Report of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

Nuclear Weapon Effects 

Test, Evaluation, and Simulation 

April 2005 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal 

Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary 

of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this 

report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of 

Defense. 

This report is UNCLASSIFIED. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................ 1

I. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 5

1.1 The Changing Threat Environment ............................................................5 

1.2 Key Trends in U.S. Capabilities ............................................................................... 7

1.3 Definitions and Organization of the Report...............................................7 

II. CHAPTER 2: THE CURRENT AND EMERGING NUCLEAR 

THREAT AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS .................................................... 9

2.1 Trends in Adversary Capabilities as a Context for Analysis...................9 

2.2 Projection of Capabilities and Scenarios of Potential Nuclear Use 

Against the U.S....................................................................................................11 

Strategic Exchanges.....................................................................................11 

Non-Strategic Exchanges............................................................................12 

Terrorist Attacks ..........................................................................................13 

 2.3 Special Cases.................................................................................................14 

Missile Defense ............................................................................................14 

High-Altitude EMP Attacks.......................................................................15 

 2.4 Survivability Concerns................................................................................16 

III. CHAPTER 3: TRANSLATING THREAT TO REQUIREMENTS .......19

3.1 Current Service, Agency, and System Practices ......................................19 

U.S. Army .....................................................................................................19 

U.S. Navy......................................................................................................20 

U.S. Air Force ...............................................................................................21 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA)................................................................21 

Command and Control (C2) ......................................................................22 

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) .............................22 

3.2 Transitioning from Requirements to Capabilities-Based 

Acquisition...........................................................................................................23 

Evolutionary Strategy .................................................................................23 

Assuring Joint Capabilities ........................................................................23 

 3.3 Nuclear Survivability – A Reduced Priority in the Joint Process?.........24 

 3.4 Nuclear Survivability for In-Place Forces..................................................25 

IV. WEAPON OUTPUT CALCULATIONS .................................................................27 

4.1 The Red Book................................................................................................27 

4.2 Uncertainties in the Calculations...............................................................28 
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4.3 Variabilities in the Calculations .................................................................28 

4.4 Programmatic Observations.......................................................................29 

V. HARDENING SYSTEMS AND ASSESSING COMPLIANCE – 

PAST AND PRESENT ................................................................................................................31

5.1 Design Strategies..........................................................................................31 

5.2 The Hardening Process and Design Assessment ....................................32 

5.3 Nuclear Weapon Effects Simulators..........................................................34 

Prompt γ Simulators....................................................................................34 

Prompt Neutron Simulators ......................................................................35 

X-ray Simulators ..........................................................................................36 

Modified Neutron/Gamma Simulators ....................................................38 

EMP Simulators ...........................................................................................38 

Impulse Simulators .....................................................................................39 

Blast Simulators ...........................................................................................40 

5.4 Modeling and Simulation ...........................................................................40 

5.5 Surveillance...................................................................................................41 

5.6 Underground Nuclear Effects Testing......................................................42 

5.7 Current Business Models ............................................................................44 

DOE Program...............................................................................................44 

Issues and Trends Impacting NNSA NWE Programs ...........................45 

DoD Requirements......................................................................................47 

DTRA Nuclear Weapon Effects Technology Program...........................47 

DTRA Program Execution..........................................................................48 

VI. HARDENING SYSTEMS AND ASSESSING COMPLIANCE – 

THE FUTURE....................................................................................................................................51 

6.1 Evolving Design Strategies.........................................................................51 

6.2 Future Radiation Hardened Technology Challenges .............................51 

6.3 Future Requirements for Nuclear Weapon Effects Simulators.............53 

6.4 Improved Modeling and Simulation.........................................................54 

6.5 Surveillance...................................................................................................54 

6.6 A New Business Model...............................................................................55 

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS. ........................................................... 57 

7.1 Summary of the Findings ...........................................................................57 

7.2 Recommendations: Assuring Capabilities ...............................................58 

7.3 Recommendations: Simulators and Simulation ......................................60 

7.4 Deferring the Roadmap...............................................................................61 
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APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................................63

