective. We describe historical attacks on networks and make some observations about the 

characteristics and effectiveness of these attacks, especially with respect to the human contributions. This leads to a broader discussion 

of the nature of humans and how humans participate in networked

activities. Finally, we apply these lessons to terrorists and the current war on terrorism.

In many ways, modern military thought views enemies as networks. For example, the mission of the Joint Warfare Analysis Center 

(JWAC) is to provide “combatant commands, Joint Staff and other 

customers with responsive, effects-based, precision targeting options for selected networks and nodes in order to carry out national 

security and military strategies of the United States during peace, 

crisis, and war.” 1 Further, “The commanding officer and his staff 

are responsible for providing planners with full-spectrum analytical 

products while giving synergistic, effects-based, precision targeting 

options for infrastructure networks to support planning and execution of military options.” 2

We also are encouraged to view our military forces as networks. 

Part of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is to leverage 

information technologies to allow our forces to fight more effectively 

as networks. Retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, now the Department of Defense Director of Force Transformation, is recognized as 

the leading advocate of Network Centric Warfare. 3 Network Centric 

Warfare is defined (promising much) as “an information superiorityenabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve 

shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of 
7

Spulak and Turnley

operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of 

self-synchronization.” 4

So it should be no surprise that we also view terrorist enemies 

as networks. In part this is because we identify threats as individual terrorists and need to describe how these individuals operate 

together to perform terrorist acts. The National Military Strategic Plan 

for the War on Terrorism 5 (NMSP-WOT) explicitly identifies our enemies as networks. The NMSP-WOT consistently uses the term network to describe the “Nature of the Enemy” in general as well as 

their survivability, critical vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and key 

resources. An unclassified Joint Staff briefing on the NMSP-WOT explicitly states that, “We are under attack from a global web of enemy 

networks...” and that, “Terrorist extremist organizations tend to be 

organized as networks; this makes them more dangerous than if they 

were organized in a centralized fashion.” 6 One of the United States 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) roles in the Global War in 

Terrorism is “Leading the development and synchronization of plans 

against terrorist networks.” 7

Networks

Networks are systems or structures that are used to manage dispersion. Theoretically, networks are described in terms of nodes (things 

that are dispersed) and relationships between nodes (connecting 

links). Using examples appropriate to war, nodes might be combat 

units, individual troops, command and control centers, reconnaissance platforms, planning cells, or supply depots, and links might be 

communication, transportation, doctrine, orders and rules, or laws 

and traditions.

Actual physical networks exist because the nodes are dispersed 

in location or function, and they must be linked to function together. 

Some things by nature must be dispersed. These include truckloads, 

shiploads, and aircraft loads, or services for a wide geographic area 

(power, water, and communications). Other things may be dispersed 

because of operational limitations, such as limited range, speed or 

firepower of individual platforms, logistical support, or vulnerability.

For example, Second World War air bases in North Africa were 

dispersed because of the limited range of aircraft. These bases had to 

be linked to supply, repair, and direct the operations of the aircraft. 
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 JSOU Report 05-3

The dispersion of German and Italian airbases led Lt. David Stirling 

to consider their vulnerability (because of their isolation), resulting 

in the creation of the British Special Air Service (SAS), originally for 

the purpose of attacking them.8 In this case the aircraft themselves 

were the most vulnerable part of the network and the SAS destroyed 

over 250 on the ground.

Or consider the age of fighting sail (Figure 1). In this case, firepower had to be dispersed on many ships because of the limited capacity of a single ship.9 The links between ships for fighting the fleet 

included the “single fleet line ahead” doctrine and fighting instructions delivered by visual signals (flags from the commodore’s ship). 

Beyond that, however, these ships had to be acquired, manned, supplied, and defended, so the overall network included ports, naval 

infantry, merchantmen and overseas possessions. The sailing fleet 

practiced network-centric warfare.

Throughout history military forces have become more and more 

dispersed. The Macedonian Syntagma (Figure 2) fought shoulder-toshoulder with pikes and shields. The common term “a good righthand man” originated in the fact that soldiers held their shields on 

their left, so a good man to your right protected you. Advances in 

technology throughout history have led to greater dispersion through 

the increased lethality of weapons and improved communications 

and transportation.10 For example, ships could no longer fight “single 

fleet line ahead” as enemy firepower could demolish the whole fleet. 

Radio enabled dispersion of the fleet by making it possible to communicate beyond visual range. By the Second World War, S.L.A. MarFigure 1. 

The age of 

fighting sail.
9

Spulak and Turnley

shall could talk about the “isolation of the battlefield” where small 

groups and individual soldiers were fighting.

In spite of current popular trends in military thought such as 

network-centric warfare, military forces throughout history can be 

viewed as networks created by the needs of war. Modern forces have 

more and more characteristics of networks created by the greater 

dispersion of forces and improvements in communications, but the 

trend has existed throughout history. Thus it will be possible to learn 

lessons from history, especially regarding the human aspects of networks that do not depend on the state of technology. 

The Nature of Physical and Social Science Theories

The purpose of theory, in general, is to describe and explain the 

world and guide us in how to think about it. The goal in discussing 

the theory of terrorist networks is to provide this understanding and 

guidance to more effectively plan to defeat the terrorists. However, at 

the outset, we must distinguish between physical science theory and 

social science theory. Some of the most powerful tools for analyzing and understanding networks are applications of physical theory. 

However terrorism, as well as war in general, is a human social activity that cannot be understood by physical science methods. We 

must consider both sources of understanding to deal with terrorist 

networks.

The physical or “hard” sciences11 have the mission to produce an 

understanding of reality in some objective and demonstrable sense. 

That is, the goal is to arrive at a description or model (a theory) that 

conforms extremely well to measured reality and that can be used to 

make predictions that can be tested. To demonstrate that something 

Figure 2. 

Macedonian 

Syntagma.
10

 JSOU Report 05-3

is true, one important principle is simplification. That is, the problem is simplified to the point that it can actually be solved exactly or 

some physical object or process can be measured well enough to distinguish between competing hypotheses. Thus the physical scientist 

arrives at a tiny slice of “truth.” The physical sciences are successful for systems that are measurable and repeatable and for which 

the scientist can arrange a simple experiment to test the prediction 

of a theory. The measure of success of a physical science theory is 

the published comparison with reality, tested and repeated by other 

scientists.12 There is no need for consensus or democracy. Although 

individual scientists may cling to their points of view for a time, a 

theory must be abandoned if it fails the test. An inadequate theory 

will eventually be replaced by a closer approximation to the truth.

