Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Dr. Robert R. Greene Sands’ Assessing Special Operations Forces Language, 

Region, and Culture Needs uses his vast experience and knowledge of this 

subject and draws from the existing Department of Defense Defense 

Language Transformation Roadmap (DLRT), recent lessons learned, and 

historical beginnings to outline the importance to the U.S. military, especially the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. The past decade 

of counterinsurgency operations has challenged the U.S. military personnel in their ability to carry out a variety of missions involving culturally 

complex situations and interactions. Success in such operations often 

depends on difficult linguistic and interpersonal skill-based competencies 

and abilities. Dr. Sands emphasizes the utility of language skills, along with 

regional and cultural knowledge and cross-cultural competence, in engaging populations across sometimes uncompromising cultural divides. This 

monograph provides key lessons learned as U.S. Special Operations Command determines the way ahead for LRC education and training to better 

prepare the future SOF operator to meet the challenges of operating in 

complex environments and meet the command’s priority to continue to 

build relationships.

ISBN 978-1-941715-00-0

Assessing Special Operations 

Forces Language, Region, and 

Culture Needs

Leveraging Digital and LRC Learning to 

Reroute the “Roadmap” from Human 

Terrain to Human Domain

Robert R. Greene Sands

JSOU Report 16-8

JSOU Report 16- 8 Assessing Special Operations Forces Language, Region, and Culture Needs Sands
Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Senior Research Fellow and adjunct professor, 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 

Monterey and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Frederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs; Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 16-8

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

Assessing Special Operations 

Forces Language, Region, 

and Culture Needs

Leveraging Digital and LRC Learning to 

Reroute the “Roadmap” from Human 

Terrain to Human Domain

Robert R. Greene Sands, Ph.D.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in August 2016.

ISBN 978-1-941715-00-0
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces, June 2016, Russell 

D. Howard and John P. Duvall, Jr.

Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization. A Case Study of 

Task Force 714 in Iraq, June 2016, Richard Shultz

2017 Special Operations Research Topics, June 2016

Unconventional Economics: Operational Economics in Unconventional Warfare, 

March 2016, Riley Post and Jeffrey D. Peterson

2016 Special Operations Essays, March 2016

The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s Undoing, February 2016, Jarret Brachman

Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied 

Environments, January 2016, Robert Haddick

SOF Role in Combating Transnational Crime, January 2016

The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, December 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion, 

November 2015, Colin S. Gray

Countering Violent Extremism in Mali, November 2015, Mark Moyar

The 2005 Iraqi Sunni Awakening: The Role of the Desert Protectors Program, 

October 2015, William Knarr

On the cover. A United States Special Forces Soldier greets a village elder in 

Shinkay district, Zabul province, Afghanistan, before conducting a Shura 20 

April 2010. Source: U.S. Army Photo by Sergeant Debra Richardson.

Back cover. A Special Forces company commander meets with village elders 

and members of the 1st Kandak, 209th Afghan National Army Corps, 10 

April 2007 to discuss military operations in the Sangin District area at an 

undisclosed forward operating base in Helmand province, Afghanistan. 

Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Daniel Love.
v

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................... vii

About the Author ..........................................................................ix

Acknowledgements .......................................................................xi

Introduction................................................................................... 1

1. The More Change, the More Things Stay the Same: 

Language and Culture for the Department of Defense.................... 7

2. Foundations for Existing Department of Defense Language, 

Regional Expertise, and Culture Capabilities—Defense 

Language Transformation Roadmap ............................................. 13

3. Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture: Concepts, 

Meaning, and Utility.................................................................... 25

 4. The Human Domain: The Contemporary Operating 

Environment................................................................................ 41

5. SOF LRC Needs, Competencies, Learning Objectives, and 

Assessments................................................................................. 59

6. Disruptive Technology ............................................................. 79

7. Learning Management Systems: Centralizing Disruption.......... 99

8. Concluding the Journey ......................................................... 113

Appendix A: Acronym List ......................................................... 119

Endnotes.................................................................................... 123

vii

Foreword

Dr. Robert R. Greene Sands’ Assessing Special Operations Forces Language, Region, and Culture Needs uses his vast experience and knowledge of this subject and draws from the existing Department of Defense 

Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLRT), recent lessons 

learned, and historical beginnings to outline the importance to the U.S. 

military, especially the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. The 

past decade of counterinsurgency operations has challenged the U.S. military 

personnel in their ability to carry out a variety of missions involving culturally complex situations and interactions. Success in such operations often 

depends on difficult linguistic and interpersonal skill-based competencies 

and abilities. Dr. Sands emphasizes the utility of language skills, along with 

regional and cultural knowledge and cross-cultural competence, in engaging 

populations across sometimes uncompromising cultural divides.

Aside from those in a few specialist fields, U.S. military personnel were 

not trained to any adequate level in language and culture knowledge, skills, 

and abilities at the start of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. In the intervening years, the Department of Defense has made 

uneven strides in promoting the usefulness of language, region, and culture 

(LRC) knowledge and skills for the remainder of the force.

Dr. Sands’ monograph suggests that a reconceptualization of language 

and culture learning methods is necessary for United States Special Operations Command to effectively meet the challenge of looming budgetary 

reprioritizations to language and culture programs, while also promoting 

innovative blended and distance learning opportunities. He advocates a 

learning tool and approach that better serves SOF operational capacities and 

prepares them for their leading role in transnational ‘gray zone’ operations, 

where they must deal with a wide variety of ethnic, religious, and cultural 

groups that transcend geographical boundaries. The author further contends 

that SOF must be prepared to function in a language and cultural landscape 

that is highly fluid and dynamic, requiring preparation that goes beyond 

singular language training and static culture-specific education. He also 

proposes development of a LRC capability in which language proficiency is 
viii

only one factor; equally important are learning events that broaden crosscultural competence and culture-general understanding.

Finally, Dr. Sands argues that how these components are brought together 

and sequenced in learning programs is important, and perhaps more important than their consideration as integral components of LRC capabilities. He 

contends a stovepiped approach to language and culture study results in an 

inefficiency of effort and resources. This study also suggests the merging of 

language and culture into singular learning events increases the learner’s 

proficiency and competence in both. Dr. Sands calls for the institutionalization of such synergistic education and training programs, with curriculum, delivery, and assessment methods that are operationally relevant to the 

learner to maximize the return on the investment of time.

This monograph provides key lessons learned as U.S. Special Operations 

Command determines the way ahead for LRC education and training to 

better prepare the future SOF operator to meet the challenges of operating 

in complex environments and meet the command’s priority to continue to 

build relationships.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Author 

Robert R. Greene Sands, Ph.D., is the Director and Senior Fellow of the 

Institute for the Study of Culture and Language (ISCL) at Norwich 

University, and President of RGSands, LLC, a full-service culture and language learning provider. Sands teaches in Norwich University’s College of 

Graduate and Continuing Studies and is the founder 

and editor of the ISCL’s online Journal of Culture, 

Language and International Security. From 2008 

to 2011, Dr. Sands was Culture Chair and Assistant 

Professor of Anthropology at the Air Force Culture 

and Language Center and Air University at Maxwell 

Air Force Base, Alabama. He was also Director of the 

Minerva Initiative for Energy and Environmental 

Security during his tenure at Air University. Dr. Sands 

has supported the Defense Intelligence Agency and 

the U.S. Army, among other organizations, in the development of culture 

and cross-cultural competence programs across the Department of Defense. 

He is an accomplished speaker and has presented to organizations such 

as the Interagency Language Roundtable, U.S. Africa Command, 17th Air 

Force, the U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Center, the Joint Chaplains College, 

U.S. Special Operations Command, the JAG School, Advanced Air Mobility 

Operations School, Joint Military Attaché School, Joint Foreign Area Officer 

Phase One course, Defense and National Intelligence professionals, among 

others. 

For the last three years, Dr. Sands has worked with Joint Base Lewis/

McChord Language and Culture Center in the development of an innovative 

program in promoting a synergistic language, region, and culture learning program for operational soldiers. He recently developed the first-ever 

culture-general and cross-cultural competence massive open online distance 

learning course, Operational Culture: Thinking Differently about Behavior 

in the Human Domain.

Dr. Sands is the author of seven books and numerous chapters and articles 

on topics such as cross-cultural competence, environmental security, building partnerships and sustainability, sport and culture, ethnographic theory, 
x

and the cognitive origins of religion. His seventh book (co-authored with 

Dr. Allison Greene-Sands) is Cross-Cultural Competence for a 21st Century 

Military: Culture, the Flipside of COIN (2014, Lexington Books). Dr. Sands 

holds a BA from Illinois State University, an MA from Iowa State University, 

and a Ph.D. from University of Illinois, all in anthropology. 
xi

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following individuals for their support during 

a lengthy and at times arduous effort in completing this monograph: 

Yvonne Pawelek, Pieter DeVisser, Jessica DeVisser, and Sergeant Kevin 

Glymph. 

I would also like to thank my wife, Dr. Allison Greene-Sands, who has 

been a trusted colleague and source of inspiration for my work in researching, developing, and delivering language and culture learning for Department of Defense populations over the last eight years. It is not every day that 

spouses can share passion and scholarship in hopefully making a difference 

in the lives and careers of those in the Department of Defense who serve in 

cross-culturally complex missions around the globe. 

1

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

Introduction

Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven, acknowledged in the last 

century by Special Operations Forces (SOF), the utility of language, 

region, and culture (LRC) skills and knowledge, and cross-cultural competence for operations and missions. The evidence for this can be found in 

a variety of forms, anecdotes, lessons learned, narratives, interviews, and 

other means. Any deployed military personnel can attest to the importance 

of language proficiency and aspects of culture, including interactional skills, 

knowledge sets, and cross-cultural competencies. However, in an organization that runs on metrics, the return on investment and training time is still 

hard to quantify and then press for continued growth and development of 

such programs. LRC lies at a crossroad; its continued utility to the mission 

is dependent on the institutionalization of education and training (learning) programs, and the continued research and innovation into curriculum 

delivery and assessment. 

The last decade of counterinsurgency (COIN)1 strained the capabilities 

of U.S. military personnel to carry out a variety of missions that included 

building infrastructure, providing security while training security personnel, 

and growing the span of control of a central government to the provinces and 

villages. To be successful at this range of operations involved linguistic and 

interpersonal skill-based competencies and abilities that even an experienced 

traveler under much different and less trying conditions would find difficult 

to engage, let alone master. Even more necessary to the missions was local 

knowledge that if not understood hid the patterns of behavior necessary 

to engage across cultural divides that were often severe. The Department 

of Defense (DOD) and its personnel, save for specialized populations such 

as military linguists, foreign area officers (FAOs), and SOF, for example, 

were not trained to any adequate level of language and culture knowledge, 

skills, and abilities (KSAs) at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In the intervening years, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD)2

 has made uneven strides in promoting the 

usefulness of LRC for the remainder of the force. A few publications recount 

the history of language, region, and culture efforts in the DOD and lessons 

learned have become cobbles that line a road making a bumpy, uneven ride.3 
2

JSOU Report 16-8

At this point in time, that cobbled road has reached an intersection with the 

past and the future, and if history has any relevance, there is a distinct possibility that language and culture knowledge and skills will progress back 

to the future, as assets and programs find dusty shelves.4

This monograph will suggest that offering a consolidated LRC learning 

approach will promote a learning synergy, an efficiency of curriculum development and cost-effectiveness. Recent and ongoing LRC programs also find 

innovation in learning development, delivery, and assessment promotes a 

more meaningful learning experience that supports application beyond the 

learning event. Current LRC learning efforts across the DOD are a superficial consolidation, far from mining efficiencies that make more sense from 

a learning perspective. More commonly, LRC is used to just house separate programs for funding and resources-sharing. That is certainly a viable 

reason, but not one that affects learning programs directly. 

Chapter 1 highlights the continued need for LRC in the DOD. Currently, 

the DOD LRC program, for better or worse, is still wedded to assumptions 

and risks as well as the programs augmented and developed under the 

guidance issued through the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap 

(DLTR). Thus, OSD Services and commands labor unevenly to meet a much 

expanded array of missions needing LRC. For SOF, the traditional missions 

that involved security force assistance (SFA) and foreign internal defense 

(FID) seen in past efforts, such as Vietnam,5 were reduced in COIN, but are 

now featured as critical to future DOD missions. 

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) poses three ‘pillars’ of U.S. 

national security: protect the homeland, build security globally, and project 

power.6 Woven throughout this QDR is the importance of LRC as enablers 

for building partnership capacity (BPC), which includes training militaries 

to help fight their own or neighbors’ insurgences and terrorists groups and 

will be critical to how the DOD will approach global security and future 

conflicts. All Services engage in BPC activities, but training foreign troops to 

fight insurgency or promote insurgency has been the staple of SOF missions 

since their inception. In the climate of disappearing conventional missions 

and a growing need for asymmetrical efforts requiring smaller numbers and 

special training and skills, SOF become critical. The U.S. Army unveiled 

its regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept in 2013, certainly as a means to 

support BPC missions and augment or perhaps supplant efforts by SOF.7
3

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

Chapter 2 chronicles the history of language learning in the DOD and 

considers the legacy and continued influence of LRC transformation in 

response to and after 9/11. Professional linguists, prior to 9/11, primarily 

supported intelligence activities. Confronted with a world that resisted traditional cold war perspectives, the OSD mounted a plan of guidance and goals 

for advancing traditional language programs and incorporating a suite of 

region and culture KSAs in training and education programs. The publication and rollout and the intervening years of the DLTR8

 featured inconsistent 

understanding and application of its guidance. Language assessment, clearly 

defined concepts for region and culture, and an overarching strategy with 

measures of DOD success, were all found to be problematic by several government reports and difficult to enact by the individual Services. This was 

especially true for organizations like SOF who were dependent on meaningful LRC programs to meet their more complicated mission in OIF and OEF.9 

Chapter 3 takes a specific look at language proficiency and regional expertise—the initial LRC knowledge and skills that lay at the heart of the DLTR. 

This report suggests that the concepts that refer to LRC are poorly defined 

by OSD, lack consensus as to their meaning, and because of that often hide 

or disguise utility to learning and application. Presently, language, regional 

expertise, and culture (LREC) refers to a collection of KSAs that, in the case 

of language, are agreed upon by those involved in developing policy, doctrine, and strategy. There is no agreed upon conceptualization of regional 

expertise. The concept of culture has been co-opted to fit a variety of needs 

and intent, and as such, clear and theoretically sound definitions are lacking 

in OSD policy and doctrine, and OSD and Services’ strategy, while having 

no common reference across the Services.10 In addition, region and culture 

were opportunistically added to traditional language programs, and that 

practice continues today, while only region and culture learning are provided 

to non-linguist populations. Either option is not optimal, with the latter 

usually occurring in ‘training’ events which minimizes the comprehension 

and the application of concepts introduced outside the training environment. For these reasons, this study will refer to LREC as an OSD construct 

that carries with it certain suppositions and may not apply to all situations 

or Services involving LRC. 

Chapter 4 explores the notion of the human domain as the interactional 

space where LRC directly affects mission success. Suggested in this chapter 

are perspectives and approaches for understanding and interpreting social 
4

JSOU Report 16-8

and cultural behavior in the human domain, which requires more than a 

language proficiency and regional understanding. The human domain intersects the more traditional domains engaged by the U.S. military: air, space, 

sea, and land (joined recently with cyberspace) and introduces the notion 

that human behavior and interaction may or may not align with natural or 

physical boundaries or borders. The perspective of space is important to this 

regard and can act to constrain understanding. 

Chapter 5 will feature a discussion of organizational needs met by a SOF 

LRC program. As discussed earlier, the human domain presents different 

challenges to be met in part by LRC. A great deal of understanding others’ 

behavior, as well as one’s own behavior in novel situations, is met through 

understanding patterns of behavior that are common across human culture 

groups. This is both a cognitive and generalist approach and should seed the 

LRC approach. From this assumption, the goals of an LRC program should 

render the appropriate KSAs to be developed across the three components. 

Sets of learning goals and objectives will be identified, and a robust discussion of LRC assessment presently being utilized will present the opportunity 

to offer an assessment program for LRC more suited to a synergized and 

generalist approach being advocated. 

Language learning programs follow a traditional approach, which features a reliance on classroom/face-to-face instruction and the expert omniscience of the instructor to carry expertise across the LRC field. Finding an 

instructor as an expert across all three LRC fields is rare. Without tending to 

the other fields not covered, the program carries the risk of providing incorrect or biased information to the student, even though a curriculum may be 

developed that provides the knowledge and skills to be passed to students. 

Learning is a process that can rarely be fully scripted without the knowledge 

and expertise of the instructor being used in ad hoc and opportunistic situations. This deficiency of expertise was highlighted by the recent retraction 

of the U.S. Army’s recently published doctrine Cultural Awareness due to 

bias, plagiarism, and reliance on incorrect information.11

Chapter 6 covers the role of disruptive technology in developing e-learning and distance learning programs. Much of U.S. Government and DOD 

workforce training is delivered as e-learning and through a learning management system (LMS). A brief history of e-learning and distance learning 

is provided to set the context for considering a remote learning system for a 

program like SOF LRC. Over the last decade, ironically lining up with the 
5

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

growth of LRC programs in the DOD, distance learning has been affected 

by disruptive technology, featuring open-access and online learning programs. A disruptive technology is one that displaces an established technology and shakes up the industry, or a groundbreaking product that creates a 

completely new industry.12 Massive online open courses (MOOCs) are the 

most compelling and representative disruptors. The unique nature of LRC 

instruction and learning, if synergized, can greatly profit from disruptive 

technology. 

Chapter 7 explores the delivery of LRC and the role of incorporating 

learning management technology into learning. Essentially, this chapter will 

suggest that an effective use of this technology can centralize learning and 

instructional delivery. LMS software technology and the ability to connect 

that with a robust database has advanced in leaps and bounds. Most business and government workforce training occurs through an LMS. On the 

other hand, the use of LMSs in higher education have also followed a similar 

path of development—one system is for training, the other for learning; one 

system is for managing the learning process, the other system is ripe for disruption through open-sourced/online learning. For LRC learning, disruption 

could be a benefit, even a game changer. LMS technology should become 

the centralizing ‘forcing’ function of instruction and its extraordinary reach 

of capability should organize all student activities, feature all assignments, 

evaluate all student work, provide an interactive chat/blog function for the 

student to diary as well as interact with students and instructor, and provide management course statistics to the instructor. In conjunction with 

an active LMS, the traditional means of ‘teaching’ a language and/or culture course can be revamped to take advantage of multiple instructors with 

different expertise within the language and culture field. Essentially, the 

LMS becomes the classroom and centralizes the use of instructors. Finally, 

and perhaps the capability that can allow language and culture instruction 

to gain instructional effectiveness while promoting efficiency of learning 

management, is the capability for blended and distance learning, allowing 

students to expand geographically from the residential classroom. The final 

section presents a case study of a successful LRC program and course at Joint 

Base Lewis/McChord. The author has been one of the primary architects of 

that program for the last three years.13

Chapter 8 reviews the study and posits the potentiality of a more useful 

LRC program for United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
6

JSOU Report 16-8

Tradition of language pedagogy in the DOD, the DLTR, and the intractability to move away from existing programs in LRC will be well documented throughout this study as agents that still retain influence in LRC 

learning programs. This final chapter will suggest that novel and innovative 

approaches to LRC learning need to be considered as missions involve greater 

LRC complexity, and LRC learning programs fall victim to budgetary consequences and the rhythm of security involvement worldwide.14
7

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

1. The More Change, the More Things 

Stay the Same: Language and Culture for 

the Department of Defense

... on any given day USSOF are working with our allies around the 

world, helping build indigenous special operations capacity so that 

our partners can effectively deal with the threat of violent extremist 

groups, insurgents, and narco-terrorists—themselves. Indeed, SOF 

focuses intently on building partner capacity and security force 

assistance so that local and regional threats do not become global 

and thus more costly—both in blood and treasure.15

It’s hard enough working in a dangerous, uncomfortable place far 

from home and family. It’s tough enough hearing constant criticism 

from politicians and journalists. But the job can look terminally 

thankless if you cannot even understand the people you’re trying 

to save.16

In a 2011 publication in this monograph series, retired Brigadier General 

Russell Howard made the assertion that cultural insight and language 

were “important knowledge sets” for military personnel while proceeding to claim that although language and culture competencies were seen 

as requirements for conventional forces, they were especially significant to 

Special Forces soldiers.17 There is no short list of leaders, external experts, 

or advocates who advance the same position that understanding the cultures of others and self and communicating successfully across oftentimes 

deep cultural and behavioral divides is a critical enabler for mission success. 

These voices have been heard this time around since 2006, and a larger DOD 

audience was told culture was a force multiplier and speaking the languages 

of those peoples critical to COIN was important and just as telling as the 

rallying cry from Army leaders to troops to “win the hearts and minds.”18

The OSD and Services have grappled with the application of LRC enablers 

over the last decade. Some of the issues considered include what languages 

to concentrate on and teach and how to instruct them, and what elements of 
8

JSOU Report 16-8

culture and region are important. Even more generally, the question of what 

is culture and region, and how to get this information and skill development 

to the forces was problematic. Prior to 9/11, these capabilities were never considered critical, let alone beneficial to the conventional forces, although for 

special populations, LRC have always been critical for mission success. For 

example, Special Forces (SF) Green Berets had a legacy of utilizing language 

and culture for their traditional mission sets well before 9/11. In Vietnam, 

the success of Green Berets in asymmetrical operations depended on critical 

language and culture knowledge and interactional skills. Many Green Berets 

learned Vietnamese and French, and lived with and trained the Montagnard 

to fight the North Vietnamese.19

Recently, newer voices advocating the importance of language and culture 

for SOF have been promoted. Christopher Lamb, National Defense University, argued, “SOF needs to rebuild the language and cultural skills that have 

declined over the past decade with the majority of its efforts being focused 

on Iraq and Afghanistan.”20 During the most active period of COIN, “85 percent of all Special Forces soldiers were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.”21 

The importance of LRC in COIN is found in anecdote and narrative. 

Quantifying the effects of language and culture in a metric or report, other 

than how many students are being taught, number of languages, and language proficiency, etc., remains elusive. A changing mission is already in 

process. For the U.S. Army, RAF22 will promote a more intimate relationship 

between soldiers, cross-cultural interactions, and missions. 

Even after the drawdown in Afghanistan, on any given day the 

Army will typically have at least 100,000 soldiers forward deployed 

... through constant engagement and assessing the effectiveness 

of activities on the ground among humans, will be well positioned 

to continue to evolve direct and indirect options for the use of the 

military instrument for policymakers.23

The SOF mission is already changing due to realigned DOD strategy. 

This expansion of mission back to more traditional mission sets involves an 

increase in mission kinds and frequency, as well as an increase in geographic 

locations. This recasting for SOF actually echoes the sustained involvement 

in Vietnam as described by President John F. Kennedy in a commencement 

speech at West Point at the start of deeper involvement of U.S. troops in 

Vietnam: “[t]hat this is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient 
9

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

in its origins – war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by 

ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking 

victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.”24

The 2014 QDR casts SOF in the counterterrorism role but expands its 

mission “to sustain persistent, networked, distributed operations to defeat al 

Qaida, counter other emerging transnational threats, counter WMD, build 

the capacity of our partners, and support conventional operations.”25 There 

will be a move:

toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct 

action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision 

strike, and Special Operations Forces ... We will sustain efforts to 

strengthen key alliances and partnerships, placing more focus on 

deepening existing cooperation as well as building new and innovative partnerships.26

Necessary to BPC is to train and educate SOF in LRC. “[US]SOCOM is 

channeling more troops into language and culture training that will make 

them effective in Africa, Asia, and Latin America ... You can’t build [that] 

partner capacity well unless you speak their language, unless you understand 

their culture, and unless you have gained their trust.”27

A 2013 New York Times column reported that then USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven’s goal was to “recast the command from 

its popular image of commandos killing or capturing terrorists, and expand 

a force capable of carrying out a range of missions short of combat – including training foreign militaries to counter terrorists, drug traffickers and 

insurgents, gathering intelligence and assessing pending risk, and advising 

embassies on securities.”28

Admiral McRaven’s testimonies to Congress in 2012, and then in 2014, 

reflected USSOCOM’s growing importance of post-COIN involvement 

in security missions. In his 2014 testimony to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, he said, “Our strategy is further informed by the current 

Defense Strategic Guidance, which directs the Joint Force of the future to 

be agile, flexible, ready, and use innovative, low-cost, and small footprint 

approaches.”29

Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, provides an extensive list and 

explanation of the core SOF missions: 
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JSOU Report 16-8

the special operations core activities are: direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense, 

security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information 

support operations, and civil affairs operations.30

Woven throughout these core missions are some shared commonalities 

when it comes to mission variables: 

They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or 

diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by 

one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert 

nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater 

requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a 

higher degree of risk.31

As the DOD reconfigures itself to meet a much different international and 

transnational landscape, two types of SOF missions have been characterized 

in theory and practice. Linda Robinson, author of One Hundred Victories: 

Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare,

32 casts these missions as 

direct and indirect. Direct missions are exemplified by the Osama bin Laden 

raid, but also included at the height of the Afghanistan War, as much as: 

14 night raids and when needed and action deemed too risky or 

politically charged, drone strikes were called in. This kind and frequency of direct mission in counterinsurgency is untenable for even 

near-term support. Although raids and drone strikes are necessary 

to disrupt dire and imminent threats to the U.S., special operations 

leaders readily admit that they should not be the central pillar of 

U.S. military strategy. In fact, raids and drone strikes are tactics 

that are rarely decisive and often incur significant political and 

diplomatic costs for the U.S.33

Indirect missions, however, contrast with direct missions and feature 

“working with and through non-U.S. partners to accomplish security objectives, often in unorthodox ways.”34 Indirect missions, Robinson claims, offer 

lasting benefits, a smaller footprint, and cost a fraction of conventional warfare. Then-Brigadier General Edward Reeder, commander of U.S. Army 
11

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

Special Forces Command (Airborne), wrote that John F. Kennedy recognized 

the connection between human and mission: “Kennedy understood the focus 

had to be on the population with the primary goal of working together with 

host nation partners to combat violent, extremist organizations and home 

grown insurgents with unique local solutions.”35

Indirect missions feature an array of roles and responsibilities that can 

often duplicate or augment those displayed by organizations such as United 

States Agency for International Development, Department of State, and 

others. 

Special Operations forces forge relationships that can last for decades 

with a diverse collection of groups: training, advising, and operating 

alongside other countries’ militaries, police forces, tribes, militias, or 

other informal groups. They also conduct civil-affairs operations that 

provide medical, veterinary, or agricultural assistance to civilians, 

improving the standing of local governments and gaining access to 

and a greater understanding of local conditions and populations.36

Finally, the pace of threat complicates the already complex nature of the 

cross-cultural interactions encountered by SOF and expressed behavior that 

exists submerged or even hidden below the level of state actors. “A flu virus 

in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent and 

interconnected. And today’s threats have become so complex, fast-moving, 

and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them alone.”37

This chapter has explored the thesis of ‘back to the future’ as SOF returns 

to their legacy of indirect missions and the traditions that made them the 

Swiss Army Knife of COIN. A decade of COIN has excised some of that 

legacy, certainly atrophying the LRC KSAs that were critical prior to 9/11. 

However the world and all its actors—i.e., nation-states as well as the growing 

legitimacy and danger of actors who exist below, across, or through nationstates—is a different world than the war and conflict that birthed SOF. In 

addition, LRC competencies that enable success in the contemporary SOF 

mission have the benefit of more than 50 years of research and application 

since Vietnam. Development and sustainment of skill-based competencies, 

like cross-cultural competence, have a greater visibility. How we think and 

analyze problems and arrive at solutions in a security environment has 

greater clarity.38
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JSOU Report 16-8

Languages of culture groups have become more important than that of 

some or many state actors. These changes over time implicate the critical 

need for continued emphasis on LRC, but they also emphasize the understanding that there needs to be a different approach to LRC, from re-conceptualization of what constitutes LRC, re-imagining content, and incorporating 

the advances in learning technology. In some ways, LRC efforts have been 

held hostage by OSD and DOD organizations because of the natural pace 

of institutional change, as well as to the priority of effort given to development and adaptation of policy, and more importantly, strategy. Yet, LRC 

efforts have also been captive to the lack of resident expertise in LRC used 

in formulating the signature DLTR and the residual effects the DLTR—some 

positive, some not so positive—had and continues to have on LRC efforts 

across and within Services and commands.

Humans have always played a role in war. In the new battlefield, frontlines 

run through neighborhoods and urban enclaves, rules of engagement have 

become more asymmetrical, and humans have become far more relevant 

to the mission. The increased relevance of humans has been captured as its 

own domain—the human domain. 
13

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

2. Foundations for Existing Department 

of Defense Language, Regional Expertise, 

and Culture Capabilities—Defense 

Language Transformation Roadmap

From the get-go, we were told that we had to “respect the local 

culture.” This took the form of endless classes on how not to look 

at the women, not to use your left hand, and never show the soles 

of your feet to anyone. It was all of the little courtesies you’d need 

to know if you were traveling to Iraq or Afghanistan as a tourist.39

Most language learning in the U.S. military and supporting organizations up until 9/11 was done to support intelligence missions, while 

aspects of region (international relations or regional studies) were derived 

from senior professional military education (PME) as well as civilian academic institutions. Knowledge and skills related to culture, until recently, 

were not considered part of policy, strategy, doctrine, or learning programs. 

This chapter will briefly explore the history of LRC in the DOD and provide a more standard conceptualization of the concepts of language, region, 

and culture, as utilized currently by DOD. It will also suggest that current 

conceptualizations lead to the inability to synchronize LRC efforts across 

the DOD LRC enterprise. Finally, the history of the use (or non-use) of LRC 

in the DOD continues to influence how these concepts are approached in 

doctrine, strategy, and most importantly, in the development of learning 

programs. 

Language use, utility, and cost strongly influenced and continue to influence the expression of region and culture into policy, strategy, and learning 

in DOD Services and organizations. Language assessment and outcomes 

have also impacted the inclusion of region and culture KSAs into DOD curricula. In other words, existing LRC programs provided to non-intelligence/

non-professional linguist populations still retain many of the elements of 

traditional DOD language programs, such as assessment, curriculum development, and instruction, all reinforcing classroom delivery. In addition, the 

language instructor, often a heritage or native speaker, has been assumed 
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JSOU Report 16-8

to be the omniscient knowledge source in not just language, but also region 

and culture knowledge and skills, if region and culture were instructed at 

all. As faux pas and lessons learned in the field support, this reliance fails to 

consider changes to the elements of language and culture in their respective 

locales, not to mention significant differences in adjacent regions in the target 

language and culture—across time for each as well. Unless the instructors 

receive training on region and culture, to include cross-cultural awareness 

and competence, they are likely to fall short of appropriately preparing their 

students for such variations requiring adaptation and flexibility within a 

not-so-static languacultural context. 

This chapter will begin with a brief history of language learning in the 

DOD. Most impetus for current language training beyond Defense Language 

Institute (DLI) can be traced to 9/11 where location and languages, expected 

and unexpected COIN missions, and eventually the duration of COIN put 

emphasis on language use that was far different than traditional language 

use and learning, such as during the Cold War. The 2005 DLTR signified the 

institutionalization of a more pedestrian approach to mostly language learning and some regional (and not at first cultural) instruction in the DOD. As 

much as the DLTR provided essential programmatic guidelines for language, 

the minimization of region and culture as key components has hampered 

their legitimacy in learning programs, such as for SOF, even a decade later. 

