Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

communications path for those in the storm-ravaged region.> Mobile satellite operators reported
large increases in satellite traffic without any particular network/infrastructure i issues.'4 More
than 20,000 satellite phones were deployed to the Gulf Coast region in the days following
Katrina.’> Broadband capacity was provided by fixed satellite operators for voice, video and
data network applications. Nevertheless, there were functionality issues with satellite
communications — largely due to lack of user training and equipment preparation.*° Some
satellite phones require specialized dialing in order to place acall. They also require line of sight
with the satellite and thus do not generally work indoors.’” Users who had not been trained or
used a satellite phone prior to Katrina reported frustration and difficulty in rapid and effective
use of these devices.** Satellite phones also require charged batteries. Handsets that were not
charged and ready to go were of no use as there was often no power to recharge handsets.
Additionally, most of Louisiana’s parishes (all but three) did not have satellite phones on hand
because they had previously chosen to discontinue their service as a cost-saving measure.
Finally, users expressed the observation that satellite data networks (replacing wireline T1
service) were more robust and had fewer difficulties in obtaining and maintaining
communications with the satellite network than voice services.

7. Broadcasting. The television and radio broadcasting industry was also
hard hit by Katrina. Approximately 28 percent of television stations experienced downtime i in
the storm zone; approximately 35 percent of radio stations failed in one fashion or another. In

“See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland

Security and Emergency Preparedness, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana,
Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,
United States House of Representatives, at 12 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearing/12-14-
ith_121405.doc [hereinafter “Jeff Smith Written Statement”]; Written Statement of Bruce Baughman,
Director, Alabama State Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the
State of Alabama, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina, United States House of Representatives, at 4 (Nov. 9, 2005), available at
http://katrina.house.gow/hearings/11_09_05/baughman_110905.doc; Written Statement of Robert Latham, Director,
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of
Mississippi, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, United States House of Representatives, at 4 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_07_05/latham_120705.pdf.

“4 Globalstar Comments at 2.

4 Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at 4.

4© See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9 (problems with satellite phones do not appear to have been

caused by the phones themselves or the satellite networks; a combination of user error and obstruction of satellite
signals were most likely the problems); Cavossa-SIA Testimony at 4-5; Bogucki Mar. 6 Public Testimony, Tr. at 55.

7 Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 5.

8 Id. ata.

* See Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to

Hurricane Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 172-73 (2006), available at
http://www.gpo.access.gow/serialset/creports/Katrina.html, {hereinafter “House Report”].
50

See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45; Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman,
Federal Communications Commission, Hearing on Communications in a Disaster, Before the Senate Comm. on



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Pre-positioning for Public Safety — An Awareness Program for Non-Traditional
Emergency Alternatives — The FCC should take steps to educate the public safety
community about the availability and capabilities of non-traditional technologies that
might provide effective back-up solutions for existing public safety communications
systems. Examples of these technologies would be pagers, satellite technology and
phones, portable towers and repeaters, point-to-point microwave links, license-exempt
WISP systems, other systems less reliant on the PSTN, and bridging
technologies/gateways that would facilitate interoperability. One means for the FCC to
do this would be to organize an exhibit area or demonstration of these technologies in
conjunction with one or more large public safety conferences, such as:

a. APCO International Annual Conference and Exposition
August 6-10, 2006; Orlando, FL

b. IAFC Fire Rescue International
September 14-16, 2006; Dallas, TX

Cc. International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference

October 14-18, 2006; Boston, MA.

d. NENA Annual Conference and Trade Show
June 9-14, 2007; Fort Worth, TX

e. National Sheriffs Association Annual Conference
June 23-27, 2007; Salt Lake City, UT
f. National Fraternal Order of Police

August 13-16, 2007; Louisville, KY

The FCC should also consider organizing a similar exhibit/demonstration for other
industry sectors that might benefit from this information

Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory Requirements — An A Priori Program for Disaster
Areas — The FCC should explore amending its rules to permit automatic grants of certain
types of waivers or special temporary authority (STA) in a particular geographic area if
the President declares that area to be a "disaster area". As a condition of the waiver or
STA, the FCC could require verbal or written notification to the Commission staff
contemporaneously with activation or promptly after the fact. Further, the FCC should
examine expanding the on-line filing opportunities for STA requests, including STA
requests for AM broadcast stations. Examples of possible rule waivers and STAs to
study for this treatment include:

a. Wireline.

i. Waiver of certain carrier change requirements to allow customers whose
long distance service was disrupted to be connected to an operational long
distance provider.

ii. Waiver of aging residential numbers rules for customers in the affected
area. This allows carriers to disconnect temporarily customers’ telephone
service, upon request, and reinstate the same number when the service is
reconnected.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

A. Lack of Activation.

The EAS can be activated by the federal government as well as by state and local officials to
disseminate official news and information to the public in the event of an emergency. The Panel
understands that the National Weather Service used the EAS to provide severe weather warnings
to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of Katrina making landfall.'*° However, the Panel also
heard that the EAS was not utilized by state and local officials to provide localized emergency
evacuation and other important information. '“° That means that an existing and effective means
of distributing timely information to our citizens was not fully utilized.

B. Limitations in Coverage.

The primary source of emergency information about Katrina came through broadcast (including
satellite broadcast) and cable infrastructure, whether through the EAS or local or national news
programming. Citizens who were not watching TV or listening to the radio at the time of the
broadcast missed this emergency information. Damage to communications infrastructure made it
difficult for news and emergency information to reach the public, as did power outages.'*” Asa
result, a fairly large percentage of the public likely were uninformed. The Panel heard about
notification technologies that may permit emergency messages to be sent to wireline and
wireless telephones as well as personal digital assistants and other mobile devices.'* For
example, the Association of Public Television Stations has developed a means for utilizing the
digital transmissions of public television stations to datacast emergency information to
computers or wireless devices.'”” In addition, the St. Charles Parish Public School District used
a telephone-based, time-sensitive notification technology to send out recorded evacuation
messages to over 21,000 phone numbers in advance of Katrina’s landfall.'°° The District
continued to utilize this technology to provide members of the public with specific information
regarding conditions in the community in the storm’s aftermath. While the use of phone-based
technologies for post-disaster communications is necessarily dependent on the state of the
telephone network, such technologies — which are less subject to disruption from power outages
— offer the potential for complementing the traditional broadcast-based EAS.

The Panel also understands that the FCC is considering extending the reach of the existing
emergency alert system to other technologies, such as wireless and the Internet.'*' The Panel

'45 The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 28.

'46 Comments of Hilary Styron of the National Organization on Disability Emergency Preparedness Initiative
at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter "Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony”).

‘47 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.
'48 Comments of Notification Technologies, Inc., EB Docket No. 04-296 (Jan. 24, 2006).

‘49 Written Testimony of John M. Lawson, President and CEO, Association of Public Television Stations,
Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
(April 18, 2006).

180 Id. at 12.

'! Review of the Emergency Alert System, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 FCC Red 18,625, 18,653 (4 69) (2005).



6.

Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Maximizing Existing Resources — FCC Website for Emergency Coordination
Information — The FCC should create a password-protected website, accessible by
credentialed entities (under recovery coordination recommendation #1), listing the key
state emergency management contacts (especially the contacts for communications
coordinating bodies), as well as post-disaster coordination areas for communications
providers. During an emergency, this website should be updated on a 24/7 basis.

Maximizing Existing Resources —- FCC Website for Emergency Response Team
Information — The FCC should create a website to publicize the agency’s emergency
response team’s contact information and procedures for facilitating disaster response and
outage recovery.

First Responder Communications — Essential Steps for Addressing Lessons
Learned from Hurricane Katrina

1.

Essential Steps in Pre-positioning Equipment, Supplies and Personnel — An
Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternatives Inventory — To facilitate the
restoration of public safety communications capabilities, the FCC should:

a. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and maintain, including through
arrangements with the private sector, a cache of equipment components that
would be needed to immediately restore existing public safety communications
within hours of a disaster. At a minimum, the cache should include the necessary
equipment to quickly restore communications capabilities on all relevant mutual
aid channels. Such a cache would consist of:

i. RF gear, such as 800 MHz, UHF, VHF, Mutual Aid, IP Gateway, and
dispatch consoles;

ii. trailer and equipment housing;

iii. tower system components (antenna system, hydraulic mast);

iv. power system components (generator, UPS, batteries, distribution panel);
and
v. fuel.

The cache should be maintained as a regional or state-wide resource and located
in areas protected from disaster impacts. The cache should be included as an
element of the National Response Plan.

b. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to utilize the cache through training
exercises on a regular basis.

c. Support the ongoing efforts of the NCC to develop and maintain a database of
state and local public safety system information, including frequency usage, to
allow for more efficient spectrum sharing, rapid on-site frequency coordination,
and emergency provision of supplemental equipment in the event of system
failures.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE
KATRINA ON THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOVERY EFFORT

The Katrina Panel has been charged with studying the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors
of the telecommunications and media industries, including public safety communications. The
Panel has also been directed to review the effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to this
infrastructure. To inform its views on these issues, the Panel heard oral presentations and
reviewed written comments from numerous government and industry representatives, as well as
other interested members of the public. The Panel members also brought to bear their own
experiences with Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. As a result of digesting and discussing all
of this information, the Pane! members identified a number of areas where problems were
observed or communications recovery and restoration efforts could have been more effective.
The Panel also identified areas where successes were achieved — successes that should be
repeated. These observed problems and successes, which are detailed below, generally formed
the basis for the Panel’s recommendations to the Commission.

The Panel’s observations below are divided into four sections. Section I, Network Reliability
and Resiliency, discusses the successes and failures in the resiliency and reliability of various
types of communications networks from an operational perspective. This section looks at the
effects of both the hurricane itself and the subsequent levee breaches on communications
infrastructure. Section II, Recovery Coordination and Procedures, reviews the challenges
communications infrastructure providers encountered in restoring and maintaining
communications service, particularly with regard to access and credentialing issues, restoration
of power, and security. Section III, First Responder Communications, examines the challenges
posed to public safety and emergency first responders in the days following Hurricane Katrina.
And finally Section IV, Emergency Communication to the Public, focuses on the adequacy and
effectiveness of emergency communications to the public before, during and after Hurricane
Katrina.

I. Network Reliability and Resiliency

The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina and the extensive flooding resulting from the breached
levees severely tested the reliability and resiliency of communications networks in the Gulf
Coast region. Katrina also affected areas of the Gulf Coast in varied fashions. In the high
impact zones near Gulfport, MS and New Orleans, LA, the hurricane created much heavier
damage to the infrastructure due to strong winds and, in New Orleans, extensive flooding in the
days after the storm. In less impacted areas, damage was less severe and recovery efforts were
more easily accomplished. Katrina taxed each type of communications infrastructure in a variety
of ways: (1) strong winds and rain made it difficult for technical staff to support and maintain
the networks and blew antennas out of alignment; (2) heavy flooding following Katrina
overwhelmed a large portion of the communications infrastructure, damaging equipment and
impeding recovery; (3) single points of failure in vital communications links led to widespread
communications outages across a variety of networks; and (4) the duration of power outages far



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

CONCLUSION

The Katrina Panel commends Chairman Martin and the Commission for their actions to assist
industry and first responders before, during and after Hurricane Katrina and for forming this
Panel to identify steps to be taken to enhance readiness and recovery in the future. The Panel
thanks the Commission for the opportunity to address the important issues associated with this
devastating hurricane’s effect on our nation’s communications networks. In this effort, the Panel
members have brought to bear a broad background of public safety and industry experiences,
including (for many) first-hand knowledge of the devastation wrought by Katrina. The Panel has
also benefited from information provided in the many comments and expert presentations. The
Panel hopes that its resulting observations and recommendations prove useful to the Commission
in helping to ensure that the communications industry, first responders, and government at all
levels are better prepared for future hurricanes and any other disasters that might lie ahead for us.

43



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

times.® For example, on Monday, September 12th, a major fiber route from Hammond,
Louisiana to Covington, Louisiana was cut by a tree trimming company.° > Cox Communications
reported that, by the eleventh day after the storm, more outages of its network in the region were
caused by human damage than storm damage. Public safety entities also noted similar cuts in
service during the restoration process.

In addition to these major causes of network interruptions, security and access to facilities were
consistently mentioned as significant issues affecting restoration of communications services.
These problems are discussed in detail in the following section.

Il. Recovery Coordination and Procedures

After Katrina’s wind and rain subsided, challenges to communications service maintenance and
restoration continued. Flooding, which submerged and damaged equipment and blocked access
for restoration, was a major problem. The Panel also observed significant challenges to the
recovery effort resulting from (1) inconsistent and unclear requirements for communications
infrastructure repair crews and their subcontractors to gain access to the affected area; (2) limited
access to power and/or generator fuel; (3) limited security for communications infrastructure and
personnel and lack of pre-positioned back-up equipment; (4) lack of established coordination
between the communications industry and state and local officials as well as among federal, state
and local government officials with respect to communications matters; and (5) limited use of
available priority communications services. On the other hand, lines of communication between
the communications industry and the federal government were established and seemed generally
effective in facilitating coordination, promptly granting needed regulatory relief, and gathering
outage information. In addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of fuel and equipment among
communications industry participants helped to maximize the assets available and bolster the
recovery effort. However, additional industry coordination of personnel and assets internally and
among governments could have substantially facilitated restoration of communications networks.

A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources.

1. Perimeter Access and Credentialing. Communications restoration efforts
were hampered significantly by the inability of communications infrastructure repair crews and
their contracted workers to access the impacted area post~ -disaster.°’ For important safety and

“ See Comments by William L. Smith, BellSouth, Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter “Smith-BellSouth Jan.
30 Written Statement”).

6 ig

® See, e.g, Comments of Robert G. Bailey, National Emergency Number Association, Harris County
Emergency Communications, at | (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter “Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony”).

$1 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corp., Before the
FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 188 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
“§mith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony”); see also Statement of Jim Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network
Group, Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 125 (Jan. 30, 2006)



iii.

iv.

Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks

Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Waiver of number portability requirements to allow rerouting of traffic to
switches unaffected by the crisis.

Waiver of reporting filings, such as Form 477 on local competition and
broadband data, during the crisis.

Wireless.

i.

iii.

Waiver of amateur radio and license exempt rules permitting
transmissions necessary to meet essential communications needs.

Waiver of application filing deadlines (e.g., renewals, construction
notifications, discontinuance notices, efc.), construction requirements, and
discontinuance of service requirements.

Streamlined STA process, such that parties in the affected area may
simply notify the FCC in writing or verbally of a need to operate in order
to restore service.

Broadcast and Cable.

vii.

viii.

Waiver of non-commercial educational (“NCE”) rules to permit NCE
television and radio stations in the affected area to simulcast and
rebroadcast commercial station programming during a crisis.

Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of use of emergency
antennas within 24 hours.

Waiver of limits on AM nighttime operations, so long as operation is
conducted on a noncommercial basis.

Waiver of rules on limited and discontinued operations.

Tolling of broadcast station construction deadlines.

Automatic STAs, or STAs granted through written or oral notification, for
broadcast stations to go silent.

Waiver of restrictions on simulcast programming of commonly owned
stations within the same band.

Waiver of location and staffing requirements of a main studio within the
community.

Waiver of activation and post-event Section 73.1250 reporting
requirements related to transmission of point-to-point communications
during a declared emergency.

Satellite.

ii.

Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of use of emergency
antenna equipment within 24 hours.

Streamlined STA process for satellite operators responding to a declared
emergency.

Pre-positioning for Government Outage Monitoring — A Single Repository and Contact
with Consistent Data Collection — The FCC should coordinate with other federal and
state agencies to identify a single repository/point of contact for communications outage
information in the wake of an emergency. The Panel suggests that the FCC is the federal
agency best situated to perform this function. The FCC should work with affected



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks (“Katrina Panel” or “Panel”) hereby submits its report to the Federal Communications
Commission (“Commission” or “FCC”). The Panel is charged with studying the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications and media infrastructure in the areas affected by
the hurricane and making recommendations for improving disaster preparedness, network
reliability and communications among first responders.

FINDINGS

Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on the Gulf Coast region, including its
communications networks. The sheer force of this deadly hurricane and the extensive flooding
from the breached levees in New Orleans severely tested the reliability and resiliency of the
communications infrastructure in the area. Indeed, every sector of the communications industry
was impacted by the storm. The Panel observed that most of the region’s communications
infrastructure fared fairly well through the storm’s extreme wind and rain, with the coastal areas
suffering the worst damage. However, the unique conditions in Katrina’s aftermath — substantial
flooding, widespread, extended power outages, and serious security issues — were responsible for
damaging or disrupting communications service to a huge geographic area for a prolonged
period of time. Indeed, in reviewing the impact on each communications sector, there appeared
to be three main problems that caused the majority of communications network interruptions:
(1) flooding; (2) lack of power and/or fuel; and (3) failure of redundant pathways for
communications traffic. In addition, a fourth item — inadvertent line cuts during restoration —
resulted in additional network damage, causing new outages or delaying service restoration.

The Panel also observed significant impediments to the recovery effort resulting from:
e Inconsistent and unclear requirements for communications infrastructure repair crews and
their subcontractors to gain access to the affected area;
¢ Limited access to power and/or generator fuel;
¢ Limited security for communications infrastructure and personnel;
e Lack of pre-positioned back-up equipment;

¢ Lack of established coordination between the communications industry and state and
local officials as well as among federal, state and local government officials with respect
to communications matters; and

¢ Limited use of available priority communications services, such as GETS, WPS and TSP.

On a more positive note, in the wake of the storm, lines of communication between the
communications industry and the federal government were established and seemed generally
effective in facilitating coordination, promptly granting needed regulatory relief, and gathering
outage information. The FCC was widely praised as playing a critical role in helping to restore
communications connectivity. In addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of fuel and equipment
among communications industry participants helped to maximize the assets available and bolster



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

also appeared to suffer from lack of interoperability. In some cases, the military was reduced
to using human runners to physically carry messages between deployed units and first
responders.'** In another case, a military helicopter had to drop a message in a bottle to warn
first responders about a dangerous gas leak, !35

While most observers characterized “operability” as the primary communications failure
following Katrina,'*° increased ability to interoperate with other agencies would have provided
greater redundant communications paths and a more coordinated response. While technological
solutions, such as IP gateways to integrate frequencies across multiple bands,'*” are a critical tool
for improving interoperability, the Panel was reminded that technology is not the sole driver of
an optimal solution.'** Training, agreement on standard operating procedures, governance or
leadership and proper usage are all critical elements of the interoperability continuum.'?
However, the Panel heard testimony that Project SAFECOM, which is intended to provide a
solution for interoperability among Federal, state and local officials, will take years to achieve its
objectives.'*° However, the Panel is also aware of more expedient proposals, such as the M/A-
COM, Inc. proposal to mandate construction of all Federal and non-Federal mutual aid channels
to provide baseline interoperability to all emergency responders that operate across multiple
frequency bands using disparate technologies. '“!

'3 See Written Statement of Dr. William W. Pinsky on behalf of the American Hospital Association, The State
of Interoperable Communications: Perspectives from the Field, Before the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives,
at 5 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyPinsky.pdf.

134

See, e.g., Written Statement of The Honorable Timothy J. Roemer, Director, Center for National Policy,
Public Safety Communications From 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of
Representatives, at 5 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at

http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/hearings/09292005 Hearing 1648/Roemer.pdf (describing the use of human
couriers by the National Guard).

‘85 Heather Greenfield, Katrina Revealed Gaps In Emergency Response System, THE WASH. TIMES, Dec. 28,
2005, at B1, available at http://washingtontimes.com/metro/2005 1227-095 134-3753r.htm.

‘36 The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 55; Saussy Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 44.

1357 See, e.g., Presentation to the Meeting of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina
on Communications Networks, Dr. John Vaughan, Vice President TYCO Electronics: M/A-COM, March 6, 2006;
see also Presentation to the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Wesley D. Smith, Technical Director, ARINC (Mar. 7, 2006).

'38 See Interoperability Continuum Brochure, Project Safecom, Dept. of Homeland Security (April 5, 2005),
available at hitp:/www.safecomprogram.gow/NR/rdonlyres/5C103F66-A36E-4DD1-A00A-
34C477B47AF

BO Id. at 4,

'40 Oral Testimony of Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of SAFECOM, Dept. of Homeland Security, Tr. at 29-30
(Apr. 18, 2006); see also Stephen Losey, Defense re-examines homeland role, tactics, Federal Times.com (Oct. 18,
2005), available at http://www federaltimes.com/index.php?S=1174164,

‘| See Further Comments of M/A-Com, Inc. (May 30, 2006).

26



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

addition, in New Orleans and the surrounding area, only 4 of the 41 broadcast radio stations
remained on the air in the wake of the hurricane.®! Some broadcasters continued broadcasting
only by partnering with other broadcasters whose signals were not interrupted.” Broadcasters
reported very few tower losses as a result of Katrina. Instead, the wind displacing and causing
misaligning antennas was the biggest cause of broadcast outages. Although this type of damage
could be readily repaired, the lengthy power outages — which substantially exceeded back-up
generator capabilities — prevented many broadcast stations from coming back on the air. Power
outages at the viewer/listener end were also an issue as they prevented broadcast transmissions
from being successfully received. Additionally, the lack of security for broadcast facilities and
repair personnel impeded recovery efforts. Nevertheless, within three weeks after Katrina, more
than 90 percent of broadcasters were up and running in the affected region.”> However, in the
areas most impacted by the storm, the vast majority of stations remained down much longer.

8. Cable. As with the broadcasting industry, cable companies in the region
reported limited infrastructure damage to their head ends following Katrina. In the areas hardest
hit by the storm itself, aerial cable infrastructure was heavily damaged. Some cable facilities are
underground; the storm’s wind and rain had only minimal effects on them. However, the
opposite was true in areas where the levees’ breach caused heavy flooding. There, underground
facilities were heavily damaged and the electronics in those facilities were generally completely
lost. The cable industry indicated that new cable plants generally allowed for multiple points of
failure and system workarounds that permitted the network to operate in spite of some
widespread faults in the infrastructure. However, lack of power to cable facilities and security
proved to be key problems. The cable operator serving New Orleans indicated that, even where
its network was intact, lack of power/fuel prevented it from restoring operations in those areas.
Also, similar to broadcasting, power outages at the viewer end prevented cable programming
from being successfully received.

9. Utilities. Electric utility networks (including utility-owned commercial
wireless networks) appeared to have a high rate of survivability following Katrina. These
communications systems did not have a significant rate of failure because: (1) the systems were
designed to remain intact to aid restoration of electric service following a significant storm event;
(2) they were built with significant onsite back-up power supplies (batteries and generators); (3)
last mile connections to tower sites and the backbone transport are typically owned by the utility

Commerce, Science, and Transportation at 2 (Sept. 22, 2005) (an estimated 100 broadcast stations were knocked off
the air).

5! Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.

2 Oral Testimony of Dave Vincent, Station Manager, WLOX-TV, Before the FCC’s Independent Panel

Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Tr. at 309 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
“Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Oral Testimony”] (WLOX in Biloxi partnered with WXXV in Gulfport, Mississippi,
which carried WLOX’s signal until they could get back on the air).

3 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45.

4 See, e.g, Comments of Greg Bicket, Cox Communications, at | (Jan. 27, 2006).

55 See, e.g., UTC Comments, Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure

Communications Networks, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2006).



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

area still running on backup generators.”* Most communications providers also did not appear to
be able to access any government fuel reserves.

On a positive note, several companies apparently shared their reserve fuel with other
communications providers who needed it, even their competitors.” This sharing occurred on a
purely ad hoc basis.®° There did not appear to be any forum or coordination area for fostering
industry sharing of fuel or other equipment.

3. Security. Limited security for key communications facilities and
communications infrastructure repair crews also hampered the recovery effort.*' Security
concerns, both actual and perceived, led to delays in the restoration of communications
networks.*? Communications providers reported generators being stolen from key facilities,
even if they were bolted down. Lack of security for communications infrastructure repair
workers at times delayed their access to certain facilities to make repairs.* Some providers
employed their own security crews. However, obtaining credentials to allow these individuals
to access the affected area was sometimes a problem. Further, communications infrastructure
repair crews generally did not receive security details from law enforcement. Clearly, law
enforcement had other very significant responsibilities in the wake of Katrina. In addition,
communications providers are apparently not considered “ emergency responders” under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act® and the National Response
Plan and thus are not eligible to receive non-monetary Federal assistance, like security protection
for critical facilities and repair personnel.*° In one instance, however, a major communications
provider successfully sought governmental security for its Poydras St. office in New Orleans,
which serves as a regional hub for multiple telecommunications carriers. Both the Louisiana

78 See Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.

® — See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 312 (describing how the radio station shared

fuel with a nearby news organization).

8 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Steve Davis, Senior Vice President of Engineering, Clear Channel Radio,

Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 81-82 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter “Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan 30 Oral Testimony”.

81 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4.

82 The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 40, available at

http://www. whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/.

8 Jan. 31 NSTAC Report at 5.

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (when government security proved unavailable, many
telecommunications providers hired private security to protect their workers and supplies); Written Statement of
Dave Flessas, Vice President for Network Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp., Before the FCC’s Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 2 (Jan. 30, 2006) (security issues forced Sprint to hire armored
guards to protect its employees and contractors); Jan. 31 NSTAC Report at 5.

5 Pub, L. No. 93-288, as amended [hereinafter “Stafford Act”].

8 See, e.g., Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at 9; Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
125; see also Oral Testimony of Captain Thomas Wetherald, Deputy Operations Director, National Communications
System, Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 24 (Apr. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter “Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony].



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

personnel available to remedy the outages). The flooding also wiped out transportation options,
preventing fuel for generators from getting where it needed to be.

2. Power and Fuel. Katrina caused extensive damage to the power grid.
Significant portions of electrical facilities in Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana — including
both power lines and electric plants — were severely impaired due to wind and flooding. Asa
result, power to support the communications networks was generally unavailable throughout the
region.” This meant that, for communications systems to continue to operate, backup batteries
and generators were required. While the communications industry has generally been diligent in
deploying backup batteries and generators and ensuring that these systems have one to two days
of fuel or charge, not all locations had them installed. Furthermore, not all locations were able to
exercise and test the backup equipment in any systemic fashion. Thus, some generators and
batteries did not function during the crisis. Where generators were installed and operational, the
fuel was generally exhausted prior to restoration of power. Finally, flooding, shortages of fuel
and restrictions on access to the affected area made refueling extraordinarily difficult." In some
instances, fuel was confiscated by federal or local authorities when it was brought into the
Katrina region.”

3. Redundant pathways. The switches that failed, especially tandems, had
widespread effects on a broad variety of communications in and out of the Katrina region. In
addition, TI and other leased lines were heavily used by the communications networks
throughout the region, with those failures leading to loss of service. As an example, a major
tandem switch in New Orleans was isolated, which meant that no communications from parts of
New Orleans to outside the region could occur. This switch, an access tandem that carried long
distance traffic through New Orleans and out to other offices, had two major routes out of the
city (one to the east and one to the west). The eastern route was severed by a barge that came
ashore during the hurricane and cut the aerial fiber associated with the route. If only this route
had been lost, the access tandem traffic could have continued. However, the western route was
also severed — initially by large trees falling across aerial cables, then subsequently by
construction crews removing debris from highway rights-of-way. While there were provisions
for rerouting traffic out of the city, the simultaneous loss of both of these major paths
significantly limited communications service in parts of New Orleans.

4. Line cuts. During the restoration process following Katrina, there were
numerous instances of fiber lines cut accidentally by parties seeking to restore power, phone, and
cable, remove trees and other debris, and engage in similar restoration activities. BellSouth
indicated in its comments to the Katrina Panel that several of its major routes were cut multiple

© House Report. at 166.

