J-A05037-22

2022 PA Super 85

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 

COMPANY

v.

CHARLES DAVIS AND KEYSTONE 

AUTOMOTIVE OPERATIONS, INC.

v.

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

D/B/A THE HARTFORD INSURANCE 

GROUP AND THE HARTFORD 

INSURANCE GROUP, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND D/B/A THE HARTFORD AND THE 

HARTFORD,

Additional 

Defendants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 310 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 11, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 

2822-2007

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: MAY 9, 2022

Appellant, Charles Davis, appeals from the February 11, 2021 judgment 

entered in favor of Appellees, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, individually 

and d/b/a The Hartford Insurance Group and The Hartford Insurance Group, 

individually and d/b/a The Hartford and The Hartford (hereinafter, “Hartford”), 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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following the trial court’s order granting Hartford’s motion for summary 

judgment; denying Appellant’s counter motion for summary judgement; and 

vacating the arbitration award entered against Hartford on October 31, 2007 

and modified on February 8, 2008. After careful review, we vacate the 

judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case stems from a September 9, 2005 motor vehicle accident in 

which Appellant was injured while operating a vehicle owned by Keystone 

Automotive Operations, Inc. (“Keystone”) during the course and scope of his 

employment. The vehicle was insured by Hartford under a commercial 

automobile policy for the April 1, 2005 to April 1, 2006 policy term. This policy 

was first issued to Keystone in April 2002 and then renewed annually up and 

through the time of Appellant’s accident. The record reflects that it was the 

practice of Hartford to obtain an Underinsured Motorist (“UIM”) Coverage 

Rejection form for each policy term renewal. See “Action for Declaratory 

Judgment,” 3/16/07 at ¶¶ 8-10. Hartford obtained a Rejection of UIM 

Coverage form signed by the Executive Vice President of Keystone in 2003 but

failed to do so for the 2005-2006 policy at issue. Id. At the time of the 

accident, a Pennsylvania UIM Coverage Endorsement was appended to the 

2005-2006 policy, although the policy did not specify a limit of UIM coverage

for Pennsylvania. See notes of testimony – deposition, 7/5/14 at 49-50; notes 

of testimony – deposition, 7/23/15 at 197-199.

The trial court summarized the procedural history of this case as follows:
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[Appellant] filed a claim with Hartford for benefits by

correspondence dated October 17, 2005. The

Hartford Policy had a basket deductible of 

$3,750,000.00 with a $250,000.00 deductible for 

each accident involving multiple coverages within the 

Hartford Policy. 

In the October 17, 2005 letter, [Appellant] requested 

a certified copy of the Hartford policy so that he could 

determine the amount, if any, of [UIM] coverage 

available. After numerous failed attempts to contact 

Hartford, [Appellant] made a formal demand for 

Arbitration by correspondence dated November 17, 

2005. When this correspondence went unanswered,

[Appellant] filed a Writ of Summons against Hartford 

on December 16, 2005 in the Court of Common Pleas 

for Luzerne County. [Appellant] also filed a Petition 

requesting the Court appoint Hartford’s arbitrator and 

a neutral arbitrator. A Rule Returnable dated

December 17, 2005 was issued requiring Hartford to 

show cause as to why the Court should not appoint a 

neutral arbitrator and a hearing was scheduled for 

January 26, 2006. In an order dated January 23,

2006, the Court made its Rule Returnable absolute, 

by agreement of the parties, appointing a neutral 

arbitrator with Hartford also appointing its arbitrator 

at that time. 

For the next month, Hartford participated in the 

Arbitration process. In a letter dated February 28, 

2006, Hartford asserted that the subject policy did not 

include UIM benefits. On March 16, 2007, Hartford 

commenced the instant action seeking a declaratory 

judgment that the policy at issue does not provide UIM 

benefits. On March 21, 2007, Hartford filed a Motion 

to stay the pending UIM arbitration until there was a

determination of coverage pending in its declaratory 

judgment action, which was opposed by [Appellant]. 

Hartford’s Motion for Stay was denied in an order

dated April 23, 2007.

The claim went to Arbitration on October 30, 2007, 

and on October 31, 2007 the panel awarded the 

amount of $2,930,000.00 to [Appellant]. On 
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December 3, 2007, Hartford filed a Petition to Vacate 

or Modify the UIM Arbitration Award which is docketed 

to 2007-13910. [Appellant] opposed Hartford’s 

Motion in an Answer and Brief in Opposition filed on 

December 19, 2007. After briefing was complete in 

that matter, the Arbitration Award was modified from 

$2,930,150 to $2,000,000 to reflect the purported 

policy limits of the insurance policy at issue by Court 

Order dated and filed February 8, 2008. 