Currently, the DOD LRC enterprise and policy lacks standardization of concepts at a policy level, features LRC programs that differ dramatically across 

the Services, and has no real LRC assessment program beyond language. The 

absence of policy focus that effectively promoted the importance of region 

and culture in such a foundational treatment document that charted out 

direction and pace of the first multimillion dollar LRC enterprise has been 

difficult to overcome in the intervening years.

Set within this complex and diverse enterprise, organizations like 

USSOCOM must situate, develop, and sustain their LRC learning program. 

Adding to this complexity, USSOCOM must also consider the different LRC 

requirements and unique approaches of the individual Services when designing or creating learning programs for personnel. In the end, this chapter 

will suggest that OSD guidance on LRC is incomplete and conflicting, while 

inconsistent nomenclature adds to the difficulty of aligning effort, organizations, and learning development methodologies. 
15

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

A Brief History of Foreign Language Instruction in the 

Department of Defense40

Language instruction prior to 9/11 was mostly provided to military linguists 

assigned to intelligence tasks at two locations: the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), Monterey, California; and DLI, 

Washington, DC. The mission of DLI has always been teaching and developing cryptologic-linguists for work in intelligence-related missions. Thus, its 

primary objective was skill instruction in listening and reading modalities. 

DLI supplied the Cold War language needs where Russian constituted the 

largest program and Chinese, Korean, and German were the other strategic 

languages taught. 

The Vietnam War featured language use that was centered on gathering 

intelligence through listening and reading, specifically intelligence related 

to North Vietnam and Chinese troop movements. Due to asymmetrical and 

unconventional operations by SF and the need to communicate with South 

Vietnamese forces, language utility also required speaking the language. 

During the Vietnam War, SF were taught to speak at least one language, 

although language proficiency or level of language instruction was not always 

measured using the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). 

9/11

On the brink of 9/11, language instruction for the most part centered on 

traditional learning programs, while development of region and culture 

as knowledge and skill sets were not formally considered in instruction or 

assessment. However, the narrow focus of intelligence in support of national 

security also impacted the diversity of languages taught at DLIFLC and 

elsewhere. Nathaniel Frank wrote in his book Unfriendly Fire: 

The shortage of language specialists in the intelligence and military 

forces has been hobbling national defense since the days of the Cold 

War. But between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World 

Trade Center, only a few voices in the wind had noted the growing 

threat of Arab terrorists to American security, and the culture of 

the armed forces and the intelligence agencies had only just begun 

to budge from a fixation on Russian language as the essential skill 

for keeping the country safe from its enemies.41
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JSOU Report 16-8

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 changed the calculus of foreign language 

instruction not just in the DOD, but across academia and other professional language training programs. OSD was unprepared in meeting the 

language needs that arose with an increased interest in the Middle East and 

other Arabic-speaking countries. The pool of Russian speakers that had been 

sustained in response to Sputnik through three decades of support from the 

National Defense Education Act was not matched by the need for existing 

Arabic speakers from the Muslim world. Three years after 9/11, DLIFLC 

was serving the military need for language by instructing 3,500 students 

in 22 languages, far short of the language need in Arabic languages, while 

the nonmilitary need for Arabic languages was vastly deficient in programs 

and students produced.42 This paucity of both Arabic linguists and language 

speakers certainly impacted the department’s capacity for traditional linguists, but also hampered the critical efforts of providing instructors and 

interpreters after the 2003 invasion. 

In the Shadow of the Defense Transformational Language 

Roadmap

By late 2002, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David Chu asked the military departments to review requirements for 

current manning needs for language professionals, to include interpreters, 

translators, crypto-linguists, interrogators, and area specialists, spanning 

enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel.43 A study done in 2003 by the deputy 

undersecretary for plans aggregated five language lines of effort across the 

DOD to include: 1) language management across the combatant commands; 

2) management of FAOs within the Services; 3) further or actual development of foreign language and regional knowledge in the officer corps; 4) 

management of language personnel; and 5) agreement of a requirements 

determination process for assessing language needs.44

A 2004 action began aligning positions with responsibilities, but there 

was a perceived lack of pace of formalizing a defense language program, 

much of it stemming from lack of direction, importance, and even bias 

placed on it by the administration at the time. In a 2004 New York Times 

op-ed on education, Samuel Freedman wrote, 

Neoconservatives inside and outside government have assailed 

Middle East studies departments—the likely recipients of any 
17

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

increased federal money for advanced study of Arabic and related 

languages—for alleged bias against the United States and Israel. It is 

expensive and time-consuming to conduct security checks of Arab 

immigrants interested in serving as linguists.45

Wrote Fred Kaplan in Slate in 2005: 

In the three and a half years after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor 

in 1941, the United States built a massive arsenal, equipped an equally 

massive fighting force, and declared victory in a worldwide war over 

imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. In the three and a half years after 

the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite in 1957, the U.S. government funded dozens—if not hundreds—of Russian-language and 

Russian-studies departments not just within the military but in 

high schools and colleges all across America. Now, three and a half 

years after Islamic fundamentalists flew airplanes into the World 

Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Department of Defense is three 

months away from publishing an official “instruction” providing 

“guidance for language program management.”46

Freedman quoted Democratic Representative Rush Holt who said, “There 

doesn’t seem to be anywhere in our government a strategic view about how 

you get a new flow of linguists. It’s all based on the assumption there’s a pool 

of linguists already out there. And that’s a fallacious assumption.’”47

Through August 2004, the work continued on the development of the 

DLTR to include assumptions, the situation at the time, the critical outcomes 

of such a roadmap, and more general recommendations.48 By 31 August, the 

foundations were solidified and approved, and the DLTR was published in 

January 2005.49

The DLTR, Its Influence and Fallout

The DLTR was a complicated endeavor undertaken in a period of national 

urgency covering the time leading up to the invasion of Iraq and the initial 

action in Afghanistan.50 Four major goals made up the arc of the roadmap 

taking the DOD from very part-time language development to a full-time 

LRC endeavor: 1) create foundational language and regional area expertise; 

2) create the capacity to surge; 3) establish a cadre of language professionals at the interagency language roundtable (ILR) level 3/3/3; 4) establish a 
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JSOU Report 16-8

process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of language 

professionals and FAOs.51 Said Chu: 

much of the Pentagon’s approach to language skills dates to the Cold 

War. The emphasis then was on training translators for intelligence 

work, mostly focused on the old Soviet Union. Now, the challenge 

goes well beyond sustaining a small cadre of professional linguists, 

extending to large numbers of combat forces and requiring knowledge of such languages as Arabic and Chinese.52

Language had always been a skill set narrowly focused to intelligence and 

specialized populations. Region was provided through PME and was focused 

in many cases on international relations and state actors. The acceptance of 

language and region as potential mission enablers and critical to warfighters 

in the Global War on Terror was a hard sell to a total force never trained in 

either. The three-year effort leading up to the publication of the DLTR forced 

the DOD to consider the role of language and region (and although not 

mentioned or laid out, culture) in a world that was very different than when 

the language program matured. This was explicit in the assumptions that 

framed the need for the DLTR. For example, it was considered highly likely 

that future adversaries would speak languages not considered at that time as 

important or even taught. Such future conflicts would also introduce a set of 

new coalition partners also speaking the same, similar, or entirely different 

languages; and an increasing U.S. global footprint, and many missions that 

come with it, could occur anywhere and with little time to prepare.53

The Washington Post faulted the DOD for “doing poorly in retaining 

troops with language experience or training in regional areas ... defense 

officials have done little to determine what language talent exists in the 

force, saying such talent is unknown and untapped.”54 In essence, a global 

expeditionary force needed an expeditionary LRC program. The DLTR 

explicitly made clear that LRC capability, and even more important, LRC 

capacity, was deficient for an ever-changing international landscape now 

more muddied and populated by non-state actors speaking unintelligible 

languages and motivated by unknown behavior. Other perspectives at the 

time of publication addressed how to fit language and regional capabilities 

into the military training cycle. A RAND study observed, “the Roadmap ... 

lays out plans to increase foreign language ability and foreign area expertise. 

Although these skills are intensely cultivated in foreign area officers, others 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

need them as well ... extra time spent in educational or training assignment 

to gain language ability means either less time spent in other assignments or 

fewer assignments.”55 For a brief document, the ambitious DLTR orchestrated 

some sweeping changes in the way the DOD executed language program 

management and instruction, but it also brought attention, limited as it 

was, to region and culture as critical pieces of an overall program. Language 

for professional linguists produced programs with distinct features such as 

facilities, curriculum development and delivery, instruction and instructors, 

and assessment; all and more were tailored for a specific population and 

mission. Early operations in Afghanistan and later Iraq revealed a paucity of 

programs or attention to non-professional linguist LRC training. The DLTR 

highlights the lack of capability and capacity stating that, “language skills are 

insufficient to meet the requirements of the changed security environment. 

The technological revolution of the 1990s requires much greater language 

capability than the stereotyped activities.”56 Identifying the pressing need 

of language and region for the Global War on Terror was certainly critical, 

but not transformative. Moving a department beyond where language was 

a peripheral mission, and region even less acknowledged as critical for a 

few select populations, to a new era where LRC were considered core, or 

enabling skills for warfighting would be the organizational transformation 

of the DLTR.

DLTR Deployment

It is safe to say that the scope and effort of the DLTR affected organizations 

and programs across the Services and the DOD as a whole. Each major goal 

in the DLTR had numerous tasks that affected policy, doctrine, strategy, 

and operations. The DLTR featured major thrusts, building language and 

regional expertise into the force and moving from a narrow focus of professional linguists to a force with some kind of LRC capability in numbers 

and capacity to support expeditionary deployments. The DLTR also created 

a professional cadre of language professionals at a high proficiency, and 

moved to create a capability to track the careers of language professionals 

and FAOs. The LRC enterprise envisioned by the DLTR created levels of new 

or revised policy, development of new and revised requirements to motivate 

plans and programs, enhanced learning programs to seed LRC throughout 

the Services’ training and education pathways, studies to identify existing 
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JSOU Report 16-8

language and region capabilities, and finally, a robust effort to shore up existing language professional programs in terms of personnel and languages. 

Of the four thrusts, building language and regional expertise into the 

total force proved to be the most difficult and building regional expertise 

was the most pressing. Building region and culture into the force involved 

an effort not conceptualized, staffed, or developed in the DOD prior to the 

publication of the DLTR. This effort involved developing ‘culture’ centers 

in each of the Services and efforts to integrate region and culture information into learning programs, both training (just in time or pre-deployment) 

and PME. Learning products supporting development of regional expertise 

became a small cottage industry, although there was much more ‘culture’ 

involved in the products, including smart cards and books, field guides, live 

actor video, video simulation, and ‘games’ that were to appeal to the varied 

learning styles and ages that existed across the learners’ spectrum receiving 

training and education.57 It was obvious that the Services and other organizations did not have the resident expertise on region (and as conceded later 

culture) and thus, positions/billets opened up and where these were not 

enough, contracts (and contractors) to augment learning programs were 

solicited, while product development fell to contracts as well. 

The DLTR was an ambitious endeavor and the founding document that 

would lay the framework for language and region efforts for years to come. 

Even a decade later, the DLTR continues to affect language, region, and 

culture programs across the DOD.

The Aftermath—10 years on

A decade of Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counter-Terrorism 

(CT) operations have highlighted our military’s shortcomings in 

employing and understanding foreign languages, the people who 

speak them, and various types of knowledge derived from language 

communities. The Department of Defense ... by 2005 had directed 

the Services to treat language capabilities as a core warfighting skill 

akin to marksmanship ... Six years have elapsed, though, and the 

Services have failed to produce doctrine, organizations, or practices 

that can be considered transformative. Instead, they have applied 

Band-Aid approaches by contracting out language and related capabilities, while not reforming the way the fielded forces train for or 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

employ language and related skills in any significant way. Given 

emphatic calls from senior leaders such as the Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chief of Staff of the Army, 

it is hard to understand why the Army has made such little progress.58

The intervening decade since the publication of the DLTR has seen extensive commentary from inside and outside the DOD on its merits, implementation, and successes. There have been testimonies by senior leaders 

within Personnel and Readiness and the Defense Language Office to different 

Congressional committees. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOD 

language program has been the focus of two Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) studies and a Congressional study, generally revealing “the 

continuing gaps in capability of the Force.”59 By June 2010, and including an 

interim 2009 report that provided recommendations, the GAO found the 

pace and centralization of language and region efforts to be inconsistent 

and lacking OSD oversight in the development of a strategy, as well as in 

collecting needed information to identify capability gaps and assess risk.60

Specifically, the GAO found a lack of comprehensive strategy by OSD to 

guide its transformation efforts.61 Included in this identified lack of strategy 

was also the inability to measure many of the DLTR tasks that were linked to 

funding requests. “In the absence of a comprehensive plan, GAO concluded 

it would be difficult for DOD to guide the Military Services as they develop 

their strategies and related training programs, and ensure these efforts were 

consistent with DOD-wide goals.”62 What was needed was a plan with measureable performance goals and objectives while also developing a method 

for identifying language and regional proficiency requirements for all communities and all proficiency levels. 

The DLTR sought to establish a language and regional expertise program, 

with little focus on identifying or conceptualizing region, or other facets of 

region, now identified as ‘cultural capabilities.’ In policy and elsewhere, only 

language is consistent in definition or application. Department of Defense 

Instruction (DODI) 5160.70, Management of DOD Language and Regional 

Proficiencies Capabilities, which has not been updated since 2007, provides 

regional proficiency guidelines and defines regional expertise, but due to 

the definitions used, lacks assessment potential or guidance for learning 

development. At the time of the conclusion of this manuscript, the DODI 

does not address culture at all, leaving little or no policy guidance. 
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JSOU Report 16-8

The DLTR placed emphasis on language assessment, but failed to address 

the need for region (and later culture) assessment. The DLPT, now in version 5 in many of the languages, is used for most language programs across 

the DOD and in related organizations such as the intelligence community. 

It is apropos for the community of military language professionals, such 

as FAOs, but has proven to be a difficult measure to use for assessing nonprofessionals, such as language enabled conventional forces and SOF, where 

proficiency is on the low end of the scale. The DLPT from the outset was 

the primary language assessment. The implications will be discussed later.

In one subtask, the DLTR advocated the need to develop assessment measures for the non-linguistic skills. Due to a lack of clear conceptualization 

of regional expertise and culture, efforts to develop assessment protocols 

have been mostly unsuccessful. However, there have been a few assessment 

protocols developed recently that approach either an LRC-wide assessment 

or assessments of regional expertise and aspects of culture, such as culturegeneral or culture-specific knowledge and cross-cultural competence. It was 

not soon after the publication that regional expertise was joined by varying 

concepts of ‘culture’ and the larger construct of LREC formed.

Traditional language learning in the DOD and at DLIFLC have shaped 

how language (and peripherally region and culture) have been taught in 

programs for language professionals. Residential or classroom instruction 

has narrowly focused mostly on face-to-face instructor/student interaction. 

However, learning technology in higher education and professional training outside of the DOD has been adapted for traditional and nontraditional 

students. Learning styles, budgets, battle rhythms, and advanced technology 

can remake traditional schoolhouses into blended and virtual schoolhouses 

that feature flexible learning programs with courses and products accommodating variables not typically considered in a traditional residential learning 

program.

In organizations that have identified language requirements, established 

language proficiency levels and dedicated learning time, the application of 

culture to that curriculum has relied on language instruction as the means to 

provide cultural learning. Furthermore, ‘culture’ has been identified mostly 

as the application of culture-specific topics that rely primarily on the experience of the instructor in a cultural group that speaks that language. In 

this application, culture does not include introducing and promoting culture-general and cross-cultural competence as a means to provide skills to 
23

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

mitigate cultural biases, engage perspective taking and sense making, as well 

as impart knowledge of critical culture-general domains and systems. These 

domains include ideology, kinship and alliance, exchange and reciprocity, 

culture change and mobilization, gender, cross-cultural differences in law, 

conflict resolution, and others necessary to understanding foreign cultural 

behavior across cultural groups found in the human domain.

Summary

There are a number of factors yet to be resolved from the DLTR that constrain organizations such as USSOCOM in their LRC programs that impact 

program effectiveness. Those factors, both legacy and organizational, will 

briefly be identified and further discussed in the next chapter on LRC terminology. In the absence of standardized guidance or detailed strategy, 

the Services have since developed their own LREC strategies that identify 

requirements and include guidance on meeting those requirements. Nonetheless, without a coordinated approach, the Services, and other commands 

such as USSOCOM, are lacking an inter-organizational alignment. One 

concerning issue is there are contrasting definitions for LRC components and 

their application to existing requirements that fail to address LRC needs of 

organizations and populations. Without a clear understanding of concepts 

and/or requirements, the development of sound learning goals and objectives, and a validated assessment program with useful metrics that translate 

into program effectiveness, a sustainable LRC program will continue to 

elude. 

25

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

3. Language, Regional Expertise, and 

Culture: Concepts, Meaning, and Utility

The DLTR was to be used as a means for establishing DOD requirements, 

budget considerations, and the follow-on strategies that would be necessary to ensure readiness. However, the lack of clear consensus within the 

DLTR on conceptualization of LRC knowledge and skills was to prove an 

obstacle to later consensus of terminology and mission that would eventually affect the development of a unified DOD-wide strategy. This chapter 

will suggest that there continues to be a lack of consensus within the DOD 

on the meaning and application of constructs within LRC. Terminology 

and concepts used in policy and strategy documents lack a theoretical rigor 

which undermines their utility to Services at tactical and operational levels. 

For example, A 2012 RAND/MITRE study found a lack of common 

understanding around LREC concepts, seven years from DLTR publication, and advocated:

There is currently confusion about the term LREC ... Developing 

a common vocabulary could be accomplished through discussions 

and agreements at management meetings and through providing the 

terminology via a DLO [Defense Language Office] website that can 

be accessed by key stakeholders in the LREC world. These stakeholders include not only DOD and service-level representatives of the 

Defense Language Action Panel (DLAP) but also researchers who 

are conducting studies related to LREC.63

Secondarily, the lack of consensus continues to spawn a ‘cottage industry’ 

of defining terms and concepts related to region and culture in the Services 

and other organizations, such as USSOCOM. This has provided a conceptual 

landscape that resists any kind of standardization of intent and requirements and makes it difficult to align meaning, learning development, and 

assessment across the DOD. In terms of equating LRC to readiness, without 

common acceptance of concepts, the questions designed to elicit data that 

can align to readiness are unable to be based on sound and definable concepts. As suggested earlier, GAO reports have stressed this programmatic 

need, as have independent studies. A decade from DLTR publication, this 
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JSOU Report 16-8

proof of the link between LRC and readiness has yet to be empirically established. This is especially critical when different populations, such as SOF or 

FAOs, with varying missions rely on concepts that should have been vetted 

and defined by those possessing subject theory, application, and experience. 

An acronym like LREC presupposes some integration across the components to meet requirements informed by needs assessments. This has not 

been the case. This chapter will also explore why that has not occurred. The 

author and Pieter DeVisser64 suggested the acronym LREC has also become 

a programmatic means to corral related but also divergent KSAs, programs, 

billets, and budgets—“acronymizing” the complexity of the individual elements in order to make it more palatable, more like a single consumable that 

can simply be “purchased off the shelf.”65 DeCamp, et al. observed a similar 

use of LREC and a lack of clarity in its meaning in that, “there is currently 

confusion about the term LREC, which is sometimes used to mean all of language, regional expertise, and culture and sometimes used to mean courses 

satisfying a military directive.”66

In 2008 and 2009, interdisciplinary efforts came together to define sets 

of cross-cultural skill-based competencies useful to the goals of the DLTR, 

and the Service culture centers collectively promoted the development of 

culture-specific products and pre-deployment training. In later documents 

and individual Service language and culture strategies, the complexity of 

terminology deepened with the additional realization of the need to consider 

perspectives in anthropology and other cultural studies such as cultural 

geography in addition to the more established approaches of international 

relations. 

In brief, (1) there is an uneven and/or lack of standardization across and 

within DOD for LRC elements; (2) there is no consensus on functional definitions of language/dialect and culture (specific and/or regional, general, operational) to develop curricula; (3) there is no consistent HQ-level articulation 

of operational requirements to guide instructional design; and (4) funding 

for LRC lacks an overarching DOD strategy and plan with no articulation 

and/or coordination of departmental and Service efforts.67

Finally, this chapter will set the stage for the remainder of this study’s 

review of USSOCOM’s own LRC program. Soon after the DLTR was published, as evidenced in early attempts at developing Service LREC strategies, 

stakeholders grappled with not just the kind of LREC that was needed by 

populations within the Service and thus developed through learning, but as 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

well with the amount of that learning. How much language and region (and 

culture), in terms of concepts and depth, were conventional forces to receive, 

especially before leaving for the deployments? SOF, however, comprise a 

unique population that historically considered LRC an important component 

of their training and preparation. If any DOD population were a candidate 

for and would accrue benefits from a holistic treatment of LRC, SOF would 

be it. Nonetheless, this also created additional difficulty, as USSOCOM had 

to distill effective learning that considered LRC together. Although rich in 

tradition of inserting language into their preparation, SOF encountered the 

same, and some different, obstacles and barriers as did the larger Services 

with their learning programs.

LRC/LREC Policy at the OSD Level—What Does It Say?

As late as 2010, the House Committee on Armed Services report, Building 

Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: Bridging the Gap, 

and the 2008 and 2009 GAO Reports on the DLTR found OSD lacking a 

policy and strategy to unify language and culture efforts.68 There were only 

two policy statements, one published in 2005 (and reissued in 2010) and the 

second in 2007, in lieu of a DOD-wide strategy to provide guidance on LRC 

for the DOD for the first five years following the publication of the DLTR. 

The first was the Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5160.41E, which 

covered the Defense Language Program and the Defense Language Steering 

Committee. Its intent is to maintain existing management of the traditional 

language programs at DLI and DLI-affiliated sites in the DOD. As of September 2015, this policy was republished.

The second, DODI 5160.70, was important to laying a framework for LRC. 

The DODI provided actionable concepts that could guide the development of 

learning goals and assessment and the best grasp of what region and culture 

were with regard to the LRC enterprise to the DOD. Pertinent to LRC, the 

DODI provided regional proficiency guidelines and the concept of regional 

expertise. Of significant omission was the lack of development of the concept 

of culture as an integral component of LRC.

Throughout the evolution of the LREC construct, culture was more or 

less interwoven into regional proficiency and identified as a part of knowledge gained through achieving regional expertise. Only later did expressing culture include the elements of culture-general/specific, cross-cultural 
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JSOU Report 16-8

competence, and more specialized skill sets of cross-cultural communications and negotiation. This set of KSAs was labeled “cultural capabilities” by a 

DLO-sponsored set of working groups in 2009 and 2010 (more on region and 

culture below) and added to the warrior’s toolkit across the Services, appearing in OSD LREC documents later. In lieu of a DOD-identified common core 

of LRC concepts, each Service and organization approached LRC, especially 

culture, differently which was also exacerbated by the Services’ unique missions and approaches to learning. 

In 2011, the DOD published the Department of Defense Strategic Plan for 

Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities, 2011–2016.69 The 

publication laid out a five-year plan with three goals to improve and then 

sustain the capacity of DOD’s LRC capabilities, seeking to build “a comprehensive, integrated approach toward increasing and sustaining language 

skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities within the Department 

of Defense.”70 The goals featured validation of requirements, building LRC 

in the Total Force, and developing interoperability and partner building 

capacity.71 However, the plan never defined the concepts within its own title. 

LREC capabilities were treated as a collective unit when discussing how 

they fit into goals. The follow-on 2014 Language, Skills, Regional Expertise 

and Cultural Capabilities: Implementation Plan72 also did not elaborate any 

further on delineating LRC concepts, save for the mention of cross-cultural 

competence, but reiterated the three goals and how each was to be implemented across the DOD.

To operationalize LRC/LREC, OSD initiated the capabilities-based 

requirement identification process (CBRIP) in 2012 by the DOD. A CBRIP 

is the standardized methodology for geographic combatant commands and 

functional commands to identify LRC capability and manning requirements 

to inform force development. In practice, commands identify LRC manning 

requirements, and conclude with “prioritized capability requirements [that] 

express the need for LRC, including identification of who, what, when, where, 

why, and how much in terms of duration and proficiency levels required for 

task execution. It does not identify sourcing solutions, e.g. number of billets, 

contractors, or machine language requirements.”73

In January 2013, the Joint Chiefs published the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3126.01A (CJCSI 3126.01A), Language, Regional 

Expertise, and Culture Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing.

74 

More as a manning and process document then a strategy or overarching 
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policy statement, CJCSI 3126.01A became a forcing function to ensure LRC 

capabilities were identified and integrated into mission and operations as 

well as codifying the CBRIP and LRC terminology that had previously been 

lacking in OSD policy. “LREC capabilities apply across the force and should 

be addressed in a continuum of capability. The continuum begins with the 

[conventional forces], progresses through surge capability, and culminates 

with professional level expertise.”75 This continuum was reflected in a simple 

proficiency scale of basic, fully proficient, and master.

In describing LRC requirements, CJCSI 3126.01A referred to the types of 

capabilities as competencies, while the levels of capability referred to proficiency levels. The Instruction featured three overall behavioral dimensions: 

cross-cultural competence, regional competencies, and leader/influence 

function, which were broken down into 12 capabilities or competencies.76

The CJCSI 3126.01A is the most up to date and complete DOD-wide LRC 

policy statement and reflects the emphasis on the development of culture 

and region as primary mission enablers. “To date, the CBRIP has shown it 

is possible to need regional expertise and/or cultural knowledge without 

needing language proficiency, but that it is highly unlikely to need language 

proficiency without also needing regional and/or cultural competence.”77

The need to spread an LRC program across organizations as large as the 

Services was more easily accomplished by concentrating on culture and 

region for all, especially for deploying service members, while parceling out 

language, and the necessary proficiency to those personnel involved in tasks 

and billets depending on language use. The 2009 Air Force LRC Strategy 

(The Flight Plan) envisions the development and application of cross-cultural 

competence “for all Airmen and robust language skills and regional expertise for targeted Airmen. The end-state sought will: (1) provide Combatant 

Commanders with Airmen who possess the language and cultural skills 

and the regional knowledge and experience to enhance joint and coalition 

warfighting capabilities.”78 Goals of The Flight Plan replicate to some extent 

similar goals of the later OSD Strategy and Implementation Plan in that 

they determine requirements, ensure strategies and resources stay current, 

and align their culture, region, and language strategy to DOD and U.S. Air 

Force strategy.79 In addition, the Air Force developed the Language Enabled 

Airman Program to meet the need for language in a timely manner and for 

tactical utility.
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JSOU Report 16-8

Recently, the U.S. Army renamed their LRC policy, Culture, Regional 

Expertise, and Language (CREL). The strategy forms initially around aspects 

of culture and features four stages of learning that focus on cross-cultural 

competence. At the close of the final stage, a combination of cross-cultural 

KSAs have been modeled and demonstrated.80 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center Director John Bird writes: 

Our Army will likely weight CREL investments toward culture and 

regional awareness because they have proven to be high payoff and 

the costs required to generate enduring language capabilities in our 

Army are simply too great and unsustainable. This is commonly 

referred to as the big “C” and little “L” approach. In general, expect 

our Army to focus on [cross-cultural competence] first and regional 

expertise second, with language a distant third (and at a very basic 

level) based on regional alignment or operational deployment. Of 

particular note, the Army will likely continue to rely on Foreign 

Area Officers and other specialists–such as the Military Intelligence 

Corps, Special Operations Forces, and other low density specialists 

as the Army’s true regional experts, a pragmatic and cost effective 

approach.81

The U.S. Navy Center for Language Regional Expertise and Culture 

(CLREC) program consists of self-paced cultural awareness and language 

materials that are accessible to sailors: 

Members going forward, whether deploying with a unit, individually, or on PCS orders, have access to self-paced cultural awareness 

products and language learning materials relevant to the deployment destination or assignment location. Additional training can 

be tailored to the individual requirements of the unit, individual, 

and mission.82

On ship, mobile training teams provide more in-depth instruction if 

the mission warrants it. Depending on operational requirements, training 

can address regional issues and cultural domains such as religion, customs, 

manners, etc. This can be supplemented with additional culture products 

and self-paced language learning material. If there is to be significant crew 

interaction with a host population beyond liberty contact, as with a global 

maritime partnership or theater security cooperation mission, CLREC is 
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prepared to arrange a more in-depth language training event (two weeks or 

more) for select personnel.83

With all the attention paid to developing a program and a process for 

LRC, little attention was paid to the need to promote theoretically sound LRC 

components that would inform learning goals and objectives and produce 

assessment measures that would apply across the DOD. This omission of 

effort and need with regard to critical elements impaired the ability to create 

a DOD-wide strategy and program. This next section will explore the LRC 

components as currently being defined and utilized throughout the DOD. 

It is important to note that there lacks agreement across the Services at the 

policy level and within individual Services regarding how the components 

are defined. 

LRC Components

LREC as a compilation of knowledge and skills developed to meet missions 

that moved outside those engaged in by traditional professional linguists, 

including operations where knowledge and skills were far different than 

those needed in intelligence, for example. For mission and time on training, 

traditional language pedagogy with its duration was not feasible for nonintelligence organizations. Intelligence necessitated listening, reading, and 

writing. Language proficiency level, languaculture awareness84 and use, if 

even a part of instruction, differed considerably from those ‘on the ground’ 

with missions that featured considerable cross-cultural interaction. As language was a cross-cultural mission enabler, it would seem that pairing language with cross-cultural skills in learning development and delivery would 

only enhance proficiency of language and the non-linguistic interactional 

skills. This learning potential will be explored later in this report.

Developing and instituting learning programs in language requires analysis, establishment of learning goals and objectives, relevant curriculum, 

qualified instructors, and understanding of what should be assessed and 

how that assessment is accomplished. The post-9/11 era ushered in an international landscape that no longer cleaved along nation-state lines, but also 

included tribes and culture groups speaking languages that fell outside of 

those traditionally taught by DLI and consisting of vastly different worldviews and belief systems. Languages, especially those spoken by these culture 

groups, existed in nations with borders and boundaries drawn by colonial 
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JSOU Report 16-8

powers no longer present. However, missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 

an increasing diversified international and transnational landscape, meant 

even intelligence professionals would need regional and cultural knowledge 

and skills.

Region and Culture

The first four pages of the DLTR featured a variety of terminology reflecting 

social and behavioral concepts that referred to region and culture, to include: 

• Regional area skills;

• Cultural expertise;

• Cultural resources;

• Regional knowledge;

• Foreign area expertise;

• Cultural understanding;

• Cultural awareness; and

• Regional expertise.

In addition, Service-specific policy and strategy statements provide further concepts: 

• Regional proficiency;

• Cultural proficiency;

• Cross-cultural competence/cross-cultural communication;

• Cultural capabilities;

• Cultural self-awareness;

• Culture-general; and

• Culture-specific.

This extensive list certainly reflects the difficulty OSD and the Services 

still have of standardizing region and culture concept and meaning. With the 

advent of the culture service centers and the hiring of professional social and 

behavioral scientists, scholarship and rigor were added to the development 

of region and culture concepts in policy, strategy, and learning programs. 

