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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

The War Within: A Look Inside 

al-Qaeda’s Undoing

Jarret Brachman, Ph.D.

JSOU Report 16-3

In this monograph, Dr. Jarret Brachman delves into al-Qaeda’s 

crumbling global movement and its internal struggles, including its attempts to remain relevant in the shadow of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Brachman cites various internal 

writings of al-Qaeda’s past and present leaders, thinkers, and 

supporters. It becomes clear that this once dominant terrorist 

organization has changed in the post-bin Laden era, is becoming 

fractured, and is taking a backseat to ISIL. Brachman analyzes 

letters, blog posts, and social media comments from various 

ranks within al-Qaeda that show the discontent, frustration, and 

confusion the once prominent terrorist organization has faced 

in recent years. Although struggling, al-Qaeda remains a serious 

threat and maintains a global footprint. But as ISIL gains more 

publicity, al-Qaeda has more trouble competing for followers, 

funding, and attention. This monograph explores al-Qaeda’s 

recent efforts to make sense of itself.

JSOU Report 16-3 The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s Undoing Brachman

ISBN 978-1-941715-08-6
Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; 

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs; Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, M.A., English, JSOU Press Editor 

Frederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Senior Research Fellow and adjunct professor, 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 

Monterey and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

Louis Alberto Ordóñez Rubio,

Vice Admiral, Colombian Navy, Ret.,

Ph.D., Education, Director, Centro Regional de 

Estudios Estrategicos en Seguridad

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

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JSOU Report 16-3

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

The War Within:

A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s 

Undoing

Jarret Brachman, Ph.D.
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

libguides.com/jsoupublications. Click on Publications. Comments about this 

publication are invited and should be forwarded to the Director of the Center 

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Printed in February 2016.

ISBN 978-1-941715-08-6
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

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Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied 

Environments, January 2016, Robert Haddick

SOF Role in Combating Transnational Crime, January 2016

The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, December 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion, 

November 2015, Colin S. Gray

Countering Violent Extremism in Mali, November 2015, Mark Moyar

The 2005 Iraqi Sunni Awakening: The Role of the Desert Protectors Program, 

October 2015, William Knarr

2016 Special Operations Research Topics

Saudi Arabia: Modernity, Stability, and the Twenty-First Century Monarchy, 

June 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fourth Edition, 2015

2015 Special Operations Essays, May 2015

Building Partner Capacity, February 2015, Harry R. Yarger

On the cover. Photo illustration by Clairvoyant Media Services. Stock photo 

by Shutterstock.
v

Contents

Foreword......................................................................................vii

About the Author...........................................................................ix

Preface ......................................................................................... 1

Introduction................................................................................... 5

1. Insights From Abbottabad ........................................................ 13

2. After bin Laden........................................................................ 29

3. Al-Qaeda’s Uncertain Future ................................................... 43

Conclusion.................................................................................. 53

Endnotes...................................................................................... 57

vii

Foreword

Dr. Jarret Brachman’s The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s 

Undoing delves into al-Qaeda’s crumbling global movement and its 

internal struggles, including its attempts to remain relevant. While at one 

time not a day would go by without al-Qaeda being mentioned in the news, 

media coverage is now much more focused on the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant (ISIL), which has dominated al-Qaeda in terms of strategic messaging, recruiting, funding, and more. 

Brachman cites various internal writings of al-Qaeda’s past and present 

leaders, thinkers, and supporters. It becomes clear that this once dominant 

terrorist organization has changed in the post-bin Laden era; it is becoming 

fractured, and it is seemingly taking a backseat to ISIL. But despite these and 

other problems in recent years, al-Qaeda remains a serious threat across the 

globe. With splinter groups, including al-Shabaab, and terrorism plots and 

attacks in many Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African nations, it is clear 

they cannot be ignored. Although they are focusing more now on local gains 

rather than a global agenda, they still have a significant global footprint. But 

Brachman questions, “whether today’s incarnations of al-Qaeda retain any 

of the same attributes that helped al-Qaeda’s general command originally 

rise to prominence.”

Brachman analyzes letters, blog posts, and social media comments from 

various ranks within al-Qaeda that show the discontent, frustration, and 

confusion the once prominent terrorist organization has faced in recent 

years. He gives an overview of the creation of the Islamic State and the tensions that erupted between them and al-Qaeda, as well as al-Qaeda’s lack of 

ability to adapt to the new era of mobile social media, which ISIL has seemingly mastered. While still a threat, al-Qaeda is struggling for survival in 

the Islamic State’s shadow, attempting to compete for resources, followers, 

and attention—and it has not had great success in these endeavors.

The first section of this monograph examines the 17 letters found in 

Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound, which highlight a vast range of 

bin Laden’s grievances and concerns about al-Qaeda’s struggles with recruiting, communication, and myriad other issues. The second section addresses 

how Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s remaining senior leadership sought 
viii

to understand their role in the world following bin Laden’s death. The section 

also explores shifts in al-Qaeda’s policies and then analyzes al-Zawahiri’s 

failure to control Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of ISIL. The third section 

examines debates among al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates, online personalities, 

and others close to the organization to better track the kinds of internal 

grievances being articulated across the movement. 

This monograph has value to the military and beyond. It is not only 

an in-depth look at one of the most infamous terrorist organizations in 

the world, but its value lies within the first-hand accounts from al-Qaeda’s 

leaders and followers alike. Taking this information that has come ‘straight 

from the horse’s mouth’ can help SOF operators, enablers, and conventional 

forces better ‘know their enemy’ so they can exploit al-Qaeda’s struggles and 

weaknesses, and eventually defeat them.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Author

Dr. Jarret Brachman is an internationally recognized specialist on alQaeda strategy, ideology, and propaganda. He earned his Ph.D. from 

the University of Delaware. During his graduate work, he served as a doctoral fellow at the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorist Center 

in 2003. Dr. Brachman went on to serve as the first 

Director of Research at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) from 2004 to 2008. In that role 

he oversaw numerous sponsored research projects 

for agencies across the Department of Defense and 

intelligence and law enforcement communities, and 

directly oversaw the establishment of the CTC Sentinel publication. 

In 2008, Dr. Brachman returned to his hometown 

of Fargo, North Dakota, where he now teaches at 

North Dakota State University. He published his first book, Global Jihadism: 

Theory and Practice, in 2008 with Routledge Press and has published numerous articles on academics and policy. He is currently directing a security and 

training center at North Dakota State University. His research is regularly 

featured across international media outlets including, NPR, CNN, Associated Press, Washington Post, and New York Times.

1

Brachman: The War Within

Preface 

Despite Ayman al-Zawahiri’s numerous pronouncements calling for 

unity among al-Qaeda’s ranks since formally becoming emir in June 

2011, he has been unable to squelch the internal discord and dissension 

plaguing al-Qaeda’s global movement. The degree to which his followers 

are expressing confusion, concern, and bitterness has only grown more acute 

since al-Zawahiri assumed the reins. With the Islamic State’s meteoric rise 

and strategic messaging dominance over al-Qaeda’s general command and 

its various regional affiliates, the militant Islamist space has only grown 

more fractured and factionalized. 

The increased levels of internal discontent are better understood as happening in spite of al-Zawahiri’s efforts, not because of them. In the immediate aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death, American counterterrorism 

analysts filled the airwaves with commentary about al-Zawahiri’s supposed 

lack of charisma or ability to effectively inspire al-Qaeda’s target audience. 

For al-Qaeda’s adherents, charisma has always mattered far less than perceived ability to demonstrate success on the battlefield. The al-Qaeda global 

movement has been so handedly eclipsed by the Islamic State, today’s militant Islamist landscape, because it has repeatedly failed to demonstrate relevance or influence to its global audience, particularly when compared with 

groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or the Islamic State. 

The global al-Qaeda movement’s post-bin Laden evolution has been heavily influenced by the al-Qaeda general command’s geographic isolation and 

an increasingly assertive regional affiliate leaders. On the ground, groups 

taking up the al-Qaeda banner have turned inward, shifting their focus to 

local matters. They draw on what they believe makes the most sense for their 

unique situations, not what al-Qaeda’s general command orders them to do 

from thousands of miles away. If anything, it is the Islamic State, not the 

general command, that is providing the new Northern Star that is setting 

the new standard for the look, feel, and behavior of regional affiliate groups.

The elimination of most of the global al-Qaeda movement’s persuasive 

senior leaders and prominent clerics, the closure of its numerous online 

discussion forums, decline of first-rate propaganda and high-visibility terrorist attacks around which to rally, and the dilution of al-Qaeda’s remaining 
2

JSOU Report 16-3

Internet support base across a variety of social media platforms, has led to 

a cacophonous, undisciplined, atomized movement that is struggling to 

understand what al-Qaeda is anymore. Militant Islamist supporters have 

retreated to the easiest point of entry that requires the least amount of intellectual work: online social media. 

Try as he might, al-Zawahiri has simply been unable to authoritatively 

and effectively wrestle al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates and global adherents back 

into line when they stray. He has also shown little ability to take al-Qaeda’s 

message viral in an era of mobile phones and mobile apps. A role that had 

been once shared across a cadre of senior leaders now falls almost entirely on 

the back of al-Zawahiri, who simply is not able to play the role of persuasive 

communicator, largely because he lacks the bureaucratic mechanisms with 

which to police his own movement. Since the general command now has so 

few resources to offer their movement as carrots for compliance, and since 

they have virtually no sticks other than public shaming, al-Zawahiri has 

become virtually irrelevant. 

Between the questions over why al-Zawahiri’s orders were publicly disobeyed by the head of al-Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate to the open letter sent to 

al-Zawahiri from a senior al-Shabaab commander pleading for assistance 

to quell in-fighting, al-Qaeda’s global following continues trying for small 

wins, or marginal propaganda successes in an otherwise dysfunctional series 

of messes. Those espousing the al-Qaeda ideology today are strategically 

confused, and questioning whether the Islamic State offers more legitimacy 

in the eyes of hardline jihadist adherents. This report analyzes al-Qaeda’s 

internal discussions—from official al-Qaeda releases to think-pieces penned 

by al-Qaeda’s intelligentsia to online postings by rank-in-file followers—

in order to better gauge the movement’s perception of internal cohesion. 

This report shows that a high degree of rancor and consternation persists 

within al-Qaeda’s ranks, but not regarding the types of issues that divided 

the movement just several years ago, most notably the killing of Muslim 

non-combatants by groups acting in alignment with al-Qaeda’s global brand. 

Rather, there remains a high degree of frustration today about perceived 

lack of unity and coordination within the general command and across the 

regional affiliates. The affiliate leaderships remain preoccupied with defending themselves and their reputations against internal critics, backbiters, and 

discouragers. 
3

Brachman: The War Within

The persistent rumblings within al-Qaeda’s movement could be viewed 

as a positive step for America’s war with the global jihadist movement. The 

more time the al-Qaeda support community spends bickering with one 

another about internal issues, the less time they are innovating dastardly 

plots or fueling the fires of online radicalization. These quarrels have very 

real consequences in terms of creating misgivings, mistrust, and ill will 

among leaders, groups, and forums. It may also lead to growing fatigue 

among al-Qaeda’s online participants as they watch the movement for which 

they so desperately want to cheer cannibalize itself. 

On the flip side, al-Qaeda’s undisciplined and relatively ungoverned 

global movement remains unpredictable and keenly intent on proving their 

organizational competence to the world. 

5

Brachman: The War Within

Introduction

In July 2009, al-Qaeda’s senior religious authority, Sheikh Abu Yahya alLibi, issued a stern warning to the global al-Qaeda movement against 

“backbiting.” For al-Libi, the notion of “backbiting,” understood as the 

unfounded public criticism by one Muslim of another, “is worse than defamation” because that criticism “damages relationships between Muslims,” 

according to al-Libi. Backbiting does more than just chip away at the movement’s morale or contribute to operational dysfunction, al-Libi contended. 

This practice of public shaming, he argued, fundamentally destroys the fabric 

of trust within al-Qaeda’s global movement as well as between al-Qaeda and 

the broader Islamic world to which it is appealing for support.1

Abu Yahya al-Libi preached that backbiting and the internal fractures 

that flow from it are not only prohibited in the Quran, Hadith, and by the 

Prophet, but “is a chronic disease” that, if allowed to spread, “will divide 

[society] and tear apart what ties it has. It leads to conflicts, hatred, and 

enmity. It makes the human, the Muslim, spiteful of his Muslim brother and 

makes him push him to fall into what he hates.” Although al-Libi was alQaeda’s most outspoken voice on the dangers of infighting, his admonitions 

have been carried forward by the few remaining senior al-Qaeda leaders as 

they have struggled to maintain unity and coherence in recent years, largely 

because of how prescient his warnings seem to have been.2

What remains of today’s al-Qaeda stands at a precarious crossroads. 

The general command’s public face is now a shadow of its former self, with 

Ayman al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn being the most visible spokesmen. 

To compensate for losses across the senior ranks, As-Sahab has brought out 

senior thinkers, including; Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf (aka Abd-al-Hadi Mustafa), 

Abu Dujanah al-Basha (aka Muhammad Bin-Mahmud al-Bahtiti),3 Maulana 

Asim Umar, the head of al-Qaeda’s sharia committee in Pakistan; Ustad 

Ahmad Farooq, al-Qaeda’s chief propagandist in Pakistan; and Abu Khalil 

al-Madani.4

Al-Qaeda’s primary affiliates have turned inward and are concentrating 

more on making territorial gains locally, appealing to the local populous 

and consolidating themselves through low-level criminality than they are 

on advancing al-Qaeda’s grandiose global agenda. 
6

JSOU Report 16-3

Al-Qaeda’s global support base, connected mostly via the Internet, is now 

fractured across a host of sporadically available online channels and platforms. But adherents with more longevity supporting the movement remain 

active primarily on Internet discussion forums, which were the mainstay of 

mid-2000s support. Al-Qaeda’s media products still find ample reception in 

the forum community. Newer generations, however, have turned away from 

the forum structure, instead interfacing with militant Islamist content via 

their mobile phones. Al-Qaeda has yet to crack the code on doing social 

media right, virtually ceding the entire space to the Islamic State. 

Despite this somewhat bleak depiction of al-Qaeda’s state, terrorist plots 

and attacks connected in some way to the al-Qaeda movement persist everywhere from Iraq to Pakistan, Kenya to Yemen, Mali to Jordan, and beyond.5 

To say that al-Qaeda is no longer a serious threat to the world, however, 

would be simply incorrect. Its global footprint is more expansive than ever 

before. The question remains, however, whether today’s incarnations of alQaeda retain any of the same attributes that helped al-Qaeda’s general command originally rise to prominence. 

Al-Qaeda observers are questioning the very premise of a war with alQaeda if that which is known as al-Qaeda has fundamentally changed. Steve 

Coll, for example, in 2013 noted that certainly, “jihadist violence presents an 

enduring danger. Its proponents will rise and ebb; the amorphous threats 

that they pose will require adaptive security policies and, occasionally, 

military action.” But at the same time, Coll disputes that this reality is any 

grounds for maintaining such a robust focus with a war on al-Qaeda. Indeed, 

Coll contends that, “the empirical case for a worldwide state of war against a 

corporeal thing called al-Qaeda looks increasingly threadbare. A war against 

a name is a war in name only.”6 To Coll’s point, with the rise of the Islamic 

State, the world has again found a corporeal entity against which to declare 

a state of war, so by contrast, what remains of al-Qaeda seems to be even 

more threadbare.

