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Nuclear Posture Review Report

 

Nuclear Posture Review 

Report 

 April 2010 

 

 
 
CONTENTS 

PREFACE i 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii

INTRODUCTION 1

THE CHANGED – AND CHANGING – 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 3

PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 

AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 9

REDUCING THE ROLE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 15

MAINTAINING STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND 

STABILITY AT REDUCED NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS 19

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL DETERRENCE 

AND REASSURING U.S. ALLIES AND PARTNERS 31

SUSTAINING A SAFE, SECURE, 

AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR ARSENAL 37

LOOKING AHEAD: 

TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 45

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st century nuclear dangers, 

declaring that to overcome these grave and growing threats, the United States will “seek the peace 

and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He recognized that such an ambitious goal 

could not be reached quickly – 

perhaps, he said, not in his lifetime. 

But the President expressed his 

determination to take concrete steps 

toward that goal, including by 

reducing the number of nuclear 

weapons and their role in U.S. 

national security strategy. At the 

same time, he pledged that as long 

as nuclear weapons exist, the United 

States will maintain a safe, secure, 

and effective arsenal, both to deter 

potential adversaries and to assure 

U.S. allies and other security partners 

that they can count on America’s 

security commitments. 

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the Administration’s approach to promoting 

the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without 

nuclear weapons, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. The NPR 

reflects the President’s national security priorities and the supporting defense strategy objectives 

identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

After describing fundamental changes in the international security environment, the NPR report 

focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons policies and posture: 

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 

2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 

3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 

4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 

5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

President Barack Obama unveils his vision for reducing nuclear 

dangers and pursuing the long-term goal of a world without nuclear 

weapons in Prague’s Hradcany Square on Apr. 5, 2009. Official 

White House photo by Lawrence Jackson. 
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While the NPR focused principally on steps to be taken in the next five to ten years, it also 

considered the path ahead for U.S. nuclear strategy and posture over the longer term. Making 

sustained progress to reduce nuclear dangers, while ensuring security for ourselves and our allies 

and partners, will require a concerted effort by a long succession of U.S. Administrations and 

Congresses. Forging a sustainable consensus on the way ahead is critical. 

The Changed – and Changing – International Security Environment 

The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. 

The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. 

As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear 

terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they 

would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of 

vast stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive equipment 

and technologies in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire 

what they need to build a nuclear weapon. 

Today’s other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries – especially those at 

odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community – 

may acquire nuclear weapons. In pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, North Korea and Iran have 

violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, 

pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through 

diplomatic means the crises they have created. Their provocative behavior has increased 

instability in their regions and could generate pressures in neighboring countries for considering 

nuclear deterrent options of their own. Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms 

by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international 

community. 

While facing the increasingly urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the 

United States must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability 

with existing nuclear powers – most notably Russia and China. Russia remains America’s only 

peer in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities. But the nature of the U.S.-Russia relationship 

has changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold War. While policy differences continue to 

arise between the two countries and Russia continues to modernize its still-formidable nuclear 

forces, Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military 

confrontation have declined dramatically. The two have increased their cooperation in areas of 

shared interest, including preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 
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The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for 

addressing global security threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and 

terrorism, are growing. At the same time, the United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain 

concerned about China’s current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and 

quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal. China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller 

than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. But the lack of transparency surrounding its 

nuclear programs – their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guides them – 

raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions. 

These changes in the nuclear threat environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear 

concerns and strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to discouraging 

additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and stopping terrorist groups 

from acquiring nuclear bombs or the materials to build them. At the same time, we must 

continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats 

posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies 

and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives they might have 

to seek their own nuclear deterrents. 

Implications for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Force Posture 

The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military 

confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly 

regimes seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that we better align our nuclear 

policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear 

proliferation. 

This does not mean that our nuclear deterrent has become irrelevant. Indeed, as long as nuclear 

weapons exist, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces. These 

nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and 

reassuring allies and partners around the world. 

But fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years – including 

the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile 

defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries – enable us to fulfill those objectives at 

significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, 

without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape 

our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet our 

most pressing security challenges. 

 By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons – meeting our NPT Article VI 

obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament – we can put ourselves in a 
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much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with us in adopting the 

measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials 

worldwide. 

 By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures 

with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our 

non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and 

confirm that they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own. 

 By pursuing a sound Stockpile Management Program for extending the life of U.S. 

nuclear weapons, we can ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent without the 

development of new nuclear warheads or further nuclear testing. 

 By modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, we can 

substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons we retain as a hedge against technical 

or geopolitical surprise, accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and improve our 

understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities. 

 By promoting strategic stability with Russia and China and improving transparency and 

mutual confidence, we can help create the conditions for moving toward a world without 

nuclear weapons and build a stronger basis for addressing nuclear proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism. 

 By working to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and moving 

step-by-step toward eliminating them, we can reverse the growing expectation that we are 

destined to live in a world with more nuclear-armed states, and decrease incentives for 

additional countries to hedge against an uncertain future by pursuing nuclear options of 

their own. 

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism 

As a critical element of our effort to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons, the United 

States will lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime – and for the first time, the 2010 NPR places this priority atop the U.S. 

nuclear agenda. Concerns have grown in recent years that we are approaching a nuclear tipping 

point – that unless today’s dangerous trends are arrested and reversed, before very long we will be 

living in a world with a steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states and an increasing 

likelihood of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons. 

The U.S. approach to preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism includes three key 

elements. First, we seek to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the 

NPT, by reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International 
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Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear 

trade, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks. 

Second, we are accelerating efforts to implement President Obama’s initiative to secure all 

vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years. 

And third, we are pursuing arms control efforts – including the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (New START), ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty, and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty – as a means of 

strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to 

reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide. 

Among key Administration initiatives are: 

 Pursuing aggressively the President’s Prague initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear 

materials worldwide, including accelerating the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and 

the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program. This includes 

increasing funding in fiscal year (FY) 2011 for Department of Energy nuclear nonproliferation programs to $2.7 billion, more than 25 percent. 

 Enhancing national and international capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks 

and interdict smuggled nuclear materials, and continuing to expand our nuclear forensics 

efforts to improve the ability to identify the source of nuclear material used or intended 

for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device. 

 Initiating a comprehensive national research and development program to support 

continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on 

verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. 

 Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or 

other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of 

mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven 

for such efforts. 

Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons 

The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy has been reduced 

significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and should be taken at this time. 

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons 

exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. 

During the Cold War, the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to 

a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Moreover, after the 
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United States gave up its own chemical and biological weapons (CBW) pursuant to international 

treaties (while some states continue to possess or pursue them), it reserved the right to employ 

nuclear weapons to deter CBW attack on the United States and its allies and partners. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. With 

the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. 

missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S. 

nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks – conventional, biological, or chemical – has 

declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 

deterring non-nuclear attacks. 

To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security 

assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 

against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their 

nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully 

complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work 

with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the 

non-proliferation regime. 

In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the 

assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and 

partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response – and that any 

individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would 

be held fully accountable. Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid 

pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment 

in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological 

weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat. 

In the case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess nuclear weapons and 

states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations – there remains a 

narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a 

conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. The United 

States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring 

nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under 

which such a policy could be safely adopted. 

Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered 

by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it 

would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital 
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interests of the United States or its allies and partners. It is in the U.S. interest and that of all 

other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever. 

Accordingly, among the key conclusions of the NPR: 

 The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the 

role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making 

deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole 

purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

 The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme 

circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. 

 The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 

weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. 

Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels 

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have reduced operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about 75 percent, but both still retain many more nuclear 

weapons than they need for deterrence. The Administration is committed to working with Russia 

to preserve stability at significantly reduced force levels. 

New START. The next step in this process is to replace the now-expired 1991 START I Treaty 

with another verifiable agreement, New START. An early task for the NPR was to develop U.S. 

positions for the New START negotiations and to consider how U.S. forces could be structured 

in light of the reductions required by the new agreement. The NPR reached the following 

conclusions: 

 Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic delivery vehicles – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 

and nuclear-capable heavy bombers – by approximately 50 percent from the START I 

level, and reducing accountable strategic warheads by approximately 30 percent from the 

Moscow Treaty level. 

 Building on NPR analysis, the United States agreed with Russia to New START limits of 

1,550 accountable strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and a 

combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers. 

 The U.S. nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be 

maintained under New START. 

 All U.S. ICBMs will be “de-MIRVed” to a single warhead each to increase stability. 
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 Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence and reassurance goals 

will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses and preserving options for 

using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in conventional roles. 

Maximizing Presidential decision time. The NPR concluded that the current alert posture of 

U.S. strategic forces – with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a 

significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time – should be maintained for the present. It 

also concluded that efforts should continue to diminish further the possibility of nuclear launches 

resulting from accidents, unauthorized actions, or misperceptions and to maximize the time 

available to the President to consider whether to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Key steps 

include: 

 Continuing the practice of “open-ocean targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs so that, in 

the highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the missile would land 

in the open ocean, and asking Russia to re-confirm its commitment to this practice. 

 Further strengthening the U.S. command and control system to maximize Presidential 

decision time in a nuclear crisis. 

 Exploring new modes of ICBM basing that enhance survivability and further reduce any 

incentives for prompt launch. 

Reinforcing strategic stability. Given that Russia and China are currently modernizing their 

nuclear capabilities – and that both are claiming U.S. missile defense and conventionally-armed 

missile programs are destabilizing – maintaining strategic stability with the two countries will be 

an important challenge in the years ahead. 

 The United States will pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic stability with 

both Russia and China which are aimed at fostering more stable, resilient, and transparent 

strategic relationships. 

A strategic dialogue with Russia will allow the United States to explain that our missile defenses 

and any future U.S. conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missile systems are designed to 

address newly emerging regional threats, and are not intended to affect the strategic balance with 

Russia. For its part, Russia could explain its modernization programs, clarify its current military 

doctrine (especially the extent to which it places importance on nuclear weapons), and discuss 

steps it could take to allay concerns in the West about its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, such as 

further consolidating its non-strategic systems in a small number of secure facilities deep within 

Russia. 

With China, the purpose of a dialogue on strategic stability is to provide a venue and mechanism 

for each side to communicate its views about the other’s strategies, policies, and programs on 
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nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities. The goal of such a dialogue is to enhance 

confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust. As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile 

Defense Review Report, “maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship is as 

important to this Administration as maintaining strategic stability with other major powers.” 

Future nuclear reductions. The President has directed a review of post-New START arms 

control objectives, to consider future reductions in nuclear weapons. Several factors will influence 

the magnitude and pace of future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces below New START levels. 

First, any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional 

adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. 

This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; further improvements in 

U.S., allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in strategic and nonstrategic weapons; and close consultations with allies and partners. The United States will 

continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived gains of 

attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable 

costs of the response. 

Second, implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure 

investments recommended in the NPR will allow the United States to shift away from retaining 

large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, 

allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments are essential to facilitating 

reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and beyond. 

Third, Russia’s nuclear force will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how 

fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Because of our improved relations, the need for strict 

numerical parity between the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold 

War. But large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among 

U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic 

relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we will place 

importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels. 

Key NPR recommendations include: 

 Conduct follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the levels 

expected in New START, while strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries, 

strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. 