As early as 2005, the need for culture (at least anthropology) in the DOD 

was revisited from its use in earlier wars and conflicts.85 By 2006, culture 

was “a force multiplier” and cast as the missing piece in mission success.86 

By the same token, region was also cast as a critical ingredient of the DLTR 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

and identified in the first DODD and DODI statements as an essential part 

of LREC.

The transformation to an expeditionary mission by non-language professionals demanded cross-cultural interactional skills, abilities, and attitudes 

that never were a part of traditional language learning. Language programs 

were still predicated on Cold War adversaries and languages that were to 

become critical after 9/11 were lightly covered. The Cold War perspective 

included cross-cultural interactions at government-to-government levels 

and military-to-military relations. Not considered in professional language 

programs were languages that were used by a variety of ethnic and tribal 

groups or knowledge about cultural behavior of these groups that were to 

become just as or more important than nation-states. This was very clear 

in Iraq and Afghanistan as colonial-inspired national borders were more 

important to those external forces than the people that lived within them. 

This lack of recognition of national borders by those living within them was 

also seen in West Africa during the Ebola outbreak.87

A regional perspective also considered the notion of place. The military 

has always operated in the domains of air, sea, and land. These domains have 

always been defined by locations on a map. Nations were always identified 

in some way by their borders. Governments, militaries, and borders framed 

how the DOD saw, interacted with, and understood the rest of the world. 

This was also the case for how U.S. military personnel saw themselves. The 

reality of OEF and OIF was that the wars were not against governments or 

alliances formed with existing governments. In fact, both featured a number 

of ethnic and tribal groups configured in complex sets of relations that dated 

back generations, even centuries. Being able to work successfully with that 

cultural complexity demanded more than a regional perspective. Thus, the 

notion of and approach to culture became an integral component of LRC and 

prompted OSD and the Services’ attempt at understanding just what culture 

meant and defining its principles and concepts. This author can remember 

his early lessons and presentations to U.S. Air Force audiences on culture 

and spending an inordinate amount of the class/presentation defining the 

concept of culture as it related to its expression in societies. It now seems 

beneficial to provide the most utilitarian as well as simplest definition to 

avoid difficulty in framing a ‘complete’ definition, not practical or useful 

to ‘on the ground’ application. “Shared patterns of human behavior” is the 

simplest. These patterns distill to more or less common domains such as 
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JSOU Report 16-8

kinship/family, exchange, religion, and more. Culture then is a collection 

of general and specific knowledge sets about these patterns of behavior that 

can be applied to individuals or collections of people to aid in discerning 

meaning of behavior. Applying these general sets of knowledge to specific 

locations or groups is referred to as culture-specific while applying nationstate phenomenon to specific locations, geographic areas or to international/

transnational groups is often referred to as region-specific knowledge.

Region and Culture KSAs, Proficiency, Capability, and 

Competence

Region and culture were certainly far different concepts than language 

when it came to understanding their KSAs. Translating those concepts to 

aid in building learning programs that used sound learning goals and objectives and included assessing/measuring what was learned, performed, or 

exhibited, was difficult. Cultural or regional knowledge can be expressed 

by two distinct models of behavior: proficiency and competency. A proficiency model is a very distinct and direct manner that defines and measures 

performance. Proficiency is also a collection of observable behaviors that 

promulgates what a successful (proficient) individual (given a certain context) produces or acts and the steps the individual must go through to be 

successful. “Think of proficiency as a picture or snap shot of what success 

looks like on the job.”88

Posing a much different perspective, a competency model includes three 

components: knowledge, skills, and attitudes. For example, a soldier exhibits 

good listening skills, or can apply the concept of kinship to a Liberian village 

to better understand social relations. These are examples of competencies. 

Obviously the more competencies one is exposed to and trained/instructed 

on, the more situations and interactions in a variety of contexts one is better 

prepared for. Proficiency is more direct and observed and therefore open 

to performance as a means to measure. Competence does not necessarily 

translate into performance; in fact, competence is only a predictor of performance more generally.

Regional proficiency was built on an 0-5 level (not ironically aligned with 

the ILR/DLPT scores for language). According to DODI 5160.70, regional 

proficiency is, “an individual’s awareness and understanding of the historical, political, cultural (including linguistic and religious), sociological 
35

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

(including demographic), economic, and geographic factors of a foreign 

country or specific global region.”89 Simply, regional proficiency is the ability 

to utilize regional knowledge. Regional expertise, as defined in the DODI, 

“consists of 40 semester hours of study focusing in but not limited to the 

political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of a foreign 

country or specific global region through documented previous experience 

...”90 Expertise becomes a way to measure the level of proficiency, although, 

as will be explored in the next chapter, there are no existing assessments 

designed to measure someone’s regional proficiency, nor is there any validated relationship between proficiency and expertise (not all institutions are 

equal, nor is the kind or duration of course spelled out or assessed). OSD is 

in the testing and validation phase of a regional proficiency assessment tool 

(RPAT)91 which may yield some measures or assessment scores. RPAT will 

be further discussed in the next chapter. 

Currently, there exists no model that posits the concept of cultural proficiency nor the actual breakdown of levels of proficiency. There is work 

ongoing at Joint Base Lewis-McChord’s Language and Culture Center to 

develop an LRC assessment.92 Part of the assessment is tied to a cultural 

performance that is pegged to a numerical scale. This program will be highlighted in Chapter 7.

The OSD regional guidelines incorporated proficiency based on experience, training, and education. An attempt was also made to align the proficiency steps with the ILR proficiency guidelines. For example, regional 

proficiency level 4 provides the following:

Typically, 4 to 7 years in a specialized area, in addition to general 

experience in a broader subject area. Has a deeper knowledge and 

understanding of most of the components of a region or country 

than many or even most natives of the country. Has experience 

working directly with senior U.S. military officers or directly with 

senior U.S. country or regional policy officers on programs that 

significantly affect U.S. policy in a country or region. Routinely 

writes and delivers substantive briefings on aspects of the region or 

country. Knowledge comes from a combination of advanced graduate education, seminars, research, teaching, publishing, area studies 

courses, in-country assignments, travel, mentoring, and specialized 

professional experience. Cultural knowledge and experience allows 
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JSOU Report 16-8

the individual to blend easily in the culture. Almost always has ILR 

level 3 or higher proficiency in at least one of the languages spoken 

in the country or region.93

Level One Novice provides the following:

Has some level of proficiency related to a job that has relevance to 

a country, region, or issue, but has very limited knowledge about 

the country, region, or issue (e.g., an F-16 mechanic who goes to 

Norway to work with Norwegian F-16 mechanics but knows very 

little about Norway). Has a basic survival-level understanding of 

the culture(s) and may have equally basic communication skills in 

the predominant language(s).94

The KSAs needed to traverse this proficiency maze are spelled out only 

generally and do not apply across the total force. In level 4, a primary part 

of the proficiency comes from specific tasks germane to functions more 

identifiable to attaches, FAOs, or embassy staff, and knowledge “comes from 

a combination of advanced graduate education, seminars, research, teaching, 

publishing, area studies courses, in-country assignments, travel, mentoring, 

and specialized professional experience.”95 This specificity limits applying the 

higher proficiency levels to personnel where high levels of LRC are critical 

but not expressed in that context.

Regional expertise, however, is solely based on knowledge gained from 

a graduate-level education or 40 semester hours:

study focusing on but not limited to the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country or 

specific global region through an accredited educational institution 

or equivalent regional expertise gained through documented previous experience as determined by the USD (P&R) or the Secretary 

of the Military Department concerned.96

Regional knowledge and application of that knowledge is about a 

place and the ability to support the DOD in its dealing with a national 

or regional government. It was never about understanding the fluid and 

culturally complex environments that COIN or other counterinsurgencies 

produced, when governments were failing, nonexistent, or actual enemies 

of the population(s). In fact, the higher one progresses in proficiency, the 
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more distinct the application to specific population. The necessity for 40 

semester college credits as a benchmark to identify regional expertise is just 

as focused on a particular type of knowledge and is the result of academic 

programs such as international relations/studies, regional studies, and others. 

Lack of educationally provided knowledge destines the individual to lower 

levels of regional proficiency and expertise. In a sense, regional proficiency 

and expertise are specialized to distinct populations and knowledge based. 

Much like language professionals and their learning programs, regionalists 

through proficiency and expertise matched the intent of an advanced level 

of utility and responsibilities. This is not that surprising given the state of 

language and, to a lesser extent, regional learning programs that existed 

prior to the publication of the DLTR. 

Culture

Over the course of policy and strategy development, there have been many 

attempts to define aspects of culture leading to the inability to draft learning goals and objectives, or develop assessments to determine if KSAs are 

being promoted. This has been compounded by the fact that definitions for 

regional proficiency and regional expertise already contain elements of what 

cultural scholars would incorporate into working definitions of culture. 

When making distinctions between cultural awareness and understanding, 

the intent may be more or less clear, but when transferring to a learning 

program, the concepts provide weaker points to learning. 

The DLO in 2008 started a section dealing with culture policy, and a 

deputy director of Culture was placed in charge. Culture had not been an 

emphasis in the DLTR and was not defined nor considered an important part 

of regional proficiency and expertise. By the time this office was stood up, the 

individual Services already had or were in the process of standing up Service 

culture centers; most of the necessary training at the centers was specific cultural information on individual populations. Products such as smart cards, 

smart books, field guides, video immersions, simulations, and games were 

produced to meet the quickly escalating need to understand the populations 

that were part of the deployment. This author was involved in expeditionary 

and/or pre-deployment training and helped write field guides and immersive 

video scripts while at the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC). 

For AFCLC, like the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command Culture 
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Center and the Marine’s Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, 

much effort was made to provide the essential culture-specific knowledge 

in different formats. The need to interact with a variety of communities, 

villages, and tribal groups in both Iraq and Afghanistan also necessitated 

cross-cultural competence to promote and help facilitate mission success. 

Just as region can be construed as a collection of knowledge that can be 

learned and then applied, cultural knowledge is also a collection of culturegeneral and culture-specific knowledge sets that refer to patterns of behavior 

that can be then applied to individuals or collections of people to aid in discerning meaning of behavior. Applying these general sets of knowledge to 

specific locations or groups is referred to as culture-specific. AFCLC based 

their overall approach to culture on a more generalized consideration, concentrating on developing transferable knowledge and skills that would act 

as a lattice and prime the understanding of others’ behavior by U.S. military 

individuals. This approach was labeled culture-general. Also included in 

culture were specialized skills such as cross-cultural communication and 

negotiations. 

Cross-Cultural Competence 

In 2008 and 2009, the DLO Culture Policy Office convened several working group meetings featuring a multidisciplinary cadre of Service social 

and behavioral scientists on promoting culture, but more specifically a 

culture–general approach utilizing cross-cultural competence. As early as 

2007, the case for cross-cultural interactional skills was advanced to enable 

successful missions involving culturally complex environments.97 Defined 

slightly differently for reasons of intent, Service, and mission, agreement 

was reached on the skill-based competencies that promote cross-cultural 

competence. For the purpose of this manuscript, cross-cultural competence 

is “the ability to navigate in complex interpersonal situations, express or 

interpret ideas/concepts across cultures, and make sense of foreign social 

and cultural behavior.”98 Key skills involve cultural self-awareness—having 

cognitive awareness of your world-view and belief/value system and biases 

that follow, awareness of influence on others, and engaging self-regulation 

when appropriate.99 The skills also include cultural learning, alternative 

perspective-taking, and observation/sense-making while additional skills 

contribute to cross-cultural competence, such as cross-cultural interaction 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

(cross-cultural communications/negotiations) and developing empathy.100 

Work by Army Research Institute (ARI) and other research organizations 

has looked at deconstructing the actual skills involved to determine how 

they are expressed in cultural complexity. There is also initial research into 

the development of cross-cultural competence,101 the incorporation of crosscultural competence into professional assignments and duties, and several 

publications on the integration of cross-cultural competence into learning 

programs. Research into cross-cultural competence assessment has not produced viable measures thus far. A comprehensive volume on cross-cultural 

competence was published in 2014 and explores facets such as learning, 

policy, experience, and articulation with cross-cultural communications, 

assessment, diversity, and more, while a survey of cross-cultural competence 

literature was published by ARI in 2014.102

By the publication of the 2011 OSD LREC strategy, the LRC components 

that related to culture were defined as cultural capabilities and included, “the 

ability to apply culture-general knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes and 

culture-specific knowledge to achieve mission success in culturally complex 

environments.”103 Culture-general aided in the transferability of these skills 

and knowledge to apply from culture group to culture group. The groups 

could be a part of any number of larger and more inclusive organizations 

or associations, extended kinship, ethnic or tribal groups, and formal state 

or regional governments. “If we try to teach a soldier about a given culture, 

region or language, they apply frameworks, concepts and theories, coupled 

with their cultural sensitivity, curiosity and interpersonal skills to other 

cultures, regions and languages - a very useful metaphor to consider as we 

move forward.”104

OSD and the Services (for the most part) have selected to develop regional 

proficiency and cultural capabilities at the expense of language in policy, 

strategy, and learning development in the conventional forces for a number 

of reasons. These reasons include the fact that OEF and OIF may have inculcated the critical need for LRC, however as indicated earlier, there are no 

solid metrics that support the utility of LRC in missions—plenty of anecdotal 

narrative, but no measures of value. Given that, the cost for funding a region 

and culture learning program is far less than language. Efficiency of learning 

for knowledge transfer and skill development is greater than in language 

and regional proficiency at what has been cast as the more advanced levels. 

Maintaining regional knowledge and cultural capabilities is far easier than 
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maintaining a language proficiency and does not require the same time 

commitment off task to continue development.

Summary

This chapter and Chapter 2 reflect a decade of uneven and inconsistent LRC 

policy and strategy development by OSD and across the DOD. Transitioning 

from a professional language program that served the intelligence community and a few specialized DOD populations, to serving the LRC requirements of the total force and not knowing what those requirements were, was 

problematic. Adding even more to the lack of consensus between OSD and 

Services was the use of theoretically deficient definitions of some key region 

and culture terms and concepts. Providing accurate and sound constructs 

would have provided a foundation for policy as well as being useful to the 

development of learning goals and objectives. 

The next two chapters will explore the uniqueness of SOF and their own 

LRC transformation. Perhaps SOF, with their operational history and utility 

of LRC provided by training and/or experience for mission success, have the 

most reticence, or even operational arrogance to change LRC learning programs and incorporate evolving research and experience of the last decade 

of LRC efforts in the DOD. SOF have dramatically grown in numbers and 

importance in the DOD present and future strategy, and continue to play a 

relevant and critical role in a variety of missions. 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

 4. The Human Domain: The 

Contemporary Operating Environment

The key to success in applying the indirect approach is persistence. 

Building partnerships requires the development of meaningful 

military-to-military relationships. That effort is long-term, and the 

effects are enduring. This approach not only builds partner nation 

capacity and regional stability, but it also deters the tacit and active 

support of sanctuaries that foster and develop future terrorists. 

Again, the effect is to drain the proverbial swamps—the perceived 

social injustice, and the persecution and intimidation—that can 

feed the germs of terrorist activity.105

The human domain has become a significant construct to USSOCOM, 

as well as the U.S. Army, as it provides a metaphor to further understanding sociocultural conditions and expectations of operating environments. Counterinsurgencies have proven to be a different kind of war than 

conventional wars. Asymmetrical and unconventional warfare will confront 

technologically advanced and large standing forces in places like Iraq and 

Afghanistan, in Colombia and the Philippines, and at every turn of conflict 

where victory cannot be total destruction of enemy forces, or where victory 

may not have much to do with battlefield supremacy. Losing a war, on the 

other hand, might not even be tied to conflict or being defeated in battle. 

Defeat may be signaled by the inability to commit and sustain to a long-term, 

human resource intensive development and partnership building campaign. 

Providing the personnel to sustain necessary force efforts, but also efforts 

toward other elements of COIN, infrastructure development, security and 

other relevant training, promoting centralized governance, and more, is 

critical. Essential to success is developing working partnerships with not 

only local and national security forces (usually these forces are ineffective or 

in state of disrepair), but those culture groups and individuals who inhabit 

areas of responsibility (AOR), surrounding communities, and provinces. 

The meaning, utility, or continuation of the population-centric paradigm 

featured in COIN certainly focused on the importance of the population 

as a primary driver of missions. The intended populations involved in a 
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population-centric approach, whether they were national, local, or tribal, or 

some of all three, were the critical, intended, and often unintended target. 

The entrenched insurgency could only be weeded out through working 

directly with village leaders and communities and providing elements of 

human security the insurgents could not.

The protracted land war in Vietnam, outside of COIN, offers the greatest 

relevance of culture groups to military operations. The greatest successes 

of that war were through the asymmetrical operations that took place with 

Green Berets and indigenous populations to fight insurgent North Vietnamese forces. The important, and what should have been enduring, lessons taken 

from Vietnam were not those from the conventional battlefield, but from the 

understanding of the importance of South Vietnam culture groups and the 

knowledge and skills necessary to connect with and influence those culture 

groups caught in the middle of conflict.

The post-Vietnam lessons learned did not include programs to identify 

LRC or even more general knowledge and skill-based competencies useful 

in an unconventional war. In fact, national security shifted gears and moved 

in step with the doctrine of defending Western Europe from a potential 

Soviet Union invasion along with certainty that a protracted unconventional 

‘messy’ war in a far-off places would not happen again.106 The fact that this 

occurred was not out of line with changing security priorities. This was a 

far more familiar position to be in—conventional warfare with a priority 

on defense weapons technology. In Vietnam, the human was the reason for 

conflict, and was essential to stopping conflict. The human was necessary 

for establishing representative government; the human was an ally, a neutral 

party, and an enemy. Force was not the only or most effective means to meet 

end states. The merits of such an engagement strategy were more or less lost 

to the intervening decades for the DOD and most of its constituent parts. 

The lessons of Vietnam were long set on the dusty shelves of past reports 

forgotten by OSD and Services when U.S. forces invaded Iraq in 2003. 

Human Terrain 

When it became apparent at the onset of COIN that civilian populations 

would play an integral role in military operations, the concept of the human 

terrain emerged. The human terrain represented a means to align social and 

cultural behavior to a more familiar and military perspective, the utility of 
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a concept in part depends on the acceptance of its perspective and fit with 

the organization and mission. “You have to understand not just the military 

terrain ... the high ground and low ground. It’s about understanding the 

Human Terrain, really understanding it.”107

Anthropologist Roberto Gonzales, a critic of anthropology in service to 

the military,108 uncovered reference to the term in a Congressional report, 

Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States, that posited groups like the 

Black Panthers might have “superior control of the human terrain.”109 The 

tie to an internal counterinsurgency linked inextricably to the connection 

between terrain and COIN. The juxtaposition of the terms human and terrain produces linguistic dissonance to those considered part of the human 

terrain, reducing their sense of identity and culture to a contested geographic 

reference point. According to Gonzales, human terrain tends to “objectify 

and dehumanize people, because it implies that they are geographic space 

to be conquered.”110 Gonzales also refers to it as “a euphemism referring to 

civilians living in a war zone, or under military occupation.”111

Human or cultural geography approaches the human terrain from its 

consideration of being able to tie these human dynamics to a layers on a 

Geographic Information System (GIS), reflecting a location. Based on this, 

human terrain is composed of sociocultural components of the population(s) 

located “... at a specific temporal, geospatial point.”112

 One view of the human terrain promotes a layered approach to locating behavior to a location, starting with the natural environment of rivers, 

mountains, valleys, etc. Then, following with layers based on the built environment, the groupings of humans along political, kinship, and other identity factors; economic organizations and cultural groupings; and finally, 

actual human behavior based on belief systems and world-views.113

An operational perspective brought out during OIF was:

to diagram Iraq’s cultural landscape - its “human terrain” - in the 

same way intelligence analysts map out Iraq’s cities, roads, and rivers. 

It’s a function that has become increasingly important as the U.S. 

military has turned its focus to counterinsurgency operations, in 

which cultural understanding is the key and knowing the human 

terrain is absolutely essential.114
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Human terrain analysis accommodates the social and geospatial sciences. Social scientists help to describe cultural relationships and discern 

historical trends. 

Geospatial scientists help to map the phenomena to determine 

regions, trends, clusters, and networks. While the interpretation 

of Human Terrain is entirely dependent upon heuristics, Human 

Terrain can be represented as computer symbols that can be manipulated. To be Human Terrain it must be tied to a specific geographic 

location to be mapped. Once a cultural event is linked to a time or 

place it can then be mapped, regions identified, and descriptions 

developed.115

From a UW perspective, the terrain is indeed an essential element. Yet, 

when operationalizing sociocultural components with the intent to connect 

to locations or positions, adequate fit may be problematic. In other words, 

are there some behaviors and cultural elements that resist being tied to a 

GIS layer, or inferred as well with any precision? The attempt at defining 

human behavior by defining spatial boundaries related to strategy and tactical operations and missions will always be incomplete. If the human domain 

can be aligned to the more common features of culture, first as an indicator 

of ‘types’ of behavior that are useful in knowing about and interacting with 

during missions or operations, and secondly the context of those behaviors 

in terms of set and shifting missions (adaptability to changing mission is 

a hallmark of SOF) the concept of domain becomes more focused on the 

behaviors and consequences and less on the proximity to military operations. 

In the end, intimacy with behavior and its meaning in different contexts 

with those in a location will start to provide an understanding of why the 

people behave the way they do. It is also important to realize that context 

parses into specific locations and over time. Additionally, any location will 

contain a diversity of social and cultural factors that produces similar or 

different behaviors. 

Human Domain

The concept of terrain for any number of reasons offered here has been 

replaced by the concept of human domain, perhaps a way to capture meaningful behavior without the result of a layer or map coordinate. Early COIN 
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postmortems, speeches, and presentations by a variety of U.S. Government 

and DOD leaders indicated critical takeaways from the last decade of U.S. 

involvement in two long wars have more to do with mastering the culturegeneral and culture-specific knowledge and interpersonal skills necessary to 

navigate in that human-centric space, which for many is veiled in ambiguity and uncertainty. It is an inescapable fact that wars are won, delayed, or 

avoided in the human space that is not defined by traditional and conventional domains that can be defended, conquered, or overrun. This realization 

is gaining traction in the consciousness of many following the last decade of 

war and an accelerating pace of transnational security threats.

In essence, COIN provided a laboratory for working in a very complex 

cultural environment that featured multiple languages spoken, contained 

several different ethnic groups and tribes, an Islamic faith that defied understanding based on stereotyped consideration, and other variables. The success of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a marker of the success of their 

operations—nowhere near technologically advanced as Coalition forces—

direct force on force was never going to work. The advantage that proved to 

engage populations for over a decade was because the Taliban possessed a 

decisive advantage in what has been and continues to be the relevant domain 

in ‘wars among the people.’

U.S. Army General Raymond Odierno, U.S. Marine Corps General James 

Amos, and Admiral William McRaven coauthored the 2013 Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills as a means to chart a future path for U.S. 

ground forces.116 The human domain was singled out as one of the primary 

components of the battlespace and one that is growing in significance given 

the current and future operating environment. The human domain was 

never fully defined in Strategic Landpower, save for the composite physical, 

social, and cultural environments, but its meaning was certainly alluded to 

as the core principle of the white paper. Others since have defined the human 

domain, noting similarities in its conception, including a list of attributes, 

the acknowledgement of an antiquity, and the emphasis on its occupants.

In “RAF and SOF Integration,” an Army publication on the concept of 

RAF, Scott Kelly and Chad McCougan wrote about doctrine and institutionalizing the concept of the human domain. “The ability to understand peoples, 

culture, tribal affiliations, customs, religion, and sources of power, is essential to effective military operations. We have learned that over the last two 

decades.”117 A recent effort by the Army to stand-up a seventh warfighting 
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function, engagement, featured Army SOF as its proponent and showcased 

the importance placed on promoting influence in the human domain. 

“The idea of engagement is a needed addition in doctrine as it addresses an 

essential aspect of modern war fighting. Formalizing the construct within 

doctrine will undergird the human domain and assist both RAF and SOF 

operations ...”118

SOF and the Human Domain

SOF, although existing in Land, Sea, and Air domains, operates 

chiefly in the human domain. Resistance which is the core science 

directly related to the human domain, is the human activity that 

underpins every core SOF task, including unconventional warfare 

(UW), counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and foreign internal 

defense.119

In August 2015, USSOCOM published a future concept paper entitled 

“Operating in the Human Domain.” Putting into a policy document the 

amalgamation of leadership speeches, commentaries, articles, and other 

publications, “Operating in the Human Domain” posits a future operational environment (that is already here) of changing rules of engagement, 

an asymmetrical shift of power away from centralized governments to dispersed smaller groups, a shifting of casts of allies and partners and growing 

importance of multinational organizations, and the increasing pace and 

pervasiveness of global media. The overarching SOF mission that considers 

the human domain, defined as, “people (individuals, groups, and populations) in the environment, including their perceptions, decision-making and 

behavior”120 is special warfare. 

Special Warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions taken by a special trained and 

educated force that has a deep understanding of culture and foreign 

languages, proficiency in small unit tactics, and the ability to fight 

alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, 

or hostile environment. Special Warfare is an umbrella term that 

represents Special Forces conducting combinations of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and/or counterinsurgency.121
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Containing elements of a bygone era, the special warfare mission, in part, 

trained foreign fighters to help overthrow an insurgency. Two elements of 

special warfare are FID, “a holistic strategy to help a friend, partner, or ally 

with its internal development of defense programs to defend itself against 

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, and terrorism;”122 and UW, “activities to 

support or enable a resistance or an insurgency to coerce, disrupt, overthrow 

a government or an occupying power through and with an underground 

auxiliary guerilla force in a denied area.”123

More specifically, the human domain plays a key part in traditional and 

irregular warfare and a disproportionately large role during populationcentric conflicts, which are confrontations in which the perceptions and 

behavior of relevant populations affect the conduct and outcome of hostilities. Over the last decade, however, SOF played more of a role in surgical 

strikes, diminishing and diluting necessary knowledge and skills sets critical 

to operating in the human domain.

With Afghanistan, and then later Iraq, the SOF mission portfolio and 

resultant capabilities adapted to fit mission needs. Hundreds of SOF operators infiltrated into Afghanistan utilizing existing CIA ties with warlords to 

connect with Northern Alliance forces just after 9/11. SOF directed and managed “large-scale use of offensive airpower using precision-guided weapons 

against Taliban forces destroying them both physically and psychologically 

through sowing fear and panic.”124

In Iraq, SOF were given their own combat responsibilities and were not 

attached to other units. After 2003, SOF engaged in combating the rise of 

the insurgency in Iraqi communities. SOF units would raid places with suspected and known insurgents and collect intelligence at the site. That intelligence, along with intelligence from drones, would be passed quickly back 

to a central collating point where analysts would assess the information and 

dispatch further raids, often occurring that same night.125 Surgical raids 

or strikes were no longer dependent on disconnected and opportunistic 

data and information that was reactive in nature. Under General Stanley 

McChrystal, raids in Iraq reached a frenzied pace. Gayle Tzemach Lemmon 

notes that during 2003, it took days to plan raids on terrorist homes and safe 

houses, but by 2010 it took “mere minutes.”126 Additionally, in August 2004 

USSOCOM oversaw “18 night raids in Iraq over the course of a single month. 

By August 2006, it was 300.”127
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As the conflict continued, SOF assumed a more long-term training role 

with the National Army and Police in Iraq and Afghanistan that included 

advising real time in the field.128 However, this role also expanded to building security forces at the local level through tribal engagement and village 

stability operations.129 Training at this level, SOF recruited police officers 

across Afghanistan for village stability operations and built in COIN and 

counterterrorism capability at the village level. “Top-down reconstruction 

strategies may have been appropriate for Germany after World War Two. 

However, in many of today’s failed states—like Afghanistan—where the 

central government is weak, political institutions are fragmented and tribal 

associations’ strong, bottom-up SOF-lead counterinsurgency may be a better 

approach.”130

Contemporary evolving operations are dependent on understanding 

and then evaluating human behavior within mission parameters. To SOF, 

the components necessary to comprehend are the social, cultural, physical, 

informational, and psychological elements influencing actors in the environment.131 Social elements involve the variety of groups that act to compete and influence behavior and compete for resources: tribes, government 

groups, social groups, and public groups. Beliefs, customs, and ways of life 

all influence behavior and comprise the cultural element. Notwithstanding 

human universals, differences in the cultural element lead to concepts of 

fear, shame, honor, and family that can differ markedly from one group to 

another. Physical elements consist of the geology, geography, urbanization, 

climate, and other natural resources, while the informational element considers the flow of messaging through various forms of media. Finally, the 

psychological element reflects how individuals or groups perceive, process, 

and act upon information. 

Conceptually, deconstructing the notion of human domain into discrete 

components may prove to be worthwhile from a programmatic, even introductory approach, but it also constrains the articulation of elements involved 

in operations. The danger of the human domain concept is that it artificially 

applies a perspective based on mission and is susceptible to cultural biases. 

The danger of applying a range of elements within categories of behavior is 

the same, providing discrete lists of components that discourage the consideration of the connectivity of elements across elements.

The following examples consider kinship, a common behavioral pattern found across human cultures. Like all facets of culture, kinship is a 
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motivating force of behavior in many societies. Kinship acts to influence 

behavior between and within related groups of people, and not just concerning who is and who is not a relative, but as an influence on other cultural 

domains such as economy, law and order, gender, and more. 

The notion of lineage, a group of related kin who trace their relationships back to a common ancestor, extends horizontally and vertically, across 

space and through time. In the Middle East, kinship is a primary motivating 

behavior for much of an individual’s life. Kinship orders behavior daily and 

over time. Lineages are lines of descent that produce larger associations of 

related members the farther one goes back in time, but also in all likelihood, 

the more distant from a village or community. Yet, the farther the lineage is 

by descent (in terms of relatedness) and location to an individual (or initial 

family), the larger the set of kin and less the interactions. In this type of 

lineage, one can trace descent back to a common ancestor. The lineage will 

coalesce in terms of related members, family, sub-clans, clans, and tribes. 

Much of life is ordered in terms of kinship and conflict, and is expressed 

through a fission and fusion principle. Intra-lineage conflict may involve 

different families, sub-clans, clans, or even tribes (lineage segments). When 

that occurs, the kinship organizations fission and all related kin that feed 

into either group and back to families are in conflict (think of Hatfields and 

McCoys). However, when the lineage is attacked or put at conflict with higher 

segments within the lineage or groups external to the lineage, kinship segments fuse and face the threat together, delaying the internal conflict until 

the threat has passed. Determining kinship is incredibly important as roles 

and responsibilities at each segment of affiliation will dictate behavior. 

Kinship identity is based on tracing back in time to a common ancestor, the larger the segment (clan vs. family), the further back this common 

ancestor existed and most probably the farther afield the lineage stretches. 

This creates three axes of distance: one related to kin distance, how distant a 

living relative; a second that could easily relate to the geographical distance 

separating kin; and a third is a temporal distance, referring to the historical 

legacy of the lineage (how many generations back does the lineage go). All 

three of the axes are important to consider in dealing with local behavior, 

but bounding the location by geography or population centers, as places of 

conflict or people to influence will disregard the effect of behaviors, such as 

kinship, on other important behaviors, such as exchange, law/order, health, 
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and more. The importance of kinship can extend to some of the basic concerns of survival in a conflict zone:

The Soldiers were worried about food distribution depot and how to 

keep the depot from being infiltrated by Moqtada Al Sadr’s Shi’ite 

militia army, which controls that part of the Iraqi Capital. The chief 

of security at the depot, however, assured them the warehouse was 

safe, because his ‘organization’ protected it from Sadr’s influence. 