This report explores al-Qaeda’s own efforts to make sense of itself. It will 

seek to identify the attributes of the al-Qaeda brand that differentiate it from 

that of other jihadist movements, particularly the Islamic State. And the 

report attempts to clarify whether there are meaningful distinctions among 

the various groups that retain the al-Qaeda mantle. Rather than attempting 

to analyze al-Qaeda’s supposed strengths and weaknesses as other counterterrorism studies have done, this report begins by peering behind al-Qaeda’s 
7

Brachman: The War Within

curtain, drawing on the words of their own leaders and thinkers. It sought to 

make sense of al-Qaeda from within rather than imposing typical external 

analytic categories upon it as many counterterrorism studies do.7

Although this report began as a project exploring strategic fissures and 

ideological wedges that could be potentially exacerbated and exploited, it 

became clear that these kinds of issues no longer fuel the fire of al-Qaeda’s 

internal debates. Rather, in light of the rise of the Islamic State and the intellectual degradation of al-Qaeda’s new generation of followers, it devolved 

into personal grudge matches. 

The report finds the same insights that many al-Qaeda analysts have intuitively known all along: al-Qaeda’s internal dialog over recent years shows a 

global movement plagued by factionalism, infighting, and backbiting. It is 

a war within that al-Qaeda’s own leaders and thinkers used to keep quiet, 

fearful that reports of such internal wrangling would only further alienate 

the movement from the broader Islamic world. 

But today, because of both the proliferation of Internet channels through 

which al-Qaeda’s adherents can communicate and the dearth of clear guidance from the senior ranks, al-Qaeda’s global movement is now pleading 

Figure 1. Former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (left) and his deputy, Ayman 

al-Zawahiri, sit in a hideout in Afghanistan in 2001. Following bin Laden’s death 

in 2011, al-Zawahiri was named al-Qaeda’s new leader. Source: Newscom
8

JSOU Report 16-3

to their own movement for semblance of unity and direction. The lack of 

definitive, authoritative voices beyond Ayman al-Zawahiri and a handful 

of others, has led to devolution of ideological and strategic influence within 

al-Qaeda’s global movement to the point that concerns about internal backbiting becomes an existential threat for its leadership.

What this report attempts to show is how contemporary discussions 

about the nature of the threat posed by al-Qaeda are inherently problematic 

because they continue to use this static label to refer to a dynamic structure. 

Since al-Qaeda entered the global lexicon in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, 

its personnel, operational capabilities, geographic presence, approach to 

messaging, and more have undergone numerous evolutions and incarnations. Today’s al-Qaeda is so vastly different from the al-Qaeda the world 

had come to know, that one must ask at what point the term mischaracterizes the phenomenon. 

At its core, al-Qaeda is a collection of men who believed they could leverage the intersection of global technology and local politics to change the 

world. Al-Qaeda’s top brass wanted to remake the Islamic world in their 

image. Operating from the margins for decades, this class of ultra-orthodox Islamist revolutionaries, spearheaded by bin Laden’s cult of personality, 

unconvincingly sought to advance their case to the world through ruthless 

terrorist attacks aimed at civilian populations. 

Time and again, the Islamic world rejected al-Qaeda’s numerous attempts 

to market itself. Offering little but wanton bloodshed and megabytes of empty 

rhetoric, even al-Qaeda’s cast of media savvy personalities were powerless 

to generate the global revolution that bin Laden had hoped he could incite 

through the 11 September 2001 attacks. Rather, al-Qaeda lost its place in the 

global spotlight, returning once again to the margins. Since 2001, the centrifugal nature of al-Qaeda’s internal dynamics has been borne out. Among 

the senior ranks, al-Qaeda’s top leaders have quarreled and quibbled about 

everything from office supply budgets to major strategic issues. Al-Qaeda’s 

regional groups have similarly faced challenges, many of which they caused 

through their own actions. They have disagreed with one another, as well as 

with the senior leadership, about a host of issues. 

Al-Qaeda’s Internet support movement has not been free of internal disputes. To the contrary, al-Qaeda’s online adherents are some of the most 

quarrelsome personalities in the movement, aggressively disagreeing with 

each other about nearly everything. In some ways, al-Qaeda’s attempt to 
9

Brachman: The War Within

make sense of itself is no different than one might find when surveying the 

populous of a given country or employees at a multi-national corporation 

about their attitudes and satisfaction. It is this continued internal discussion 

that helps drive an organization forward. 

In al-Qaeda’s case, the lack of internal agreement about who they are and 

what that means has had disastrous consequences. Individual leaders have 

defined the bounds of al-Qaeda’s mission differently than others, granting 

themselves autonomy that far exceeded what had been originally envisioned 

by the organization’s senior leadership. 

Al-Qaeda’s foundational challenge continues to be that, in the minds of 

most of its global movement, it was inextricably tied to one man, bin Laden, 

and his criticism of Islam’s failing to counter the onslaught of internal and 

external enemies. The senior leadership, particularly Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

has assiduously sought to reign in the differing internal perspectives of what 

al-Qaeda should be. Repeated broadcasts defining the boundaries of what 

is possible, appropriate, and necessary have done little in practice, however, 

to dispel the varying application of the al-Qaeda idea on the ground. As a 

consequence of the loss of most of al-Qaeda’s historical senior leadership, 

a messaging vacuum began to emerge within al-Qaeda’s global movement. 

Al-Qaeda’s best known media celebrities, including bin Laden, Abu al-Layth 

al-Libi, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Atiyatallah al-Libi, Abdallah Saeed, and Khalid al-Husainan, offered not only content for their media 

productions but characters with whom the global al-Qaeda movement could 

associate. 

As these al-Qaeda senior leaders were killed, the frequency and innovation of al-Qaeda’s media releases deteriorated. The organization was losing 

its brainpower and clerical sources of ideological authority. Equally important was deterioration of the personal connectedness that al-Qaeda’s online 

global support movement had with the senior leadership.

A strong esprit de corps is imperative for any virtually connected movement, particularly one premised on convincing their membership to break 

laws, kill people, and potentially sacrifice their lives for a cause. That sense of 

a personal relationship that the senior leadership propaganda helped to foster 

between themselves and their global movement was critical in maintaining 

forward momentum. Its senior leaders were able to more readily enforce their 

ideological agendas with their globally dispersed, virtual support movement. 
10

JSOU Report 16-3

Either due to a lack of vision, ineptitude, dearth of quality replacements, 

or out of strategic calculus, al-Qaeda did not backfill those media personalities by introducing new voices. Not only had al-Qaeda lost most of its 

well-known media personalities, leaving its global following with fewer 

inspirational role models, but since al-Qaeda was not backfilling these 

personalities, the general command seemed to be dwindling right before 

the eyes of its followers. In the absence of a robust messaging core from 

al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, the door was opened for one of the regional 

affiliates to step into the vacuum and assert their dominance as al-Qaeda’s 

new torch bearer. 

The most likely candidate was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP), a group that had demonstrated its ability to both target and message locally, regionally, and globally. Through a consistent releasing of both 

Arabic-language and English-language media products, AQAP’s visibility 

increased worldwide. Their messaging did not, however, catapult them into 

any role as first among equals with regard to al-Qaeda discourse. Whether 

it was because AQAP offered no compelling personality behind which the 

global al-Qaeda movement could rally—at least after the death of Sheikh 

Anwar al-Awlaki—or because their pledge of loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri 

as al-Qaeda emir necessarily subordinated them to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is unclear. 

What is clear, though, is that despite al-Zawahiri’s concerted efforts to 

capture the imagination of the global al-Qaeda movement through numerous media releases, he has been unable to do so. Although his media releases 

are generally met with fanfare and celebratory reactions, they tend to have a 

short shelf-life on the jihadist discussion forums, provoke little substantive 

conversation, receive a moderate number of views, and do not seem to result 

in the kind of discursive or behavioral shifts for which he aims. 

With no single focal point of authoritative messaging behind which the 

global al-Qaeda movement can exuberantly rally, the movement has been 

devolving into a centrifugal state of local/regional foci. In other words, what 

had been a more or less coherent global discourse, ruthlessly guided by a 

cadre of highly visible and vocal senior al-Qaeda commanders, has since 

transformed into a cacophonous marketplace of individuals, shadowy media 

outlets, and a multiplicity of media products. 

Despite whatever internal challenges the global al-Qaeda movement 

faces, the world continues to witness attacks conducted in the name of 
11

Brachman: The War Within

both al-Qaeda as well as that of the Islamic State, leaving militant Islamist 

watchers and policymakers torn about how serious of a threat these movements continue to pose outside of the Middle East region. As one researcher 

recently wrote, “Islamist groups—some of them affiliated with al-Qaeda, 

others not—are far from defeated. They still have considerable capacity to 

wreak carnage and, given the weakness of regimes that are fighting them 

across the Middle East and Africa, they can make substantial inroads into 

failed states.”8

This report draws almost entirely on the internal writings of al-Qaeda’s 

leaders, thinkers, and supporters. The first section examines the 17 letters 

found in bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound that were publicly released in 

2012 by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. They highlight the range of bin Laden’s grievances spanning from concerns about new 

hires to regional affiliate messaging to internal communication challenges 

and much more. 

The report’s second section addresses how al-Zawahiri and the remaining 

senior leadership sought to understand their role in the world in the wake of 

bin Laden’s death. The section explores shifts in al-Qaeda’s policies, including 

making al-Shabaab an official al-Qaeda affiliate in the immediate aftermath 

of bin Laden’s death. The section then analyzes al-Zawahiri’s inability to 

control Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, in a situation reminiscent of his previous inability to control Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 

The third section examines debates among al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates, 

online personalities, and pundits to better track the kinds of internal grievances and fissures being articulated across the movement. 

13

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1. Insights From Abbottabad

In May 2012, the CTC at West Point released the contents of 17 letters that 

were found in the raid on bin Laden’s Abbottabad, Pakistan, compound 

one year prior.9 The letters, which are reportedly just a sampling of the extensive collection of documents captured in the raid, offer breathtaking insight 

into the mind of bin Laden and those around him during his later years. 

Although the extent to which these letters are representative of the other 

material collected is unknown, they open a window previously unknown to 

researchers about the candor with which al-Qaeda’s senior leaders considered 

their own failings. 

Most broadly in the years leading up to his death, bin Laden arguably 

became preoccupied with three major issues:

1. A War of Attrition. Bin Laden seemed to fully understand the extent 

to which al-Qaeda’s bench had been depleted. He pressed remaining 

leaders of al-Qaeda’s general command to relocate to an area outside 

of the tribal areas in order to salvage what little was left. The challenge 

was that al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates were no longer responsive to the 

senior leadership’s advice, much less their orders. Al-Qaeda, in bin 

Laden’s eyes, was coming unglued. 

2. A War of Words. Bin Laden seemed to believe the Obama Administration’s decision to stop employing bellicose and polarizing rhetoric, 

such as phrases like ‘War on Terror’ had reduced the effectiveness of alQaeda’s propaganda, particularly within the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda 

had to rebrand themselves in the midst of this changed rhetorical 

reality. This required communication, coordination, and foresight, 

none of which al-Qaeda’s remaining leaders seemed to appreciate. In 

fact, al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates seemed to only further alienating 

themselves from their target audiences. 

3. A War for Hearts and Minds. Years of savage attacks by al-Qaeda 

fighters within the Middle East and South Asia had disgraced al-Qaeda 

within the eyes of the broader Islamic world. The regional affiliates’ 

prioritization of parochial concerns and personal agendas threatened 

to undermine the entire al-Qaeda project, in bin Laden’s perception. 
14

JSOU Report 16-3

The 17 letters surprised the counterterrorism community on primarily 

two fronts. First, far from being an absentee organizational emir, the documents gave the impression that bin Laden was meticulously trying to wield 

bureaucratic control over the global al-Qaeda movement. Media headlines 

covering the document release painted bin Laden as a “micromanager,” 

holed up in his Abbottabad compound doing little but plotting America’s 

destruction and obsessing in letter form to anyone who would listen about 

al-Qaeda’s cratering popularity.10

The second insight was the degree to which bin Laden’s internal missives were being ignored by the actual al-Qaeda movement. The idea of bin 

Laden shouting into the darkness was not the dominant narrative among 

most open source counterterrorism researchers before these letters were 

revealed. Neither was the extent to which he relied on the Libyan, Atiyah 

abd al-Rahman, as a sort of consigliore to transmit his grievances to the 

broader al-Qaeda ranks.11

A number of key insights can be gleaned pertaining to his attitude 

about certain leaders, groups, and trends. In many ways these documents 

upend much of the traditional thinking about al-Qaeda as a cohesive, singular global entity. To the contrary, if bin Laden’s thinking in these letters 

is any reflection about the broader perspectives held by al-Qaeda’s senior 

leaders, the group had far more internal fissures than had been previously 

understood. 

Somalia

The nature of al-Qaeda’s relationship with the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen militant organization in Somalia has been one of great concern in 

the West. Neither al-Qaeda’s senior leaders nor al-Shabaab did much to help 

clarify the nature of this relationship while bin Laden was still alive. In February 2009, al-Qaeda’s official media organization, for example, As-Sahab 

Media, issued a video titled, “From Kabul ... To Mogadishu” prominently 

featuring Ayman al-Zawahiri discussing a range of geopolitical priorities 

for al-Qaeda.

In the video, As-Sahab also excerpted an interchange with Hasan “Turki” 

Abdullahi Hirsi, an early senior al-Shabaab official, who has faded from the 

scene in recent years due to a host of ailments.12 According to Turki: 
15

Brachman: The War Within

I am not a terrorist; the terrorists are the Americans, and Bush and 

his army who annihilate the peoples of Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, 

Somalia, and Palestine. The terrorists are the infidels led by Bush. 

We are reformists not terrorists. I am a mujahid Shaykh among the 

scholars of jihad, and my association and affiliation to Al-Qaida 

is of the same kind as my affiliation to HAMAS or the [Islamic] 

Jihad, or to the mujahidin in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. The 

mujahidin are attached to each other, but the infidels and those who 

denied the signs of God are friends and supporters to each other. 

The mujahidin are our brothers. Almighty God says: ‘The Believers 

are but a single Brotherhood’. From this perspective, I am a member 

of Al-Qaida Organization, and Al-Qaida is part of me. To sum up, 

I do not belong to Al-Qaida as an organization, but we have one 

common objective which is the jihad against the enemies.13

For Turki, making that distinction between the global ideology for which 

groups like al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab claimed to fight and the al-Qaeda organization itself was imperative. Bin Laden implored al-Shabaab’s leadership 

to maintain that distinction for their own good as well as for helping avoid 

any further damage to al-Qaeda’s reputation by reigning in who could claim 

to be conducting operations under the al-Qaeda banner. 

According to the letters released by the CTC, bin Laden maintained correspondence with al-Shabaab’s leader, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr. Concerned 

about potentially negative fallout among the broader Somali people of such 

an alliance with al-Qaeda, bin Laden counseled against a formal alliance. In 

a letter dated 7 August 2010 from “Zamarai” (likely, bin Laden) to al‐Zubayr, 

bin Laden responds to a letter he had previously received from al‐Zubayr, 

who was requesting official unity with al‐Qaeda.14

Bin Laden argued in that letter that “there should be a practical working 

emirate on the ground,” the al-Shabaab leadership should avoid “declaring 

it in the media or confirming it in any paperwork, in order to avoid these 

documents leaking out to the enemies – should it happen for any reason.”15

Any attempt to publicly unite the two organizations would be a mistake, bin 

Laden argued. Rather, any collaboration should be done through “unannounced secret messaging,” bin Laden advises. But bin Laden’s concern for 

operational security causes him to raise the issue of al-Shabaab members 

potentially “talking about their relationship with al-Qaeda, if asked.” 
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JSOU Report 16-3

Instead of denying or embracing a clearly delineated status, bin Laden 

advocated a kind of strategic ambiguity, offering that “it would be better 

for them to say that there is a relationship with al-Qaeda which is simply a 

brotherly Islamic connection and nothing more, which would neither deny 

nor prove.” Bin Laden offered two reasons for discouraging any form of 

public connectedness. 