A. Terms of Reference......................................................................................63 

B. Task Force Participants...............................................................................65 

C. DTRA/NNSA Memorandum of Understanding ....................................67 

D. Missile Defense Agency..............................................................................73 

E. U.S. Army Survivability Procedures ........................................................79 

F. U.S. Navy Survivability Procedures .........................................................85 

G. U.S. Air Force Survivability Procedures ..................................................91 

H. Department of Energy ..............................................................................105 

I. DTRA Assessment of NWE Capabilities & Gaps .................................111 

J. Acronyms....................................................................................................115 

K. List of Briefings Received by the Task Force.........................................117 

L. Congressional & NNSA Actions During the Review 

of this Report .....................................................................................................121 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects (NWE) Test, 

Evaluation and Simulation was undertaken with the overall goal of providing a 

comprehensive evaluation of current and future Department of Defense (DoD) 

processes for assuring successful operation in nuclear environments. As directed by the 

Terms of Reference, we have assessed opponent capabilities and DoD processes for 

establishing and enforcing hardness goals. These assessments have considered the 

emergence of terrorism as a major threat to the U.S. homeland and deployed forces 

abroad, the asymmetric attractiveness of the use of nuclear weapons to offset U.S. 

conventional superiority, and the growing evidence of proliferation of nuclear-capable 

states. We have also evaluated the evolution of DoD and Department of Energy (DOE) 

modeling, simulation, and above-ground testing capabilities since the cessation of 

underground testing to understand our ability to qualify hardened systems. The results 

of this Task Force were developed independent of, but are highly consistent with, the 

findings and recommendations of the Congressionally mandated Electromagnetic Pulse 

(EMP) Commission.1

Principal findings of this Task Force are: 

 Despite the reduction of the threat of strategic nuclear exchange, it is becoming 

more, not less, likely that U.S. forces will have to operate in a nuclear 

environment in regional operations. This is driven by the proliferation of nuclear 

weapon capabilities and the attractiveness of nuclear weapons as an offset to U.S. 

conventional superiority and as a counter to U.S. preemptive doctrine. 

 It is essential that U.S. forces retain the capability to conduct conventional 

operations after limited nuclear use by opponents. 

 Trends in acquisition and conventional military operations over the past 15 years 

have created a set of factors that should make decision makers concerned about 

the survivability of critical warfighting elements in a nuclear environment. 

These include the shift to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) based electronics, 

aging of key systems, the growing reliance on historically “soft” C4ISR2 assets, 

the general neglect of nuclear hardening as a requirement, and the general 

neglect of nuclear environments as a factor in gaming and exercises. The bottom 

 

1 Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, July 

2004.

2 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
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line is that commanders and planners cannot be assured that today’s weapons 

platforms, command and control (C2), intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance (ISR), and associated support systems will be available should a 

nuclear detonation occur. 

 Across Service and Joint systems, there are highly uneven approaches to 

assessing the need for nuclear survivability and assuring the proper processes in 

either acquisition or concept of operations (CONOPs) development to ensure 

successful operations in nuclear environments. 

 The shift in acquisition from threat-based requirements to capabilities-based 

development supporting Joint operations offers an opportunity to develop and 

apply uniform survivability tools and assurance processes across a range of 

systems and operations. These elements must be developed and applied 

through scenarios that test warplans in circumstances of operational nuclear use. 

 The deployment of Missile Defense Agency (MDA) systems presents both 

technical and procurement challenges that are unlike those of previous 

experience, but could serve as a flagship with respect to addressing nuclear 

hardening in the context of an evolutionary acquisition strategy. 

 There remains a base of DoD personnel and facilities to accomplish many nuclear 

weapon effects test and evaluation needs, but it is fragile and has eroded 

significantly in the past 15 years. 