S| Id. at 164.

® See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (citing Committee staff interview of William Smith, Chief
Technology Officer, BellSouth, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006) (FEMA commandeered communications fuel reserves
in order to refuel helicopters).

® See, e.g., Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 66 (Mar. 6, 2006).



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Cc. PSAP Rerouting.

When a PSAP becomes disabled, 911 emergency calls from the public are typically diverted to a
secondary neighboring PSAP using preconfigured traffic routes. In many cases, Katrina disabled
both the primary and secondary PSAPs, which resulted in many unanswered emergency calls.
Additionally, many PSAPs in Louisiana did not have protocols in place to identify where 91 1
calls should go and had not arranged for any rerouting, resulting in dropped emergency calls."
The Panel heard testimony that Katrina has highlighted a need to identify additional back-up
PSAPs at remote locations. However, FCC regulations may currently restrict the ability of local
phone companies to establish pre-configured routes across LATA boundaries.'*? In addition, the
routing of calls to more distant PSAPs would require specific planning to ensure appropriate and
timely response to emergency calls.

42

D. Emergency Medical Communications.

There are indications that the emergency medical community was lacking in contingency
communications planning and information about technologies and services that might address
their critical communications needs.'* In particular, this group of first responders did not seem
to avail itself of existing priority communications services, such as GETS, WPS and TSP. It also
appeared that emergency medical personnel were not always integrated into a locality’s public
safety communications planning.

IV. Emergency Communications to the Public.

The communications infrastructure, in all of its forms, is a key asset in delivering information to
the American public. In emergencies and disaster situations, ensuring public safety is the first
priority. The use of communications networks to disseminate reliable and relevant information
to the public is critical — before, during and after such events. Moreover, to the extent a more
well-informed citizenry is better able to prepare for and respond to disasters, there should be less
strain on already taxed resources, thereby benefiting recovery efforts.

The Emergency Alert System (“EAS”) and its predecessor systems have long made use of
broadcast radio and television stations as the principal tools for communicating with the public
about emergencies and disaster situations. The Panel heard stories of heroic efforts by
broadcasters and cable operators to provide members of the public impacted by Katrina with
important storm-related information. However, there were also reports of missed opportunities
to utilize the EAS and limitations in existing efforts to deliver emergency information to all
members of the public. New technologies may address some of these limitations by facilitating
the provision of both macro- and micro-level information about impending disasters and
recovery efforts.

42

House Report at 173.

3 Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony at 3.

14g

See House Report at 269.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

centers that route calls and to the lines used to connect buildings and customers to the network.?*
Katrina highlighted the dependence on tandems and tandem access to SS7 switches.”” The high
volume routes from tandem switches, especially in and around New Orleans were especially
critical and vulnerable. Katrina highlighted the need for diversity of call routing and avoiding
strict reliance upon a single routing solution. One tandem switch, which was critical for 911 call
routing, was lost from September 4 to September 21. This switch went down due to flooding
that did not allow for fuel to be replenished. Due to the high winds and severe flooding, there
were multiple breaks in the fiber network supporting the PSTN. Katrina demonstrated that in
many areas there may be a lack of multiple fiber routes throughout the wireline network and that
aerial fiber was more at risk than underground fiber. As with other private sector
communications providers, lack of access to facilities (due to both flooding and inadequate
credentialing), lack of commercial power, and lack of security greatly hampered recovery efforts.
Nevertheless, ten days after Katrina, nearly 90 percent of wireline customers in the Gulf region
who had lost service had their service restored.” However, the vast majority of these customers
were in the less impacted regions of the Gulf; regions that were harder hit sustained more
infrastructure damage and continued to have difficulty in restoring service.

4. Cellular/PCS. Local cellular and personal communications service
(“PCS”) networks received considerable damage with more than 1000 base station sites
impacted? ' In general, cellular/PCS base stations were not destroyed by Katrina, although some
antennas required adjustment after the storm. Rather, the majority of the adverse effects and
outages encountered by wireless providers were due to a lack of commercial power or a lack of
transport connectivity to the wireless switch (wireline T1 line lost or fixed microwave backhaul
offline). The transport connectivity is generally provided by the local exchange carrier. With
either failure, wireless providers would be required to make a site visit to return the base station
to operational status. Wireless providers cited security for their personnel, access and fuel as the
most pressing needs and problems affecting restoration of wireless service. However, within one
week after Katrina, approximately 80 percent of wireless cell sites were up and running.
Consistent with other systems, the 20 percent of base stations still affected were in the areas most
impacted by Katrina. Cellular base stations on wheels (“COWs”) were successfully used as
needed to restore service throughout the affected region. Over 100 COWs were delivered to the
Gulf Coast region.» In addition to voice services, text messaging was used successfully during

Representatives, at 2 (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fec.gov/edocs, public/attachmatch/DOC-
260895A L pdf [hereinafter “Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement”].

% Id, at 2-3.

® See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Woody Glover, Director, St. Tammany Parish Communications District, Tr. at
64-67 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony”].

Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 43.

Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.

32 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 44.

S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong., Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still

Unprepared at 18-4, May 2006, available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/ files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf [hereinafter
“Senate Report on Katrina”.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

INTRODUCTION

The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks (“Katrina Panel” or “Panel”) hereby submits its report to the Federal Communications
Commission (“Commission” or “FCC”). The Panel is charged with studying the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications and media infrastructure! in the areas affected by
the hurricane. As directed by the Commission, this report presents the Panel’s findings as well
as recommendations for improving disaster preparedness, network reliability and
communications among first responders.

IL Panel Formation and Charge

On September 15, 2005, FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin announced that he would establish an
independent expert panel to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the communications
infrastructure.? Chairman Martin made the announcement at the FCC’s Open Meeting focusing
on the effects of Hurricane Katrina, which was held in Atlanta, Georgia. He stated that the Panel
would be composed of public safety and communications industry representatives.> The twenty-
seven members of the Panel, reflecting that diverse composition, are identified in Appendix A.
Chairman Martin appointed Nancy J. Victory of Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, the former
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and Administrator of the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, to chair the Panel.*

In accordance with the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the FCC published
a notice announcing the establishment of the Katrina Panel in the Federal Register on January 6,
2006.5 The Panel’s charter details the Katrina Panel’s objectives and the scope of its activity.°
Specifically, the Charter directs the Panel:

' Throughout this report, the terms “communications infrastructure” and “communications networks” are

intended to refer to both telecommunications (e.g., telephony, wireless, satellite, WISP) and media (e.g., radio,
television, cable) infrastructure. “Communications providers” is intended to refer to the operators of these networks.

2 Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Open Meeting on the

Effects of Hurricane Katrina, Atlanta, GA, at 3 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at

http://hraunfoss. fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-26 1095A 1 .pdf [hereinafter “Martin Sept. 15 Statement”];
see also FCC Takes Steps to Assist in Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief, 2005 FCC LEXIS 5109 (rel. Sept. 15,
2005) (Commission news release).

3 Martin Sept. 15 Statement at 3.

4 Chairman Kevin J. Martin Names Nancy J. Victory as Chair of the Federal Communication Commission's

Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 2005 FCC
LEXIS 6514 (rel. Nov. 28, 2005) (Commission news release).

5 See Federal Communications Commission, Federal Advisory Committee Act, Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 933

(Jan. 6, 2006), available at http://www.fec.gov/eb/hkip/hkipnoe.pdf. Access to the public comments filed with and
notices generated by the Katrina Panel (unless otherwise noted with a URL designation in the citations which
follow) is through the Panel’s website, available at hitp://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

employees to support their customers.''” Similarly, M/A-Com supported the restoration and
maintenance of the New Orleans 800 MHz system as well as the systems for Mobile, Biloxi,
Gulfport, and St. Tammany Parish.''® Reports indicate that these efforts with established
vendors were generally well-executed, except for problems with access into New Orleans.

However, the Panel was made aware of a variety of non-traditional, alternative technologies that
could have served as effective, back-up communications for public safety until their primary
systems were repaired. As noted in Section I, satellite infrastructure was generally unaffected by
the storm and could have provided a viable back-up system. Two-way paging operations
remained generally operational during the storm and did provide communications capabilities for
some police, fire emergency medical personnel, but could have been more widely utilized.''?
Other types of non-traditional technology that can be deployed quickly, such as WiFi and
WiMax, or self-contained communications vehicles, could also have been effectively utilized.
These all appear deserving of exploration as back-up communications options to primary public
safety systems.

First responders’ lack of training on alternative, back-up communications equipment was also an
impediment in the recovery effort.'2° This lack of training may have accounted for a sizeable
number of communications failures during the first 48 hours after Katrina.'?! Public safety
officials noted that that there was little time after Katrina to investigate the capabilities of new
technologies for which none of their personnel had been adequately trained. This highlights the
need for public safety entities to have contingency communications plans with training as a key
component. The lack of training issue evidenced itself in particular with the distribution of
satellite phones. These phones proved to be a beneficial resource to some, while others
described the service as spotty and capacity strained. In many cases, it appears that complaints
about spotty coverage really resulted from the user’s lack of understanding about how to use the
phone (e.g., some satellite phones have a unique dialing pattern and they generally do not work
indoors).'*? However, the uncontrolled distribution of satellite phones could also have triggered
capacity issues in certain areas.'* Additionally, public safety officials reminded the Panel that
users must be properly trained before they can be expected to competently use technologies
during high stress events.'

"7 Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement at 2.

"8 Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).

19 Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 7-9; Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 122-23.

20 See, e.g., Written Statement of James Monroe III, Chief Executive Officer, Globalstar LLC, Before the
FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina at 4 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “Monroe-
Globalstar Written Statement”] (some first responders failed to keep handset batteries charged, others did not realize
that satellite phones require a clear line of sight between the handset and the satellite).

2h ag
"22. Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 4-5.

"3 See Report of Ed Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire Department, Hurricane Katrina Independent Panel
Meeting, at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter “Written Report of Ed Smith”].

'4 See, e.g., Scholl Oral Testimony, Tr. at 57-58, 61-62.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

2. Industry — State and Local Government Coordination. In general,
coordination between communications providers and state and local government officials in the
affected region for communications network recovery purposes did not appear to exist except on
an ad hoc basis. For the most part, there did not appear to be in existence any organized
mechanism for communications providers to share information with local officials or to seek
their assistance with respect to specific recovery issues, like access and fuel. Following Katrina,
the Panel heard that state and local government representatives were exchanging business cards
with communications providers in their area for the first time. Local government officials noted
that they sometimes did not know where to turn to figure out why communications to and from
key government locations did not work and how to express their priorities for communications
service restoration. In addition, coordinating credentialing, access, fuel sharing, security and
other key recovery efforts was difficult because there were no identified staging areas or
coordination points for the communications industry.

3. Federal Government — State and Local Government Coordination. The
Panel is not aware of pre-established mechanisms through which the federal government
coordinated with state and local governments concerning communications network restoration
issues in the wake of Katrina. For example, the Panel heard that civilian public safety officials
were often unable to communicate with military officials brought in to assist local law
enforcement. In addition, state and local governments are not a part of the NCC” and, therefore,
were not able to directly coordinate with that industry-federal government group. As noted
above, and due in part to a lack of pre-arranged recovery procedures, state and local government
officials did not seem to be part of communications network recovery efforts. This meant that
their restoration priorities may not have been effectively conveyed to communications providers
and that communications providers did not have an identified place to turn for assistance with
access and other recovery issues.

Cc. Emergency Communications Services and Programs.

The federal government, through the NCS, has established several programs for priority
communications services during and following an emergency.'® These are the Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service (“GETS”), which enables an eligible user to get
priority call completion for wireline telephone calls; the Wireless Priority Service (“WPS”),
which enables an eligible user to get access to the next free channel when making a wireless call;
and Telecommunications Service Priority (“TSP”), which enables a qualifying user to get
priority restoration and provisioning of telecommunications services. °! During and after
Katrina, these priority services seemed to work well for those who subscribed to them.
However, only a small percentage of those eligible for the services appeared to do so. This is
particularly true of public safety users — many eligible public safety entities have not signed up
for these services. It also appears to be true for some communications providers, including

°° See May 10 NSTAC Report at 3.
100 See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 18.

101 See, e.g., Written Statement of Dr. Peter Fonash, Deputy Manager, National Communications System, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs, Hearing on Managing Law Enforcement and Communications ina
Catastrophe at 3-4 (Feb. 6, 2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.zov/ files/020606F onash.pdf.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon its observations regarding the impact of Hurricane Katrina on communications
networks and the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort, the Panel has developed a
number of recommendations to the FCC for improving disaster preparedness, network reliability
and communications among first responders. These recommendations fall within four basic

areas:

>

Pre-positioning the communications industry and the government for disasters in order
to achieve greater network reliability and resiliency. These recommendations include:

Pre-positioning for the Communications Industry—A Readiness Checklist. The FCC
should work with and encourage each industry sector, through their organizations or
associations, to develop and publicize sector-specific readiness recommendations.

Pre-positioning for Public Safety — An Awareness Program for Non-Traditional
Emergency Alternatives. The FCC should take steps to educate the public safety
community about the availability and capabilities of non-traditional technologies that
might provide effective back-up solutions for existing public safety communications
systems.

Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory Requirements ~ An A Priori Program for
Disaster Areas. The FCC should explore amending its rules to permit automatic
grants of certain types of waivers or special temporary authority (STA) in a particular
geographic area if the President declares that area to be a "disaster area".

Pre-positioning for Government Outage Monitoring — A Single Repository and
Contact with Consistent Data Collection. The FCC should coordinate with other
federal and state agencies to identify a single repository/point of contact for
communications outage information in the wake of an emergency. The Panel
suggests that the FCC is the federal agency best situated to perform this function.