To broaden the applicability of these tiny slices of truth, the hard 

sciences appeal to reductionism: the assumption that splitting the 

world into tiny slices, solving those slices, and assembling the solutions produces a broader solution that solves the larger problem. 

This works extremely well for physics and engineering and such.13

Development of physical science theories throughout history has led 

to their applications in the familiar sophisticated technologies that 

make modern life possible. The danger lies in applying simplification 

and reductionism to systems that do not obey physical laws or that 

are too complex for this approach to succeed.

The social sciences attempt to understand human behavior. 

Much of human behavior is not simple, observable, measurable in 

quantitative terms, nor can it be divided into parts that can be separately solved. The social and behavioral sciences are referred to as 

“soft” sciences precisely because they lack characteristics of measurement, repeatability, and prediction. Some branches of social and 

behavioral science, described as quantitative, apply mathematical 

models and statistics to describe and analyze certain parts of human behavior. However, these tools and methods should not be used 

in exactly the same ways they are in the physical sciences. Mathematical statistics, for example, deals with ensembles of identical 

objects. The reductionist approach in the physical sciences allows us 

to say that certain elements are identical in certain essential aspects. 

In human environments, even though the behavior manifest in a 

particular instance may look like the behavior manifest in another, 

the behavior that we observe is only one part of the significance of 
11

Spulak and Turnley

that event.14 While the events have certain similar aspects, there are 

others that are dissimilar. Identifying which are significant in terms 

of crafting a response is a complex endeavor. Furthermore, since 

mathematical models and their sister methodologies have been devised to deal with identical objects, we abstract certain aspects of 

the humans and their behavior when we deal with them in these 

types of models (e.g. we determine that what is important is religion, 

or race/color, or age, or education, or ...). These selection criteria 

are external (or exogenous) to the model. The researcher determines 

their importance based on some theory of human behavior. However, when these models 

are used these criteria and the theories upon 

which they are based are often not questioned 

nor made explicit. We will return to this point 

later. 

A second way in which social science differs from the science of the physical world is 

in its inability to test theories. For ethical reasons, human systems 

cannot be manipulated in the same way that physical systems can. 

We cannot apply remedies for social problems to one group, but leave 

another untouched as a control group, to see what would happen 

without the intervention. A large body of theory in the social sciences 

is based on case studies where the researcher develops an a priori 

construct of what should happen based on historic evidence and 

then “observes” a current event (or other historical examples) to see 

if that construct can explain it. It is common for multiple and often 

conflicting theories to exist for the same acts.

Simplification and reductionism cannot be applied to human 

systems, meaningful and repeatable measurements are extremely 

difficult (humans and societies are each unique and much that is 

significant is not observable), the theories have limited ability to 

make testable predictions, and simple experiments to test specific 

predictions are difficult to arrange. Thus there are often multiple 

and competing theories to describe the same reality and objective 

tests cannot be used to distinguish between these theories. A theory’s explanatory power, not its predictive power, is its measure of 

goodness. Therefore, although certain types of social theory may use 

techniques and approaches from physical science, we must be aware 

... these criteria and 

the theories upon 

which they are 

based are often not 

made questioned 

nor made explicit.
12

 JSOU Report 05-3

of the limitations of the transference of such tools and understand as 

much about what they do not tell us as about what they do.

We will use both physical science and social science perspectives to discuss terrorist social networks. We use simplification and 

reductionism to create a model or description of such networks. This 

simple description, while accurate as far as it goes, has limited applicability in discussing real terrorist networks. 

Description of Technical and Human Networks

The classic conception of a network includes discrete nodes and discrete links that connect these nodes. Nodes can be assigned functions 

and links can be assigned to provide flows such as communication. 

Even when the links and nodes are human, these kinds of networks 

are typically analyzed using physical science perspectives (Figure 

3). For example, in this simplification, mathematical tools such as 

graph theory are 

applied to identify 

critical nodes and 

links, the removal 

of which would disconnect the greater portions of the 

network. Physical 

models of the network are created 

incorporating flows 

and functions and 

an attempt is made 

to predict the result 

of specific actions 

planned to cause 

the network to fail to function in a specific way. This is the basis of 

the current emphasis on effects-based targeting. 

A typical example of the physical science perspective is: “All 

countries are systems; collections of many interlinking nodes. Each 

of these nodes—individuals, physical facilities, groups, or even symbols—affects other nodes, some more so than others. A careful and 

methodical analysis of the target systems could clearly identify the 

Figure 3. Representation of a “social network” of 

individual humans. 
13

Spulak and Turnley

relatively small number of critical nodes that, if destroyed or disabled, would cause the physical and psychological systems to cease 

to function.” 15 Note that the author assumes that a country is a 

network, that the network contains both human and physical nodes, 

that the network can be analyzed and understood by physical science methods, that there are a small number of critical nodes, and 

that the effect of destroying these nodes can be predicted.

Obvious goals in the war on terror would then be to eliminate the 

critical nodes of the terrorist network or to interdict the critical links 

between nodes. Attacks on physical networks are often conceptualized as destroying nodes and links.16 Extension of this perspective to 

terrorist networks leads to conceptualizing attacks on such networks 

as eliminating nodes (killing or capturing individual terrorists) and 

interdicting links (operations against communications systems, including bank transactions, etc.). 

The limitations of this approach are obvious, especially applied 

to warfare. It is almost impossible to assess in retrospect the effect 

of a particular attack, battle, or campaign when studying history. 

How much more difficult must it be to try to predict such things, 

especially when the human will and capacity for adaptation will be 

of great importance? One cause of this limitation is our inability to 

perform meaningful measurements. The only truly important measure is whether the war is won or whether greater strategic goals are 

accomplished. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom one enemy 

network, the Iraqi Army, was easily destroyed and the war was won 

but perhaps it would have been better to leave it intact to assist other 

strategic goals.

Non-human entities, which we refer to as technical entities, are 

much more amenable to measurement and prediction than human 

entities. Thus in discussing networks we divide the world into human and technical so that the more appropriate theoretical perspective can be used for each portion. There are four possibilities: technical nodes with technical links, technical nodes with human links, 

human nodes with technical links, and human nodes with human 

links. These possibilities are illustrated in Figure 4.

