Defense Science Board

Task Force

on

The Roles and Authorities of

the Director of Defense

Research and Engineering

October 2005

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

20051123 131
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The Roles and Authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

(DDR&E)

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Dr. Theodore Gold and Mr. Donald Latham,

Task Force Co-Chairmen

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD "28 Oct 2005

MEMORANDUM TO THE UNDER SECRETARY Of DEFENSE FOR

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Roles and

Authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

(DDR&E)

I am forwarding to you the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

The Roles and Authorities of the Director of DDR&E. This report underscores the

important contributions of technology in meeting the objectives of the nation's

military strategy and calls for science and technology considerations to again play

a more central role in influencing defense strategy, policy, programs, and

resources.

The task force does not argue for new organizations or new authorities.

However it does call for active participation of the Secretary of Defense and

Deputy Secretary of Defense, along with AT&L leadership, to champion a robust

science and technology effort in DOD.

I agree with the findings and recommendations of this report and commend

them to your attention.

William Schneider, Jr.

DSB Chairman
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Roles and

Authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Our task force was charged to evaluate the roles and authorities of the Director of

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). We did so in the context of technology's

contributions to meeting the nation's security and defense objectives.

An unsurpassed ability to understand and exploit the military implications of

technology has long been a cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy. It is no less

important today that DOD's strategies, plans, and programs be so informed by

science and technology in order to meet a quite different security environment.

However, we believe that the attributes that have served the nation so welltechnical leadership at high levels in DOD, a world-class technical staff in the

OSD, and technology investments informed by long-term visions-are eroding.

Thus, DOD is not as well positioned as it should be to meet the challenges and

exploit the opportunities offered by technology.

The globalization of technology provides adaptive adversaries means to

inflict serious damage to U.S. interests. DOD's early access to these technologies

is hampered by Cold War-era research, development, and acquisition processes.

The capabilities that are needed to deal with the new threats require exceptionally

close coupling of technology to new concepts, doctrine, tactics, and training.

Furthermore, rapidly evolving technologies-such as bio- and

nanotechnologies-will have military implications beyond today's understanding.

We recommend neither new organizations nor new authorities to address these

challenges. Sufficient authority already exists.

The primary role for DDR&E as DOD's chief technology officer (CTO)

should be focusing on strategic issues while providing oversight of the S&T

portfolio as a lesser priority. However, sole responsibility cannot be delegated to

the DDR&E. It will take the Secretary of Defense sharing our concerns and the

strong leadership of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics (USD [AT&L]). Strategic technology issues, including

championing a robust science and technology (S&T) effort, should be a

responsibility second to none in the USD (AT&L)'s portfolio.
A strategic technology plan, taken seriously by the most senior leadership in

DOD, can be a valuable tool and we recommend that the Secretary of Defense

direct the USD (AT&L) to develop such a plan. The plan should identify the

handful of technology enablers of future critical capabilities and missions. As an

example of such a plan, we point to the identification and pursuit of stealth,

precision, and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, by DOD

leadership in the late 1970s which enabled the powerful capabilities demonstrated

in Iraq in 1991. The plan should also address how the DOD can more

successfully:

"= Exploit technology developed outside of DOD

"* Anticipate adversaries' exploitation of technology

"• Apply technology to reduce system costs

• Insert new capabilities rapidly into ongoing operations

"• Sustain a robust long-term research effort

"• Supply S&T and systems engineering talent that DOD needs

A serious concern we have about the USD (AT&L) and DDR&E being able

to fulfill their responsibilities stems, not from a lack of authority, but from the

thinness of their technical staff. The staff is capable and hardworking, but does

not come close to matching the breadth and depth of technical talent and

experience inside OSD during much of the Cold War. Today's challenges merit

the same capability. DARPA provides an existence proof that it is still possible to

recruit first class technologists into DOD.

Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense foster an initiative to

improve the technical competence and industrial management experience of the

staff in OUSD (AT&L). In the report we suggest several mechanisms that could

be exploited, but there is nothing more important than providing an empowering

work environment.

The chairmen speak for all members of the task force in expressing our appreciation

for the efforts and critical contributions of Beth Foster (Executive Secretary), LTC Scott

Dolgoff and CDR Cliff Phillips (DSB representatives) and Barbara Bicksler, Julie Evans

and Grace Johnson (staff).

Dr. Theodore Gold Mr. Donald Latham

Task Force Co-Chair Task Force Co-Chair
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUM M ARY .............................................................................................

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN DOD STRATEGY, PLANNING, AND

PROGRAM M IN G ............................................................................................. 3

W HAT SHOULD BE DONE? .................................................................................... 7

Organization, Roles, and Authorities ........................................... 7

Strategic Technology Plan and S&T Challenges ......................... 9

Science and Technology Workforce ............................................ 14

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 16

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE ................................................................ 19

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ........................................................... 23

APPENDIX C. PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE ........................................ 24

APPENDIX D. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING ................ 27

APPENDIX E. CURRENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING ........................... 36

APPENDIX F. REFLECTIONS FROM A FORMER DIRECTOR OF

DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING ..................................................... 43

APPENDIX G. U.S. AND WORLDWIDE RESEARCH BASE SINCE WORLD WAR II...46

APPENDIX H. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5134.3: DIRECTOR

OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING .............................................. 48

APPENDIX I. THE ROLE OF CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICERS .............................. 56

APPENDIX J. DRAFT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION

M EM ORAN DUM ............................................................................................. 62
ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Task Force was charged with examining future roles and

authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

(DDR&E). We considered these roles and authorities in the context of

how technology contributes to meeting national security and defense

objectives.

An unsurpassed ability to understand and exploit the military

implications of technology has long been a cornerstone of U.S.

defense strategy. The success of the Department of Defense (DOD) in

these areas has been enabled by technical leadership at high levels in

the Department, world-class technical staff, and technology

investments informed by long-term visions. However, we are

concerned that DOD is not well-positioned today to meet new

challenges and exploit new opportunities offered by technology.

These opportunities and challenges include the following:

" The implementation of critically important new

operational capabilities, e.g., finding and tracking

terrorists and insurgents; assuring command,

control, and communications networks; providing

protection to personnel and vehicles; detecting and

disabling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

" The commercialization and globalization of

technology makes it increasingly available for

potential adversaries to use against our interests. On

the other hand, DOD's early access to these

technologies is made more difficult as commercial

technology moves offshore and is further hampered

by Cold War-era research, development, and

acquisition processes and practices. We are seeing

adversaries able to turn technology into capability

quicker than DOD's acquisition processes allow.

iii
EXECUTIVESSUMMARY

"* Rapidly evolving technologies - such as bio- and

nanotechnologies -will have profound military

implications beyond our understanding today.

"* Increasing pressures to cut long-term and

potentially disruptive science and technology

investments due to short-term demands and top-line

budget constraints.

We recommend neither new organizations nor new authorities to

address these challenges. We further believe that sole responsibility

cannot be delegated to the DDR&E. Instead, it will take the Secretary

of Defense sharing our concerns, the active participation of the

Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in crafting a strategic

technology plan, and the strong leadership of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]).

Strategic technology issues, including championing a robust science

and technology (S&T) effort, must be a responsibility second to none

in the USD (AT&L)'s portfolio.

Specifically we recommend that the Secretary of Defense1 perform

the following:

Direct the USD (AT&L) to develop S&T objectives,

agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense, an S&T

strategy, and a strategic technology plan. A list of

technologies, even prioritized, does not constitute

a strategic plan. The plan should identify the

handful of technologies critical to enable those

capabilities that in turn are critical to support U.S.

national security objectives and strategies.

Such a plan was designed in the late 1970s, by then

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under

Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

William Perry to support their "offset strategy." The

identification and pursuit of stealth, precision, and

tactical intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance, brought realization of the powerful

1. A draft implementation memorandum is included in Appendix J.

iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

new capabilities demonstrated in Iraq in 1991. These

capabilities depended not only on the technological

advances, but also on the complementary air-land

battle conceptualization by the Services.

The strategic technology plan should also describe

how DOD can more successfully accomplish the

following:

- Exploit technology developed outside of DOD

in the commercial sector, academia, and other

government agencies.

- Anticipate and prepare for adversaries'

exploitation of technology, both readily

available and advanced.

- Apply technology to reduce the total cost of

acquiring and maintaining capabilities.

- Provide for more rapid insertion of new

capabilities into ongoing operations. Closer

collaboration between technologists and

warriors is a necessary step.

- Ensure an adequate level of long-term

research for DOD needs.

- Supply the S&T and systems engineering

talent that DOD needs.

These objectives, or an equivalent list approved by

the Secretary of Defense, are the strategic technology

challenges that must shape the DDR&E's agenda.

Foster--via direction, interaction with Congress,

and follow-up - an initiative to improve the

technical competence and industrial management

experience of the leadership and staff in the office

of the USD (AT&L), including DDR&E and

Defense Systems.

This initiative can be accomplished by making more

aggressive use of existing mechanisms, including the

V
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Experimental Personnel Hiring Authority under

Section 1101 of the 1999 National Defense

Authorization Act, the Intergovernmental Personnel

Act (IPA), and one-year rotational assignments for

career civil servants.

vi
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005

directed that the "Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the

roles and authorities of the Director of Defense Research and

Engineering" and that the study should be conducted by the Defense

Science Board (DSB).2 In execution of this request, the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD

[AT&L]) convened a Defense Science Board Task Force to undertake

this study.

In particular, the Task Force was directed to include the following

in its review:3

"* An examination of the past and current roles and

authorities for the Director of Defense Research and

Engineering (DDR&E)

"* Appropriate future roles and authorities for the

director, including an analysis of

- The relationship of the director to senior

science and technology and acquisition

officials of the military departments and

defense agencies

- The relationship of the director to a range of

functions, including planning and

programming for research and engineering

programs, managing the laboratories,

promoting rapid technology transition and

technology transfer, coordinating research and

engineering activities with those outside of the

2. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, H.R. 4200,

Section 901.

3. Appendix A contains the complete Task Force terms of reference, which is a direct

version of the congressional language. Appendices B and C, respectively, list the Task

Force membership and the presentations received by the members.

1
INTRODUCT7ON

Department of Defense (DOD), technical

review of acquisition programs, training and

education of the technical workforce,

maintaining the national technology and

industrial base, and development of new

technologies

An examination of the duties of the DDR&E as chief

technology officer of the Department of Defense

The Task Force considered these roles and authorities in the

context of how technology contributes to meeting national security

and defense objectives. The effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces on

the battlefield and their superior advantage compared to militaries

worldwide derive, in large measure, from the development and

integration of advanced technology and, in particular, from

maintaining leadership in technology development.

2
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGYIN DOD STRATEGY,

PLANNING, AND PROGRAMMING

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN DOD STRATEGY,

PLANNING, AND PROGRAMMING

In his report Science: The Endless Frontier, Vannevar Bush,

President Roosevelt's architect for World War II research, said, "In

this war, it has become clear beyond all doubt that scientific research

is absolutely essential to national security." Throughout the Cold

War, DOD strategies, plans, and programs were informed by a deep

understanding of the implications of technology. A defining event,

the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, spurred the creation of

processes, positions, and organizations to assure that science and

technology (S&T) played a major role in shaping DOD's strategic

planning, resource allocation, and overall implementation during the

Cold War.