 DOE components of nuclear weapons must also be survivable in nuclear 

environments. The integrated DOE system for assuring nuclear warhead 

hardening in the absence of underground testing, using modeling and simulation 

as well as testing with simulators, has been more robust and become more 

technically advanced than the DoD equivalent over the past decade. This is a 

result of not only of DOE’s explicit support for nuclear survivability, but also 

investment in advanced codes and computers and large parallel investments in 

radiation, pulsed power and fusion science and technology. Many of these new 

capabilities and advances at DOE are of direct benefit to, or can be leveraged by, 

DoD.3 

 

3 See Appendix L for a summary of Congressional actions of concern affecting DOE that occurred during 

review of this report. 
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The following recommendations are based on the principle that the Department of 

Defense/Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services need to 

accept that the ability to assure the nuclear survivability of critical national security 

systems is an inherent governmental responsibility. The capabilities to support this 

endeavor – in particular, advanced code development and simulator infrastructure 

maintenance and improvements – cannot be met by the private sector. The principal 

recommendations of this Task Force can be summarized as follows: 

1) In order to reinstate nuclear survivability as a considered need: 

a) The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) should assure that the 

Department promptly and carefully considers the recommendations of the EMP 

Commission and this Task Force, prioritizes corrective actions, and provides 

appropriate funding, with the authorities of the Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense (National Center for Biodefense) [ATSD(NCB)] reaffirmed to assure 

follow through; 

b) The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Requirements and Integration 

(OJCS/J8) should ensure that nuclear threats and survivability assessments are 

addressed through the reference scenarios of the Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System (JCIDS) process; 

c) Waivers to survivability requirements for new or modified systems should be 

granted only by agreement of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD/AT&L) and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (VJCS) in the context of Joint operations; and 

d) The DEPSECDEF should direct the Services to assess the hardness of critical 

current operational components and the impact on overall operations should 

they fail to operate in a nuclear environment. Where serious issues are 

identified, operational and/or hardening fixes should be developed, approved by 

ATSD(NCB) and implemented. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

should serve as the principal technical resource to aid the Services in such efforts. 

2) ATSD(NCB) should direct DTRA to serve as the DoD lead to establish a coordinated 

DoD/DOE program in which expertise, codes and test facilities are optimally 

supported, shared and used. 

a) Such a coordinated program should include investment plans and business 

models that support the needs of both departments to conduct research and 
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development (R&D), to support agency and Service users, and to provide 

contractor/supplier access to the facilities. 

b) An immediate need is agreement between DoD and DOE on the long term 

plan to assure continued availability of a prompt neutron source. 

c) The two departments should also ensure the operation of a sufficient suite of 

EMP simulators, as also recommended by the EMP Commission, to meet the 

needs of both conventional and nuclear warfighting systems. 

d) Agreements between the two departments should be institutionalized 

through amendments to the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding 

between DTRA and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).4

3) MDA should convene a group of experts from across the community (DoD and its 

contractors, NNSA and its labs) to sort through the options for assessing and 

qualifying its system to the HAENS5 standard in the context of its evolutionary 

development process. 

a) Existing simulators coupled with the advances in modeling being made 

through DOE’s Radiation Effects Science and Advanced Simulation and 

Computing (ASC) programs appear sufficient to meet MDA’s needs, so that 

further investment in the DECADE facility is not warranted. 

 

4 See Appendix C for the text of the current MOU. 

5 High Altitude, Exo-atomspheric Nuclear Survivability 
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CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1 The Changing Threat Environment 

For the most part, our Nation’s current capability to address NWE testing, 

evaluation, and simulation is a legacy from the Cold War. The U.S. was focused on an 

adversary with the capability to launch a massive nuclear attack and possessing a 

substantial numerical superiority of conventional ground troops. Our nuclear weapons 

were viewed as a deterrent against the massive attack as well as a hedge against 

conventional attack. It was clear that many of our military systems might be required to 

survive and operate reliably in a hostile nuclear environment. The evaluation and 

definition of the necessary survivability levels were therefore a rigorous part of the DoD 

acquisition process, and many of the resulting components and systems were usually 

built around “radiation hard” technologies and methods developed specifically for 

government use and at government expense. Experimental validation of the 

survivability of these hardened systems was achieved by a series of exposures to 

radiation simulators at as near threat level as possible. The “final exam” came with 

threat level exposure in an underground nuclear explosion. Computational modeling 

was used as an adjunct to the exposure experiments but was severely limited by 

computational horsepower in its ability to model the complex shapes and materials of 

actual components and experiments. 