First, he wrote that any announcement or leak of a formal alliance 

between the two organizations “would have the enemies escalate their anger 

and mobilize against you,” which is what he saw as being the downfall of alQaeda’s efforts in Iraq and Algeria. Second, bin Laden seemed to recognize 

that al-Qaeda’s brand name had become much more of a liability than a 

benefit. In the case of Somalia, bin Laden’s apprehension was that any formal 

(or visible) alliance between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda would shrink potential 

donor funding to Somalia as a consequence. Bin Laden wrote to al-Zubayr:

The matter is that some Muslims in Somalia are suffering from 

immense poverty and malnutrition, because of the continuity of 

wars in their country ... Therefore, by not having the mujahidin 

openly allied with al-Qaida, it would strengthen those merchants 

who are willing to help the brothers in Somalia, and would keep 

people with the mujahidin.16

The Somali people, who bin Laden viewed as being in dire need of foreign 

aid and investment, might come to blame al-Qaeda for the disappearance of 

that aid. Loss of popular support would scuttle any chance of building longlasting and widespread support in the country for al-Qaeda. According to 

Ahmed Sheikh Hussein, a political analyst who tracks al-Shabaab, bin Laden 

had never been keen on making al-Shabaab an official organizational affiliate, even when the group swore its allegiance to him in 2009. “This may have 

been because of his belief that al-Shabaab’s performance was lacking and 

that it was too strict in enforcing Sharia law, not to mention the increasing 

internal divisions within its ranks,” he told Sabahi news.17

A second letter believed to have been composed in December 2010, sheds 

further light on the issue.18 Although the author is unknown, the letter was 

likely written to bin Laden from a colleague based on the familiarity with 

which it is written. Referring to “our friend’s letter” and the perspective of 

the “brothers ... [who might have been] too concerned about inflating the 

size and growth of al‐Qa`ida,” the author of the document urges the receiver 
17

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to “reconsider your opinion not to declare the accession [i.e. formal merger] 

of the brothers of Somalia ...” The CTC analysts who initially reviewed the 

letters speculate that if the letter was authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri, then 

there was serious internal disagreements about this strategic issue. If the 

above letter was indeed penned by al-Zawahiri, then it suggests that he held 

a starkly different perspective than bin Laden on the wisdom of formally 

aligning with al-Shabaab. 

Yemen

Perhaps the most of the globally visible and arguably operationally effective 

of the affiliates is AQAP, which is based in Yemen. AQAP has been one of 

the most active al-Qaeda regional affiliates. Its interests in targeting locally, 

regionally, and globally have become increasingly clarified during recent 

years through a series of brazen attempted attacks against targets in Yemen, 

Saudi Arabia, and the United States.19

The introduction of two American Jihadists, Imam Anwar al-Awlaki and 

Samir Khan, drastically upgraded the group’s ability and interest in attacking 

Western targets, particularly the United States.20 With al-Awlaki and Khan’s 

deaths, AQAP’s interest in pursuing Western targets must be questioned 

because it is unclear whether their deaths mean the group will maintain the 

capacity or commitment to direct attacks against the United States. AQAP 

has been making global headlines because of the group’s embrace of the 

American-Yemeni imam, Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki; its establishment of an 

English-language propaganda magazine, Inspire, aimed at radicalizing and 

operationalizing Western Muslims; and a series of terrorist plots and attacks 

it has directed at the American homeland. 

Prior to bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership had been completely silent in its public pronouncements about al-Awlaki and the series 

of attacks inspired by or directed by AQAP. That may have been because 

of how strongly bin Laden believed that AQAP was making fundamental 

errors in their activities. In another released letter that was addressed to “Abu 

Basir” (Nasir al‐Wuhayshi, leader of AQAP) from an unidentified author, 

who the CTC believes is most likely bin Laden or his trusted lieutenant, 

Sheikh `Atiyya abd al-Rahman, the writer sought to redirect AQAP’s efforts 

away from the near enemies and back on the external enemies. The writer 

repeatedly called for avoiding any military escalation in Yemen. 
18

JSOU Report 16-3

According to the CTC’s analysis, the letter is in part a response to specific 

requests for guidance from AQAP’s leadership to fundamentally rethink the 

point of having an open al-Qaeda front operating in Yemen. For bin Laden, 

the regime’s military weakness at the time was not justification for AQAP to 

overthrow it if they could not ensure that once they controlled Yemen they 

could maintain it. The United States, he reminds Abu Basir, was able to topple 

Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan and thus the 

United States would have little trouble ousting AQAP from control of Yemen. 

For bin Laden, the United States would not be willing to see AQAP seize 

military control over the country, “because of its geographical location, 

which is in the heart of the Gulf where the largest store of oil is in the world.” 

Therefore, if they were able to rally the people to seize control and then 

subsequently lost control, the Yemeni “people will not help us the second 

time.” For this reason, bin Laden argued that “Yemen should be peaceful 

and kept as reserved military for the Ummah.” Yemen, bin Laden argued, is 

best positioned to meet the demand for “reserve military,” thereby keeping 

American military forces “in the open fronts until the enemy becomes weak, 

where we would be able to establish Islamic State.”21

Bin Laden used the letter to advance a number of specific recommendations to AQAP’s leadership which are paraphrased below: 

• Appoint scholars and tribal Sheikhs to accomplish a practical truce 

among them.

• Avoid military escalation with Yemeni government forces. The goal is 

not to bring down the regime but to use Yemen as a place to prepare 

for future campaigns.

• Concentrate on the Yemeni emigrants who come back to visit Yemen 

and have American visas or citizenship and would be able to conduct 

operations inside America, expanding operations beyond blowing up 

airplanes. 

• Avoid the killing of anyone from Yemeni tribes.

• Maintain an AQAP leadership presence in southern Yemen.

• Avoid targeting Yemeni military and police officers unless al-Qaeda’s 

senior leadership directly orders such an attack. 

• Accept truces from supporters and partners. 

• Rigorously vet senior leaders. 
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In summary, each of these recommendations concern limiting the focus 

on active militancy in Yemen and rethinking of it as a limited area from 

which to plan external operations and regroup. Bin Laden’s thinking about 

the nature of al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen could not be any more different 

from how AQAP’s regional leadership was operating. 

Another letter, marked SOCOM‐2012‐0000019, sheds expanded light 

into bin Laden’s concerns about how the AQAP organization was conducting itself in Yemen. According to the CTC’s analysis, the letter is authored 

by bin Laden after the death of Sheikh Sa’id (Mustafa Abu’l‐Yazid) in late 

May 2010 and it is addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (aka: `Atiyya; Atiyatallah) who he designates as Sa’id’s successor. In the letter, bin Laden laid out 

the mistakes he believed al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates were committing. In 

this letter, bin Laden asserted a desire to launch a “new phase” for al-Qaeda 

aimed at regaining the trust of the broader Muslim world, who he believed 

had essentially turned against the al-Qaeda brand because of its tie to violence against other Muslims. As we can infer, bin Laden spent a great deal 

of time focusing his thoughts about Yemen. 

Bin Laden also used the letter to chide AQAP’s deputy leader, Sa’id alShehri, for making a speech demanding the release of a female al-Qaeda 

member arrested by the Saudis. According to bin Laden, al-Shehri had contradicted al-Qaeda’s previous positions by threatening to carry out kidnapping operations against Westerners in that country, members of the Saudi 

royal family, and the senior security employees in exchange for her release.

Bin Laden also cited the negative coverage that al-Qaeda received on alArabiya Television, arguing that it portrayed al-Qaeda as a movement that 

was uninterested in the Palestinian cause, the blockade in Gaza, and fighting 

against the Jews, but rather focused on fighting Saudis.

According to bin Laden: 

The issuance of [al-Shehri’s] speech, especially at this time, conflicted 

with our policy of focusing on the bigger foe, and concealed our 

interest in the main issues that were the main reasons in initiating the Jihad. It announced to the people that we are in a fight and 

argument with the rulers to avenge our brothers, those that were 

killed and detained far from the cases and interests of the general 

nation, due to which it held our brothers responsible for the killing 

and imprisonment. It also gave the Muslims an impression of us 
20

JSOU Report 16-3

that we were overcome by the region-like command or parties or 

both; they heard our brother talk about the sister from the Arab 

Peninsula and from al-Qa’ida organization, but they did not hear 

him talk about our sister in Palestine – this is contrary to our reality 

and our general policy, as it weakens our stance when we say that 

we are an international organization fighting for the liberation of 

Palestine and all of the Muslim countries to erect an Islamic caliphate that would rule according to the Shari’ah of Allah.22

Finally, bin Laden expressed specific concern about AQAP’s integration and promotion of the American-Yemeni cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki. In 

SOCOM‐2012‐0000003, a letter that the CTC believes to have been authored 

by bin Laden and addressed to Sheikh Mahmud (`Atiyya Abdul Rahman) on 

27 August 2010, bin Laden directs the AQAP emir to remain in his position 

rather than passing it to al-Awlaki.

According to bin Laden, AQAP’s embrace of al-Awlaki needed more vetting from the senior leadership than it received. “How excellent would it 

be,” bin Laden penned to Atiya, if the AQAP emir “gives us a chance to be 

introduced to him more.” Specifically, according to bin Laden:

I hope that brother Basir writes me his vision in detail about the 

situations and also asks brother Anwar al-’Awlaqi to write his vision 

in detail in a separate message, as well as brother Abu-Sufyan Sa’id 

al-Shahri, to send his vision in detail and separate.

How excellent would it be if you ask brother Basir to send us the 

resume, in detail and lengthy, of brother Anwar al-’Awlaqi, as well 

as the facts he relied on when recommending him, while informing 

him that his recommendation is considered. However, we would 

like to be reassured more.23

From the letters released by CTC, bin Laden’s apprehension about the 

AQAP’s decision to cast Yemen as an open military front, their integration 

of Anwar al-Awlaki and their failure to synchronize their public messaging with the senior leadership’s messaging priorities were all major headaches for bin Laden. However, other reporting suggested that bin Laden had 

more grievances with the Yemeni-based AQAP than is revealed in the CTC’s 

Abbottabad letters. 
21

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According to Sebastian Rotella’s piece in ProPublica, where he cites an 

unnamed U.S. counterterror official, bin Laden had criticized the Inspire 

magazine’s bloodthirsty tone, particularly an article that taught readers how 

to convert a pickup truck into a lethal human mowing machine. According to this official, “bin Laden said this is something he did not endorse. 

He seems taken aback. He complains that this tactical proposal promotes 

indiscriminate slaughter. He says he rejects this and it is not something that 

reflects what al-Qaeda does.”24

Bin Laden’s criticisms can be taken on multiple levels. Viewing them on 

a policy level, it could be argued that he was viewing AQAP’s media efforts 

through an outdated lens. But when viewed at a strategic level, bin Laden’s 

anxiety about AQAP’s promotion of Anwar al-Awlaki and their prioritization 

on encouraging disconnected, lone wolf attacks was fundamentally at odds 

with the overall al-Qaeda methodology and organizational architecture that 

bin Laden had dedicated decades of his life to building. 

Iraq

Al-Qaeda’s franchise operation in Iraq has long caused the senior leadership 

management frustration. In the mid-2000s, substantial counterterrorism 

focus was placed on the series of letters issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Atiyah 

abd al-Rahman, and Abu Yahya al-Libi to the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq at 

the time, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The letters were a final effort by al-Qaeda’s 

general command to warn al-Zarqawi about straying from their guidance 

strategically and operationally.25

After al-Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, al-Qaeda’s troubles with their Iraqi 

franchise were far from over. Al-Qaeda’s leadership continued to view Iraq 

as their best bet for a second base so al-Zawahiri pressed for the declaration 

of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which provoked a furious backlash by some 

in al-Qaeda’s global movement. As Steven Brooke wrote in a CTC study on 

al-Qaeda’s internal fractures:

With Zawahiri’s prodding, al‐Qa’ida in Iraq announced the 

establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in western Iraq in 

mid‐October 2006. One of the justifications cited by ISI ideologue 

Uthman Bin Abd al‐Rahman al‐Tamimi for the establishment of 

the Islamic State was the need for a secure base for jihadist activity in Iraq and abroad. To many, however, the establishment of an 
22

JSOU Report 16-3

Islamic State was done abruptly and without fulfilling the necessary 

theological requirements.26

As Brooke observes, the Kuwait‐based cleric Sheikh Hamid al‐Ali, and 

the London‐based Abu Basir al‐Tartusi were the most outspoken critics from 

within al-Qaeda’s own ranks who questioned the ISI’s ability to “control its 

territory and implement sharia law, as well as the ISI’s decision to appoint the 

relatively unknown Abu ‘Umar al‐Baghdadi as its leader.” Hamid al-Ali went 

so far as to issue a fatwa, in which he argued that because the mujahidin do 

not have “absolute authority” in Iraq, the country does not meet the conditions for establishing an Islamic State. According to al-Ali, the mujahidin 

needed to first work on “driving the occupation out” and bringing the people 

together before establishing a state.27

The letters gathered from the bin Laden compound raid in Abbottabad 

show that bin Laden continued to have issues with the al-Qaeda franchise 

operating in Iraq. In SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, a letter believed to be written by Adam Gadahn, it becomes clear the senior leadership was having 

internal debates about whether the mujahidin fighters in Iraq even ought to 

be considered al-Qaeda. Gadahn writes: 

[Dr. Muhammad al-Misa’ri] was also correct in his analysis about 

Iraq, in comparison with other Jihadi arenas. To end the suspicion I would say: Whoever read my comments on the Dr.’s book 

knows that I said something similar to what he mentioned about 

the forums and the Islamic State of Iraq. All of that before the alMisa’ri announcement that he issued after the killing of the State 

Emirs. My comments on the Dr.’s book were two months earlier, 

so I did not stem my thoughts from al-Misa’ri at all. But, there was 

some agreement on opinions –only on these two issues ... I would 

like to emphasize that I was at ease with declaring the State for a 

long time. I was not at ease with al-Zarqawi’s—may God bless his 

soul—moves, which he took in the name of al-Qa’ida. All of this is 

known to the Shaykhs Ayman, ‘Atiyah and Ubayd (Munir). My stand 

is not a new one, but I followed the official stand of the organization, 

being afraid not to create a seduction, and because I used to accuse 

my own opinion. This is to note now, although I have accepted my 

own stand, I do not discuss this topic except with the scholars like 

you and sometimes with my brothers at al-Sahab.28
23

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Gadahn pointed to the 2010 attack on the Catholic Church in Baghdad, 

which he said “halted” him because he believed it played directly into the 

narrative being advanced at the time by the Bush Administration:

Here this group in Iraq is telling the Christians (You’re either with 

us or with the al-Maliki government and there is no space for neutrality. Either you pay the “Jizya” to our fictitious state that cannot 

defend itself, and has no chance of defending you, or we will destroy 

your goods). Is this the justice that we are talking about, and that 

the Shaykh talks about in his statements and messages?29

For Gadahn, such attacks flew directly in the face of previous messages 

from bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Abdallah Azzam, and Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi about avoiding attacks against Christian communities in the Middle 

East who were not actively posing a threat to al-Qaeda or Muslims, and 

not bombing Christian churches. “Strange,” Gadahn griped in the letter, 

“I swear—the conflict between the statements of our leaders and scholars, 

and the acts of those allied with them—or you may say: those claiming to 

follow them!”