 Address non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with the non-deployed nuclear weapons 

of both sides, in any post-New START negotiations with Russia. 
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 Implement U.S. nuclear force reductions in ways that maintain the reliability and 

effectiveness of security assurances to our allies and partners. The United States will 

consult with allies and partners in developing its approach to post-New START 

negotiations. 

Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners 

The United States is fully committed to strengthening bilateral and regional security ties and 

working with allies and partners to adapt these relationships to 21st century challenges. Such 

security relationships are critical in deterring potential threats, and can also serve our nonproliferation goals – by demonstrating to neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear weapons 

will only undermine their goal of achieving military or political advantages, and by reassuring 

non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests can be protected without their 

own nuclear deterrent capabilities. 

U.S. nuclear weapons have played an essential role in extending deterrence to U.S. allies and 

partners against nuclear attacks or nuclear-backed coercion by states in their region that possess 

or are seeking nuclear weapons. A credible U.S. “nuclear umbrella” has been provided by a 

combination of means – the 

strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, 

non-strategic nuclear weapons 

deployed forward in key regions, 

and U.S.-based nuclear weapons 

that could be deployed forward 

quickly to meet regional 

contingencies. The mix of 

deterrence means has varied over 

time and from region to region. 

In Europe, forward-deployed U.S. 

nuclear weapons have been reduced 

dramatically since the end of the 

Cold War, but a small number of 

U.S. nuclear weapons remain. Although the risk of nuclear attack against NATO members is at 

an historic low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – combined with NATO’s unique nuclear 

sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and 

possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons – contribute to 

Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional 

threats. The role of nuclear weapons in defending Alliance members will be discussed this year in 

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates conducts a press conference following 

the NATO Defense Ministerial in Istanbul, Turkey, Feb. 5, 2010. 

DoD photo by Cherie Cullen. 
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connection with NATO’s revision of its Strategic Concept. Any changes in NATO’s nuclear 

posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance. 

In Asia and the Middle East – where there are no multilateral alliance structures analogous to 

NATO – the United States has maintained extended deterrence through bilateral alliances and 

security relationships and through its forward military presence and security guarantees. When 

the Cold War ended, the United States withdrew its forward deployed nuclear weapons from the 

Pacific region, including removing nuclear weapons from naval surface vessels and general 

purpose submarines. Since then, it has relied on its central strategic forces and the capacity to redeploy nuclear systems in East Asia in times of crisis. 

Although nuclear weapons have proved to be a key component of U.S. assurances to allies and 

partners, the United States has relied increasingly on non-nuclear elements to strengthen regional 

security architectures, including a forward U.S. conventional presence and effective theater 

ballistic missile defenses. As the role of nuclear weapons is reduced in U.S. national security 

strategy, these non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden. 

Moreover, an indispensable ingredient of effective regional deterrence is not only non-nuclear 

but also non-military – strong, trusting political relationships between the United States and its 

allies and partners. 

Non-strategic nuclear weapons. The United States has reduced non-strategic (or “tactical”) 

nuclear weapons dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Today, it keeps only a limited 

number of forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, plus a small number of nuclear 

weapons stored in the United States for possible overseas deployment in support of extended 

deterrence to allies and partners worldwide. Russia maintains a much larger force of non-strategic 

nuclear weapons, a significant number of which are deployed near the territories of several North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. 

The NPR concluded that the United States will: 

 Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers 

and heavy bombers, and proceed with full scope life extension for the B-61 bomb 

including enhancing safety, security, and use control. 

 Retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N). 

 Continue to maintain and develop long-range strike capabilities that supplement U.S. 

forward military presence and strengthen regional deterrence. 

 Continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners to address 

how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent. No changes 
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in U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made without close consultations with our 

allies and partners. 

Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal 

The United States is committed to ensuring that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and 

effective. Since the end of U.S. nuclear testing in 1992, our nuclear warheads have been 

maintained and certified as safe and reliable through a Stockpile Stewardship Program that has 

extended the lives of warheads by refurbishing them to nearly original specifications. Looking 

ahead three decades, the NPR considered how best to extend the lives of existing nuclear 

warheads consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program and 

U.S. non-proliferation goals, and reached the following conclusions: 

 The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will pursue ratification and entry 

into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

 The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs 

(LEPs) will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not 

support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. 

 The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of 

nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated 

Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: 

refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, 

and replacement of nuclear components. 

 In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United 

States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of 

nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program 

goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and 

approved by Congress. 

Consistent with these conclusions, the NPR recommended: 

 Funding fully the ongoing LEP for the W-76 submarine-based warhead and the LEP 

study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb; and 

 Initiating a study of LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility 

of using the resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead types. 

In order to remain safe, secure, and effective, the U.S. nuclear stockpile must be supported by a 

modern physical infrastructure – comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex of 

supporting facilities – and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain 
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the nuclear deterrent. As the United States reduces the numbers of nuclear weapons, the 

reliability of the remaining weapons in the stockpile – and the quality of the facilities needed to 

sustain it – become more important. 

Human capital is also a concern. The national security laboratories have found it increasingly 

difficult to attract and retain the most promising scientists and engineers of the next generation. 

The Administration’s commitment to a clear, long-term plan for managing the stockpile, as well 

as to preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism will enhance recruitment and retention of the 

scientists and engineers of tomorrow, by providing the opportunity to engage in challenging and 

meaningful research and development activities. 

The NPR concluded: 

 The science, technology and engineering base, vital for stockpile stewardship as well as 

providing insights for non-proliferation, must be strengthened. 

 Increased investments in the nuclear weapons complex of facilities and personnel are 

required to ensure the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. 

New facilities will be sized to support the requirements of the stockpile stewardship and 

management plan being developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

 Increased funding is needed for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old facility, and 

to develop a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

Looking Ahead: Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons 

Pursuing the recommendations of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review will strengthen the security 

of the United States and its allies and partners and bring us significant steps closer to the 

President’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons. 

The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give up their 

nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and insecurity are very 

demanding. Among those conditions are success in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

much greater transparency into the programs and capabilities of key countries of concern, 

verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations of disarmament obligations, 

enforcement measures strong and credible enough to deter such violations, and ultimately the 

resolution of regional disputes that can motivate rival states to acquire and maintain nuclear 

weapons. Clearly, such conditions do not exist today. 

But we can – and must – work actively to create those conditions. We can take the practical steps 

identified in the 2010 NPR that will not only move us toward the ultimate goal of eliminating 

all nuclear weapons worldwide but will, in their own right, reinvigorate the global nuclear non-
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proliferation regime, erect higher barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear 

materials by terrorist groups, and strengthen U.S. and international security. 
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INTRODUCTION 

A year ago in Prague, President Obama offered a new direction for coping with 21st century 

nuclear dangers, declaring that to overcome grave and growing threats of nuclear terrorism and 

nuclear proliferation, the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without 

nuclear weapons.” He recognized that such an ambitious goal could not be reached quickly – 

perhaps, he said, not in his lifetime. But the President expressed his determination to take 

concrete steps toward that goal, including by reducing U.S. nuclear weapons and their role in 

U.S. national security strategy. At the same time, he pledged that as long as nuclear weapons 

exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential 

adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s 

security commitments. 

This Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlines the Administration’s approach to promoting 

the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without 

nuclear weapons – while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests, consistent 

with the President’s national security priorities and the supporting defense strategy objectives 

identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The 2010 NPR represents the third 

comprehensive assessment of U.S. nuclear policy and strategy conducted by the United States 

since the end of the Cold War. Previous reviews were completed in 1994 and 2001. 

As mandated by Congress, the 2010 NPR was conducted by the Secretary of Defense in 

consultation with the Secretaries of State and Energy. Within the Department of Defense, the 

review was led jointly by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The Military 

Departments and Combatant Commands also contributed to the analytical work; there was 

especially close collaboration with U.S. Strategic Command. Because of the breadth of issues 

addressed, the review involved a number of additional departments and agencies, including the 

Departments of Homeland Security and Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence. The review also benefited from extensive consultations with Congress, U.S. allies, 

and other interested stakeholders. The National Security Council and its supporting interagency 

bodies met throughout the review to consider key issues of strategy and policy. 

In Presidential guidance initiating the NPR, the President called for a thorough review of U.S. 

nuclear weapons policies and force posture. He directed that the review bring forward options for 

discussion aimed at multiple objectives: reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons; 

strengthening deterrence of adversaries; reassuring allies and partners, who depend on the U.S. 

commitment to extended deterrence; enhancing strategic stability; and moving demonstrably 

toward the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. 
INTRODUCTION 

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A key premise of the 2010 NPR was that any successful strategy for achieving these objectives 

must be balanced, with movement in one area enabling and reinforcing progress in other areas. 

For example, increased infrastructure investment and a sound Stockpile Stewardship Program 

will facilitate reductions in both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. The elements of 

such a strategy must also be integrated, both nationally – across federal agencies and between the 

executive and legislative branches – and internationally among a wide range of partner 

governments. And an effective strategy must be sustained over time, with support from a long 

succession of U.S. Administrations and Congresses. A balanced, integrated, and sustained 

strategy will require a strong bipartisan consensus. Forging such a consensus is a central purpose 

of this NPR. 

After describing fundamental changes in the international security environment and U.S. 

adjustments to date, the NPR report focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons 

policies and posture: 

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 

2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 

3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels; 

4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 

5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

A final section of the NPR considers the path ahead for U.S. nuclear strategy and posture over 

the coming years and decades. 

 
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THE CHANGED – AND CHANGING – 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. 

The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. 

The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism 

The most immediate and extreme threat today is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist 

allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they 

managed to obtain them. Although terrorist groups are currently believed to lack the resources to 

produce weapons-usable nuclear material themselves, the vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast 

stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive equipment and 

technologies in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire what 

they need to build a nuclear weapon. 

To date, the international community has made progress toward achieving a global “lock down” 

of nuclear weapons, materials, and associated technology, but much more work needs to be done. 

In addition, the United States and the international community have improving but currently 

insufficient capabilities to detect, interdict, and defeat efforts to covertly deliver nuclear materials 

or weapons—and if an attack occurs, to respond to minimize casualties and economic impact as 

well as to attribute the source of the attack and take strong action. 

Today’s other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries – especially those at 

odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community – 

may acquire nuclear 

weapons. In pursuit of 

their nuclear ambitions, 

North Korea and Iran 

have violated nonproliferation obligations, 

defied directives of the 

United Nations Security 

Council, pursued missile 

delivery capabilities, and 

resisted international 

efforts to resolve through 

diplomatic means the crises 

President Barack Obama chairs a United Nations Security Council meeting at UN 

Headquarters in New York, N.Y., Sept. 24, 2009. Official White House photo by 

Pete Souza. 
THE CHANGED – AND CHANGING – NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

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they have created. Their illicit supply of arms and sensitive material and technologies has 

heightened global proliferation risks and regional tensions. Their provocative behavior has 

increased instability in their regions. Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms 

by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international community 

at large. 

The potential for regional aggression by these states raises challenges not only of deterrence, but 

also of reassuring U.S. allies and partners. In the Cold War, our allies sought assurance that they 

would remain safe in the face of Soviet threats because the United States was demonstrably 

committed to their security. Today’s environment is quite different. Some U.S. allies are 

increasingly anxious about changes in the security environment, including nuclear and missile 

proliferation, and desire reassurance that the United States will remain committed to their 

security. A failure of reassurance could lead to a decision by one or more non-nuclear states to 

seek nuclear deterrents of their own, an outcome which could contribute to an unraveling of the 

NPT regime and to a greater likelihood of nuclear weapon use. 

Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and has 

served the international community well over the past four decades. Its fundamental bargain is 

still sound: all parties have a right to peaceful nuclear power; states without nuclear weapons 

forsake them; and those with nuclear weapons work towards disarmament. However, with clear 

evidence of non-compliance with the NPT, the non-proliferation regime urgently requires 

strengthening. 

Further, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the international body charged with 

applying safeguards to ensure that nuclear facilities and materials are used only for peaceful 

purposes, currently lacks sufficient resources and authorities necessary to carry out its mission 

effectively. 

Strategic Stability with Russia and China 

While facing the urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the United States 

must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing 

nuclear powers – most notably Russia and China. Russia remains America’s only peer in the area 

of nuclear weapons capabilities. But the nature of the U.S.-Russia strategic and political 

relationship has changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold War. Policy differences 

continue to arise between the two countries, and Russia continues to modernize its stillformidable nuclear forces. But Russia and the United States have increased their cooperation in 

areas of shared interest, including preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. And the 

prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically in recent decades. 
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While the United States and Russia have reduced deployed nuclear weapons by about 75 percent 

since the end of the Cold War, each still retains more nuclear weapons than necessary for stable 

deterrence. As the United States and Russia reduce their deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 

delivery vehicles under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and a followon agreement to it, maintaining a stable bilateral balance and avoiding dangerous nuclear 

competition will be key objectives. 

The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for 

addressing global security threats, such as WMD proliferation and terrorism, are growing. The 

United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role 

in supporting international rules, norms, and institutions. 

At the same time, the United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain concerned about the 

pace and scope of China’s current military modernization efforts, including its quantitative and 

qualitative modernization of its nuclear capabilities. China’s nuclear arsenal remains much 

smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. But the lack of transparency 

surrounding its programs – their pace and scope as well as the strategy and doctrine guiding them 

– raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions. 

Adapting to a Changed Security Environment 

These changes in the nuclear threat environment – especially the heightened concern about 

nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation and the less dangerous strategic interaction between 

the United States and Russia – have not emerged overnight. They have developed over the last 

twenty years, and Administrations of both parties have responded with modifications of U.S. 

nuclear weapons policies and force posture. But those modifications have not gone far or fast 

enough. As the President has said, we have to “put an end to Cold War thinking.” 

 The United States has begun to shift our focus to the dangers of nuclear proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism, but we need to intensify our efforts to build broad international 

support for the rigorous measures needed to prevent these dangers. 

 The United States has sought to prevent the emergence of new regional nuclear-armed 

states, but we need to do more to enhance regional security architectures to reassure our 

allies and partners that our commitments to their defense will remain strong and reliable. 

 The United States and Russia have deeply reduced their nuclear forces from Cold War 

levels, but both still retain many more nuclear weapons than needed. 

 The United States has reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons as Cold War nuclear 

rivalries have eased and as our conventional military forces and missile defense capabilities 
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have strengthened, but we have sent mixed signals about the importance we place on 

nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. 

 The United States has maintained a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile without 

nuclear testing since 1992, but significant investments are needed in both physical and 

human capital to ensure that the stockpile can be maintained without ever needing to test 

again. 

The growing dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism have altered the hierarchy of 

our nuclear concerns and strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to 

discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and stopping 

terrorist groups from acquiring the materials to build nuclear bombs. At the same time, we must 

continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats 

posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies 

and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives our non-nuclear 

allies and partners might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents. 

Implications for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Force Structure 

The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military 

confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly 

regimes seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that we better align our nuclear 

policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear 

proliferation. 

This does not mean that our nuclear deterrent has become irrelevant. Indeed, as long as nuclear 

weapons exist, the United States will maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces, including 

deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, highly capable nuclear delivery systems and command 

and control capabilities, and the physical infrastructure and the expert personnel needed to 

sustain them. These nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential 

adversaries, reassuring allies and partners around the world, and promoting stability globally and 

in key regions. 

But fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years – including 

the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile 

defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries – enable us to fulfill those objectives at 

significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, 

without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape 

our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet today’s 

most pressing security challenges. 
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 By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons – and thereby demonstrating 

that we are meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear 

disarmament – we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT 

partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide against theft or seizure by 

terrorist groups. 

 By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures 

with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our 

non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and 

confirm that they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own. 

 By pursuing a sound Stockpile Management Program for extending the life of U.S. 

nuclear weapons, we can ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent without the 

development of new nuclear warheads or further nuclear testing. 

 By modernizing our aging nuclear 

weapons-supporting facilities and 

investing in human capital, we can 

substantially reduce the number of 

stockpiled nuclear weapons we retain as a 

hedge against technical or geopolitical 

surprise, accelerate the dismantlement of 

nuclear weapons no longer required for 

our deterrent, and improve our 

understanding of foreign nuclear weapons 

activities. 

 By promoting strategic stability with 

Russia and China and improving 

transparency and mutual confidence, we 

can help create the conditions for moving 

toward a world without nuclear weapons 

and build a stronger basis for addressing 

the threats of nuclear proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism. 

 By working to reduce the salience of 

nuclear weapons in international affairs 

and moving step-by-step toward 

Vice President Joseph R. Biden delivers a speech on 

nuclear security and implementing the President’s 

Prague agenda before Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James 

Cartwright, and several hundred guests, at the 

National Defense University on Feb. 18, 2010. 

National Defense University photo. 
THE CHANGED – AND CHANGING – NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

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eliminating them, we can reverse the growing expectation that we are destined to live in a 

world with many nuclear-armed states, and decrease incentives for additional countries to 

hedge against an uncertain and dangerous future by pursuing nuclear options of their 

own. Creating these conditions will reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapon use. 

In sum, the security environment has changed in fundamental ways since the end of the Cold 

War. The landscape of threats and challenges has evolved. But a changing landscape has also 

brought with it some valuable new opportunities. Accordingly, U.S. policy priorities must shift. 

The U.S. policy agenda must reflect a clear and current understanding of how U.S. nuclear 

strategy and posture shape these international dynamics. 

 
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PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 

AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 

As part of our effort to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons, the United States will lead 

expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation 

regime and to accelerate efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. Concerns have grown in recent 

years that unless today’s dangerous trends are arrested and reversed, before long we will be living 

in a world with a steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states and an increasing likelihood 

of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons. Therefore, for the first time, the 2010 NPR 

places this priority atop the U.S. nuclear agenda. 

The United States is committed to renewing and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime it anchors to cope with the 

challenges of non-compliance and of the growth of nuclear power. We support expanding access 

to the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, but this must be done in a way that does not 

promote proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. To strengthen the regime, the United 

States seeks to champion and reaffirm through its own actions the grand bargain that underpins 

the treaty: states without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, states with nuclear weapons will 

move toward disarmament, and all Parties can have access to peaceful nuclear energy under 

effective verification. 

As part of this effort, the United States seeks to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime by: 

 Reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. We have demonstrated that we 

are prepared to engage multilaterally and bilaterally with these states to arrive at 

negotiated solutions that provide for their political and economic integration with the 

international community, while verifiably confirming they are not pursuing nuclear 

weapons capabilities. However, their continued defiance of international norms and 

agreements will lead only to their further isolation and increasing international pressure. 

 Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. NPT Members, 

particularly non-nuclear weapons states, rely for security on assurances that countries will 

not divert nuclear material to illicit nuclear weapons programs. IAEA safeguards are 

essential in maintaining that assurance. To deter and detect safeguards violations, the 

IAEA must be given additional financial resources and verification authorities, and all 

countries should adhere to the IAEA Additional Protocol. The United States is committed 

to expanding financial support for the regular IAEA budget and will continue to push for 

stronger institutional support from other states, while we continue to increase our own 

extra-budgetary contributions. The U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative will assist 
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the IAEA to confront new challenges far into the future by helping develop the tools, 

authorities, capabilities, technologies, expertise, and resources needed to meet current and 

future safeguard challenges. 

 Creating consequences for non-compliance. It is not enough to detect non-compliance; 

violators must know that they will face consequences when they are caught. Moreover, 

states that violate their obligations must not be able to escape the consequences of their 

non-compliance by withdrawing from the NPT. 

 Impeding sensitive nuclear trade. National and multilateral export and border controls 

must be strengthened, financial and other tools must be used to disrupt illicit proliferation 

networks, and tighter restrictions must be placed on the transfer of dual-use enrichment 

and reprocessing technologies. The United States has increased its funding to help 

countries improve strategic trade controls and improve targeting and inspection at border 

crossings. We also support development of a United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1540 “trust fund” to assist countries in meeting their obligations under the resolution, 

including developing and enforcing national export controls to prevent non-state actors 

from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related materials and technology. 

We are implementing President Obama’s pledge to make the Proliferation Security 

Initiative into a durable international institution, under which over 90 countries 

coordinate, share intelligence, and build capacity to interdict WMD-related transfers. And 

the United States is working to detect and disrupt the financing of nuclear proliferation 

and terrorism by identifying and prosecuting its networks and establishing international 

standards and best practices. 

 Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks. 

President Obama has called for the development of a new framework for international 

nuclear energy cooperation, which the United States is pursuing with the international 

community through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which includes 25 partner 

and 31 observer nations. To reduce incentives for countries to pursue indigenous fuel 

cycle facilities, this new framework should include international fuel banks, such as the 

Russian Angarsk fuel bank approved by the IAEA in February 2010, multilateral fuelsupply assurances, agreements by suppliers to take back spent fuel, and spent fuel 

repositories. Cradle-to-grave nuclear fuel management could be one important element of 

this new framework. The United States will also continue to assist other countries in 

benefitting from the other peaceful applications of nuclear materials, including for 

medical and agricultural uses and pure research. 

The United States is committed to improving nuclear security worldwide in order to prevent 

nuclear terrorism. This cannot be accomplished by the United States alone. All states have a 
PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 

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fundamental responsibility to ensure the security and control of nuclear materials and weapons in 

their possession. Further, this ambitious agenda requires the active engagement of a broad 

coalition of nations acting in concert. The United States has given high priority to strengthening 

and accelerating international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism by: 

 Pursuing aggressively the President’s 

Prague initiative, endorsed in United 

Nations Security Council Resolution 1887, 

to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials 

worldwide. The United States will be 

doing so by expanding our cooperation 

with other countries and strengthening 

nuclear security standards, practices, and 

international safeguards. 

 Hosting the April 2010 Nuclear Security 

Summit, where leaders of over 40 countries 

will commit to fight nuclear smuggling and 

terrorism and put in place effective nuclear 

security measures. 

 Increasing funding in fiscal year (FY) 2011 

for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s nuclear non-proliferation 

programs to $2.7 billion, an increase of 

more than 25 percent. 

 Accelerating the Global Threat Reduction 

Initiative to remove and secure high-priority vulnerable nuclear material around the 

world, convert additional research reactors to operate on fuel that cannot be used in 

nuclear weapons, and complete the repatriation of U.S.- and Russian-origin highly 

enriched uranium from research reactors worldwide. 