Although the number of stockpiled nuclear weapons (by all parties) was quite 

large during the Cold War, the number of nuclear nation states was small and all 

possessed rigorous systems of C2 over their nuclear arsenals. This helped to add a 

degree of stability and predictability throughout this period in the nation’s history. 

The Cold War ended more than a decade ago and much has changed since the 

collapse of the Soviet Union in ways that significantly alter the manner in which we 

must go about the business of determining operational capabilities and judging the 

need for nuclear survivability across the spectrum of warfighting systems, both 

strategic and non-strategic. Foreign nuclear activities worldwide are not negligible and 

it is clear that the future will not be nuclear-free. 

Although the U.S. no longer appears to face the immediate threat of a massive 

nuclear exchange, we now live in a much more complex and unpredictable nuclear 

world. There has been unprecedented proliferation of nuclear technology, nuclear 
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weapons, and potential delivery platforms. The U.S. now faces smaller but more 

numerous adversaries that possess or may acquire nuclear weapons in a geopolitical 

environment where alliances can, and do, change rapidly. While C2 of nuclear 

weapons remains strong in the U.S. and in other major nuclear powers, proliferation 

and weak nuclear states are creating a much higher probability of loss of control of a 

nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a rogue nation or a terrorist group 

is a real possibility. 

Current concerns range from the terrestrial use of a nuclear device for gaining an 

asymmetric advantage in a conventional conflict to the detonation of a nuclear device at 

high altitude to produce an EMP for the purpose of disrupting electronic systems and 

impacting infrastructures required to support operations in both military and civilian 

sectors. This latter use would almost certainly enhance the earth’s radiation belts with 

fission electrons in a manner that would reduce satellite lifetimes with significant 

consequences for the reconnaissance, communications, navigation and commercial 

space communities.6 Detonation at lower altitudes would probably not have so 

widespread an effect, but could be tailored to disable “soft” military systems in a more 

localized theater of operations. 

The nuclear threat environment has therefore become more diffuse, uncertain, 

and difficult to characterize, but it has not gone away. Over the past decade, the U.S. 

has built up a competent and highly capable conventional force which surpasses that of 

our potential adversaries. The acquisition of nuclear weapons as a hedge against 

overwhelming conventional force superiority is now more important to our adversaries 

than it is to the U.S. The view of nuclear weapons as a potential war-fighting tool is 

more prevalent in many nations and groups than it is in the U.S. Tactical use of a 

nuclear weapon on the battlefield is a growing possibility. The U.S. must retain the 

ability to conduct both conventional and nuclear operations after nuclear use by 

others. Critical space systems and missile defense must operate in a nuclear 

environment and our strategic systems must continue to be survivable to nuclear 

effects. Moreover, our conventional systems must be subjected to a hard look at how 

survivable they would be in a battlefield nuclear environment – a factor not seriously 

considered for some time. This may require hardening, redundancy, operational 

changes, rapid reconstitution, or combinations thereof to achieve an effective 

survivability strategy.

 

6 Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States of Electromangentic Pulse (EMP) Attack, July 

2004. 
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1.2 Key Trends in U.S. Capabilities 

An important trend has resulted from the cessation of underground nuclear 

testing. The rapid growth of computational capabilities has driven a major shift in the 

approach to the testing and validation of nuclear effects and survivability. No longer 

do we have the luxury of the full-scale test to validate a given design in a “real” threat 

environment. The validity must be inferred from a combination of intelligent design 

rules, above-ground simulator experiments, and sophisticated computer models. 