For Gadahn, the solution was clear. He states unequivocally in a letter he 

wrote, most likely to bin Laden, that al-Qaeda ought to officially disassociate 

themselves with the ISI. He said:

I do not see any obstacle or bad act if al-Qa’ida organization declares 

its discontent with this behavior and other behaviors being carried 

out by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, without an order from alQa’ida and without consultation. I see that this is done immediately 

or lately, favorably sooner. I see that the organization should declare 

the cutoff of its organizational ties with that [Islamic State of Iraq].30

Such a move would not be as major as it may sounds, Gadahn argues. In 

fact, the ISI and al-Qaeda’s senior leadership had been estranged for some 

time. He confirms in the letter that the relations between al-Qaeda and the 

ISI had been “practically cut off for a number of years.” The reputational 

damage that the ISI’s attacks were causing the broader al-Qaeda brand name 

had reached a point where they could no longer be tolerated, Gadahn argued. 

Al-Qaeda’s only solution was to disassociate from the ISI, “otherwise its 

reputation will be damaged more and more as a result of the acts and statements of this group, which is labeled under our organization.”31
24

JSOU Report 16-3

Reputational Damage

One of the more analytically surprising insights from the several hundred 

pages of released material by West Point’s CTC focuses on the written interchanges between bin Laden and his primary confidant, Sheikh Atiyatallah. 

Bin Laden and Atiyatallah might not seem like natural compatriots, but by 

examining their personal histories and religious beliefs, the natural affinity 

these two men shared becomes starkly apparent. Religiously, they were the 

most vocal in al-Qaeda on the need for sharia-compliant operations. 

On a personal level, both men portrayed themselves as humble and merciful servants of God. Shy, reserved, soft-spoken, and somewhat awkward 

in front of a camera, neither of them was the kind of fiery rhetorician like 

Ayman al-Zawahiri or an Abu Yahya al-Libi. Ideologically, both Atiyatallah 

and bin Laden were obsessed with destroying the West. Strategically, they 

believed in organizational centralization and top-down communication. 

They had a shared belief in the power of perception and intense fear of 

negative press. Unnecessary killing of Muslims, they both agreed, should 

be avoided at all costs. 

In al-Qaeda’s video commemorating the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 

attacks on America, which was entitled, “The Dawn of Imminent Victory: 

The 10th Anniversary of the Blessed Tuesday Raids,” a poem written by 

bin Laden was posthumously read.32 The narrator of that poem was Sheikh 

Atiyatallah. The Abbottabad documents released by the CTC suggests the 

decision to have Sheikh Atiyatallah read the poem was not simply made by 

chance or his available schedule. Rather, it could be understood to be the 

natural outcome of a close professional and personal relationship that had 

developed between bin Laden and Atiyatallah over the later years of bin 

Laden’s life. 

Jamal Ibrahim Ishtaywi al-Misrati, better known as Sheikh Atiyatallah, 

first appeared in December 2005, when the CTC had been able to review 

and release a declassified letter penned by a shadowy figure known at the 

time only as, “Atiyah.” The letter was a surprisingly long and authoritative 

missive to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda’s then field commander in Iraq. 

“Atiyah” had written to al-Zarqawi in such a way that showed both his deep 

personal familiarity with al-Zarqawi, but also his senior position within the 

al-Qaeda command structure. 

According to the CTC’s analysis:
25

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Atiyah reminds Zarqawi that military actions must be subservient 

to al-Qa`ida’s long-term political goals. Zarqawi’s use of violence 

against popular Sunni leaders, according to `Atiyah, is undermining 

al-Qa`ida’s ability to win the “hearts of the people.”33

This depiction accurately summarizes how, for Atiyatallah, violence 

could never be pursued for violence’s sake. It could only be a means—one 

that had to be regulated by sharia proscriptions on killing—not an end in 

itself. Atiyatallah’s nightmare experiences in Algeria during the mid-1990s, 

according to Chris Anzalone, including a period when he was held captive 

by the Armed Islamic Group, likely influenced his views on takfir and the 

employment of mass violence against other Muslims—two issues which he 

later addressed repeatedly in his writings and audio and video statements. 

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s depiction of Sheikh Atiyatallah’s experiences in 

Algeria is consistent with that research. According to al-Zawahiri: 

[Atiyatallah] traveled to Algeria to participate in the jihad of the 

Armed Islamic Group (GIA). He had a bitter experience with this 

group. He returned to Afghanistan just as the Islamic Emirate was 

being established. He taught at Kabul’s Arabic school.34

Standing witness to the cataclysm that Algeria would become, watching 

how the mujahidin Muslims “destroyed themselves with their own hands” 

by slaughtering Muslims. This indelibly scarred him and would shape his 

outlook on terrorist operations in the Middle East. 

Perhaps equally as jarring for Atiyatallah was the collapse of global support the mujadhin faced, both in Algeria and abroad, as a result of that 

wanton bloodshed. Atiyatallah’s letter to Zarqawi hammered on this concern, about not repeating the mistakes of the past. For example, according 

to Atiyatallah:

I had previously talked with you and with many of the brothers 

about what happened in Algeria, so do remember that. My brother, 

what use is it for us to delight in some operations and successful 

strikes when the immediate repercussion is a defeat for us of our 

call, and a loss of the justice of our cause and its logic in the minds 

of the masses who make up the people of the Muslim nation, who are 

ignorant and simple, and upon whom the afflictions of stultification, 

misguidance and corruption pile, and increased domination by the 
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enemies, more oppression, more humiliation visited upon us, and 

more ills, troubles, loss in capabilities, and wasted opportunities?35

As early as 2005, Atiyatallah was publically arguing that strong and effective senior leadership was necessary for keeping the global movement on 

the right path and ensuring that individuals avoid conducting acts that, 

while seemingly tactically effective and perhaps popular in the short-term, 

would actually prove inadvertently subversive to the long-term interests of 

al-Qaeda’s strategic agenda. He ordered that leaders “abstain from making 

any decision on a comprehensive issue and on substantial matters until you 

have turned to your leadership; Sheikh Usama and the Doctor, and their 

brothers there, and consulted with them.” Atiyatallah was adamant about 

the religious and strategic necessity of consultation and outreach. He argued 

fervently about the use of taking stock of public opinion from members, 

supporters, fence-sitters, critics, and even adversaries. 

Furthermore, there should even be consultation with good people 

who are not mujahidin, among which are the people of the country 

where you are, the Sunnis and the like; even if they are religiously 

unorthodox at times, or even hypocritical, as long as they are Muslims who agree with us in the resistance and jihad, not standing by 

the unbelievers. An example would be many of the religious scholars and tribal leaders and so forth. This is because consulting with 

them (and this does not necessarily mean accepting their opinion 

every time, or even most of the time) and having them participate 

in the matter is a wise policy that is supported by evidence from 

religious law, reason, history, and the knowledge of nations and 

their experiences.36

Atiyatallah’s combination of experiences, relationships, and beliefs led 

him to prioritize the following themes that would come to define him. These 

themes were the religious and strategically pragmatic necessity of avoiding 

the unnecessary killing of Muslims. For Atiyatallah, no violation of sharia 

could ever be tolerated, particularly when it concerned a Muslim killing 

another Muslim. Second, alienating oneself from one’s host population is 

just bad policy. In Atiyatallah’s mind, excommunication, which was used 

by hardliners to legitimize their attacks against Muslim population centers, 

was neither religiously sound nor practically wise. 
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Atiya argued that anyone seeking to conduct an attack in the name of alQaeda must consult with those who are more religiously knowledgeable and 

organizationally connected than they were to ensure both the operational 

soundness of the plan and that it advanced al-Qaeda’s strategic and ideological interests. Additionally, he advised, al-Qaeda’s command structure would 

be best poised to leverage any attacks if they were informed about planned 

operations in advance. 

Atiyah did not seem to be alone in his warnings about the reputational 

damage that would ensue from the wrong kinds of terrorist operations. 

Gadahn was similarly concerned about the way in which both the Iraqi 

fighters operating under the ISI moniker as well as the Pakistani Tehrik-iTaliban. According to Gadahn:

Qa’ida al-Jihad Organization has denounced, more than once, and 

on the tongue of its Emirs and scholars and symbols and those who 

speak in favor, any armed operation that targets the Muslims in the 

places of their gathering, and any operation that does not account 

for the sanctity of their blood, souls, bodies, belongings or money. 

This acquittal includes the explosive operations that takes place in 

the center of markets, streets, restaurants, hotels that are packed 

with Muslims. It also includes, as a first principal, the detonation 

of mosques on the heads of the innocent praying public, shattering 

their bodies.37

One of the most chiding letters to be released from the Abbottabad trove 

was jointly penned by Abu Yahya al-Libi and Atiyah abd al-Rahman to 

Hakimullah Mehsud, Emir of Tehrik-i-Taliban Movement in Pakistan (TTP). 

Referring to the TTP’s “clear legal and religious mistakes,” the two al-Qaeda 

Sheikhs chided Mehsud that the TTP’s actions are “contrary to the objectives 

of Jihad and to the efforts exerted” by al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Mehsud 

needed to understand that he was not “the sole Emir for everyone to swear 

allegiance to,” they demanded. His approach was a “misconception of the 

real situation, and may cause an inter-Mujahidin fighting,” the two senior 

leaders warned.38

They also focused the negative reputational consequences of his targeting 

of Muslims, arguing that, “as a result of martyrdom operations that takes 

place in the marketplaces, mosques, roads, assembly places, and calling the 

Muslims apostates” is against sharia and not in compliance with al-Qaeda’s 
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thinking about the permissibility of killing human shields. “We want to 

make it clear,” they demanded, echoing their previous letters to another 

problem child, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, that Mehsud was in the wrong and 

needed to “avoid these grave mistakes” in the future, otherwise al-Qaeda’s 

general command would “take decisive actions” if their warnings continued 

to be ignored.39
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2. After bin Laden

In late May 2010, before bin Laden had been killed in his Abbottabad compound, he penned a letter to Sheikh Atiyah Abd al-Rahman al-Libi (aka, 

Sheikh Atiyatallah). The letter contained his reflections on the continued 

mistakes being committed by regional jihadist groups and the disturbing 

consequences it was having for al-Qaeda’s global agenda. Al-Qaeda was 

losing support from within the Islamic world and many in his movement 

were questioning the deaths of Muslim civilians.

As a way to alleviate any further self-inflicted alienation from their followers or the broader Islamic world, bin Laden proposed launching a ‘new 

phase’ in the way that al-Qaeda sought to market itself globally so that the 

mujahidin could regain the lost trust of Muslims. Bin Laden directed Atiyatallah to prepare a memorandum focused on centralizing all al-Qaeda 

media and the operations of the regional al-Qaeda affiliates. Bin Laden spent 

much of the letter reflecting on the future of Yemen, external operations, 

and plans for his son Hamza. 

After unsubstantiated rumors and rumblings circulated that Sayf al-Adl 

would be named as al-Qaeda’s interim emir, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri was 

officially announced as bin Laden’s successor.40 Al-Zawahiri had been seen 

by most analysts as being the natural choice to replace bin Laden in his official role as head of the al-Qaeda senior leadership. Most Western analysts, 

however, were dubious about al-Zawahiri’s ability to fill bin Laden’s shoes in 

his more symbolic role as figurehead of the global al-Qaeda movement. The 

dubiousness might be better framed not in terms of personality or charisma, 

as there is no question al-Zawahiri is widely loved and revered. Rather, the 

challenge for al-Zawahiri was whether he could persuasively transform the 

idea of al-Qaeda from one that was inherently tied to bin Laden into a unified global movement that was responsive to his rhetorical leadership and 

direction. 

With far less ability to wield rhetorical authority over the global movement like bin Laden, and with a severely degraded roster of loyal lieutenants 

to help him keep the regional affiliates on task and in line, al-Zawahiri’s job 

was going to be difficult. Compounding that with the operational pressure 

that al-Qaeda’s senior leadership had been under from an aggressive drone 
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JSOU Report 16-3

campaign and the widening geographic footprint of al-Qaeda’s regional 

affiliates, al-Zawahiri seemed to be losing control of his movement. 

The degree of attention that al-Zawahiri allocates to various topics in his 

public statements can be a strong barometer for the concerns of al-Qaeda’s 

senior leadership. A review of al-Zawahiri’s statements since the death of 

bin Laden sheds light on his preoccupation with issues of command and 

control over regional affiliates, al-Qaeda’s irrelevance vis-à-vis Middle East 

politics and the perceived need to articulate a cogent vision for a post-bin 

Laden organization. 

For example, in the aftermath of bin Laden’s death, al-Zawahiri’s concerns about the future of the al-Qaeda movement resonated loudly in his 

June 2011 open statement, “The Noble Knight Has Dismounted.” Al-Zawahiri 

uses the occasion to allay the fears of al-Qaeda’s varied constituencies about 

the continuity of operations in al-Qaeda’s corporate headquarters. Above 

all others, al-Zawahiri made clear that al-Qaeda still deferred to “Amir of 

the Believers,” Mullah Muhammad Omar, by renewing the group’s pledge 

of allegiance to him. Al-Zawahiri went on to reassure “all the mujahidin 

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the 

Islamic Maghreb” of the al-Qaeda senior leadership’s ongoing support of 

them and their cause. He counseled “the mujahidin in usurped Palestine” 

and those “encamped Muslim ummah in Jerusalem” that al-Qaeda remained 

committed to fighting the United States until Palestine could be freed. He 

specifically highlighted the people of Pakistan, appealing to them to revolt 

against the Pakistani military and the country’s “bribed politicians” who 

“converted Pakistan into a U.S. colony.” One of al-Zawahiri’s chief concerns 

seemed to be convincing the al-Qaeda global movement to have “cohesion 

with the people of the Muslim ummah.” Far from attacking Muslims, alZawahiri re-emphasized the need for al-Qaeda and its like-minded associates 

to “avoid any operations that might endanger people in markets, mosques, 

or crowded places.”41

In the decade following the 11 September 2001 attacks, al-Qaeda had 

alienated itself from the broader Islamic world by targeting predominantly 

Muslim population centers. Al-Qaeda became perceived by most Muslims 

as bloodthirsty thugs rather than the kind of Islamic vanguard that they 

represented themselves as being. 

For those who criticized al-Qaeda for forgetting about or ignoring certain 

battlefronts, al-Zawahiri hoped to mute the sentiment, by trying to “assure 
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all Muslim people that we are their soldiers, and we will not spare any effort, 

God willing, to liberate their occupied parts in Kashmir, the Philippines, 

Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and Palestine.”42

Given al-Qaeda’s complete inability to demonstrate relevance during the 

so called “Arab Spring” uprisings, al-Zawahiri sought to interject al-Qaeda 

into the conversation. “We support their blessed uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, 

Libya, Yemen, and the Levant,” he announced, “and we tell them that we 

are fighting along with them in one battle against the United States and its 

collaborators.” Al-Zawahiri specifically called to those battling the regimes 

in Syria, Libya, and Yemen to “continue their struggle, fight, and jihad,” 

pledging al-Qaeda’s continued support. 

In summary, al-Zawahiri was caught in several conundrums at once: 

• the structural reality of al-Qaeda’s expanding global footprint, 

• creating more open fronts in which to have leadership challenges, 

• al-Qaeda’s flattening command and control structure as a byproduct 

of the operational pressure being placed on the senior leadership, 

• the global al-Qaeda movement’s geographic dispersion, 

• the lack of the same kind of innate symbolic authority that his predecessor wielded, and

• a global movement of supporters who are turning inward, creating 

petty rhetorical battles as they lose hope and steam. 

Based on his public messaging, al-Zawahiri seems to believe the only cure 

for this increasingly fractious al-Qaeda is restoring a sense of unity, which 

is presumably code for deference to his rulings. 

This need for unity theme, with cohesion and submissiveness to the senior 

leadership, surprisingly has not become al-Zawahiri’s most used refrains in 

his deluge of post-bin Laden messaging. “We should unite to liberate the 

homelands of Muslims from each aggressor invader and corrupting agent, 

and support everyone who is wronged in this world,” he proclaimed in his 

June 2011 eulogy for bin Laden. And it is that same call for unity in the face 

of internal discord that he has continued to preach. 