Improving recovery coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize the
use of existing resources. These recommendations include:

Remedying Existing Shortcomings — National Credentialing Guidelines for
Communications Infrastructure Providers. The FCC should work with other
appropriate federal departments and agencies and the communications industry to
promptly develop national credentialing requirements and process guidelines for
enabling communications infrastructure providers and their contracted workers access
to the affected area post-disaster.

Remedying Existing Shortcomings — Emergency Responder Status for
Communications Infrastructure Providers. The Panel supports the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s (“NSTAC’s”) recommendation that
telecommunications infrastructure providers and their contracted workers be afforded
emergency responder status under the Stafford Act, but recommends that it be
broadened to include all communications infrastructure providers.

ili



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

the recovery effort. However, additional coordination of personnel and assets within industry
and among government agencies could have substantially facilitated restoration of
communications networks.

With respect to emergency communications, Hurricane Katrina significantly hampered the
functionality of these typically resilient systems. The areas in and around New Orleans were
seriously impacted, due to heavier storm impact and the levee flooding. As a result, more than
2,000 police, fire and emergency medical service personnel were forced to communicate in
single channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing only three mutual aid frequencies. This level of
destruction did not extend to inland areas, which generally did not lose their communications
capabilities and were soon operating at pre-Katrina capabilities. In the hardest hit areas,
however, the disruption of public safety communications operability, as well as a lack of
interoperability, frustrated the response effort and caused tremendous confusion among official
personnel and the general public.

The Panel observed that lack of effective first responder communications after the storm
revealed inadequate planning, coordination and training on the use of technologies that can help
to restore emergency communications. Very few public safety agencies had stockpiles of key
equipment on hand to implement rapid repairs or alternative, redundant systems to turn to when
their primary systems failed. To the extent alternative systems were available, lack of training
and familiarity with the equipment limited functionality and impeded the recovery effort.
Communications assets that could have been used to fill gaps were apparently not requested or
deployed in sufficient quantities to have a significant impact. Hurricane Katrina also highlighted
the long-standing problem of interoperability among public safety communications systems
operating in different frequency bands and with different technical standards. Additionally, 911
emergency call handling suffered from a lack of preprogrammed routing of calls to PSAPs not
incapacitated by the hurricane. Finally, the emergency medical community seemed lacking in
contingency communications planning and information about technologies and services that
might address their critical communications needs.

The use of communications networks to disseminate reliable emergency information to the
public is critical — before, during and after such events. While the Panel understands that the
National Weather Service used the Emergency Alert System (“EAS”) to provide severe weather
warnings to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of Katrina making landfall, the system was
apparently not utilized by state and local officials to provide localized emergency evacuation and
other important information. In the absence of EAS activation, inconsistent or erroneous
information was sometimes provided within the affected area. Further, the Panel heard about
notification technologies that may permit emergency messages to be sent to wireline and
wireless telephones as well as personal digital assistants and other mobile devices, thus
complementing the traditional broadcast-based EAS. Ensuring emergency communications
reach Americans with hearing or visual disabilities or who do not speak English was a major
challenge. Although the broadcast industry has taken significant steps to provide on-screen sign
language interpreters, closed captioning, and critical information in a second language, these
steps were reported to be insufficient in certain instances. Shelters also generally did not have
communications capabilities for those with hearing or speech disabilities.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

the crisis and appeared to offer communications when the voice networks became overloaded
with traffic. Additionally, wireless providers’ push-to-talk services appeared to be more resilient
than interconnected voice service inasmuch as they do not necessarily rely upon connectivity to
the PSTN.

5. Paging. Paging systems seemed more reliable in some instances than
voice/cellular systems because paging systems utilize satellite networks, rather than terrestrial
systems, for backbone infrastructure.*° Paging technology is also inherently redundant, which
means that messages may still be relayed if a single transmitter or group of transmitters in a
network fails.*° Paging signals penetrate buildings very well, thus providing an added level of
reliability.” Additionally, pagers benefited from having a long battery life and thus remained
operating longer during the power outages.*® Other positive observations concerning paging
systems included that they were effective at text messaging and were equipped to provide
broadcast messaging.°” Finally, although it is unclear whether this function was utilized, group
pages can be sent out during times of emergencies to alert thousands of pager units all at the
same time.“°

6. Satellite. Satellite networks appeared to be the communications service
least disrupted by Hurricane Katrina.*' As these networks do not heavily depend upon
terrestrial-based infrastructure, they are typically not affected by wind, rain, flooding or power

42 . : . :
outages.” As a result, both fixed and mobile satellite systems provided a functional, alternative

See Written Testimony of Dave Flessas, VP, Network Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp, Before the FCC’s

Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 3 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter “Sprint Nextel Jan.
30 Written Testimony”).

35 See, e.g., Written Testimony of Vincent D. Kelly, President and Chief Executive Officer, USA Mobility,

Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina at 7 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
“Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony”); Oral Testimony of Bruce Deer, President, American
Association of Paging Carriers, Tr. at 122-123 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony”].

See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 7-8.
*7 Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.

8% Id.
See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 3.
40

See, e.g., Comments of Interstate Wireless, Inc., at | (May 10, 2006).

4! See, e.g., Comments of Globalstar LLC, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter “Globalstar Comments”].

2 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9 (“satellite phones do not rely on terrestrial . . . infrastructure that

is necessary for land mobile radio, land-line, and cellular communications”); Written Statement of Tony Trujillo,
Chairman, Satellite Industry Association, Hearing on Public Safety Communications From 9/11 to Katrina: Critical
Public Policy Lessons, Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/09292005Hearing 1648/Trujillo.pdf [hereinafter “Trujillo Sept. 29 Written
Statement”.

10



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

© Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons Learned — A Plan for Resiliency and
Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and Public Safety Answering Points (“PSAPs”).
The FCC should encourage implementation of certain Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council (“NRIC”) best practice recommendations to ensure more
robust E-911 service. In addition, the FCC should recommend and take steps to
permit the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP more than 200 miles away, as
well as urge applicable federal programs to expand eligibility for 911
enhancement/interoperability grants.

¢ Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons Learned Concerning Emergency Medical and
Hospital Communications Needs — An Outreach Program to Educate and Include the
Emergency Medical Community in Emergency Communications Preparedness. The
FCC should work to assist the emergency medical community to facilitate the
resiliency and effectiveness of their emergency communications systems through
education and clarification of Stafford Act classification and funding eligibility.

> Improving communication of emergency information to the public. These
recommendations include:

© Actions to Alert and Inform — Revitalize and Publicize the Underutilized Emergency
Alert System. The FCC should revitalize and publicize the underutilized EAS through
education and the exploration of complementary notification technologies.

¢ Actions to Alert and Inform — Commence Efforts to Ensure that Persons with
Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans Receive Meaningful Alerts. The
FCC should commence efforts to ensure that persons with disabilities and non-
English-speaking Americans receive meaningful alerts, including resolving technical
hurdles to these individual’s utilization of EAS, publicizing best practices for serving
these individuals, and encouraging state and local emergency agencies to make
critical emergency information accessible to persons with disabilities and non-
English-speaking Americans.

© Actions to Alert and Inform — Ensure Consistent and Reliable Emergency Information
Through a Consolidated and Coordinated Public Information Program. The FCC
should work with federal, state and local agencies to ensure consistent and reliable
emergency information through a consolidated and coordinated public information
program.

ee RR OK

The Katrina Panel commends Chairman Martin and the Commission for their actions to assist
industry and first responders before, during and after Hurricane Katrina and for forming this
Panel to identify steps to be taken to enhance readiness and recovery in the future. The Panel
hopes that its observations and recommendations prove useful to the Commission and assist our
Nation in preparing for and responding to future hurricanes and any other disasters that might lay
ahead for us.



independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

security reasons, law enforcement personnel set up a perimeter around much of the impacted
region and imposed restrictions on who could access the area. Communications infrastructure
repair crews from all sectors of the industry had great difficulty crossing the perimeter to access
their facilities in need of repair.®* This seemed to be a particular problem for smaller or non-
traditional communications companies,” who tended to have lower levels of name recognition
with law enforcement personnel guarding the perimeter.

Although some jurisdictions provided credentials to communications infrastructure repair crews
to permit them to access the affected area, the process appeared to be unique for each local
jurisdiction. Communications providers reported t that credentials that permitted access through
one checkpoint would not be honored at another.”” In many cases, different checkpoints required
different documentation and credentialing before permitting access.”' Asa result, repair crews
needed to carry multiple credentials and letters from various federal, state and local officials.”
There was no uniform credentialing method in place whereby one type of credential would
permit access at any checkpoint.’ Communications providers were also not clear about which
agency had authority to issue the necessary credentials.“ And there did not appear to be any
mechanism in place for issuing credentials to those who needed them prior to Katrina making
landfall.

Once communications infrastructure repair crews gained access to the impacted area, they had no
guarantee they would be allowed to remain there. The enforcement of curfews and other security
procedures at times interrupted repair work and required communications restoration crews to
exit the area. In at least one instance, law enforcement personnel insisted that communications

[hereinafter “Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony”]; Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at 9; Comments of M/A-
Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).

See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (repair workers sometimes had difficulty gaining access to their

equipment and facilities because the police and National Guard refused to let crews enter the affected area); Federal
Support to Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers in National Emergencies: Designation as “Emergency
Responders (Private Sector)”, The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee,
Legislative and Regulatory Task Force, at 7 (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter “Jan. 31 NSTAC Report”].

© See, e.g., Comments of the Satellite Industry Association at 6 (January 27, 2006) (describing how satellite
system repair crews had difficulty obtaining access to the impacted area); Comments of Xspedius Communications,
LLC, at 2, 6 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “Comments of Xspedius”].

7 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (citing Committee staff interview of Christopher Guttman-
McCabe, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006) (industry representatives said that
their technicians would benefit from having uniform credentialing that is recognized by the multiple law
enforcement agencies operating in a disaster area).

1 See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 5 (stating that a credential that permitted access
in one county was sometimes not honored in a different county).

” See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 2-3.

7 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at Findings at 8 (efforts by private sector to restore communications

efforts were hampered by the fact that the government did not provide uniform credentials to gain access to affected
areas).

TM See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.

16



wri}

1776 K STREET NW
WASHINGTON, OC 20006
PHONE 202.719.7000
FAX 202.719.7049

Virginia Office
7925 JONES BRANCH DRIVE
SUITE 6200

McLEAN, VA 22102

PHONE 703.905.2800

FAX 703.905.2820

www.wrf.com

aS

Wiley Rein & Fielding te

June 12, 2006 sary ony

nvictory@wrf.com

Chairman Kevin J. Martin

Federal Communications Commission
445 Twelfth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20554

Re: Report and Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In January of this year, under your leadership, the Commission established the
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks (“Katrina Panel” or “Panel”). The Panel was charged with (1) studying
the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications and media
infrastructure, including public safety communications; (2) reviewing the
sufficiency of the recovery effort with respect to this infrastructure; and (3) making
recommendations for improving disaster preparedness, network reliability and
communication among first responders in the future. The Panel was directed to
complete its report by June 15, 2006.

As the Chair of the Katrina Panel, I am pleased to submit the Panel’s Report and
Recommendations to the Commission (“Report”). The Panel members have
brought to bear a broad background of public safety and industry experiences,
including first-hand knowledge of the devastation wrought by Katrina. After five
months of hard work, and the review of oral and written submissions by interested
parties, the Panel unanimously approved the Report at our final meeting on June 9,
2006.

On behalf of the members of the Katrina Panel, I would like to thank the
Commission for forming the Panel and giving all of us the opportunity to contribute
to its important work. I have also been extremely honored to chair this Panel and to
work with so many dedicated individuals, including several personally affected by
Katrina’s devastation. My colleagues on the Panel and I hope that the findings and
recommendations set forth in the Report will provide a foundation for actions to



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Work with the NTIA and DHS to develop strategies and policies to expedite
allowing Federal (including the military), state and local agencies to share
spectrum for emergency response purposes, particularly the Federal incident
response channels and channels established for mutual aid and interoperability.

Publicize interoperability successes and/or best practices by public safety entities
to serve as models to further interoperability.

Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons Learned — A Plan for Resiliency and
Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and PSAPs — \n order to ensure a more robust E-
911 service, the FCC should encourage the implementation of these best practice
recommendations issued by Focus Group 1C of the FCC-chartered NRIC VII:

a.

Service providers and network operators should consider placing and maintaining
911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport facilities (e.g., geographically
diverse facility routes, automatically invoked standby routing, diverse digital
cross-connect system services, self-healing fiber ring topologies, or any
combination thereof). See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-0566.

Service providers, network operators and property managers should ensure
availability of emergency/backup power (e.g., batteries, generators, fuel cells) to
maintain critical communications services during times of commercial power
failures, including natural and manmade occurrences (e.g., earthquakes, floods,
fires, power brown/blackouts, terrorism). The emergency/backup power
generators should be located onsite, when appropriate. See NRIC VII
Recommendation 7-7-5204.

Network operators should consider deploying dual active 911 selective router
architectures to enable circuits from the caller's serving end office to be split
between two selective routers in order to eliminate single points of failure.
Diversity should also be considered on interoffice transport facilities connecting
each 911 selective router to the PSAP serving end office. See NRIC VIT
Recommendations 7-7-0571.

Network operators, service providers, equipment suppliers and public safety
authorities should establish alternative methods of communication for critical
personnel. See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-1011.

In addition, the FCC should:

a.

Recommend the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP that is more than 200
miles away to answer calls when the primary and secondary PSAPs are disabled.
This requires the FCC to eliminate any regulatory prohibition against the transport
of 911 across LATA boundaries. The Panel recommends that the FCC
expeditiously initiate such a rulemaking. This rulemaking should also consider
permitting a backup E-911 tandem across a LATA boundary.