The examples in Figure 4 illustrate the various possibilities. A 

power grid by itself could be thought of as technical nodes (power 

generators, computerized switches, transformer yards, and electrical 

meters) connected by technical links (power lines, data transmission). 
14

 JSOU Report 05-3

An example of technical links between human nodes is the combination GPS/radio that can automatically display the locations of fellow hikers. Mailmen 

could be thought 

of as human links, 

sorting and transporting mail between 

technical nodes (post 

offi ces, mailboxes). 

And social organizations such as the 

Boy Scouts could be 

thought of as human 

nodes (the scouts 

and leaders) connected by human links (social interaction).

Note that our description has some defi nitions that we impose 

upon the network to give it meaning. We see a group that we defi ne 

as Boy Scouts and we make some assumptions that such a group 

has scouts and leaders. Anyone who did not know what Boy Scouts 

are would not make such assumptions. We further defi ne the nodes 

(scouts and leaders) by only a subset of all available attributes. Leaders are adult, probably (although not strictly) male, and probably 

have a son. That they are Christian or Jewish or Muslim or Buddhist 

or Hindi is not an attribute of relevance here although there is an 

expectation, usually not strictly enforced, that Boy Scouts will be 

religious (note the nuances of interpretation). Nor are their height, 

hair color, education level, and a host of other attributes, that would 

be relevant in other settings, important. However, once again, the 

determination that these attributes and not others are important is 

external to the network itself. It is part of our defi nition of a node or 

a link. When we turn to unknown groups such as terrorist organizations (or should we say organizations that use terrorism as a tactic) 

we should be very careful about the types of attributes we select as 

signifi cant. The movie Battle of Algiers illustrates how dangerous a 

mistake can be when the French assumed that all the insurgents 

were male.17

Any real network will most likely be a combination of these reductionist possibilities. For example, the concept of a power grid can 

be expanded to include human components such as the operators, 

Figure 4. Classifi cation and examples of links and 

nodes as technical or human.
15

Spulak and Turnley

customers, repairmen, managers, shareholders, and political and 

military leaders. In addition to the purely technical aspects of understanding the critical links and nodes to attack in the physical 

network, the effectiveness of attacking a power grid may depend on 

how the operators respond to limit the damage or redirect power (this 

could be a function of physiology, psychology, social issues such 

as training, and cultural constructs such as the importance placed 

on various aspects of the response), the time it would take for repairs to be made, and the priority of resources political or military 

leaders may make available to substitute for lost capability. Thus 

non-observables such as human will and adaptability, and values 

such as our cultural assignment of the importance of hospitals over 

residences in terms of power allocation, and the like become critical aspects of a network that might otherwise be viewed as purely 

technical. These aspects of human behavior do not fit well in a mathematical construct of links and nodes.

A terrorist network is more likely to resemble the Boy Scouts as 

a purely social organization than it will resemble a technical network 

such as a power grid. Terrorist networks may contain technical components, such as technical communications, weapons, transportation, training camps, banking, etc., that might be understood and 

attacked using the physical science perspective. However, much of 

the network will consist of individuals and their associations. Unfortunately, theories of individual or social behavior lack the predictive power of physical theories. Simply applying social models to the 

human parts of a network in an analogy to using physical models 

for the technical parts of the network will not work. Portraying terrorist groups as social networks (as in Figure 3) presents an untrue 

impression that the analysis has the accuracy and predictive power 

of physical theories. That is, the representation as a network implies 

simplification, since the nodes are individual terrorists and the links 

are specific interactions that are analyzed in isolation, and reductionism, since the network and its behavior are assessed based on 

the simple relationship of links and nodes, neither of which may be 

possible when dealing with humans. 

We also must beware of the tendency to treat human networks 

as something that exists in a similar form over time. In fact, human 

(social) networks are constantly changing. One of the characteristics distinguishing a net-centric organization from a bureaucratically 
16

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structured organization is its fluidity.18 We come from a culture that 

functions predominately along bureaucratic lines. Our strong beliefs 

in the rule of law and basic human equality give predominance to 

these types of corporate organizations. When dealing with cultures 

with other strong bases for social organization, such as the predominance of kinship relations or patronage ties, we must recognize that 

these organizational structures (social networks) are highly fluid in 

nature. The diagram we draw today may well be outdated by tomorrow. Clearly this is also much less true of technical networks. 

Anything involving large capital investments such as infrastructure 

systems such as power grids, water systems, or experimental facilities change slowly. 

From a theoretical point of view, then, it is important to distinguish between the technical parts of a network and the human parts. 

The technical parts may be amenable to analysis and attack from 

the physical science perspective.19 Any real network will also contain 

important human elements. These elements may be easily separated 

from the technical elements but more likely the technical and human 

will be intertwined. 

Physical Science: Theory of Attacking Networks

A network by definition is a collection of nodes and links even if these 

nodes and links are considered to be human elements. We describe 

here a theory or classification of ways to attack networks. There are 

at least four ways to attack a network. The first is to overwhelm the 

entire network. The second is to interdict critical nodes or links. The 

third is to establish operational superiority and interdict nodes or 

links when necessary or convenient. And the fourth is to isolate and 

degrade a portion of the network to reduce its efficiency. These methods are illustrated conceptually in Figure 5.

Note that these reasonable ways of attacking a network assume 

that the network is a static entity whose structure after the attack 

will be the original less the parts that have been attacked and that 

the effects of an attack can be predicted to guide the choice of the 

kind and locations of the attack. They also assume that enough is 

known about the network (even its very existence) to make these 

kinds of analyses possible. 
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It is appropriate here to insert a comment about intelligence. We 

cannot apply theory without data. The whole issue of adequate information is itself a major limitation of the operational concept of 

attacking networks. Our experience has been that we often don’t 

know about the existence of terrorist network or that we have not 

placed a priority on understanding it until we are attacked. We didn’t 

know the extent of Saddam’s nuclear program before Desert Storm. 

We didn’t know the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, some methods of attacking 

networks may require less information. Attacking critical nodes requires a high level of understanding to identify critical nodes and 

predict the consequences of an attack. But overwhelming everything 

or establishing operational superiority may not require as much accurate information about the network.