 Accelerating the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program to 

install nuclear security upgrades at Russian weapons complex sites and to expand 

cooperation to new priority countries beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

 Securing and eliminating weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery 

through cooperative threat reduction programs at the Departments of Defense, State, and 

Energy, including the flagship Nunn-Lugar program. And assisting other countries to 

strengthen their national capacities for nuclear materials protection, control, and 

In May 2009, the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) announced the removal of 

73.7 kilograms (162.5 pounds) of Russian-origin 

highly enriched uranium (HEU) “spent” nuclear fuel 

from Kazakhstan. The material was removed and 

returned to Russia for storage at a secure nuclear 

facility in a series of four shipments between 

December 2008 and May 2009. NNSA photo. 
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accounting through these programs, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 

and multilateral cooperative threat reduction programs. 

 Enhancing national and international capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled nuclear 

materials. We are expanding the Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo 

and the Second Line of Defense and Megaports programs to install radiation detectors at 

key borders, airports, and seaports. We also are making the 77-country Global Initiative 

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism a durable international institution. The Initiative 

coordinates expertise, shares information, and integrates capabilities to deter, detect, 

interdict, mitigate, and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism. 

 Continue to strengthen our nuclear forensics efforts to improve the ability to identify the 

source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device. 

 Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or 

other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of 

mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven 

for such efforts. 

U.S. arms control and disarmament efforts, as well as other means of reducing the role of nuclear 

weapons and moving toward a world without them, can make a major contribution to our goal 

of preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. By demonstrating that we take 

seriously our NPT obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament, we strengthen our ability to 

mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation 

regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide. We are doing so by: 

 Concluding a verifiable New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that limits 

U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to levels well below those provided for in the 1991 

START Treaty and the 2002 Moscow Treaty. U.S. ratification and subsequent 

implementation of the new Treaty will be a concrete step on the path to nuclear 

disarmament. The verification and transparency measures included in the Treaty will help 

ensure stability and predictability in the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship. 

Implementation of the treaty also will set the stage for deeper, verifiable nuclear 

reductions. As the United States and Russia reduce their deployed weapons through New 

START, the United States will pursue negotiations for deeper reductions and greater 

transparency in partnership with Russia. Over time, we will also engage with other nuclear 

weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the 

future. This process should include efforts to improve transparency of states’ nuclear 

policies, strategies, and programs. 
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 Pursuing ratification and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty (CTBT). Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons 

states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear 

competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament. U.S. ratification could also encourage 

ratification by other states, including China, and provide incentives for the remaining 

states to work toward entry into force of the treaty. Further, U.S. ratification of the 

CTBT would enable us to encourage non-NPT Parties to follow the lead of the NPTrecognized Nuclear Weapon States in formalizing a heretofore voluntary testing 

moratorium, and thus strengthen strategic stability by reducing the salience of nuclear 

weapons in those states’ national defense strategies. 

 Seeking commencement of negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 

(FMCT) to halt the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Given that 

some states continue to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons, a multilateral, 

binding FMCT is needed to provide a quantitative cap on the potential growth of existing 

nuclear weapons stockpiles. As a result, the United States is committed to prompt 

negotiation of an FMCT with appropriate monitoring and verification provisions. The 

United States recognizes that such negotiations will be complex and will take time; 

however, a carefully crafted and verifiable FMCT will enhance our national security and 

contribute to nuclear stability worldwide. 

 Working with the Russian Federation to jointly eliminate 68 tons of weapons-grade 

plutonium no longer needed for defense purposes. 

 Initiating a comprehensive national 

research and development program to 

support continued progress toward a world 

free of nuclear weapons, including 

expanded work on verification technologies 

and the development of transparency 

measures. Such technologies will help us 

manage risk as we continue down this path 

by ensuring that we are able to detect 

potential clandestine weapons programs, 

foreign nuclear materials, and weapons 

production facilities and processes. 

A Nuclear Forensics Ground Collection Team in 

protection equipment screens a debris sample in a 

field exercise in Idaho. Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency photo.
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REDUCING THE ROLE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy has been reduced 

significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and should be taken at this time. 

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons 

exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. 

During the Cold War, the United States also reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in 

response to a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. 

Moreover, after the United States gave up its own chemical and biological weapons (CBW) 

pursuant to international treaties (while some states continued to possess or pursue them) the 

United States reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons to deter CBW attack on the United 

States and its allies and partners. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. 

First, and foremost, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are gone. Russia is not an enemy, 

and is increasingly a partner in confronting proliferation and other emerging threats. And all of 

the non-Soviet former members of the Warsaw Pact are now members of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO). 

Second, U.S., allied, and partner conventional military capabilities now provide a wide range of 

effective conventional response options to deter and if necessary defeat conventional threats from 

regional actors. Major improvements in missile defenses and counter-weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) capabilities have strengthened deterrence and defense against CBW attack. 

Given these developments, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter and respond to non-nuclear 

attacks—conventional, biological, or chemical—has declined significantly. The United States 

will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack. 

To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security 

assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 

against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. 

This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully 

complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work 

with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the 

non-proliferation regime. 
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In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the 

assurance that uses CBW against the United States or its allies and partners would face the 

prospect of a devastating conventional military response—and that any individuals responsible 

for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable. 

Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology 

development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that 

may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. 

capacities to counter that threat. 

In the case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess nuclear weapons and 

states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations – there remains a 

narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a 

conventional or CBW attack 

against the United States or its 

allies and partners. The United 

States is therefore not prepared 

at the present time to adopt a 

universal policy that the “sole 

purpose” of U.S. nuclear 

weapons is to deter nuclear 

attack on the United States and 

our allies and partners, but will 

work to establish conditions 

under which such a policy could 

be safely adopted. 

Yet this does not mean that our 

willingness to use nuclear 

weapons against countries not 

covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress 

that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the 

vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. 

It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear 

non-use be extended forever. As President Ronald Reagan declared, “A nuclear war cannot be 

won and must never be fought.” 

In summary, the following principles will guide U.S. nuclear policies: 

 The United States will meet its commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue 

nuclear disarmament and will make demonstrable progress over the next five to ten years. 

A medium-range ballistic missile with a separating target is launched from 

the Pacific Missile Range Facility on Jun. 22, 2007 (left photo). Minutes 

later, a Standard Missile (SM-3) was launched from the Aegis combat system 

equipped Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Decatur (DDG 73), successfully 

intercepting the ballistic missile threat target (right photo). It was the first 

time such a test was conducted from a ballistic missile defense equipped-U.S. 

Navy destroyer. U.S. Navy photos. 
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We will work to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons while enhancing 

security for ourselves, and our allies and partners. 

 The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the 

role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making 

deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole 

purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

 The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme 

circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. 

 The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 

weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. 
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MAINTAINING STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND 

STABILITY AT REDUCED NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS 

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have reduced operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons by approximately 75 percent, but both still retain many more 

nuclear weapons than needed for deterrence. As an initial step, the Administration is committed 

to working with Russia to preserve stability at significantly reduced nuclear force levels, through 

the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). 

Beyond New START’s bilateral reductions in operationally deployed strategic forces, the NPR 

examined ways to minimize potential nuclear instability by maximizing the decision time 

provided to the President. Analysis also focused on our limited non-strategic nuclear weapons 

posture. Moreover, in our commitment to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear 

weapons, the NPR examined the full range of factors that will allow deeper reductions in U.S. 

nuclear force levels. 

It is also clear that maintaining strategic stability at reduced force levels will be an enduring and 

evolving challenge for the United States in the years ahead. Ongoing nuclear and other military 

modernization efforts by Russia and China compound this challenge, making the need for 

strategic stability dialogues all the more critical. 

Toward New START 

U.S. strategic forces – 

comprised of submarinelaunched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs), inter-continental 

ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 

and nuclear-capable heavy 

bombers – continue to 

underwrite deterrence of 

nuclear attack against the 

United States, our allies, and 

partners. 

In the two decades since the 

end of the Cold War, the 

United States has reduced 

deployed warheads on 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton meets with Russian President 

Dmitry Medvedev and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow, 

Russia, Oct. 13, 2009. State Department photo. 
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strategic delivery systems by approximately 75 percent. The next step in this process is to replace 

the expired 1991 START I Treaty with another verifiable agreement, New START. U.S. and 

Russian negotiators have recently completed this agreement. 

An early task of the NPR was to develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations. In so 

doing, the review explored how a range of force structures might affect strategic stability at lower 

numbers. Further the NPR considered whether the nuclear Triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and heavy 

bombers should be retained, and, if so, the necessary investments to sustain each Triad leg. 

Determining New START Positions 

Detailed NPR analysis of potential reductions in strategic weapons, conducted in spring 2009, 

concluded that the United States could sustain stable deterrence with significantly fewer 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads, assuming parallel Russian reductions. The NPR analysis 

considered several specific levels of nuclear weapons, all below current levels of approximately 

2,200 deployed strategic warheads. Its conclusions, approved by the President, the Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, formed the basis 

for U.S. negotiations with Russia on New START. Because New START is intended to be only 

an initial step in a continuing process of bilateral nuclear reductions, this initial analysis used 

conservative assumptions to determine acceptable reductions in deployed strategic nuclear 

weapons. 

New START will result in significant mutual limits in deployed strategic nuclear warheads, well 

below the 2,200 allowed under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known 

as the Moscow Treaty, which expires in 2012. 

The NPR conducted detailed analysis to determine an appropriate limit on nuclear warheads and 

strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). After determining that the United States should retain a 

nuclear Triad under New START, the NPR went on to assess the appropriate force structure for 

each Triad leg, namely the required numbers of strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and 

SLBMs, ICBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Analysis focused on meeting four 

requirements: 

 Supporting strategic stability through an assured second-strike capability; 

 Retaining sufficient force structure in each leg to allow the ability to hedge effectively by 

shifting weight from one Triad leg to another if necessary due to unexpected technological 

problems or operational vulnerabilities; 

 Retaining a margin above the minimum required nuclear force structure for the possible 

addition of non-nuclear prompt-global strike capabilities (conventionally-armed ICBMs 

or SLBMs) that would be accountable under the Treaty; and 
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 Maintaining the needed capabilities over the next several decades or more, including 

retaining a sufficient cadre of trained military and civilian personnel and adequate 

infrastructure. 

The 1991 START I, which expired in December 2009, limited the United States and Russia to 

1600 SDVs each. While the United States has approximately 1,200 SDVs still accountable under 

the now-expired Treaty’s counting rules, fewer than 900 are associated with deployed strategic 

nuclear weapons. The remainder are essentially “phantoms:” either conventional-only delivery 

systems, particularly B-1B bombers and SSGN submarines (converted from SSBNs to carry 

conventional sea-launched cruise missiles), or ICBM silos and heavy bombers that are no longer 

in use but which have not yet been eliminated. 

The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic 

Command supported reductions in limits on deployed as well as non-deployed U.S. SDVs. This 

recommendation was conditional on the exclusion of conventional B-1B bombers and U.S. 

SSGN submarines from accountability under the Treaty and the acceptance of the potential 

conversion of a subset of the B-52 fleet to a conventional-only capability. 

Building on NPR analysis, the United States and Russia have agreed to mutual limits under the 

New START: 

 A limit of 1,550 accountable strategic warheads; 

 A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed nuclear-capable 

heavy bombers; and 

 A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, 

and nuclear capable heavy bombers. 

Under the New START, dual-capable bombers will count as both one strategic delivery vehicle, 

and as one warhead. This counting rule was adopted in recognition of the facts that heavy 

bombers do not pose a first-strike threat to either side, and that on a day-to-day basis few or no 

bombers are loaded with nuclear weapons. 

