Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-495 | July 3, 2019 Page 1 of 9

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Zachary J. Stock

Attorney at Law, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Chandra K. Hein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Edgar Santiago,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 3, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-495

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court

The Honorable Mark A. Smith, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D04-1806-CM-826

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-495 | July 3, 2019 Page 2 of 9

[1] Edgar Santiago appeals his conviction for Class A Misdemeanor Driving While 

Suspended,1 arguing that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his 

suspended driver’s license because the prolonged stop violated the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On June 19, 2018, Avon Police Department Officer Mercedes Spicer was 

patrolling in her fully marked police car when she stopped behind a Toyota 

truck at a red light. Officer Spicer ran a license plate check of the truck and 

discovered that it belonged to a man named Valentine Hernandez and that 

Hernandez’s license had been suspended. Officer Spicer spotted the driver of 

the truck and saw that he, too, was a man. With this information, she turned on 

her patrol lights and conducted a traffic stop under the suspicion that the driver, 

who Officer Spicer believed was Hernandez, was operating a motor vehicle 

with a suspended license. 

[3] Officer Spicer then approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and told the 

driver, who was later identified as Santiago, that she had stopped the vehicle 

because the owner’s driver’s license had been suspended. Santiago, the sole 

occupant of the vehicle, told Officer Spicer that his cousin owned the truck and 

that he was not Valentine Hernandez. To confirm this information, Officer 

 

1

Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2.
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Spicer asked Santiago for his driver’s license, but Santiago handed her a 

Mexican identification (ID) card identifying him as Edgar Santiago. Officer 

Spicer clarified that she wanted to see his driver’s license and not just an ID 

card; Santiago replied that he did not have a driver’s license. 

[4] Officer Spicer returned to her police car and ran a search of Santiago using his 

Mexican ID. She discovered that Santiago’s driver’s license had been suspended

and that he had a prior conviction for driving while suspended. Consequently, 

Officer Spicer arrested Santiago and had the vehicle towed. 

[5] On June 20, 2018, the State charged Santiago with Class A misdemeanor 

driving while suspended. Soon after, Santiago filed a motion to suppress 

evidence that his driver’s license was suspended, arguing that the prolonged 

investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. At Santiago’s 

February 25, 2019, bench trial, Santiago renewed his objection to the admission 

of the evidence, which the trial court overruled. The trial court found Santiago 

guilty as charged. During sentencing later that same day, the trial court imposed

fines without any period of probation or incarceration. Santiago now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Santiago raises one argument on appeal—namely, that the trial court erred 

when it admitted evidence of his suspended driver’s license because the 

prolonged investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution. Specifically, Santiago contends that this evidence was 

obtained during an unconstitutional extension of an initially valid traffic stop.

[7] As a general matter, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. “[T]he Fourth 

Amendment’s ‘protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or 

vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.’” Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 

319 (Ind. 2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). And 

evidence that is the product of an unlawful seizure is inadmissible under the 

Fourth Amendment. Hanna v. State, 726 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 

(holding that evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures is “fruit of the 

poisonous tree” and is inadmissible in a court of law). 

[8] Reversal of a trial court’s decision to admit evidence is appropriate only where 

the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. 

Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997). “Moreover, we will sustain the 

trial court[’s] [decision on the admission of evidence] if it can be done on any 

legal ground apparent in the record.” Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 

2000). However, we will review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo, 

giving no weight to the legal analysis below. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332, 

334 (Ind. 2013). In reviewing determinations of reasonable suspicion 

specifically, we look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see 

whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for 

suspecting legal wrongdoing. State v. Burlington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind. 

2004).
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[9] Here, Santiago does not contest the validity of the initial Terry2stop of the

vehicle. Santiago concedes that Officer Spicer had a reasonable suspicion that 

the owner was driving the vehicle with a suspended license, thereby allowing 

her to conduct a routine traffic stop. See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850 

(Ind. 2017). Rather, Santiago argues that Officer Spicer’s initial reasonable 

suspicion leading to the traffic stop dissipated as soon as she determined that 

Santiago was not Valentine Hernandez, the owner of the vehicle. Rodriguez v. 

United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) 

(finding that a traffic stop becomes unlawful “if it is prolonged beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of the stop itself). According to 

Santiago, Officer Spicer had already determined from both Santiago’s replies

and his Mexican ID card that Santiago was not Hernandez before she asked for 

his driver’s license a second time. Therefore, because the mission of the stop 

was to investigate the owner of the car (Hernandez), any further questioning by 

Officer Spicer unlawfully prolonged the stop and violated the Fourth 

Amendment.

[10] Santiago cites Holly v. State, in which our Supreme Court encountered a very 

similar situation also challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds. 918 N.E.2d 

323 (Ind. 2009). In Holly, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer 

Jason Ross ran a license plate check of the vehicle travelling in front of him and 

 

2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that officers may conduct brief investigatory stops “where a 

police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him [or her] reasonably to conclude in light of his [or 

her] experience that criminal activity may be afoot”).
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discovered that the vehicle’s owner was a Black woman named Terry Sumler 

and that she had a suspended driver’s license. Officer Ross conducted a traffic 

stop and immediately noticed that the driver was a Black man, later identified 

as Damen Holly. There were two other passengers in the vehicle: Sumler and 

Holly’s brother. Confused, Officer Ross asked Holly for his driver’s license. 