Once again using the age of fi ghting sail, we can illustrate the 

four methods of attack. A larger fl eet with more cannon was a decisive advantage in a single fl eet line ahead engagement. A 3/2 advantage was enough to destroy the enemy fl eet, overwhelming everything. Critical nodes in the fl eet included the commodore’s fl agship 

that issued fi ghting instructions and key resupply bases. OperationFigure 5. Attacking networks.
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al superiority could be gained by establishing sea control with faster 

better-armed ships. Tactics used to exploit operational superiority 

included breaking the enemy’s line, doubling lines, and attacking 

ports and merchantmen at leisure. Since the network included isolated ports and overseas possessions, these could be isolated and 

degraded by privateering, terror, and attacking sources of supplies 

and raw materials.

The question is how well does this classification account for attacking real networks, especially since real networks are not such 

neat collections of nodes and links? We will now describe some 

historical examples of attacking networks to demonstrate the relative effectiveness of such attacks and the influence of human elements. Note that this is an example of applying social science theory 

through historical case studies.20 Our conclusions are influenced by 

our choice of case studies, the perspectives through which we view 

history, and many other exogenous factors.

Social Science: Attacking Real Networks in History

During the Vietnam War, the United States bombed the network of 

North Vietnamese fuel facilities.21 This led the North Vietnamese to 

disperse their oil reserves. They placed storage tanks near major 

highways and 55-gallon drums along roads, in cities, towns, and 

rice paddies. In another example, their electrical power plants that 

were destroyed in the spring of 1967 were replaced by more than 

2,000 portable generators. A critical network that was not attacked 

was the extensive dike system because of the perceived political cost 

of attacking civilian infrastructure.

In the Second World War, a critical node in the German war effort was assessed to be the Ploesti, Romania, oil refining facilities.22

Destroying Ploesti was predicted to destroy one-third of Hitler’s oil 

production and shorten the war in Europe by six months. Twentythree heavy bombing raids, totaling 9,173 bomber and fighter sorties, 

dropped 13,709 tons of explosives. Although 13 kilotons is roughly 

equivalent to the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, resulting in heavy damage to several facilities, they were repaired 

by battalions of Russian slave laborers and remained operating at 

20 percent of capacity. Twenty percent may not seem like much, but 

the message is that 13 kilotons of conventional explosives was not 

enough to overwhelm the capacity for repair.
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Spulak and Turnley

Another critical node was thought to be the German ball-bearing 

industry. Paul Nitze, who participated in the United States Strategic 

Bombing Survey conducted after the war, relates that “not one end 

item of German war production had been delayed a single day by 

virtue of attacks on the ball-bearing industry. The buildings of the 

ball-bearing plants had been blown into rubble, not once, but time 

after time... While the cost to the Germans to restore ball bearing 

production was high, involving the dispersal of factories and even the 

building of underground plants, they were able to offset the damage 

within the time they had to repair their losses.” 23 On the other hand, 

massive Allied bombardment caused extensive German civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. By late 1944 the 

German economy was severely damaged but the German Army was 

able to continue fighting until May 1945. Civilians in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan all suffered greatly and generally 

became more resolute under direct attack. Stalin tolerated sieges of 

Soviet cities and more than 20 million deaths without surrendering. 

Dresden and Tokyo were firebombed causing massive destruction 

and loss of life with little strategic effect.

In the age of fighting sail, a major network was the Spanish Armada. The network consisted of the Spanish fleet, Spanish shipyards, 

client states that supplied some ships, treasure ships from the New 

World that funded the 

fleet, and many ports 

where provisions were 

stockpiled.24 Sir Francis Drake was sent to 

attack the network in 

1587. His orders were 

to disrupt shipping 

between the Mediterranean and Spanish 

ports, distress enemy 

ports, seize ships from 

the East and West 

Indies, and harass 

the Armada if at sea. 

Drake raided the port 

of Cadiz (Figure 6) and Figure 6. The defense of Cadiz.
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burned 31 merchant vessels. He attacked Portuguese ports, in one 

case destroying the seasoned wood to be used for barrel staves on 

Spanish ships. Therefore the Spaniards had leaky barrels, spoiled 

food, and contaminated water. Drake sailed into the Atlantic and 

the threat to the treasure ships caused the Spanish fleet to deploy, 

returning with worn vessels and sick crews. These actions did not 

defeat the Armada but delayed it sailing against England. Germany 

had an atomic bomb project in the Second World War. Since the Allies did not know how little advanced the German atomic bomb project was, the attempt to defeat Germany had to seriously consider the 

potential for an atomic defense. This network included the German 

scientists, research institutions, and material production. Because 

of their research focus, heavy water was the key to the German bomb 

project and the Ryukan, Norway, 

heavy water plant really was a 

critical node (Figure 7).25 It was 

predicted that successfully destroying the plant would delay 

German heavy water production 

two years.

There were four attacks on 

German heavy water and its production. The first (unsuccessful) 

attack consisted of a glider assault with 34 engineer commandos. The gliders crashed and the 

survivors were killed by the Germans. When the Germans discovered that the Norsk-Hydro plant was the objective, they increased 

their forces in the area to ~300 men and established antiaircraft 

defenses.

The final assault team for the first successful attack—the demolition of the heavy-water production cells at the Norsk-Hydro plant 

on February 28, 1943—consisted of nine men, a four-man demolition party, and a five-man covering party. The operators parachuted 

into Norway. Since the Germans expected another relatively large 

commando attack, the enemy was not alert against a small force. 

Figure 7. The Norsk-Hydro heavy 

water plant at Ryukan, Norway.
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Access to the plant was controlled by two guards on a bridge over a 

600-feet-deep gorge. To bypass the bridge, the operators skied and 

walked until they descended into the gorge and crossed the icy river. 

They ascended the gorge and walked to the plant, gaining access to 

the grounds by cutting the chain on a railway gate. The door to the 

plant could not be forced, but two men entered the plant through a 

cable tunnel (a known alternative), and two men entered by breaking 

a window. There was one night watchman who was detained. They 

laid the charges which exploded while they were still on the grounds. 

There was no immediate reaction by security forces and the operators withdrew.