The Future of the Triad 

After considering a wide range of possible options for the U.S. strategic nuclear posture, 

including some that involved eliminating a leg of the Triad, the NPR concluded that for planned 

reductions under New START, the United States should retain a smaller Triad of SLBMs, 

ICBMs, and heavy bombers. Retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at 

reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. 
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Each leg of the Triad has advantages that 

warrant retaining all three legs at this stage of 

reductions. Strategic nuclear submarines 

(SSBNs) and the SLBMs they carry represent 

the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear 

Triad. Today, there appears to be no viable near 

or mid-term threats to the survivability of U.S. 

SSBNs, but such threats – or other technical 

problems – cannot be ruled out over the long 

term. Single-warhead ICBMs contribute to 

stability, and like SLBMs are not vulnerable to 

air defenses. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs, 

bombers can be visibly deployed forward, as a 

signal in crisis to strengthen deterrence of 

potential adversaries and assurance of allies and 

partners. 

While significantly reducing the size of the 

technical hedge overall, the United States will 

retain the ability to “upload” some nuclear 

warheads as a technical hedge against any future 

problems with U.S. delivery systems or 

warheads, or as a result of a fundamental deterioration of the security environment. For example, 

if there were a problem with a specific ICBM warhead type, it could be taken out of service and 

replaced with warheads from another ICBM warhead type, and/or nuclear warheads could be uploaded on SLBMs and/or bombers. 

Sustaining Strategic Submarines (SSBNs) 

The NPR concluded that ensuring a survivable U.S. response force requires continuous at-sea 

deployments of SSBNs in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, as well as the ability to surge 

additional submarines in crisis. To support this requirement, the United States currently has 

fourteen nuclear-capable Ohio-class SSBNs. 

By 2020, Ohio-class submarines will have been in service longer than any previous submarines. 

Therefore as a prudent hedge, the Navy will retain all 14 SSBNs for the near-term. Depending 

on future force structure assessments, and on how remaining SSBNs age in the coming years, the 

United States will consider reducing from 14 to 12 Ohio-class submarines in the second half of 

this decade. This decision will not affect the number of deployed nuclear warheads on SSBNs. 

Air Force Global Strike Command officials assumed 

responsibility for the Air Force's nuclear-capable bomber 

force, including the B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit, 

Feb. 1, 2010 (top photo). U.S. Air Force photo. An 

unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 

missile is test launched off the California coast (bottom 

right photo). U.S. Air Force photo. The U.S. Navy's 

nuclear ballistic missile submarine USS MAINE 

(SSBN-741) conducts surface navigational operations 

(bottom left photo). Photo by PH1 Michael J. Rinaldi. 
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To maintain an at-sea presence for the 

long-term, the United States must continue 

development of a follow-on to the Ohioclass submarine. The first Ohio-class 

submarine retirement is planned for 2027. 

Since the lead times associated with 

designing, building, testing, and deploying 

new submarines are particularly long, the 

Secretary of Defense has directed the Navy 

to begin technology development of an 

SSBN replacement. 

Today, there appears to be no credible near 

or mid-term threats to the survivability of 

U.S. SSBNs. However, given the stakes involved, the Department of Defense will continue a 

robust SSBN Security Program that aims to anticipate potential threats and develop appropriate 

countermeasures to protect current and future SSBNs. 

A “DeMIRVed” ICBM Force 

Today, the United States has 450 deployed silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs, each with one to 

three warheads. The NPR considered the type and number of ICBMs needed for stable 

deterrence, and to serve as a hedge against any future vulnerability of U.S. SSBNs. 

The United States will “deMIRV” all deployed ICBMs, so that each Minuteman III ICBM has 

only one nuclear warhead. (A “MIRVed” ballistic missile carries Multiple Independentlytargetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). “DeMIRVing” will reduce each missile to a single 

warhead.) This step will enhance the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives 

for either side to strike first. 

ICBMs provide significant advantages to the U.S. nuclear force posture, including extremely 

secure command and control, high readiness rates, and relatively low operating costs. The 

Department of Defense will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program with the aim 

of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as mandated by Congress. Although a decision on any 

follow-on ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform that decision are needed now. 

Accordingly, the Department of Defense will begin initial study of alternatives in fiscal years (FY) 

2011 and 2012. This study will consider a range of possible deployment options, with the 

objective of defining a cost-effective approach that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear 

weapons while promoting stable deterrence. 

Chief Torpedoman Eric Ragan looks through binoculars while 

watching for a personnel transfer vessel to welcome the newest 

members of the crew aboard nuclear ballistic missile submarine 

USS Louisiana (SSBN 743). U.S. Navy photo by Electronics 

Technician 3rd Class Dominique Cardenas. 
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A Smaller and Highly Capable Nuclear Bomber Force 

The United States currently has 76 B52H bombers and 18 B-2 bombers that 

can be equipped with nuclear weapons. 

The NPR determined that the Air Force 

will retain nuclear-capable bombers, 

while converting some B-52Hs to a 

conventional-only role. 

There are two principal reasons to retain 

nuclear-capable – or more accurately 

dual-capable – bombers. First, this 

capability provides a rapid and effective 

hedge against technical challenges with 

another leg of the Triad, as well as 

geopolitical uncertainties. Second, nuclear-capable bombers are important to extended deterrence 

of potential attacks on U.S. allies and partners. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs, heavy bombers can 

be visibly forward deployed, thereby signaling U.S. resolve and commitment in crisis. 

U.S. dual-capable heavy bombers will not be placed on full-time nuclear alert, and so will 

provide additional conventional firepower. The value of heavy bombers has been demonstrated 

multiple times since World War II, including in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom. The Department of Defense (DoD) will invest 

more than $1 billion over the next five years to support upgrades to the B-2 stealth bomber. 

These enhancements will help sustain survivability and improve mission effectiveness. 

DoD is studying the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers 

as well as non-nuclear prompt global strike, in follow-on analysis to the 2010 Quadrennial 

Defense Review and the NPR. This analysis will affect the Department’s FY 2012 budget 

proposal. In addition, the Air Force will conduct an assessment of alternatives to inform 

decisions in FY 2012 about whether and (if so) how to replace the current air-launched cruise 

missile (ALCM), which will reach the end of its service life later in the next decade. 

DoD is also studying emerging challenges in the defense industrial base. As commitments are 

made to life extend or replace current weapons, challenges are likely to emerge that could impair 

needed progress. Steps can be taken now to mitigate some of these risks. An example is in the 

production of solid rocket motors. Across the U.S. Government, there are three users of the solid 

rocket motor industry: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for shuttle 

boosters; the Air Force for Minuteman III, and the Navy for Trident II D-5. None of them has 

immediate plans for a new large solid rocket motor design. With current plans to sustain the 

U.S. Air Force Capt. Joshua Logie, a B-52 Stratofortress pilot 

assigned to the 20th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, Barksdale 

Air Force Base, completes a flight on Feb. 9, 2010. U.S. Air 

Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jacob N. Bailey. 
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Minuteman III and Trident II strategic missiles for at least another two decades, the nation will 

need technically skilled personnel to address the unknown future challenges associated with the 

aging of these systems. In order to revive the health of this industry, a research and development 

program is being initiated that focuses on commonality between the Military Departments and 

joint scalable flight test demonstrations. 

In sum, the NPR concluded: 

 Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing accountable U.S. strategic delivery 

vehicles by approximately 50 percent from the START level and reducing accountable 

strategic warheads by approximately 30 percent from the 2002 Moscow Treaty level. 

 During the ten-year duration of New START, the nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and 

heavy bombers will be maintained. 

 All U.S. ICBMs will be “de-MIRVed” to a single warhead each to increase stability. 

 Some ability to “upload” non-deployed nuclear weapons on existing delivery vehicles 

should be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise. Preference will be 

given to upload capacity for bombers and strategic submarines. 

 Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence and reassurance goals 

will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses in New START and ensuring 

that New START will not preclude options for using heavy bombers or long-range missile 

systems in conventional roles. 

The NPR conducted extensive analysis of alternative force structures under a New START 

Treaty, and the Department of Defense will define its planned force structure under the Treaty 

after taking account of this work. The United States will retain the ability to adjust this posture 

under New START as needed to account for unexpected technological developments or 

operational vulnerabilities, or geo-political surprise. 

Maximizing Presidential Decision Time 

Maximizing decision time for the President can further strengthen strategic stability at lower 

force levels. Thus, the NPR considered changes to existing nuclear policies and postures that 

directly affect potential crisis stability, including alert postures and the Nuclear Command, 

Control, and Communication (NC3) system. 

The NPR examined possible adjustments to the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces. 

Today, U.S. nuclear-capable heavy bombers are off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs remain on 

alert, and a significant number of SSBNs are at sea at any given time. The NPR concluded that 

this posture should be maintained. 
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The NPR reaffirmed the current practice of “open-ocean targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs so 

that, in the highly unlikely event of an accidental launch, the missile would land in the open 

ocean. The United States will ask Russia to reaffirm its commitment to continue this practice, 

which was mutually agreed in 1994. 

The NPR considered the possibility of 

reducing alert rates for ICBMs and at-sea 

rates of SSBNs, and concluded that such 

steps could reduce crisis stability by giving 

an adversary the incentive to attack before 

“re-alerting” was complete. At the same 

time, the NPR concluded that returning 

heavy bombers to full-time nuclear alert was 

not necessary, assuming the other two Triad 

legs retained a significant alert rate. 

Looking to the longer term, the NPR 

initiated studies that may lead to future 

reductions in alert posture. For example, in 

an initial study of possible follow-on systems 

to the Minuteman III ICBM force, the Department of Defense will explore whether new modes 

of basing may ensure the survivability of this leg of the Triad while eliminating or reducing 

incentives for prompt launch. 

Additionally, the NPR examined the effectiveness of our command and control of U.S. nuclear 

forces as an essential element in ensuring crisis stability, deterrence, and the safety, security and 

effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile. The DoD NC3 system enables informed and timely 

decisions by the President, the sole authority for nuclear employment, and execution of 

Presidential nuclear response options. 

The Secretary of Defense has directed a number of initiatives to further improve the resiliency of 

the NC3 system and the capabilities for the fully deliberative control of the force in time of crisis. 

The Department of Defense has taken steps to strengthen NC3 in the FY 2011 budget request, 

including modernizing “legacy” single-purpose NC3 capabilities to meet current and projected 

challenges, and continuing to invest in secure voice conferences for NC3. An interagency study is 

being initiated to determine the investment needed and the organizational structure best suited 

to further strengthen the NC3 capabilities. This study, led by DoD, will begin in 2010 and 

provide a long-term strategy that will inform out-year budget submission to Congress. 

The NPR concluded that the United States will: 

Capt. Jeremy Ritter, 490th Missile Squadron (MS) flight 

commander (right), and 1st Lt. William Springer, 490th MS 

ICBM combat crew deputy commander (left), are "strapped 

in" and coordinating with the other launch crews to turn keys 

to launch their missiles during a simulation in the Missile 

Procedure Trainer. Crews "strap in" to prevent being thrown 

around the capsule in the event that they are attacked. U.S. 

Air Force photo by John Turner. 
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 Maintain the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces: U.S. nuclear-capable heavy 

bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs 

at sea at any given time. 

 Continue the practice of “open-ocean targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs so that, in the 

highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the missile would land in 

the open ocean. The United States will ask Russia to re-confirm its commitment to this 

practice. 

 Make new investments in the U.S. command and control system to maximize Presidential 

decision time in a nuclear crisis. 