Recommend that the FCC urge the DHS, Fire Grant Act, and other applicable
federal programs to permit state or local 911 commissions or emergency
communications districts, which provide 911 or public safety communications



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

The Panel formed informal working groups (“IWGs”), made up of small numbers of Panel
members, to help it effectively review and process the necessary information within the time
required. The working groups met numerous times in person and telephonically during the
Panel’s existence. These working groups were not decision-making bodies. Rather, they
compiled and sorted information in particular issue areas for presentation to the full Panel. The
Panel had three informal working groups:

IWG-1; Infrastructure Resiliency. This working group focused its discussions and efforts
on four main areas: (1) reviewing how and why certain portions of the communications
networks failed; (2) identifying which portions of the communications networks
continued to work and withstood the hurricane and why; (3) examining how
communications technology can be made less vulnerable to failing; and (4) studying what
steps can be taken, pre-event, to strengthen the communications infrastructure. Marion
Scott, Vice President - Operations, CenturyTel, served as the Chair of this working group
and Steve Dean, Fire Chief of Mobile, Alabama, served as Vice-Chair.

IWG-2: Recovery Coordination and Procedures. This working group focused on seven
main issues: (1) examining ways to increase the speed with which communications
networks can be restored post-event; (2) reviewing whether communications technology
could have been used more effectively during the recovery period, including issues
relating to consumer education and post-event deployment of communications
technology; (3) reviewing the intra-industry procedures that communications providers
use to coordinate recovery efforts; (4) reviewing the industry-government procedures that
private communications firms and federal, state and local governments use to coordinate
recovery efforts; (5) studying ways that private industry can obtain faster and more
efficient access to impacted areas; (6) reviewing the security and protection procedures
utilized by private communications industry members when they send their first
responders to impacted areas; and (7) reviewing how well emergency communications
services, including Telecommunications Service Priority, Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service, and Wireless Priority Service, performed during Katrina
and the extent to which emergency responders used these services. Steve Davis, Senior
Vice President - Engineering, Clear Channel Radio, served as the Chair of this working
group and Lt. Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State Police,
served as Vice-Chair.

IWG-3: Emergency Communications. This working group focused on six main issues:
(1) identifying means for ensuring or enabling rapid deployment of interoperable
communications in the wake of an event like Hurricane Katrina that can be implemented
in the short term; (2) identifying any coordination that needs to occur among public
safety entities to facilitate implementation of such a system in the wake of a disaster; (3)
reviewing Hurricane Katrina’s impact on the Gulf Coast Region’s 911 and E-911

also published notices in the Federal Register announcing Panel meetings. See, e.g., Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Advisory Committee Act; Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Notice of public meeting, 71 Fed. Reg. 2233 (Jan. 13, 2006). The Panel’s website at
http://www. fee.gov/eb/hkip/Meetings.html contains more information about meeting notices.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

¢ to study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the telecommunications and
media industries, including public safety communications;

© to review the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to this
infrastructure; and

* to make recommendations to the Commission by June 15, 2006 regarding ways to
improve disaster preparedness, network reliability, and communication among first
responders such as police, fire fighters, and emergency medical personnel.’

Pursuant to the Charter, the Panel became operational on January 9, 2006. The Charter also

provides that the Panel will terminate on June 15, 2006 and must carry out its duties before that
date.

II. Process and Activities of the Panel

In order to gather information to fulfill the directives of its Charter, the Panel called upon the
experiences of its members, many of whom were directly involved in the recovery efforts
following Hurricane Katrina. The Panel also solicited broad public input by providing processes
by which interested parties could submit written comments® and provide oral presentations.’ The
Panel additionally invited certain experts to present to the Panel or demonstrate new technologies
and applications. The written comments received by the Panel, as well as transcripts of the
Panel’s meetings, are publicly available at the FCC’s Public Reference Room and on the Panel’s
website. Finally, the Panel also reviewed publicly available information regarding matters under
the Panel’s consideration.

The Panel met five times to hear oral presentations, to discuss draft findings and
recommendations, and to finalize and approve this report. Those meetings occurred on January
30, March 6-7, April 18, May 12, and June 9, 2006. The March 6-7 meeting was held in
Jackson, Mississippi, where the Panel was able to hear oral presentations by interested parties.
All other meetings of the Panel occurred in Washington, DC. All of these meetings were public,
with prior notice of their date, time and location provided to the public.'°

© See FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks,

Charter (filed Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www. fec.gov/eb/hkip/HK1PCharter.pdf.
7 Id. at 1-2.

See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Federal Advisory Committee Act; Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Notice of opportunity to provide oral
presentations, 71 Fed. Reg. 5846 (Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/0 ljan2006 1800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/06-1057.pdf.

° Id.
10

See, e.g., Notice of Appointment Of Members To Serve On Federal Communications Commission's
Independent Panel Reviewing The Impact Of Hurricane Katrina On Communications Networks; And Independent
Panel's First Meeting Scheduled For January 30, 2006, Public Notice, 21 FCC Red 197 (2006). The Commission



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Remedying Existing Shortcomings — Emergency Responder Status for
Communications Infrastructure Providers — The Panel supports the NSTAC’s
recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure providers and their contracted
workers be afforded emergency responder status under the Stafford Act and that this
designation be incorporated into the National Response Plan, as well as state and local
emergency response plans. However, the Panel suggests that this recommendation be
broadened to include all communications infrastructure providers (including wireline,
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting infrastructure providers) and their
contracted workers. The FCC should work with Congress and the other appropriate
federal departments and agencies to implement this broadened recommendation.

Remedying Existing Shortcomings — Utilization of State/Regional Coordination Bodies
— The FCC should work with state and local government and the communications
industry (including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better
utilize the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local EOCs, as well as the Joint
Field Office (“JFO”). The FCC should encourage, but not require, each regional, state
and local EOC and the JFO to engage in the following activities:

a. Facilitate coordination between communications infrastructure providers
(including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting providers,
where appropriate) and state and local emergency preparedness officials (such as
the state emergency operations center) in the state or region at the EOC or JFO.
The parties should meet on a periodic basis to develop channels of
communications (both pre-and post-disaster), to construct joint preparedness and
response plans, and to conduct joint exercises.

b. Develop credentialing requirements and procedures for purposes of allowing
communications infrastructure providers, their contracted workers and private
security teams, if any, access to the affected area post-disaster. These
requirements and procedures should be consistent with any nationally-developed
credentialing guidelines. Where possible, web-based applications should be
created to pre-clear or expedite movement of communications infrastructure
providers into a disaster area.

c. Develop and facilitate inclusion in the state’s Emergency Preparedness Plan,
where appropriate, one or more clearly identified post-disaster coordination areas
for communications infrastructure providers, their contracted workers, and private
security teams, if any, to gather post-disaster where credentialing, security, escorts
and further coordination can be achieved. The state’s Emergency Preparedness
Plan should describe the process for informing communications infrastructure
providers where these coordination area(s) will be located.

d. Post-disaster, share information and coordinate resources to facilitate repair of
key communications infrastructure. Specifically, this would include identifying
key damaged infrastructure; if necessary, assigning priorities for access and
scarce resources (fuel, security, etc.) to repair this infrastructure. Additionally,
the coordination body and staging area can provide a means for industry to share



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

systems operating in different frequency bands and with different technical standards.'” One
advantage that New Orleans had was the fact that no broadcasters were using the 700 MHz
spectrum set aside for public safety, thus freeing it up immediately for first responder use.''° As
a result of this availability, communications providers were able to provide emergency trucks
and hundreds of radios that operated on this spectrum as soon as first responders needed them.
Finally, 911 emergency call handling suffered from a lack of preprogrammed routing of calls to
PSAPs not incapacitated by the hurricane.

i

A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures.

It was described to the Panel that public safety officials plan for disasters but that Hurricane
Katrina was a catastrophe.'!? This left many state and local agencies — those who are required to
respond first to such emergencies — ill-prepared to restore communications essential to their
ability to do their jobs.'"? Very few public safety agencies had stockpiles of key equipment on
hand to implement rapid repairs or patches to their systems. Had they been available, spare
radios, batteries and chargers as well as portable repeaters or self-sufficient communications
vehicles (also known as “communications on wheels”) would have enabled greater local
communications capabilities.''* Further, when the primary communications system failed, many
public safety entities did not have plans for an alternative, redundant system to take its place.'!®
Similarly, public safety entities, including state and local government offices, did not appear to
have plans in place for call forwarding or number portability to route their calls to alternative
locations when they relocated. The apparent absence of contingency plans to address massive
system failures, including widespread power outages, "6 was a major impediment to the rapid
restoration of first responder communications.

Public safety agencies rely heavily on their equipment vendors to support them during such
disasters by providing replacement parts and spare radios. Motorola stated that 72 hours prior to
Katrina’s landfall, it had mobilized more than 100,000 pieces of equipment and more than 300

' See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel (ret.) Terry J. Ebbert, Director, Homeland Security for New Orleans,
Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, United States House of Representatives, at 3-4
(Dec. 14, 2005), available a http://katrina house.gov/hearings/12_14_05/ebbert_121405.doc.

0 See Written Statement of Kelly Kirwin, Vice President, Motorola Comm. & Electronics, Before the FCC’s
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter “Kirwin Jan. 30
Written Statement”] (in some major cities (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco), the 700 MHz spectrum
would not be available to first responders).

See id.

'2 Written Statement of Sheriff Kevin Beary, Major County Sheriffs Assn. at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
“Beary Jan. 30 Written Statement”).

"3 Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.
"4 Beary Jan. 30 Written Statement at 1.

"5 Presentation of Sheriff Ted Sexton, Sr. National Sheriffs Assn at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006); McEwen Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 35-36.

"6 McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement at 5-6.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

services, to be eligible to apply for 911 enhancement and communications
enhancement/interoperability grants.

4, Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons Learned Concerning Emergency Medical and
Hospital Communications Needs — An Outreach Program to Educate and Include the
Emergency Medical Community in Emergency Communications Preparedness — The
FCC should work to assist the emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency
and effectiveness of their emergency communications systems. Among other things, the

FCC should:

a. Educate the emergency medical community about emergency communications
and help to coordinate this sector’s emergency communications efforts;

b. Educate the emergency medical community about the various priority
communications services (i.e., GETS, WPS and TSP) and urge them to subscribe;

c Work with Congress and the other appropriate federal departments and agencies
to ensure emergency medical personnel are treated as public safety personnel
under the Stafford Act; and

d. Support DHS efforts to make emergency medical providers eligible for funding

for emergency communications equipment under the State Homeland Security
Grant Program.

Emergency Communications to the Public — Actions to Alert and Inform

1. Actions to Alert and Inform — Revitalize and Publicize the Underutilized Emergency
Alert System — To facilitate and complement the use of the existing Emergency Alert
System (“EAS”), the FCC should:

a.

Educate state and local officials about the existing EAS, its benefits, and how it
can be best utilized.

Develop a program for educating the public about the EAS and promote
community awareness of potential mechanisms for accessing those alerts sent
during power outages or broadcast transmission failures.

Move expeditiously to complete its proceeding to explore the technical and
financial viability of expanding the EAS to other technologies, such as wireless
services and the Internet, recognizing that changes to communications networks
and equipment take time to implement.

Consistent with proposed legislation, work with Congress and other appropriate
federal departments and agencies to explore the technical and financial viability
of establishing a comprehensive national warning system that complements
existing systems and allows local officials to increase the penetration of warnings
to the public as well as target, when necessary, alerts to a particular area.

40



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

broadcast, WISP, and cable companies. These priority services could be an extremely useful
tool in network restoration efforts. Yet, they are tools that appear not fully utilized. Like other
emergency tools, they require training and practice. In some cases, users who had access to
these services did not fully understand how to use them (e.g., that a WPS call requires inputting a
GETS code so the call would get priority treatment when it reached the landline network).

Ill. First Responder Communications

In the days following Hurricane Katrina, the ability of public safety and emergency first
responders to communicate varied greatly across the affected region. The areas in and around
New Orleans were seriously impacted." New Orleans EMS was forced to cease 911 operations
in anticipation of Katrina’s landfall and, after the levees were breached, a total loss of EMS and
fire communications ensued.'® The communications infrastructure in coastal areas was heavily
damaged due to winds or flooding.'TM As a result, more than 2000 police, fire and EMS
personnel were forced to communicate in single channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing only
three mutual aid frequencies.'°> Some mutual-aid channels required each speaker to wait his or
her turn before speaking, sometimes up to twenty minutes.'” This level of destruction did not
extend to inland areas affected by the hurricane so, in contrast to New Orleans, neither Baton
Rouge nor Jackson County, Mississippi, completely lost their communications capabilities and
were soon operating at pre-Katrina capabilities.'©” In the hardest hit areas, however, the
disruption of public safety communications operability, as well as a lack of interoperability,
frustrated the response effort and caused tremendous confusion among official personnel!” and
the general public.

State and local first responders are required to act and communicate within minutes after
disasters have occurred and not hours or days later when Federal or other resources from outside
the affected area become available. As further described below, the lack of effective emergency
communications after the storm revealed inadequate planning, coordination and training on the
use of technologies that can help to restore emergency communications. Hurricane Katrina also
highlighted the long-standing problem of interoperability among public safety communications

loz

See, e.g., Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43.

103 yg.

'4 Jeff Smith Written Statement at 12.

105 Presentation of Major Mike Sauter, Office of Technology and Communications, New Orleans Police

Department, Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at | (Feb.1, 2006)
{hereinafter “Sauter Written Statement”).

106 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 21-6 (NOFD and NOPD were forced to use a mutual aid channel,
rather than the 800 MHz trunk system they were supposed to operate on; transmission over the mutual aid channel
was limited and could not reach certain parts of the city).

107 See Oral Testimony of George W. Sholl, Director, Jackson County Emergency Communications District,
Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at Tr. at 58-59 (Mar. 6, 2006)
(hereinafter “Scholl Mar. 6 Oral Testimony’].

108 Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.

1



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Remedying Existing Shortcomings — Utilization of State/Regional Coordination
Bodies. The FCC should work with state and local government and the
communications industry (including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and
broadcasting) to better utilize the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local
Emergency Operations Centers, as well as the Joint Field Office.