Somalia

In one of the most decisive first acts of his administration as al-Qaeda’s 

emir, al-Zawahiri announced on 9 February 2012 the official joining of alShabaab with al-Qaeda. In the As-Sahab video titled, “Good Tidings, by 
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JSOU Report 16-3

Sheikhs Abu-Zubayr, Amir of the Mujahidin Youth Movement in Somalia, 

and Amir Ayman al-Zawahiri, May God Protect Them Both,” al-Zawahiri 

formally designates the al-Shabaab organization as al-Qaeda. According to 

al-Zawahiri in the video:

Today, I am bringing the glad tidings to our Muslim ummah of good 

tidings that shall delight the believers and embitter the lives of the 

Crusaders. Namely, the Mujahid Youth Movement in Somalia will 

hereby merge into Al-Qa’ida, in order to support the jihadist coalition in the face of the Zionist-Crusader campaign and its agents, 

the traitorous and betraying rulers.43

The news of al-Shabaab’s official merger with al-Qaeda was generally 

celebrated across the jihadist Internet spaces although much of the commentary was tempered with expressions of confusion or caution. 

To allay some of the concerns that Somali tribal leaders and religious 

authorities would not support the merger or that the public association with 

al-Qaeda would sully al-Shabaab’s domestic popularity with the people, 

al-Shabaab sought to generate excitement in the immediate aftermath by 

publishing a number of Arabic-language statements covering supposed proal-Qaeda rallies across al-Shabaab-held Somali territory. 

Al-Zawahiri similarly continued drumming the importance of the Somali 

front on his end. In November 2012, for example, As-Sahab Media released 

a video titled, “The Crusader Invasion of Somalia: A New Epic From the 

Epics of Jihad Against the Crusaders by Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri.” In the 

statement, al-Zawahiri addresses four primary constituencies: the people of 

Somalia, members of al-Shabaab, the broader Islamic world, and the senior 

clerical authorities (ulema). 

My first message is to our mujahidin brothers in Somalia and their 

brave vanguards, the Mujahidin Youth Movement [al-Shabaab]. Be 

not concerned with the numbers and materiel of the Crusaders ... 

Make them taste the fire and heat of jihad. Pursue them through 

guerilla warfare, ambushes, and martyrdom-seekers ... 

My second message is to the free people of Somalia, its noble ones, 

its tribes and ulema, its faithful, truthful, mujahidin leaders on the 

battlefield who refuse humiliation, who delight in death with honor, 
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and who refuse to live in disgrace. The Kenyan and African forces, 

the gangs of the hypocrites, came along bringing the world’s shame 

and dishonor upon you. They want to occupy your lands, violate your 

sanctities, shed your blood, rob your fortunes, alter your religion, 

and separate you from Islam, Shari’ah, and jihad. Therefore, be the 

supporters of God and do not be the supporters of America and the 

Crusaders. Write in the history of Islam a new page of glory and 

pride, and of rising up with faith ... 

As for my third message, it is for the ummah [community of Muslims 

worldwide] of Islam to support their brothers in Somalia and to 

stand by them with men, money, weapons, support, and supplication in the face of the contemporary Crusader campaign. Do not 

forsake them as you will be chewed up and consumed after them.

As for my fourth message, it is for the ulema of the ummah. Where 

are your fatwas that make jihad against the non-believer invaders 

obligatory ... So, fulfill the promise that you made and lead your 

ummah in the face of the Crusader invasion standing against it.44

Despite the two-front attempt by al-Zawahiri and al-Shabaab to galvanize 

supporters around the merger, recently publicized infighting and factionalism within al-Shabaab has stymied the progress they had hoped to make. 

Several issues have handicapped al-Shabaab’s recent public relations campaign. In April 2013, reports emerged of al-Shabaab leader Sheikh Ibrahim 

al-Afghani publicly posting an open letter to al-Zawahiri denouncing the 

policies of al-Zubayr.45 The letter, posted on 6 April 2013 to the Global Jihad 

Network was titled, “I Give a Stark Warning,” and published under the auspices of the “Islamic World Issues Study Center.”46

In the letter, Sheikh Ibrahim appealed to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership to 

intervene and replace al-Zubayr. “We need a talented leader who will attain 

our objective which is to establish Islamic rule in Somalia.” Sheikh Ibrahim 

also reportedly prodded al-Zawahiri to demand the establishment of an 

Islamic court which mediates disputes within al-Shabaab. 

At the same time, a very public falling out between an American born 

member of al-Shabaab, Omar Hammami, and al-Shabaab’s leader, al-Zubayr, 

was holding counterterrorism watchers in rapt attention. Hammami, who 
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grew up in Alabama, joined al-Shabaab around 2006, becoming something 

of a poster child for the group by 2009 thanks to his unconventional propaganda work. In a 2013 interview with Wired magazine, Hammami explained 

that he grew increasingly frustrated with its leadership, particularly alZubayr, who Hammami believed was marginalizing the foreign fighters 

and levied unreasonable taxes on the locals.47 According to the Wired article, 

in late 2011, Hammami confronted al-Zubayr. “I told him every last detail in 

person,” Hammami told Wired, “leading to the beginning of the oppression.”

When asked about the public rift between Sheikh Ibrahim and al-Zubayr 

during another interview, Hammami responded:

Other grand emirs support this message, although they prefer to 

remain silent for personal reasons. The truth is that all had hoped 

for a solution without reverting to this method, but they are disappointed, especially after the death threats from unknown members.48

Hammami’s interview covered the broad extent to which infighting seems 

to have consumed the al-Shabaab leadership. When asked about whether Ali 

Muhammad Jaydi, a mosque sheikh, had been assassinated by the al-Shabaab 

leadership, Hammami replied, “Yes, I checked with the senior emirs, who are 

aware of this story, and they admit that the man was killed after repenting 

from apostasy in the media and in an official statement by the movement 

about his embracing Islam. Then, after allowing him to come into Mogadishu, he was assassinated. When the matter was examined, al-Zubayr denied 

that he had given the order. Later, he admitted that those responsible for the 

assassination were indeed, his security men.”49

When asked about whether Fazul Abdallah Muhammad was assassinated 

for betraying al-Shabaab’s senior leadership, Hammami answered that “some 

mujahideen actually do complain that al-Zubayr is involved in it but justify 

it with his strange interpretations of killing people under the pretext of 

competing with the emir.”50

Hammami shocked the counterterrorism community the next March by 

breaking his silence to announce that he feared for his life from al-Shabaab’s 

leadership. For Hammami, quiet attempts to reform al-Shabaab were no 

longer working and, therefore, he believed that going public with his criticisms “would avert [in-]fighting and [prompt] an intervention by Shaykh 

Ayman, may God protect him. In the beginning, we tried to do it without 
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Brachman: The War Within

giving out too much detail. The ensuing events forced us to open the matter 

to the ummah so that similar issues can be avoided on other fronts ...”51

Hammami’s repeated attempts to pull the curtain back on the reality 

of al-Shabaab by way of social media were soon halted with his death after 

months on the run.52 According to reports, Hammami was killed by alShabaab rivals. 

Al-Qaeda’s web supporters responded with predictable confusion. When 

asked to comment about “his stance toward the sedition in Somalia and killing Sheikh Abu-Mansur al-Amriki and some sheikhs there,” the Network 

administrator of the Al-Shamukh Forum avoided offering any answer. “I 

have no comment,” he wrote. “I supplicate to God to protect our mujahidin 

brothers and to join their ranks.”53

On 20 September 2013, web user, “Mu’assasat al-Zil’i lil-Intaj al-I’lami,” 

posted a message to the Global Jihad Network containing links to download an audio statement produced by the Al-Zi’li Establishment for Media 

Production and attributed to an individual named “Khattab al-Masri,” who 

the message identifies as “the mujahid brother expelled from the al-Shabaab 

Movement, and a friend of Abu-Mansur al-Amriki, may God have mercy 

on him.”

My supporter brothers: We inform you that we demand the imposition of God’s sharia upon the one who assaulted us and sought 

to kill us. He is known to all, and is acknowledged by the eyes and 

ears of the people. Without reason, he fired upon my brother Faruq 

[refers to Abu-Mansur al-Amriki] intending to kill him. For the 

sake of argument, if we assume that we have laws, then is there not 

a sharia court [to apply them]? Are these laws in name only? Where 

is the judiciary? Where is the accountability? Do these only exist in 

name as well? If there is someone who has been sentenced, should 

he be killed without anyone knowing?54

Al-Qaeda’s Emir vs. Islamic State of Iraq vs. Jabhat Al-Nusrah 

One of the most publicly damaging episodes for al-Qaeda’s senior leadership 

was the triangular rift between al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, and the senior leadership as represented by Ayman al-Zawahiri. On 8 April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who at the time commanded 
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JSOU Report 16-3

al-Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq known then as the Islamic State of Iraq, unilaterally announced the merger with Syrian based rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra 

in an audio statement posted to the Internet.55 The al-Nusra organization, 

which al-Baghdadi referred to as, “an extension and part of the Islamic State 

of Iraq,” would henceforth fall under the umbrella of a newly branded organization he was calling the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.56

Although concerns had been appearing across international media about 

potential linkages between the organizations, the merger announcement was 

widely seen as a surprising move, but not because it confirmed Al-Nusra’s 

ties to al-Qaeda. In fact, a growing consensus had been emerging within 

international media reporting on Syria about the fact Al-Nusra’s likely ties 

with official al-Qaeda entities. 

As cited in the Long War blog, The Wall Street Journal had been previously reporting that the Al-Nusra Front, “was deepening its ties to the 

terrorist organization’s central leadership in Pakistan, according to U.S. 

counterterrorism officials.” These same anonymous officials “said they have 

seen a growth in communications among operatives from al Nusrah Front, 

al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan.” The Journal

also reported “growing numbers of al-Qaeda fighters traveling from Pakistan to Syria to join the fight with” Al-Nusra. “The ties to al-Qaeda’s central 

operations have become so significant that U.S. counterterrorism officials 

are debating whether al-Nusra should now be considered its own al-Qaeda 

affiliate instead of an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq, as it has generally been 

viewed within the U.S. government, according to a person familiar with the 

debate,” the article stated.57

Al-Baghdadi’s announcement did not come as a surprise to most of the 

counterterrorism world. His message did, however, seem to shock the leader 

of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. Just one day after al-Baghdadi’s unilateral announcement of his al-Nusra acquisition, al-Jawlani posted 

his own public denial of al-Baghdadi’s merger announcement, stating that 

absolutely no merger with al-Baghdadi’s ISI had occurred. Instead, al-Jawlani 

unilaterally pledged his support to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and 

the al-Qaeda Senior Leadership, a pledge that usually is made in a jointly 

produced statement with al-Zawahiri. In al-Jawlani’s statement, however, he 

stated flatly that, “this is a pledge of allegiance from the sons of the al Nusra 

Front and their supervisor general that we renew to the Sheikh of Jihad, 

Sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri, may Allah preserve him.”58
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Al-Qaeda’s global movement had little idea what to do about this internal fissure. On the one hand, al-Qaeda’s widely respected head of the ISI 

announced a step forward for al-Qaeda’s efforts in the Levant that the global 

movement was eager to celebrate. On the other hand, al-Jawlani’s statement 

suggested that there had been a serious miscommunication between the two 

groups. At the same time, however, al-Jawlani’s official pledge of allegiance 

to al-Qaeda’s general command was a cause for celebration and a metric of 

al-Qaeda having formally expanded. 

Al-Qaeda’s top intelligentsia, along with their grassroots supporters, came 

out in droves to make sense of this issue on social media platforms like 

Facebook, Twitter, and other discussion forums. Some online pundits came 

out strongly in support of al-Baghdadi’s maneuver. Most of the early posts 

were defenses of al-Baghdadi’s declaration of this newly merged organization against critics.

The situation changed again when, rather than backing down to al-Jawlani’s frigid pushback against the merger announcement, al-Baghdadi issued 

a new statement asserting that, “the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

remains, as long as there is blood in our veins and our eyes are blinking 

... It remains, and we will not compromise; we will not give up ... until we 

die.”59 Al-Qaeda’s global movement was again in a state of confusion about 

what was happening. 

In an effort to deal with what was becoming increasingly perceived inside 

and out of al-Qaeda as a major crisis of leadership, al-Zawahiri sent stern 

letters to both al-Jawlani and al-Baghdadi on 11 April 2013. In those communiques, Zawahiri explained that he “sought to resolve the dispute by sending 

a message” and wanted to freeze “the matter as it was before the dispute until 

the matter could be arbitrated.”60 After receiving letters back from both alJawlani and al-Baghdadi, al-Zawahiri issued another statement on 23 May 

2013. Al-Zawahiri had grown angry with the fact that he was not given prior 

notification of this matter by al-Baghdadi. It was clear that al-Zawahiri felt 

as if his leadership had been directly undermined and that he recognized 

the situation was spinning quickly out of his control. 

Al-Zawahiri’s attempt to resolve this dispute was decisive. “I received 

messages from both sides and from other sides,” he explained in a missive.61 

“Accordingly, after holding consultations with my brothers in Khorasan 

and outside of it, after asking Allah for guidance, and for support to make 

me capable of putting out the fire of sedition and dispute between the two 
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JSOU Report 16-3

sides, I resolved the issue.” His proposed resolution contained a number of 

key points. First, al-Zawahiri stated in no uncertain terms that Sheikh Abu 

Bakr al-Baghdadi was wrong when he announced the establishment of the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) without asking permission or 

receiving advice from al-Qaeda’s general command, much less notifying 

them in advance. Al-Zawahiri also scolded al-Nusrah’s leader, Sheikh Abu 

Muhammad al-Jawlani, who he said was wrong to have announced his rejection to ISIL and formally claiming affiliation with al-Qaeda without first 

communicating with al-Qaeda’s general command.62

Al-Zawahiri ordered the immediate dissolution of ISIL, for the ISI to 

continue its work in Iraq under al-Baghdadi under a one-year renewable 

contract, and for Jabhat al-Nusra to continue as another official al-Qaeda 

franchise that reports directly to the general command under al-Jawlani, 

whom al-Zawahiri also offered a one-year renewable contract.63

Finally, al-Zawahiri declared that Jabhat al-Nusrah would supply to the 

ISI, as far as it could, what it needs of fighters, arms, money, shelter, and 

security, and that the two sides would cease any attack, by words or by deeds, 

against the other. In other words, al-Zawahiri could not have been clearer: 

“the Mujahidin [must] stop arguing over this dispute and to stop sedition 

among the Mujahidin and to seek harmony and unity, along with winning 

hearts and uniting ranks among Muslims and the Mujahidin.”64

Online discussions among al-Qaeda supporters were chaotic during 

this time. The “general supervisor” al-Qaeda supporter forum Al-Minbar 

al-I’lami, for example, expressed uncertainty about whether al-Baghdadi’s 

message was authentic despite the fact that his website advertised the banner 

for the production on its front page. Other forums chose not to carry alBaghdadi’s message or future ISI messaging prompting numerous tweets 

and comments from users. Most of the first tier al-Qaeda forums issued 

statements that encouraged silence among their users about the issue until 

it was resolved, which only further enflamed many of the forum users who 

demanded credible information and wanted to debate the issue openly. 