From the Defense Department's creation in 1947, its approaches to

managing, supporting, and harnessing S&T for military needs have

evolved in response to changes in perceived threats, economic and

technical challenges to the United States, and the priorities of

different administrations and DOD leaders.4

Since the mid-1980s, the Department's management approach has

been dispersed and decentralized. The Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) has provided a role best described as policy and

oversight. This contrasts with the more proactive, high-level,

direction- and strategy-shaping roles characteristic of the 1960s and

1970s -the period following the establishment of the DDR&E in

1958.5 For example, in the 1970s, OSD drove several decisive

technological developments - stealth, stand-off precision strike, and

tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems -that

have transformed U.S. military capabilities, as was demonstrated in

Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom.

4. Appendix D provides a history of how science and technology has been managed

through the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Appendix E.

contains an overview of the management priorities of the DDR&E office today.

5. In Appendix F, Dr. John Foster offers reflections on the role of the DDR&E during his

tenure from 1965 to 1973.

3
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN DOD STRATEGY,

PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

It is no less important today that DOD's strategies, plans, and

programs be so informed by S&T in order to meet the quite

different situation and new challenges. A profound difference

between today and the Cold War is the commercialization and

globalization of technology (see appendix G). No longer does the

United States government (through DOD, the Department of Energy,

the intelligence community, and other agencies) and its laboratories

and contractors own or control most of the defense-relevant

technology.

The commercialization and globalization of technology makes it

increasingly available for potential adversaries to use against U.S.

interests. DOD's early access to these technologies is made more

difficult as commercial technology moves offshore and is further

hampered by Cold War-era research, development, and acquisition

processes and practices. We are seeing adversaries able to turn

technology into capability quicker than DOD's acquisition processes

allow. Rapidly evolving technologies - such as bio- and

nanotechnologies -will have profound military implications beyond

our understanding today.

The most immediate threat today - non-state actors able to inflict

strategic harm -is different from the Cold War threat, with even

greater potential for the disruptive use of technologies. Critical U.S.

military capabilities dependent on new technology include the

following:

Finding, identifying, tagging, and tracking terrorists

and insurgents.

* Detecting nuclear, biological, and chemical devices.

* Assuring command, control, and communications

networks and the information they convey in the

face of threats to disrupt, corrupt, and deceive. The

threats range from electromagnetic pulse to

computer hacking. The networks include

transmissions related to the Global Positioning

System as well as more traditional communications.

4
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN DOD STRA TEGY,

PLANNING, AND PROGRAMMING

" Exploiting unmanned systems - air, sea, and

ground - to the fullest. Necessary enablers of these

capabilities are technologies that provide "system

awareness and perception." These capabilities will

change how we fight and train.

" Conducting distributed adaptive operations. One

enabler is greater energy efficiencies achieved

though battery density, engine design, lightweight

structures (including exploitation of nanotechnology), and aerodynamics.

"* Fielding a more rapid and precise strike capability,

e.g., via low-cost, directed energy weapons for both

neutralization and destruction.

" Protecting forces on the ground. The span of

relevant technologies is extensive with applications

to personnel and vehicle protective armor; detection

and disablement of improvised explosive devices;

persistent surveillance and reconnaissance; and

rapid analysis, synthesis (including pattern

recognition) and sharing of information.

Indeed, technology is a necessary enabler of transformational

advances in DOD's key operational capabilities as spelled out in the

National Defense Strategy: strengthen intelligence, protect critical

bases of operation, operate from the global commons, project and

sustain forces in distant anti-access environments, deny enemy

sanctuary, conduct network centric operations, and deal with

irregular challenges. Technology also has an important role to play in

another key operational capability: increasing capabilities of partners,

both international and domestic.

We have great concern that today's strategy, plans, programs,

and resources are not being adequately informed by considerations

of S&T, and are not meeting the challenges of the new security

environment. Furthermore, there are underlying trends that may

make it more difficult to do so in the future. These include a smaller

talent pool of individuals, than available during the Cold War, with

the requisite technical knowledge willing to work in DOD. National

5
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN DOD STRATEGY,

PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

security is no longer the magnet for the nation's technical talent that

it was during much of the Cold War, particularly after the shock of

the Sputnik launch by the Soviet Union in October 1957. DOD faces

stiffer competition from the commercial world for the Services of

talented technologists. Therefore it is becoming less likely that

technologists will be a part of the senior decision-making circle.

Over time there has been a relative decline in the influence in

strategic matters of the DDR&E, and more importantly, the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In

addition, funding for long-term research, as reflected in the DOD

fiscal year 2006 budget submittal, is still below levels recommended

in past DSB studies, which advocated S&T investments at three

percent of total obligation authority.6

The DDR&E is the Department's point person to assure S&T has a

defining role in the transformation of military capabilities and

avoidance of technological surprise. While we focus on the DDR&E

in this report, we cannot overstate the critical role that the USD

(AT&L) must take in these areas. In fact, today the closest successor

to the Cold War DDR&E is not the current DDR&E position, but the

USD (AT&L). The USD (AT&L) cannot merely delegate these

responsibilities to the DDR&E, while the Under Secretary focuses on

other matters. Instead, strategic technology issues, including

championing a robust S&T effort, must be a responsibility second

to none in the USD (AT&L)'s portfolio.

6. Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology, Washington

D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,

May 2002.

6
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

ORGANIZA TIO, ROLES, AND A UTHORITIES

We do not believe major changes in organization, roles, or

authorities are needed, nor would they be beneficial.

We recommend that the DDR&E position remain under the

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics. Some have suggested that the DDR&E report directly to

the Secretary of Defense, as it was in the early years. However, we

believe it is important to keep S&T tightly coupled to acquisition and

logistics, rather than to raise the rank of the S&T advocate and

organizationally separate it from acquisition and logistics.

The current organization does place great responsibility on the

USD (AT&L) to ensure that the implications of S&T -both

opportunities for the United States and dangers from adversaries -

fully inform decisions on strategy, plans, and programs. It also places

a responsibility on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense to

be proactive in getting these inputs. Per Goldwater-Nichols, on

acquisition matters, the USD (AT&L) reports directly to the Secretary

of Defense (not through the Deputy Secretary), so the level of

authority is sufficient.

We do not see the need for additional directives that would give

the DDR&E more "control" over the Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA). The nature of DARPA's business-to

pursue ideas of high risk and very high payoff -requires some

separation from normal bureaucratic processes. The relative influence

of the DARPA Director and the DDR&E over such investment

decisions should be left to the Secretary and USD (AT&L) and would

be dependent on the individuals filling the DARPA and DDR&E

positions. The DARPA director clearly does have a responsibility to

ensure that the DDR&E is fully informed of DARPA's plans and

programs. This requires recurrent communication between the staffs,

in addition to meetings of the two directors.

7
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

Moreover, we do not see the need for change to the directives

specifying DDR&E's roles and authorities. Current directives are

sufficient to enable an effective DDR&E role. DOD Directive 5134.3

(November 3, 2003) calls out 15 responsibilities and functions and

provides adequate authorities to carry these out (see appendix H).

The issue is which of these responsibilities, covering a wide range of

activities, should get priority.

We believe that the primary role for DDR&E as DOD's chief

technology officer (CTO) is to focus on strategic issues and provide

oversight of the S&T portfolio as a lesser priority. The essence of the

CTO's role goes beyond oversight of the Department's research and

engineering activities and is captured by item 4.2 in DOD Directive

5134.3.7 The CTO role is to "develop the strategies and supporting

plans that exploit technology and prototypes to respond to the needs

of the Department of Defense and ensure U.S. technological

superiority."

Doing this job effectively requires guidance and support from

the Secretary of Defense and, as we have already indicated, intense

involvement by the USD (AT&L). DDR&E is a staff position to the

Secretary of Defense, not a line manager. To a great extent, the

influence of the office depends on the relationship among the

DDR&E, the USD (AT&L), and the Secretary.

The tension among investment opportunities with near-, mid-, or

far-term payoffs is ever present. These tensions lead to the hard calls

that routinely challenge the senior leadership of large enterprises.

Few, however, face the momentous consequences of such decisions

as does the Secretary of Defense, most particularly in times of war.

These hard calls are in essence judgment calls, with no formula or

algorithms to ease the way.

We have no doubt that it is critically important to U.S. security

objectives for the DOD to sustain a robust S&T program, one that

includes a substantial speculative and longer-term component. A

7. Appendix I describes the roles and responsibilities of chief technology officers in both

industry and government.

8
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

well-articulated vision, a technology strategy for objectives endorsed

by the Secretary of Defense, and a technology plan supported with

adequate resources are all necessary.

The DDR&E must be the champion in OSD for those investments

with longer-term payoffs. Thus, it is vital that the DDR&E be able to

"compete" with other claimants for scarce resources by having

comparable access to senior decision makers. It was so during the

Cold War; it should be again. We believe that the USD (AT&L) is the

proper position to oversee this competition and inform and seek the

guidance of the Secretary of Defense on its outcome.

Consistent with the role as DOD's chief technology officer, the

DDR&E should be tasked to assure that all research and

development organizations are implementing the strategic

technology guidance of the Department. This responsibility includes

"strategic oversight" of all technology efforts in areas such as missile

defense; nuclear weapons; biological and chemical defenses;

command, control and communications; intelligence; and logistics -

whether in the technology implementation plans of the individual

Services, defense agencies, or other OSD organizations.

Sufficient mechanisms are in place to make this happen if the

Secretary and USD (AT&L) want to make it happen. We do not

believe that any new budget authority need be granted to the

DDR&E. Through the authority of the USD (AT&L) and the Secretary

of Defense, the DDR&E has sufficient influence over the S&T budget.

This capacity does not imply that the DDR&E directly manages the

S&T activities. However, it does require that the DDR&E be

sufficiently knowledgeable about them to make credible assessments

about the extent to which the entire portfolio of these activities

supports the Department's strategic objectives.

STRA TEGIC TECHNOLOGY PLAN AND S& T CHALLENGES

A strategic technology plan, created under the leadership of the

DDR&E and the USD (AT&L), endorsed and valued by the

Secretary of Defense, could become an effective tool to enable

these challenging responsibilities. Without such involvement by the

9
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

Secretary of Defense, it would likely become just another

bureaucratic document of little value. The plan should focus on the

crucial strategic technology challenges and provide an executable

chain of logic connecting military missions and technology

opportunities.

What are these strategic challenges? The Task Force's short list,

deserving more high-level attention, includes the following:

Gathering and nurturing technology from a variety

of sources (commercial, defense industry, academic,

other government, as well as in-house sources) and

speeding its transition into operational capability.

Developing and exploiting technology to enable new

disruptive capabilities. This challenge entails

establishing an environment that tolerates and

rewards disruptive ideas and supports emerging

concepts for joint operations.