Damage from the demolition attack was repaired in only two 

months instead of two years. The plant was unsuccessfully bombed 

by the Allies, which caused the Germans to decide to move the equipment and heavy water to Germany, crossing Lake Tinn by ferry. The 

ferry was chosen for attack by the Special Operations Executive 

(SOE) operators because the Germans were expecting another attack on the plant and had increased security with two companies of 

SS troops. It had been estimated that it would take at least 40 welltrained and heavily-armed men to now directly attack the plant, with 

no hope of escape.

Moving the heavy water and equipment by ferry created a new 

vulnerability. The second successful attack—the sinking of the ferry—was executed by only three men. An operator rode the ferry prior 

to the shipment date of the heavy water. He determined both the best 

place to place a charge and the time for the explosion. In the early 

morning of the day of the shipment, before the heavy water arrived 

by rail, three operators boarded the docked, unguarded ferry. While 

one operator engaged the night watchman in conversation, the other 

two men planted an improvised charge consisting of 8.4 kg of plastic 

explosive, clocks, and 9-volt batteries below the floor along the keel. 

They left by 0400. The explosion occurred at 1100, when the ferry 

was in the middle of the lake, and it sank in 300 meters of water.

Another enemy network was the equivalent of six German infantry divisions dispersed among the Aegean islands (Figure 8). This 

network was attacked to prevent the redeployment of these troops to 

reinforce the German defense against the Allied invasion of France. 

There were three phases that were implemented with small-unit raids 

using small boats of the Special Boats Service (SBS), including indig-
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enous craft, and Greek sympathizers, operating from the Turkish 

coast. In the first phase, cumulative attacks on shipping were designed to reduce the available tonnage to the point where the Germans could no longer evacuate their garrisons. The second phase 

involved harassing attacks on outlying garrisons, forcing the Germans to dedicate and expose to attack shipping for reinforcement, 

evacuation of wounded, and investigation. The third phase was specifically designed to create friction: “Every island would now have 

been raided, every island would be waiting for our next visit. Short 

of food, and short of mail, with leave at home a distant memory, 

with horizons bounded by a few square miles of rock and scrub, the 

disgruntled garrisons would toil up nightly from their comfortable 

billets to the trenches which they had dug on bleak hillsides, there 

to keep vigil.” 26

These historical examples illustrate several truths about attacking real, militarily significant, networks. First, attacking a network 

rarely destroys the function of the network outright, although there 

may sometimes really be a critical node. Second, the ability of the 

human enemy to adapt and repair or replace the network is almost 

always underestimated. Third, the major effect of attacking a network 

is to reduce its effectiveness through reduced efficiency and diversion of resources devoted to defense or repair. Fourth, successfully 

Figure 8. The network of Aegean islands.
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attacking a network often requires a sustained campaign, against either a single critical node or multiple elements of the network. Fifth, 

it is rarely possible to separate the technical and human parts of a 

network and consider them separately. Sixth, isolated parts of the 

network are more effectively attacked. Finally, attacks aimed at civilian infrastructure networks or that cause civilian collateral damage 

are likely to stiffen the resolve of the enemy or reduce the sympathy 

of the population to our cause.27

The Nature of Humans

This brings us back to a point we made earlier. While understanding social networks is an important part of understanding how 

humans operate in groups, networks are only one dimension of such 

understanding. Any human action, for example, may be parsed as 

the result of the confluence of (at least) four very complex levels of 

analysis. The first is physiological—every individual is biological being 

and his biological state at any moment in time has an impact on 

behavior. The second is psychological. The particular orientation of 

any individual will influence his response to environmental conditions. The third is social. Each individual is embedded in a structure 

of relationships with others. Those relationships embody elements 

of power, affect, and other dimensions. The fourth is cultural. The 

social relationships, psychological orientations, and physiological 

states are given some sort of value and meaning by the group within 

which the individual moves. The individual then is located in some 

physical environment which gives him access to certain types of resources and takes on value from the socio-cultural complex within 

which the individual moves. This complexity is illustrated in Figure 

9. Note that any behavioral event is a simultaneous manifestation of 

factors from all illustrated dimensions, further constrained by the 

physical environment within which the event takes place. Also note 

that not all these factors are observable. 

The nodes in social networks are actors. The links are the structure of the social relationships between and among them. What is 

missing from this construct is the value placed upon behavior—the 

cultural dimension. For example, we could draw a communication 

link between two individuals based on the number of contacts over 

a given time period. But the significance of that communication is 

cultural. Greater frequency does not necessarily mean greater in-
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vestment in or importance of the relationship.28 Also missing are the 

inactive links—links that can be created or (re)activated if an existing 

link is broken. A large part of the willingness to do this stems from 

the importance of the link to the actor—another non-observable.

We should also keep in mind that relationship-based organizations such as social networks and rule-based organizations such as 

bureaucracies are not mutually exclusive. Many in the military have 

a go-to person—the individual who, by virtue of personal knowledge 

and social ties, can make things happen by working relationships in 

the military world. By the same token, even strongly relationshipbased organizations have bureaucratic or functionally defined aspects. Families can have patriarchs (or matriarchs for that matter) 

who serve as head of the family. As one individual dies another will 

replace him. The amount of influence the person in the position exercises may be personality-dependent, but the position exists independent of the person who occupies it. 

Terrorist Networks

To ask the obvious question, why are networks a useful tool for understanding terrorism? We can identify many characteristics that fit 

well into the network concept and we are disposed by the trends of 

military thought to think in networks. The use of network structures 

Figure 9: Behavioral factors
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to respond to perceived vulnerabilities is the most oft-quoted motivation we attribute to terrorists as networks. For example, Russell 

Howard asserts that “in response to improvements in counterterror 

capabilities and increased cooperation among governments, global 

terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have adopted networked structural models instead of hierarchical structures.” 29 But large numbers of 

individual terrorists, multiple enemies, dispersion of targets among 

western states, the tactic of multiple simultaneous attacks to multiply terror effects, dispersion of the recruiting base, dispersion of 

sources of resources, desire to show worldwide reach and service to 

their constituency of worldwide Muslim extremists, and establishing 

the unpredictability of the location of attacks are also reasons that 

we could use a network model.