Despite al-Zawahiri’s definitive pronouncements, however, al-Baghdadi 

publicly raised the stakes by openly defying al-Zawahiri’s dictates. “As for the 

message attributed to Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri,” the ISI issued statement 

explained, “we have Sharia and methodological objections to it.” After deliberation with his Shura council, al-Baghdadi decided to choose what he called, 

“God’s command instead of the opposing command in [Al-Zawahiri’s] 
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message.”65 The ISI’s official spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, echoed 

this statement on 19 June 2013 when he posted a YouTube audio statement 

titled, “So Leave Them and Their Inventions Alone.”66 The audacity of alBaghdadi’s flat rejection of al-Zawahiri’s pronouncement stunned the global 

al-Qaeda movement. 

On 21 June 2013, Al-Arabiya aired its “Death Industry” program hosted by 

Maysun Azzam, which presented a panel of regional experts who addressed 

questions about al-Zawahiri’s degraded influence on his regional affiliates.67

Researcher and political analyst, Yusuf al-Dini, joining the program via 

satellite from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia assessed that if one reviews “reactions 

that appear on al-Qa’ida cites and in chat rooms, one would find sharp differences among al-Qa’ida members concerning the argument between Ayman 

Al-Zawahiri and Al-Baghdadi.” He continued, “Judging by what appeared 

on the Internet recently some 60 or 70 percent of the al-Qa’ida members are 

of the view that the fighters in Syria should not remain under the spotlight, 

that the conditions of Syria are different, and that Ayman Al-Zawahiri rather 

than al-Baghdadi must be obeyed.” Some al-Qaeda supporters, he said, went 

so far as to demand that “Al-Baghdadi must stand trial” because he “rebelled 

against the Al-Qa’ida leadership.” According to al-Dini, these inter-al-Qaeda 

differences are “a new development” that has to be carefully studied.68

To his point, throughout mid-June 2013, forum participants on al-Qaeda 

websites and al-Qaeda Twitter users reacted speculatively to al-Baghdadi’s 

rejection of al-Zawahiri’s order to dissolve ISIL. Participants offered their 

thoughts about why the al-Baghdadi audio was not disseminated by the 

Al-Fajr Media Center, al-Qaeda’s official dissemination outlet. Most of the 

reactions expressed confusion and concern about what had now become a 

major rift within al-Qaeda’s global architecture. 

One of the most well-known al-Qaeda pundits, “Asad al-Jihad2,” came 

out against al-Baghadi’s decision. Writing under the Twitter handle “AsadAljehad2,” he tweeted during September, “As the days go by, it becomes 

clear that the claims about the deviations and infiltrations of the Islamic State 

of Iraq’s leadership made by us and other advisers are correct.”69 In another 

tweet, “Asad al-Jihad2” wrote, “The leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq 

who succeeded Abu-Umar al-Bahgdadi and Abu-Hamzah al-Muhajir deviate 

day after day; they will drive their mujahideen into the abyss!”

Responding to Asad al-Jihad2’s series of blasts against the ISI’s decision, 

prominent al-Qaeda Twitter user “Abu-Usamah al-Iraqi,” tweeted that Asad 
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al-Jihad2, “went to Afghanistan more than once before and he met Sheikh 

Atiyatallah al-Libi. Now he gives people the impression that he is close to the 

mujahideen and that he is aware of all of their secrets and of what goes on 

behind the scenes. He suffers from megalomania, as if everyone who goes to 

Afghanistan becomes a theorist!”70 Others accused Asad al-Jihad2 of being 

a double agent for the Kuwaiti security service. 

Some in the al-Qaeda online discussion forums tried to paint the situation in the rosiest light. For example, in a thread titled, “I Swear by God That 

Our Situation Is Better, God Willing,” forum participant “Al-Jawlani,” wrote 

that al-Qaeda would not be “harmed if Al-Nusra Front elements or Ahrar 

al-Sham elements join this State.And we will not be harmed if the remaining 

Al-Nusrah Front elements stay under the command of Al-Jawlani ... as long 

as they all fight for the same goal and purpose: implementing the Sharia.” 

The poster concluded, perhaps naively, that his, “mujahideen brothers in the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Al-Nusrah Front have never and 

will never fight among themselves because they are the sons of Usama.”71

Other online supporters, like Abu al-Yazid al-Misri, were less optimistic. 

“My dear brother,” he wrote, “honestly my heart is torn. I have not felt such 

worry and sorrow ever in my entire life. O God, unite our ranks, bring us 

together, and reconcile us.”72 Online participant Abu-Waqqar al-Gharib was 

one of many who expressed concern that al-Baghdadi’s statement was not 

released through official Al-Fajr channels when he reposted a prior statement 

from the Islamic State of Iraq’s Ministry of Media advising adherents that 

the Al-Fajr was the only official dissemination outlet for ISI and Al-Furqan 

Establishment for Media Production releases.73

Hafid al-Rashid was one of several web users on the Al-Hanein discussion 

forum who demanded that, “There is no confusion.” According to al-Rashid’s 

post, “Al-Baghdadi responds to Al-Zawahiri’s resolutions by rejecting them! 

Because they are contrary to the approach and sharia!”74 Internet user Ilias 

Kashmiri, however, disagreed: “The decision to announce a state in this way 

was crazy. Secondly, the brothers in the State disparaged Al-Jawlani, arguing he had disobeyed his emir. But what about Al-Baghdadi’s obedience? 

He is the one who did not abide by Al-Zawahiri’s words. I read the text of 

Al-Zawahiri’s statement and I did not see any sharia violation in it.”75 That 

post provided other strong reactions, “It is a clear violation of the ummah’s 

leader Al-Zawahiri,” wrote, user Al-Arabi al-Muslim in the same thread.76
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The situation again evolved in September 2013 when approximately a 

dozen prominent Syrian militant groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, formed 

something known as an Islamic Alliance, which is openly opposed to the 

Syrian National Coalition. Although Al-Nusra Front supporters have cheered 

the move under the belief that uniting with other militant factions would 

strengthen it, supporters of al-Baghdadi were suspicious of the move. 

After Ayman al-Zawahiri went to Al-Jazeera television to release a message on 8 November 2013, further waves of divided reactions flooded the 

al-Qaeda online spaces. Online participants in the Ana al-Muslim forum 

had much to discuss on the matter. One of the most read threads on the 

issue criticized al-Baghdadi’s “mad desire to gain power and authority.”77

Online discussion forums have long been a source of intrigue and infighting. Even in 2013, despite the fact that most of the pro-al-Qaeda online forums 

no longer remain online and those that do are highly security conscious, 

concerns about maintaining the thematic integrity of the forums persists. 

Much of the concern about the trustworthiness of the forums has come 

in response to multiple forums attempting to avoid conflict by removing and 

editing user posts, mostly with regard to the leadership disputes in Iraq and 

Syria. Abu al-Ayna, an administrator with the Shamukh forum, for example, 

took responsibility for the forum’s decisions by posting an explanation.78

“It is not easy at all to be driven by the ummah’s neglect and the abandonment by talented and scholarly people,” Abu al-Ayna bemoans about 

today’s state of online jihad. According to the administrator, the level of 

online disagreement about the Syria situation, “breaks the hearts and puzzles the minds and arouses a great deal of suspicion,” which has forced the 

Al-Shumukh forum to “not take sides and will remain objective and bring 

people together and unite the front and the hearts. We will unite not divide 

...” Although many on the forums objected to the Shumukh leadership when 

they “deleted or edited some postings and accused us wrongly, forgetting 

the words of God almighty,” Abu al-Ayna defended the forum, “I swear to 

God, we did not delete or edit anything for our own self-interest!” In other 

words, in attempting to mitigate any further infighting, forum administrators inadvertently spiked the level of suspicion, mistrust and ill will on one 

of the most elite al-Qaeda Arabic discussion forums. 

The topic of intentional subversion in al-Qaeda’s online spaces has been 

addressed by many other senior figures. On 22 September 2013, for instance, 

Dr. Akram Hijazi’s Facebook page posted an Arabic-language message titled, 
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“Provocateurs Are Dedicated to Instigating Strife.” In the message, Hijazi’s 

center writes that there are parties, “who received orders and instructions to 

populate Islamic and non-Islamic forums. “They are dedicated to instigating strife and adding fuel to fire, exactly like a poisonous lizard,” he writes. 

These people are “skilled in looking for the mujahideen’s mistakes, taking 

these mistakes out of proportion, distorting them, and molding them in a 

strife-inducing manner that has one goal, which is inciting internal fighting 

among the mujahideen.” The consequence of these kinds of discussions, the 

post continues, is to “stir sedition ... under the guise of justice, advice, and 

promoting jihad.”79

To al-Qaeda’s various groups engaged in factionalism and infighting, 

the forum administrators advised that they, “revert to the Sharia for arbitration in any discord among them.”For al-Qaeda’s global movement more 

broadly, the administrators warned, “against intolerance and the meddling 

with intentions and motives, let alone badmouthing and showing disrespect 

toward the brothers, who disagree with us.”80

Between the grassroots supporters, administrators of the discussion 

forums, the intelligentsia, and official senior leadership, al-Qaeda’s global 

movement is universally concerned with what may be a fundamental crisis 

of legitimacy based on factionalism, suspicion, and mistrust. Ironically, the 

more those individuals discuss it and attempt to mitigate the discord, they 

seem to inadvertently catalyze the suspicion from an already concerned alQaeda populous. Both al-Nusra and al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State seem unwavering in their commitment to their respective positions, and any resolution to 

this matter in the near term appears unlikely. This situation has left Ayman 

al-Zawahiri in an impossible position because if he allows al-Baghdadi to 

flagrantly disregard direct his orders he may lose his legitimacy with other 

regional affiliates and his global followers. But if al-Zawahiri continues to 

hammer al-Baghdadi publicly, he also risks alienating the extremely large 

and dedicated following al-Baghdadi has within al-Qaeda. 
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3. Al-Qaeda’s Uncertain Future

Debates about al-Qaeda’s strength, capabilities, and strategies are pervasive within al-Qaeda’s online spaces. Not only do al-Qaeda’s adherents 

want to know where the movement is headed, but often they are also just 

simply clamoring to understand where al-Qaeda is at the moment. Al-Qaeda 

is having difficulty maintaining momentum, support, and feelings of connectivity with its global support base because al-Qaeda’s central leadership 

has lost the ability to project a unified, guiding voice. 

Al-Zawahiri remains both the official emir of al-Qaeda’s general command as well as the symbolic figurehead of the global al-Qaeda movement. 

Nonetheless, he has repeatedly shown himself to have little control over 

the regional affiliates, particularly as evidenced vis-à-vis ISIL and al-Sham. 

With regard to his dispersed global followers, al-Zawahiri is revered for his 

longevity and historic position as bin Laden’s chief deputy, but the kind of 

adoration that online participants show him greatly pales in comparison to 

other senior leaders, all of whom are now dead. It was those others’ ability 

to skillfully wield their cult of personality that allowed them to keep this 

inherently chaotic movement relatively cohesive. 

At the heart of al-Qaeda’s management challenges is the fact the movement itself is trying to exist as an organization, a network of organizations, 

and a decentralized social movement of global adherents. As researcher 

Mark Stout has argued, “Given the loose nature of the al-Qaeda-inspired 

movement, there is no formal assessment body or assessment mechanism. 

However, the strategic elites do tend to focus on four measures of merit, 

particularly when speaking privately among themselves.”81

Al-Qaeda’s leadership has long been prone to hyperbole, overpromising, and consistently under-delivering. For its dedicated global following of 

ideological adherents, failure to reproduce the 11 September 2001 attacks, for 

instance, has been rationalized time and again. 

Over time, al-Qaeda’s global following has grown perceptibly tired of 

continuously trying to spin failure into small successes and small successes 

into existential victory. Al-Zawahiri has been most notoriously grandiose 

in his language and arguably out of touch with reality in his arguments. 
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Stout has said al-Qaeda’s online intelligentsia now focuses their attention 

on four metrics of success, at least in internal discussions, as a way of identifying where they are along their path toward global domination. Stout’s first 

measure of effectiveness is the degree to which Muslims around the world 

express their feelings of discontent with their local governments, the United 

States, and Israel. This need to awaken Muslims worldwide has long been 

a tenet of al-Qaeda’s messaging and attacks, therefore expressions of those 

grievances is viewed as potential susceptibility to the al-Qaeda ideology. 

Stout argues that the al-Qaeda movement would gain a better sense for 

the degree to which they might still have global support by taking inventory 

of the size of communities who openly support them. Stout’s broader point 

is that they need to integrate their vanguard revolutionary movement as 

seamlessly as possible with the broader Islamist movements. Stout notes that, 

like all terrorist groups, al-Qaeda is similarly faced with the need to balance 

conducting attacks with prioritizing other necessary activities including 

recruitment, fundraising, and marketing. In light of the rise of the Islamic 

State and shrinking organizational resources, this need to negotiate between 

maintaining a low profile for security reasons and needing to stay visible for 

propaganda reasons has never been more important for al-Qaeda. 

Al-Qaeda’s intelligentsia could also use territorial control as a useful 

indicator of where they stand on their strategic campaign. According to alZawahiri, “it is the cause of unifying the Islamic action toward the word of 

monotheism” that he considers “the most important cause for the Islamic 

Ummah nowadays.” For al-Zawahiri, “the spread and growth of the jihadist 

awakening in the abode of Islam from the African Sahel to Turkistan in the 

east, from Chechnya to Somalia, and after the repeated heroic steadfastness 

of our people in Palestine,” is a clear metric of success.The fundamental 

challenge with that logic, as al-Qaeda is witnessing first-hand, is that the 

more geographically dispersed, dependent on local leadership, and removed 

that the senior leadership becomes, the more pervasive this problem is likely 

to become for al-Qaeda.82

Unity 

A theme that most dominates al-Qaeda’s contemporary discourse is that 

of the dire need for unity. For al-Zawahiri, and al-Qaeda more broadly, the 

unification of jihadist groups under a single umbrella has become something 
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of an existential mandate. It is difficult to see how that unity can be forged 

without a structural change of circumstances wherein al-Qaeda’s general 

command comes into a wealth of new resources and ekes out greater operational breathing space in which to leverage them. Otherwise, al-Zawahiri 

and the general command leadership will be forced to boomerang around the 

regional affiliate leaders and appeal directly to the foot soldiers, inculcating 

into them a need to defer to the senior leaders. 

Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders in its general command, particularly al-Zawahiri, are well aware of the historical problems that infighting, factionalism, 

and parochialism have caused similarly styled violent Islamist movements. 

It is with that historical perspective at the forefront of his mind that alZawahiri seems to have doubled down on this call for global unity among 

the various associated, affiliated, and ideologically like-minded organizations 

and movements since the death of bin Laden. 

In April 2013, al-Zawahiri’s audio statement elevated this call for unity as 

the primary issue with which al-Qaeda’s followers need to be concerned.83

In fact, he used the unity theme as basis on which to articulate a framework 

for which the global al-Qaeda movement can advance. According to alZawahiri, “all parties should focus on combining their forces and unity” 

and “all parties should be aware of the objectives of this unity and accord.” 

All the gains that Islamist revolutionary groups had made, he argues, have 

been squandered “due to the lack of awareness of what the ummah and the 

Islamic groups should hold on to in order to maintain victory and to avoid 

losing the triumph.”84

Al-Zawahiri’s criticism of the ummah on this count is multidimensional. He made an opportunistic argument about the need for all Islamist 

revolutionary groups to operate off the same playbook, the one that he 

advanced as being legitimate. By forcing all global affiliates, associates, and 

inspired movements to subordinate to al-Zawahiri’s ideological and strategic 

guidance, he believed that he could ensure the status of al-Qaeda’s senior 

leadership. 