Maximizing Existing Resources — Expanding and Publicizing Emergency
Communications Programs (GETS, WPS, and TSP). The FCC should work with the
National Communications System (“NCS”) to actively and aggressively promote
GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible government, public safety, and critical industry
groups.

Maximizing Existing Resources — Broadening NCC to Include All Communications
Infrastructure Sectors. The FCC should work with the NCS to broaden the
membership of the National Coordination Center for Telecommunications (“NCC”)
to include adequate representation of all types of communications systems, including
broadcast, cable, satellite and other new technologies, as appropriate.

Maximizing Existing Resources — FCC Website for Emergency Coordination
Information. The FCC should create a password-protected website, accessible by
credentialed entities, listing the key state emergency management contacts, as well as
post-disaster coordination areas for communications providers.

Maximizing Existing Resources ~ FCC Website for Emergency Response Team
Information. The FCC should create a website to publicize the agency’s emergency
response team’s contact information and procedures for facilitating disaster response
and outage recovery.

Improving the operability and interoperability of public safety and 911
communications in times of crisis. These recommendations include:

Essential Steps in Pre-positioning Equipment, Supplies and Personnel ~ An
Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternatives Inventory. The FCC should
encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and maintain, including through
arrangements with the private sector, a cache of equipment components that would be
needed to immediately restore existing public safety communications. The FCC
should also work with the NCC to develop inventories of alternative communications
assets.

Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency Communications Capabilities — Facilitating
First Responder Interoperability. The FCC should take several steps to facilitate
interoperability among first responder communications, including maintaining the
schedule for commercial spectrum auctions to fund the federal public safety grant
programs; working with the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (“NTIA”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to
establish appropriate criteria for these grants; encouraging the expeditious
development and approval of 700 MHz regional plans; working with NTIA and DHS
to develop spectrum sharing among federal, state and local agencies for emergency
response purposes; and publicizing interoperability successes and best practices.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

and have redundant paths (both T1 and fixed microwave); and (4) the staff responsible for the
communications network have a focus on continuing maintenance of network elements (for
example, exercising standby generators on a routine basis).

10. License Exempt Wireless (WISPs). The License Exempt Wireless or
wireless internet service provider (“WISP”) infrastructure, in general, was not heavily damaged
by Katrina or the subsequent flooding, although some antennas required adjustment because of
high winds. Rather, the majority of the adverse effects and outages encountered by WISP
providers were due to a lack of commercial power and difficulty with fuel resupply. WISP
providers cited access difficulties as their most pressing problem in restoring their networks.

11. Amateur Radio Service. As with other communications services, amateur
radio stations were also adversely affected by Katrina. Equipment was damaged or lost due to
the storm and trained amateurs were difficult to find in the immediate aftermath. However, once
called into help, amateur radio operators volunteered to support many agencies, such as FEMA,
the National Weather Service, Hurricane Watch and the American Red Cross.°° Amateurs
provided wireless communications in many locations where there was no other means of
communicating and also provided other technical aid to the communities affected by Katrina.”

B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina.

In reviewing the detailed reports from each communications sector, there were three main
problems that caused the majority of communications network interruptions: (1) flooding; (2)
lack of power and/or fuel; and (3) failure of redundant pathways for communications traffic. In
addition, a fourth item — inadvertent line cuts during restoration — resulted in additional network
damage, causing new outages or delaying service restoration. Each of these areas of concern is
detailed below.

1. Flooding. Hurricanes typically have flooding associated with them due to
the torrential rainfall and storm surge associated with the storms. However, in addition to these
sources of flooding, the levee breaks in New Orleans caused catastrophic flooding that was
extremely detrimental to the communications networks.*® While communications infrastructure
had been hardened to prepare against strong winds from a hurricane, the widespread flooding of
long duration associated with Katrina destroyed or disabled substantial portions of the
communications networks and impeded trained personnel from reaching and operating the
facilities.” In addition, as detailed below, the massive flooding caused widespread power
outages that were not readily remedied (electric substations could not be reached nor were there

56 See Hurricane Katrina Amateur Radio Emergency Communications Relief Effort Operations Review

Summary, Written Statement submitted by Gregory Sarratt, W4OZK, at 2 (Mar. 7, 2006).
7 Id at4.

58 See, e.g, House Report at 164 (reporting that flooding knocked out two telephone company switches and
hindered the communications abilities of six out of eight police districts in New Orleans, as well as the police
department headquarters).

See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Juliette M. Saussy, Director, Emergency Medical Services of the City of
New Orleans, Louisiana, Tr. at 43-44 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony”.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

of ethnic media outlets.'® Innovative notification technologies, such as those described above,
may provide a partial answer to the emergency communications needs of persons with
disabilities and non-English-speaking members of the public as such technologies can be used to
deliver targeted messages in a specified format.

Relatedly, individuals with disabilities often had a difficult time using communications
capabilities at shelters or other recovery areas. 'S° Phone and computer banks provided : at these
locations generally did not have capabilities to assist the hearing or speech- impaired.'®

D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information.

One of the benefits of the EAS is that it facilitates the communication of a uniform message to
the public by an authoritative or credible spokesperson, thereby minimizing confusion and
contributing to an orderly public response. However, as noted above, the EAS was not activated
in several jurisdictions. Moreover, while broadcasters, cable operators and satellite providers
went to considerable lengths to provide the public with information regarding Katrina and its
impact, the Panel understands that inconsistent or erroneous information about critical
emergency issues was sometimes provided within the affected region. For example, information
regarding conditions in one portion of New Orleans did not necessarily accurately depict
conditions in other areas of the city. The dissemination of targeted information from an
authoritative source through the EAS or other notification technologies might have assisted with
this problem.

158 See, e.g., La Raza Comments at 5 (citing Interview with official at the National Weather Service, Jan. 6,
2006).

189 Id; Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2.

'60 See, e.g., id.; Comments of the Consortium for Citizens With Disabilities at 1-2 (April 13, 2006); Styron
Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 291.

30



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon its observations regarding the impact of Hurricane Katrina on communications
networks and the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort, the Panel has developed a
number of recommendations to the FCC for improving disaster preparedness, network reliability
and communications among first responders. As with its observations, these recommendations
are grouped into four sections. The first contains recommendations for steps to better pre-
position the communications industry and the government for disasters in order to achieve
greater network reliability and resiliency. The second section presents suggestions for improving
recovery coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize the use of existing
resources. The third section focuses on first responder communications issues, recommending
essential steps for improving the operability and interoperability of public safety and 911
communications in times of crisis. And finally, the last group of recommendations presents the
Panel’s suggestions for improving emergency communications to the public. All of our citizens
deserve to be sufficiently informed should a major disaster strike in the future.

Pre-positioning for Disasters — A Proactive, Rather than Reactive Program
for Network Reliability and Resiliency

1. Pre-positioning for the Communications Industry — A Readiness Checklist - The FCC
should work with and encourage each industry sector, through their organizations or
associations, to develop and publicize sector-specific readiness recommendations. Such a
checklist should be based upon relevant industry best practices as set forth by groups
such as the Media Security and Reliability Council (“MSRC”) and the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council (“NRIC”). Any such checklist should include the
following elements:

a. Developing and implementing business continuity plans, which would at a
minimum address:

i. power reserves,

ii. cache of essential replacement equipment,
iii adequate sparing levels,

credentialing,

v. Emergency Operations Center (“EOC”) coordination,
training/disaster drills, and
vii. appropriate disaster preparedness checklists;
b. conducting exercises to evaluate these plans and train personnel;
c. developing and practicing a communications plan to identify “key players” and

multiple means of contacting them (including alternate communications channels,
such as alpha pagers, Internet, satellite phones, VOIP, private lines, BlackBerry-
type devices, etc.);

d. routinely archiving critical system backups and providing for their storage in a
“secure off-site” facilities.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

State Police and the FBI provided security so that BellSouth workers could return to the office
and keep it in service.*”

Apparently, several companies that had their own security forces shared them with other
communications providers by forming a convoy to go to a particular area.** Such arrangements
seemed to occur on a purely informal basis. There did not appear to be any forum or staging area
for fostering industry sharing of security forces or other resources.

4, Pre-positioning of Equipment. Limited pre-positioning of
communications equipment may have slowed the recovery process. While some individual
companies and organizations had some backup communications technologies on-hand for use
after a disaster, most did not appear to locate strategic stockpiles of communications equipment
that could be rapidly deployed and immediately used by persons in the impacted area.

B. Coordination Between Industry and Government.

1. Industry — Federal Government Coordination. Despite problems related
above at the scene of the disaster, at the federal level, industry and government recovery
coordination for the communications sector appeared to function as intended. Under the
National Response Plan, the lead federal agency for emergency support functions regarding
communications is the National Communications System (“NCS”). NCS manages the National
Coordination Center for Telecommunications (“NCC”) in Washington, DC, which is a joint
industry-federal government endeavor with 36 member companies.’ The NCC meets on a
regular basis during non-emergency situations; during and immediately after Katrina, it met daily
and conducted analysis and situational monitoring of ongoing events and response capabilities.”
The Katrina Panel heard that this group played an important and effective role in coordinating
communications network recovery and allowing for information sharing among affected industry
members.”! Yet, NCC membership is limited to only certain providers and does not represent a
broad cross-section of the communications industry (for example, no broadcasters, WISPs, or
cable providers are members).” Accordingly, certain industry sectors or companies that might
have been helpful were not a part of this coordination effort. State and local government are also
not a part of this coordination effort.

87 Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at 8-9.

88 See, e.g, Comments of Xspedius at 3.

The NSTAC Report on the National Coordinating Center (4/27/06 Draft), The President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, May 10, 2006, at 9-10 [hereinafter “May 10 NSTAC Report”}.

% See Written Statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Director, National Communications System, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events, Before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, at 2, 6 (Oct.
26, 2005), available at http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyFonash.pdf.

°

See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 17 -18.

°2 See May 10 NSTAC Report at 4.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION
I. Panel Formation and Charge......c.cssssssssssessssesesssssssssssesssssssesessenenesseeessnenensenenensenenenearensaeens 1
Il. Process and Activities of the Panel .........ccssssssssssssseessesseesseeneeeneennecueesneennecsnecneenseeseeneennessee 2

PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON
THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF

THE RECOVERY EFFORT .....sscssssesssssssssessssessssessssecsssvecsseeessseesssecessecssnsecsnsccsnnecsnnssenseesnsceenneesnaes 5
I. Network Reliability and Resiliency ........cccssessessessssseseeseesesseesesseeneeseensensenensesseneenseneenennennes 5
A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of Communications Networks....... 6
B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina..........scssssssssscsseesseeeeneeseesneenennees 13

Il. Recovery Coordination and Procedures..
A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources.
B. Coordination Between Industry and Government...

Cc. Emergency Communications Services and Program ........ssssusssesseessesseesseeseeenees 21

III. First Responder Communications

A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures ..........s:sssssserseseenseenees 23

B. Lack of Interoperability .......sssssssssesssssessssesssseessvecesneessnecssnsessnecesneessnecenneeeaneessnnees 25

Cc. PSAP Rerouting

D. Emergency Medical CommunicationSs........cssssssssessecceersserneereeneesseessesstessessneesnes 27
IV. — Emergency Communications to the PUbLC........ssecsssesseessessesseesseesessesseeeneesnesseesneeneeenees 27

A. Lack Of Activation .......ecsssssssssessesssessessesssessseessesseseseesnecsneesecneceusennecneesneeaneaneesnees 28

B. Limitations on Coverage...

C. Reaching Persons with Disabilities and Non-English Speaking Americans......... 29

Dz. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information .........sssseeeeeeeesereeneneeneestees 30
RECOMMENDA TIONG. .........sssssssssssssessssesescsessesesecscsesscsessencneesenensenenenngnesessensssesenseessansesseaseaneneen 31
CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A: Members of the Independent Panel



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Urge public safety licensees to familiarize themselves with alternative
communications technologies to provide communications when normal public
safety networks are down. Such technologies include satellite telephones, two-
way paging devices, and other technologies less reliant on the PSTN. Most
importantly, public safety agencies should be reminded/encouraged to train and
use such devices prior to emergencies.

Support the efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory of available
communications assets (including local, state, federal civilian and military) that
can be rapidly deployed in the event of a catastrophic event. The list should
include land mobile radios, portable infrastructure equipment, bridging
technologies/gateways, and backup power system components. This information
should include the steps necessary for requesting the deployment of these assets.
The FCC should work with the NCC and the appropriate agencies to educate key
state and local emergency response personnel on the availability of these assets
and how to request them.

Coordinate with the NCS/NCC to assure that, immediately following any large
disaster, there is an efficient means by which federal, state and local officials can
identify and locate private sector communications assets that can be made rapidly
available to first responders and relief organizations. One such means to be
considered would be a website maintained by either the FCC or NCC through
which the private sector could register available assets along with product
information. The website should be designed with a special area for registering
available equipment to assist persons with disabilities in their communications
needs,

Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency Communications Capabilities — Facilitating
First Responder Interoperability — To facilitate interoperability among first responder
communications, the FCC should:

a.

Consistent with recent legislation, maintain the schedule for commencing
commercial spectrum auctions before January 28, 2008 to fully fund the $1 billion
public safety interoperability program.

Work with National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(“NTIA”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to establish
appropriate criteria for the distribution of the $1 billion in a manner that best
promotes interoperability with the 700 MHz band. Among other things, such
criteria should mandate that any radios purchased with grant monies must be
capable of operating on 700 MHz and 800 MHz channels established for mutual
aid and interoperability voice communications.

Encourage the expeditious development of regional plans for the use of 700 MHz
systems and move promptly to review and approve such plans.

Expeditiously approve any requests by broadcasters to terminate analog service in
the 700 MHz band before the end of the digital television transition in 2009 in
order to allow public safety users immediate access to this spectrum.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

and maximize scarce resources (share surplus equipment, double and triple up on
security escorts to a particular area, efc.).

e. Facilitate electric and other utilities’ maintenance of priority lists for commercial
power restoration. Include commercial communications providers on this priority
list and coordinate power restoration activities with communications restoration.