The Soldiers were doubtful the warehouse was safe. The chief’s 

independence seemed inexplicable given what they knew about 

the area - it was a puzzling anomaly in a sea of data pointing in the 

other direction.132

David Matsuda, one of the initial human terrain system (HTS) social 

scientists, knew the importance of kinship, not just family to Iraqi soldiers. 

He started asking questions of first the chief, then others, about their nuclear 

family, extended family, tribal members, and then affiliations with other 

tribes. “‘Later, he was able to chart the relationships on a diagram to show 

how the chief’s tribal hierarchy operated, giving the Soldiers a rare glimpse 

into the complicated inner workings of Iraqi society.”133

Finally, understanding the general constructs of kinship, or other 

common patterns of meaning, can provide conceptual maps to help orient 

behavior within the context of an event or action. In the Ebola virus disease 

outbreak, kinship was critical to tracking the virus, but was also important 

to stopping the spread of Ebola. The virus was transmitted by touch. Prior to 

the urban as well as the rural populations understanding this—let alone the 

cause/attribution or the proper cure given by the appropriate healer—those 

who died of Ebola were given funerals. Kin came from distances far enough 

to be in adjacent countries to attend and place hands on the dead before 

burial. The populations of the three countries affected the most by Ebola—

Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone—like so many other African countries, 

gave the national borders little attention as they were artifacts of a colonial 

period. The Ebola virus in effect was traveling as much through lineage as it 

was over distance. Knowing the kinship, not locations, would have brought 

knowledge of how the disease traveled in the early stages. Closing national 

borders as a means to quarantine the populations and the virus had little 

effect; the borders were lightly observed by people who traveled across on a 

daily basis.134 It is apparent also with the collapse or fragmenting of national 
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borders in countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Syria, that culture and ethnic 

groups may view their boundaries culturally established by kinship or political alliances and not tied to a geopolitical border grafted artificially by a 

colonial power, or a standing government. How these boundaries are generated and their utility for demarking culture groups is critical information 

to have, especially when official or more formal boundaries and borders are 

not accepted or adhered to by segments of the population.

In each example of kinship provided, knowledge and understanding of 

kinship behaviors and how kinship orders these behaviors provided understanding at the point of need, but also provided enduring lessons for future 

occurrences. Matsuda implicated the reach and importance of a kinship 

system and how that kinship system was conceived by the Iraqis while providing a general template to aid in deciphering kinship systems elsewhere. 

It was not just an anthropology lesson in kinship systems; it was an applied 

perspective to how such systems operate and the social forces that utilize 

them. In the examples, behavior may have been localized to an individual or 

culture group, but the ramifications of behavior are deeply contextualized 

and layered. When the definition of the human domain includes the sum 

total of human environments as variables impacting human behavior, the 

thought of incredible complexity and an impossible task—to understand the 

human domain—is a significant consideration. 

Utilizing kinship and social ties established through fictive kin can be 

considered part of a more inclusive analytical approach known as social 

network analysis, “the mapping and measuring of relationships and flows 

between people, groups, organizations, computers, URLs, and other connected information/knowledge entities. The nodes in the network are the 

people and groups while the links show relationships or flows between the 

nodes.”135 The power and influence of such cultural behaviors as kinship 

rights and responsibilities can be very influential in determining behavior of 

the kinship groups. The United States Military Academy at West Point hosts 

the multidisciplinary Network Science Center whose mission is to “research 

and develop significant contributions in the study of network representations 

of physical, biological, and social phenomena leading to predictive models.”136

Princeton social scientists and electrical engineers received a National Science Foundation grant to study networks of terrorists and emergency workers to help understand the way networks are connected and sustained.137 

No matter the underlying theoretical premise or the approach, analysis of 
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behavior in and of the human domain depends on the grasp of cultural 

knowledge. Cultural and regional knowledge and skills are integral to the 

success of any type of predictive modeling, such as social network analysis. 

Important for any analysis is validating the on-the-ground cultural information or data while also understanding the past and current cultural behavior 

of individuals and groups that prove to be a node of part of a network. 

This section has provided a conceptual framework utilizing cultural 

knowledge and cross-cultural/interactional skills to better help in understanding others’ behavior and promoting cross-cultural interactions in the 

human domain. Questions of how the domain is represented or should be 

represented are problematic, and concerns about the lack of precision of the 

use of models or metaphors to describe or define the human domain also 

creates ambiguity in those not prepared for or comfortable with less than 

an empirical representation. In addition, developing learning for success in 

the human domain might benefit from developing an ontological approach 

to the kinds of knowledge and skills necessary. However, a culture-general 

approach to learning about and working in the human domain already shares 

a sense of ontologies about culture domains, such as kinship (as evidenced 

in the above examples), ideology, exchange, and more.

Human Domain Too Complex for Preparation Provided

Culture groups and individuals are the currency of the human domain. 

Behavior and symbols mark their thoughts and can provide insight into 

motivation, although difficult to retrieve without language and culture 

knowledge and skills. The complexity of the human domain deepens as 

military personnel directly and indirectly strive to influence the path and 

pace of interactions where “the human domain becomes incredibly layered 

and dense, where meaning and purpose is difficult to extract and effort and 

skill necessary for success within the domain difficult to master.”138

“Operating in the Human Domain” provides a breakdown of necessary 

knowledge and skills sets, cross-cultural communication, multicultural 

collaboration and negotiations, language skills, adaptability, environmental awareness and affinity for cultural exploration, and skills to navigate 

hierarchy of allegiances to obtain support from individuals, groups, and 

populations in the field.139 The critical competencies necessary are indeed 

impressive. Yet, the cultural complexity that is inherent in the human 
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domain has been suggested by some as being far too complex for the kind 

and depth of training currently available to SOF, or the experience in missions. SOF “have far less regional and cultural knowledge than they’re given 

credit for ... it’s easy to assume that a crash course in the local language and 

mores combined with some time in country allow people to make more 

nuanced judgments than they’re truly qualified to make.”140

In addition, the past decade of evolving the surgical strike capability has 

left SOF deficient in critical UW capability. The capacity of corporate knowledge and skills sets important for UW have “atrophied or with the duration 

of the Wars have never been trained/learned to SOF who entered the force 

in the last 10 years.”141 The mission necessary for SOF’s success in Iraq and 

Afghanistan was one of direct action, and the organizational culture has 

“come to value direct action” while degrading the skill set and devaluing the 

UW mission.142 Even with the shift in operational focus, some see the legacy 

of SOF being a theme that re-establishes once most of the force is out of the 

shadow of OEF. “I don’t see the role of Special Forces changing tremendously, 

frankly the idea was well ahead of its time back in the 1960s. Green Berets 

will continue to focus on Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional 

Warfare, but will do so at a deeper level of sophistication with additional 

training and language capabilities.”143

UW does not just demand reading the security environment; it involves 

a working knowledge of how culture works, and more importantly, how it 

may be impacted by insurgencies, movements, or even COIN “outside intervention in tribal conflicts is absurdly complex and perilous.”144 The point of 

this argument is easy. It takes anthropologists years of study, fieldwork, more 

study, and then more fieldwork to become knowledgeable about a village, 

the interlocking villages around that village, and how villagers respond to 

a host of external agents. Next is the publication of a peer-reviewed article 

or two to offer this knowledge and expertise. Their learning never stops—

each field visit offers perhaps a glimpse, maybe even a jarring experience of 

culture change. Now translate those years of research and experience to the 

U.S. military members who served in Afghanistan. 

The Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) Hands Program was a collection of 

military officers and civilian volunteers who learned Urdu, Dari, or Pashto. 

They also received instruction in an array of regional and cultural knowledge. Andrew Exum, an instructor in the course, wrote, “If these soldiers had 

been immersed in two years of intensive language training and an additional 
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four years of education in the people, tribes, history, and cultures of Afghanistan, at the end of those six years, they would still have only a fraction of the 

local knowledge of an illiterate subsistence farmer native to the region.”145 

Is the expectation of knowledge and skills needed to replicate the above 

and carry a weapon a bridge too far? How do we know the right kind and 

amount of LRC is sufficient for the evolving mission landscape that features dynamic and shifting alliances of non-state actors, ethnic, and tribal 

groups?146 Culture groups that form out of traditional ethnic or tribal groups, 

as well as any number of terrorist groups to the U.S., may not be considered 

that to local populations. “Unless we’re prepared to spend decades learning 

the local culture and building trust with the tribal leaders—and even the 

investment of decades is no sure thing, as most Western colonial powers 

learned—it may simply be impossible to master the nuances and necessary 

to transform these societies.”147

Organic SOF LRC capabilities may not be sufficient or even possible given 

the needs of the human domain. To some, external academic resources are 

necessary to augment existing LRC capability. 

[T]he Human Domain in its broadest sense is too complex a problem set within a given region to be addressed solely by organic SOF 

resources. The number of SOF operators and enablers available at any 

given time to the various combatant commands is a finite resource.148

The Joint Special Operations University represents one such forum engaging external resources. The need to engage experience and perspective that 

comes from beyond a military lens is keen. With some of the social sciences, 

including anthropology, highly critical of supporting military operations and 

HTS, and the most recent allegations of the American Psychological Association supporting instances of torture for the CIA—“it appears American 

Psychological Association colluded with the CIA to bend the profession’s 

rules of ethics to permit torture”149—that kind of problematic association 

may continue to hinder a more fertile scholarly relationship. Despite limited 

reception of SOF need, “it is inevitable that SOCOM will seek to partner 

with academic institutions in order to gain access to skill sets and resources 

that are unavailable within the current force structure. Whether directly or 

indirectly, SOCOM will have to engage subject matter experts in academia 

to obtain cultural information, engineering studies, agricultural studies ... 

etc.”150
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The takeaway from this section is that success in present and future SOF 

operations will probably not be based on the outcome of conflict, but judged 

by recent results, based far less on decisive or complete outcomes. In many 

ways, the social and behavioral sciences necessary for preparing, understanding, and acting in these operations present directions of inquiry and 

learning different than military sciences. One solution to the problem of the 

lack of social and behavioral capability in the DOD was to import expertise 

via the HTS and social scientists. The program was quietly ended in 2015 for 

many reasons, having to do with managing and staffing the program, and 

the inconclusiveness of the effectiveness of the program (lacking metrics).151 

Many voices, mostly inside the DOD, still feel the program is viable and 

worth revisiting if the program has not already found another benefactor 

or sponsor.152 Delivery and method of social and cultural knowledge, then 

application of it in country via social scientists may not be tenable or desirable, leaving a thorough sustainable learning program the best and perhaps 

only option. Remaking SOF into social scientists is not a goal, and “Ph.D.s 

Who Can Win a Barfight”153 are not needed. However, providing SOF with 

critical foundational sets of social and cultural knowledge and interactive 

skills to better understand a variety of complex environments and groups 

is an option. To capitalize on the rich and diverse foreign experience and 

allow learning to occur in the ‘natural’ laboratory (deployed setting) and 

then be able to sustain and reinforce continued learning in interventions 

throughout a career provides capability over the span of a career, and allows 

organic transmission of such knowledge and skills from experienced operators to those with less experience. Some anthropologists today acquire jobs in 

business and government without advanced degrees. They take their degree 

or knowledge set with some experience and apply it to the life of an organization, an effort, or an industry. These applied anthropologists offer some 

similarity to SOF through the acquisition of foundational knowledge (and 

skills) and application to the human experience. 

It Is the Human in Human Domain

The culture groups that make up the human domain are difficult to attribute intent, reason, and purpose, let alone influence behavior. Even with the 

recent efforts in policy and doctrine to cast the ‘human’ in human domain as 

an essential component of current and future missions, the conceptualization 
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of the domain as defined by recent military scholars and authors falls short 

due to deep-seated cognitive, operational, analytic, and the most profound 

and least understood cultural biases. SOF operations feature conditions with 

enduring interactions fraught with “ambiguous conditions in environments 

where complex social, historical, and economic contexts are as important as 

purely military factors.” 

This author identified several reasons the human domain cannot be 

simply conceived as a space that involves social interactions, or as a list of 

social or cultural attributes:154

a. The domain does not coincide or align neatly with spatial boundaries defined by geopolitical, physical, or environmental variables; one 

cannot draw absolute and definitive physical boundaries around the 

human domain. This goes against the grain of traditional military 

operations. For example, in the recent Ebola virus outbreak, it was 

obvious that the affected population did not adhere to national borders 

and other geopolitical parameters prior to or during the outbreak. In 

fact, when effort was made by the U.S. Agency for International Development and other agencies to enforce the borders as a means to limit 

spread of the virus, they were largely ineffective. However, stopping at 

the acknowledgment the borders did not function as response workers 

would expect them to would have shut off the flow of information of 

why the borders were ineffective. 

b. The defining variables of the human domain critical to the management 

of it are social, cultural, and behavioral, and based on constructs such 

as world-views and underlying cultural lattices of belief systems and 

values of the actors (including military and/or intelligence personnel). 

In other words, these underlying cultural systems greatly influence 

the behavior that is observable in the human domain.

c. The human domain transcends the traditional and new domains: air, 

sea, space, land, and now cyber. Behavior found in each can be traced 

back to the human domain, and the human domain will cross-cut 

each of the other domains. 

d. Knowledge of the human domain is critical; the kinds of knowledge necessary to understand the parameters of this domain include 
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sociocultural knowledge domains that feature culture-general and 

region and culture-specific information. 

e. The application of these types of knowledge sets to ascertain meaning 

of behavior and to interact (work) with pertinent actors in the human 

domain is tantamount to success and requires mastering thinking 

strategies and interpersonal skills and abilities not traditionally a part 

of military operations or learning programs, even language programs. 

Comprehending the extent of behavior in the human domain depends 

on theoretically and applied sociocultural knowledge and skill-based competencies in addition to language. The environment and missions that SOF 

primarily are involved in are linguistically and culturally complex. It could 

be said that the use of the human domain is a conceptual repackaging of 

past operational environments, such as human terrain, especially for SOF. 

The linguistic and cultural skills and knowledge that were critical during 

Vietnam and other more recent insurgencies are critical to those needed 

for today’s mission. However, a language and culture learning program to 

prepare for the human domain must also consider characteristics of that 

domain that are now just coming to light. 

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5. SOF LRC Needs, Competencies, 

Learning Objectives, and Assessments

Last year [2008] we called attention to the importance of language 

and regional knowledge as essential to strengthening relations and 

facilitating more effective operations with foreign partners ... We 

have a long way to go in recognizing and incentivizing such expertise 

as an operational necessity before we can truly develop and sustain 

real experts in specific key regions around the world. I call this 

“Project Lawrence,” after T. E. Lawrence of Arabia.155

Defining and detailing need is critical to establishing necessary KSAs 

(and competencies) that can be used to build effective learning programs. Critical task functions derived from a needs assessment provide 

means to define expected behavior, which then can be used to build learning goals and objectives. At the other end, assessment is based on developing 

a solid understanding of which criteria to use—proficiency, performance, 

or competence—to build the assessment. What is novel in this process is 

to build a curriculum and overall learning program that features different 

subjects/emphases (LRC), distinct and interwoven KSAs, and an assessment 

program that can produce an effective measure of student learning. In addition, a comprehensive assessment program should provide assessment of the 

quality and effectiveness of the curriculum/learning program and offer a 

means to fold student experience back into course development. 

This chapter will open with a discussion of the need for current SOF 

operations. SOF vision and mission demands more than an asymmetrical 

application of LRC to learning. Next, utilizing the discussion of the DLTR 

and its legacy on DOD LRC development, and the uneven application of 

terminology and concepts in policy and strategy, the author will suggest that 

SOF, like other organizations, have been captive to the lack of consensus on 

aspects of LRC. In addition, SOF have undergone a transformation in force 

growth, mission orientation, expected capabilities, expanded autonomy, and 

budget. These variables influence and enable a reorientation of the existing 

SOF LRC program. LRC will be defined and explained in terms of KSAs. 

Finally, the assessment program of such an integrated LRC program will be 
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explored. This discussion will include existing assessment programs used 

and their benefit (or lack of benefit) to the existing LRC program. It also will 

include a survey of current LRC assessment tools in use or in development. 

To conclude this chapter, an assessment model will be advanced that allows 

an organization to customize assessment needs while maintaining necessary 

standardization. 

The Language and Culture Qualifying Course156

Course Number: 2E-F253/011-F95, Clearance: Secret, Course Duration: 

24 weeks

Class Size: varies, several Iterations per year, See ATTRS for course dates

Prerequisites: Successful completion of the first four phases of the Special 

Forces Qualification Course (SFQC)

Course Description: Phase 5 of the SFQC focuses on language and culture. 

During Phase 5, Soldiers receive basic special operations language training in the language assigned to them at the completion of Special Forces 

assessment and selection. Languages are broken into two categories based 

on their degree of difficulty.

Category I/II: French, Indonesian-Bahasa, and Spanish

Category III/V: Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Czech, Dari, Hungarian, 

Korean, Pashto, Persian-Farsi, Polish, Russian, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, 

and Urdu.

Students receive instruction in three basic language skills: speaking, participatory listening, and reading (limited). The following areas of emphasis 

are covered during the training: overview of physical and social systems, 

economics, politics and security, infrastructure and technology information, 

culture, and regional studies. Language instruction focuses on functional 

application geared toward mission-related tasks, enhanced rapport building techniques, cultural mitigation strategies, interpreting, and control of 

interpreter methods. Also during Phase 2, a progressive physical training 

program is started in order to prepare for Phase 3.

To successfully complete Phase 5, Soldiers must achieve a minimum of 

1/1 listening and speaking as measured by the two-skill Oral Proficiency 

Interview.
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

The Operational Landscape–LRC

The SOF language training program publication, ARSOF Next: A Return 

to First Principles, ensures SOF operators will “facilitate special warfare 

activities and optimize the ability to work with and through partner forces 

and indigenous personnel.”157 The publication promotes LREC capability as 

a SOF value and language and culturally capable SOF as the first choice for 

optimal mission accomplishment. Learning ensures all LREC training and 

education includes region-specific and cultural content as well as understanding people’s motivations, beliefs, economics, politics, history, customs, 

and languages, is necessary to deal effectively with the enemy, allies, and 

uncommitted civilians.

Needed KSAs 

Ambiguity of situation, a variety of culture groups that may have competing 

agendas, and extended periods of operations result in a need to understand 

the behaviors of those involved in an insurgency, movements, or counterinsurgency. SOF trained in or supporting special warfare taking place in a 

cross-culturally rich environment are at least comfortable with being the 

tip of the spear. In this milieu, LRC enables mission success. The suite of 

LRC competencies are functional, enduring, provide a platform for further learning to occur while adding to a repository of existing experience 

through observation and sense making. They work to mitigate conscious and 

unconscious cultural biases—in short, to think differently about behaviors 

that are dissimilar so that the similarities can surface to explain and guide 

future behavior. There must be utilization of cross-cultural interaction skills, 

to include language, nonverbal, and paralinguistic skills, and a working 

understanding of the communication and languaculture, through myth 

and narrative that underpins many of the areas where UW may take place.

Language

LRC learning in conventional forces and professional military linguists 

consists of distinct LRC learning programs. Any overlap usually reflects an 

asymmetry on the part of the population. The Marine Corps’ Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization program features low-level language and 

a more in-depth treatment of region and culture, as do the rest of the Services 
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in different ways. Professional linguists who graduate from DLI matriculate 

through an intensive language curriculum with a high proficiency level in 

the language taught. Regional and cultural knowledge, at least through a 

formalized and assessable curriculum, is not offered.

Initial language learning for ARSOF, most likely initial acquisition training (IAT), occurs during the yearlong qualifying SFQC. Duration of the 

language program is 24 weeks and is the last phase of the course. The course 

description: 

Phase 5 of the SFQC focuses on language and culture. During Phase 

5, Soldiers receive basic special-operations language training in the 

language assigned to them at the completion of the Special Forces 

Assessment and Selection. Languages are broken into two categories 

based on their degree of difficulty. Category (CAT) I/II: French, 

Indonesian-Bahasa and Spanish. CAT III/IV: Arabic, ChineseMandarin, Czech, Dari, Hungarian, Korean, Pashto, Persian-Farsi, 

Polish, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish and Urdu.158

Additional information on the course indicates that language instruction 

covers two primary modalities that are assessed using the oral proficiency 

interview (OPI), speaking and participatory listening with limited reading. 

Professional language instruction in the DOD, on the other hand, is geared 

toward listening and reading. Professional linguists at DLI are assessed 

using the DLPT, discussed earlier. Instruction in areas of emphasis include 

overview of physical or social systems; economics, politics, and security; 

infrastructure and technology information; and culture and regional studies. Language instruction focuses on functional application geared toward 

mission-related tasks, enhanced rapport building techniques, cultural mitigation studies, interpreting, and control of interpreter methods. “To successfully complete Phase 5, Soldiers must achieve a minimum of 1/1 Listening 

and Speaking as measured by the two skilled Oral Proficiency Interview.”159

SOF Language Transformation Strategy Assessment

In 2010, USSOCOM published a Special Operations Forces Language and 

Culture Needs Assessment project. An earlier Special Operations Language 

Transformation Strategy Needs Assessment project was published in 2004. 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

Presentations at the ILR based on these studies and course development were 

given by SOF and contractors.160

The existing Special Forces qualifying language program is six months 

in duration. The sole proficiency or mastery assessment required is a 1/1 OPI 

score (although policy may be forthcoming that elevates that to a 1+/1+). The 

OPI is a brief interview to determine level of mastery, while the DLPT is a 

multi-day exam. Non-linguistic items covered in the SFQC feature an array 

of topics with several articulating with the breadth of LRC areas discussed 

briefly above, however lacking information on learning objectives and goals, 

the curriculum, breadth of each topic, the interrelationship of topics, and 

assessment.

Language utility is critical for special warfare activities, as it is for SOF in 

general. A decade ago, minimal language proficiency to graduate the SFQC 

was a 1/1/1 measured by the DLPT. More recently, the emphasis on modality 

changed to speaking and listening still pegged at 1/1. A 2012 USASOC survey 

indicated that reading and writing were not utilized in operations and missions, and the speaking and listening components should be tested through 

an oral interview, reducing the language learning and cost of testing.161 Level 

1 is the standard minimum for all four SOF components. 

USSOCOM LREC strategy reports at 720 hours, 66 percent of John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School students achieved a 1+/0/1+ in 

all languages, compared with Naval Warfare Special Command students 

achieving a 98 percent pass rate over minimums while 68 percent exceeded 

the CAT III and IV target scores. These observations are not contextualized 

to year however, or if the percentages represent over time.162

Level 1 proficiency is about “most survival needs and limited social 

demands.”163 Referring to the start of the AfPak Hands Program, one author 

wrote, “volunteers receive cultural training and 16 weeks of language instruction in Dari, Pashto or Urdu ... and if you have tried to learn those languages, 

16 weeks ain’t nothing. 16 weeks of Urdu and you’re still wondering whether 

that’s a “N” or an “L” and saying “Aap kya hal hai?” with a goofy grin on your 

face.”164 Outside of SOF-wide surveys and focus groups there have been no 

‘in-field’ studies done on LRC use by SOF operators.

The utility of a low-level proficiency for special warfare is limited, and 

given the complexity of the operating environment in the human domain, 

it needs to be determined whether level 1, even 1+, is the proficiency that can 

provide the critical KSAs for most SOF missions to include UW, insurgency, 
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JSOU Report 16-8

or even COIN. Given 24 weeks of LRC learning, what can be done to increase 

the language proficiency in the six months of learning? In addition, sustainment language training should not be considered as maintenance, but 

enhancement, thus training duration and intensity should reflect that goal.

With the given importance of LRC in recent SOF policy, proficiency level 

is important, as they are minimums for those in the program and for policymakers. There do not seem to be studies done on the expected duration of 

language learning to get to the lower levels of the different CAT languages. 

Expected duration for different levels have been advanced. LTI provided a 

table of expected learning times for the different CAT languages.165 Briefly, 

CAT I and II languages given aptitude variation in an immersive classroom experience with one to four students and at 720 hours produce at 

the advanced to superior level on the American Council on the Teaching 

of Foreign Languages proficiency scale. Cat III languages at 720 hours of 

instruction feature intermediate to superior proficiency and 720 hours of 

instruction at CAT IV produces an intermediate level of proficiency. 

A decade of surgical strikes and supporting two focused wars has 

degraded SOF language diversity and capacity166 and the ability to apply 

cross-cultural competence and regional/cultural knowledge leading to an 

overuse of interpreters in OEF and OIF and lack of opportunity to develop 

language capability. The difference between SOF deployed in numbers and 

percentages is dramatic; 84 percent were deployed to CENTCOM in 2010 

compared to just 17 percent in 2000.167 “Almost inversely proportional to 

SOF’s overwhelming numbers and length of commitment within these two 

countries [Afghanistan and Iraq] is their presence in other regions of the 

world.”168 Still four years after this figure, the percentage and number may 

have only decreased a bit. This concentration has limited the ability of SOF 

to support more global operations.

Fletcher Schoen argues that the success of SOF also created a surge in 

SOF personnel and a dilution in capability, which was seen in the lowering 

of requirements for LRC.169 Losing linguistic capability certainly enhances 

the need for cross-cultural competence. Even with an elementary proficiency, 

cross-cultural, skill-based competencies augment cross-cultural capabilities 

in a very uncertain environment. Even with good interpreters, mitigating 

biases, perspective-taking, and the ability to access, process, and apply cultural knowledge can be difficult without some elementary proficiency. 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

ARSOF strategy includes the continued development of advanced language learning programs for selected SF and selection campaign to recruit 

into the Q-courses personnel with proficiency already at or above the 1/1 

levels to help mitigate the loss of LRC capability. 

Advanced Languages: The Special Warfare Education Group continues to develop plans to send selected Soldiers to advanced language training (existing and newly developed options) to facilitate 

special warfare activities and optimize the ability to work through 

partner forces and indigenous personnel. The intent remains to 

achieve a near native language capability in special warfare units. 

To incentivize language skills, language proficiency is now tied to 

re-enlistment bonuses.170

Increase Number of Personnel Entering ARSOF Q-courses with 

FL Proficiency Above 1/1: Current efforts include target language 

proficiency identification through the DLAB to focus recruiting 

on Soldiers who possess a 1/1 or better; for in-service recruiting, 

screening personnel databases for targeted recruitment, expanding 

into the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard for Soldiers who 

possess a 1/1 or better language capability.171

Regional and Cultural Knowledge 

In the last decade, there has been uneven progress in the DOD on succinctly 

defining terms and concepts that are involved in region and culture.172 Some 

of this unevenness can be traced back to the preparation and publication 

of the DLTR and the lack of scholarly sophistication when dealing with the 

non-linguistic components of the DLTR. Yet, even if Services and commands 

were left to their own devices, which many were, it was critical to define 

concepts that matched theory and were applicable to Service or command 

operations, missions, and learning development. With the use of LREC, 

regional expertise and culture, or cultural capabilities, became a collection 

of knowledge and skills that were applied unevenly in policy, strategy, and 

learning. 

USSOCOM provides a similar treatment to LREC in the SOF Language 

Training Program. SOF will, “Ensure[s] all LREC training and education 
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JSOU Report 16-8

includes region-specific and cultural content. Understanding people’s motivations, beliefs, economics, politics, history, and customs, in addition to 

their languages, is necessary to deal effectively with the enemy, allies, and 

uncommitted civilians.”

The concept of region connects human behavior to a geospatial location 

and is defined by the physical characteristics of the location, the human 

imprint on the location, and the reflections of the human/environmental interface at that location. Region and culture-general offer very broad 

labels to capture an array of components that relate to places and people. 

Simply, how do culture groups that reside in particular locations or areas 

see their surroundings, and how do they define their land versus not their 

land? Regions are related in description, such as in story or myth, and as 

being physically marked or imprecisely defined by informal and/or transitory 

boundaries or borders, or jurisdictionally ordered where national borders 

are clearly defined in law. Region gives way to nation-state and other larger 

associations such as supranational organizations like the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, European Union, and African Union.

Culture represents the second axis of interest in human behavior that 

accounts for knowledge of common sets of behaviors that can define a singular collection or group of people. Human behavior is predicated on sets 

of beliefs and values and is expressed in domains such as kinship, law and 

order, exchange, governance, and more. This is culture-general knowledge. 

Culture-specific knowledge is the manifestation of such commonalities to 

specific culture groups, not necessarily tied to one location. The second 

aspect of culture concerns the interactional skill-based competencies that 

promote effective interaction between culture groups or organizations in 

specific locations or a series of locations.

Region and cultural-general knowledge are sets of universal concepts and 

principles that apply across space and human culture groups. The intent of 

this focus is to instill in students the understanding and lattice that applies 

somewhat evenly to all culture groups at any location. SOF should be concerned about where they go and whom they will interact with on a friendly, 

neutral, or adversarial basis. However, land and people, even language, will 

differ in expression, behavior, and dialect, even language or languages. It is 

imperative that foundations of regional and cultural knowledge and essential 

skills of cross-cultural competence are provided as they represent transferable knowledge sets—not only that accelerate specific knowledge when 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

presented, but also of entry into unknown places or continuing presence, or 

influence of external agency or actor. The main disciplines that contribute to 

this inquiry are anthropology and human/cultural geography. 

Region and culture-specific knowledge relate directly to a specific region 

or country and definite culture groups within a region. This knowledge is 

acquired through continued learning and reflects the ‘flesh’ of the region and 

culture ‘skeleton’ initially acquired. This learning is not new to the DOD and 

SOF. As discussed, learning was the primary conduit of quick knowledge sets 

provided through pre-deployment training and mobile training teams and 

the array of products and materials produced and distributed throughout 

OEF and OIF. Some of these products and materials are still being produced 

and distributed.173

The final piece of this LRC triumvirate is the introduction and development of the procedural knowledge and skill-based competencies related to 

facilitating effective interactions, establishing sustainable relationships with 

culture groups and making sense of culturally and regionally complex environments. Obviously, language capability is critical. Perhaps more important, 

especially given low-level language capability, is the understanding, development, and deployment of this set of skills. The frame for this interactive 

set of skills and for general or specific knowledge acquisition is thinking 

differently.174 Thinking differently is supported by cross-cultural competence 

and its principle competencies: cultural learning, cultural self-awareness, 

perspective-taking, and observation/sense-making. Cross-cultural competence is “the ability to navigate in complex interpersonal situations, express 

or interpret ideas/concepts across cultures, and make sense of foreign social 

and cultural behavior.”175 Developing and engaging empathy is important. 

Also a part of cross-cultural competence are interactional skills such as 

cross-cultural communications and negotiations, and finally, working with 

interpreters. At the base of cross-cultural competence skill-based competencies and capabilities is thinking differently, “managing the unintended 

consequences of human cognition – bias – and its operation when considering those who are culturally different.”176 These skill-based competencies can 

be enhanced with learning and experience. 