Computer modeling in conjunction with simulator experiments is maturing to become 

the cornerstone of nuclear effects evaluation. This shift in approach is especially 

important as we attempt to evaluate nuclear effects on large, complex, highly 

interconnected systems where experimental testing is not feasible. 

A feature of the recent, rapid evolution of our defense technology is the growing 

dependence on COTS components, particularly electronics hardware and computer 

software. While such commercial equipment provides tremendous capability at 

reduced cost, the components are typically not radiation hardened because there is little 

commercial incentive to make them so. It is a unique government responsibility to 

develop and maintain the test and validation technologies and skills necessary to 

produce military systems that will operate reliably and predictably in a nuclear 

environment. This is particularly important as the acquisition process moves to spiral 

or evolutionary development in which major block changes are planned from the onset, 

but nuclear hardening is often deferred to later phases. The radiation effect design and 

evaluation technologies must be in place to support the planned evolution, but it is 

critical that the basic design concepts are consistent with hardening the subsequent 

hardware iterations unless DoD is prepared to accept much higher costs for redesigned 

systems – or continue to accept yet another spiral of “soft” capability. 

1.3 Definitions and Organization of the Report 

In the context of this fundamentally different future, this DSB Task Force was 

established to conduct a comprehensive assessment of DoD needs for a nuclear weapon 

effects enterprise, including test facilities, modeling and simulation capabilities, and a 

healthy base of expertise in relevant areas, to assure responsible NWE hardening and 

validation of systems in current and emerging threat environments. In its broadest 

usage, NWE includes effect on our assets (survivability, vulnerability) and the assets of 

others (lethality, collateral effects); but in this report, we focus on the effects on our 

assets. Nuclear survivability of a military system is the ability of that system to perform 

its intended functions with no more than acceptable degradation during or after 
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exposure to specified natural, intrinsic, diagnostic, hostile, and/or fratricide radiation 

and nuclear environments. The principal environmental context considered in this 

report is hostile environments. 

The report addresses the current and emerging threat environment over the next 

decade (Chapter 2) and discusses how that threat translates into capabilities (and 

attendant requirements) (Chapter 3). A particularly important issue that underpins 

nuclear effects evaluation deals with our understanding of weapon outputs, a topic 

treated as a focus subject in Chapter 4. Current approaches and methods intrinsic to 

the hardening and validation process are addressed in Chapter 5; whereas the future 

strategy and associated business models for the NWE testing and validation enterprise 

are addressed in Chapter 6. Finally, recommendations for revitalizing and sustaining a 

national capability are delineated in Chapter 7. Several appendices are also included to 

provide relevant details supporting principal report themes. 
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CHAPTER 2 

THE CURRENT AND EMERGING NUCLEAR THREAT 

AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 

2.1 Trends in Adversary Capabilities as a Context for Analysis 

Nowhere has the end of the Cold War had a more profound effect on national 

security policy than in the area of nuclear weapons. Dramatic changes continue to 

occur in the source and nature of the nuclear threat to the U.S. and as discussed in 

Chapter 1, the future world will not be nuclear-free. Although nuclear weapons will 

have much less impact in political and military calculations than at the height of the 

Cold War, it appears that they will have a significant, albeit different, role in the years 

ahead. Importantly, the attitude of many other countries regarding nuclear weapons is 

evolving in a manner quite different from ours, with selected nations viewing nuclear 

weapons as a legitimate, asymmetric war fighting tool.7 This Task Force believes that 

the U.S. is, unavoidably, entering a future in which the probability of nuclear weapon 

use by others is higher than during the Cold War. The U.S. must create resources agile 

enough to confront the nuclear challenges of the next 15 years. Considerations must 

include three categories of nuclear threats: peer nuclear nations, emerging nuclear 

nations, and terrorists. 