The Panel would also support communications infrastructure providers in a state or
region forming an industry-only group for disaster planning, coordinating recovery
efforts and other purposes. Nevertheless, the Panel believes that coordinating capabilities
and staffing of regional, state and local EOCs, as well as the JFO, need to be better
utilized for the purposes described above.

4. Maximizing Existing Resources — Expanding and Publicizing Emergency
Communications Programs (GETS, WPS and TSP) — To facilitate the use of existing
emergency communications services and programs, the FCC should:

a. Work with the National Communications System (“NCS”) to actively and
aggressively promote GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible government, public
safety, and critical industry groups. As part of this outreach effort, the
Commission should target groups that have relatively low levels of participation.
For example, the Panel recommends that the Commission reach out to the
emergency medical community and major trauma centers to make them aware of
the availability of these services.

b. Work with the NCS to clarify whether broadcast, WISP, satellite, and cable
company repair crews are eligible for GETS and WPS under the Commission’s
existing rules. If so, the Commission should promote the availability of these
programs to those entities and urge their subscribership. If the Commission
determines that these entities are not eligible, the Panel recommends that the
Commission revise its rules so that these entities can subscribe to WPS and
GETS.

c. Work with the NCS to explore whether it is technically and financially feasible
for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS treatment when they reach landline
facilities (thus avoiding the need for a WPS caller to also enter GETS
information). The Commission may desire to set up an industry task force to
explore this issue.

d. Work with the NCS and the communications sector to establish and promote best
practices to ensure that all WPS, GETS, and TSP subscribers are properly trained
in how to use these services.

5. Maximizing Existing Resources — Broadening NCC to Include All Communications
Infrastructure Sectors — The FCC should work with the NCS to broaden the membership
of the National Coordination Center for Telecommunications (“NCC”) to include
adequate representation of all types of communications systems, including broadcast,
cable, satellite and other new technologies, as appropriate.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

outlasted most generator fuel reserves, leading to the failure of otherwise functional
infrastructure. However, there were resiliency successes in the aftermath: (1) a large portion of
the communications infrastructure withstood the storm’s wind and rain with only minor damage
(as distinguished from post-storm flooding from levee breaches and power outages, which had a
more devastating impact); (2) satellite networks, although taxed by extensive numbers of
additional users, remained available and usable throughout the affected region; and (3) the
communications networks operated by utilities appeared to have a very high rate of survivability.
By examining the failures in network resiliency and reliability, along with the successes, we can
better prepare communications infrastructure to withstand or quickly recover from future
catastrophic events.

A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of Communications Networks.

Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath had a devastating impact on communications networks in the
Gulf Coast region. In the affected areas of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, more than three
million customer telephone lines were knocked out of service. Both switching centers and
customer lines sustained damage. Thirty-eight 911 call centers went down. Approximately 100
broadcast stations were unable to transmit and hundreds of thousands of cable customers lost
service.'? Even generally resilient public safety networks experienced massive outages. In short,
Katrina had a catastrophic impact over a huge geographic area. Further, due to the unique
circumstances associated with this disaster, repair and activation of the communications
infrastructure in the region was not a matter of days, but rather a long and slow process.

To understand the precise impact that Hurricane Katrina had on communications networks, it is
useful to distinguish between the impact of the storm itself (i.e., hurricane force winds and rain)
and the effect of what came later — extensive flooding from breached levees and widespread,
long term power outages. As detailed below, it appears that most communications infrastructure
in the areas impacted by Katrina fared fairly well through the storm’s wind and rain, in most
cases sustaining only minor damage or damage that should have been promptly repairable.
Indeed, the tower industry reported that of all the towers in the path of the 2005 hurricanes in the
Southeastern and Gulf Coast areas of the United States, less than | percent suffered any
structural damage.'> The coastal areas that bore the brunt of the storm suffered the worst
infrastructure damage from the hurricane. Not to diminish the significant impact of the hurricane
itself, what made Katrina unique and particularly catastrophic were the unique conditions after
the winds subsided — substantial flooding and widespread, extended power outages. These
developments impacted communications networks greatly, causing irreparable damage to
submerged electronics and prolonged outages in many cases. The Panel’s observations on how
each type of communications infrastructure withstood Katrina and its challenging aftermath is
presented below.

'2 See Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Hearing on

Public Safety Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of
Representatives, at 2 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fec.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
261417A Lpdf [hereinafter “Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement” ].

B

See Comments of PCIA — The Wireless Infrastructure Association, at 1 (May 15, 2006).



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

public safety responders. Given PSTN failures, as well as damage to fixed microwave links,
public safety communications were significantly affected.

d. Training Issues. Because of failures of the primary public safety
networks, public safety personnel had to utilize back-up or alternative communications
technologies with which they may not have had substantial experience. Confusion or
unfamiliarity with the capabilities or operational requirements of the alternative technology
seemed to result in limitations in functionality.?' For example, some public safety personnel
handed satellite phones were not familiar with their special dialing requirements and, as a result,
thought the phones did not work.” Public safety personnel did not seem to have adequate
training on alternative communications technologies, such as paging, satellite, license-exempt
WISP systems, and thus were not able to transition seamlessly to these alternatives when existing
public safety communications networks failed. Additionally, because alternative technologies
were used so infrequently, there were reported problems with upkeep and maintenance of the
equipment.”

2. Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). Handling of 911 calls was
identified as a problem during Katrina. As a result of the storm and subsequent flooding, thirty-
eight 911 call centers ceased to function.4 Limited training and advanced planning on how to
handle rerouting of emergency calls under this situation created serious problems.” Asan
example, the City of Biloxi was able to relocate their 911 call center prior to landfall; however,
representatives relocated to the facility did not have full 911 capabilities. This severely
hampered their ability to effectively route 911 calls to the appropriate agencies. The Katrina
experience identified that there appeared to be a lack of 911 PSAP failovers and some deficits in
training on routing and handling of calls when a crisis and rerouting occurs. Nevertheless, the
vast majority of 911 call centers, especially in the less impacted portions of the region, were up
and running by September 926

3. Wireline. According to FCC data, more than 3 million customer phone
lines were knocked out in the Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama area following Hurricane
Katrina’ The wireline telephone network sustained significant damage both to the switching

21 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Sandy Bogucki, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Tr. at 54-
55 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony”].

2 Written Testimony of David Cavossa, Executive Director, Satellite Industry Association, Before the FCC’s
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 4-5 (Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter “Cavossa-SIA
Written Testimony”]; Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 55.

2

See Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 55.

4

See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.

25 See, e.g., Comments of Comcare at 2 (May 11, 2006) (there was no plan to bring in additional
telecommunicators to the region to keep up with the influx of 91 Icalls from victims and rescue response teams).

26 See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 27.

27 See Written Statement of Kenneth P. Moran, Director, Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau,

FCC, on Hurricane Katrina, Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of



Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks

Report and Recommendations to the
Federal Communications Commission

June 12, 2006



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

understands that there are ongoing collaborative industry-government efforts to overcome the
hurdles to extending alerts to other technologies.

Cc. Reaching Persons with Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans.

Ensuring emergency communications reach all Americans, even those with hearing and visual
disabilities or who do not speak English, remains a major challenge. Unfortunately, accessibility
to suitable communications devices for the deaf and hard of hearing was difficult during and
after Hurricane Katrina.’ This problem was intensified by the fact that Katrina brought
humidity, rain, flooding, and high temperatures (which translate into perspiration), all of which
reduce the effectiveness of hearing aids and cochlear implants.'° For persons with visual
impairments, telephone and broadcast outages made information very hard to obtain, and many
people with vision loss were unable to evacuate.'TM

The broadcast industry has taken significant steps to provide on-screen sign language interpreters
and close captioning. Broadcasters also sometimes broadcast critical information in a second
language where there are a significant number of non-English speaking residents in the
community. For example, a Spanish-language radio station in the New Orleans area provided
warnings, and information about family members and disaster relief assistance.'*°

However, the Panel also heard that written or captioned information was at times inadequate and
that station logos or captions sometimes covered up the sign-language interpreter or close-
captioning.'°° Additionally, personnel who provided these critical services often evacuated,
leaving the station with no ability to deliver these services. Further, specialized radios relied
upon by the hearing-impaired, because they can display text messages, are not currently designed
to be battery-operated and thus became useless when power goes out.'°” The distribution of
emergency weather information in languages other than English appeared limited, based
primarily on the willingness and ability of local weather forecasting offices and the availability

132 See, e.g., Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2 (over 80% of shelters did not have access to

communications devices for the deaf; over 60% of shelters did not have captioning capabilities utilized on the
televisions screens and several broadcasters did not caption their emergency information, even though it is required
by the FCC); Oral Testimony of Cheryl Heppner, Vice Chair, Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy
Network, FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Tr. at
283 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony”] (many television stations did not provide visual
information).

‘53 Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 282.

‘5¢ Comment of the American Council of the Blind and American Foundation for the Blind, at 2 (May 3,
2006).

'S5 Soe, e.g, Comments by the National Council of La Raza, In the Eye of the Storm: How the Gov’t and
Private Response to Hurricane Katrina Failed Latinos at 5 (Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter “La Raza Comments”).

‘86 Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 283-84; Remarks by Cheryl Heppner, Deaf and Hard of Hearing

Consumer Advocacy Network, at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006).

‘57 Heppner Mar. 6. Oral Testimony at 283-85.

29



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

technicians cease their work splicing a key telecommunications cable and exit the area in order
to enforce a curfew.’> Although such practices may have been necessary from a security
standpoint, they did interrupt and hamper the recovery process.

The problems with access were not all one-sided. Law enforcement personnel also expressed
frustration with the access situation, particularly with respect to the different credentials issued
and not knowing what to ask for or what to honor. It was also reported that credentialed
communications infrastructure repair personnel sometimes allowed non-credentialed individuals
to ride in their vehicles through checkpoints, which compromised the security of the area. It also
caused law enforcement personnel at the perimeter to be wary of persons seeking to access the
affected area and the credentials they presented, potentially further slowing the access process.

2. Fuel. Problems with maintaining and restoring power for
communications infrastructure significantly affected the recovery process. As described in
Section I.B.2 above, many facilities could have been up and operating much more quickly if
communications providers had access to sufficient fuel. The commercial power upon which the
vast majority of communications networks depended for day-to-day operations was knocked out
over a huge geographic area. Back-up generators and batteries were not present at all facilities.
Where they were deployed, most provided only enough power to operate particular
communications facilities for 24-48 hours — generally a sufficient period of time to permit the
restoration of commercial power in most situations, but not enough for a catastrophe like
Hurricane Katrina.

Access to fuel reserves or priority power restoration appeared extremely limited for the
communications industry.’° Only a few communications providers had stockpiles of fuel or
special supplier arrangements. However, if the fuel was not located fairly near to the perimeter,
it was difficult and expensive to get it where it was needed in a timely fashion. Perimeter access
issues also impeded the ability to bring reserve fuel into the region. Moreover, many roads and
traditional means of accessing certain facilities could not be used due to the extensive flooding
that followed Hurricane Katrina. And many communications providers did not anticipate the
need for alternative means of reaching their facilities. In addition, some providers reported
having their limited fuel reserves confiscated by law enforcement personnel for other pressing
needs.’” Although electric and other utilities maintain priority lists for commercial power
restoration, it does not appear that commercial communications providers were on or eligible for
such lists. Indeed, one wireless provider speaking at the Katrina Panel’s January 2006 meeting —
more than 4 months after Katrina’s landfall — reported that it had 23 cell sites in the impacted

18
125.

Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 191; see also Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at

7 See, e.g., Comments of Mississippi Assn. of Broadcasters at 1-2 (Jan. 27, 2006).

7” See, e.g., id.; House Report at 167 (“[O]ne of Nextel’s fuel trucks was stopped at gunpoint and its fuel
taken for other purposes while en route to refuel cell tower generators, and the Mississippi State Police redirected a
fuel truck carrying fuel designated for a cell tower generator to fuel generators at Gulfport Memorial Hospital.”).



Chairman Kevin J. Martin
June 12, 2006
Page 2

better prepare the communications industry and our nation’s first responders for
future emergencies.

Respectfully submitted,

4)
1) pe 49" oT
Nancy J. vill. ry
Chair, Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks

cc w/encl.: | Commissioner Michael J. Copps
Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein
Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate
Commissioner Robert M. McDowell



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

e. Work with the DHS and other appropriate federal agencies on pilot programs that
would allow more immediate evaluation and testing of new notification
technologies.

f. Work with the Department of Commerce to expand the distribution of certain
critical non-weather emergency warnings over NOAA weather radios to
supplement the EAS.

2. Actions to Alert and Inform - Commence Efforts to Ensure that Persons with
Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans Receive Meaningful Alerts —- To
help to ensure that all Americans, including those with hearing or visual disabilities or
who do not speak English, can receive emergency communications, the FCC should:

a. Promptly find a mechanism to resolve any technical and financial hurdles in the
current EAS to ensure that non-English speaking people or persons with
disabilities have access to public warnings, if readily achievable.

b. Work with the various industry trade associations and the disabled community to
create and publicize best practices for serving persons with disabilities and non-
English-speaking Americans.

Cc. Encourage state and local government agencies who provide emergency
information (through video or audio broadcasts or websites) to take steps to make
critical emergency information accessible to persons with disabilities and non-
English-speaking Americans.