Identifying and countering disruptive capabilities

developed by adversaries using readily available or

advanced technology.

* Using technology and associated management

approaches to reduce the total cost of acquiring and

maintaining capabilities.

Ensuring an adequate level of long-term research for

DOD needs.

* Providing the S&T and systems engineering talent

the DOD needs.

Such a list, approved by the Secretary of Defense, would focus

DDR&E's activities. We briefly elaborate these challenges.

There may be no more formidable and important challenge for

the DDR&E than fostering more exploitation of technology from

outside DOD and then shaping a complementary internal S&T

program. To be a smart buyer and user of advanced technology,

DOD's technical staff must be informed of worldwide science and

technology trends, and be aware of current and future science and

10
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

technology innovations. This requires lively mechanisms of contact

between the scientific and DOD communities, both military and

civilian. We believe this contact is eroding. An OSD staff with

considerably broader and deeper technical expertise than exists today

will be necessary to restore it. We will have more to say about this

subject later in the report.

DDR&E should take the lead role in inventing robust processes

for rapid technology insertions that can serve the Department well

over the coming decades. Fundamental technology development is

usually a multi-year effort that provides the opportunity for a quick

"last step" from lab to application -whether in the commercial

marketplace or to the war fighter on the front lines. For DOD,

speeding the application of technology is important not only to

provide timely solutions in wartime, but also because the utility of

much commercial technology is perishable and needs to be exploited

quickly. It appears that at present, speeding technology insertion is

treated as a transient need - a special case driven by today's

contingencies to speed technology to the battlefield -that will

diminish once these contingencies are over. Instead it should be

viewed as the norm.

That said, the technology insertion process is complex, requiring

participation and accountability from players in the S&T, acquisition,

and logistics communities. While we recommend that DDR&E take a

leading role in technology insertion, the USD (AT&L) must place

high priority on this effort and take a personal role in its

implementation. An important element of this implementation would

be increased prototyping to demonstrate to the "buyers" that the

technology is worthy of transition. This role for DDR&E will increase

as DOD implements true spiral development in which an "objective

system" is not preordained, but rather the fielding of capability

enhancements is influenced by ongoing aggressive technology and

experimentation efforts.

With DDR&E's new role in the first stage of acquisition-the

budget activity 6.4 accounts in the science and technology budget -

there is an opportunity to bring to bear greater influence on how

these funds are used to speed rapid transitions to the war fighters. Of

11
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

particular significance are the new Joint Concept Technology

Demonstration (JCTD) program elements in both the 6.3 and 6.4

accounts, the latter intended to facilitate transition of successful

JCTDs to the joint war fighter.

DDR&E has an important role in fostering closer collaboration

between operators and technologists. Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstration (ACTDs) programs are one mechanism

that has had success in fostering such collaboration. ACTDs put

prototypes in the hands of operators to develop tactics, techniques

and procedures and to demonstrate useful capability. Technologists

should also be tied closer into the more speculative war fighting

experimentation. In these activities technologists could be providing

surrogates (including virtual) rather than prototypes.

A related approach to the ACTDs would be to tie the injection of

new technology more closely with training in order to provide a

nearer-term technology insertion. This approach would involve

testing prototype items in training centers such as the National

Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the USMC

Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California. At the

centers, the trainers can develop tactics, techniques, and procedures

(on the run) and then let the forces in training try them out in a

training context. The prototype items can then be shipped with the

force that was trained. This approach is better than drop-shipping

items to Iraq.

DDR&E should be tasked to ensure an aggressive effort

directed at anticipating and avoiding the effect of potentially

disruptive technologies. This effort involves more and moreeffective red-teaming and is no easy task. The U.S. Navy's SSBN

Security Program is an exemplar of how to do it well. It also involves

a significant portion of the S&T activities directed at avoiding

surprise -that is, S&T valued for what we learn from it, not only

whether it shows up directly in acquisition programs.

A pervasive concern that the Task Force heard was that too

much S&T investment was directed at doing better what is already

done very well and not nearly enough at identifying disruptive

12
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

technologies. Winston Churchill, in The Great War, Volume 4, stated

this challenge well: "A hiatus exists between the inventor who knows

what they could invent ... if they only knew what was wanted ... and

the soldiers who knew, or ought to know, what they want and would

ask for it ... if they only knew how much science could do for them.

You have never really bridged that gap yet." The concern is related to

the need to involve technologists much more into the process of

developing new concepts for joint operations. Transformational

concepts are much more likely to arise when there is intimate

collaboration between war fighters and technologists, as happened in

the development of the air-land battle concept during the 1970s and

early 1980s.

More attention needs to be paid to using technology to reduce

the costs of acquiring and sustaining capabilities. While it is

accepted that advanced technology can result in greatly improved

performance, the historic trend has been to achieve this performance

at increasing, and perhaps unaffordable, weapon costs (particularly

in the quantities required). However, the commercial world has

demonstrated that advanced technology can simultaneously improve

performance and reduce costs. Thus, a key element of the strategic

role of the DDR&E is to assure that advanced technology is used to

reduce weapon systems acquisition and related costs - so that

adequate numbers of systems can be affordably acquired for an

effective future military force. Moreover, the use of technology to

reduce cost should not be limited to materiel, but applied to training,

leadership development, and the other critical enablers of military

capabilities. Lower cost should be a major consideration in

selecting which technologies and systems approaches to pursue.

A sustained and aggressive long-term research program creates

opportunities, hedges against surprise, and is vital to the future

security of the nation. However, the payoffs from individual projects

are uncertain and distant. Bureaucracies have a natural aversion to

such speculative investment and we are concerned about recent

trends including S&T support in the fiscal year 2006 President's

budget. We are not advocating that S&T funding be exempt from

budget competition, although that approach was recommended in

several presentations to our Task Force. We are saying that a robust

13
WHA TSHOULD BE DONE?

sustained effort in long-term research is unlikely without a strong,

credible, and connected (to DOD top leadership) DDR&E champion.

S&T is a commitment made to the war fighters of tomorrow, and S&T

investment decisions have strategic consequences.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WORKFORCE

A serious concern we have about DDR&E being able to fulfill

its responsibilities stems, not from a lack of authority, but from the

thinness of its staff. They are capable and hardworking. However,

we do not intend to denigrate the current staff by pointing out that it

does not match the breadth and depth of technical talent and

experience inside OSD during much of the Cold War. We believe

today's challenges merit the same capability.

The DOD could purchase the technical talent it needs from

academia and industry, but DOD must be a smart customer of

technology, and the strategic decisions - what to invest in, when to

disinvest, assessing the technology readiness of critical programs -

require in-house technical talent. In fact, the revolutions in bio and

information technology place greater demands for a breadth of

technology expertise than existed during the Cold War.

Restoring this quality will be difficult, and we offer no sure-fire

solutions. One difficulty in upgrading personnel in OSD is the

increasing thinness of the defense industrial base, especially in

certain areas, as well as the attractiveness of non-defense, commercial

industries for many of the newer, cutting-edge technologies that are

in particular demand as DOD changes its focus.

From the 1950s through the 1970s, the "revolving door" between

industry and OSD was a major contributor to the DOD's technical

talent pool. Experienced, mid-level, technical managers from the

defense industry would come to OSD and DARPA to work for a few

years and then return to their firms or other firms in the defense

industry. Current ethics legislation has effectively closed this door.

Restrictions on post-DOD employment now inhibit mid-level

industrial personnel from joining DOD acquisition organizations. We

14
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

appreciate the difficulty of relaxing these restrictions given the

current level of Congressional concern regarding ethical behavior in

the acquisition community. However, we believe the perceived

benefits of these restrictions are outweighed by their cost, impeding

the transformation of technology into military capabilities. The longterm costs are significant enough to warrant Secretary of Defense

engagement with members of Congress on this matter to identify and

implement ways to overcome the potential conflict of interest issues

that today impede the flow of experienced talent from the private

sector to the government.

Rebalancing the current workforce with the addition of limited

appointments and increasing the number of rotational assignments

would also enable a more agile and technically competent

community within OSD. Mechanisms exist for rotating personnel

from industry and academia into government for limited-term

appointments. One is the Experimental Personnel Hiring Authority

under Section 1101 of the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act.

This authority has been used successfully by DARPA to bring

technical talent from industry and academia to serve for up to four

years.

Other available tools include the Intergovernmental Personnel Act

(IPA) and one-year rotational assignments of career civil servants.

The IPA provides a means through which individuals from nonprofit

organizations and other government agencies can serve as

government officials for up to six years. Rotational assignments, used

only sporadically within OSD, should be increased not only to bring

talent to OSD, but also to allow OSD employees to rotate outside and

gain new knowledge and expertise.

15
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDAT ,,l III I III III III I

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DOD is not well positioned to meet the challenges and exploit

the opportunities offered by advancing technology. This situation

presents serious long-term risks to U.S. security. The challenges and

opportunities include the following:

The dependence of critically important new

operational capabilities on technology development

and integration. Technology will rarely by itself

provide the new capability. To be effective, it must

be integrated along with changes to doctrine,

organization, training, and other complementary

enablers.

* The commercialization and globalization of

technology increasingly available to potential

adversaries for use against our interests while DOD

access to this treasure is hampered by Cold War-era

R&D and acquisition processes and practices.

Rapidly evolving technologies - such as bio- and

nanotechnologies - that will undoubtedly have

military implications only dimly understood today.

* Increasing pressure to cut long-term and potentially

disruptive science and technology investments due

to short-term demands and top-line budget

constraints.

We recommend neither new organizations nor new authorities

to address these challenges. We further believe that responsibility

for addressing these challenges cannot be delegated solely to the

DDR&E.

Instead, it will take the Secretary of Defense sharing our

concerns, the active participation of the Secretary and the Deputy

Secretary of Defense in crafting a strategic technology plan, and the

leadership of the USD (AT&L). Strategic technology issues,

16
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA TIONS

including championing a robust S&T effort, must be a

responsibility second to none in the USD (AT&L)'s portfolio.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense8

* Direct the USD (AT&L) to develop a strategic

technology plan drawing on the experience and

knowledge of the DDR&E. A list of technologies,

even prioritized, does not constitute a strategic plan.

The plan should identify the handful of technologies

critical to enabling those mission capabilities, which

in turn are critical to supporting the strategies to

achieve national security and national defense

objectives.

A past example of what we have in mind is the

identification of stealth, precision, and tactical

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, in the

late 1970s, by then-Secretary of Defense Harold

Brown and USDR&E William Perry to support their

"offset strategy." It is important to note that the

subsequent realization of powerful new capabilities

depended not only on the technological advances

but also the complementary conceptual work in the

Services on air-land battle.

The strategic technology plan should also describe

how DOD must become more successful in

- Exploiting technology developed outside of

DOD in the commercial sector, academia, and

other government agencies.

- Anticipating and countering adversaries'

exploitation of technology (readily available

and advanced). Doing this will involve the

intelligence community and require red

teaming and net assessment. 9

8. A draft implementation memorandum is included in Appendix J.

9. An approach to this type of red teaming and net assessment is discussed in the Defense

Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Transformation:: A Progress Assessment, forthcoming.