The idea of a terrorist network may be useful to identify the enemy (“terrorist network” instead of “terrorism”) against which we can 

wage international war. Terrorism as criminal political violence could 

be viewed as a law-enforcement problem. Fighting terrorism as an 

international criminal activity includes law enforcement, diplomacy, 

international cooperation, and foreign assistance. The role of the 

military is to support these activities. However the fundamental purpose of the military is to wage and win the nation’s wars. A specific 

terrorist network as an enemy in war would require all of the actions 

described above and a primary role for military force. This may be 

especially justified if the threat is not low-level political violence that 

could remain in the domain of law enforcement but is catastrophic 

terrorism that can be viewed as waging war on US civilians. Waging 

war involves the politics of war that may remove many operational 

restrictions against a terrorist enemy but will also likely involve violation of other states’ sovereignty, capturing or killing enemy personnel, interception and destruction of foreign vessels and aircraft, 

seizure of foreign assets, and acceptance of collateral damage and 

accidental innocent casualties.

Are terrorist organizations really networks as we understand networks in the largest sense? As we have seen, the concept of a network 

and how to attack it fits better into the physical science perspective 

that doesn’t account for much of the human qualities of combatants 

throughout history. It will be useful to take a broader perspective of 

social organization.
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Different dominant organizational structures work well in different environments and for different social ends. Networks, because of 

their flexibility and adaptability, are advantageous at a tactical level. 

They allow adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances, including 

significant changes in organizational purpose. Rule-based organizations, like bureaucracies, are strategically advantageous. Changes 

in individuals in top positions do not necessarily mean significant 

changes in organizational direction or purpose. These types of organizations can last over time, and survive significant personnel change. 

They also can organize more efficiently and effectively to manage and 

execute complicated projects with a high degree of division of labor. 

The predominance of network over rule-based relationships in the Islamic fundamentalist groups may be a contributing factor to the predominance of low-technology weapons (including suicide bombers) 

and the absence of more sophisticated weapons that require more 

lasting and structured social organization to develop and deploy. 

Networks’ are indeed important in the war on terrorism. That 

said, we need to recognize the difference between social and technical networks and the consequences these differences have for plans 

to disrupt them. We also need to keep in mind that social networks 

are only part of the human story. Our adversaries—like us—are 

much more complicated than “the [social] ties that bind.” Links may 

be amorphous and hard to identify or attack effectively or without 

collateral damage. The philosophical and ideological motivations for 

terrorists (the value they place on behavior) may be created and communicated by others who have no direct social or structural link 

to the terrorists themselves. The Unabomber worked alone but was 

linked and motivated by a philosophy of anti-technology and environmental extremism that he held in common with others. Timothy 

McVeigh and Terry Nichols identified with an anti-federal government philosophy. Islamic extremists are linked through a common 

ideology created by certain Islamic scholars (living and dead) and 

promulgated through various mosques and schools that also serve 

non-extremist constituents.

Technical networks will be more (but not perfectly) amenable to 

analysis and attack with predictable outcomes because of the applicability of physical science methods. Social networks will be difficult 

to identify, understand, analyze, plan attacks against, or predict the 

outcome of attacks. Application of physical science methods against 
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social networks may be misleading and inappropriate. John Arquilla, 

et al., explain the evolution of terrorists toward social networks in 

explicitly technical terms: “The information revolution is altering the 

nature of conflict across the spectrum” and “Information technology (IT) is an enabling factor for networked groups; terrorists aiming 

to wage netwar may adopt it not only as weapon, but also to help 

coordinate and support their activities.” 30 Thus the concept that “It 

takes a network to fight a network” 31 is also based on the view of 

terrorist organizations as social networks but is a strategy based on 

the physical concept of operational superiority for speed of response 

to dispersed threats and response to changes in the enemy network 

that imply a need for a dispersed attack (a network).

One aspect of terrorism that may be more amenable to analysis 

and attack may be weapons of mass destruction (WMD). WMD are 

more likely to require an identifiable and relatively stable structure 

to garner and maintain control over necessary resources and the 

weapons themselves. WMD require more technical resources including technical people with critical skills and a bureaucratic structure 

may more effectively characterize the complex social infrastructure 

needed for the development of WMD than does a network. An interesting analog is the emergence of monumental architecture in 

civilizations only after they developed food resources necessary to 

feed specialized non-food-producing technical classes and developed 

bureaucratic structures from what had previously been kin-based 

networks. Finally, the catastrophic consequences of WMD terrorism 

are more likely to justify use of military force.

This is not to say that social networks are unimportant in the 

War on Terrorism, but that they are only part of the story just as 

physical networks are only part of the story. Disrupting these networks can have a significant effect on social activity.32 There is a cost 

to constructing new links, activating old links, or assuming a different role in a social network. However, the willingness to invest in this 

cost is a function of other factors. Consistent with our description 

of social science theories there are several different ways to analyze 

terrorists and their relationships.

In the terrorism literature there are at least four general schools 

of thought: psychological, sociological, communicative, and powerbased.33 The psychological approach looks for a particular personality 

constellation or composite of psychological factors that characterize 
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the terrorist (this approach has fallen out of favor lately). The sociological approach focuses on the sense of self-identity and the paths 

to social actualization that marginalized groups such as terrorist organizations afford some individuals. In this explanatory frame, an 

individual trades loyalty to the group for social and moral security 

and the chance of success. To some degree, Sageman’s work falls 

under this approach with his focus on disaffected individuals.34 The 

sociological approach focuses on the milieu which spawns or supports terrorist groups. The interest in failed states or, as Barnett 35

puts it, the gap or unconnected states, falls into this camp. The communicative explanations see terrorism as a type of street theatre, 

albeit a rather grisly type. And finally, the power-based constructs 

see terrorism as a tool used by disenfranchised groups to gain access 

to power and resources. The later two (communicative and powerbased) are instrumental in nature, that is, they see terrorist groups 

as a means to an end. The two former approaches (psychological 

and sociological) are causal and explanatory frames, seeking to understand why these types of groups emerge and the forces that keep 

them functioning as groups. The more powerful treatments of terrorism use elements from both the instrumental and causal camps, 

and from both approaches within each. The value of these theories 

is not that any may be demonstrated to be true (or false), but that 

each represents a different perspective form which to view human 

behavior. But since these theories do not result in predictions with 

which we can confidently predict behavior in individual cases, they 

also cannot be used to accurately direct actions to accomplish specific desired goals. 