Trial court opinion, 5/4/21 at 2-5 (citations and footnotes omitted).

The question of whether the policy provided for UIM coverage remained 

undecided. Eventually, the stay of the action was lifted and on April 17, 2019, 

Hartford filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellant filed a counter 

motion for summary judgment of May 31, 2019. Following oral argument and 

the filing of supplemental briefs, the trial court entered an order on January 

11, 2021 denying both motions. On January 25, 2021, Hartford filed a motion 

requesting that the trial court reconsider its denial of the parties’ summary 

judgment motions. The trial court granted Hartford’s request on February 8, 

2021.

As noted, on February 11, 2021, the trial court entered an order 

granting Hartford’s motion for summary judgment; denying Appellant’s 

counter motion for summary judgement; and vacating the arbitration award 

entered against Hartford on October 31, 2007 and modified on February 8, 

2008. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Hartford that same day. 

In reaching this decision, the trial court found that the policy issued by 

Hartford for the 2005-2006 term did not specify a limit of UIM coverage for 
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Pennsylvania and, thus, the coverage limit was zero and the “Pennsylvania

UIM Coverage Endorsement” (Endorsement 60) appended thereto was a 

nullity. See trial court opinion, 5/4/21 at 15-20. The trial court further held

that Keystone effectively waived UIM coverage in Pennsylvania by executing 

a “Rejection of UIM Protection” form in 2003. Id. at 22-31. The trial court 

found that this form: (a) was applicable to the 2005-2006 policy, despite the 

fact that a new rejection form was never obtained for the 2005-2006 policy 

term; and (b) fully complied with Section 1731 of the Pennsylvania Motor 

Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1701-1799.7. Id. 

On March 5, 2021, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant

filed a six-page Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on March 24, 2021. The trial 

court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 4, 2021, indicating that it was 

relying on the reasoning set forth in its prior opinion and order entered 

February 11, 2021.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1 Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Policy 

issued by [Hartford] to [Keystone]for the 2005-

2006 term did not provide Pennsylvania [UIM]

Coverage despite the fact that a Pennsylvania 

[UIM] Coverage Endorsement was appended to 

the Policy?

2. With respect to the 2003 Rejection of [UIM]

Protection form, did the Trial Court err in: (a) 

finding that it was applicable to the 2005-2006 

Policy term; and (b) finding that it strictly 

complied with the requirements of the 

[Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 

Responsibility Law]?
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3. Did the Trial Court similarly err in dismissing the 

extracontractual bad faith claims once it 

determined that the 2005-2006 Policy term did 

not provide Pennsylvania [UIM] Coverage?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

Our standard of review of a trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment is well settled:

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial 

court only where it is established that the [trial] court 

committed an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

with all questions of law, our review is plenary. 

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter 

summary judgment, we focus on the legal standard 

articulated in the summary judgment rule. The rule 

states that where there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a 

matter of law, summary judgment may be entered. 

Where the non-moving party bears the burden of 

proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his 

pleadings or answers in order to survive summary 

judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to adduce 

sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case 

and on which it bears the burden of proof establishes 

the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a 

matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all 

doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving 

party.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261-1262 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 governs motions for 

summary judgment and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within 

such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party 

may move for summary judgment in whole or in part 

as a matter of law

(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any 

material fact as to a necessary element of the cause 

of action or defense which could be established by 

additional discovery or expert report, or

(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to 

the motion, including the production of expert reports, 

an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at 

trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential 

to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial 

would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.

We begin by addressing Appellant’s first two claims simultaneously. 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the 2005-2006 policy 

issued by Hartford did not provide for UIM coverage at the time of his 

automobile accident, despite the fact that a UIM Coverage Endorsement was 

appended to thereto. Appellant’s brief at 11-20. Appellant also contends that 

the trial court erred in concluding that the “Rejection of UIM Protection” form 

executed by Keystone in 2003 was applicable to the 2005-2006 policy term. 

Id. at 22-27. Following our careful review, we agree

It is well settled in this Commonwealth that in interpreting an 

automobile insurance policy, “a court must view the policy in its entirety, 

giving effect to all of its provisions.” Continental Cas. Co. v. Pro Machine, 

916 A.2d 1111, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). “An insurance 

policy must be read as a whole, and not in discrete units.” Clarke v. MMG 
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Ins. Co., 100 A.3d 271, 276 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 294 (Pa. 2015). “[The]

interpretation of an insurance policy presents a pure question of law, over 

which our standard of review is de novo.” Erie Ins. Exch. v. King, 246 A.3d 

332, 336 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, 259 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2021).

Pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (hereinafter, 

“MVFRL”), motor vehicle liability insurance carriers are required to offer the 

named insured UIM liability coverage, unless such coverage is rejected in 

accordance with the statute. Subsection 1731(a) of the MVFRL provides as 

follows:

(a) Mandatory offering.-- No motor vehicle liability 

insurance policy shall be delivered or issued for 

delivery in this Commonwealth, with respect to any 

motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this 

Commonwealth, unless uninsured motorist and 

underinsured motorist coverages are offered therein 

or supplemental thereto in amounts as provided in 

section 1734 (relating to request for lower limits of 

coverage). Purchase of uninsured motorist and 

underinsured motorist coverages is optional.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731(a).

Under the MVFRL, insurers are also required to inform named insureds 

that they may reject UIM coverage by signing a written rejection form set 

forth in Subsection 1731(c). See id. § 1731(c). 

Subsection 1731(c.1) further provides that if an insurer’s UIM coverage 

rejection form does not “specifically comply” with Section 1731, then UIM 
J-A05037-22

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coverage shall be equal to the policy’s bodily injury liability limits. Specifically, 

Subsection 1731(c.1) states as follows:

(c.1) Form of waiver.--Insurers shall print the 

rejection forms required by subsections (b) and (c) on 

separate sheets in prominent type and location. The 

forms must be signed by the first named insured and 

dated to be valid. The signatures on the forms may be 

witnessed by an insurance agent or broker. Any 

rejection form that does not specifically comply with 

this section is void. If the insurer fails to produce a 

valid rejection form, uninsured or underinsured 

coverage, or both, as the case may be, under that 

policy shall be equal to the bodily injury liability limits. 

On policies in which either uninsured or underinsured 

coverage has been rejected, the policy renewals must 

contain notice in prominent type that the policy does 

not provide protection against damages caused by 

uninsured or underinsured motorists. Any person who 

executes a waiver under subsection (b) or (c) shall be 

precluded from claiming liability of any person based 

upon inadequate information.

Id. § 1731(c.1).

Here, the record reflects that the policy at issue expressly provided for 

UIM coverage at the time of Appellant’s September 9, 2005 accident. It is 

undisputed that the 2005-2006 policy issued by Hartford contained a UIM 

Coverage Endorsement. Additionally, the UIM Coverage Endorsement was 

referenced on both the Declarations Pages and in the List of Policy Provisions 

and Endorsements. See Hartford’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 4/17/19, 

Exhibit M – Hartford Policy, 2005-2006 Policy Term. 

As discussed, under the MVFRL, “Section 1731 mandates that an 

insurance company issuing a policy in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
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must provide UM/UIM coverage equal to the bodily injury liability coverage, 

unless the insured validly rejects UM/UIM coverage or validly requests lower 

limits of coverage pursuant to section 1734.” Weilacher v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 65 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted); see 

also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731(c.1).

The insurance policy issued by Hartford to Keystone and in effect at the 

time of Appellant’s accident provided $2,000,000.00 in liability coverage. 

Thus, absent a valid and specific rejection for the 2005-2006 policy term, the 

Pennsylvania UIM coverage limit was also $2,000,000.00.

Hartford would have this Court find that the UIM Coverage Endorsement 

was issued as a result of a “clerical error” and the Rejection of UIM Coverage 

form executed by Keystone in 2003 was applicable to the 2005-2006 policy. 

See Hartford’s brief at 10. We decline to do so. 

Hartford acknowledged that a signed Rejection of UIM Coverage form 

was never obtained from Keystone for the 2005-2006 policy term, pursuant 

to its own policies and procedures, and it specifically appended the UIM 

Coverage Endorsement to the 2005-2006 policy. Contrary to the trial court’s 

findings, there was also no valid and specific rejection of the UIM coverage for 

the policy in effect at the time of the accident.

It is immaterial that the policy issued by Hartford for the 2005-2006 

term did not specify a limit of UIM coverage for Pennsylvania. Pursuant to the 

MVFRL, liability and UIM coverages must be co-extensive unless rejected in 
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accordance with Subsection 1731. See id. Instantly, no Rejection of UIM 

Coverage form was ever executed by Keystone for 2005-2006 policy term, 

and thus, by operation of law, the policy at issue was required to provide UIM 

coverage in an amount equal to the liability coverage of that policy, 

$2,000,000.00.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court failed to give full 

effect to all the terms of the 2005-2006 policy, namely, the UIM Coverage 

Endorsement appended thereto. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hartford; vacate the February 

11, 2021 judgment; and remand for proceeding consistent with this opinion.1

Judgment vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/09/2022

____________________________________________

1

In light of our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s remaining claim 

of trial court error.