LRC components should not be developed in isolation. The power of their 

effect on learning is ultimately their synergy within a coordinated learning 

program. “[S]uccess at meeting individual [LRC] component and synergistic learning outcomes can result from an integration of concept intent, 
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JSOU Report 16-8

curricular content and blended learning processes.”177 More generally, if 

language proficiency of graduated SOF from the various qualification schools 

is maintained at level 1 or 1+, and given the continued mission need of FID, 

for example, it is even more necessary to graduate students with additional 

region and culture knowledge sets and cross-cultural competence skills that 

resonate with need to enhance mission success. 

An LRC coordinated program does not mean language and a further 

compendium of region and culture KSAs. An LRC learning event does mean 

a highly interactive and sequenced curriculum where instructional designers, subject matter experts, and scholars develop relevant learning goals and 

objectives that connect to usable and meaningful assessment measures. A 

coordinated and blended LRC program means the development and full 

utilization of a LMS and the development of a cadre of instructors that 

facilitate the LRC instruction together.178 A coordinated program does not 

mean utilizing a DLPT proficiency score to accurately or even generally 

approximates the speaker’s region and culture capabilities, but developing 

an assessment program that within the context of the learning event promotes an assessment measure that is specific to an organization, reveals an 

understanding of capability, even performance across the LRC continuum, 

and can be tracked from initial acquisition LRC even through interventions. 

There have been two recent developments of SOF LRC curriculum/

courses: Naval Special Warfare training and a course in development for 

Marine Corps Special Operations.179 Much of the region and culture content 

in the Navy curriculum was culture specific and produced in the form of 

‘culture notes.’ The MARSOC course still in development will have 10 percent 

region and culture material in it.180

Assessment

It is clear that there does not exist any kind of meaningful assessment for 

regional knowledge and culture-general and culture-specific knowledge 

or cross-cultural competence in LRC learning at any level or organization. 

There are certainly ample organizations that could use one, such as SOF and 

other populations who might deploy or support assignments or exercises, 

such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), SFA, and UW, 

etc. Assessment serves several stakeholders: the learner, the organization, 

the instruction designers, the educators, policymakers, and budget makers. 
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There are several questions that should be asked and considered when setting 

up an LRC assessment program. What does it mean to assess capability? For 

assessing culture, how do you measure gain in a short period of time? When 

is assessment given, and why? Do assessments come with gap analysis and 

learning programs? Do they lead to learning goals and objectives, or are 

they based on learning goals and objectives? Are they guided/self-paced? 

Are facilitators trained/authorities on subject matter? Are assessments across 

LRC synchronized?181

Those who are conducting assessments also need to consider what is 

wanted out of an assessment. Questions to consider: Is it an understanding 

of one or several capabilities, linked or separate? Is it a biographical sketch or 

is it something useful to an organization but based on a more generic model, 

which can also be customizable? Assessment should also consider there is an 

understanding of what has been learned and can be expressed. And finally, 

should the assessment be an organizational-wide ‘score’ with relevance to a 

focus or mission, but also relevant to other organizations and programs?182

This study suggests LRC assessment should reflect the actual learning 

process and be given within the confines of that learning program/event. 

LRC assessment should be a measure of what has been learned and not 

approximated with grades or other more traditional means of assessing. The 

problem is the need to move beyond a language-centric program because 

of the limiting nature of the intent and material. If an LRC assessment was 

feasible, then being able to capture it will allow the necessary metrics to track 

performance, build concrete learning objectives, and support requirements. 

Existing or In-Development LRC Assessments

Currently, there are no existing region and culture assessments. Regional 

proficiency and expertise, until it is modified or republished by Defense 

Language and National Security Education Office, offers nowhere near the 

terminology and concepts that are needed for standardized assessment. 

Definitions of proficiency levels lack any precision to the construction of 

learning goals and objectives. There are three existing attempts at creating 

coordinated LRC assessments to benefit the DOD with various utility. 

DLPT/OPI

Language assessment for SOF was changed from the DLPT to the OPI. A 

low-level DLPT designed to pick up the IAT proficiency of SOF learning 
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was initiated, but only a few languages were completed by DLI and have not 

been utilized by LRC learning programs. The DLPT, especially at the lower 

registers, and the OPI do not adequately assess region and culture knowledge 

gain or performance. Upon completion of any LRC learning program, the 

only measure of capability is a DLPT or OPI score. This is problematic to say 

the least, especially for organizations like SOF where understanding what 

region and culture KSAs map to what level of performance. This is critical 

for reasons of immediate utility in operations, but as a means to track LRC 

capability over time, and as a means to plan LRC interventions.

As seen in the selection of the OPI over the DLPT by SOF, language 

assessment has seen some indication of correcting for organization need and 

utility. In brief, the DLPT is a computer-based test, usually multiple-choice 

with automated grading. It is the standardized procedure that uses the ILR 

scale for the global assessment of reading and listening only. The DLPT is 

normed or predicated for military intelligence linguists along global domains 

of potential operational relevance (politics, society, economy, etc.). The DLPT 

focuses more on intelligence collection rather than analysis and interpretation. There is no authentic linguistic production in the target language, and 

it is not communicative in nature. The OPI is a ‘live’ subjective and communicative assessment of global functional speaking ability. It is a standardized 

procedure using ILR scale for assessment of global and functional speaking 

ability. It can be used in academic placement, student assessment, program 

evaluation, professional certification, hiring, and promotional qualification.

As a fit to organizations like SOF, neither language assessment is truly 

focused on assessing DOD operational ability in the target language, nor are 

they set up to include any kind of assessment of region and culture. Capturing low-level language scores and making them relevant is difficult, although 

an attempt was made to produce very low-level DLPT tests for primary 

mission languages for SOF; only a few were made. If LRC is to continue to 

be a defining SOF capability for a force of more than 60,000 members, an 

organization-based language assessment would seem to be a viable option.

Education–Navy Asia-Pacific (APAC) Hands Program

Not similar to the AfPak Hands Program, save in name, the APAC Hands 

Program is a Navy initiative to build officers with regional understanding 

and confidence to inform decision makers.183 There is a rigorous graduatelevel certification program designed by Navy LREC and Naval Postgraduate 
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

School. ‘Proficiency’ levels are marked by incremental increases in graduate 

education and experience gained in select regionally focused billets. The program is staffed with officers who will be acting as resources for commanders 

on Asia-Pacific matters of concern. 

All commands are highly encouraged to identify APAC Hand 

positions that may require or be enhanced by regional knowledge. 

Typically, these billets will be found on staffs at the operational 

or strategic level and will be related to the work required by the 

incumbent rather than based on a physical location. Coding billets 

will facilitate opportunities for education en route, which should 

reduce manning shortfalls and minimize the requirement for on 

the job training to learn regional dynamics.184

Selection/Training—ARI Cross-Cultural Competence Assessment 

Battery 

ARI initiated a six-year project to develop a cross-cultural competence 

assessment battery to ultimately exist as a series of web-based tests.185 “The 

overarching objective of this project is the validation and delivery of a battery of cross-cultural competency assessments that could be used by the 

U.S. Army for future selection and training in roles and assignments that 

have a cross cultural component.” As of now, an assessment mechanism to 

measure cross-cultural competence in service members does not exist. There 

are intercultural assessments that have been developed by academic and 

private industry for non-DOD populations, but as a few surveys of existing 

assessments relate, most of the data is from self-reports, and validity of the 

measures may not be accurate or valid.186 It is through two avenues, better 

training and/or selection methods, that a Soldier’s cross-cultural competence 

will improve.

The first two of four phases concern cross-cultural performance indicators and requirements and a literature review of existing research and 

assessment. The third phase is the actual assessment development for the 

test battery, after research and using parts of existing assessments and the 

development of new assessments.187 The completion of the first three phases 

was to end at the end of FY 2015.188 “This project was started back in 2013 

with the goal of addressing some of the major concerns the Army faces 
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regarding the assessment of non-cognitive skills, in general, and culturally 

relevant skills.”189

The current status of the project is the identification of 13 sociocultural 

performance indicators in Phase I, some of which may need some revision as they were based heavily in operations in Iraq/Afghanistan and not 

representative of current and future missions. Researchers need to develop 

criterion measure for performance indicators—how well one variable or set 

of variables predicts an outcome based on information from other variables. 

In Phase III, 16 constructs were identified and approximately 30 assessments 

were identified or generated for use in the cross-cultural competence assessment system.190 Phase IV will consist of the refinement and validation of 

the assessment battery “for use as a selection and training tool by the U.S. 

Army.”191 The ultimate goal is to develop a web-based tool/battery of tests 

that does not rely on self-reporting for use in training and/or selection. The 

final Phase IV is due to be completed by 2018.

Human Capital—RPAT

The RPAT is a ground-breaking analytical tool to assess the propensity of DoD personnel to perform duties in 15 regions of the world. 

It is designed to provide commanders a means to quickly identify 

personnel in their commands who possess skills relevant to key 

regions and compare them to identified needs for regional expertise. 

RPAT goes beyond simple skill attribute tracking by using algorithms 

to assess individuals’ formal education, duty assignments, deployment and stationing history, training, and foreign language skills 

to derive a regional proficiency rating on a six-point scale from 0+ 

to 5. The RPAT collects information via a user interface operated by 

the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Future plans call for 

evolving the RPAT into a personnel system data mining tool that 

will pull its information from personnel data bases, eliminating the 

need for collecting data via the user interface. RPAT information 

will reside in the Language Readiness Index in the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).192 

The RPAT represents an assessment of individual skills that together 

offer insight into how background, training, and experience predispose 

an individual to perform tasks in a specific region. RPAT features as its 
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assessment factors: regionally specific systematic knowledge; regionally specific experiential knowledge; utility of language skills; analytic and critical 

thinking skills; and nonspecific experiential knowledge. The biographical 

information critical to mining the individual’s history and experience is 

drawn from an extensive introductory survey taken by the individual. Each 

survey is individually scored and a composite score generated which is nested 

within 15 regions. There are degradation rates integrated into variables such 

as language. Regions are North America, Central Asia, West Africa, Central 

America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, Southeast Asia, 

Middle East North Africa, Western Europe, East Asia, Western Oceana, 

Eastern Europe, Caribbean, and Eastern Oceana.

RPAT is tied to providing proficiency levels, based on those identified by 

DODI 5160.70, that “represent an individual’s awareness and understanding of the historical, political, cultural (including linguistic and religious), 

sociological (including demographic), economic, and geographic factors of 

a foreign country or specific global region.”193

RPAT has been in production and testing since 2011,194 indicating the 

difficulty in creating an assessment that captures LRC across the total force 

(to now include the civilian population). It is difficult to capture the depth 

and nuance of varied experience in biographical formulation derived from a 

survey. Through the five years of design and testing, the algorithm has been 

adjusted as well as the populations enlisted to participate have changed to 

include FAOs, SOF, and conventional forces. 

Some of the issues may still hamper successful implementation of the 

RPAT.195 There has been difficulty in recruiting personnel from pilot groups 

identifying and recruiting from targeted groups. Initial validation based 

on populations like FAOs now limits the expanding scope of the RPAT. For 

use in conventional forces, there is the need to recalculate the algorithm. 

Difficulties captured during the validation process and the targeted rollout 

were completing the initial survey was time-consuming as well as the perception of the tabulated regional proficiency rating to the individual and 

the organization. There was not a realistic accounting of heritage knowledge 

or language in the algorithm and education was a very critical component 

that innervated several of the variables. However, the inability of the tool to 

include incomplete degrees or certifications, training or education in civil 

schools also affected the tool and the users. Finally, the overall utility to the 

DOD was questioned. 
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The other difficulty of the RPAT is the intent for the tool to draw from 

existing biographical information housed on DOD personnel systems. The 

need is to be able to populate the tool with existing variables already tracked 

in these personnel systems and a means and inclination for the individual 

to capture and update information that would effect, or not effect, a change 

in the RPAT score. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) is currently revising/updating the questionnaire/algorithm to ensure consistency 

with the latest Center for the Advanced Study of Language (CASL) version. 

Having all of the components of the RPAT common and tracked and updated 

in DMDC is problematic at best. 

DMDC has developed and launched a production version of the Data 

Collection Module. Through its initial data collection, DMDC has 

provided necessary personnel data for CASL to test the prototype’s 

validity, sensitivity, and utility. The next version of the RPAT will 

be informed by analyses of the tool’s sensitivity, and new questions 

will be incorporated. Its criterion validity will be determined by 

comparing regional proficiency assessments from the RPAT with 

experts’ assessments.196

Simply, RPAT was developed with a learned and well-traveled/mission 

experience population in mind, such as FAOs. Education and knowledge 

about regions/countries were critical to understanding of national governments and militaries. Language was more or less secondary, but those 

variables that could have applied to culture were much less important than 

degrees. RPAT’s scale was modeled after the regional proficiency scale and 

with the advanced scores, the education, degrees, and experience became 

healthy distinguishers of ‘expertise.’ The RPAT has been unable to deliver a 

finished tool that spanned the total force, which was one of the initiatives of 

the DLTR—account for the LRC capability across the DOD. In this author’s 

experience with RPAT, one issue has been ‘fitting’ the RPAT to specific organizations and their needs. It may be that spanning the total force for LRC 

proficiency is not to the best interest of the DOD or the organization/Service/

command. Developing an assessment that immediately benefits the commander on LRC needs is more necessary, and making it specific to mission, 

operations, and force advisable.
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Narrowing the LRC Assessment Focus by Opening the 

Aperture

Assessing LRC proficiency has always been a ‘step too far’ based on existing research that could apply to region and culture. Language proficiency 

has existing measures and its application to organizations and missions 

outside that of professional linguists has been imperfect at best. This can 

be seen in SOF’s adoption of the OPI as the more relevant measure for their 

need—dropping the requirement to take the DLPT based on application of 

modalities not critical to their mission success and the need to continue to 

utilize the DLPT as no other measures exist. 

The Haitian earthquake response energized the discussions of the need to 

quickly identity Haitian French and Creole speakers for deployment. Identifying speakers was important, but pulsing the entire force for this requirement was perhaps unnecessary. Granted language capability was important, 

so was regional and culture learning and experience. Perhaps in some ways 

just as important was the ability to match LRC with the composite force that 

actually would be ‘on the ground,’ including medical, logistics, security, and 

others. Pulsing organizations and commands for this information does not 

require a force-wide tool, but for each organization to know the LRC capability in their ranks and then be able to sift and sort through the capability 

based on external requests and internal manning capability.

At this time, there is no existing LRC assessment that can be tailored to 

an organization, or even mission. An assessment can be developed that offers 

a means to capture LRC capability taken from performance of a LRC learning event, such as IAT for language or language sustainment. As indicated 

above, building an integrated LRC ‘friendly’ curriculum, fielding capable 

instructors, and having supporting LMS (see next chapter) is critical to build 

this assessment. 

Assessment measures within a learning event are divided into two broad 

categories: direct and indirect. Direct measures concentrate on what students 

have learned or failed to learn—tied to discrete and expert-generated learning objectives. This information can highlight strengths. Through weaknesses, faculty can explore causes, over which they have control, and develop 

solutions based on “tangible, visible, self-explanatory, and compelling evidence of exactly what students have and have not learned.”197
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Indirect measures “reveal characteristics associated with learning, but 

imply that learning has occurred ... and evidence consists of proxy signs 

that students are probably learning.”198 Example of indirect measures are: 

mid-semester course evaluations; evaluations of course assignments or units; 

course-level surveys; course evaluations that can be aggregated for the entire 

department/program; semester-end course evaluations; percent of class time 

spent in active learning; honors, awards, and scholarships earned by students 

and alumni; and number of student hours spent on homework. Add-on 

assessment measure can be supplied by portfolios, surveys, focus groups, a 

published test such as the National Survey of Student Engagement, language 

tests, or pre- and post-program standardized tests (not including licensure 

tests).199

Programs can implement course-embedded assessments, i.e., use course 

work assignments, which can be a more efficient use of time and minimize 

the feeling that outcomes assessment is an additional task. Work that students complete is relevant to the learning goals being assessed; this increases 

the likelihood that they will put forth their best effort. The coursework is 

created by faculty, who are experts in their discipline and have an interest 

in maintaining the standards of their profession in the next generation. 

Learning objectives are written to capture measurable responses. The results 

are relevant to faculty, who want to improve student learning.200 In essence, 

the learning event through course designers, faculty, and agers provides the 

KSAs necessary for the mission and necessary to build relevant assessment 

measures. The assessment measures should be able to provide a more or less 

general ‘performance’ indicator, directly transferable to scores. 

An LRC learning program at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) is incorporating an assessment model that spans an extended LRC learning event. A 

variety of evaluative, language, region/culture-general and specific knowledge, and interactional skills, such as 3C and cross-cultural communication CCC, are tested through the OPI, a knowledge section, and procedural 

knowledge/essay/scenario-driven ‘language in action’ sections. There are 

three separate measures/scores around knowledge and skills:

• Language-performance score (a calculation of OPI with Lange in 

Action scores);

• Culture-general/specific/cross-cultural competence declarative and procedural knowledge acquisition as an expression of 
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performance—based on a series of knowledge checks and essays in 

class and DL; and,

• Cross-cultural communication interaction—procedural knowledge 

and skill assessment—based on procedural knowledge, situational 

judgment tests, and language in action. 

Measures will range from 0 to 3 (in whole numbers). In IAT, language 

will consistently grade out at the low end of the 0 to 3 scale. The other 

two measures will fall along a 1, 2, or 3, or low, moderate, or high scoring. 

This model of LRC assessment would be a departure from overreliance on 

language-only ILR ratings. An example scoring:

Language ≈= 1S/1L (official OPI results would also be provided)

Culture ≈= 2

Cross-cultural Interaction ≈= 1201

At the conclusion of the learning event, the commander immediately 

knows coming out of this course what the learner knows and is capable of 

performing across the identified and provided learning objectives based on 

LRC KSAs. Follow-on language sustainment programs offer learning interventions to enhance and even accelerate LRC capability.

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6. Disruptive Technology

The shift to personal digital learning is profound—it’s not just the 

shift from print to digital, it’s a shift from cohorts to competency, 

and from common to customized pathways. It’s a shift from flat and 

sequential to interactive pedagogies and from a short school day to 

anytime anywhere learning. Add the Common Core adoption and 

you have a higher bar of real college and career ready expectations. 

Add multiple providers and the concept of school-as-a-service and 

you have a new educational landscape.202

The wave of digital learning presently is crashing on the shore of what 

remains of traditional residential learning approaches (classroom setting and singular instructor). The wave can carry learner, facilitator/educator, and organization beyond that beach. The trajectory of non-traditional 

learning approaches to an array of delivery methods and models has matched 

the pace of accelerating technology in society because these new methods 

integrate the pace and kind of this technological evolution. Digital learning, “learning facilitated by technology that gives students some element 

of control over time, place, path, and/or pace,”203 is moving learning out of 

the confines of walled classrooms. It is guiding learners to the possibilities 

of what is digitally stored, the power of networking, and the expression of 

learning output, among other benefits. An evolutionary precursor to digital 

learning is distance or e-learning, “formalized teaching and learning system 

specifically designed to be carried out remotely by using electronic communication.”204 More to the point, distance education or learning involves a 

physical distance between instructor and student. Distance programs feature 

“students ... in a geographical location apart from the institution hosting the 

program; the final award given is equivalent in standard and content to an 

award program completed on campus.”205 Online learning, “learning with 

the assistance of the Internet and a personal computer,”206 can be considered 

a variation of distance learning utilizing the Internet and a computer, but 

other labels such as e-learning, or electronic learning, are often used interchangeably with online learning.
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All of the approaches and labels used over the last decade or so provide a 

sense of the pace and the scope of change in the learning fields. Change has 

been rapid and disruptive technology has opened new windows and provided 

new avenues, even new directions, to learning approaches for students and 

educators. 

Disruption

Take, for example, Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), which 

have become the poster child of innovation in higher education over 

the last two to three years.207

Just recently, MOOCs took higher education by storm. Perhaps their sevenyear ride may have already peaked, but if it has, the intent, technology, and 

reach has secured MOOCs as disruptive movements. A disruptive technology 

is, “one that displaces an established technology and shakes up the industry 

or a ground-breaking product that creates a completely new industry.”208 

Clayton Christensen, in his book The Innovator’s Dilemma, defined disruptive technology as being one of two types of new technology: sustaining or 

disruptive.209 Sustaining technology relies on small and gradual improvements to a technology while disruptive technology is not fully tested or 

deployed and often has performance problems because of its limited outreach 

and audience, and still may be on the left side of proven practical application. 

Examples of disruptive technologies could be considered the smartphone, 

Windows, e-mail, laptop computing, the ‘cloud’ and more. When it comes 

to higher education, disruption follows a similar evolution: 

The reason why you want to disrupt a system is because you think 

you have something that is better than the status quo. In that sense, 

almost any system is always ripe for disruption, unless you accept 

that the status quo is the best thing you can possibly achieve, which 

you should never think. Anything can be improved. So when it 

comes to higher education, of course it should be disrupted, which 

is the same as saying that we should improve it.210

Technology and innovation have always pushed learning into realms that 

were just beyond their use for managing the sustainable. This surge of innovation has also pushed institutions and organizations beyond their tradition, 
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and the learning status quo, with new modes of delivery and innovative and 

interactive content, and the increase of reach from inside a classroom to the 

outer bounds of the Internet. MOOCs have been labeled disruptive, not just 

for the innovation, but for the impact they had on the more staid institutions 

of higher learning. MOOCs are just the latest disruptors in learning, and just 

one of many disruptive technologies within the last two decades that have 

created new directions for industries, but also for their impacts on society. 

This chapter will explore the ‘disruptions’ that have fueled innovations 

in higher education and professional learning. Technology is at the forefront 

of this evolution. Not to get lost in the innovation is also a movement to 

reach distances and populations and provide a more customizable learning 

outcome. At no time in the past has there been a perfect storm of accessibility to knowledge, platforms, networking, and delivery; and presence of 

learning systems disruptors. The DOD, but especially SOF LRC learning, 

should embrace the disruptors that are present in learning programs outside 

of the DOD and engage elements to promote a higher efficiency of learning 

and a corresponding decrease in costs and a greater LRC programmatic 

sustainability.

First, a quick history of distance learning will be presented. Contextualizing the innovations that blanket higher education and professional/

business learning today will provide a sense of trajectory and awareness of 

future learning pathways. Trends in current distance learning practices as 

MOOCs are becoming the staple of entire degree programs, if not certificated 

professional development. An online approach permits a drastic reduction 

in expense which is passed on to the student. Many innovations in learning take place in corporate/industry where agility and performance drive 

learning/training programs. 

Against this backdrop of online innovation, the DOD’s efforts to push 

distributed learning as a viable learning alternative will be surveyed in a variety of programs. A concluding statement will explore disruptive technology 

applied to SOF overall learning programs, but more specifically, LRC efforts. 

The current disruptive learning environment offers much to organizations 

such as SOF where mission is promoting the necessity for increased learning performance. The next chapter will explore briefly the role of LMS as a 

disruptive technology. The author has designed and launched a MOOC on 

culture-general and cross-cultural competence for organizations such as 

the DOD, and the course will be utilized to provide a backdrop to LMSs.
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History

The evolution of learning technology dates back to the 19th century and the 

advent of correspondence courses. Correspondence via a more efficient postal 

service provided learners, and soon to include factory workers, a learning 

avenue not afforded to them earlier due to distance and cost. In the 1800s, 

students from Australia were already able to take correspondence courses 

from prestigious universities, such as the London School of Economics, one 

of the first in the United Kingdom to offer distance education.211 By 1890, 

there were more people in the U.S. undertaking correspondence courses 

than there were students in the undergraduate system.212

The growth of media such as television and radio in the mid-20th century 

catapulted remote learning to a global educational venture. That period also 

brought the first wave of learning democracy to places never before reached. 

Viewers not having formal educational training could watch or listen to 

courses for free and course designers and instructors could adapt content to 

the learning audience. This was truly the first foray of formal education into 

geographically distant locations, but as well into populations culturally distinct and distant from the educators. Access to content, although global, still 

depended on having access to the right technology in order to participate.213

However, as Juliana Marques relates in her publication, Short History 

of MOOCs and Distance Learning, this first generation was still far from 

reaching massive numbers of students like MOOCs are doing today. The 

arrival of electronic media popularized radio and television as educational 

tools in the 20th century. Teachers and learners from all parts of the world 

took advantage of the new multimedia technology. Those who did not have 

access to formal learning could watch or listen to classes for free, wherever 

they were. The content was adapted to reach different types of audiences and 

even students in remote areas could have knowledge in academic subjects. 

However, as a tool of learning, the use of electronic media lacked the interaction with professor and other classmates, and overall new possibilities still 

lacked traditional ingredients in traditional learning. It would be the advent 

of computers and Marques writes that could provide the electronic infrastructure through networks and online communities that would reshape 

learning possibilities.

In the middle of this phase of electronic learning, an initiative started in 

the United Kingdom that pushed learning further in the direction of learning 
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through openness and media. The prescient Open University (est. 1969 - 

present day) shaped the distance learning landscape. Marques states that:

Open University revitalized distance education because it combined 

correspondence instruction, supplementary broadcasting and publishing, residential short courses and support services at local and 

regional levels. Its founders believed communication technologies 

could be explored to provide high-quality degrees.214

Perhaps the most lasting and influential feature of Open University was 

the ‘open’ policy that encouraged immediate access of academic knowledge 

through online courses dramatically increasing global learners.

Digital advancements at the close of the 20th century, especially the individual connection to the Internet, accelerated the pace of disruptive learning 

innovation, writes Marques. Information was stored and transferred more 

rapidly and in larger units of data on CDs and new software made the online 

experience a better environment for instructing. The development of the 

LMS, and its capability to manage the learning population, while allowing interactivity in either real time or asynchronously, pushed the reach 

of the classroom and the traditional means to access knowledge. Marques 

states that, “Even regular pedagogy — formal textbooks and written assignments — were influenced by digital technologies such as Blackboard, leading 

physical classrooms to integrate knowledge with hardware and software 

interfaces.”215

Distance learning has become a staple of for-profit higher education institutions and many not-for-profit institutions are advancing programs, even 

complete degree programs, for distance-challenged students. For example, 

Arizona State offers multiple degree programs online to 13,000 students 

out of 85,000 part- and full-time students. As of 2015, they will be offering 

a Global Freshman Academy, a series of eight freshmen MOOC courses 

through the distance learning company EdX (a joint venture between Harvard and MIT) platform.216 University of Maryland University College features the same emphasis. Liberty University serves over 70,000 students 

in their distance learning efforts. Norwich University, a small, four-year 

military university, offers an online graduate and undergraduate degree 

programs that cater to military and former military learners.

The first example of a MOOC occurred in 2008 and was launched by 

two University of Manitoba professors. Their effort “Connectivism and 
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Connectedness” reached at its height over 2,000 students. Student engagement and interaction on course material took place through different platforms including Facebook groups, Wiki pages, blogs, forums, and other 

resources.217 ‘Massive’ truly became operationalized when a 2012 free online 

course, “Introduction to Artificial Intelligence,” was offered by two Stanford 

professors. More than 160,000 students from 190 countries signed up (a fraction completed the entire course—a troubling statistic that has followed 

MOOCs in their brief meteoric rise) and the professors chose to feature the 

experience as replicating an introductory class in a traditional setting.218

Soon after, two Stanford professors, Sebastian Thrun and Peter Norvig, 

started their own educational provider, Udacity. Eye-popping enrollment 

numbers followed for a number of MOOC startups, such as Stanford’s Coursera and EdX. Three years later, MOOCs continue to disrupt higher education, and more traditional and elite schools in addition to MIT, Harvard, 

and Stanford are offering courses. For example, in the Spring semester, 2015, 

Cornell offered four additional MOOCs, based on the success of their first 

set in 2014 that drew enrollments of 55,000 students. Courses include the 

following: 

Revitalize neighborhoods and examine the people, places, and practices that restore nature with Civic Ecology: Reclaiming Broken 

Places ... a course defining social-ecological systems and the relationship of nature to human and community well being.

Networks, taught by [a team of computer scientists to aid students 

in grasping] how the modern world connects us all. Students will 

explore game theory, Internet structure, and social contagion, the 

spread of social power and popularity, and information cascades.

“American Capitalism: A History,” ... will cover how the United 

States has gone from a backwater colony to a global power, revealing enduring lessons about what is possible in capitalism’s ongoing 

development.219

The first complete study of MOOCs was published by Harvard in late 

2014 and a follow-on study in April of 2015. Findings were surprising and 

expected.220 Participation in Harvard and MIT open online courses has 

grown steadily, while participation in repeated courses has declined and 
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then stabilized. Over half of the students seek certificates, while the actual 

rates for those interested in computer science per course mattered more than 

for social sciences and the humanities. A slight majority of MOOC students 

are seeking certification, and many participants are teachers. The strong participation by teachers suggests that even participants who are uninterested 

in certification may still make productive use of MOOCs. Academic areas 

matter when it comes to participation, certification, and course networks. 

Participants were drawn to computer science courses in particular, with 

per-course participation numbers nearly four times higher than in courses 

in the humanities, sciences, and social sciences. Self-identified teachers were 

a large segment of the population and also repeat users, but of those who 

enroll in MOOCs, many already have a degree.221

First, while many MOOC creators and providers have increased 

access to learning opportunities, those who are accessing MOOCs 

are disproportionately people who already have college and graduate 

degrees. The researchers do not necessarily see this as a problem, 

as academic experience may be a requirement in advanced courses. 

However, to serve underrepresented and traditionally underserved 

groups, the data suggest that proactive strategies may be necessary.222

MOOCs and Businesses

As MOOCs continue to evolve and grow in numbers, along with the number 

of students, businesses are finding MOOCs a disruption in workplace learning. Marcel Salathe argues that, “I think the strong demand for vocational 

training will be a major force for innovation in the short term.”223 Businesses 

such as Microsoft, AT&T, and Tenaris are developing MOOCs built for their 

industry and workforce. Beyond internal use, other businesses such as Bank 

of America and Qualcomm are curating their courses for use beyond their 

own workforce. Companies now can: 

[D]esign and deliver online learning, where learners become peer 

reviewers, collaborate with each other, are highly engaged in watching short videos, participate in threaded discussion groups and some 

arrange local meetups to continue their learning.224
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Online learning was a disruptor in business and higher education well 

before MOOCs were developed. Portability and accessibility provided the 

means to take it out of the classroom and as recent successes have indicated, 

propel learning into a far more ‘giving’ virtual environment. Certainly, since 

the economic downturn in 2009, there has been an accelerated focus on 

agile work practices and more rapid adjustments in company strategy. This 

change has created opportunities for employees to drive career growth by 

acquiring and applying new skills in short bursts. Much of this has come 

through on the job skill development, but individuals and organizations are 

also adapting more formal training and education approaches so it aligns 

with the accelerating pace of business.

Udacity, Coursera, and EdX have realized professional development has 

become a learner-centric and competence-driven experience. The pace of 

business learning cannot be sedate or peripheral to the needed core competencies. Businesses see learning and development as punctuated bursts of 

foundational knowledge on marketing, strategy, finance, or negotiations to 

lay the groundwork for the technical skills that are necessary to engage the 

business-driven mission. Learning mechanisms can respond to immediate 

need for usable knowledge and skills or more long-term in constructing 

formal and necessary broad frames or perspectives that can help orient the 

learner to the immediacy of contextualization.