 Explore new modes of ICBM basing that could enhance survivability and further reduce 

any incentives for prompt launch. Such an assessment will be part of the Department of 

Defense’s study of possible replacements for the current ICBM force. 

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 

The United States has reduced its non-strategic (or “tactical”) nuclear weapons dramatically since 

the end of the Cold War. Today, it keeps only a limited number of forward deployed nuclear 

weapons in Europe, plus a small number of nuclear weapons stored in the United States, 

available for global deployment in support of extended deterrence to allies and partners. Russia 

maintains a much larger force of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a significant number of which 

are deployed near the territories of several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

countries and are therefore a concern to NATO. 

Non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with the non-deployed nuclear weapons of both sides, 

should be included in any future reduction arrangements between the United States and Russia. 

The United States will consult with our allies regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in 

Europe, and is committed to making consensus decisions through NATO processes. In 

cooperation with allies and partners, the NPR has determined that the following steps will be 

taken. 

 The Air Force will retain a dual-capable fighter (the capability to deliver both 

conventional and nuclear weapons) as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

As described in more detail below, the United States will also conduct a full scope B-61 

(nuclear bomb) Life Extension Program to ensure its functionality with the F-35 and to 

include making surety – safety, security, and use control – enhancements to maintain 

confidence in the B-61. These decisions ensure that the United States will retain the 

capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance 

commitments. These decisions do not presume the results of future decisions within 
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NATO about the requirements of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing, but keep open 

all options. 

 The United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N). 

This system serves a redundant purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. It has been one of a 

number of means to forward-deploy nuclear weapons in time of crisis. Other means 

include forward-deployment of bombers with either bombs or cruise missiles, as well as 

forward-deployment of dual-capable fighters. In addition, U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs are 

capable of striking any potential adversary. The deterrence and assurance roles of TLAMN can be adequately substituted by these other means, and the United States remains 

committed to providing a credible extended deterrence posture and capabilities. 

As these NPR decisions are implemented and as we work with our allies and partners to 

strengthen security while reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, we will continue 

close consultations with allies and partners. No changes to U.S. extended deterrence capabilities 

will be made without continued close consultation with allies and partners. 

These decisions are embedded in a broader approach to the emerging challenges of extended 

deterrence that is reflected in not just the NPR but also the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review (BMDR) and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The United States seeks to 

significantly strengthen regional security architectures in a comprehensive way. It seeks improved 

peacetime approaches that fully integrate “whole of government” approaches as well as the “hard” 

and “soft power” tools of the United States and its allies and partners, including an overall 

balance of conventional military power that serves the purposes of security and peace. U.S. 

nuclear weapons will play a role in the deterrence of regional states so long as those states have 

nuclear weapons, but the decisions taken in the NPR, BMDR, and QDR reflect the U.S. desire 

to increase reliance on non-nuclear means to accomplish our objectives of deterring such states 

and reassuring our allies and partners. 

Reinforcing Strategic Stability 

Given that Russia and China are currently modernizing their nuclear capabilities – and that both 

are claiming U.S. missile defense and conventionally-armed missile programs are destabilizing – 

maintaining strategic stability with the two countries will be an important challenge in the years 

ahead. 

 The United States will therefore pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues with Russia and 

China aimed at promoting more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationships. 

A strategic dialogue with Russia will allow the United States to explain that our missile defenses 

and any future U.S. conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missile systems are designed to 

address newly emerging regional threats, and are not intended to affect the strategic balance with 
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Russia. For its part, Russia could 

explain its modernization programs, 

clarify its current military doctrine 

(especially the extent to which it 

places importance on nuclear 

weapons), and discuss steps it could 

take to allay concerns in the West 

about its non-strategic nuclear 

arsenal, such as further 

consolidating its non-strategic 

systems in a small number of secure 

facilities deep within Russia. 

A bilateral dialogue would also 

provide an opportunity for the two 

sides to consider wide-ranging 

missile defense cooperation, building on a joint statement signed by President Obama and 

President Medvedev in July 2009, and addressing such areas as integrating U.S. and Russian 

sensors, developing joint missile defense architectures, and conducting joint testing, research and 

development, modeling and simulations, and exercises. 

With China, the purpose of a dialogue on strategic stability is to provide a venue and mechanism 

for each side to communicate its views about the other’s strategies, policies, and programs on 

nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities. The goal of such a dialogue is to enhance 

confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust. As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile 

Defense Review Report, “maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship is as 

important to this Administration as maintaining strategic stability with other major powers.” 

Building more stable strategic relationships with Russia and China could contribute to greater 

restraint in those countries’ nuclear programs and postures, which could have a reassuring and 

stabilizing effect in their regions. It could also facilitate closer cooperation by those two countries 

with the United States on measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 

Future Nuclear Reductions 

The United States is committed to the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The 

President has directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons below 

New START levels. Several factors will influence the magnitude and pace of such reductions. 

First, any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional 

adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. 

U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and Gen. Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General 

Staff, address the media after counterpart talks in Moscow, Russia June 

26, 2009. DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class 

Chad J. McNeeley. 
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This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; further improvements in 

U.S., allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in strategic and nonstrategic weapons; and close consultations with allies and partners. The United States will 

continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived gains of 

attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable 

costs of the response. 

Second, implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure 

investments recommended in the NPR will allow the United States to shift away from retaining 

large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, 

allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments are essential to facilitating 

reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and beyond. 

Third, Russia’s nuclear force will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how 

fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Following ratification and entry into force of New 

START, the Administration will pursue a follow-on agreement with Russia that binds both 

countries to further reductions in all nuclear weapons. Because of our improved relations, the 

need for strict numerical parity between the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was 

during the Cold War. But large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both 

sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, 

long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, 

we will place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels. 

The President has directed follow-on analysis to the NPR that considers the above three factors, 

and others as appropriate, to set goals for future U.S.-Russia reductions in nuclear weapons 

below New START levels. The size and pace of U.S. nuclear force reductions will be 

implemented in ways that maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to 

our allies and partners. 

Following ratification and entry into force of New START, the Administration will pursue 

discussions with Russia on further reductions and transparency, which could be pursued through 

formal agreements and/or parallel voluntary measures. These follow-on reductions should be 

broader in scope than previous bilateral agreements, addressing all the nuclear weapons of the 

two countries, not just deployed strategic nuclear weapons. 
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STRENGTHENING REGIONAL DETERRENCE 

AND REASSURING U.S. ALLIES AND PARTNERS 

U.S. allies and partners are on the front lines of a changing global security environment. Some 

are enjoying unprecedented security and accordingly seek an acceleration of efforts to reduce 

reliance on nuclear deterrence. Others face new challenges to their security and look to the 

United States for continued partnership in safeguarding their interests. Among their neighbors 

are nuclear proliferators, potential smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and weak 

and failing states. Some also feel the 

pressures of neighboring major powers 

asserting stronger regional roles, in some 

cases by nuclear means. 

Accordingly, the United States is fully 

committed to strengthening bilateral and 

regional security ties and working closely 

with its allies and partners to adapt these 

relationships to emerging 21st century 

requirements. We will continue to assure 

our allies and partners of our commitment 

to their security and to demonstrate this 

commitment not only through words, but also through deeds. This includes the continued 

forward deployment of U.S. forces in key regions, strengthening of U.S. and allied non-nuclear 

capabilities, and the continued provision of extended deterrence. Such security relationships are 

critical not only in deterring potential threats, but can also serve our non-proliferation goals – by 

demonstrating to neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear weapons will only undermine 

their goal of achieving military or political advantages, and by reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies 

and partners that their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear deterrent 

capabilities. Further, the United States will work with allies and partners to strengthen the global 

non-proliferation regime, especially the implementation of existing commitments within their 

regions. 

Security architectures in key regions will retain a nuclear dimension as long as nuclear threats to 

U.S. allies and partners remain. U.S. nuclear weapons have played an essential role in extending 

deterrence to U.S. allies and partners against nuclear attacks or nuclear-backed coercion by states 

in their region that possess or are seeking nuclear weapons. A credible U.S. “nuclear umbrella” 

has been provided by a combination of means – the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, nonAn F-35 Joint Strike Fighter test aircraft undergoes a flight 

check over Fort Worth, Texas. U.S. Air Force photo courtesy 

of Lockheed Martin. 
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strategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that 

could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies. 

The mix of deterrence means has varied over time and from region to region. During the Cold 

War, the United States forward-deployed nuclear weapons in both Europe and Asia, and retained 

the capability to increase those deployments if needed. At the end of the Cold War, a series of 

steps were taken to dramatically reduce the forward presence of U.S. nuclear weapons. Today, 

there are separate choices to be made in partnership with allies in Europe and Asia about what 

posture best serves our shared interests in deterrence and assurance and in moving toward a 

world of reduced nuclear dangers. 

In Europe, forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons have been reduced dramatically since the end 

of the Cold War, but a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons remain. Although the risk of 

nuclear attack against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members is at an historic 

low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing 

arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess 

specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons – contribute to Alliance 

cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats. The 

role of nuclear weapons in defending Alliance members will be discussed this year in connection 

with NATO’s revision of its Strategic Concept. Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should 

only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance. 

In Asia and the Middle East – where there are no multilateral alliance structures analogous to 

NATO – the United States has mainly extended deterrence through bilateral alliances and 

security relationships and through its forward military presence and security guarantees. When 

the Cold War ended, the United States withdrew its forward-deployed nuclear weapons from the 

Pacific region, including removing nuclear weapons from naval surface vessels and general 

purpose submarines. Since then, it has relied on its central strategic forces and the capacity to redeploy non-strategic nuclear systems in East Asia, if needed, in times of crisis. 

The Administration is pursuing strategic dialogues with its allies and partners in East Asia and 

the Middle East to determine how best to cooperatively strengthen regional security architectures 

to enhance peace and security, and reassure them that U.S. extended deterrence is credible and 

effective. 

Regional Security Architectures 

Enhancing regional security architectures is a key part of the U.S. strategy for strengthening 

regional deterrence while reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons. These regional 

security architectures include effective missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional 

power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and control – all underwritten by strong 
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political commitments. The goal is to ensure that if states attempt to attack U.S. forces or our 

allies and partners, their attacks will be blunted and their aims denied by an enhanced set of 

capabilities – and that these states understand this reality and so are deterred from threatening or 

undertaking such an attack. 

Strengthening the non-nuclear elements of regional security architectures is vital to moving 

toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The United States is positioned with capabilities across 

all domains to deter a wide range of attacks or forms of coercion against itself, its allies, and 

partners. Credible deterrence depends on land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited 

and large-scale conflicts in anti-access environments, as well as forces prepared to respond to the 

full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups. These forces are enabled by U.S. 

capabilities to protect its assets in cyberspace and outer space and enhanced by U.S. capabilities 

to deny adversaries’ objectives through resilient infrastructure (including command and control 

systems), global basing and posture, and ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD capabilities. 

Effective missile defenses are an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen regional 

deterrence against states of concern. Thus, while the United States will maintain a nuclear 

deterrent to cope with such states, we are also bolstering the other critical elements of U.S. 

deterrence, including conventional and ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

The U.S. nuclear posture has a vital role to play in regional security architectures. Proliferating 

states must understand that any attack on the United States, or our allies and partners, will be 

defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with a response that would be effective and 

overwhelming. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, will determine the precise nature of any 

U.S. response. But by pursuing nuclear weapons, such states must understand that they have 

significantly raised the stakes of any conflict. 