17
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Applying technology to reduce the total cost

of acquiring and maintaining capabilities.

- Providing for more rapid insertion of new

capabilities into ongoing operations. Closer

collaboration between technologists and

warriors is a necessary step.

- Ensuring an adequate level of long-term

research for DOD needs.

- Supplying the S&T and systems engineering

talent that DOD needs.

These objectives, or an equivalent list approved by

the Secretary of Defense, are the strategic technology

challenges that must shape the DDR&E's agenda.

Foster--via direction, interaction with Congress,

and follow-up - an initiative to improve the

technical competence and industrial management

experience of the staff in the office of the USD

(AT&L), including DDR&E and Defense Systems.

These improvements should be accomplished both

by increasing the training and education of the

existing staff, for example by rotations through wellmanaged industries and by recruiting additional

experienced, knowledgeable leadership and staff.

There should be more aggressive use of existing

mechanisms including the Experimental Personnel

Hiring Authority under Section 1101 of the 1999

National Defense Authorization Act, the

Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) and oneyear rotational assignments of career civil servants.

18
TERMS OF REFERENCE

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE

19
APPENDIXA

20
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010 SE-C 20 I

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY

AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference -- Defense Science Board Task Force on the Roles and

Authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board Task Force to study the roles and

authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

The study shall include the following:

(1) An examination of the past and current roles and authorities of the Director of

Defense Research and Engineering.

(2) An analysis to determine appropriate future roles and authorities for the Director,

including an analysis of the following matters:

(A) The relationship of the Director to other senior science and technology and

acquisition officials of the military departments and the Defense Agencies.

(B) The relationship of the Director to the performance of the following functions:

(i) The planning, programming, and budgeting of the research and engineering

programs of the Department of Defense, including those of the military

departments and the Defense Agencies.

(ii) The management of Department of Defense laboratories and technical

centers, including the management of the Federal Government scientific and

technical workforce for such laboratories and centers.

(iii) The promotion of the rapid transition of technologies to acquisition

programs within the Department of Defense.

(iv) The promotion of the transfer of technologies into and from the

commercial sector.

(v) The coordination of Department of Defense research and engineering

activities with organizations outside the Department of Defense, including other

Federal Government agencies, international research organizations, industry,

and academia.

(vi) The technical review of Department of Defense acquisition programs and

policies.

AM
(vii) The training and educational activities for the national scientific and

technical workforce.

(viii) The development of research and engineering policies and programs

relating to the maintenance of the national technology and industrial base.

(ix) The development of new technologies in support of the transformation of

the Armed Forces.

(3) An examination of the duties of the Director as the Chief Technology Officer of the

Department of Defense as prescribed by- Department of Defense Directive 5134.3, dated

November 3, 2003, especially in comparison to the duties of similar positions in the

Federal Government and industry.

The report shall include recommendations regarding the appropriate roles and authorities

that should be assigned and resources that should be provided to the Director of Defense

Research and Engineering.

The Study will be sponsored by me as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Mr. Don Latham will serve as chairman of the Task

Force. Ms. Beth Foster, DDR&E will serve as Executive Secretary and Commander David

Waugh, USN, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory

Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into

any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it

cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

Acting
APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CHAIRMEN

NAME - AFFILIATION

Mr. Donald Latham Private Consultant

Dr. Ted Gold Private Consultant

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Dr. Mike Andrews L-3 Communications

r.John Foster Northrop Grumman Space Technolog

Dr. Jacques Gansler LUniversity of lMryand

Mr..Charles.Herzfeld Private Consultant

Dr. Joe Markowitz Private Consultant

Dr. George Schneiter_ .. Private Consultant

Mr. John Stenbit __Private Consultant

Mr. Dick Urban CharlesStark Draper Laboratory

LMr. Daniel Winegard, PrivateConsultant .....

GOVERNMENTADVISOR

Dr. Paris Genalis _NationalDefense Universiy __

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Ms. Beth Foster _ DDR&E Plans and Programs

DSB REPRESENTATIVES

LTC-Scott Dolgoff, USA -- Defense Science Board

CDR Cliff Phillips, USN i Defense Science Board

STAFF

Ms. Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Mrs. Grace Johnson Strategic Analysis, Inc.

23
APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C. PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE

JANUARY 24, 2005

NAME ToPic

Dr. Craig Fields IDeveloping an Effective

Private Consultant Technoloqy Strategy

Mr. Al Shaffer

Director, Plans and Programs, Current Roles and Responsibilities

Office of the Director, of the DDR&E

Defense.Research and EnPineering..DDR&..

Ms. Sue Payton Mission, Roles, and Functions of

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, the Advanced Systems and

Advanced Systems and Concepts _Concepts Office in DDR&E

Dr. Charles Holland

Deputy Under Secretaiy of Defense, DOD Science and Technology

Science and Technology

SDr. Bill Berry Overview of the Laboratories and

Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,

Laboratories and Basic Sciences

Dr. Tony Tether

Director, Defense Advanced DARPA's Organization and

Research, Projec Agency (DARPA) . .

MARCH 2, 2005

Dr.'Mike An w Roles and Responsibilities of Chief

Chief Technology Officer, Techolog O L3 Communications Technology Officers

Hon. Ronald Sega Roles and Responsibilities of the

Director, Defense Research and Engineering DDR&E

Hon. Vic ReHistorical Perspective on DDR&E

Private Consultant

.f1"mp PADiect R dA Roles and Responsibilities

MARCH 14, 2005

ADM J.M. Cohen

Chief of Naval Research

Mr. James Engle Panel Discussion: Relationship

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Pel D icusSin R elation s Between Service S&T Executives for Science, Technology and Engineering

Dr. Thomas Killion

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Army for Research and Technology

24
PRESENTA TIONS TO THE TASK FORCE

Dr`br'. Glen n F_., L-amair't-in "--- - .. Director, Defense Systems, Office of the Under Systems Engineering

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

7 echnology and L ogistics ....... Mr. GereSngley . GPerspectives on DDR&E Roles and

Private Consultant , • Rsoiblts Responsibilities I.(former acting DDR&E)

APRIL 18,,2005

Hon. Anita Jones on.veAnita ofVine Perspectives on DDR&E Roles and University of Virginia Repniblte

"(former DDR&E) Responsibilities

Hon. John S. Foster, Jr. Historical Perspective on DDR&E

Northrop Grumman Space Technology Roles and Responsibilities

Dr. Delores Etter

U.S, NavalAcademy Perspectives on DDR&E Roles and

(former acting DDR&E and Deputy Under Responsibilities

Secretaly of Defense for Sience and

_Technologqy).......

MAY 17, 2005

Hon. Ryan Henry Importance of Science and

Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Technology in Defense Planning

Hon. Michael Wynne Perspectives on DDR&E Roles and

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Responsibilities

Technology and Lo tics. ..

Dr. Craig Fields

Private Consultant

(former DARPA Director)

Mr. Larry Lynn

Private Consultant Panel Discussion:

(former DARPA Director) CalDe

Mr Walt Morrow Challenges Facing the DDR&E

Director Emeritus, MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Mr. Vince Vitto

President and CEO,

The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.....................

JUNE 8, 2005

Hon. Ken Krieg

Under Secretary of Defense, Discussion on the DDR&E

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Dr. Tom Connelly Roles and Responsibilities of the

Senior Vice President and Chief Chief Technology Officer at

and Technology Officer, DuPont _ _ Dcience Dupont.

25
APPENDIX C

rHonl. John Hamre Perspectives on DDR&E Roles and

I Private Consultant L~former Depu•jj Secretal of Defense2 Responsibilities

26
A BRIEF HISTORY OF

THE OFFICE OF THE DDR&E

APPENDIX D. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND

ENGINEERING10

Technological superiority has been, and continues to be, a

cornerstone of our national military strategy. It has been a key

element of deterrence during times of peace. It has provided

invaluable options to our national leaders and allies during times of

crisis. It has often proved to be a decisive element in times of war.

The military capabilities the U.S. possesses today are a legacy of the

leadership of high-level technologists within the government, worldclass technical staff in DOD, and substantial investment in science

and technology guided by long-term visions.

During World War II, the Office of Scientific Research and

Development (OSRD) headed by Vannevar Bush demonstrated that

American scientists and engineers could contribute significantly to

the war efforts. The OSRD projects gave the United States and Allied

troops more powerful and more accurate bombs, more effective

radars, more reliable detonators, lighter and more accurate weapons,

safer and more effective medical treatments, and more versatile

vehicles.

After the war, the National Security Act of 1947 created the

National Military Establishment, the Departments of the Air Force

and the Army, the Munitions Board, the National Security Council

and created the Research and Development Board as the highest level

research and development (R&D) organization in the Pentagon.

Vannevar Bush served as its first chairman (see table D-1).

10. A broader history of DOD S&T leadership can be found in Richard Van Atta, Michael J.

Lippitz, and Robert L. Bovey, DoD Technology Management in a Global Technology

Environment, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-4017, May

2005. This appendix draws from aspects of that research, as pertains specifically to the

DDR&E.

27
APPENDIX D

Table D-1. Chronology of Research and Engineering

Leadership in DOD, 1947-present

1947-1953

CHAIRMAN, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

Vannevar Bush Sept 30, 1947-Oct 14, 1948

Karl T. Compton Oct 15, 1948-Mar 14, 1950

William Webster Mar 15, 1950-Jul 31, 1951

Walter G. Whitman Aug 1, 1951-Jun 29, 1953

1953-1957

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT)

Donald A. Quarles Sep 1, 1953-Aug 14, 1955

Clifford C. Fumas Dec 1, 1955-Feb 15, 1957

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (APPLICATIONS ENGINEERING)

Frank D. Newbury Aug 18, 1953-Mar 17, 1957

1957-1958

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING)

Frank D. Newbury Mar 18, 1957-May 17, 1957

Paul D. Foote Sep 10, 1957-Oct 31, 1958

1958-1977

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Herbert F. York Dec 30, 1958-Apr 30, 1961

Harold Brown May 8, 1961-Sep 30, 1965

John S. Foster, Jr. Oct 1, 1965-Jun 21, 1973

Malcolm R. Currie Jun 21, 1973-Jan 20, 1977

William J. Perry Apr 11, 1977-Oct 21, 1977

1977-1977

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

William J. Perry Nov 4, 1977-Jan 20, 1981

Richard B. DeLauer May 7, 1981-Nov 4, 1984

Donald A. Hicks Aug 6, 1985-Oct 10, 1986

1986-PRESENT

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Robert C. Duncan Dec 17, 1987-Nov 30, 1989

Charles M. Herzfeld Mar 12, 1990-My 18, 1991

Victor Reis Dec 3, 1991-May 31, 1993

Anita K. Jones Jun 1, 1993-May 23, 1997

Hans M. Mark Jul 1, 1998-May 10, 2001

Ronald M. Sega Aug 14, 2001-present

28
A BRIEF HISTORY OF

THE OFFICE OF THE DDR&E

However, the board was largely ineffective because it lacked

authority and because of the decentralization of responsibilities to a

complex system of part-time committees. The board did have a

positive influence on R&D by providing a mechanism for the

exchange of information and ideas and a channel for ideas to reach

those with authority and influence in the administration.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1953 abolished the Research

and Development Board and replaced it with two separate full-time

staffs, each headed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research

and Development and for Applications Engineering. The

establishment of these positions was motivated by concerns that

modern technology was not being exploited to its full potential.