Application to the National Military Strategic Plan 

for the War on Terrorism

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSPWOT) has three elements: protect the homeland, disrupt and attack 

terrorist networks, and counter ideological support for terrorism.36

Disrupting and attacking terrorist networks is described as, “These 

offensive efforts of the strategy are designed to disrupt terrorists’ 

ability to execute their attacks effectively or sustain their ideology. 

These efforts include killing and capturing key enemy leaders and 

foot soldiers, destroying training centers, and denying enemy access 
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to each of the eight categories of resources critical to the enemies’ operations.” The eight categories of resources (types of nodes and links) 

are identified as: leadership, safe havens, funds, communications 

and movement, weapons, foot soldiers, access to targets, and ideological support. Thus the NMSP-WOT appears to define the network 

and the strategy to attack it. Note, for example, that the NMSP-WOT

assumes that there are critical nodes or links: “key enemy leaders 

and foot soldiers” and “resources critical to enemy operations.”

The next step might be to construct a model of the terrorist network to apply the tools that have been developed for analyzing social 

or physical networks. It is important to keep in mind that any model 

is just a representation of reality and there may be many different 

representations. One possible model we could construct is terrorists 

as a purely human or social network with nodes consisting of leaders 

and foot soldiers linked by purely social relationships (as in Figure 

3). In that case, the eight categories of resources would be attributes 

of the nodes or links. But there are many reasons one might want to 

incorporate physical components in the network itself. Recall John 

Arquilla’s thesis, that the terrorist network is enabled to some degree 

by technological links. The definition of Network Centric Warfare includes both human and technical links and nodes. Terrorist foot 

soldiers might be thought of more as human links, like mailmen, 

delivering weapons to physical targets. In some cases, such as WMD, 

the weapons and the technical means to develop them may be the 

critical nodes that would be most effectively attacked. And we have 

argued that the physical parts of the network may be more amenable 

to analysis, prediction, and attack due to the nature of physical theory. (The danger in the latter case is in neglecting the human parts 

of the network.)

Figure 10 shows one possible notional simplified representation 

of a terrorist network with both human and technical elements suggested by the NMSP-WOT. Obviously there may be many more nodes 

of each type. The links may be “communications and movement” or 

“leadership” or both. There may be many more links between any of 

the types of nodes.

Referring to our theory of networks (technical and human) and 

our discussions of social science theory, we see that this presentation of the network itself contains human actors as well as technical 
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or physical entities, and makes assumptions about factors that are 

external (or exogenous) to the network. 

The human actors or nodes are leaders and foot soldiers. These 

are people with different types of attributes. Leaders (we assume) 

have leadership qualities that could be an attribute of a leader—or 

it could be what is transmitted from a leader to a foot soldier to 

cause the soldier to follow. This example illustrates a couple of the 

earlier points we have made with regard to the limitations of social 

networks. What does leadership look like? How would we know if 

someone had it (i.e., was a leader) or was transmitting it? And do we 

know how leadership is manifest in the adversary culture? It may 

well be manifest through behavioral traits very different than those 

we would recognize. The restriction of the network to these two types 

of people also begs the question of the role of people other than leaders and foot soldiers in keeping terrorist organizations alive. Let’s 

look at a node like a training center. A training center is a physical 

place. Do we know any of the attributes of that physical place? How 

do these vary from culture to culture—or over time? A training center 

also has personnel, some of whom may be permanent (trainers or 

cadre), others who may be transient (trainees). How do these relate 

Figure 10. Notional terrorist network as suggested by the NMSP-WOT.
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to leaders and foot soldiers, who are the only people we have in our 

schema? And how about communications... what and where are the 

physical means by which information is transmitted? The medium 

is an important part of any communication but the communication 

infrastructure does not appear here. Ideological support is shown as 

another node—a resource in the NMSP-WOT. However, such support 

is generated by people who are neither leaders nor foot soldiers—and 

who are not represented in our network. We also need to know both 

about the ideology of concern (what are its key tenants and how 

might they be interpreted?) and about the mechanisms of support. 

Is it through provision of materiel and/or safe havens? Is it through 

non-interference ... a sort of passive support? Furthermore, attacks 

on ideological support may actually justify and strengthen it. This 

type of construct does not illustrate how completely terrorist organizations are embedded within a larger society, and the importance of 

the larger society’s interaction with them. Finally, even the technical 

parts of the network (sources of funds, communications and movement, and weapons) may have significant human contributions. For 

example, funds denied from one source may be easily replaced. One 

mode of communication may be replaced by another. 

The language of the NMSP-WOT leads us to construct a network 

that operates on several logical levels at once. This is conceptually 

good, as the environment within which we wage war operates simultaneously on several logical levels. However, it precludes us from 

applying many of the analytic techniques of formal network analysis 

to the schema, for these require what might be termed an impoverished network—one which operates on only one dimension at a 

time. At best, we may conceive of a moment in terrorist time as the 

intersection of many different networks of many different types. The 

NMSP-WOT schema also highlights the need for exogenous or external definitions of key elements (such as leadership or ideological support) that will locate the network in some specific space and time. We 

should therefore heed the lessons of physical attacks against technical and human networks.

To recap, attacking a network rarely destroys the function of the 

network outright, although there may sometimes really be a critical 

node. The ability of the human enemy to adapt and repair or replace 

the network is almost always underestimated. The major effect of 

attacking a network is to reduce its effectiveness through reduced 
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 JSOU Report 05-3

efficiency and diversion of resources devoted to defense or repair. 

Successfully attacking a network often requires a sustained campaign, against either a single critical node or multiple elements of 

the network. It is rarely possible to separate the technical and human parts of a network and consider them separately. Isolated parts 

of the network are more effectively attacked. And, attacks aimed at 

civilian infrastructure networks that cause civilian collateral damage 

are likely to stiffen the resolve of the enemy or reduce the sympathy 

of the population to our cause.

Given these lessons, networks can be useful tools in the war on 

terrorism. As with our earlier model of human behavior that illustrated the interaction of the biological, psychological, social, cultural, and external environment in any event, so can networks of various aspects of terrorist activities illuminate (although not predict or 

illustrate with certainty) key nodes and connections. In the fashion 

that these networks are discussed by the NMSP-WOT, the networks 

can be constructed and conceptually (mentally) manipulated only. 