Key Initiatives 

Enduring alliances and broad-based political relationships are the foundation of strategic stability 

and security. The United States will work closely with allies and partners across the globe to 

ensure strong political and military ties, based on a common understanding of the challenges and 

opportunities of the emerging security environment, and strengthen regional deterrence. The 

United States will: 

 Continue to work extensively with allies and partners to build enhanced regional security 

architectures, including non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence, helping to build partner 

capacity, conducting combined exercises and training, and sustaining a forward presence 

in key regions – as described in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 

2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). 
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 Continue and, where appropriate, expand ongoing bilateral and multilateral discussions 

with allies and partners, including in Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the 

Middle East, on the most effective ways to enhance regional stability in the near-term and 

long-term. 

 Work with allies and partners to respond to regional threats by deploying effective missile 

defenses, including in Europe, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. This 

includes pursuing a Phased Adaptive Approach in these regions – as described in detail in 

the 2010 BMDR. 

 Strengthen counter-WMD 

capabilities, including improved 

U.S. and allied ability to defeat 

chemical or biological attack. 

The Department of Defense is 

significantly bolstering defenses 

against next-generation chemical 

weapons and advanced biological 

weapons – these initiatives are 

described in more detail in the 

2010 QDR. 

 Develop non-nuclear prompt 

global strike capabilities. These 

capabilities may be particularly 

valuable for the defeat of time-urgent regional threats. The Administration is currently 

examining the appropriate mix of such capabilities needed to improve our ability to 

address such regional threats, while not negatively affecting the stability of our nuclear 

relationships with Russia or China. Specific recommendations will be made in the fiscal 

year (FY) 2012 Department of Defense budget. 

 Develop and deploy, over the next decade, more effective capabilities for real-time 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as intelligence analysis to 

enable rapid processing of data. 

 Expand and deepen consultations with allies and partners on policies and combined 

postures to prevent proliferation and credibly deter aggression. 

 Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers 

(in the future, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) and heavy bombers (the B-2 and B-52H), 

and will proceed with full scope life extension, including surety – safety, security, and use 

Members of a joint U.S. and Australian Navy boarding team 

conduct a security sweep aboard USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 

193), Oct. 29, 2009, during a boarding exercise in the South 

China Sea as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

exercise Deep Sabre II. DoD photo by Mass Communication Spc. 

2nd Class Seth Clarke.
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control – enhancements, for the B-61 nuclear bomb, which will be able to be carried by 

the F-35 and B-2. These decisions do not presume what NATO will decide about future 

deterrence requirements, but are intended to keep the Alliance’s options open and provide 

capabilities to support other U.S. commitments. 

 
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SUSTAINING A SAFE, SECURE, 

AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR ARSENAL 

The United States is committed to ensuring that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, 

secure, and effective. The NPR has made a significant number of decisions to meet this longterm obligation. 

Today’s nuclear weapons have aged well beyond their originally planned lifetime. Until 1992, 

the U.S. nuclear stockpile was sustained through continual warhead-type replacement that 

proceeded from design to test, deployment, and then retirement and replacement by a successor 

design. Since then, the United States has stopped testing nuclear weapons, maintaining and 

certifying our warheads as safe and reliable through a Stockpile Stewardship Program that has 

extended the lives of some warheads by refurbishing them to nearly original specifications. 

To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile today, with the ultimate goal of a world free of 

nuclear weapons in the future, we must prudently manage our nuclear stockpile and related Life 

Extension Programs (LEPs), while cultivating the nuclear infrastructure, expert workforce, and 

leadership required to sustain it. 

Managing the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile 

The U.S. nuclear stockpile includes 

both deployed and non-deployed 

warheads. The United States has 

additional warheads awaiting 

dismantlement. 

Deployed warheads include both 

strategic (planned to be delivered at 

intercontinental range and 

deployed on strategic submarines 

(SSBNs), intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBMs), and heavy 

bombers) and non-strategic 

weapons assigned a nuclear mission, 

such as the B-61 bombs deployed in 

Europe. In the near- to mid-term, 

the U.S. strategic deployed force 

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu speaks at a dedication ceremony 

recognizing the start-up of operations at the nation’s new facility for 

weapons-grade uranium. The Highly Enriched Uranium Materials 

Facility (HEUMF) – the ultra-secure uranium warehouse at the Y-12 

National Security Complex – replaces multiple aging buildings with a 

single state-of-the-art storage facility. NNSA photo. 
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will be reduced through arms control agreements with Russia, initially by the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). 

Non-deployed warheads provide logistics spares, support the surveillance program, and hedge 

against technical or geopolitical surprise. Logistics spares enable the United States to maintain 

desired quantities of deployed weapons during maintenance and surveillance where some 

warhead components are destroyed and the warheads are not rebuilt for return to the stockpile. 

Non-deployed warheads also provide a hedge against technological surprise, such as discovery of 

a technical problem in a warhead that renders it (and all of its type) non-operational. They also 

serve as a hedge against geopolitical surprise, such as an erosion of the security environment that 

requires additional weapons to be uploaded on delivery systems. The non-deployed stockpile 

currently includes more warheads than required for the above purposes, due to the limited 

capacity of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complex to conduct LEPs for 

deployed weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restoring NNSA’s production infrastructure 

will allow these excess warheads to be retired along with other stockpile reductions planned over 

the next decade. 

Warheads awaiting dismantlement are those in the queue for disassembly. Today, there are several 

thousand nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement, and this number will increase as weapons 

are removed from the stockpile under New START. We anticipate it will take more than a 

decade to eliminate the dismantlement backlog. Investments to modernize the nuclear 

infrastructure, outlined below, will ensure that the United States can continue to decrease this 

backlog in a responsible manner. 

Looking ahead three decades, the NPR considered how best to extend the lives of existing 

nuclear warheads consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program 

and U.S. non-proliferation goals. Over that period, every nuclear warhead now in the stockpile 

will require some level of technical attention. Thus, the Stockpile Management Program will 

outline ways to ensure the safety and security of warheads over time. While the general 

parameters of this plan are discussed here, some key information about the specific numbers and 

types of warheads in different elements of the stockpile are classified, as are specific plans for their 

future disposition, and will be briefed separately to Congress. 

After consideration of how to best manage our current stockpile, the NPR reached the following 

conclusions to guide future U.S. stockpile management decisions: 

 The United States will not conduct nuclear testing, and will pursue ratification and entry 

into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
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 The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs will 

use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new 

military missions or provide for new military capabilities. 

 The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of 

nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated 

Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: 

refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, 

and replacement of nuclear components. 

 In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United 

States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of 

nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program 

goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and 

approved by Congress. 

 The United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our 

need to deter adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical 

surprise. 

Using these guidelines, the United States will extend the life of nuclear warheads required for the 

smaller force structure identified under New START. Consistent with this approach, the NPR 

recommended that: 

 The Administration will fully fund 

the ongoing LEP for the W-76 

submarine-based warhead for a fiscal 

year (FY) 2017 completion, and the 

full scope LEP study and follow-on 

activities for the B-61 bomb to 

ensure first production begins in FY 

2017. 

 The Nuclear Weapons Council will 

initiate a study in 2010 of LEP 

options for the W-78 ICBM warhead 

to be conducted jointly by the National Nuclear Security Administration and the 

Department of Defense. This study will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the 

possibility of using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in order to reduce the 

number of warhead types. 

Air Force maintenance technicians work on the B-61 bomb. 

U.S. Air Force photo.
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 The United States will consider reductions in non-deployed nuclear warheads, as well as 

acceleration of the pace of nuclear warhead dismantlement, as it implements a new 

stockpile stewardship and management plan consistent with New START. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), in close coordination with DoD, will 

provide a new stockpile stewardship and management plan to Congress within 90 days, 

consistent with the increases in infrastructure investment requested in the President’s FY 2011 

budget. As critical infrastructure is restored and modernized, it will allow the United States to 

begin to shift away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a technical hedge, 

allowing additional reductions in the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed nuclear weapons over time. 

The approach described here will ensure high confidence in the technical performance of 

warheads retained in the stockpile. It will guarantee that their safety and security are aligned with 

21st century requirements (and technical capabilities). At the same time, it will not develop new 

nuclear warheads, and it will be structured so as not to require nuclear testing. Life Extension 

Programs will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not 

support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. This approach sets a high 

standard for the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons and, in support of nonproliferation 

goals, positions the United States to encourage other nations to maintain the highest levels of 

surety for their nuclear stockpiles. 

Critical Infrastructure and Human Capital 

In order to sustain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear weapons 

exist, the United States must possess a modern physical infrastructure – comprised of the 

national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities – and a highly capable 

workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent and support the 

President’s nuclear security agenda. 

Today’s nuclear complex, however, has fallen into neglect. Although substantial science, 

technology, and engineering investments were made over the last decade under the auspices of 

the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the complex still includes many oversized and costly-tomaintain facilities built during the 1940s and 1950s. Some facilities needed for working with 

plutonium and uranium date back to the Manhattan Project. Safety, security, and environmental 

issues associated with these aging facilities are mounting, as are the costs of addressing them. 

Responsible stockpile management and disarmament require not only infrastructure, but skilled 

scientists and engineers to manage these efforts. Like our infrastructure, over the last decade our 

human capital base has been underfunded and underdeveloped. Our national security 

laboratories have found it increasingly difficult to attract and retain the best and brightest 

scientists and engineers of today. Morale has declined with the lack of broad, national consensus 
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on the approach to sustaining warheads and nuclear technical capabilities. The cumulative loss of 

focus, expertise, and excellence on nuclear matters in the United States remains a significant 

challenge. A strong national commitment to these important nuclear security objectives is 

essential to countering this trend. 

Increased investments in the nuclear infrastructure and a highly skilled workforce are needed to 

ensure the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal and to support the 

full range of nuclear security work to include non-proliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear, 

counter-terrorism, emergency management, intelligence analysis and treaty verification. 

Such investments, over time, can reduce our reliance on large inventories of non-deployed 

warheads to deal with technical surprise, thereby allowing additional reductions in the U.S. 

nuclear stockpile and supporting our long-term path to zero. A revitalized infrastructure will also 

serve to reduce the number of warheads retained as a geopolitical hedge, by helping to dissuade 

potential competitors from believing they can permanently secure an advantage by deploying 

new nuclear capabilities. 

Efforts to strengthen the science, technology, and engineering base and address the problems in 

the physical infrastructure will help with the human capital problem. A renewal of the sense of 

national purpose and direction in nuclear strategy will also be helpful. The President has clearly 

outlined the importance of nuclear issues for our national security, and the importance of 

keeping the U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective at the minimum numbers required. 

Further, the Administration’s commitment to a clear and long-term plan for managing the 

stockpile ensures the scientists and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in 

challenging research and development activities which is essential to their recruitment and 

retention. 

A modern nuclear 

infrastructure and highly 

skilled workforce is not only 

consistent with our arms 

control and nonproliferation objectives; it is 

essential to them. By 

certifying the reliability of 

each weapon type we retain, 

the United States can 

credibly assure non-nuclear 

allies and partners they need 

not build their own, while 

Aerial photo of the Y-12 National Security Complex, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

Y-12 plays a vital role in the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Security Enterprise 

helping ensure a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons deterrent. Y-12 also 

retrieves and stores nuclear materials, fuels the nation's naval reactors and performs 

complementary work for other government and private-sector entities. Y-12 photo. 
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seeking greater stockpile reductions than otherwise possible. Further, a corps of highly skilled 

personnel will continue to expand our ability to understand the technical challenges associated 

with verifying ever deeper arms control reductions. 