These new positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense also

reflected the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the operations

of the individual military departments. In 1957, both secretariats were

merged into a single Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and

Engineering.

The launch of Sputnik on October 4,1957, triggered new

initiatives to harness science and technology for national security

objectives. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 abolished the

position and offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research

and Engineering and created the office of the Director of Defense

Research and Engineering. The Assistant Secretary's function had

been primarily involved with providing advice and program

coordination.

The DDR&E, however, was given direct authority to approve,

disapprove, or modify all R&D programs of the Department. Key

programs in ballistic missiles and satellites ceased to be separately

managed by the military services. The Defense Reorganization Act

explicitly stated that the DDR&E was equal in status to the service

secretaries and ranked higher than any of the assistant secretaries of

defense. In short, DDR&E occupied the number three position in the

DOD.

29
APPENDIX D

At about the same time, the Advanced Research Projects Agency

(ARPA) was formed to execute special projects, separately from the

Services, in space and missile defense and other programs not

normally supported by the Services. It was also charged with the

mission of preventing future technological surprise. While the

Director of ARPA initially reported to the Secretary of Defense,

within a few years the ARPA Director reported to the DDR&E.

Herbert York was the first DDR&E (see figure D-1). Prior to his

appointment, he had been the Director of the Atomic Energy

Commission's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and then the Chief

Scientist of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. During his

tenure, York recruited a staff of top talent from the aerospace and

electronics industries and structured them to focus on problem areas

rather than technologies. He also played a role in establishing a

centralized organization to develop a national R&D strategy and

aggressively guide the execution of that strategy by the military

departments and ARPA.

The next two DDR&Es, Harold Brown and John Foster, also came

from the Directorship of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Each

continued York's efforts to build an office with the best and brightest

engineers and scientists. Each also played major roles in shaping U.S.

plans and programs in strategic forces, missile defense, and satellite

communication and warning. John Foster, in addition, led the

development and application of a variety of technologies to support

the Vietnam conflict including night vision, laser-guided bombs,

satellite communications, ceramic armor, and tactical sensors.

During these years, science and engineering considerations

strongly informed national security strategy, plans, and programs.

The DDR&E met with the Secretary of Defense on a daily basis and

roughly monthly with the President. They had close working

relationships with the President's science advisor and other leaders in

the administration and Congress. As a result, key leaders were

informed about the nation's priorities and science and technology

objectives. This gave DDR&E more influence than is normally

attributed to a staff position.

30
Figure D-1. Evolution of the Position of Director, Defense Research and Engineering

John Richard Jimmy George George W.

Dwight Kennedy Lyndon Nixon Gerald Carter Ronald Bush William Bush

Eisenhower 4 Johnson Ford Reagan Clinton

S1 +1 + I .+. i PRESIDENT

James

Schlesinger

Thomas Clark Elliot I Harold Frank Les William

Gates Clifford Richardson Brown Carlucci Aspin Cohen

Nel I Robert Melvin I RDonald Casper I Richard William I Donald

McElroy McNamara Laird Rum seld Weinberger Cheney Perry Rumsteld

F' + IF + SECDEF Donald Robert Yockey Paul Pete

Costello L Kaminski Aldridge Richard I John Jacques Kenneth Godwin John Deutch I Gansler 4Kreg BettiKre

Richard-- USD(ATL)

Delauer

William Donald

Perr Hicks

- . iUSDR&E

Harold Malcolm Charles Anita Ronald

Brown Curde Herzfeld Jones Sega

Herbert John William Robert IVictor I Hans

ASD (Research York Foster Perry Duncan Reis Mark

and Development) . 4 - A .. . . DDR&E

ASD (Applications

Engineering)

I5 I I I I I I I I I I 1958 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 19B5 1990 1995 2000 2005
APPENDIX D

In 1973, Malcolm Currie became the first DDR&E from industry.

He focused on the Services as the science and technology "customer."

He worked with DARPA and the Services to address Secretary

Schlesinger's guidance to harness emerging technology capabilities to

address the challenge of Soviet military buildup to the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization forces, particularly in the tactical area. Working

with DARPA and the Air Force, Currie entertained and supported

research and development to determine the feasibility of stealth

technology.

William Perry became DDR&E in early 1977, and like his

predecessor, came from the defense industry. Later in 1977, as the

result of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's concern about the

ability to transition research and development results into

operational systems, the position of Under Secretary of Defense for

Research and Engineering (USD [R&E]) was established and given

greater responsibility for system acquisition. At the same time, the

position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy was created and the

position of DDR&E was disestablished.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and William Perry developed

the "offset strategy" -applying U.S. technology to offset the

numerical superiority of the Soviet Union. Perry was directly

involved with the aggressive development of a new generation of

systems emphasizing precision weapons; stealth; and tactical

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Also, as did all

previous DDR&Es, he played an influential role in starting and

sustaining programs intended to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Richard DeLauer assumed the USD (R&E) position in May 1981.

U.S. supremacy now faced more serious technological and economic

challenges. DeLauer and Secretary Weinberger set a strategy to

strengthen U.S. worldwide technical leadership with an emphasis on

increasing basic research and addressing issues with the U.S.

military-industrial base. The Strategic Defense Initiative was created

and provided a major focus for the application of U.S. technology.

At this time, there was a growing concern about the operational

suitability (reliability) of deployed weapon systems. As a result, the

32
A BRIEF HISTORY OF

THE OFFICE OF THE DDR&E

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, separate from USD

(R&E) and reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, was

established in 1984. Continued heightened concern over the

management of acquisition continued to dominate USD (R&E)

activities through Donald Hick's tenure.

In 1986, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act created

the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD [A]).

The position of USD (R&E) was abolished. In 1993, a Department of

Defense Directive changed the title of USD (A) to Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition and Technology and later to Under Secretary

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. USD (A) is the

only high-level position (president appointed and Senate approved)

required by title 10 of the United States Code to "be appointed from

among persons who have an extensive management background in

the private sector."

The Defense Reorganization Act failed to mention the position of

DDR&E, but this position, reporting to the USD (A), was

subsequently re-established by the Military Retirement Reform Act of

1986. The creation of USD (A) had the underlying result of changing

the Under Secretary's role from one of being the primary advocate for

research and development with acquisition responsibilities to that of

being the primary advocate of acquisition reform with research and

development responsibilities.

Between 1977 and 1986, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

for Research and Advanced Technology (DUSD[R&AT]) reported to

USD (R&E) and provided review and oversight of all basic research,

applied research, and advanced development programs in the

Department. DUSD (R&AT) also exercised authority, direction, and

control over several R&D organizations. This position was essentially

replaced with the title DDR&E in 1986. As late as the year 2000, the

OSD organization chart showed the Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense (ATSD

[NCB]), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and DARPA

reporting to DDR&E. ATSD (NCB) and DTRA no longer report to

DDR&E.

33
APPENDIX D

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989

directed DOD to prepare and submit a Critical Technologies Plan

identifying the top 20 technologies of importance to the DOD. The

subsequent report (identifying 22 critical technologies) was criticized

for not being a plan or a strategy, but merely a description of current

S&T programs. Congressional criticism caused the DDR&E and the

Services to create a series of processes to improve S&T planning and

review, some of them still in effect today. In 1990, the Services took

their own initiative to create an ad hoc organization called the Joint

Director of Laboratories (JDL). Shortly thereafter the JDL initiated the

Service led "Project Reliance" to consolidate and coordinate, amongst

themselves, all S&T programs. Project Reliance ostensibly took on the

responsibility of assuring that no duplication of effort existed - a

primary responsibility of the DDR&E.

A new S&T strategy was introduced by DDR&E Victor Reis in

1992, with 7 S&T thrusts and 11 key technologies. To review the

implementation of the S&T thrusts, DDR&E made heavy use of the 17

Project Reliance technology panels established by the JDL. The 7 S&T

thrusts evolved into the creation of the Advanced Concept

Development Program and the 11 key technologies expanded to 23

technologies and evolved into the DDR&E Technology Area Plan

(DTAP). There, however, remained criticism that these plans were

still a list of current programs and not a strategy. Further, the plans

were constructed by technologists without the inputs from the

military users and, since they were constructed by the JDL Project

Reliance Panels, they did not have participation by OSD

organizations like DARPA, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and

Strategic Defense Initiative.

The Technology Area Review and Assessment (TARA) process

was created to elaborate on specific areas of technology, solicit inputs

from a wider variety of technologists and users, and to provide a

comprehensive defense S&T strategy composed of a coalition of

inputs from national and Joint Chief of Staff sources, and Service and

agency plans. Inputs from these sources were integrated into three

plans: the Basic Research Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plan,

and the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan. Much of this

process is still in effect today.

34
A BRIEF HISTORY OF

THE OFFICE OF THE DDR&E

From 1958 to 1986, the DDR&E was primarily involved with

overcoming the problem of Service-centric stovepipe technology

development and balancing the Department's technology portfolio

among the Service programs while assuring new competitive

capabilities were added to the portfolio. The DDR&E was the

strongest advocate for transition of technology into operational

capability. Most of the major decisions in the early years were made

by a handful of key people. The DDR&E had direct access to the

Service Secretaries, the Secretary of Defense, and the President and

possessed unquestionable authority to implement decisions.

Over time, the management of science and technology has grown

much more complex. There have been significant changes in the

world that affect national security and defense S&T strategies -most

notably the replacement of the Cold War Soviet threat by new threats

to U.S. national security and the globalization of technology. This

complexity has been addressed by creating processes that coordinate

inputs from claimants and users to form an overall S&T strategy and

depends heavily upon the Services to coordinate the execution of that

strategy. These changes have caused a fundamental shift in the role of

OSD with respect to the Services. The role of DDR&E has likewise

shifted from that of "directing" to that of coordinating, facilitating,

and arbitrating among elements of a very large S&T infrastructure to

assure U.S. military technological leadership is maintained.

It is no longer possible for a small group of brilliant people to

direct and control the development of defense science and

technology. Yet while the roles and authorities of the DDR&E have

changed over time, the importance of science and technology to our

national security has not. The need for strong leadership to shape and

guide the development of defense science and technology has never

been greater.

35
APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E. CURRENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF

THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND

ENGINEERING 11

The DDR&E is the Chief Technology Officer for the Department

of Defense. As defined in DOD Directive 5134.3, the DDR&E serves

as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Secretary

and Deputy Secretary of Defense for research and engineering

matters (see appendix H). The mission of the DDR&E is to ensure

that war fighters, both today and tomorrow, have superior and

affordable technology to support their missions and to give them

revolutionary war-winning capabilities. This mission involves the

DDR&E in activities that span technology planning, development,

and integration -all with focus on improving the capability of the

war fighter.