3. Actions to Alert and Inform — Ensure Consistent and Reliable Emergency Information
Through a Consolidated and Coordinated Public Information Program — Public
information functions should be coordinated and integrated across jurisdictions and
across functional agencies, among federal, state, local and tribal partners, and with
private sector and non-governmental organizations. The FCC should work with all
involved parties to help facilitate the following:

a. Integration of media representatives into the development of disaster
communications plans (ESF #2). These plans should establish systems and
protocols for communicating timely and accurate information to the public during
crisis or emergency situations.

b. Designation of a public information officer at each EOC. This individual should
be accessible to the media to handle media and public inquiries, emergency public
information and warnings, rumor monitoring and response, and other functions
required to coordinate, clear with appropriate authorities, and disseminate
accurate and timely information related to the incident, particularly regarding
information on public health, safety and protection.

c. During large scale disasters, the formation of a Joint Information Center (“JIC”)
for the collocation of representatives from federal, regional, state, local and/or
tribal EOCs tasked with primary incident coordination responsibilities. The JIC
would provide the mechanism for integrating public information activities across



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

Finally, it seems that communications assets that were available and could have been used by
first responders were not requested or deployed. There have been reports that federal
government communications assets operated and maintained by FEMA and USDA were
available, but not utilized, for state and local public safety operations.'** This underutilization
may have been due to the fact that FEMA’s pre-staged communications vehicles apparently were
located 250-350 miles away from the devastated areas,'”° and that FEMA did not request
deployment of these vehicles until twenty-four hours after landfall.'?’ Further, first responders
were not made aware of these assets and/or did not know how to request them.'* As noted
above, many public safety officials failed to subscribe to the GETS, TSP and WPS priority
programs, despite their eligibility.'” Communications assets made available by the private
sector also appear to have been underutilized by first responders. The Panel heard that
manufacturers of alternative public safety communications systems were unable to gain the
attention of key public safety officials to effectuate their proposed donation of equipment and
services. Some offered equipment or access to their network in Katrina’s aftermath but “found
no takers”.'3° These and other outlets could have provided some measure of communications
capabilities, while repairs to primary systems were completed.

B. Lack of Interoperability.

Because of its scope and severity, Hurricane Katrina demanded a coordinated response from
federal and affected state and local agencies, as well as volunteers from states both neighboring
and distant. The Panel heard evidence that, in many cases, responders in different agencies were
unable to communicate due to incompatible frequency assignments.'?! When the existing
infrastructure for the New Orleans system was incapacitated by flooding, communications were
almost completely thwarted as too many users attempted to use the three mutual aid channels in
the 800 MHz band.'TM In addition, communications between the military and first responders

"5 The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 55.

"26 Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff interview of James Attaway,
Telecommunications Specialist, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).

27 Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff interview of William Milani, Chief Mobile
Operations Section, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).

128 See, e.g., Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement at 5 (first responders generally did not have pre-emergency
deployment plans that they could invoke in advance of the actual emergency).

"29 During and after Katrina, the NCS issued 1,000 new GETS access code numbers to first responders, and
the GETS system was used to make more than 35,000 calls between August 28 and September 9. House Report at
176. During Katrina, the NCS enabled and distributed more than 4,000 new WPS phones. /d. The NCS also
completed more than 1,500 TSP assignments following Hurricane Katrina. /d. at 177. It would have been helpful if
these assets had been in place before the disaster and first responders were fully trained in how to use them.

13° Statement of Jerry Knoblach, Chairman & CEO, Space Data Corporation, Before the Federal
Communications Commission’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, at 6 (Mar. 7, 2006).

31 4 Failure to Communicate: A Stocktake of Government Inaction to Address Communications

Interoperability Failures Following Hurricane Katrina, First Response Coalition, December 2005.

132 Sauter Written Statement at 1; Written Report of Ed Smith at 1.

y



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

industry members and their trade associations to establish a consolidated data set and
geographic area for data collection. Once broad agreement is reached on the appropriate
outage information to be collected, it should be consistently applied and not subject to
routine changes. To the extent practical, the frequency of voluntary reporting and
duration of reporting requirements should be specified as part of any emergency outage
reporting plan. The Panel suggests that reporting no more than once a day would strike
the right balance between supplying important outage information and not distracting
resources from critical recovery efforts. Additionally, any proprietary information that is
gathered through voluntary outage reporting must be kept confidential, with only
aggregated information provided to appropriate government entities, such as the local
EOC, during a crisis situation. Any carrier-specific data should be disclosed to other
agencies only with appropriate confidentiality safeguards (such as non-disclosure
agreements) in place.

Recovery Coordination — Critical Steps for Addressing Existing Shortcomings
and Maximizing Use of Existing Resources

1.

Remedying Existing Shortcomings — National Credentialing Guidelines for
Communications Infrastructure Providers — The Panel generally supports the National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s (“NSTAC’s”) recommendation for
a national standard for credentialing telecommunications repair workers, but believes this
should be broadened to include repair workers of all communications infrastructure
providers (including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting
infrastructure providers). Specifically, the Panel recommends that the FCC work with
other appropriate federal departments and agencies and the communications industry to
promptly develop national credentialing requirements and process guidelines for enabling
communications infrastructure providers and their contracted workers access to the
affected area post-disaster. The FCC should encourage states to develop and implement a
credentialing program consistent with these guidelines as promptly as possible and
encourage appropriate communications industry members to secure any necessary
credentialing. Under this program, credentials should be available to be issued to
communications infrastructure providers at any time during the year, including before,
during and after a disaster situation. The credentials should be issued directly to
communications infrastructure providers, which will then be responsible for distributing
these credentials to their employees and contracted workers. These credentials, together
with company-issued employee or contractor identification should be sufficient to permit
access. As a condition of credentialing, the program should require that communications
infrastructure providers receiving credentials ensure that their employees and contracted
workers receiving credentials complete basic National Incident Management System
(“NIMS”) training (i.¢., “Introduction to NIMS”). The FCC should work with the
communications industry to develop an appropriate basic NIMS training course (no more
than one hour) for communications repair workers that can be completed online. Once
developed, this communications-specific training course should replace “Introduction to
NIMS” as the requirement for credentialing. The FCC should also encourage states to
recognize and accept credentials issued by other states.



Independent Panel Reviewing the impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

The FCC was widely praised as playing a critical role in helping to restore communications
connectivity in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.® > During and immediately after Katrina, the
Commission stayed open 24 hours a day, seven days a week to respond to the disaster.”* Within
hours of Katrina’s landfall in the Gulf Coast region, the Commission established an internal Task
Force to coordinate its response efforts,”® focusing on providing regulatory relief where
necessary, coordinating efforts with other federal agencies, and providing information and
assistance to evacuees. To assist communications providers in their recovery, the Commission
established emergency procedures to streamline various waiver and special temporary authority
processes to speed needed relief,” reached out to various providers to determine their needs, and
assisted communications providers in obtaining access to necessary resources.”

These actions by the Commission appeared substantially to assist the industry in the recovery
effort. The emergency, 24/7 contacts the Commission made available and the new streamlined
processes clearly accelerated the time frame for receiving necessary regulatory approvals.
However, the extensive communications outages made accessing this new information about
who to contact and how to comply with the new processes difficult. Similarly, repair crews often
did not know what repairs they needed to make until they reached the site.

In addition, while it was generally clear to communications providers that the Commission was
the right agency to contact for regulatory relief after the disaster, the roles of other federal
agencies in the recovery effort were not as clear to a large portion of the industry.”*
Communications providers who needed federal assistance (such as obtaining fuel authorizations
or access to the impacted area), often did not know whom to contact. Industry participants also
appeared generally unclear about which federal agency was responsible for implementing
important recovery programs or distributing resources to communications companies operating
in the impacted area. Competing requests for outage information from government entities at the
federal, state and local level added to the confusion about agency roles. And responding to
duplicative, repeated inquiries in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was cited by some as a
distraction to communications providers’ restoration efforts.

® See, e.g., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned at 142-43 (February 2006).

See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 3.

Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 4.

© — See, e.g., International Bureau Announces Procedures to Provide Emergency Communications in Areas

Impacted by Hurricane Katrina, FCC Public Notice (rel. Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fec.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260835A L.pdf.
1

See Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 83 (describing how the Audio Division of
the FCC’s Media Bureau helped radio licensees secure access to fuel).

See, e.g., Written Statement of C. Patrick Roberts, President of the Florida Association of Broadcasters,
Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 3 (Mar. 7, 2006) (observing that
American must have a more cohesive and comprehensive program among federal, state, and local governments to
prepare for disasters); see also Sprint-Nextel Jan. 30 Written Testimony at 4-5 (recognizing that there is a need to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the government agencies that are involved telecommunications restoration).

20



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

systems; (4) reviewing the impact of the hurricane on PSAPs and the procedures used to
re-route emergency calls; (5) examining whether and how the communications networks
could have provided greater 911 connectivity for private citizens; and (6) reviewing the
adequacy of emergency communications to the public before, during and after the
hurricane, and the best ways to alert and inform the public about emergencies in the
future. Steve Delahousey, Vice President - Operations, American Medical Response,
served as the Chair of this working group and Jim Jacot, Vice President, Cingular
Network Group, served as Vice-Chair.

Typically, discussion about various findings and recommendations occurred first within the
working groups. The working groups then presented draft findings and recommendations to the
full Panel for further discussion. Certain issues were referred back to the working groups for
additional discussion and revision.

The Panel held its final meeting on June 9, 2006. During this meeting, the Panel discussed the
final draft report, including recommendations to the Commission. The Panel then unanimously
approved this report for submission to the Commission.'!

'' The Panel would like to recognize and express appreciation to Lisa Fowlkes and Jean Ann Collins, the

Designated and Alternate Designated FACA Officers for the Panel, for their important contributions in enabling the
Panel to carry out its mission under the Charter. In addition, the Panel would like to thank Michael A. Lewis,
Thomas Dombrowsky, and Brendan T. Carr of Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP for their considerable assistance in
preparing this report.



Independent Panel Reviewing the impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

jurisdictions and with private sector and non-governmental organizations. Media
operations should be an integral part of the JIC.



Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

APPENDIX A

Members of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks

Chair: Nancy J. Victory, Partner, Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP

Carson Agnew, Executive Vice President, Mobile Satellite Ventures, LP

Michael R. Anderson, Chairman, PART-15.ORG

Robert G. (Gil) Bailey, ENP, Telecommunications Manager, Harrison County, MS Emergency
Communications Commission

Kevin Beary, Sheriff, Orange County, FL

Greg Bicket, Vice President/Regional Manager, Cox Communications

Lt. Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State Police

Steve Davis, Senior Vice President - Engineering, Clear Channel Radio

Robert G. Dawson, President & CEO, SouthernLINC Wireless

Stephen A. Dean, Fire Chief, City of Mobile, AL

Steve Delahousey, Vice President - Operations, American Medical Response

Dave Flessas, Vice President - Network Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp.

Martin D. Hadfield, Vice President - Engineering, Entercom Communications Corp.

Jim O. Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network Group

Tony Kent, Vice President - Engineering & Network Operations, Cellular South

Kelly Kirwan, Vice President - State and Local Government and Commercial Markets Division,
The Americas Group, Government, Enterprise, and Mobility Solutions, Motorola
Communications and Electronics, Inc

Jonathan D. Linkous, Executive Director, American Telemedicine Association

Adora Obi Nweze, Director, Hurricane Relief Efforts, NAACP; President, Florida State
Conference, NAACP; Member, National Board of Directors, NAACP

Eduardo Pena, Board Member, League of United Latin American Citizens

Billy Pitts, President of Government Affairs, The NTI Group

Major Michael Sauter, Commander, Office of Technology and Communications, New Orleans
Police Department

Marion Scott, Vice President - Operations, CenturyTel

Kay Sears, Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing, G2 Satellite Solutions, PanAmSat
Corporation

Edmund M. “Ted” Sexton, Sr., President, National Sheriffs Association

Edwin D. Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire Department

William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corporation

Patrick Yoes, President, Louisiana Fraternal Order of Police, National Secretary, Fraternal Order
of Police



independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

1. Public Safety Communications Networks. Public safety communications
networks are generally built to be reliable in extreme conditions.'* To ensure this, the systems
are planned to accommodate everyday peak service times as well as large incidents. They are
also designed to account for radio system disruptions, such as power outages, transmission
failures, system interconnect failures, and personal radio equipment failures. However, these
systems are generally not designed for widespread catastrophes of long duration — the situation
resulting from Katrina.'> As a result of the storm and its aftermath, public safety networks in the
Gulf states experienced a large number of transmission outages that impacted the functionality of
both primary and back-up systems. The loss of power and the failure of switches in the wireline
telephone network also had a huge impact on the ability of public safety systems to function.'*
Public safety personnel’s apparent lack of familiarity with the operation of back-up or alternate
systems (such as satellite systems) also limited functionality.

a. Tower Failures. In general, public safety’s antenna towers
remained standing after the storm. The winds did blow antennas out of alignment, requiring
readjustment. However, the main cause of transmission failures was loss of power (as discussed
below). Most public safety radio systems by design are able to handle and manage a single or
isolated subsystem failure or loss.'’ However, Katrina affected parts of four states, causing
transmission losses at a much greater number and over a larger area than public safety planning
had envisioned.

b. Power Failures. Power for radio base stations and battery/chargers
for portable radio devices are carefully planned for public safety systems. However, generators
are typically designed to keep base stations operating for 24 to 48 hours. The long duration of
power outages in the wake of Katrina substantially exceeded the capabilities of most of public
safety’s back-up generators and fuel reserves.’ 5 Similarly, portable radios and back-up batteries
generally have an 8 to 10 hour duty cycle.'? Without access to power to recharge the devices and
backup batteries, portable devices quickly ran out of power.

c. Wireline and Network Infrastructure Failures. Katrina and the
subsequent levee breaches caused significant failures of the Public Switched Telephone Network
(“PSTN”), particularly in the New Orleans area.”? Public safety radio networks rely on
interconnection with the PSTN or by fixed microwave links to get communications through to

'* See, e.g., Written Statement of Chief Harlin R. McEwen, Chairman, Communications and Technology

Committee, International Association of Chiefs of Police, at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “McEwen Mar. 6 Written
Statement”).

'S Id. at4.
'© See id. at 6.
"7 See id. at 5.
"8 See id.
"Id. até.
Id.