This limits us to relatively simple networks, given the limitations of 

the human mind. If we wish to accommodate greater complexity or 

size (numbers of nodes) by working computationally, we need to impoverish the network, breaking it into constituent networks of similar logical orders such as communications infrastructure or social 

networks. Keep in mind that the types of links in social networks (the 

things connecting people) can range from abstracts such as ideological support to concrete items such as weapons. If we take the former 

route and use abstractions such as ideological support, we must 

carefully define a) what ideology we are dealing with, and b) what 

support looks like behaviorally. We also need to recognize that (to 

continue to follow our example) to fully understand ideological support we also need to understand the communications infrastructure. 

And the communications infrastructure itself has a physical and a 

social aspect.

Conclusions

The term network is used to describe a wide variety of phenomena, including terrorist groups. Networks are structures that are used 

to manage dispersion and are described by nodes (things dispersed) 

and relationships (or links) between nodes. There are many reasons 

for dispersion, including vulnerability, limits on operational capa-
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bilities, and service to geographical areas. Military forces throughout 

history have become more dispersed due to increased lethality of 

weapons and improved communications.

In the past social and physical networks have been analyzed 

using similar tools. We have argued two points. First, applying approaches from the physical sciences to human phenomena will give 

false results because the phenomena in question are fundamentally 

different. As a result, social theory is different in kind from theories 

about physical systems. Second, there is no such thing as a purely 

physical network. Each of the physical phenomena, whether they are 

nodes or links, has a human dimension.

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism

(NMSP-WOT) defines terrorist organizations as a network, identifies 

components of the network, and defines a strategy to attack it. Taken 

literally, there are several network models that could be constructed, 

from a purely social network of leaders and foot soldiers to a complicated structure that contains many human and technical links 

and nodes. There are many assumptions and perspectives we must 

define to give meaning to the NMSP-WOT network. Analysis of a network model (via physical science methods) may be useful for attacking technical parts of the network, but the human parts will determine the effectiveness of attacks and the response of the network. 

Various social science perspectives will be more important in attacking the human parts of the networks, but they cannot be applied to 

confidently predict the results.

We thus suggest that the problem of destroying or rendering ineffective networks of terrorists requires a combination of physical 

and social approaches. Our theoretical discussion provides a context with which to assess practical approaches for attacking terrorist 

networks.

Endnotes

 1. Joint Warfare Analysis Center, United States Joint Forces Command 

website www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jwac.htm, accessed July 2005.

 2. Joint Warfare Analysis Center website www.jwac.mil/mission.asp, accessed July 2005.

 3. David S. Albers, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network 

Centric Warfare (Washington, D.C.: C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2000).

 4. Ibid, p. 2.
34

 JSOU Report 05-3

 5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan 

for the War on Terrorism, 4 March 2005. All quotations and references 

to the NMSP-WOT are from sections marked “unclassified.”

 6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategic Plan for the War 

on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT)”, 29 March 2005.

 7. Ibid.

 8. E.g., Robin Hunter, True Stories of the SAS (London: Virgin Books, 

1995).

 9. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press), Chapter 2.

 10 T. N. Dupuy, Understanding War (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 

Chapter 13.

 11. Scientists would quibble with our definition of hard sciences as equivalent to physical sciences since physical sciences usually mean physics, chemistry, etc., as distinguished from the “hard” biological sciences (that we include here in the physical sciences).

 12. It must be noted that many ideas about physical reality are ultimately proved wrong, otherwise there would be no need for the scientific 

method. Greek philosophers, for example, created plausible (but incorrect) explanations for natural phenomena and the great advance 

was when the scientific method was created to test ideas against reality. Since social science theories cannot be tested in the same way, it 

is almost certain that many of our ideas about human behavior are 

wrong.

 13 But there is some dispute: there is an interesting book, The Tao of 

Physics, that argues that even for physical systems the whole is different than the sum of the parts.

 14. A homemade bomb on a bus carrying black schoolchildren to a predominately white school in the American South is a very different event 

than a homemade bomb on a bus in the Gaza Strip or in Baghdad.

 15 John L. Petersen, “Plan for the 21st Century Now,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August, 1991, p. 53.

 16. Although there has also been discussion of information operations 

against information systems.

 17. Gillo Pontecorvo, director, “Battle of Algiers,” 1967.

 18. It is important to keep in mind that bureaucratic or corporate structures also have operative social networks. These social networks may 

or may not parallel the power and influence paths of the bureaucratic 

structure.

 19. Or perhaps not. Chaos theory deals with physical systems that are 

non-linear. One result is the “butterfly effect” where the smallest difference in initial conditions for the system will grow exponentially to 

produce dramatically different results.

 20. Strictly speaking, our illustrations lack the rigor of true history (e.g., 

we use secondary sources).

 21. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower (New York: The Free Press, 

1989).
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Spulak and Turnley

 22. James Dugan and Carroll Stewart, Ploesti (New York: Bantam Books, 

1963).

 23. Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 32.

 24. Samuel A. Southworth, ed., Great Raids in History ( : Castle Books, 

2002).

 25. E.g., Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy (London: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999).

 26. John Lodwick, Raiders from the Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

1990), p.106.

 27. We could also infer that terrorist attacks against us have had the same 

results that we identify for attacking networks. We now place more 

emphasis on internal security (the Department of Homeland Security) 

and in military operations we have experienced a diversion of resources away from offensive action to force protection.

 28. Think of the number of times one may call a mortgage broker when 

buying a house, vs. the number of times one may have called a commanding officer in the same time period. 

 29. Russell D. Howard, “Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New 

Terrorism – The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign,” in Terrorism and Counterterroism, Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, eds. 

(Guilford, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), p. 80.

 30. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, 

and Information-Age Terrorism” in Terrorism and Counterterroism, 

op. cit., pp. 95, 98.

 31. Ibid, p. 95.

 32. Sendero Luminoso apparently had a real critical node, Guzman. In a 

more significant example, the communist terrorist networks in Europe 

(Red Brigades, etc.) were eliminated after the fall of communism due 

to many social factors, probably including discredited ideological goals 

and the elimination of safe-havens, sources of financing, and technical support.

 33. See, for example, Jessica Glicken Turnley and Julienne Smrka “Terrorist Organizations and Criminal Street Gangs,” Advanced Concepts 

Group, Sandia National Laboratories, 2002.

 34. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

 35. Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: GP Putnam’s 

Sons, 2004).

 36. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op cit.