Additionally, al-Zawahiri’s adamant calls about the need to shore up the 

al-Qaeda ranks were not just being driven by internal concerns. He consistently expressed his fear that the West was strategically leveraging a divideand-conquer strategy to weaken the Islamic world, ever weakening its ability 

to rise up through violent revolution. According to al-Zawahiri, “[the West 

has] imposed on us secular, nationalist, and ethnic regimes, which divided 
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us into more than 50 countries after we had enjoyed one caliphate. Every 

country has had a separate flag, national anthem, government, international 

airport, and a seat in the United Nations.”85

For al-Zawahiri, the temptation for al-Qaeda styled revolutionary groups 

to turn to their local issues, falling into the trap of accepting the legitimacy 

of these externally imposed national boundaries, fundamentally undercuts 

the value of the al-Qaeda brand as a transnational uniting force. Scattered 

revolutionary groups in Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, parts of North Africa, and so 

on, is not a global movement, even if they all claim to be waging their jihads 

under a common banner. Unless those movements are linked and operating under the same unified, central command structure, al-Zawahiri would 

argue, they will eventually be picked apart and collapse.

As another attempt to assert itself as the head of the regional affiliates 

and global movement, al-Qaeda took an unprecedented step in June 2013 by 

having Sheikh Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf, editor-in-chief of al-Qaeda’s Vanguards 

of Khurasan magazine, making his first public statement on As-Sahab Media.

The statement was a telling reminder to the global al-Qaeda movement about 

the level of seniority the general command still had among its ranks. AlRa’uf is widely revered for his work with the magazine. But his decision to 

go public at this point after years, decades even, working in the shadows, 

shows that al-Qaeda’s general command felt enormous pressure. 

Al-Ra’uf’s message echoed al-Zawahiri’s previous messaging that it was 

in the general command—one that was inherently multinational and multiethnic—that separated al-Qaeda from most other Islamist movements, which 

were focused on local and national objectives. “We are a group of Muslims 

from all different professions, levels of learning, and academic and professional specialties who have rallied around the religion of Islam and the creed 

of monotheism,” al-Ra’uf proclaimed in his statement. “As for our leaders,” 

he added, “they concern a group of the ulema, the students of religion, and 

the faithful leaders of their religion and their ummah.” The message was 

clear: the al-Qaeda general command possesses superior level of intellect, 

experience, and wisdom over the regional affiliates and should be followed 

based on that fact alone.86

Al-Zawahiri has, therefore, continued trying to find ways to ensure that 

all of al-Qaeda’s adherents are operating from the same guidelines and 

policies. In September 2013, he issued his, General Guidelines for Jihad in 

Arabic, English, and Urdu versions, which offered one of the clearest and 
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most cogent articulations of al-Qaeda’s goals and methods.87 For al-Zawahiri, 

these were the guidelines under which anyone claiming to be “al-Qaeda” 

needed to operate. Al-Zawahiri has not been alone in terms of his calls for 

unity. Other senior pundits and Sheikhs continue making similar calls to 

the global movement to come together. The pro-al-Qaeda Kuwaiti cleric, 

Sheikh Hamid al-Ali, has issued numerous statements about the need for 

greater unity within al-Qaeda, both in terms of operational cooperation and 

the elimination of the ideological backbiting.88

If it were in my hands, I would gather the jihadist groups in Iraq and 

others also. I said Iraq since it is unfortunately the most disputable 

to put an honor agreement in which everyone confirms the slogan 

‘all guns are directed toward the enemy’ and the Islamic fraternity 

spirit prevails, the callers for sedition, and the provokers of disputes 

and division spirit are expelled by spreading challenges, filing accusations, and noting mistakes.89

Senior cleric Abu Qatada published a 6-page document titled, “A Timely 

Message to the Mujahideen in the Levant.” Despite the fact that there have 

been numerous, “successful jihadist operations,” which he says, “pleases 

every believer,” the amount of discord is tearing the global movement apart. 

All progress made in Syria and elsewhere may be lost, he implores, “due to 

rifts and conflict” among groups. The longer it takes for the leadership to 

resolve their differences, he continued, “the more dire the consequences” for 

al-Qaeda’s reputation and strategic goals.90

Reflecting just how concerned the global al-Qaeda movement’s informal 

intelligentsia has about the current level of discord, a jointly published statement hit the al-Qaeda forums at the beginning of October 2013, laying out a 

set of prescriptions and proscriptions. The listed co-authors of the statement 

is a veritable who’s who of senior al-Qaeda pundits, including, Abu Sa’d alAmili, Mu’awiyah al-Qahtani, Gharib al-Ikhwan al-Shami, Nasir al-Qa’idah, 

Abu-Abdallah Anis, the poet Shaybah al-Hamd, Abu-Dujanah al-Kinani, 

Qalam Muwahhid, Al-Nadhir al-Ariyan, Sahnun Atallah, Muhammad alZuhayri and Abu-al-Ayna al-Khurasani. The 8-page document was published 

and disseminated jointly by the Fursan al-Balagh Media Establishment and 

Al-Ma’sadah Media Establishment.91

The statement discusses the “duties” that “fall upon the shoulders of the 

supporters” given that “the open fronts against our ummah have multiplied” 
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around the world. As al-Qaeda supporters, the authors write, they must “be 

the first to expose” any groups that seek to ignite strife among the mujahideen. Online participants must “work to encourage unity instead of encouraging division,” the authors urge, which includes avoiding “verbal wars” with 

opponents, and instead “focus on supporting your brothers and awaiting the 

fruits of their jihad in order to publicize them.”92

Realizing the gravity to which discord threatens to undermine the very 

legitimacy of al-Qaeda’s global enterprise, these authors create a situation 

wherein they deem, “everyone who seeks to divide the mujahideen” as being 

“certainly one of Satan’s followers.”93

According to Mark Stout, those who subscribe to al-Qaeda’s ideology, 

“exist along a continuum of commitment to instrumental thought.” At one 

end, he observes, are: 

Warriors who see participation in violent jihad as an expression of 

identity and faith. For these expressive warriors, the question of 

victory is remote. Theirs is a micro-level war oriented around issues 

such as maintaining solidarity with their friends, demonstrating 

bravery, and getting martyred.94

At the other end of Stout’s spectrum, he contends, are:

Soldiers or strategists who see participation in violent jihad as an 

instrumental act that can bring a desired end state closer. Not all 

of these individuals are leaders, though this class of people is disproportionately represented in the leadership. While they also see 

engagement in jihad as an expressive act, they nonetheless feel 

obligated to seek victory: the reform of Islam back to what they 

view as its pure roots and the restoration of an Islamic super-state.95

Al-Qaeda’s intelligentsia has taken their own stab at mapping the terrain 

of their rank-in-file supporters and adherents. One of the most prolific and 

respected online writers within al-Qaeda’s Internet discussion forums is Abu 

Asma al-Kubi, an essayist about whom little is known other than he claims 

to be writing from the Arabian Peninsula. On 9 May 2012, al-Kubi posted 

an essay to the Internet discussion forums titled, “What Type of Jihadist Are 

You?”96 On its face, the essay was al-Kubi’s effort to offer a schema for understanding the kind of al-Qaeda supporter. But when viewed in the broader 

context, it stands as an important attempt by a senior member of al-Qaeda’s 
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intelligentsia to add a greater semblance of structure and higher standards 

to an otherwise chaotic mess. 

Al-Kubi suggests there are “four types of mujahidin” within al-Qaeda’s 

global movement, all of whom are necessary for a successful campaign. The 

first, he explains, are the positions of leadership. According to al-Kubi, leaders are “rare” as they have a set of unique qualities including, “courage, 

wisdom, psychological skill in dealing with soldiers, experience in how to 

put soldiers in their correct positions, bravery against the enemy, firmness 

in issuing orders, ability to bear the psychological and practical costs of 

war, and knowledge in religious rulings and how to apply them on the reality.”97 For al-Kubi, there are actually two forms of leadership that need to be 

understood by global al-Qaeda adherents: “General Leadership,” which he 

says represents the senior leaders like the general command who think globally and strategically, and “Specialized Leadership,” which he explains may 

be either functional (bomb making, for instance), or includes the regional 

affiliate leaders who are focused on more limited goals and territory. 

Al-Kubi’s second kind of al-Qaeda mujahideen is what he terms the “Jack 

of All Trades,” which he calls “the rarest one” in jihadist posts. This kind of 

mujahid, he writes, “has a great personality that has very high capabilities in 

understanding all jihadist works, and he is a substitute for everyone. If the 

emir is absent, he can become the emir, if a guard is absent, he can become a 

guard, if a field commander is absent, he can replace him, and you will find 

him in any work.” People with this personality, he explains, play “a role in 

linking between soldiers and leadership, and it is rare that this personality 

is affected by psychological effects.”98

Al-Qaeda has lost a great number of these personalities over the past 

decade, which, if al-Kubi is correct in his assessment of these individuals 

serving as the intangible glue that hold a personality- and idea-based movement together, helps to explain the current state of affairs. Abu al-Laith alLibi fits this category perhaps better than anyone else. 

Al-Kubi’s third category are the “Worshippers,” whom he calls the “lamps 

of jihad” who “are the lions of battlefields” that form the backbone of al-Qaeda’s global efforts. The fourth category, which he calls “The Moody People,” 

best highlights al-Kubi’s frustration with the broader global al-Qaeda movement. For Al-Kubi, the bulk of al-Qaeda’s supporters are “moody,” some are 

“nearer to goodness” while others are “nearer to evil.” These may be the kinds 

of supporters known within al-Qaeda online forums as the “sitters” who, 
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al-Kubi says “do not comply with the toughness of jihad and orders issued by 

Emirs, unless they are permanently reminded.” These are the people who, “if 

they are ordered to follow things that contravene their desires, they interpret 

them in their own way and carry them out in such a way that meets their 

desires.”99

The moody supporters who al-Kubi says are nearer to evil because these 

are the internal backbiters and critics. “It is useless to remind those people,” 

he notes, “and you cannot win them by good manners and treatment because 

those people think that having good manners is a point of weakness and 

they are naturally disposed for being stubborn.” He cannot understate “the 

evil and harm caused by those people,” which he says, “affects their brothers 

due to their bad manners, dirty words, and insults against their brothers, 

the emirs, and leaders.” They “cause trouble” and “cause division.” Al-Kubi 

says they are the “fuel of all seditions.”100

Al-Kubi’s thoughts on the challenge posed to al-Qaeda from within its 

own ranks are not unique. Even Adam Gadahn expressed as much in a private letter obtained by the CTC at West Point. 

As for the Jihadi forums, it is repulsive to most of the Muslims, or 

closed to them. It also distorts the face of al- Qa’ida, due to what 

you know of bigotry, the sharp tone that characterizes most of the 

participants in these forums. It is also biased towards (Salafists) 

and not any Salafist, but the Jihadi Salafist, which is just one trend 

of the Muslims trends. The Jihad Salafist is a small trend within a 

small trend.101

Abu Yahya al-Shinqiti, member of the sharia committee of AQIM, has 

been on a similarly motivated virtual campaign advocating for unity among 

the mujahidin. For example, his no-holds-barred article in the fifth issue of 

the Al-Balagh magazine titled, “When Sun of Justice Sets,” taking on what he 

called a “relentless war waged by some writers against their Muslim brothers” on social media websites.This phenomena, according to the writer, is a 

war that its “rockets are curses and insults and its shells are accusations and 

judgmental intentions and purposes.” The problem with this war, al-Shinqiti 

writes, is that it is being, “waged at a time when the Muslims are in dire need 

for unity and for closing ranks.”102

Several months later, he published an online tract urging al-Qaeda adherents to unite “under the sharia of God, away from hateful prejudice and 
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ill-guided desires.”103 If they resist, he warned, they would become “consumed by minor issues” and exaggerate them in large part because of those 

who “spread your secrets and the shortcomings of your brothers on social 

media sites, which pleases the enemy” and “discourages supporters and 

weakens their will.” Spreading online rumors, he contends, is the “enemy’s 

way to exaggerate disputes among Muslims, destroy their unity, and create 

barriers between the mujahideen and righteous people of knowledge.”104

As the few remaining al-Qaeda senior leaders struggle to remind their 

ranks of the importance of unity, what they actually desire is a greater level 

of discipline and deference to authority. Al-Qaeda’s general command leadership seems to appreciate why and how they lost influence over their affiliates 

and their global movement. Thus, as the Islamic State continues to dominate 

global headlines and online social media, these leaders will likely continue 

pressing on any angle they can to try and slow that tide by appealing to what 

initially made al-Qaeda the primary group in this space: a clearly articulated 

ideology. The challenge is that there are so few individuals left within alQaeda’s global movement who can effectively command attention or wield 

influence against the backdrop of the Islamic State. 

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Conclusion

Since their brazen attacks against the United States on 11 September 

2001, al-Qaeda has been locked in two existential battles. In its rise to 

global notoriety, al-Qaeda found incredible traction defining itself against 

its adversary: a so-called coalition of Christians and Jews waging an all-out 

war against Muslims using every instrument of national and cultural power 

available. This approach worked until al-Qaeda’s organizational structure 

was so shattered that attempts to build its own reputation up by tearing its 

adversaries down found little resonance. 

Al-Qaeda’s organizational capability can wax and wane; particularly 

given how much it is now being overshadowed by the Islamic State. It is 

thus al-Qaeda’s second existential battle that will likely shape its long-term 

viability: its efforts to maintain a semblance of internal coherence and continuity in the absence of any clear advantage vis-à-vis its peers. Al-Qaeda 

is no longer the most extreme global jihadist organization. It has extremely 

limited operational capacity. Its leaders have failed to galvanize popular support within global jihadist circles much less the broader Muslim community. 

Al-Qaeda itself is historically rooted in deep factionalism and oppositional viewpoints about the methodology for advancing the lethal mix of 

extreme religious zealotry and vicious militancy for which al-Qaeda has 

become known. Since bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda has been forced to again 

re-conceptualize itself. Al-Qaeda’s followers can no longer rest on thinking 

of itself as the organizational extension of a single man, nor a continuation 

of a single attack. With the loss of its best public relations officials, al-Qaeda’s 

few remaining senior leaders have sought to find other ways to convince their 

global following to maintain their allegiance and support. 

Al-Qaeda is attempting to rebrand, however, in an environment with 

new players and very different rules. When juxtaposed against the Islamic 

State, both in terms of the Islamic State’s operational successes and sheer 

dominance in recruiting via the Internet, al-Qaeda looks almost defunct. 

Drawing on old methods, such as the launch of its English-language magazine, Resurgence, to the establishment of its new al-Qaeda in the Indian 

Subcontinent, al-Qaeda’s leaders are doing what they know to focus global 

attention again on its approach to militant Islamism. So far their efforts have 
54

JSOU Report 16-3

had little impact, largely because these efforts are being viewed as inferior 

copies of a far superior original product, that being the Islamic State. 

Al-Qaeda’s global footprint has atomized and its leadership has fractured. With affiliates on multiple continents adopting al-Qaeda’s namesake, 

symbols, ideology, and methods, the importance of brand management for 

al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has never been more critical. Al-Qaeda’s senior 

leadership is far weaker than ever before in terms of its ability to exert command and control over its affiliate organizations and global adherents. This 

declined capacity has allowed al-Qaeda’s affiliates, associates, and adherents to turn inward and pursue more parochial agendas. Today, al-Qaeda is 

becoming synonymous with activities that its founding fathers would never 

have approved. These internal debates have led to more than just acerbic 

debates in the al-Qaeda discussion forums. Rather, with Forum Administrators removing threads, participants are now fundamentally questioning the 

very validity or sharia compliance of the regional affiliates and al-Zawahiri 

himself. 