By widening the aperture of the potential, the learning event can adapt 

through the agility of the enterprise to sudden or subtle changes in direction, meeting employee needs or offering the opportunity to new customers or as onboarding for new hires. Curating a suite of accessible learning 

assets to a workforce or others external becomes a part of the online production.225 Issues common to industry instituting a distance-learning program, 

specifically MOOCs, involve insufficient budget or time; technology, especially security concerns; and perhaps the most enduring problem, the lack 

of knowledge and skills within the human capital or training department 

to build and facilitate the courses.226

According to Amy Rouse, director of AT&T University operations training, the company decided to focus on creating their first internal MOOC on 

the topic of “Business Writing,” a course that is also taught in an in-person 

classroom setting and was selected because of its wide appeal. By choosing 

an existing class, content development was streamlined, the same instructors 

could be utilized, and the metrics could be compared to the in-person course. 
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While the in-person version lasted one full day (and required travel), the 

corporate MOOC took about four to six hours over the course of a few weeks. 

Rouse notes the results of the MOOC were quite positive—the completion 

rate was around 80% and learning retention (as measured by a post-class 

assessment) was high and comparable to that seen in in-person courses.227

A Synergy of MOOC Intent and Application: Approach, Costs, 

and Student Diversity

Vocational training is hugely important, and schools can sometimes 

struggle with that. Things are changing so rapidly, technology is 

advancing so rapidly, that it can be a real challenge for universities 

and schools in general to provide enough training. Think about 

the skills to develop for mobile devices, or the skills to analyze big 

data sets. These are now highly prized skills, but just five to seven 

years ago only a few people talked about them. Schools to this day 

in the U.S. are struggling to find enough teachers to teach coding 

skills. MOOCs can very efficiently fill this gap. I think the strong 

demand for vocational training will be a major force for innovation 

in the short term.228

MOOCs feature innovations to enhance social interactions between faculty and other faculty, faculty to student, student to student, institution 

to institution (EdX, Courseara, Udacity), and as of late, higher education 

and business. But to be sure, MOOCs are ultimately a means to disrupt 

the manner in which learning occurs. MOOCs are a logical extension of 

advances in distance and online learning, allowing a variety of learning 

approaches to be utilized by the organization. Higher education and business learning can appear contrary in approach and method; B.S., MBAs, and 

other business-oriented degrees feature long-term education in grounding 

principals and concepts. 

MOOCs can extend time on learning, promote diversity of method, and 

meaningful assessment. Online, or digital learning, offers a more conducive 

learning method and approach to non-traditional students. From a 2014 

study, over 80 percent of undergraduate students are outside of the 18- to 

22-year-old demographic for traditional students and most are residing offcampus. At Georgia Tech, the average student age in the computer science 

master’s online program is 34; the average residential student is 23.229
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MOOCs are a fraction of the cost to both students and institution. Online 

learning minimizes on-campus physical infrastructure and other brick and 

mortar costs—human relations, enrollment, records keeping, living needs, 

and more. Laura Sanborn captures two Wharton Business School professors 

on MOOC experience, “Based on our experience at the Wharton School, we 

show that it costs just pennies to register a new student in a MOOC and a 

few dollars for every student that actually completes the course.” In a recent 

e-mail solicitation from Kahn Academy, they write, that $30, “can help us 

provide 720 hours of free education over the next year.”230

Southern New Hampshire University, in a 2008 program, featured traditional learning delivery held at off-site buildings for a 60 percent reduction 

on tuition costs. Sanborn stretched the concept of non-traditional student 

and delivery to remark that, “if colleges can offer lower tuition rates for 

those physical yet off-campus students that don’t use the gym, public safety, 

dining halls, custodial services, what type of tuition could then be offered 

to digital students who produce absolutely zero wear and tear on buildings, 

technology, and require minimal staff?”231

Examples where online approaches drastically reduce costs include Georgia Institute of Technology, University of Illinois, and Southern New Hampshire. Georgia Institute of Technology offers a master’s degree in computer 

science, all online, for $7,000—the cost of the on-campus experience for the 

degree is $40,000. The cost of an online undergraduate degree is $10,000 for 

a degree at Southern New Hampshire that has been approved by the New 

England Association of Schools and Colleges, compared to the $37,800 per 

year average for a private non-profit, in-person, higher education school.232 

Finally, the University of Illinois offers an Internet Masters of Business 

(iMBA) program that includes digital coursework. Courses are available 

free to all on the Coursera platform. At any point in the program, a student 

may elect to apply to the iMBA program and any of the digital coursework 

completed will be considered as part of the application package. “Performance in the Specializations will be considered for student admittance, 

not just test scores and past transcript.”233 The entire degree is estimated to 

be $20,000 in tuition, compared to $50,000 to take the degree in-person at 

this and similar MBA-granting institutions. Granted, $20,000 isn’t free, but 

all the content is, and the online MBA degree is 60 percent cheaper than 

the on-campus version.234 Part of the key to success for new educational 

initiatives at large, argued Dai Ellis, is to go “radically open source,” to not 
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only adapt to linguistic or regional needs, but to encourage others to seize 

their “university in a box” and use it anywhere. Students can then receive 

an associate degree through Southern New Hampshire University’s College 

for America, a competency-based program.235

At the moment, digital education has modeled itself on the classroom 

of the past. Lectures, quizzes, assessments, often some sort of discussion 

space parsed out over a course term. Perhaps this is not the ideal model of 

learning and training. 

Early cell phones, with their bread loaf-sized heft, were focused on 

meeting the mission of the land-line: making a phone call. Thirty 

years later, the phone has evolved into a mobile device surpassing 

early home computers. While I use my phone consistently (too 

much!) throughout every day, the feature I use the least? The making-a-phone-call feature. What could digital education look like in 

25 years? A 2014 OCLC white paper believes that “We are tipping 

toward an educational era of choice over tradition, convenience over 

perfection, self-service over predefined options.” The foundation 

blocks for new approaches are only now being set into place, and 

the innovation just begun.236

The DOD and Disruption: Too Much or Not Enough?

The Department of Defense is America’s oldest and largest government agency—tracing its roots back to pre-Revolutionary times. 

Today, the Department is not only in charge of the military, but it 

also employs a civilian force of thousands. With over 1.4 million 

men and women on active duty, and 718,000 civilian personnel, 

DOD is the nation’s largest employer. Another 1.1 million serve in 

the National Guard and Reserve forces. More than 2 million military 

retirees and their family members receive benefits.237

Current and past DOD distance and online learning efforts can be traced 

back to the development of the Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) Initiative which was the result of a 1999 Executive Order: 

[T]o ensure that DOD and other federal employees take full advantage of technological advances in order to acquire the skills and 
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learning needed to succeed in an ever-changing workplace. The 

intent of the Executive Order was to provide flexible training opportunities to employees and to explore how federal training programs, 

initiatives, and policies can better support lifelong learning through 

the use of learning technology.238

ADL is the interface between a changing world and the need to develop 

learning approaches to make it more understandable and meaningful. Says 

ADL Director Sae Schatz:

Globalization, social media, ever-increasing computing power, and 

the proliferation of low-cost advanced technologies have created 

a level of complexity and rapid change never before seen. Success 

requires reflection and creativity, the adaptability to notice and react 

quickly to evolving conditions, and a strategic understanding of the 

far-reaching effects of actions taken. Learning science and technologies can help foster outcomes such as critical thinking, emotional 

intelligence, and more efficient and agile pathways to expertise. The 

methods and tools developed by ADL and our partners in government, industry, and academia are essential to achieving this vision.239

ADL is the hub of research and development for the DOD promoting 

the reduction of “e-learning costs to government though interoperability, 

shareability, and durability of e-learning content.”240 More specifically, ADL 

was designed to identify and promulgate standards for training software 

purchased by federal agencies and contractors; promote development of 

technical training standards; and establish guidelines on the use of standards 

and furnish a means to aid DOD and other federal agencies in the large-scale 

development, implementation, and assessment of interoperable and reusable 

learning systems. ADL is currently spearheading next generation interoperability specifications, research and development for a personal assistant for 

learning, and mobile learning and empirical research into game design to 

enhance cognitive capabilities.241

Originating with ADL was the concept of providing a set of standards and 

specifications that promulgate a collection of inter-related “content objects, 

data models and protocols such that objects are sharable across systems that 

conform to the same model.”242 Labeled SCORM (sharable content object 

reference model), this set of references about e-learning and standardizations 
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promotes the ability to reuse learning content across LMSs.243 SCORM is a 

collection and harmonization of specifications and standards that defines 

the interrelationship of content objects, data models and protocols such that 

objects are sharable across systems that conform to the same model. This 

specification promotes reusability and interoperability of learning content 

across LMSs.244

With almost half a million employees overseas, at sea, and on land, out 

of a total of over three million, the DOD faces a complex and remote training need, especially one that involves joint services. This is accomplished 

through joint training and exercises for combatant commands and features 

designated joint and combined force headquarters, and coalition partners, 

through officer and enlisted joint professional military education, and the 

National Defense University. 

Much of the DOD’s e-learning efforts are web-based and sit on existing 

internal systems within the organization’s information technology infrastructure. Training efforts can be mandatory, including knowledge checks 

associated with the content. Most training is self-paced, limiting the variability of learning approaches or styles, while professional military and civilian 

education can be both residential and e-learning/web-based. Service institutions such as the Command and Staff and War Colleges, Naval Postgraduate School, joint universities such as National Defense University, Defense 

Acquisition University, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, and others offer residential and distance e-learning programs. There 

are accredited courses and certificate options for DOD military members 

and civilians available through Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

Department of Homeland Security, and the Defense Security Service’s Center 

for Development of Security Excellence. Learning programs for many of 

these institutions focus on security, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism.245 

Each Service provides an online repository of learning opportunities: Navy 

Knowledge Online, MarineNet, Army Knowledge Online, and Air Force 

Portal. Joint Knowledge Online is the home for “the Department of Defense 

(DOD) unique and authoritative source for online joint training.”246

Language and culture learning efforts across the DOD feature e-learning/

self-paced and distance learning programs. Culture-specific products that 

may feature self-paced elementary learning are accessible at various sources 

through websites such as DLI, Joint Language University, and individual Service centers. Language programs such as Global Language Online Support 
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System (GLOSS) and Rapport offer self-paced audio and reading content for 

linguistic and cultural learning. GLOSS offers audio lessons in languages and 

culture for independent learners for improving their foreign language skills. 

“Reading and listening lessons are based on authentic materials (articles, TV 

reports, radio broadcasts, etc.) and consist of 4 to 6 activities.” Automated 

feedback is provided following tasks.247 Rapport consists of six to eight hours 

of assessed training via a knowledge check that “covers military language 

modules and cultural awareness for history, religion, geography, and basic 

social exchanges in the target language.”248

Joint Language University (JLU) is another web-based language learning 

program utilized as a U.S. Government language training portal. One of the 

featured resources of JLU is Transparent Language’s CL-150 which is a broad 

suite of software tools and content for language learners, instructors, and 

program managers.249 Through JLU, and synchronized across the web and 

personal devices, CL-150 offers learning content in over 120 languages “for 

both general proficiency and specialized performance domains of interest 

to government.”250 CL-150 provides language instructors and mentors to 

manage the learning experience while reporting learning analytics at student, class, instructor, and program levels.251

DOD and MOOCs 

This is the future of education. I think this is the greatest invention 

since the public library system. It is the public library system and 

the internet combined, with guided direction of the world’s greatest 

instructors thrown into the mix. I am convinced that this is how the 

world will judge future academic institutions and decide where they 

will send their children to study full-time. It is also quite possibly, 

how future college students will prepare and choose their degree 

paths. I expect great things for the future due largely to efforts 

such as these. For Scott’s part, he believes the business model will 

allow MOOCs to count towards degree and certificate programs at 

“brick-and-mortar” institutions if they are individually partnered 

with that institution and upon the successful completion of testing 

on a fee basis.252

The DOD is not the most nimble of organizations when it comes to accepting technology in areas away from weaponry advance and more generally 
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programs that directly support the warfighter. Preparing and developing the 

warfighter in education and training endeavors has only partially acquiesced 

to DOD’s development of disruptive online learning efforts. However, the 

DOD has recognized the potential of MOOCs as an example of an online 

delivery system. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) acknowledged the 

disruption of MOOCs but also their benefits: 

Barely two years young, massive open online courses (MOOCs) have 

already begun to radically change the way universities teach. The 

top universities worldwide have begun creating free, Web-enabled 

courses. NDLP participants are encouraged to participate in these 

classes using Coursera and covering topics such as organizational 

analysis, nutrition sciences and terrorism.253

ADL, at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, researched 

the feasibility of alternative technology and learning advances with a report 

due back in Academic Year 2015. MOOCs, and more generally online learning, was folded in that request.

Shane Gallagher, from ADL, provided a presentation in June of 2014 

on the feasibility of MOOCs in the DOD and provided a detailed analysis 

of the utility and portability of an online learning experience.254 Features 

such as the ‘scalability’ of start-up, reach, and content were pointed out as 

positive capabilities. Gallagher found that MOOCs, as a learning application, spanned the joint enterprise and learning communities that were and 

are usually siloed, and they also provided open access to learning opportunities for allies, partners, and coalition members. From a learning standpoint, MOOCs provide accessibility and sharing of content, the potential 

to promote richer learning models, and the ability of facilitators to leverage 

a wide array of resources. Says Professor Ben Bederson, Special Advisor to 

the Provost on Technology and Educational Transformation, University 

of Maryland, about MOOCs and creation of a diversity of learning styles, 

“the potential comes from not only self-paced and self-service learning, but 

also by making face-to-face learning more effective by enabling more active 

learning styles.”255 To contend with ‘massive,’ MOOCs allow the formation 

of peer-based or mentored working groups that provide learning reinforcement and can be used, similarly to business to help transition and re-position 

workforce, or in the case of DOD, veterans. Finally, from a programmatic 

perspective, offering MOOCs, especially in the numbers that drive the label 
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‘massive,’ offers the ability for any organization, such as the DOD, in need 

of tracking performance to access data on learning analytics, content and 

instruction, considering subject preference, and especially assessment. 

Gallagher provides a contrary set of variables that create obstacles to 

the MOOCs’ learning utility in the DOD and U.S. Government. Where 

massive offered reach, massive is suggested to degrade the intimacy of the 

instructor/student relationship. Assessment may prove to be difficult due to 

the absence or scaled back role of the instructor. Student investment may be 

diminished, and motivation and drive to complete the course problematic, 

given the history of diminishing completion rates of the MOOCs. If the 

course is required, investment and drive may be moot, or also exhibited in a 

traditional learning setting. Openness of the content and access to the course 

may hamper an organization’s need for security. Grading models, cheating, 

and plagiarism are all issues of MOOCs.256

Many in the DOD learning establishment see resistance to distance and 

even further online learning (MOOCs for example). Resistance to MOOCs, 

more generally online or distance learning, has always been attributed to the 

reduction of live face-to-face interaction and the lack of perceived control of 

the instructor over the learning process. This author has heard many voice 

opposition due to the one-dimensionality of the many distributed distance 

learning products. “[M]any say that DL ‘is just like all the other PowerPoint 

trainings we have to do, from force protection, security and operational 

awareness to Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and Sexual Assault 

Prevention and Response (SAPR).’”257

Face-to-face interaction today is not what it was a decade, even two 

decades ago. Live video, even taped, synchronous, and asynchronous discussions or chat, and other means connect instructors/facilitators and students. 

“We have to get much, much better at enabling interactions. Collaboration 

happens, but not nearly enough. In addition, people really do crave human 

face-to-face interactions. Look at the popularity of video chats, look at the 

popularity of live events (up 400% despite a collapse in music sales) - we just 

love genuine human interaction.”258 This author found that minimizing faceto-face interaction actually put the emphasis on solid instructional design 

theory to make the course successful, making that interaction paramount to 

successful learning. “I think that is a big plus with the populations I teach. I 

arrogantly used to think my real time gyrations in the classroom were what 

sunk in learning; not any more. Success in DL requires a well-built course 
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and that becomes a turn off for classroom instructors who can get by on 

personality and discussion.”259 Faculty may perceive MOOCs as a threat to 

their employment, or their role as professor. Consolidation of faculty, even 

subjects taught, could impact them professionally.

In the end, MOOCs, or what may be the next learning disruptor, may 

depend on technology to enhance or accelerate the ‘speed of learning,’ allow 

the openness and diversity of experience of cohorts and provide meaningful assessment. MOOCs and online learning can also transform learning 

programs and their organizations by offering opportunities for experimentation. “MOOCs have a profound opportunity to impact the way we learn 

and train, both our service people and our citizens,” said Dr. Karen Cooper, 

Research Scientist Future Workforce Technologies and Strategies, NAVAIR. 

“Technology is merely an enabler; it is sound instructional design that creates the opportunity for learning to occur. And well-designed MOOCs that 

effectively leverage technology are creating powerful large-scale, global, open 

constructs to significantly change how we learn.”260

Summary

One encouraging result of the MOOC mania is the rising interest 

in open online learning, even if in this case innovation has become 

synonymous with how to scale a single course for many users. The 

more interesting challenge for an open learning architecture is how 

to scale agile and distinct environments across and among many 

courses — or even better, across several institutions and across 

the web itself. This moves us back toward a network of networks, a 

foundational principle of the Internet.261

Disruption to learning policy, programs, and instruction in the DOD 

requires more than overcoming current inertia. It requires sustaining progress through skepticism. Specific learning programs such as SOF LRC present 

unique opportunities to explore disruptive technology and learning models. 

This author has designed and launched a MOOC entitled “Operationalizing 

Culture: Thinking Differently about Behavior in the Human Domain” (this 

course will explore more in depth in the next chapter on Technology and 

LMS).262 The course is representative of online learning and open access 

(open to the limits of SOF) providing capability to link beyond geography 

and over time. Online can also promote a much applied learning focus. 
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Like any non-traditional student, taking learning and applying it 

immediately to their situations where they are at doesn’t require a 

physical classroom. But for what and who I teach, for today’s military or other deployed agencies, DL allows my students to actually 

be in country when taking the course – tell me that doesn’t open 

up new levels of real time cross-cultural learning that would make 

any educator salivate over application – real learning takes place in 

novel and ‘natural settings’ outside of the classroom.263

What this allows from an LRC promotes linking culture-general knowledge constructs to culture-specific knowledge in varying locations students 

are deployed to for both the individual learner but as well for the remainder 

of the cohort not there. This is powerful.

Even with access to numbers of students that just a decade ago would 

have been unfathomable, online learning still pushes traditional features of 

a ‘classroom’ and the role of instructor toward innovation. Disruptions have 

created the agility and remote learning architecture for many different kinds 

of learning populations, to include formal higher education, and organizations that seek to combine higher learning and professional development. 

This newest disruption applies to military learning, but specifically to the 

DOD. For instance, LRC learning often requires a substantial effort to master 

foundational knowledge and language skills necessary. Also important is the 

experience, both personal and others’, that is expressed through narrative 

in the real-time interactions of a cohort. This interaction helps anchor the 

concepts while language training is best obtained in a highly interactive 

environment. There are several trends or manifestations of disruptions that 

have utility for the SOF LRC enterprise. Technology is critical to any kind 

of contemporary learning endeavor, but more so for blended or distance 

learning. LMSs, such as Blackboard or Moodle, are critical technological 

interfaces that have been in existence a few short years. Against the backdrop 

of fast-moving revolutions such as MOOCs, their presence is now accepted 

as a necessary piece of the learning infrastructure. The next section will 

provide a review of LMSs, their function and utility, and considerations for 

deployment in a traditional learning setting. Technology through an LMS 

provides a centralizing function for an array of tasks, including collection of 

biographical data, performance indicators, and learning records. Ultimately, 

learning models and delivery systems will affect learning programs in very 
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large organizations, such as the DOD, that are dependent on constantly seeking transformative technology, online learning provides not just disruptive 

technology, but transformative approaches to learning about a very rapidly 

changing world, one which technology is just a part of a more human-centric 

solution.

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7. Learning Management Systems: 

Centralizing Disruption

A remotely piloted aircraft or drone offers a platform of sensing 

technology and lethal weaponry. Sitting on a tarmac or flying level 

the drone is an example of the principles of unmanned flight. It takes 

a pilot and a sensor operator sitting often times 8,000 miles away 

to engage the technology and send it off on its mission, selecting 

the kinds of sensor equipment to engage to turn it into a working 

ISR platform, or to arm a hellfire missile to turn it into a killing 

machine. Function follows aim, need or exploration. 

Thus far, alternative learning approaches, models, and systems have been 

explored. An LMS facilitates these approaches, including residential instruction, while offering opportunity to create blended instruction. The power 

of an LMS is indeed in the software’s ability to manage functions within a 

learning event. Yet, the true power and value of an LMS is in the manipulation of its capabilities and the many ways the LMS can be used. 

Most current LMSs feature integrated comprehensive software that “supports the development, delivery, assessment, and administration of courses 

in traditional face-to-face, blended, or online learning environments.”264 

Digital frameworks manage curriculum, training materials, and evaluation 

tools.265 LMSs provide web-based “24/7 from anywhere” access to instructor, 

learning content, and administration; and can be found across higher education, form the foundation for most business workforce training programs, 

and are found in many DOD learning efforts. 

The learning management system (LMS) is a remarkable phenomenon in higher education. On the one hand, the LMS has seen 

unprecedented adoption rates. Estimates of colleges and universities 

running an LMS are almost always near 99 percent. Of faculty, 85 

percent use an LMS, with 56 percent using it on a daily basis, and 74 

percent say it is a useful tool to enhance teaching. Among students, 

83 percent use an LMS, and 56 percent say they use it in most or 

all courses. In an enterprise as highly individualistic as teaching 
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and learning, these are remarkable numbers. No other academic 

application comes close to such adoption rates.266

What an LMS Brings to Learning

An LMS can be considered a processor and administrator of the learning 

experience. Not all LMSs are created equal or have the breadth of capability. LMS is a generic label that encompasses different software systems that 

reflect two main approaches to all kinds of e-learning. These approaches and 

associated types of LMSs will be discussed in a following section. An LMS 

can be as simple as a rudimentary wiki developed for students or groupware 

to share their learning products or experiences and engage in a forum. Just 

like the many and often interchangeable definitions of alternate learning 

models; remote, distributed, distant, online, and more; the designation of 

LMS has been applied to different types based on use and utility. However, 

the most common utility of an LMS is the ability to administer in some way, 

simple or complex, a learning event that may involve managing curriculum, 

training materials, and evaluation tools.

LMSs are a reflection of function and organizational learning need. There 

are over 600 kinds of LMSs on the market and each is unique in its own 

way, possessing a feature set to meet the needs of a variety of trainers and 

educators.267 There has been much written on a variety of questions that can 

help an organization determine need to implement an LMS, such as what 

are the assets and ‘functions’ that are critical, and other variables about 

learners, facilitators, learning content, and more. There seems to be two 

initial overarching questions to address when considering the move from 

a traditional classroom to a variation of e-learning (learning utilizing electronic technologies to access educational curriculum outside of a traditional 

classroom268) and the contemplation of an LMS. Will the intent of the LMS 

be for education or training (and thereby used by an institution of higher 

learning or a corporate entity/business), and secondarily, will the utility of 

the LMS be to support learning and instruction or will the LMS be to provide 

inclusive learning as stand-alone content with much student interaction or 

the use of an instructor? 

The history of LMSs starts with its initial application to educational institutions. Businesses found LMSs could help centralize training to an internal 

workforce and outside clients and customers. With training at the speed of 
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business, advancing technology was critical for success and the more powerful tool to consulting human resources/human capital companies and any 

organization looking to get a better grasp on the continuing education of its 

workforce. It is not surprising that businesses have capitalized on the utility 

of an LMS given its efficiencies, even though initial intent was higher education. It has only been within the last decade that higher learning has discovered the market that features non-traditional learners motivated to acquire 

degrees and certificates, and also the inability of the traditional university 

and college experience to shape their educational experience around work, 

family, and distance. With both higher education and businesses facing 

evolving learning needs and the transformative agency of the Internet, the 

intent and form of learning is being disrupted, and the proliferation of LMSs 

is the result. In essence, “the same technological and market forces are dramatically changing today’s classroom as well.”269

There are core features or functions that can be found across the LMS 

landscape. Common component areas include content creation, communication, assessment, and administration.270 Within those four categories, the 

below more specific features have been distilled from a few publications, but 

are by no means inclusive or exhaustive of a list.271

• Rosters/registration and control: Tracking attendance and for sending 

invitations to class participants.

• Document management: Upload and manage, including on-demand 

access of documents containing curricular content.

• Multiple device access: Delivery of course content over web-based 

interfaces such as desktops, phones, or tablets.

• Distributed instructor and student base: Remote participation by the 

instructor or pupil allows courseware to feature multiple teachers or 

experts from across the globe.

• Course calendars: Creation and publication of course schedules, deadlines, and tests.

• Instructor-student/student-student engagement: Interaction between 

and among facilitators/students, such as instant messaging, email, 

and discussion forums.

• Tracking/reporting: Tracking of learner data, including progress on 

a predefined set of training goals and requirements, and tracking of 
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courses for usage, especially in relation to required deployment of 

mandated training (for example, compliance training).

• Customization and branding: It is important that your online courses 

can be identified as your own. Be sure you have the abilities to brand 

courses with your logo and colors, customize groups and terms of 

use, create custom certifications of completion, and create custom 

email notifications.

• Administration: Course administrator and all of the tools and features 

available; including tracking and reporting, content management, 

notifications, single sign-on, application program interface, and more.

• Tracking and reporting: Tools guide student progress via prerequisites 

and learning paths, export user data and create real-time reports, 

and deliver timed courses and inactivity timeouts. Includes tracking 

of courses for usage, especially in relation to required deployment of 

mandated training (for example, compliance training).

• Assessment and testing tools: Most learning management systems 

have some sort of online exam system with various testing tools. 

Bonus tools are question pooling, question randomization, required 

responses, and automated self-grading.

• Compatibility and supported devices: Many LMSs have an HTML 

5-based user interface that adapts to different hardware devices; 

including desktops, laptops, and tablets. Specific platforms that may 

be supported are PC, Mac, Linux, iOS (iPads/iPhones), Android, 

Blackberry, and more.

• Course interactivity: Levels of interactivity can vary among LMSs. 

Interactive features consider HD streaming video, audio, images, 

SCORM presentations, assignments, and tests.

• User registration: Import students via mass uploads, automate 

uploads, and/or enable students to self-register quickly.

• SCORM compliance: Critical if developing training/learning in or 

for government use.

Types of LMSs 

There are basically two types of LMSs that feature the above list of functions. 

The first LMS manages the learning process and is primarily used by business or corporate training programs. Management includes orchestrating 
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the learning process from creation/authoring of content through the delivery of web-based content and tracking of learners and their progress. LMSs 

provide functionality such as content migration and management, learning 

object repositories, content re-use and individualized learning via learning 

objects, asynchronous collaborative learning, testing and certification, and 

interconnectivity with virtual classroom and learning management system 

applications.272 In business and government, training security concerns and 

the proprietary nature of training material LMS are closed circuit platforms 

(logins, restricted access to classes). The idea of sharing content and reusing products generated during classes does not exist in the world of ‘LMSs’ 

(mainstream e-learning).273

A learning content management system (LCMS) is a variation of an 

LMS. The most significant difference is that a LCMS can actually create 

and manage the use and delivery of web-based learning content. LCMSs are 

more nimble and can aid swift acquisition, delivery, and overall management 

of knowledge ensnared in the web-based process.274 The LMS is more of a 

logistical application managing learners, the activities, and mapping the 

selected competencies of the organization.275

The second system, usually referred to as an LMS, but also as a course 

management system (CMS), has become indispensable to universities and 

colleges for traditional classroom learning as well as for blended and online 

learning. “Course Management Systems (CMS) are software packages that 

bring together numerous Internet tools and allow them to be accessed via 

a simple and convenient user interface. Such systems are also referred to as 

Virtual Learning Environments (VLE) or Learning Management Systems 

(LMS).”276 Unlike LMSs found in training programs that often do not require 

instructors or even facilitators, CMSs act to increase the efficacy of a course 

by providing a frame for instructors and students, and mature software 

with sets of tools for the instructor. CMSs are designed to assist instructors in constructing their course then managing the learning progress and 

students. Instructor usability is a primary function. On the other hand, a 

LMS’s primary function is an instructorless stand-alone e-learning capability 

with little intervention occurring during the learning phase. It is irrelevant 

to discuss advantages and disadvantages of CMSs over LMSs, since they are 

designed more for education than for training.277

User registration and authentication, creation of static web pages, file 

exchange, tests and surveys, student grading, journals, wikis, photo galleries, 
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and chat rooms are examples of tools found in a CMS. Known to CMS 

software engineers as modules, “a well-designed CMS will integrate several 

modules behind a seamless user interface.”278 The CMS may also include tools 

for real-time chat, or asynchronous bulletin board type communications. 

Supporting distance learning or the more traditional residential courses 

selects a relatively sophisticated environment to run efficiently.279 A CMS 

requires installation on a web-based server with integration to an associated database/relational database which must include significant hardware, 

software, and technical resources. The cost for setting up a CMS requires a 

rather significant human and financial resource outlay. Due to this, colleges 

and universities field the most CMSs.280 To those with a mature network 

architecture, the major cost will be CMS licensing, which can be somewhat 

daunting. Without infrastructure and budget, many smaller educational 

institutions may engage the CMS company to install and host the CMS for 

a fee.281

Many educational institutions, unfortunately, have neither the infrastructure nor the budget to install and maintain a CMS. In the absence of a 

computer network infrastructure, one alternative is web hosting, in which 

the CMS developer or a commercial Internet service provider will install 

and maintain the CMS for a charge. However, where budgetary constraints 

are the main factor precluding the installation of a CMS, there exist free 

open source CMS packages such as Moodle and Claroline, and individual 

instructors or departments that can be accessed and the onus of installation 

and maintenance will typically fall on individual teachers.282

Finally, there are web-based virtual tools that promote collaborative 

instructor or group-led learning. Virtual software for business meetings 

are an example, but for learning use, virtual ‘classrooms’ often categorized 

as webinars represent the classroom environment. Limited capability allows 

synchronous interaction and sharing of materials or content, such as slides, 

images, etc., per event. This author utilizes webinars to support periodic 

‘life of the Institute’s’ meetings of research fellows, as well as ‘roundtables’ 

for the one-year research fellows. Connectivity can pose difficulty for all to 

take part. This author also uses Skype as a means to instruct culture courses 

to JBLM from Alexandria, Virginia. 

SOF Teletraining System (SOFTS) is an online training tool that features language learning in a small online classroom setting. “SOFTS takes 

advantage of proprietary and commercial off-the-shelf technology to deliver 
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real-time language and culture training to students anywhere in the world, 

including those who are unable to attend traditional classes at traditional 

institutions.”283 Classes include language and culture instruction. Requirements include: computer, microphone, webcam, and bandwidth. Bandwidth 

is key particularly because a lagging voice can be detrimental to the learning 

process. PowerPoint presentations are usually shown during the class with 

the instructor talking through the slides. Students have the ability to interact 

with the slides through a variety of tools that are attached to the program.284

There seems to be a clear cut distinction between types of LMSs, based on 

the type of organization and what kind of learning they require, a training 

versus education mission, and the role of the learner. Due to these variables, 

the content, intent, and application of the learning can be dramatically different. Both LMSs manage the learning experience, one supports a facilitator, 

the other is fed with stand-alone material, and after being ‘programmed’ by 

the instructional designers, is more self-sufficient.