The roles and responsibilities of the DDR&E involve both strategic

planning and oversight functions. Among the DDR&E's oversight

functions include programmatic and budget direction, establishing

balance between Service and OSD equities, laboratory oversight, and

technology transition. Five priority areas for the DDR&E, established

in fiscal year 2005, are reviewed below, following an overview of the

research and engineering portfolio.

RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING PORTFOLIO

The research and engineering portfolio includes science and

technology programs -which consist of basic and applied research

and advanced technology development -and advanced component

development and prototypes programs, collectively covering budget

11. This appendix provides a description of the research and engineering portfolio and

priorities of the DDR&E, under the direction of Dr. Ronald Sega, at the time of the Task

Force deliberations. It was provided to the Task Force by Ms. Beth Foster, the Task

Force's executive secretary.

36
CURRENTROLESAND

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DDR&E

activities 1 through 4. The research, development, test, and

engineering (RDT&E) budget request for fiscal year 2006 is $69.36

billion (budget activities 1 through 7). Of this total, the science and

technology budget is $10.5 billion (see table E-1) -comprising 15

percent of the total RDT&E budget. Advanced component

development and prototypes add an additional $14.14 billion within

DOD.

Over the last five years, the Department's S&T portfolio has

increased significantly from fiscal year 2001. The fiscal year 2006

President's Budget Request is 28 percent higher than the fiscal year

2001 request of $7.5 billion (see table E-1). However, in fiscal year

2006, the President's Budget Request is expected to drop slightly

from the fiscal year 2005 level. This reality reflects the challenges of

sustaining a robust investment in S&T, including investments in basic

research, during an era where force transformation has dominated

defense planning and more recently where war time requirements vie

for defense resources.

Table E-1. S&T Budget, Selected Fiscal Years

PRESIDENT BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL YEAR

(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 2001 2005 2006

Army $11294 $1,783 $1,735

Navy/Marine Corps 1,463 1,718 1,776

Air Force 1,291 1,919 1980

Defense-Wide 3,494 5,130 5,031

Total DOD S&T $7 543 $10,550 $10,522

Source: Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Figure E-1 arrays the S&T program into functional areas. Over 50

percent of the total investment focuses on four functional areas:

information systems, sensors and electronics, basic research, and

weapons. In short, the program is dominated by investments in

"sensing and shooting."

The fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects some change in S&T

priorities and increases investments in chemical and biological

37
APPENDIX E

defense, sensors and electronics, hypersonic technologies, networkcentric technologies, and high-energy lasers.

Figure E-1. Characterization of the Fiscal Year 2006 DOD S&T

Program

Battlespace

Environments.

Nuclear 162 Other. 873 Information

Technology. - Systems

203 Technology,

Biomedical, / 1,615

212/

Space

Platforms. 384

Human

Systems, 400 Sensors,

Materials/ . and Electronic

Processes, 560 VWarfare, 1,598

Chemical/

Biological Defense.

569

Ground and Basic

Sea Vehicles, Research.

612 Air Platforms, 1,319

733 Weapons,

1.164

Source: Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

When evaluating DOD's S&T budget, it is important to look not

only at DOD's own investment but to look at this investment in

comparison to others. Thus, the DDR&E is currently engaged in

specific technology assessments in areas such as nanotechnology,

directed energy, and cruise missile defense.

38
CURRENT ROLES AND

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DDR&E

DDR&E PRIORITIES

In fiscal year 2005, the DDR&E established five priority areas that

support the National Security Strategy and Secretary of Defense

goals. The five priorities are:

"Integrate DOD science and technology and focus on

"transformation"

"* Enhance technology transition

"* Address national security science and engineering

workforce

"* Expand outreach to combatant commands and

intelligence community

"* Accelerate support to the global war on terrorism

Focus S&T on Transformation

Beginning in 2002, the DDR&E took steps to realign S&T funding

to focus on transformation. Fundamental to this realignment is to: 1)

provide stable funding in basic research to maintain the technology

base and sustain the science and engineering workforce and 2) shift

S&T investments from traditional to transformational and disruptive

technologies. Transformational initiatives underway include the

National Aerospace Initiative, with emphasis on high-speed

hypersonics, space access, and space technology; energy and power

technologies, including power generation, energy storage, and power

management and control; and surveillance and knowledge systems.

The following areas are key elements of the focus on

transformation:

Disruptive technologies. In 2004, DDR&E sponsored an assessment

of disruptive technologies. This study looked at disruptive

technologies from several perspectives -what the DOD could bring

forward as potential game changes, what other governments and

militaries can do to develop new technologies or technologies that

might mitigate U.S. capabilities, and unintended uses of technologies

39
APPENDIX E

(such as to bring down financial networks or create biological

weapons).

Comprehensive review of S&T portfolio. This year, the DDR&E

implemented the Comprehensive S&T Review that includes the

Technology Area Review and Assessments (TARA) coupled with

Investment Strategy Review and Assessment. The purpose of the

Comprehensive S&T Review is to strengthen S&T planning by

improving the integration of S&T investments with DOD priorities

and objectives -to better assess whether the Department is investing

in the right programs. In the first year of this two-year review

process, DDR&E will examine the Department's investment strategy

with an eye toward identifying gaps in DOD investments. The second

year, the focus will be on evaluating how well the programs are being

executed.

The first investment strategy review, which took place in the

winter of 2005, identified the following areas where the Department

is under-investing -chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and

high explosive; cruise missile defense; nonlethal weapons technology;

tagging, tracking, and locating of people and things; and novel ways

to access space.

Enhance Technology Transition

The war in Iraq has focused significant attention on rapid

insertion of technology in the field. The DDR&E is setting up

processes to encourage technology transition between military and

commercial sectors by matching war fighter needs with S&T and

working with the acquisition community to field successful results.

The essence of this challenge is to provide an "on ramp" for

industry innovation as well as "off ramps" from S&T to industry and

programs, thus providing innovative solutions for the war fighter.

Processes such as the Technology Readiness Assessments -part of

DAB milestone reviews -help to identify risk areas and serve as a

mechanism to improve integration of efforts between the S&T and

acquisition communities. The DDR&E is also initiating a Joint

Capability Technology Demonstration business process to create a

40
CURRENT ROLES AND

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DDR&E

better model of addressing the different and unique joint and

coalition needs. The goal for this process is to engage combatant

commands to identify solutions for emerging and validated needs

and to speed transformational solutions to the war fighter.

Science and Engineering Workforce

Technical talent is critical -in the labs, in the acquisition

workforce, in logistics, on the battlefield. Studies show expected

shortfalls in many disciplines important to national security and

energy. The DDR&E has proposed legislation to expand the SMART

Pilot Program and build a permanent program titled "SMART -

National Defense Education Act (NDEA), Phase 1" (also referred to

as the National Defense Education Program). The new program

would provide additional authorities that could improve

substantially the Department's ability to develop, recruit, and retain

individuals who will be critical in fulfilling the national security

mission.

Expand Outreach

DDR&E is engaged in initiatives to expand outreach to the

combatant commands, the intelligence community, and others. In

fiscal year 2005, DDR&E implemented a new process for developing

the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan that better defines near- and far-term

capability needs in eight joint functional areas. DDR&E and the

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence are sponsoring

technology net assessments to help identify technology capability

gaps between the United States and the rest of the world as well as

assessments of foreign technology capabilities in high-interest

technology areas. DDR&E has also introduced the R&E Portal in an

effort to provide current R&E information to the DOD R&E

community -including civil service, military, and contractors.

Accelerate Support to the War on Terrorism

The DOD Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF)

was established in September 2001 to bring DOD S&T leadership,

laboratories, and agencies together to focus on global-war-on41
APPENDIX E

terrorism challenges. The goal has been to facilitate the rapid

transition of mature S&T programs to meet war fighter needs and to

increase outreach and information sharing with various government

agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING GOALS

In February 2005, the DDR&E established seven process goals and

eight technical capability goals for the Department of Defense. The

technical capability goals were identified to fill current capability

gaps and create new advanced capabilities for the future. They cover

four areas: protection, situation awareness, strike, and force

sustainment. In addition, two cross-cutting capabilities are identified:

reusable vehicles for space launch and training tools for complex

urban terrain and conventional scenarios.

Underlying these technical capabilities goals are several enabling

technology goals - areas that may not lead directly to systems, but

are vital for enhancement of military capability. These technology

goals are as follows:

"* Nanotechnology

"* Biotechnology

"* Unmanned and autonomous systems

"* Quantum communications/computing technology

"* Networked systems

"* Advanced materials

"* Intellectual capital (workforce)

"* DOD R&E infrastructure

"* Modeling, simulation, computation, and software

for complex systems

The goals provide guidance needed to advance near-term

capability while maintaining a steady flow of technology options for

a future force.

42
REFLECTIONS FROM A FORMER DDR&E

APPENDIX F. REFLECTIONS FROM A FORMER DIRECTOR OF

DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Looking back on my term as the DDR&E (1965-1973), it seems to

me that six priorities received most of my attention: foreign

intelligence, deterring the Soviet Union, the Viet Nam conflict,

technological possibilities, the science and technology base and

education, and the quality and role of the DDR&E staff. I discuss each

of these in turn.

Foreign intelligence. The need to focus on intelligence derives from

the recognition that if there is no potential adversary to threaten our

national security, there is no need for large standing forces. But there

were two main adversaries at that time, the Soviet Union and North

Vietnam. So, it was critical to understand their capabilities,

development efforts, supporting investment trends, and other

relevant concerns.

Deterring the Soviet Union. Of particular concern was the Soviet

development and deployment of strategic systems -intercontinental

ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and active and

passive defenses - as well as a wide range of capabilities arrayed

against Western Europe. We had to ensure that U.S. developments

and deployments were appropriate to deter Soviet attacks against the

United States and its allies.

The Viet Nam conflict. The existence of conflict, in this case Viet

Nam, brought tactical surprises and operational shortfalls in our

capabilities. This conflict was a matter of priority to the President and

the Secretary of Defense and so it was a priority for DDR&E. Because

of this sense of urgency, it was necessary to initiate aggressive

research, development, engineering, and deployment activities. It

was possible to fund such activities because of the priority being

given to that conflict. And yes, it was recognized that some of the

R&D might not mature before the conflict was over but, if successful,

the product would be available for a future conflict.

43
APPENDIX F

Technological possibilities. In those days it was clear that we were in

the middle of a raging technological revolution- one that has only

increased since that time. In such an environment, it was important to

identify those possibilities which could "change the game," and to

avoid being surprised by providing unique capabilities or permitting

the provision of capabilities at less cost. While the latter is obviously

desirable, it usually doesn't happen unless some authority formally

imposes a price limit on the product (an example of which is the F16).

Identifying possible "game changers" was achieved by calling on

.senior scientists and engineers of national stature and acting on their

recommendations. Having as a ground rule that they would report to

the Secretary of Defense made it easier to act on those

recommendations.