As the most dominant militant Islamist organization in the Sunni terrorism space, the Islamic State has made its position vis-à-vis al-Qaeda starkly 

clear. On 11 May 2014, one of the Islamic State’s official media outlets, AlI’tisam Establishment, published a message from Abu Muhammad al-Adnani 

al-Shami, the official spokesman of the Islamic State, titled, “Pardon, Emir 

of al-Qa’ida.” In the message, al-Adnani addressed al-Zawahiri:

Today, you and your Al-Qa’ida have no more than two options: 

Either you stubbornly and obstinately carry on with your wrongdoing, and in turn, the rift and infighting among the mujahideen 

all over the world continues or you admit to your slip and mistake, 

and then redress it.105

Al-Adnani accused al-Zawahiri of having “dispersed, ripped, and torn 

apart” the unity among jihadist movements that had been forged by bin 

Laden. 

Although the in-depth substantive grievances were not widely discussed 

by Islamic State supporters, the broader thrust of his message—that al-Zawahiri had failed to effectively lead its followers and was willing to collaborate, 

compromise, and stand-down—was clearly understood. Today, although 

there remains a general reverence for the historic contribution that al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, including al-Zawahiri, had made to the global jihadist 
55

Brachman: The War Within

movement, a steady drumbeat of messages from the Islamic State and its 

supporters arguing that al-Qaeda now stands in the way of real progress has 

become the predominant line of thinking among supporters. 

Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership will have extreme difficulty overcoming this 

narrative. Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders are older and do not innately appeal to 

the younger demographic forming much of today’s online jihadist support 

movement. Meanwhile, the collective memory of today’s jihadist movement 

is increasingly forgetting the contributions of al-Qaeda’s general command. 

As an intellectually-grounded movement, al-Qaeda will likely run into more 

trouble appealing to new generations of Islamic State supporters. These youth 

have shown they are largely driven by graphic and brutal propaganda, and 

use territorial control as a measure of effectiveness far more than longevity 

or scholarly credentials. 

This report summarizes a qualitative academic research dive to informally gauge the current level of coherence or incoherence of al-Qaeda’s 

global movement. At this strategic juncture, al-Qaeda’s general command 

seems likely to fade into the background, ceding its role as the vanguard of 

a global jihadist ideology to the Islamic State supplants. Parochial politics 

and cults of personality will likely fuel this centrifugal motion, forcing alQaeda’s online supporters to choose between the Islamic State, or panoply 

of more localized sub-groups and personalities to support. 

57

Brachman: The War Within

Endnotes

1. Abu Yahya al-Libi, “Reflections on the Al-Hujurat Chapter,” Seven part series, 

7 July 2009 – 8 July 2009, Al-Fajr Media Center.

2. Ibid. 

3. Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf has becoming increasingly vocal after a long history writing 

and editing the official al-Qaeda magazine, Vanguards of Khorasan. He recently 

appeared in the As-Sahab video, titled, “And They Are Raging Furiously Against 

Us,” on 14 September 2014. As-Sahab most recently featured Abu Dujanaha alBasha in a 26 September 2014 video titled, “This Is Our Message.” He published 

the article, “The Martyrdom of the Imam of Jihad, Courage, Abstinence, Piety,” 

in the 19th edition of al-Qaeda’s official magazine, Vanguards of Khorasan, posted 

to the Internet on 12 September 2011. 

4. Little is known about Abu Khalil al-Madani other than that he is a member of 

al-Qaeda’s Shura Council. He appeared in an al-Qaeda video in 2008 and only 

resurfaced in July 2013 in the al-Qaeda media production, “The Call for the 

Primordial Nature.”

5. For more on al-Qaeda’s global presence today, see: Peter Bergen, Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Michael Hurley, and Erroll G. Southers, “Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment,” 9 September 2013. Accessed at: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/

uploads/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism-A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.

pdf.

6. Steve Coll, “Name Calling,” The New Yorker, 4 March 2013. Accessed at: http://

www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2013/03/04/130304taco_talk_coll.

7. There have been several useful articles and studies over the years detailing various 

leadership squabbles, ideological debates, strategy quarrels and power plays. See, 

for instance, Vahid Brown’s “Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in 

al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006,” published 2 January 2007 by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Also see: Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, 

Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, edited by Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, 

(Routledge Press: 2011). 

8. Max Boot, “The Mistaken Focus on Core Al-Qaeda,” Commentary Magazine, 23 

September 2013. Accessed at: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/09/23/

the-mistaken-focus-on-core-al-qaeda/. 

9. The letters in their original Arabic and translated English can be found on the 

Combating Terrorism Center’s website, along with analysis of them. See: http://

www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined. 

10. Richard McGregor, “Bin Laden Letters Show Micro-Manager,” Financial Times, 

3 May 2012. Accessed at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ef3fd692-9549-11e1-

8faf-00144feab49a.html.
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11. For more on Atiyah Abd al-Rahman al-Libi, see: Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Drone 

Is Said to Kill Al-Qaeda’s No. 2,” The New York Times, 27 August 2011. Accessed 

at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/world/asia/28qaeda.html?_r=0.

12. For more on Hasan Turki, see the International Crisis Group’s Policy Briefing, 

“Somalia’s Divided Islamists,” 18 May 2010. Accessed at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B74%20Somalias%20

Divided%20Islamists.ashx. 

13. “From Kabul...To Mogadishu,” As-Sahab Media, 22 February 2009. 

14. SOCOM‐2012‐0000005, 7 August 2010. The documents can be downloaded 

in Arabic or English from the CTC’s website: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/

letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid. 

17. Mahmoud Mohamed, “Bin Laden letter reveals strained relations between 

al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab,” Sabahi Online, 7 May 2012. Accessed at: http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/05/07/feature-01.

18. SOCOM‐2012‐0000006. 

19. The National Counterterrorism Center’s website maintains an overview of AQAP 

and its terrorist plots here: http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html.

20. For more on the impact of Al-Awlaki and Khan on the media production of 

AQAP, see: Mark Schone and Matthew Cole. “American Jihadi Samir Khan Killed 

With Awlaki.” ABC News.com. 30 September 2011. Accessed at: http://abcnews.

go.com/Blotter/american-jihadi-samir-khan-killed-awlaki/story?id=14640013.

21. SOCOM-2012-0000016-HT, undated.

22. SOCOM‐2012‐0000019.

23. SOCOM‐2012‐0000003.

24. Sebastian Rotella, “New Details in the bin Laden Docs: Portrait of a Fugitive 

Micro-Manager,” ProPublica, 11 May 2011. Accessed at: http://www.propublica.

org/article/bin-laden-documents-portrait-of-a-fugitive-micro-manager. 

25. For an in-depth look at this period in al-Qaeda’s history, see: Brian Fishman, 

“After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington 

Quarterly, Autumn 2006, 29:4, 19–32.

26. Steven Brooke, “The Near and Far Enemy Debate,” 45-68, in Self-Inflicted Wounds: 

Debates and Divisions within al-Qaida and its Periphery, The Combating Terrorism Center, edited by Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, December 2010. 

27. Hamid al-Ali. “Jihad Against Occupiers is the Only Option; Violence Against 

Arab Regimes Forbidden.” Interview with Al-Jazeera TV on 14 September 2009. 

Accessed at: http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/2234.htm.

28. SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT. Accessed at: http://www.jihadica.com/wp-content/

uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000004-Orig.pdf.

29. Ibid.
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Brachman: The War Within

30. Ibid. 

31. Ibid.

32. “The Dawn of Imminent Victory: The 10th Anniversary of the Blessed Tuesday 

Raids,” As-Sahab Media, posted 12 September 2011. 

33. “Letter Exposes New Leader in Al-Qaida High Command,” CTC Analysis, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 11 December 2005. Accessed at: http://

thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/100066/4745/ATI20051211.pdf.

34. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Exoneration. A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of the 

Pen and Sword from the Unjust Allegation of Feebleness and Weakness,” May 

2008. Accessed at: http://fas.org/irp/dni/osc/exoneration.pdf. 

35. “Letter Exposes New Leader in al‐Qa’ida High Command,” Combating Terrorism 

Center website, 25 September 2006. Accessed at: http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/

pdf/CTC‐AtiyahLetter.pdf. 

36. Bill Roggio, “Harmony: The Attyia – Zarqawi Letter,” The Long War Journal, 27 

September 2006. Accessed at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/

harmony_the_attyia_z.php. 

37. SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT. Accessed at: http://www.jihadica.com/wp-content/

uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000004-Orig.pdf.

38. SOCOM-2012-0000007-HT dated 3 December 2011. Accessed at: http://www.

jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000007-Trans.pdf. 

39. Ibid. 

40. For more on this stream of reporting, see: Peter Bergen, “Egyptian Saif al-Adel 

Now Acting Leader of al-Qaeda, Ex-militant Says,” CNN.com, 17 May 2011. 

Accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/17/mideast.al.qaeda.

appointee/.

41. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Noble Knight Has Dismounted,” As-Sahab Media 

Establishment, 8 June 2011.

42. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “And the Noble Knight Dismounts,” As-Sahab Media, 8 

June 2011. 

43. “Good Tidings, by Shaykhs Abu-Zubayr, Amir of the Mujahidin Youth Movement in Somalia, and Amir Ayman al-Zawahiri, May God Protect Them Both,” 

As-Sahab Media, 9 February 2012. 

44. “The Crusader Invasion of Somalia: A New Epic From the Epics of Jihad Against 

the Crusaders by Shaykh Ayman al Zawahiri,” As-Sahab Media, 6 November 

2012.

45. Majid Ahmed. “Open letter to al-Zawahiri Rocks Foundations of al-Shabaab,” 

Sabahi Online, 12 April 2013. Accessed at: http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/

articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/12/feature-01. 

46. Accessed at: http://www.aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=30131, posted on 6 

April 2013. 
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47. Spencer Ackerman, “‘There’s No Turning Back’: My Interview With a Hunted 

American Jihadist,” Wired, 4 April 2013. Accessed at: http://www.wired.com/

dangerroom/2013/04/omar-hammami/all/. 

48. “Answers From Open Interview With Jihadist Shaykh Abu-Mansur al-Amriki, 

May God Preserve Him,” Center for Studies of Islamic World Issues and disseminated by the Al-Minbar al-I’lami Jihadist Forum, 12 May 2013. 

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. “Somalia Islamic group eulogizes slain American jihadist Omar Hammami, aka 

Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki,” CBS News, 16 September 2013. Accessed at: http://

www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57603081/.

53. “Q&A with Abu-al-Hawra al-Ansari, forum administrator at the Shumukh 

al-Islam Network,” 20 October 2013. Accessed at: https://shamikh1.info/vb/

showthread.php?t=213045#. 

54. Accessed at: http://124.217.247.216/vb/showthread.php?t=33800.

55. Accessed at: http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=86251, posted on 

9 April 2013. 

56. “Iraqi al-Qaeda and Syrian Group ‘Merge.’” Al-Jazeera English. 9 April 2013. 

Accessed: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/.../04/201349194856244589.html.

57. “CIA Expands Role in Syria Fight: Agency Feeds Intelligence to Rebel Fighters, 

in Move That Deepens U.S. Involvement in Conflict,” The Wall Street Journal, 

22 March 2013. Accessed at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732

4373204578376591874909434.html. 

58. Accessed at: http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=86372, posted on 

10 April 2013. 

59. “Al-Qaeda Chief Rejects Zawahiri’s Orders.” Al-Jazeera, 15 June 2013. Accessed 

at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013615172217827810.

html. 

60. For more about al-Zawahiri’s letters to al-Baghdadi and al-Jawlani, see Thomas 

Jocelyn’s “Analysis: Zawahiri’s letter to al Qaeda branches in Syria, Iraq,” 

Long War Journal, 10 June 2013. Accessed at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2013/06/analysis_alleged_let.php.

61. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s statement dated 23 May 2013, was released by Al-Fajr Media

to Al-Jazeera. For the original letter and Al-Jazeera’s report, see: Basma Atassi, 

“Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger,” 9 June 2013. Accessed at: http://

www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html. 

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid. 

64. Ibid.
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65. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “Baqiya fi ‘l-’Iraq wa’-l-Sham,” 15 June 2013. Accessed 

at: http://alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?t=24134.

66. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “So Leave Them and Their Inventions Alone,” 

published by Al-Furqan Media on YouTube on 19 June 2013. Accessed at: http:///

www.youtube.com/watch?v=OY6zVLigfrQ. 

67. “Death Industry,” Al-Arabiya Television, 21 June 2013. 

68. Ibid. 

69. See Asad al-Jihad2’s series of tweets on 21 September 2013 for more about his 

thinking on the issue of the ISI’s rejection of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s order to disband the ISIL here: https://twitter.com/AsadAljehad2.

70. For more on Abu Usama al-Iraqi’s Tweets, see: https://twitter.com/rammesura.

71. “Swear by God That Our Situation Is Better, God Willing,” 16 June 2013. Accessed 

at: http://www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=91530. 

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. See complete thread at: http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=317918.

75. Ibid. 

76. Ibid. 

77. The original thread, titled, “Sheikh Musa al-Ghanami Reveals Very Serious 

Information About the Reason Behind Al-Zawahiri’s Speech and the Expected 

Glad Tidings of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” was originally found 

at: http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?522564. 

78. Abu Al-Ayna, “Thoughts From the Administration: Who Will Mediate Between 

Us and Brothers Who Have Deserted Us,” 29 July 2013. 

79. Akram Hijazi, “Provocateurs Are Dedicated to Instigating Strife,” 22 September 

2013. Accessed at: https://www.facebook.com/almoraqeb1?ref=stream. 

80. “Statement of Advice, Clarification,” Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum, posted by the 

forum’s official Twitter account: “Shabakat Ansar al-Mujahidin” (@as_ansar), 

26 September 2013. 

81. Mark Stout, “Mr. Bin Laden Are We to the Caliphate Yet?,” War on the 

Rocks, 30 October 2013. Accessed at: http://warontherocks.com/2013/10/

mr-bin-laden-are-we-to-the-caliphate-yet/.

82. “Al-Sahab Presents Statement Entitled ‘Unifying the Word Toward the Word of 

Monotheism’ by Jihadist Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, May God Protect Him,” 

Al-Sahab Establishment for Media Production, 7 April 2013. 

83. Ibid. 

84. Ibid. 

85. Ibid. 

86. Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf, “A Message to the Ummah,” produced by the As-Sahab 

Establishment for Media Production and the Al-Fajr Media Center, 28 June 2013. 
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87. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for Jihad,” published by As-Sahab 

Media and disseminated by the Al-Fajr Media Center, 13 September 2013. 

88. Hamad al-Ali, “If it Were in my Hands,” 6 November 2009. Accessed at: 

www.h-alali.net.

89. Ibid.

90. Abu Qatada al-Fillistini, “A Timely Message to the Mujahidin in the Levant,” 31 

October 2013. Accessed at: http://www.gulfup.com/?WTHZdD. 

91. Mu’assat al-Mas’ada al-I’lamihyya/Fursan al-Balagh al-I’lam (eds), “Bayyan 

nusrat al-ansar li-ikhwanihim al-mujahideen al-abrar,” published 10 October 

2013 at: https://shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=212520. 

92. Ibid. 

93. Ibid. 

94. Stout, “Mr. Bin Laden Are We at the Caliphate yet?”

95. Ibid. 

96. Accessed at: http://www.aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=17955.

97. Ibid. 

98. Ibid. 

99. Ibid. 

100. Ibid.

101. SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT. Accessed at: http://www.jihadica.com/wp-content/

uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000004-Orig.pdf.

102. Abu Yahya al-Shinqiti, “When Sun of Justice Sets,” published in Al-Balagh 

Magazine, Issue 5, July-August 2013.

103. Abu Yahya al-Shinqiti, “The Levant Series: Between the Sacrifices of Noble People 

and the Lurking of the Malicious Vile Ones – First Installment,” 1 November 

2013.

104. Ibid.

105. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “Pardon, Emir of al-Qa’ida,” published by Al-I’tisam 

Establishment, 11 May 2014.