Through science and engineering programs that improve the analysis of the reliability of our 

warheads, we also enhance our ability to assess and render safe potential terrorist nuclear devices 

and support other national security initiatives, such as nuclear forensics and attribution. Expert 

nuclear scientists and engineers help improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons 

activities, which is critical for managing risks on the path to zero. And, in a world with complete 

nuclear disarmament, a robust intellectual and physical capability would provide the ultimate 

insurance against nuclear break-out by an aggressor. 

Additionally, the industrial base activities that support the nuclear enterprise also remain critical 

to the nation’s deterrence posture. Increased surveillance of critical commercial sector human 

skills, manufacturing capabilities, and sustainment capabilities is required to ensure this 

infrastructure remains viable to support the enterprise. 

The NPR concluded that the following key investments were required to sustain a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear arsenal: 

 Strengthening the science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) base needed for 

conducting weapon system LEPs, maturing advanced technologies to increase weapons 

surety, qualification of weapon components and certifying weapons without nuclear 

testing, and providing annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance. This 

includes developing and sustaining high quality scientific staff and supporting 

computational and experimental capabilities. The NNSA will develop a long-term strategy 

that will describe the ST&E base required to meet the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

The report will be delivered to the Nuclear Weapons Council in 2011. 

 Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research facility in 2021. 

 Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee 

to come on line for production operations in 2021. Without an ability to produce 

uranium components, any plan to sustain the stockpile, as well as support for our Navy 

nuclear propulsion, will come to a halt. This would have a significant impact, not just on 

the weapons program, but in dealing with nuclear dangers of many kinds. 

More broadly, the Administration supports the needed recapitalization of the nuclear 

infrastructure through fully funding the NNSA. New production facilities will be sized to 

support the requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program mandated by Congress and to 
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meet the multiple requirements of dismantling warheads and eliminating material no longer 

needed for defense purposes, conducting technical surveillance, implementing life extension 

plans, and supporting naval requirements. Some modest capacity will be put in place to surge 

production in the event of significant geopolitical “surprise.” 

Defense Department Leadership of the Nuclear Deterrence Mission 

Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal requires sustained and effective leadership. 

In recent years, it has been necessary for the Department of Defense to renew its commitment to 

that leadership, following the cumulative loss of focus and expertise on nuclear matters within 

DoD. The Department has taken a number of steps over the last two years to address these 

problems, and this NPR reflects a continued high-level commitment to their implementation. 

The Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management generated a large set of 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments. The Secretary of 

Defense strongly endorsed the recommendations and took steps in 2008 to ensure their timely 

implementation. U.S. Strategic Command initiated several efforts to address these findings and 

to ensure a renewed and sustained dedication, to and focus on, the strategic deterrence mission. 

The U.S. Navy has been focused on continuous improvement of the nuclear enterprise for more 

than twenty years; most recently evidenced by the establishment of the Nuclear Weapons Senior 

Leadership Council and OPNAV Nuclear Weapons Council. The U.S. Air Force roadmap titled 

“Reinvigorating the Nuclear Enterprise” describes ongoing efforts, including the standing-up of 

the new Air Force Global Strike Command 

for nuclear-capable bombers and ICBMs, 

the consolidation of nuclear sustainment 

efforts in Air Force Materiel Command and 

the establishment of the Headquarters, U.S. 

Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration 

(HAF/A10). 

Maintaining leadership focus, expertise, and 

excellence on nuclear capabilities is a 

fundamental obligation of the Department 

of Defense. As the United States reduces the 

role and numbers of nuclear weapons, 

sustaining a cadre of talented and expert 

leaders will become more, not less, 

important. 

 

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tells Airmen at Minot Air 

Force Base that the Air Force’s nuclear mission and 

maintaining its long tradition of excellence are vital to the 

security of the United States during a visit Dec. 1, 2008. 

U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joe Rivera. 
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LOOKING AHEAD: 

TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

The U.S. nuclear posture is pivotal to international and national security. While the risk of allout nuclear war is much diminished relative to the Cold War, nuclear dangers persist and some 

are increasing. Even as we seek a future world free of nuclear weapons, we are realistic about the 

world around us, recognizing that this goal will be a long-term effort, not the work of one 

Administration. 

During the Cold War, our nuclear weapons policies and forces were designed to meet two core 

goals: to deter a massive nuclear or large-scale conventional, biological, or chemical attack by the 

Soviet Union and its allies; and to reassure our allies and partners that they could count on us to 

carry out that mission effectively. At the peak of the Cold War, the United States had over 

30,000 nuclear weapons, including thousands deployed in overseas locations on short-range 

delivery systems. The U.S. nuclear weapons production complex constantly developed new types 

of weapons. 

Today, the reassurance mission remains, but the deterrence challenge is fundamentally different. 

While we must maintain stable deterrence with major nuclear powers, the likelihood of major 

nuclear war has declined significantly; thus far fewer nuclear weapons are needed to meet our 

traditional deterrence and reassurance goals. Further, the United States today has the strongest 

conventional military forces in the world. Our close allies and partners field much of the rest of 

the world’s military power. Moreover, our most pressing security challenge at present is 

preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, for which a nuclear force of thousands of 

weapons has little relevance. 

As a result of these changes, nuclear weapons play a much more circumscribed role in U.S. 

national security strategy, a change reflected in the U.S. nuclear posture today. Since the end of 

the Cold War two decades ago, the United States has cut deployed strategic weapons by 

approximately 75 percent and has also substantially reduced the overall nuclear stockpile of 

deployed and non-deployed weapons. As this NPR report makes clear, more can and must be 

done. 

A key focus of the 2010 NPR was therefore to bring our nuclear weapons policies and force 

posture into better alignment with today’s national security priorities. To that end, the NPR 

decided on a number of steps, many of which have already been initiated or will be pursued in 

the near term: 
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 Pursue rigorous measures to reinvigorate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

and the broader non-proliferation regime, and secure vulnerable nuclear materials 

worldwide against theft or seizure by terrorists; 

 Seek ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and 

prompt commencement of negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; 

 Increase efforts to improve nuclear forensics to attribute the source of any covert nuclear 

attack, so that the United States can hold accountable any state, terrorist group, or other 

non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use nuclear weapons; 

 Adopt a strengthened “negative security assurance” declaring that the United States will 

not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are 

party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations; 

 Seek ratification and implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 

START) requiring substantial reductions in deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces; 

 Structure the reduced U.S. force in a way that promotes stability, including “deMIRVing” U.S. ICBMs; 

 Eliminate the Tomahawk, nuclear-equipped, sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N); 

 Strengthen regional security architectures and reinforce security commitments to allies 

and partners by maintaining an effective nuclear umbrella while placing increased reliance 

on non-nuclear deterrence capabilities (e.g., missile defenses and conventional long-range 

missiles); 

 Work with NATO Allies on a new Strategic Concept that supports Alliance cohesion and 

sustains effective extended deterrence, while reflecting the role of nuclear weapons in 

supporting Alliance strategy in the 21st century; 

 Pursue high-level dialogues with Russia and China to promote more stable, transparent, 

and non-threatening strategic relationships between those countries and the United States; 

 Continue to posture U.S. forces and enhance command and control arrangements to 

reduce further the possibility of nuclear weapons launches resulting from accidents, 

unauthorized actions, or misperceptions and to maximize the time available to the 

President to consider whether to authorize the use of nuclear weapons; 

 Implement well-funded stockpile management and infrastructure investment plans that 

can sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at significantly reduced stockpile 

levels without nuclear testing or the development of new nuclear warheads; 
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 Complete the Presidentially-directed review of post-New START arms control objectives, 

to establish goals for future reductions in nuclear weapons, as well as evaluating additional 

options to increase warning and decision time, and to further reduce the risks of false 

warning or misjudgments relating to nuclear use; and 

 Initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support 

continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on 

verification technologies. 

This agenda encompasses a comprehensive set of concrete steps to reduce nuclear dangers to the 

United States and our allies and partners, to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear 

weapons, and at the same time to ensure that nuclear deterrence remains effective for the 

problems for which it is relevant in today’s world. 

While the 2010 NPR focused principally on the near term, it also identified a number of longerterm steps to limit nuclear dangers, reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, and 

strengthen deterrence of potential adversaries and assurance of U.S. allies and partners. As such, 

the NPR identified several important objectives toward which the United States should direct 

future efforts: 

 Engage Russia, after ratification and entry into force of New START, in negotiations 

aimed at achieving substantial further nuclear force reductions and transparency that 

would cover all nuclear weapons – deployed and non-deployed, strategic and nonstrategic; 

 Adopt expanded measures to broaden cooperation and transparency, and strengthen 

strategic stability with Russia and China; 

 Continue efforts to strengthen regional security architectures and eliminate chemical and 

biological weapons, so that over time all states possessing nuclear weapons can be secure in 

making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of nuclear weapons; 

 Continue to ensure that the United States sustains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist; 

 Following substantial further nuclear force reductions with Russia, engage other states 

possessing nuclear weapons, over time, in a multilateral effort to limit, reduce, and 

eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide; 
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 Improve nuclear physical 

infrastructure and human 

capital to position the United 

States to safely reduce nuclear 

weapons, and if international 

conditions allow, eliminate 

them altogether. In a world 

where nuclear weapons had 

been eliminated but nuclear 

knowledge remains, having a 

strong infrastructure and base 

of human capital would be 

essential to deterring cheating 

or breakout, or, if deterrence 

failed, responding in a timely 

fashion; and 

 Set a course for the verified elimination of all nuclear weapons and minimize risk of 

cheating and breakout, through increasing transparency and investments in verification 

technologies focused on nuclear warheads, rather than delivery vehicles. 

Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons 

The long-term goal of U.S. policy is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. At this point, 

it is not clear when this goal can be achieved. Pursuing these NPR recommendations will 

strengthen the security of the United States and its allies and partners and bring us significant 

steps closer to the President’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons. 

While security arrangements including NATO will retain a nuclear dimension so long as nuclear 

threats to the United States and our allies and partners remain, we will continue to seek to reduce 

the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in the future. In the coming years, as U.S. and allied 

non-nuclear and counter-WMD capabilities continue to improve and regional security 

architectures are strengthened, and as we assess progress in restraining other threats, including in 

particular biological weapons, the United States will consult with allies and partners regarding 

the conditions under which it would be prudent to shift to a policy under which deterring 

nuclear attack is the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give up their 

nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and insecurity are very 

demanding. Among those are the resolution of regional disputes that can motivate rival states to 

acquire and maintain nuclear weapons, success in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev sign 

documents on nuclear arms reduction at the Kremlin in Moscow, Jul. 6, 

2009. Official White House photo by Chuck Kennedy. 
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much greater transparency into the programs and capabilities of key countries of concern, 

verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations of disarmament obligations, 

and enforcement measures strong and credible enough to deter such violations. Clearly, such 

conditions do not exist today. But we can – and must – work actively to create those conditions. 

The Administration is committed to establishing a sustainable bipartisan consensus on an agenda 

for American leadership to reduce nuclear risks to ourselves, our allies and partners, and the 

international community. Together, we can take practical steps immediately and in the near term 

– starting with those identified in the 2010 NPR – that not only move us toward the ultimate 

goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide but can, in their own right, reinvigorate the 

global nuclear non-proliferation regime, erect higher barriers to the acquisition of nuclear 

weapons and nuclear materials by terrorist groups, and strengthen U.S. and international 

security.