Peer states, specifically Russia and China, continue to advance their nuclear 

weapons capabilities. In addition to stockpile safety and reliability issues, Russian 

investment includes work on new designs and testing protocols over a range of 

applications.8 For example, President Putin recently announced the development of a 

new class of nuclear weapons designed to penetrate our developing National Missile 

Defense System. China has launched the first in a new class of ballistic missile 

submarines that will carry intercontinental missiles capable of hitting targets in the U.S. 

without ever leaving protected waters of the Chinese coast. 

Although the U.S. cannot ignore the possibility for strategic engagements 

between peers, the unclassified literature underscores the increasing importance of 

nuclear use by Russia (and others) in non-strategic engagements as an offset to 

 

7 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental 

Experts, December 2000 

8 Remarks of Defense Minister Ivanov: Russian Views of Nuclear Weapons as a Basis for Global Stability,

Moscow Interfax (in English), July 2004.
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conventional strength of neighboring adversaries.9 Even if the U.S. is not involved in 

the initial stages of regional conflicts, the potential exists to be subsequently drawn in to 

aid our allies. Strategies, doctrine, and new low yield weaponry are maturing to make 

nuclear environments a recognized operational reality for other countries in a range of 

engagements. The U.S. must be prepared for a world in which at least some existing 

and future nuclear powers perceive an advantage in improving, expanding, and 

brandishing their nuclear arsenals. 

 

With respect to emerging nuclear states, the roster of nuclear-capable nations 

during the next decade or two is likely to lengthen, not shorten. The attitudes of these 

nations regarding nuclear weapons vary widely, as do their views of the U.S.; neither is 

static. Views regarding the role of nuclear weapons by current regimes in North Korea 

and Pakistan, both of which aggressively threaten provocation, proliferation and use for 

diplomatic and military purposes, contrast with India’s views, which are largely 

deterrence based.10 The role of Pakistani scientists in the proliferation of nuclear knowhow and technologies cannot be ignored, for they serve as seed for the worldwide 

global nuclear community of the next decade. Moreover, rogue states, such as North 

Korea and Iran, may also be developing the capability to pose a nuclear threat to the 

U.S. and its military forces, which may be unpredictable and difficult to deter.11

Terrorist groups pose an even more complex problem. These groups have no 

state identity, may have only one or a few weapons, and are motivated to attack the 

U.S. without regard for their own safety. There are a growing number of militant 

Islamic groups in addition to al-Qaeda that continue to advertise their intent to strike 

the U.S.9. In addition, other non-Islamic terrorist and insurgent groups, such as the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), may evolve to become a threat to the 

U.S. and its allies. Moreover, other non-traditional emerging threats from non-state 

actors, such as anti-globalization activists and organized crime, may complicate the U.S. 

counterterrorism mission as well as frustrate other political, economic, and 

technological goals.10 Interest in terrorist groups acquiring a nuclear weapon is not 

new. While the capability for terrorist organizations to prosecute a nuclear EMP attack 

 

9 Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (in Russian), Weekly independent military newspaper 

published by Boris Berezovskiy-financed Nezavisimaya Gaseta. 

10 N Korea Wants Nukes to Reduce Cost on Military, Reuters, July 9. 2003; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The 

Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, New York Harper Collins, 1999 

11 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental 

Experts, December 2000. 

9 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Threat of International Terrorism, June 2000.

10 National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear 

Facilities and Military Forces, February 2002. 
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against U.S. military forces cannot be ruled out, the scenarios of greater concern for 

terrorist usage of a nuclear weapon involve terrestrial detonations (producing blast, 

shock, thermal, and fallout effects), likely in urban areas with civilian populations and 

facilities as the target. 

2.2 Projection of Capabilities and Scenarios of Potential Nuclear Use Against the 

U.S. 

The scenarios of concern over the next decade or two may be correlated with the 

actors discussed in the previous section. A profile of these concerns and their ranking 

by the Task Force as High, Medium, or Low is shown in Figure 2.1 below. Using the 

categories outlined above, several additional issues should be noted regarding potential 

scenarios involving nuclear weapons. These are discussed below. 