To put it another way, course management is often the main function of 

an LMS—a secure place to store and launch training to a subset of users. In 

some respect, you can attribute metrics to a course management system, but 

that is not a requirement. A CMS also has less need to be SCORM compliant. 

An LMS on the other hand encompasses course management, but is more 

robust in that it often implies a subset of learning standards (i.e., SCORM) 

for reporting purposes, and lately has started to include learning that takes 

place outside of a computing environment. An LMS can assist in the learning strategy as it relates to improving performance. A CMS is less dynamic, 

more or less offering a secure database. To put it simply, an LMS can be as 

big or small as you want it to be, while a CMS will struggle to adapt to be 

something more than a file repository.285

Training and education find the LMS as a common denominator in 

the current learning landscape, but a move to more application not at the 

expense of knowledge is ongoing while making learning immediately usable. 

Education/learning was always about the foundational components framed 

by theory, training provided specific skills to accomplish a task, no matter 

how simple or complex—to do rather than know. The LMS becomes an agent 

to set the learning priorities. What LMS is used without careful consideration will short-circuit the learning strategy due to available features. To an 

educational institution, “it is critical [to deliberate] fully before selecting an 

LMS that is aligned with its educational plan and meets the needs of various 
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stakeholders286 while a business is more intent on identifying core learning 

and development objectives and aims. More specifically, the question needing answering is which skill sets or information are your learners expecting 

to take away from your e-learning course or online training event?287

Given the complexity and diversity of the human domain, the current 

asymmetrical application of LRC components to that complexity by SOF, and 

the need to promote LRC learning as part of IAT in the qualifying schools 

and to then be able to sustain LRC at periodic interventions along the trajectory of a career would best be facilitated by utilization of an LMS that 

could support both stand-alone e-learning and online distant learning. This 

author was one of the primary architects of an innovative LRC program at 

JBLM. A LMS has been utilized at JBLM to do just that—synergize instruction across the LRC enterprise featuring multiple LRC instructors for each 

course and provide the assessments critical to establishing student performance, as a more accurate measure of capability. In effect, the uniqueness 

of the intent and content of the JBLM program forces the complimentary 

juxtaposition of LMS/CMS capability. LRC instruction features knowledge 

and skills that tie to both a learning/knowledge component and a more 

applied skills development. 

There are several webpages and publications that offer quick and much 

more in-depth exposés about moving traditional training/learning programs 

to distant and/or online learning programs. The website eLearning Industry 

offers informative web articles/blogs that provide lists of concerns, issues, 

and questions to consider: “Tips for Choosing the Best Learning Management System; How To Choose The Best Learning Management System Based 

On Your Company’s Needs; 6 Questions You Need to Answer To Successfully Move your Corporate Training Online; Is Corporate eLearning Really 

Worth The Investment?, Top 5 Tips to Convert Your Traditional Course into 

an eLearning Format,” and more. There are also individual web articles that 

cover elements of initiating or continuing an e-learning or distance/online 

learning program, or selection of an LMS; one need to just search e-learning, 

LMS, distant/online learning, or even MOOCs to uncover a treasure trove of 

information. The amount of information on these subjects certainly underscores the wealth of resources available to the learner in an online program, 

at the same time of underscoring the amount of resources available. Finally, 

there are certainly more formal, lengthy, and scholarly efforts that relate 
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to the problem at hand, text books, contracted studies, and work done by 

institutes and research centers. 

Although SOF LRC does not represent a formal academic institution, the 

move to a program that features a distance/online learning fueled by a LMS 

would encounter a transition period where changing the entire or parts of the 

traditional learning program would necessitate a complete move or smaller 

moves to a new LMS. The oftentimes bumpy transition would involve critical 

stakeholders, such as resource personnel, faculty, and administrators, and 

the unknown effect on students’ learning and perception of the value of this 

move would all be problematic. 

Perhaps one of the key areas of concern with a transition are the stakeholders—not only their buy-in but their active involvement in the transition.

It is critical that a diverse group of people representing different 

academic and non-academic departments, as well as students, be 

involved in the decision-making process to ensure buy-in and minimum resistance during the implementation process. Proper project 

management is also required to ensure a successful implementation. 

If an institution is seeking to make widespread improvements to an 

existing LMS, it must also ensure widespread stakeholder involvement and effective project management during this process; such 

re-alignment is likely to succeed only if the existing LMS has the 

necessary capabilities.288

However, as C. Wright details, despite the many benefits that can accrue 

when an LMS is implemented, the selection and implementation processes 

sometimes fail when there is an overall lack of institutional understanding, adherence to its educational strategy, resourcing for the transition, and 

training faculty and staff on LMS use, and other areas of concern. The below 

provide a sense of critical awareness of points of failure if not addressed:289

• leadership, by management, academic leaders, and those who have 

political influence within the institution;

• commitment to the process through time and resources before evidence of success emerges;

• organization-wide buy-in and appreciation for what an LMS can and 

cannot do;

• stakeholder involvement in the selection process;
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• alignment with the education plan or direction of the institution;

• congruency with how instructors teach—implementing an LMS can 

itself lead instructors to reconsider their teaching methods;

• recognition of the cultural changes required to achieve success and 

resistance to changes;

• organizational preparedness during implementation; 

• training for instructional designers, instructors, students, and information technology specialists;

• focus on designing quality courses interweaving subjects together;

• student and instructor computer literacy skills;

• student/faculty access to Internet, computers, the web, and/or the 

LMS; 

• user-friendliness of the software;

• funds required for hardware, including servers, network infrastructure, backup storage, backup power supply, air conditioning for the 

hardware, and computers/digital terminals; and

• due diligence by the LMS selection committee to adequately address 

the needs and concerns of the potential users, verify the information 

provided by vendors and external experts, and ensure that the selected 

LMS can actually perform the tasks requested by users.

JBLM Language and Culture Center (LCC)—A Case Study in 

LRC LMS Use

JBLM LCC has a robust LRC learning footprint across several organizations 

and missions. The author, as indicated earlier, has supported the development of LRC efforts at JBLM for three years. His experience there—two ILR 

plenary presentations (2014, 2015) and a Plenary at the 2015 LEARN—forms 

the basis for this section. A primary responsibility for the JBLM LCC is the 

language development for 7th Infantry Division that includes three pillars 

of LRC support; professional military intelligence (MI) linguists, a language 

enabled conventional force soldiers’ (LES) program, and a cultural orientation and language training program that is comprised of an array of training and products developed as just-in-time support to mission need or as a 

stand-alone product and materials offered to individuals and units.290

The role, scope, and breadth of JBLM LCC in Army LRC has grown 

dramatically over the last decade.291 The initial pillar of MI linguist training 
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continues to serve language refresher and sustainment classes for 7th Infantry Division. The LES pillar developed as an organic program at JBLM 

requested initially by a Stryker commander who realized the implications 

of not having enough, or any, cultural awareness in his units. This awareness 

included understanding and communicating with a wide variety of significantly diverse cultures. For his second deployment to Iraq, the commander 

wanted to “grow some capability in language and culture.” Six iterations of 

the initial LES learning program were offered—four for OIF and two for 

OEF—for the Stryker brigades and one fires brigade. The ILR results averaged at 0+ level in proficiency. The third pillar of LRC effort is a menu of LRC 

training, products, and culture and region support to units. These products 

include AOR and culture briefs, language familiarizations to include crosscultural competence, culture-general and computer science knowledge, CCC, 

how to use an interpreter, and self-paced materials: Headstart, 200 hour 

courses, language survival kits, and access to distance learning websites such 

as Joint Knowledge Online and Joint Language University.292

The JBLM LCC program runs through a Moodle CMS (or as we will continue to use LMS). It offers instructor-facilitated remote LRC distance learning where the instructor and students from off-post (Hawaii, for example) 

utilize the JBLM LMS for content/materials, homework, assessment, and 

enrollment/registration. It provides a blended learning experience to military 

linguist classes where an onsite instructor provides language instruction in 

class while utilizing the LMS to offer additional learning sources, homework, 

and assessment. All exercises and homework is done, assessed, and recorded 

in the LMS. It provides an outlet for stand-alone products and training that 

can be accessed by individuals or units upon request or opportunistically. 

And finally, the LMS was the integrating factor in developing the LES model 

that is now in use at JBLM. The initial 10-week IAT OIF and OEF course 

has transitioned into a fully realized LRC event. The functionality of the 

LMS allowed the flexibility needed to create the current operating model. 

The LMS is a secure-access platform. Potential users set up an account and 

access once inside the LMS is determined by JBLM LCC staff, provided by 

the LMS administrators. As the LMS is a front-end of the system, storage 

for the numerous classes, support materials such as videos and readings, 

and other content and products, is only as powerful as the storage capacity 

supplied by the servers. Those servers sit in the basement of the LCC.
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LES and LMS

The current operating LES model evolved out of the AfPak Hands language 

model with the initial iterations of the 2006 and 2007 course offering at JBLM 

LCC. KSAs of the initial classes included language maintenance required 

for soldiers upon conclusion of training (6 hours/week—scenario training, 

two-week immersion) and dedicated cultural specific training. This became 

the ‘campaign continuity’ for all brigade sized units deploying to OIF and 

OEF. After the program had run for several iterations, issues with the campaign continuity model became apparent. An ILR proficiency of 0+ was too 

low. ILR level 1 was the lowest ‘useful’ level for commanders. The number of 

languages for AfPak did not compare to the large numbers of Pacific Command specific languages. The types and content of culture-specific material 

covered were not aligned with the mission realities. The need for the LES was 

to assist in missions with a combative focus as opposed to myriad potential 

missions, the majority of which are likely to be ‘left of bang.’293 The language 

curriculum was developed using available DLIFLC Basic Course materials, 

which as discussed earlier, was designed for MI linguists (reading/listening 

focused).

Current LES Model

I expect commitment to fully hone language skills and embrace an 

appreciation for cultural nuances of the Armies and citizens of the 

locations where you will train and engage ... Bottom line—I want to 

see the same energy unit focused on Kunar or Paktika province in 

Afghanistan applied to the new regional focus of Java in Indonesia 

for example.294

Recently, the model was changed dramatically as was the focus of the 

command at JBLM. Much of the conventional forces need is now based 

on exercise contingency training missions. LES courses were constructed 

on mission need. In this case, the impending exercise was used to initiate 

a cycle of course construction. The questions asked of the units for goals/

objectives of the course included: who you want to train, what will they be 

doing with the language, and what components of the exercise are likely 

to involve cross-cultural communication. A real-life scenario is selected to 

span the 10-week course and from that information, a point of instruction 
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is developed and then refined through the draft to final process. Once a 

course has been taught, the point of instruction is reviewed and refined as 

needed. The model also includes folding the linguistic acquisition in four 

functional military domains: rapport building, logistical, security, and medical. The current model is based on three years of refinement and has become 

a 10-week IAT for Pacific Command languages, thus far Korean, Japanese, 

Tagalog, Thai, and Indonesian. 

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8. Concluding the Journey

Readiness Issues

Advanced Foreign Language Proficiency Training Systems

The committee believes that foreign language proficiency is an 

essential component of military readiness that enables U.S. military personnel to provide strategic warning and critical response 

capability. The committee is concerned that changes in advanced 

foreign language proficiency training programs may have an impact 

on the ability of civilian and military personnel at the Department 

of Defense to support combatant commanders and possibly lead 

to gaps in readiness. Specifically, the committee is concerned that 

linguists at the Department of Defense and supporting agencies 

may be unable to perform their job functions properly if they are 

unable to access advanced language and cultural training modules, 

as these personnel are required to interact, speak, and write in 

multiple dialects and social registers of a given language in order 

to adequately perform their varied missions. 

To better understand any potential shortfalls arising from planned 

changes in advanced foreign language proficiency training programs, 

the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the House 

Committee on Armed Services not later than October 1, 2015, on 

any capability gaps in advanced foreign language proficiency training within the Department of Defense. The Secretary shall also 

note any shortfalls that may arise within agencies that support the 

Department of Defense.295

This has been a rather uneven journey into the critical need to further 

develop LRC KSAs in the DOD. This is especially true for SOF and the 

potential of alternative learning strategies and programs that can provide 

those KSAs in meaningful and sustainable ways. The above summons for the 

Secretary of Defense to brief Congress on advanced foreign language readiness did not feature elements of the conventional forces. The summons was 

instead intended for military and civilian linguists who “may be unable to 

perform their job functions properly if they are unable to access advanced 
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language and cultural training modules, as these personnel are required to 

interact, speak, and write in multiple dialects and social registers of a given 

language in order to adequately perform their varied missions.”296 Interest and concern from this Congressional request reveals a step back at the 

conclusion of OEF and OIF in the importance of LRC for all of DOD, but 

especially the conventional forces. This request may also signal a different 

direction in the ongoing development of LRC capability. 

This journey has been uneven for several reasons. One, there never has 

been a resounding agreement across the DOD on the importance of LRC, 

first in COIN and now as the DOD faces a future where building partnerships can be just as (or even more) important than surgical strikes. The 

DOD may respond to HADR missions that besides being horrific in impact 

to local populations, could easily also tip the scales of local, national, or 

regional stability. Important as well, terrorist groups are carving out territory in lawless or conflict-driven environments. The impact to populations 

while militant groups are within established nations creates havoc. This is 

the regionally and culturally complex canvas that greets each day. Samuel 

Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations forecasted fault lines not along borders, 

but ideologies. However, the 21st century is experiencing clash of cultures 

that exists across recent and historically established borders, age-old ideologies, and the stretch of ancient civilizations.297

This study reiterated the absolute critical need for LRC in this uncertain 

world. LRC is not just a handy acronym that corrals behaviors in name only. 

LRC identifies important KSAs, but also reflects the synergy they produce 

when featured together in learning—a much more nuanced utility of crosscultural and interactional skills and knowledge. Persistent engagement was 

the way SOF’s future was painted; persistence in mission and persistence in 

growing and sustaining relationships. Michael Vickers, as far back as 2006, 

said just that: “I think the future of the long war or Global War on Terror will 

predominantly be persistent operations in countries with which the U.S. is 

not at war, leveraging locals ... And so the key will be to have a distributed 

global presence where we are working with lots of locals to suppress this 

global insurgency down to very low levels.”298

To identify an operational focus, the human domain as of late has become 

one way to acknowledge that missions have changed. What was seen from 

the last decade of war, humans, both good, bad, and indifferent, were vital 

to success, whatever that success looked like. More often than not, lethal 
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operations only got you partway there. If mission success was predicated 

on BPC, HADR, SFA, or FID, then it is the human domain where the hard 

work needs to be done for the payoff. Losing the military bias toward borders 

and boundaries opens the aperture of understanding human behavior that is 

defined not just by location, but by kinship, exchange, identity, and other cultural systems, which oftentimes resists being coordinates. An AOR may still 

be about geography, but human behavior is best grasped by understanding 

human culture, and language, and other elements of cross-cultural interaction and communication. LRC learning is perhaps the most knowledge- and 

skill-based activity a military person will engage in.

The transformation of LRC policy, strategy, and learning after 9/11, imperfect as it was, prompted the first ever DOD-wide approach to codify concepts, 

propose actions, establish committees and offices, and plant the seeds of 

LRC learning approaches. Following the 2005 publication of the DLTR, a 

DOD-wide strategy and implementation plan was slow in development and 

the Services and even commands were left to their own devices. They established fledgling LRC programs that minimized language except for special 

populations and concentrated on region and culture. Compared to the costs 

of extended instruction and sustainment in language, big culture and little 

language was a much wiser investment to the budget-minded Services, even 

at the cost of establishing and sustaining Service culture centers. However, 

SOF, perhaps more than any other population, had the need to provide thousands of operators big language and big culture. The delay in the centralization of guidance and standardization of policy, and the lack of agreement 

on concepts/terms impacted all DOD organizations, but especially those 

populations such as SOF. It was suggested that there still is residual effect of 

the DLTR and decisions made, or not made, on SOF’s own LREC strategy. 

For the last decade, there has been a swinging door on establishing and 

coming to consensus on theoretically sound and informed LRC constructs. 

Work this author and others have done implicates a more applied approach 

to how the concepts are used in operations and instructed and developed in 

learning programs. Concepts like regional expertise and regional proficiency 

were found to lack sufficiency in terms of theory. Furthermore, developing 

the necessary learning objectives and assessments from these constructs was, 

and still is, not easy. Efforts exist to find assessments for LRC, some of those 

are outlined in this chapter. At the heart of the need to standardize LRC 

terminology was the importance of developing learning goals and objectives 
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accessible to subject matter experts, instructional designers, instructors, and 

learning program managers. 

A deeper dive into SOF operations and the operating environment provided deeper understanding of the LRC demands predicated on missions. 

Special Operations warfare, as well as UW, is a critical competence and 

represents the majority of SOF effort and personnel currently and expected 

into the future. The use of SOF in surgical strikes proved instrumental in 

mission success in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the last decade of COIN 

and the strikes have diluted language proficiency and region and culture 

knowledge and skill. It is not enough to just regain proficiency in language, 

but that region and culture as sets of knowledge and skills must be developed 

well beyond current learning programs. In addition to more robust ‘synergized’ LRC programs, a theoretically-driven and applicable LRC assessment 

program is necessary. Existing use of the DLPT or OPI scale may not be 

the best indicator of language use or utility and the use of either does not 

assess to any degree of precision or confidence the LRC performance, even 

capability of the learner. 

Disruptive technology and innovation has been transformative on higher 

education and training programs. Lately, MOOCs have exemplified this disruptive impact on traditional models of learning. SOF LRC learning should 

consider engaging elements or at least the intent of disruptive technology. 

Business and government workforce training is mostly self-contained and 

static e-learning courses that concentrate on developing new skills. The LMS 

manages the training experience for the learner but minimizes the opportunity for student learning through acquisition of knowledge and information 

to increase skills and abilities. A case study of JBLM’s LRC program was 

provided as an example of an entire LRC program being run through an 

LMS, both residential and distant learners.

This study was by no means a definitive look at LRC in DOD and SOF. 

Nor was it a complete study of distance learning technology. To keep with 

the theme of the last two chapters, this study was meant as a call to disrupt 

DOD and SOF LRC policy and learning programs. Throughout this study 

the theme of ‘we can do LRC better’ hopefully came across, as well as the 

examples offered that have done LRC better. LRC, as developed now in the 

DOD and the Services, is based on need distilled from OEF and OIF. The 

future of LRC depends on how well that need has been institutionalized in 
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policy, doctrine, and strategy. For better or for worse, that institutionalization has already been accomplished. 

However, SOF represents a unique LRC situation from the rest of the 

DOD. They need LRC almost in equal amounts and the number of potential learners across the SOF landscape numbers well into the thousands. 

The initial push for LRC after 9/11 led to the DLTR—that was the disruptor. 

Likewise, SOF could stand on the precipice of potential disruption in terms 

of their LRC program. The work is being done in disruptive technology and 

innovation in higher education and industry. New development and evolving technologies and innovations happen at the speed of ‘business.’ Already, 

MOOCs and online learning has been overrun by Web 2.0.

The term Web 2.0 refers to new ways of using the web to deliver a 

more personalized and collaborative online learning experience 

through information sharing and interoperability. Examples of Web 

2.0 are social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), video 

and photo sharing sites (YouTube, Flickr, Instagram, Vimeo, Vine), 

wikis, blogs, podcasts, RSS feeds, and Delicious. In the eLearning 

industry, Web 2.0 has revolutionized the way instructors and endusers interact with learning content and each other. In the workplace, 

the term “tribal knowledge” has taken on a whole new meaning.299

The world of changing technology does not slow for institutionalization, 

Web 3.0 has already arrived, “third generation of Internet-based services 

that collectively comprise what might be called ‘the intelligent Web’ — such 

as those using semantic web, microformats, natural language search, datamining, machine learning, recommendation agents, and artificial intelligence technologies — which emphasize machine-facilitated understanding 

of information in order to provide a more productive and intuitive user 

experience.”300 Web 4.0 is just around the corner.

In the end, this study has advanced a re-envisioning of SOF LRC learning through approach and delivery, content and assessment, and outcomes. 

The concept, operation, and outcomes of war are changing; it seems logical 

the preparation for what now and will constitute war should also change.

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Appendix A: Acronym List

ADL Advanced Distributed Learning

AFCLC Air Force Culture and Language Center

AfPak Afghanistan-Pakistan (Hands Program)

AOR area of responsibility

APAC Asia-Pacific (Hands Program)

ARI Army Research Institute

BPC building partnership capacity

CASL Center for the Advanced Study of Language

CAT category

CBRIP capabilities-based requirement identification process

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CLREC Center for Language Regional Expertise and Culture (U.S. 

 Navy)

CMS course management system

COIN counterinsurgency

CREL Culture, Regional Expertise, and Language (U.S. Army LRC 

 policy) 

DLI Defense Language Institute

DLIFLC Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center

DLO Defense Language Office

DLPT Defense Language Proficiency Test

DLTR Defense Language Transformation Roadmap

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center
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DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction

FAOs foreign area officers

FID foreign internal defense

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GIS geographic information system

GLOSS Global Language Online Support System

HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

HTS human terrain system

IAT initial acquisition training

ILR interagency language roundtable

iMBA internet Masters of Business

JBLM Joint Base Lewis-McChord

JLU Joint Language University

KSAs knowledge, skills, and abilities

LCC Language and Culture Center

LCMS learning content management system

LES language enabled soldiers’ program

LMS learning management system

LRC language, region, and culture

LREC language, regional expertise, and culture

MI military intelligence

MOOCs massive online open courses
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NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPI oral proficiency interview

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PME professional military education

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RAF regionally aligned forces

RPAT regional proficiency assessment tool

SCORM sharable content object reference model

SF Special Forces

SFA security force assistance

SFQC Special Forces Qualification Course

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOFTS SOF Teletraining System

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare

VLE Virtual Learning Environments

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Endnotes

1. In this study, COIN will refer specifically to operations that occurred in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

2. This report acknowledges the difference between OSD as a Department-wide 

policy office and DOD as the collection of Services and other special joint populations. OSD sets overarching policy for the DOD when it comes to language, 

region and culture.

3. Allison Abbe, “The Historical Development of Cross-cultural Competence,” 

in Cross-Cultural Competence for a 21st Century Military: Culture, the Flipside 

of the COIN (Lantham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), edited by Robert Greene 

Sands and Allison Greene-Sands, 31-42; and Kerry Fosher, “Foreword,” in CrossCultural Competence for a 21st Century Military: Culture, the Flipside of the 

COIN (Lantham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), edited by Robert Greene Sands 

and Allison Greene-Sands, xiii-viii.

4. Robert G. Sands, “Finding a Common Thread: Implications for the Future of 

Culture and Language Programs in Support of International Security,” Journal 

of Culture, Language and International Security 1, no. 1 (2014): 3-21, accessed at: 

http://iscl.norwich.edu/jclis-summer-2014. 

5. Mark K. Brown Jr, “Village Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective from 

Viet Nam to Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, 28 March 2013, accessed at: http://

smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/ 13939.

6. Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review, 14 March 2014, 

accessed at: http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.

pdf.

7. Sandra I. Erwin, “In Game of Strategy, SOCOM Outsmarting Conventional 

Military,” NDIA Business and Technology Magazine, 18 March 2014, accessed at: 

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/ posts/post.aspx?ID=1447.

8. Department of Defense (DOD), “Department of Defense (DOD) Transformational 

Roadmap,” January 2005, accessed at: www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/

policy/dod/d20050330roadmap.pdf.

9. United States Government Accountability Office, “Military Training: DOD 

Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and Requirements Data to Guide 

Development of Language Skills and Regional Proficiency,” Report no. GAO09-568, 19 June 2009, accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-568; 

United States Government Accountability Office, “Military Training: Continued 

Actions Needed to Guide DOD’s Efforts to Improve Language Skills and Regional 

Proficiency,” Report no. GAO-10-879T, 29 June 2010, accessed at: http://www.

gao.gov/products/GAO-10-879T; and U.S. House of Representatives Committee 

on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Building 

Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DOD’s Challenge 

in Today’s Educational Environment,” Report, November 2008, accessed at: 
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http://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/Readiness/ DLNSEO/

files/LanguageCultureReportNov08_HASC.pdf.

10. Jennifer DeCamp et al., “An Assessment of the Ability of the U.S. Department of 

Defense and the Services to Measure and Track Language and Culture Training 

and Capabilities Among General Purpose Forces,” TR-1192-OSD, 24 October 

2012, accessed at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1192.html; 

RAND Corporation and MITRE Corporation, “Linking Language, Regional 

Expertise, and Culture Capabilities to Military Readiness,” RB 9660, 18 October 

2012, accessed at: www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_ briefs/2012/

RAND_RB9660.pdf; Robert G. Sands et al., “Assessing Language, Regional 

Expertise and Culture (LREC) Performance: Not like Threading a Camel through 

the Eye of a Needle,” 15 March 2015, accessed at: http://www.govtilr.org/Publications/Final%20to%20Scott.pdf; and Robert G. Sands and Pieter R. DeVisser, 

“Narrowing the LREC Assessment Focus by Opening the Aperture: A Critical 

Look at the Status of LREC Assessment Design & Development,” Journal of 

Culture, Language and International Security 2, no. 2 (December 2015): 3-33, 

accessed at: http://iscl.norwich.edu/special-issue.

11. Kevin Lilley, “Army Pulls New Culture Manual over ‘content Issue,’” Army 

Times, 13 March 2015, accessed at: http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/2015/05/13/buzzfeed-awareness-plagiarized-doctrine/27248265/; and Dan 

Vergano, “U.S. Army Withdraws Flawed and Plagiarized Manual about ‘Cultural 

Understanding,’” BuzzFeed, 12 May 2015, accessed at: http://www.buzzfeed.com/

danvergano/us-army-withdraws-flawed-and-plagiarized-manual-about-cultur. 

12. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies 

Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).

13. Robert G. Sands and Yvonne Pawelek, “Synergizing Language and Culture at 

Joint Base Lewis/McChord Language and Culture Center: A First Step Toward 

Building an LREC Learning Program,” Interagency Language Roundtable Plenary, Foreign Language Institute, Arlington, VA, 6 June 2014.

14. Sands, “Finding a Common Thread.”

15. “Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United 

States Special Operations Command presented to the 113th Congress Senate 

Armed Services Committee,” 111th Cong. 2013, accessed at: http://finance.senate.

gov/hearings/hearing/?id=d8527d95-f3be-a061-77b7- 6526d7673f74. 

16. John Tierney, “Letter from The Middle East; Baffled Occupiers, or the Missed 

Understandings,” New York Times, 22 October 2003, accessed at: http://www.

nytimes.com/2003/10/22/world/letter-from-the-middle-east-baffled-occupiersor-the-missed-understandings.html. 

17. Russell Howard, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisitions for Special Forces: 

Necessity, Acceleration and Potential Alternatives, JSOU Report 11-6 (MacDill 

AFB: Joint Special Operations University, 2011), accessed at: http://jsou.socom.

mil/JSOU%20Publications/11-6_Final.PDF; and Mark K. Brown Jr., “Village 

Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective from Vietnam to Afghanistan,” 
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Small Wars Journal, 28 March 2013, accessed at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/

printpdf/13939. 

18. David Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering 

in Iraq,” Military Review, January/February 2006, 2-12, accessed at: http://www.

au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/petraeus1.pdf.

19. Rebecca Onion, “The Snake-Eaters and the Yards: The Vietnamese Tribesmen 

Who Fought Alongside American Special Forces Won the Green Berets’ Admiration—and Lost Everything Else,” Slate.com, 27 November 2013, accessed at: http://

www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/american_military_ history/2013/11/

the_green_berets_and_the_montagnards_how_an_indigenous_tribe_won_the_

admiration.html; Brown, “Village Stability Operations;” and Abandoned Allies 

on the History of the Relationship between the Green Berets and the Montagnard, 

Directed by Camden Watts, Produced by Surrey Roberts, Abandoned Allies, 27 

December 2013, accessed at: http://abandonedallies.com.

20. Matthew Cox, “Experts Tell Congress SOCOM Needs to Shift Focus,” Military.

com, 12 July 2012, accessed at: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/07/12/

experts-tell-congress-socom-needs-to-shift-focus.html.

21. Howard, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisitions for Special Forces. 

22. Raymond Odierno, “Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building 

Partnerships,” Army Live, 22 March 2012, accessed at: http://www.army.mil/

article/95729/; and Raymond Odierno, “CSA’s Strategic Intent,” Army Live, 5 

February 2013, accessed at: http://www. army.mil/article/95729/.

23. Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, “U.S. Landpower in 

Regional Focus Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual,” Parameters 

43, no. 3 (2013): 55-63, accessed at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.

mil/pubs/Parameters/issues/Autumn_2013/5_Field.pdf. 

24. James R. Arnold, Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from 

the Philippines to Iraq, (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).

25. Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review, 14 March 2014, 7, 

accessed at: http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.

pdf.

26. Ibid., 11.

27. Bennet S. Sacolick, “Special Operations/Conventional Forces, Interdependence: 

A Critical Role in ‘Prevent, Shape and Win,” Army Magazine, June 2012, accessed 

at: www.ausa.org/publications/ armymagazine/archive/2012/06/Documents/

Sacolick_0612.pdf.

28. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “A Commander Seeks to Chart a New Path for 

Special Operations,” The New York Times, 1 May 2013, accessed at: http://www.

nytimes.com/2013/05/02/us/politics/admiral-mcraven-charts-a-new-path-forspecial-operations-command.html?_r=0.
126

JSOU Report 16-8

29. “Posture Statement of Admiral William H. Mcraven, USN Commander, United 

States Special Operations Command presented to the 113th Congress Senate 

Armed Services Committee,” 111th Cong. 2013, 6.

30. Department of Defense, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, 16 July 2014, 

accessed at: www.dtic.mil /doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf.

31. Ibid. 

32. Linda Robinson, One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American 

Warfare (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2013).

33. Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2012, accessed at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/

united-states/2012-11-01/future-special-operations.

34. Ibid.

35. Edward Reeder Jr., “Keeping Special Forces Special: Regional Proficiency in 

Special Forces,” John F. Kennedy Commemoration Ceremony Remarks, Naval 

Postgraduate School, Arlington, VA, 11 December 2011.

36. Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations.” 

37. “Posture Statement of Admiral William H. Mcraven, USN Commander, United 

States Special Operations Command presented to the 113th Congress Senate 

Armed Services Committee,” 111th Cong, 2013, 6.

38. Robert G. Sands, “Thinking Differently: Unlocking the Human Domain in Support 

of the 21st Century Intelligence Mission,” Small Wars Journal, 20 August 2013, 

accessed at: http://smallwars journal.com/jrnl/art/thinking-differently-unlockingthe-human-domain-in-support-of-the-21st-century-intelligence.

39. Peter Nealen, “The Failure of COIN: Ignorance of Culture,” SOFREP, 2 

November 2013, accessed at: http://sofrep.com/29375/failure-coin-ignoranceculture/#ixzz3Zx9Kjy3e.

40. This section features material from the DLI website. Accessed at: http://www.

dliflc.edu/about/.

41. Nathaniel Frank, “Unfriendly Fire,” The New York Times, 18 March 2015, accessed 

at: http://mobile.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/books/chapters/chapter-unfriendlyfire.html?referrer=&_r=0.

42. Ibid.

43. Department of Defense (DOD), “Department of Defense (DOD) Transformational 

Roadmap.”