S&T base and education. Because the DOD is dependent on the

national S&T base, it is important to monitor and correct adverse

trends. DOD is dependent on universities for the education of its

civilians and military, for much of its basic research, and for advice

provided by leading academics. For example, it was necessary to

establish chairs in certain fields to support our needs (such as systems

engineering).

Quality of the DDR&E staff. My predecessor, Harold Brown, told

me that the DDR&E staff was the best in the building, and that I must

make the effort to assure it remained so. Two things were helpful in

that regard. The first was to explain our needs to fill specific positions

to the leadership in industry and the university departments. Second,

was to arrange to be directed to make staff reductions beyond what

was being requested by the Department in order to make room for

the best people we could find. It was a matter of quality, not quantity.

It was important to focus our effort on identifying the important

problems and opportunities and the approaches to address them.

That was our job. It was equally difficult to leave it to the Services

and agencies to propose and implement the programs, which we

would then oversee.

44
REFLECTIONS FROM A FORMER DDR&E

Of course, all of that was then and this is now. The organizational

situation is different as are the authorities. We have a new set of

potential adversaries and we are at war. Yet it seems to me that the

priorities and approaches of four decades ago are still appropriate

today. Today's DDR&E can still seize upon a few key problems and

opportunities, work out strategies to address them, and go to the

Secretary for his support and signature on a directive providing

DDR&E with all the authority necessary to proceed. Of course, it is

necessary to attract a DDR&E with the appropriate experience and

leadership. Then it's just a matter of seizing the burden of initiative.

- Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.

45
APPENDIX G

APPENDIX G. U.S. AND WORLDWIDE RESEARCH BASE

SINCE WORLD WAR II

One legacy of the effort to modernize America's Armed Forces

during World War II was a large defense-focused technology and

industrial base, consisting of government, academic-related, and

industrial organizations. During the Cold War, this base continued to

support the Department of Defense, with commercial and academic

establishments taking on an increasing share of research. Since the

end of the Cold War, these trends have accelerated, while overseas

research has increased as well (figure G-1).

Table G-1. U.S. and Worldwide Research Base since World War II

100

90 Estimated

so Projected 

Total

70

I,.-

00 60

50

0

40

30

20

1.,.~,U.S. Gov.- DOD

10

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Year

Source: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Technology Capabilities of Non-DoD

Providers; June 2000; Data provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

& National Science Foundation

46
U.S. AND WORLDWIDE RESEARCH BASE

Today, DOD no longer dominates the science and technology

research base as it did after World War II. The vast majority of S&T is

performed by the civil sector. Relative to DOD's near-stable

contributions since the late 1950s, the U.S. civilian and worldwide

research base has increased significantly. What this means is that the

U.S. government and its laboratories and contractors no longer own

or control most of the defense-relevant technology. Further, it means

that potential adversaries have as much access to commerciallydeveloped technology as does the United States.

Knowledge of this changing research base, of emerging science

and technology capabilities, and their impact on military capabilities

is critical to developing DOD strategies, plans, and programs.

47
APPENDIX H

APPENDIX H. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE

5134.3: DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND

ENGINEERING

48
Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5134.3

November 3, 2003

DA&M

SUBJECT: Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E)

References: (a) Sections 137 and 113 of title 10, United States Code

(b) DoD Directive 5134.3, "Director of Defense Research and

Engineering (DDR&E)," August 31, 1994 (hereby canceled)

(c) DoD 7000.14-R, "DoD Financial Management Regulation," Volume 2,

"Budget Formulation and Presentation," July 1996

(d) DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition

System," May 12, 2003

(e) through (g), see enclosure 1

1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

Pursuant to section 137 of reference (a) and the authorities vested in the Secretary of

Defense by section 113 of reference (a), this Directive reissues reference (b) to update

the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the Director of Defense

Research and Engineering (DDR&E).

2. APPLICABILITY

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military

Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies,

the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of

Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").
DODD 5134.3, November 3, 2003

3. DEFINITION

Research and Engineering. Research and Engineering (R&E) includes Science and

Technology programs (consisting of Basic Research, Applied Research, and Advanced

Technology Development) and Advanced Component Development and Prototypes

programs, which are identified as Budget Activities 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, in

reference (c).

4. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

The DDR&E is the principal staff advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Secretary and Deputy

Secretary of Defense for research and engineering matters. In this capacity, the

DDR&E shall:

4.1. Serve as the Chief Technology Officer for the Department of Defense.

4.2. Develop the strategies and supporting plans that exploit technology and

prototypes to respond to the needs of the Department of Defense and ensure U.S.

technological superiority.

4.3. Conduct analyses and studies; develop policies; provide technical leadership,

oversight and advice; make recommendations; and issue guidance for the DoD R&E

plans and programs.

4.4. Recommend approval, modification, or disapproval of programs and projects

of the Military Departments and other DoD Components in assigned fields to eliminate

unpromising or unnecessarily duplicative programs, and initiation or support of

promising ones for R&E.

4.5. Actively participate in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

process by providing guidance throughout budget development, and:

4.5.1. Oversee a process, that includes the DoD Components, as appropriate,

to identify critical technology areas. Provide input into the Defense Planning Guidance

and Transformation Planning Guidance concerning these critical technology areas and

overall content of the R&E Program, consistent with a capabilities-based planning

approach.

4.5.2. In coordination with the DoD Components, develop the Technology

Planning Guidance for the Secretary of Defenses approval early in the budget
DODD 5134.3, November 3, 2003

preparation cycle. The Technology Planning Guidance shall outline programmatic

investment priorities consistent with DoD policy and DoD Component transformational

objectives.

4.5.3. Recommend, through the USD(AT&L) to the Secretary of Defense,

appropriate funding levels for R&E.

4.5.4. Represent the R&E Program as a member of the Program Review Group

or equal management structure during the Program Review.

4.5.5. Recommend, through the USD(AT&L) to the Under Secretary of

Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C))/Chief Financial Officer (CFO), resource and

programmatic adjustments to the Budget Estimate Submission for the Presidents

Budget Request on specific R&E programs and technology areas to meet military goals

and objectives, as determined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Secretaries of the Military Departments.

4.5.6. Advise the Secretary of Defense whether the Presidents Budget

Request meets the Department's goals and objectives and is the best allocation of

resources for R&E. If not, identify reallocations required to achieve the desired results.

4.6. Oversee matters associated with R&E at DoD laboratories operated by the

Military Departments or other DoD Components.

4.7. Promote coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding of R&E within

the Department of Defense and between the Department of Defense and other Federal

Agencies and the civilian community.

4.8. Ensure R&E interchange with Allied and friendly nations, in coordination with

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the USD(AT&L), and the Military

Departments.

4.9. Provide support to the Defense Technology Security Administration on

technological issues pertaining to international acquisition and export activities.

4.10. In cooperation with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition

and Technology, provide advice and assistance in developing policies for rapid

technology transition.

4.11. Develop and maintain an R&E metrics program to measure and assess the

quality and progress for the Department of Defense's R&E program.
DODD 5134.3, November 3, 2003

4.12. Provide specific technical evaluation of DoD Component R&E Special

Access Programs, as directed by the USD(AT&L) and in coordination with the

OUSD(AT&L) Director, Special Programs.

4.13. Provide technical support to the USD(AT&L) on:

4.13.1. R&E aspects of programs subject to reviewby the Defense

Acquisition Board, to include conduct of a complete assessment of technology

readiness consistent with DoD Instruction 5000.2 (reference (d)); and

4.13.2. R&E matters pertaining to maintenance of a strong defense industrial

base.

4.14. Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to the DDR&E's

functional areas, and represent the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of

Defense, and the USD(AT&L) on DDR&E matters outside the Department of Defense.

4.15. Carry out such other functions and responsibilities as the Secretary and

Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the USD(AT&L), may direct.

5. RELATIONSHIPS

5.1. In the performance of assigned functions and responsibilities, the DDR&E

shall:

5.1.1. Serve under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) in

accordance with DoD Directive 5134.1 (reference (e)).

5.1.2. Exercise authority, direction, and control over the Director of the

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

5.1.3. Use existing facilities and services of the Department of Defense and

other Federal Agencies, whenever practicable, to avoid duplication and to achieve an

appropriate balance among modernization, readiness, sustainability, efficiency, and

economy.

5.1.4. Coordinate and exchange information with other OSD officials, the

Heads of the DoD Components, and Federal officials having collateral or related

functions.
DODD 5134.3, November 3, 200

5.2. The USD(C)/CFO shall coordinate with the DDR&E prior to approving the

transfer or reprogramming of funds into or from a program supported by funds from

Budget Activities 1 through 4.

5.3. Other OSD officials and the Heads of the DoD Components shall coordinate

with the DDR&E on all matters related to the responsibilities and functions cited in

section 4., above.

6. AUTHORITIES

The DDR&E is hereby delegated authority to:

6.1. Issue DoD Instructions, DoD Publications, and one-time directive-type

memoranda, consistent with DoD 5025.1 -M (reference (f)), that implement policy

approved by the Secretary of Defense in assigned fields of responsibility. Instructions

to the Military Departments shall be issued through the Secretaries of the Military

Departments. Instructions to the Combatant Commands shall be communicated through

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6.2. Obtain reports and information, consistent with the policies and criteria of

DoD Directive 8910.1 (reference (g)), as necessary, to carry out assigned functions.

6.3. Communicate directly with the Heads of the DoD Components, as necessary

to carry out assigned functions, including the transmission of requests for advice and

assistance. Communications to the Military Departments shall be transmitted through

the Secretaries of the Military Departments, their designees, or as otherwise provided in

law or directed by the Secretary of Defense in other DoD issuances. Communications

to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, except in unusual circumstances,

shall be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6.4. Communicate with other Federal Agencies, representatives of the Legislative

Branch, members of the public, and representatives of foreign governments, as

appropriate, in carrying out assigned functions.

6.5. Establish arrangements for DoD participation in those non-defense

governmental programs for which the DDR&E has been assigned primary cognizance.
DODD 5134.3, November 3, 2003

7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

PalWolfowitz

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 1

El. References, continued
DODD 5134.3, November 3, 200

El. ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(e) DoD Directive 5134. 1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics," April 21, 2000

(f) DoD 5025.1 -M, "DoD Directives System Procedures," March 5, 2003

(g) DoD Directive 8910.1, "Management and Control of Information Requirements,"

June 11, 1993

ENCLOSURE 1
APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I. THE ROLE OF CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICERS

The roles of the DDR&E as Chief Technology Officer of the

Department of Defense is prescribed by Department of Defense

Directive 5134.3, dated November 3, 2003. In order to provide a broad

context for considering this responsibility, the Task Force looked to

industry experience and addressed the following questions: What

models exist in industry with regard to a CTO function? What

responsibilities, authorities, and reporting relationships do industry

CTOs have? How does this compare to DOD? What industry

approaches could DOD adopt?

CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICERS IN INDUSTRY

The position of Chief Technology Officer in industry has evolved

over the past 20 to30 years from a period when most companies did

not have a CTO to their widespread use today. By the 1990s the

position requirements evolved from a highly-published laboratory

researcher with great depth in a single field to an operational

executive who can make important strategic decisions that impact the

competitive position of a company. The modern CTO position often

calls for a technologist or scientist who can translate technological

capabilities into strategic business decisions. Lewis describes the

nature of this role: "The CTO's key tasks are not those of lab director

writ large but, rather, of a technical businessperson deeply involved

in shaping and implementing overall corporate strategy."12

Models

There are few examples in the literature (papers, journal articles,

and presentations) of explicitly defined roles, authorities, and

responsibilities of a CTO in industry. How this person contributes to

an organization varies widely. Looking across a range of industries,

12. Lewis, W.W., & Lawrence, H.L. (1990). A new mission for corporate technology. Sloan

Management Review, 31(4), pp. 57-67.

56
THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER

the CTO has been used as a technical trouble shooter for the

chairman, to leverage technology across internal businesses, to

provide insight for new directions in technology, and often as

combinations of all of these.

There has been little research done to define the CTO's

responsibilities. From the "CTO.net" established by Roger E. Smith,

Each industry has a very different business model (even within

the same industry), customer base, internal structure, and culture.

The position is poorly understood and unevenly applied: CTOs are

not publishing their activities and academics are not researching the

position. Fewer than 20 published journal articles in the last 10 years.

It is unlikely, if not impossible, for one definition or model to meet

the needs of all of these organizations. 13

Responsibilities

Although there is no single model that can be used for the role of

CTOs, Smith has characterized CTO strategic responsibilities in a

review paper. Smith's characterization identifies the following

responsibilities:

Monitoring and assessing new technologies. ... Serve as an

advisor to senior executives during strategic decisionmaking. ... identify, access, [and] investigate high-risk,

high-return technologies possessing potential application

within existing businesses or for creating new businesses.

Strategic innovation. ... Assure development or acquisition

of fundamental technologies offering clear competitive

advantage for current and future businesses ...

* Mergers and acquisitions. ... Due diligence includes

evaluating patents, reviewing technical publications, and

studying trade data to determine the value of the target

company and to rank it against its competitors ...

13. Smith, Roger D. (October 2003). "Strategic Responsibilities of the Chief Technology

Officer," Technology Management Journal, Korean Industrial Technology Association.

57
APPENDIX I

"Marketing and media relations.... Translate technical

details into real customer advantages that are superior to

those of competing products....

" Government, academia, professional organizations.... Ensure

that money and time spent on such projects is aligned

with corporate strategy and has a realistic potential of

contributing to company's competitive advantage ...

" Company culture.... Initiate activities and policies that

create a technology-friendly culture aligned with

company's business strategy.14

From Task Force interviews and discussions, the following are

further illustrations of CTO roles in industry:

"* Participate in senior leadership team for preparing

business plans and directions

"* Review business unit engineering support plans

(tech roadmaps and independent research and

development [IRAD])

"* Conduct executive oversight of technology

initiatives occurring in the corporate research

organization (laboratory vice president or director

typically reports to CTO)

"* Lead in the establishment of global research facilities

"* Assist business units with new initiatives and

continually evaluate evolving technologies used in

company products

"* Provide recommendations to chairman and to senior

leadership team on advanced products and

technology gaps (IRAD investments)

Authorities

The Task Force examined the authority of the CTO in the area of

R&D resources -who controls the resources and how they are

14. Smith, Roger D. (July-August 2003) "The Chief Technology Officer: Strategic

Responsibilities and Relationships," Research Technology Management, CTOnet.org.

58
THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER

allocated. For large aerospace and commercial sector companies,

CTOs are often staff positions with no line authority. If there is a

central research laboratory, the lab vice president or director often

reports to the CTO. Since business units are responsible for profit and

loss, they are also responsible for determining R&D investments

needed to grow their business unit. The CTO's authority lies with the

chairman and chief executive office (CEO) to provide advice or set

technology goals for the senior leaders of the company as to the

direction and appropriateness of business unit investments.

Reporting

From the Task Force review of companies in the defense and

commercial sectors, the CTO most often reports to and advises the

chairman or CEO on potential technology impacts and discontinuities

that can help shape future business growth. Business units will seek

advice and support on new initiatives or issues and will often depend

on the CTO to lead research and engineering "processes" across the

corporation.

DOD VERSUS INDUSTRY CTOs-SUMMAR Y COMPARISONS

Table I-1 summarizes CTO authorities and responsibilities in

DOD as compared to industry.

Industry CTOs will most often have the role of setting strategic

technology directions for their company and leave the IRAD

performance of the business unit to that leadership. The Task Force

does believe that the appropriate role for DDR&E as DOD's Chief

Technology Officer is to focus on strategic issues rather than to

provide oversight of the S&T portfolio. The essence of the CTO's role

goes beyond oversight of the Department's research and engineering

activities and is captured by item 4.2 in Department of Defense

Directive 5134.3 dated November 3, 2003. DOD's CTO role is to

"Develop the strategies and supporting plans that exploit technology

and prototypes to respond to the needs of the Department of Defense

and ensure U.S. technological superiority."

59
APPENDIX I

Table I-1. Comparison of DOD and Industry CTO Authorities and

Responsibilities

DOD CTO INDUSTRY CTO

Principal staff advisor to the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Reports to chairman and provides

Technology, and Logistics and the advice on research and engineering

Secretary and Deputy Secretary of matters.

Defense for research and engineering

matters.

Develop the strategies and supporting Assures strategic innovation in

plans that exploit technology and fundamental technologies offering

prototypes to respond to the needs of clear competitive advantage for

the Department of Defense and ensure current & future businesses.

U.S. technological superiority.

Develop and maintain an R&E metrics Metrics regarding revenue increase

program to measure and assess the from new products introduced in a

quality and progress for the desired cycle time are fundamental to

Department of Defense's R&E program. business growth.

Recommend approval, modification, or

disapproval of programs and projects

of the military departments and other Technology gates monitored to

DOD Components in assigned fields to decide if a project moves to next

eliminate unpromising or unnecessarily stage of development or is killed.

duplicative programs, and initiation or

support of promising ones for R&E.

Actively participate in the Planning,

Programming, Budgeting, and

Execution process by providing Serve as an advisor to senior

guidance through out budget executives during strategic decisiondevelopment. Advise the Secretary of making. Identify, access, [and]

Defense whether the Presidents Budget investigate high-risk, high-return

Request meets the Department's goals technologies possessing potential

and objectives and is the best application within existing businesses

allocation of resources for R&E. If not, or for creating new businesses.

identify reallocations required to

achieve the desired results.

Promote coordination, cooperation, and

mutual understanding of R&E within Assist business units on new

the Department of Defense and initiatives and continually evaluate

between the Department of Defense evolving technologies used in

and other federal agencies and the company products.

civilian community.

60
THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER

Table I-1. Comparison of DOD and Industry CTO Authorities and

Responsibilities (continued)

DOD CTO INDUSTRY CTO

Ensure R&E interchange with Allied and Lead in the establishment of global

friendly nations, in coordination with research facilities.

the Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy, the USD (AT&L), and the

military departments.

Oversee matters associated with R&E Executive oversight of technology

at DOD laboratories operated by the initiatives occurring in the corporate

military departments or other DOD research organization (laboratory vice

components. president/ director reports to CTO)

Conduct analyses and studies; develop Initiate activities and policies that

policies; provide technical leadership, create an innovation and technologyoversight, and advice; make friendly culture aligned with

recommendations; and issue guidance company's business strategy.

to military services and defense

agencies for the DOD R&E plans and

programs.

Serve on boards, committees, and Serve in government, academic, or

other groups pertaining to the DDR&E's professional organizations. Insure

functional areas, and represent the of that money and time spent on such

Defense, the Deputy Secretary of projects is aligned with corporate

Defense, and the USD (AT&L) on strategy and has realistic potential of

DDR&E matters outside the contributing to company's

Department of Defense. competitive advantage.

For the DDR&E to effectively perform the job of CTO requires

guidance, and support, from the Secretary of Defense and the USD

(AT&L). DDR&E is a staff position (to the Secretary of Defense), not a

line position, and, as such, the influence of the office depends on the

relationship and support of the Secretary of Defense. Within industry

the CTO typically reports directly to the chairman and chief executive

officer. This relationship is critical for setting technical

competitiveness and innovation for the company. When business unit

leaders recognize that the CTO has the backing of the chairman, their

individual plans for growth better reflect the strategic plans of the

corporation.

61
APPENDIXJ

APPENDIX J. DRAFT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

IMPLEMENTATION MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE

ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION

DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: DOD Strategic Technology Plan

The Department's preeminent ability to understand, nurture and exploit

science and technology (S&T) was a major contributor to victory in the Cold

War. This ability has remained a critical enabler of the powerful new

capabilities we have demonstrated since.

However, our ability to continue to do so faces new challenges, not the

least of which is the commercialization and globalization of technology.

Resourceful adversaries now have a much richer menu of technologies to

exploit for their own use against U.S. interests. At the same time our ability

to use all available technology is hampered by research and development

practices still influenced by Cold War requirements.

Civilian technologies undergoing revolutionary progress can have

profound and unforeseen influence on future military affairs. We have not

seen the last of such impacts from information technology. We will surely

62
DRAFT IMPLEMENTATION MEMORANDUM

see more from biotechnology and nanotechnology. We must ensure that we

are the first to understand these effects and the first to exploit or counter

them as appropriate.

Furthermore, while critical, technology is only an enabler of new

capabilities. The capabilities we need to counter new threats depend

perhaps even more so than during the Cold War, on our human resources.

Therefore, we must foster closer collaboration between our warriors and

technologists so that the introduction of new technology is tied to

development of concepts, doctrine, tactics and training.

In the face of these challenges I have asked the USD (AT&L) and the

DDR&E, in accord with Department of Defense Directive 5134.3, to take

steps to ensure that we will exploit technology to the fullest and avoid

technological surprise. One of these steps is to develop a strategic

technology plan. The plan is intended to help ensure on the one hand, that

our S&T activities support national defense goals, and on the other, that our

strategies are informed by a deep understanding of technology. The

strategic plan should be developed within 90 days of receiving this

memorandum and be updated annually.

The plan will provide a rationale and roadmap for a robust long-term

science and technology effort. It will tie technology objectives closer to the

operational capabilities spelled out in the National Defense Strategy. It will

identify

* Critical investment areas

* How to make much more effective use of technology

developed in the commercial sector, academia, and other

government agencies

Ways to be more successful in anticipating how

adversaries will exploit technology. This will involve the

intelligence community and require red teaming and net

assessment

Means for more timely collaboration between warriors

and technologists to permit rapid insertion of new

capabilities into ongoing operations.

63
APPENDIX J

Steps to increase the technical depth and breadth of the

OUSD (AT&L) staff

The Deputy Secretary and I are committed to spend the time needed to

achieve these objectives. Please provide the necessary support to this

important effort.

64