Holly stated that he did not have his driver’s license, so Officer Ross went back 

to his vehicle to run Holly’s information. Officer Ross then discovered that 

Holly’s driver’s license was also suspended, so Officer Ross ordered everyone 

out of the vehicle. He and a back-up officer conducted a search of the vehicle 

and found a small baggie of marijuana. Officer Ross arrested Holly. 

[11] Holly later challenged the admission of any evidence obtained from the officer’s 

inquiry about his driver’s license or the subsequent search on the same grounds 

as Santiago. Specifically, Holly conceded that Officer Ross had the reasonable 

suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle under the belief that the owner, 

Sumler, was driving it with a suspended driver’s license. However, Holly 

argued that once it was apparent that he was not Sumler and not the owner of 

the vehicle, Officer Ross’s reasonable suspicion dissipated, and any further 

inquiry unlawfully prolonged the Terry stop in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. Our Supreme Court ruled in Holly’s favor, holding, in pertinent 

part, as follows: 

To be sure, if a license plate check reveals that the driver’s license 

of the vehicle’s registered owner has been suspended, then there is 

reason to believe (a) the registered owner is driving the vehicle, 

and thus (b) is doing so illegally. Under those circumstances, in 

Terry terms, an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that 
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criminal activity is afoot. But once it becomes apparent that the driver of 

the vehicle is not the owner then an officer simply has no reason to conduct 

additional inquiry. An officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a 

Terry stop when among other things, “the officer is unaware of any 

evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the 

driver of the vehicle.”

Id. at 325 (quoting Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ind. 2009)) (emphasis 

added).

[12] According to our Supreme Court, the “stubbornly clear” evidence that Holly 

was a man and Sumler was a woman proved that Holly was not the vehicle’s 

owner, thereby making Officer Ross’s request for Holly’s driver’s license 

violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 326. In other words, the additional 

request for Holly’s driver’s license, which led to a search of the vehicle, 

unlawfully prolonged the stop because Officer Ross’s reasonable suspicion that 

Sumler had been driving the vehicle had already evaporated. Simply put, 

“[r]easonable suspicion to pull a car over does not confer unconditional 

authority to request the driver’s license and registration.” Id.

[13] Despite Santiago’s claim that his scenario is identical to that of Holly’s, his 

argument is unavailing. Key facts distinguish Santiago’s case from Holly’s—

namely, those related to identification. Unlike Officer Ross in Holly, whose 

reasonable suspicion vanished as soon as he saw that the driver was a man and

not a woman, Officer Spicer could not immediately determine that Santiago 

was not Hernandez, the owner of the car. Officer Spicer’s license plate search of 

the vehicle in front of her showed that the vehicle was owned by a Latino man 
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named Valentine Hernandez. Officer Spicer then stopped the vehicle, 

approached the driver’s side, and found a Latino man driving the vehicle.

Therefore, we hold that it was within the officer’s authority to ask for a driver’s 

license to confirm Santiago’s identity because it was not immediately apparent 

that he was not the owner of the vehicle.3

[14] Furthermore, Indiana law supports the notion that an officer may ask for a 

driver’s license in the course of a Terry stop to confirm that someone can validly 

drive on Indiana roads. “A Terry stop is a lesser intrusion on the person than an 

arrest and may include a request to see identification and inquiry necessary to 

confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 

570 (Ind. 2006). Indiana Code section 9-24-1-1 requires any individual driving 

on Indiana roads to have a valid driver’s license or permit issued by a motor 

vehicle bureau. Furthermore, a “‘driver’s license’ means any type of license or 

privilege to operate a motor vehicle under the laws of a jurisdiction.” Ind. Code 

§ 9-28-2-4. Accordingly, this definition encompasses international driver’s 

licenses, including those from Mexico.

[15] Officer Spicer had the authority to check for a driver’s license, like in any other 

routine traffic stop, to ensure that the driver was properly licensed to operate a 

 

3 Both Holly and Armfield rely on numerous state supreme and intermediate court decisions from other 

jurisdictions where there was “evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of 

the vehicle.” Holly, 918 N.E.2d at 326. These cases all point to evidence of clear differences in age, gender, 

and race as examples of demonstrable proof that the driver was not, in fact, the owner of the vehicle—the 

person about whom the officer formed the initial reasonable suspicion of engaging in potential criminal 

activity. See, e.g., Armfield, 918 N.E.2d at 321 n.7. 
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motor vehicle on Indiana roads. See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 

2006) (holding that “[w]here an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, a 

request for the driver’s license and vehicle registration . . . are within the scope 

of a reasonable detention[]”); see also State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an individual’s “failure to produce his license was 

a circumstance independent of the [] violation, which provided [the officer] 

with reasonable suspicion that [defendant] might not have a valid driver’s 

license”). Here, because Officer Spicer did not have conclusive evidence to 

determine that Santiago was not Hernandez and because she had an obligation 

to ensure that Santiago could legally drive on Indiana roads, it was not 

impermissible of her to ask for Santiago’s driver’s license during the Terry stop.

[16] Therefore, we hold that Officer Spicer’s request to see Santiago’s driver’s license 

did not unlawfully prolong the initial purpose of the investigatory traffic stop, 

and consequently, did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.