44. Ibid.

45. Samuel G. Freedman, “After Sputnik, It Was Russian; After 9/11, Should It Be 

Arabic?” The New York Times, 16 June 2004, accessed at: http://www.nytimes.

com/2004/06/16/education/16education.html.

46. Fred Kaplan, “How Many Government Agencies Does It Take to Teach Soldiers Arabic? A Pathetic Case of Pentagon Incompetence,” Slate.com, 6 

April 2005, accessed at: http://www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/
127

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

war_stories/2005/04/how_many_government_agencies_does_it_take_to_teach_

soldiers_arabic.html.

47. Freedman, “After Sputnik, It Was Russian; After 9/11, Should It Be Arabic?”

48. DOD, “Defense Language Transformation Roadmap,” Washington, DC: DOD, 

2005, 2.

49. Peter Schirmer, Challenging Time in DOPMA: Flexible and Contemporary Military Officer Management (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research 

Institute, 2006).

50. Bradley Graham, “Pentagon to Stress Foreign Languages,” The Washington Post, 

8 April 2005. 

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Department of Defense (DOD), “Department of Defense (DOD) Transformational 

Roadmap.”

54. Graham, “Pentagon to Stress Foreign Languages.” 

55. Schirmer, Challenging Time in DOPMA, 14.

56. Department of Defense (DOD), “Department of Defense (DOD) Transformational 

Roadmap.”

57. Sands, “Finding a Common Thread.” 

58. Richard Outzen, “Language, Culture, and Army Culture: Failing Transformation,” Small Wars Journal, 20 March 2012, accessed at: http://smallwarsjournal.

com/jrnl/art/language-culture-and-army-culture-failing-transformation.

59. United States Government Accountability Office, “Military Training: Continued 

Actions Needed to Guide DOD’s Efforts to Improve Language Skills and Regional 

Proficiency.”

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. DeCamp et al., “An Assessment of the Ability of the U.S. Department of Defense 

and the Services to Measure and Track Language and Culture Training and Capabilities Among General Purpose Force;” and RAND Corporation and MITRE 

Corporation, “Linking Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Capabilities 

to Military Readiness.” 

64. Sands and DeVisser, “Narrowing the LREC Assessment Focus by Opening the 

Aperture.” 

65. Sands et al., “Assessing Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) Performance;” and Sands and DeVisser, “Narrowing the LREC Assessment Focus 

by Opening the Aperture.”

66. DeCamp et. al., An Assessment of the Ability of the U.S. Department of Defense 

and the Services to Measure and Track Language and Culture Training and 
128

JSOU Report 16-8

Capabilities Among General Purpose Forces; and RAND Corporation and MITRE 

Corporation, “Linking Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Capabilities 

to Military Readiness.” 

67. Sands and DeVisser, “Narrowing the LREC Assessment Focus by Opening the 

Aperture.” 

68. United States Government Accountability Office, “Military Training: Continued 

Actions Needed to Guide DOD’s Efforts to Improve Language Skills and Regional 

Proficiency;” U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Building Language Skills and 

Cultural Competencies in the Military;” and U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, 

“Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: Bridging 

the Gap,” December 2010, accessed at: http://armedservices.house. gov/index.

cfm/files/serve?File_id=2361fa65-7e40-41df-8682-9725d1c377da.

69. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense 

Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities, 

2011-2016,” accessed at: http://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/

Readiness/DLNSEO/files/STRAT%20PLAN.pdf.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 5.

72. Department of Defense, Office of The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Defense Language and National Security Education Office, 

“Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural 

Capabilities,” January 2014, accessed at: http://dlnseo.org/sites/default/files/ 

APPROVED%20Implementation%20Plan.pdf.

73. G. Bauleke, “Capabilities-Based Requirement Identification Process (CBRIP),” 

Information Paper, 2013, “Readiness,” Defense Language and National Security 

Education Office, accessed at: http://dlnseo.org/content/readiness.

74. Department of Defense, Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction: Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing, CJCS 3126.01A, 31 January 2013, accessed at: http://www.

dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3126_01.pdf.

75. Ibid., A-1.

76. William McGovern and Virginia Krammer, “The UFMCS and Regionally Aligned 

Forces, Strategic Landpower, and LREC,” MI Professional Bulletin 40, no. 3 (July 

2014): 31-35, accessed at: https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2014_03.pdf.

77. Department of Defense, “Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction: 

Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, 

Planning, and Sourcing.”

78. U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Culture, Region & Language Flight Plan,” Flight Plan, 

May 2009, accessed at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1

.180.3327&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
129

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

79. Ibid., 3.

80. Mahir Ibrahimov, “Army Culture and Foreign Language Program,” Culture, 

Regional Expertise & Language (CREL) Management Office (LRECMO), 22 July 

2015, accessed at: http://usacac.army.mil/.../ALCC_10June15_CREL_Brief.pp.

81. John Bird, “Culture, Regional Expertise, and Language (CREL) Competency: 

Ramping-Up for Global Response and Regional Engagement,” MI Professional 

Bulletin 40, no. 3, June 2014, 6-11, accessed at: https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/

mipb/2014_03.pdf.

82. U.S. Navy, Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Training Opportunities, accessed at http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/career/language_culture/Pages/default2.aspx. 

83. Ibid.

84. Languaculture is from Michael Agar’s conceptualization of elements of communication that include grammar and vocabulary, and also past knowledge, local 

and cultural information, habits and behaviors. Michael Agar, Language Shock: 

Understanding the Culture of Conversation (New York: Wm. Morrow, 1994).

85. Montgomery McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange 

Story of Their Curious Relationship,” Military Review, March/April (2005); and 

Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Cultural Knowledge,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, no. 38 (2005): 42-48.

86. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency.”

87. Robert G. Sands, “Training for the Perfect Storm,” The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security 2, no. 1, 2015, 78-90, accessed at: http://online.

fliphtml5.com/iggr/kglg/#p=18.

88. “Competency vs. Proficiency Model,” Learning Paths International, Blog, 11 

April 2011, accessed at: http://www.learningpathsinternational.com/blog/?p=5.

89. Department of Defense, Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency 

Capabilities, (DODI) 5160.70, 12 June 2007, accessed at: http://www.dtic.mil/

whs/directives/corres/pdf/516070p.pdf.

90. Ibid., 18. 

91. “Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool (RPAT),” University of Maryland Center 

for Advanced Study of Language, 2015, accessed at: https://www.casl.umd.edu/

RPAT.

92. Sands and DeVisser, “Narrowing the LREC Assessment Focus by Opening the 

Aperture.” 

93. Department of Defense, Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency 

Capabilities.

94. Ibid., 18.

95. Ibid., 19.

96. Ibid., 18.
130

JSOU Report 16-8

97. Brian Selmeski, “Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and 

Individual Development,” Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society, Royal 

Military College of Canada, 2007, accessed at: http://www.cultureready.org/sites/

default/files/publications/Selmeski%20(2007).pdf.

98. Robert G. Sands, “A Baseline of Cross-Cultural Competence: The Decisive Edge 

for a 21st Century U.S. Military Mission,” Society for Applied Anthropology News, 

February 2013, 18.

99. Sands, “Thinking Differently.”

100. Hila Mehr, “Cultivating Empathy and Internal Awareness in International Security 

Actors,” The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security 2, Winter 

2015, 60-70.

101. Patrice Reid et al., “A Developmental Model for Cross-cultural Competence,” in 

Cross-cultural Competence for a Twenty-first-century Military: Culture, the Flipside 

of COIN (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), edited by Robert Greene Sands 

and Allison Greene-Sands, 43-60.

102. Robert G. Sands and Allison Greene-Sands, Cross-cultural Competence for a 

Twenty-first-century Military.

103. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Department of 

Defense Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural 

Capabilities, 2011-2016.”

104. Bird, “Culture, Regional Expertise, and Language (CREL) Competency.” 

105. Eric T. Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare.” Irregular Warfare: 

A SOF Perspective 34, no. 11, 2011, accessed at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/library/report/call/call_11-34_ch1.htm.

106. Charles Cleveland and Stuart Farris, “Knowledge Is Power: Adaptations Required 

to Survive in the Human Domain,” ARMY Magazine, 12 June 2014, accessed at: 

www.ausa.org/publications /armymagazine/archive/2014/Pages/July.aspx.

107. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency.”

108. For a historical review of the use of the concept of human terrain see: Roberto J. 

González, American Human Terrain (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009). 

109. Elizabeth Redden, “American Counterinsurgency,” Inside Higher Ed, 29 January 2009, accessed at: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/01/29/

humantrrain.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid. 

112. Erik Eldridge, “Qualifying Human Terrain,” Foundations of Geographic Information and Spatial Analysis, June 2008, accessed at: https://courseware.e-education.

psu.edu/courses/bootcamp/lo01/13.html.

113. Foundations of Geographic Information and Spatial Analysis, accessed at: https://

courseware.e-education.psu.edu/courses/bootcamp/lo01/13.html.
131

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

114. Mike Pryor, “Human Terrain Team Helps Soldiers in Iraq Understand Cultural Landscape,” Army.mil, 11 December 2007, accessed at: http://www.army.mil/article/6531/ 

human-terrain-team-helps-soldiers-in-iraq-understand-cultural-landscape/. 

115. Ibid.

116. U.S. Army General Raymond Odierno, U.S. Marine Corps General James Amos, 

and Admiral William McRaven, “Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of 

Wills,” White Paper, 2013, accessed at: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20 Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf.

117. Scott Kelly and Chad McGougan, “RAF and SOF Integration,” in Regionally 

Aligned Forces: Concept Viability and Implementation (Carlisle, PA: United States 

Army War College Student Publications, 2014), edited by Larry D. Miller, 103.

118. Ibid.

119. ARSOF: Return to First Principles, 2015, 8, accessed at: soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/

archive/ ARSOF_Next/ARSOF%20Next.pdf.

120. USSOCOM Concept, “Operating in the Human Domain,” 15 August 2015, 

accessed at: file:///C:/Users/rrgre/Downloads/USSOCOM%20Concept_Operating%20in%20the%20Human%20Domain%203%20Aug%202015.pdf.

121. Department of the Army, Special Operations, ADRP 3-05, August 2015, accessed 

at: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_05.pdf.

122. Octavian Manea, “The Need to Understand and Conduct UW,” Small Wars 

Journal, 25 May 2015, accessed at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/

the-need-to-understand-and-conduct-uw.

123. Ibid.

124. Michael Noonan, “The Seductiveness of Special Ops?” War on the Rocks, 3 March 

2015, accessed at: http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/the-seductiveness-of-specialops/?singlepage=1.

125. Ibid.

126. Stephen Okin, “Resist the Hype: Prevent SOF from Being the Next Victim 

of Too Much Attention,” Small Wars Journal, 9 July 2015, accessed at: http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/resist-the-hype-prevent-sof-from-being-the-nextvictim-of-too-much-attention.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Pryor, “Human Terrain Team Helps Soldiers in Iraq Understand Cultural 

Landscape.” 

133. Ibid.
132

JSOU Report 16-8

134. See the module on health in the online course Operational Culture: Thinking 

Differently about the Human Domain. Information on this course can be accessed 

at: http://www.rgsands.org/#!education/v3plx.

135. Valdis Krebs, “Social Network Analysis: An Introduction,” by Orgnet, LLC, 

accessed 3 December 2015 at: http://www.orgnet.com/sna.html.

136. USMA, Network Science Center, accessed 3 December 2015 at: http://www.usma.

edu/nsc/SitePages/About.aspx.

137. Stephen Schultz, “From Terrorism to HIV, It’s All about the Network,” News at 

Princeton, 18 December 2009, accessed at: https://www.princeton.edu/main/

news/archive/S26/11/47I21/ index.xml?section=topstories. 

138. Sands, “Thinking Differently.” 

139. USSOCOM Concept, “Operating in the Human Domain,” 37-38.

140. James Joyner, “Are Special Forces Special Enough?” Outside the Beltway (blog), 13 June 2012, accessed at: http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/

are-special-forces-special-enough/.

141. Noonan, “The Seductiveness of Special Ops?” 

142. Schoen Fletcher, “Reorganization Is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces’ Bent 

Unconventional Culture,” Small Wars Journal, 29 June 2015, accessed at: http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ reorganization-is-imperative-to-fixing-specialforces%E2%80%99-bent-unconventional-culture.

143. Jack Murphy, “The Future of USASOC: Projecting Forward into the Coming 

Decades,” SOFREP (blog), 28 February 2012, accessed at: http://sofrep.

com/4240/the-future-of-usasoc-projecting-forward-into-the-coming-decades/

#ixzz3goJ0beAK.

144. Joyner, “Are Special Forces Special Enough?” 

145. Andrew Exum, “Abu Muqawama: Special Forces, or the Danger of Even a Lot of 

Knowledge,” World Politics Review, accessed at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.

com/articles/12050/abu-muqawama-special-forces-or-the-danger-of-even-a-lotof-knowledge.

146. USSOCOM Concept, “Operating in the Human Domain,” 37-38.

147. Joyner, “Are Special Forces Special Enough?”

148. Thomas Briggs, “The Third Order Effect: Understanding the Risks to Academia 

from Engaging with the SOF Enterprise,” Small Wars Journal, 29 January 2015. 

149. Steven Reisner, “Why There Would Have Been No Torture Without the Psychologists,” Slate.com, 12 December 2014, accessed at: http://www.slate.com/articles/

news_and_politics/politics/2014/12/ psychologists_role_in_the_cia_s_torture_

why_these_medical_professionals.html; and Spencer Ackerman, “Three Senior 

Officials Lose Their Jobs at APA after U.S. Torture Scandal,” The Guardian, 14 

January 2015, accessed at: http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/14/

apa-senior-officials-torture-report-cia.

150. Briggs, “The Third Order Effect.”
133

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

151. Scott Jaschik, “Embedded Conflicts,” Inside Higher Ed, 7 July 2015, accessed 

at: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/07/army-shuts-downcontroversial-human-terrain-system-criticized-many-anthropologists.

152. Christopher Lamb et al., “The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Team,” Joint 

Forces Quarterly 70, no. 3rd (2013): 21-29, accessed at: http://ndupress.ndu.

edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-70/JFQ-70_21-29_Lamb-et-al.pdf; and 

W. Kassel, “The Army Needs Anthropologists,” Foreign Policy, 28 July 2015, 

accessed at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/ 07/28/the-armyneeds-anthropologists-iraq-afghanistan-human-terrain/.

153. Lujan Fernando, “Wanted: Ph.D.s Who Can Win a Bar Fight,” Foreign Policy, 

8 March 2013, accessed at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/08/wanted-phd-s-who-can-win-a-bar-fight/.

154. Sands, “Thinking Differently.”

155. Admiral Eric Olson, USSOCOM Posture Statement, in Jessica G. Turnley, 

Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF 

are, JSOU Report 11-1 (MacDill AFB: Joint Special Operations University, 

March 2011), accessed at: http://www.soc.mil/528th/PDFs/JSOU11-1turnleyFDWDandSmallGroups(Turnley)_final(16Mar).pdf.

156. U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2013 Academic 

Handbook, 47, accessed at: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/_pdf/AcademicHandbook.

pdf.

157. U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Office of Strategic 

Communication, ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles, 2015, 12, accessed at: 

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/ARSOF_Next/ARSOF%20Next.pdf.

158. U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, USAJFKSWCS 

Academic Handbook, 2015, 32, accessed at: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/academichandbook.html.

159. Ibid.

160. SWA in conjunction with USSOCOM and NWS gave two presentations at the 

ILR, one on the switch from using the DLPT to the OPI and the second was the 

report out on a Training Needs Assessment done of the NWS Language Program.

161. Sarah Bienkowski and Eric Surface, “Special Operations Forces Mission-related 

Language Requirements: What Skills Should Be Tested?” 22 March 2013, accessed 

at: http://bit.ly/1MuxpdQ

162. Department of Defense, “Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction: 

Language, Regional Expertise, And Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, 

Planning, And Sourcing.”

163. Reineke, “How Long Does It Take to Learn a Language?” Learnalanguageortwo.

blogspot.com, 29 December 2007, accessed at: http://learnalanguageortwo.

blogspot.com/2007/12/how-long-does-it-take-to-learn-language.html. See complete the ILR level at ILR.gov.
134

JSOU Report 16-8

164. Asher Kohn, “I Want YOU to Mumble a Few Words of Pashto,” Registan, 7 

January 2010, accessed at: http://registan.net/2010/01/07/i-want-you-to-mumblea-few-words-of-pashto/.

165. “How Long Does It Take to Become Proficient?” Language Testing International, 

accessed at http://www.languagetesting.com/how-long-does-it-take.

166. Michele Malvesti, “To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an 

Era of Persistent Conflict,” Center for New American Security, 2 June 2010, 

accessed at: http://www.cnas.org/ publications/reports/to-serve-the-nationu-s-special-operations-forces-in-an-era-of-persistent-conflict#.VgV8AbSVVCA.

167. Ibid., 29.

168. Ibid.

169. Schoen, “Reorganization Is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces’ Bent Unconventional Culture.”

170. “ARSOF: Return to First Principles,” 2015, 8, accessed at: soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/

archive/ ARSOF_Next/ARSOF%20Next.pdf.

171. Ibid.

172. Sands et al., Assessing Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) 

Performance.

173. Sands, “Finding a Common Thread.” 

174. Sands, “Thinking Differently.”

175. Sands, “A Baseline of Cross-Cultural Competence;” and Robert G. Sands, “3C, 

The Flipside of COIN.” In Cross-cultural Competence for a Twenty-first-century 

Military: Culture, the Flipside of COIN (Lantham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 

edited by Robert Greene Sands and Allison Greene-Sands.

176. Sands, “3C, The Flipside of COIN.”

177. Robert G Sands, “Language and Culture in the Department of Defense: Synergizing Complimentary Instruction and Building LREC Competency,” Small 

Wars Journal, 8 March 2013, accessed at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/

language-and-culture-in-the-department-of-defense-synergizing-complimentaryinstruction-and.

178. Ibid. See also Sands and DeVisser, “Narrowing the LREC Assessment Focus by 

Opening the Aperture.”

179. Marla Federe, “Developing a Mission-Focused, Capability-based Language Curriculum for Naval Special Warfare,” lecture, Iteragency Language Roundtable 

(ILR) Committee, National Foreign Language Center, College Park, MD, 21 

March 2014.

180. Sands, et al., “Assessing Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) 

Performance.”

181. Sands and DeVisser. “Narrowing the LREC Assessment Focus by Opening the 

Aperture.”

182. Ibid.
135

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

183. Chief of Naval Personnel Public Affairs, “Navy Creates Designation to Identify 

Officers with Pacific Region Expertise,” Navy.mil, 5 February 2015, accessed at: 

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=85473.

184. Ibid.

185. Meghan Brenneman and Jennifer Klafehn, “In Search of the Magic Bullet: 

Assessing Cross Cultural Competency in the United States Military,” lecture, 

Personnel Testing Council, MU Arlington Campus, Founder’s Hall, Room 121, 

Washington, DC, 14 January 2015.

186. Marinus van Driel and William K. Gabrenya, Instrumentation Challenges in 

Developing Cross-cultural Competence Models, in Cross-cultural Competence 

for a Twenty-first-century Military: Culture, the Flipside of COIN.

187. See Broad Agency Announcement W911NF-13-R-0001N, Request for White 

Papers: BAA TOPICT II-A-2.3.3: Multi-National and Cross-Cultural Competency 

Assessment Battery, 2015. 

188. Ibid. 

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid.

191. Ibid.

192. Defense Language and National Education Security Office, “Regional Proficiency 

Assessment Tool,” accessed at: http://dlnseo.org/content/readiness.

193. “Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool (RPAT),” University of Maryland Center 

for Advanced Study of Language, 2015, accessed at: https://www.casl.umd.edu/

RPAT.

194. Ibid. 

195. This set of issues derives from the author’s limited working knowledge of RPAT.

196. Susannah B. Paletz, “CASL Research Fact Sheet: RPAT validation and improvement,” September 2015, accessed at: http://www.casl.umd.edu/sites/default/files/

DO0074_FactSheet_092015.pdf

197. Linda A. Suskie, Assessing Student Learning: A Common Sense Guide (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2009).

198. Ibid.

199. Ibid.

200. Ibid.

201. The symbol for “approximately equal to” (≈=) is appropriate as the grouping of 

these scores merely represents an indication of one’s potential abilities, assessed 

at a specific moment in time, prior to the engagement for which training was 

conducted. The assessment date(s), along with a rate-of-estimated-atrophy (presuming non-use and no additional training) and a list of recommended sustainment resources (to be developed), would be provided as part of the assessment.
136

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202. T. Vander Ark, “How Will the Shift to Digital Learning Happen?” Getting Smart, 

6 December 2011, accessed at: http://gettingsmart.com/2011/12/how-will-theshift-to-digital-learning-happen.

203. M. Horn, “Digital Learning Day Cometh,” Forbes, 17 January 2012, accessed 

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204. Margaret Rouse, “Definition: Distance Learning (e-learning)” Whatis.com, September 2005, accessed 29 July 2015 at: http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/

distance-learning-e-learning.

205. “What Is Online Learning?” Frostburg State University, accessed 29 July 2015 

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206. Ibid.

207. Jim Groom and Brian Lamb, “Reclaiming Innovation,” Educause, 2014, accessed 

at: http://www.educause.edu/visuals/shared/er/extras/2014/ReclaimingInnovation/default.html.

208. “Disruptive Technology,” Whatis.com, July 2014, accessed 27 July 2015 at: http://

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209. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma.

210. Marcel Salathe, “MOOCs and Disruptive Innovation in Higher Education: An Interview,” Wired Innovative Insights, 26 September 2014, accessed at: http://insights.

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211. Juliana Marques, “A Short History of MOOCs and Distance Learning,” MOOC 

News and Reviews, 17 April 2013, accessed at: http://moocnewsandreviews.

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212. C. Barnes, “Education and Training - What’s the difference?” ELearning Industry, 14 June 2015, accessed at: http://elearningindustry.com/education-andtraining-what-is-the-difference.

213. Marques, “A Short History of MOOCs and Distance Learning.”

214. Ibid.

215. Ibid.

216. Tamar Lewin, “Promising Full College Credit, Arizona State University Offers 

Online Freshman Program,” The New York Times, 22 April 2015, accessed at: 

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217. Ibid.

218. Marques, “A Short History of MOOCs and Distance Learning.” 

219. Blaine Friedlander, “Four New MOOCs Offered for Spring 2015,” Cornell Chronicle, 29 October 2015, accessed at: http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2014/10/

four-new-moocs-offered-spring-2015.
137

Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

220. “Massive study on MOOCs: Harvard, MIT report provides new insights on an 

evolving space,” Harvard Gazette, 1 April 2015, accessed at: http://news.harvard.

edu/gazette/story/2015/04/massive-study-on-moocs/ 

221. Ibid.

222. Ibid.

223. Salathe, “MOOCs and Disruptive Innovation in Higher Education: An Interview.”

224. J. Meister, “MOOCs & Open Learning Assets Emerge As Disruptors To Corporate 

Learning,” Class Central, accessed 28 July 2015 at: https://www.class-central.

com/report/corporate-moocs/.

225. Ibid.

226. Ibid.

227. Ibid.

228. Salathe, “MOOCs and Disruptive Innovation in Higher Education: An Interview.”

229. Lura Sanborn, “The Present Future Potential of Online Education,” Class Central, 

accessed at: https://www.class-central.com/report/potential-of-online-education/.

230. Ibid.

231. Ibid.

232. Ibid.

233. Ibid.

234. Ibid.

235. H. Gais, “Is the developing world ‘MOOC’d out’?” Aljazeera America, 17 July 

2014, accessed at: http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/mooc-educationdevelopingworldivyleave.html.

236. Sanborn, “The Present Future Potential of Online Education.”

237. Federal Soup, “Department of Defense,” accessed at: https://forum.federalsoup.

com/default.aspx?g=posts&t=43468#post476417.

238. Advanced Distributed Learning, “SCORM Overview,” accessed at http://www.

adlnet.gov/scorm.html.

239. Ibid.

240. Ibid.

241. Ibid.

242. Ibid.

243. Ibid.

244. Ibid. 

245. Scott Cheney-Peters and Adam Kahnke, “Classes for Nothing and Degrees for 

Free Pt. 2, or Knowledge (That’s What I Want),” U.S. Naval Institute Blog, February 2014, accessed at: http://blog.usni.org/tag/moocs.

246. Joint Knowledge Online, accessed 30 July 2015 at: http://jko.jten.mil/.
138

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247. GLOSS, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, accessed 30 July 

2015 at: https://gloss.dliflc.edu/.

248. RAPPORT, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, accessed 30 

July 2015, https://rapport.lingnet.org/.

249. Joint Language University, accessed 30 July 2015 at: jlu.wbtrain.com/sumtotal/

jlu2.0/HOME/index.asp.

250. Ibid.

251. Ibid.

252. Cheney-Peters and Kahnke, “Classes for Nothing and Degrees for Free Pt. 2.”

253. “NAVAIR charts a new course in virtual worlds,” NAVAIR News, 10 February 

2014, accessed at: http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.

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254. P. Shane Gallagher, “Putting the Massive into Military Training,” presentation 

at the 2014 Online Symposium on MOOCs: Scaling Corporate Learning, 18 June 

2014, accessed at: http://web.corpu.com/2014-online-symposium-on-moocs.

255. Mary Kukla, “MOOCs and the Future of Education, Patuxant Partnership,” The 

Patuxent Partnership, 16 July 2013, accessed at http://paxpartnership.org/index.

cfm?action=NWD&NW_ID=371.

256. Gallagher, “Putting the Massive into Military Training.”

257. Robert G. Sands, “We Built a Culture MOOC...for Soldiers Everywhere (and 

Marines, and Airmen, and USAID Personnel and Others),” Small Wars Journal, 

29 June 2015, accessed at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/we-built-aculture-mooc%E2%80%A6for-soldiers-everywhere-and-marines-and-airmenand-us-aid-personnel.

258. Salathe, “MOOCs and Disruptive Innovation in Higher Education: An Interview.”

259. Sands, “We Built a Culture MOOC...for Soldiers Everywhere.”

260. Kukla, “MOOCs and the Future of Education.” 

261. Groom and Lamb, “Reclaiming Innovation.”

262. Sands, “Operationalizing Culture: Thinking Differently about Behavior in the 

Human Domain.” 

263. Sands, “We Built a Culture MOOC...for Soldiers Everywhere.”

264. Clayton Wright, Valerie Lopes, T. Craig Montgomerie, Sunday Reju, and Seb 

Schmoller, “Selecting a Learning Management System: Advice from an Academic 

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ero/article/selecting-learning-management-system-advice-academic-perspective.

265. Ibid.

266. Malcolm Brown, Joanne Dehoney, and Nancy Millichap, “What’s next for the 

LMS?” Educause Review, 22 June 2015, accessed at: http://www.educause.edu/

ero/article/whats-next-lms.
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Sands: Assessing SOF LRC Needs

267. “Mindflash, Choosing a Learning Management System,” Advanced Distributed 

Learning (ADL) Co-Laboratories, June 2014, 9, accessed at: http://www.adlnet.

org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Choosing-an-LMS-1.pdf.

268. “What is eLearning?” E-Learning NC, accessed 13 July 2015 at: www.elearningnc.

gov/about_ elearning/what_is_elearning/.

269. “Mindflash, Choosing a Learning Management System,” Advanced Distributed 

Learning (ADL) Co-Laboratories.

270. Y. Kats, “Learning Management System Technologies and Software Solutions for 

Online Teaching: Tools and Applications: Tools and Applications,” Information 

Science Reference, 2010, 2.

271. “Mindflash, Choosing a Learning Management System,” Advanced Distributed 

Learning (ADL) Co-Laboratories; and Kats, “Learning Management System 

Technologies and Software Solutions for Online Teaching,” 2.

272. “Edutech Wiki,” LCMS, accessed 15 July 2015 at: http://edutechwiki.unige.ch/

en/LCMS.

273. Ibid.

274. “Managing Knowledge with Learning Objects: The Role of an e-learning Content 

Management System in Speeding Time to Performance,” a WBT Systems White 

Paper.

275. Advanced Distributed Learning, “SCORM Overview.”

276. Janusz Buda, “Course Management Systems,” Waseda University Faculty of 

Commerce, 28 November 2006, accessed at: http://www.f.waseda.jp/buda/texts/

cms.html.

277. Advanced Distributed Learning, “SCORM Overview.”

278. Buda, “Course Management Systems.”

279. Ibid.

280. Ibid.

281. Ibid.

282. Ibid.

283. “Language Training,” Special Forces Training, accessed at: http://www.specialforcestraining.info/language.htm.

284. “SOFTS Language Training,” Professional Soldier, accessed at: http://www.

professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=31308. 

285. “What is Web 2.0 E-Learning?” Knowledge Direct, accessed at: http://kdplatform.

com/what-is-web-2-0-elearning/.

286. Wright et al., “Selecting a Learning Management System.”

287. C. Pappas, “11 Tips for Choosing the Best Learning Management System,” 

E-Learning Industry, 4 November 2014, accessed at: http://elearningindustry.

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288. Wright et al., “Selecting a Learning Management System.”
140

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289. Ibid.

290. Sands and Pawelek. “Synergizing Language and Culture at Joint Base Lewis/

McChord Language and Culture Center;” and Robert G. Sands, “Assessing Language, Region & Culture: The Power of the Measure is in the Association of the 

Components,” plenary presentation, Language Education and Resources Network 

(LEARN) Workshop: Integrating Language Training & Regional/Transnational 

Studies, The Universities at Shady Grove, Rockville, MD, 27 August 2015, accessed 

at: https://www.fbcinc.com/e/LEARN/e/Integrating/default.aspx. 

291. Ibid.

292. Ibid.

293. “Left of Bang” refers to non-kinetic activities and missions that occur prior to 

conflict that could play in a role in reducing or eliminating conflict. See Michael 

T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis, “‘Left of Bang’: The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s Environment,” Prism 3 (4): 13-21, accessed at: https://

mlc.linguistics.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Left-of-Bang.pdf.

294. Comments made by Lieutenant General Francis J. Wiercinski, USARPAC Commander, “USARPACS’s Regional Partnership Program,” 10 January 2013, in Sands 

and Pawelek, “Synergizing Language and Culture at Joint Base Lewis/McChord 

Language and Culture Center.”

295. “Committee Reports: 114th Congress (2015-2016) House Report 114-102,” 

Library of Congress, Thomas, accessed at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpqu

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l=TOC_480157&.

296. Ibid.

297. Robert G. Sands, “Culture Clash,” Journal of Culture, Language and International 

Security 2, no. 1 (2015): 3-21, accessed at: http://iscl.norwich.edu/jclis-winter2015.

298. U.S. Congress, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities Subcommittee Of The Committee On Armed Services House Of Representatives, “Assessing 

U.S. Special Operations Command’s Missions and Roles,” 109th Cong., 2nd 

sess. Cong. Doc. H.A.S.C. No. 109–129, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008, 

accessed 18 November 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/soc.

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299. “What is Web 2.0 E-Learning?” Knowledge Direct, accessed at: http://kdplatform.

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300. Nova Spivack, “Web 3.0: The Third Generation Web Is Coming,” Lifeboat Foundation: Safeguarding Humanity, accessed at: http://lifeboat.com/ex/web.3.0.