Scenario 

Concerns 

Strategic 

Exchange 

Non-Strategic 

Exchange 

Terrorist Use 

High Red 

Medium Green 

Low Blue 

Figure 2.1 Scenario concerns and potential future use of nuclear weapons 

Scenario 

1. Large-scale strategic exchange of nuclear arsenals (Cold War scenario) 

2. Limited, non-strategic (tactical) nuclear use by peers or Nth tier powers 

3. Use by terrorists 

Concerns regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the next 15-20 years 

1. High (red) 

2. Medium (green) 

3. Low (blue) 

Strategic Exchanges 

It is not difficult to imagine future political situations that would prompt marked 

increases in tensions between three major nuclear powers, on a pair-wise basis. U.S. – 

China relations could erode over Taiwan; U.S – Russian relations could sour over 

conflicts between Russia and U.S. allies and friends; Russia-China relations might turn 

hostile over border conflicts; other regional issues might escalate in a manner that 
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ensnares the U.S. In the extreme, any of these might result in a strategic exchange, 

although these circumstances are perceived as quite remote by the leadership of 

involved countries.11 Although the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia will likely continue 

to be reduced, it must be remembered that such trends are easily reversed. The Cold 

War clearly demonstrated that with will and resolve, a technologically advanced nation 

can develop and produce thousands of nuclear weapons, involving hundreds of 

megatons of yield in just a few years. The striking slope of these build-ups is shown in 

Figure 2.2 below.12

Figure 2.2 Stockpile Development Profile---Numbers of Weapons by Decade 

Although not a driving future contingency, this potential underscores the 

prudence of assuring that our small backbone of legacy strategic systems are viable and 

not allowed to erode. 

Non-Strategic Exchanges 

Many nuclear nations, including major players and aspirants, particularly those 

with limitations in their conventional forces, view nuclear weapons as an equalizer to 

overwhelming conventional superiority. Public statements, military writing and field 

 

11 Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Responses to Questions for the Record, in Senate Committee 

on Intelligence, United States Senate, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, 

February 11, 2003. 

12 Michael Light, 100 Suns, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2003. 

0

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USSR/R

40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s

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exercises in Russia, for example, underscore the operational value of nuclear weapons 

to the Russian military in a range of non-strategic conflicts. In fact, 

“...nuclear weapons are now the main and a relatively cheap means of deterrence, 

and during an emergency period the main weapon for conducting combat operations 

to ensure the territorial integrity of Russia and it allies.”13 

 

The potential exists for the U.S. to be drawn into such a conflict in which its 

troops and systems would be exposed to a nuclear environment including both ionizing 

and electromagnetic radiation. Within this context, U.S. forces would be particularly 

vulnerable at times when forces are massed, e.g., a Navy Carrier Battle Group, a 

deployed Air Force Wing of aircraft, and/or Army or Marine divisions during 

debarkation and forward-movement operations. Adversaries would seek to gain 

significantly in terms of anti-access and overall asymmetric advantage. The Task Force 

has seen these circumstances exercised on a limited basis in war games such as the 

Carlyle Barracks War Games and encourage a much more frequent use of a limited 

number of nuclear weapons in operational planning scenario assessments, scripted 

gaming activities, and in field experiments involving operational resources. This 

scenario usage is discussed further in Chapter 3. 

Terrorist Attacks 

“For five centuries only a state could destroy another state...We are entering a period, 

however, when very small numbers of persons, operating with enormous power of 

modern computers, biogenetics, air transport, and even nuclear weapons, can deal 

lethal blows to any society.” 14

Today, and unfortunately well into the future, non-state actors appear motivated 

to inflict massive damage on the United States. Official reports are unambiguous, for 

example, about al Qaeda’s intent to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear weapons to cause mass casualties in the western world and among those 

that support the west.15 However, 

“...If al Qaeda and Usama bin Laden were to disappear tomorrow, the United States 

would still face potential terrorists threats from a growing number of groups opposed to 

 

13 Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 2004 (weekly independent military newspaper 

published by boris Berezovskiy- finanaced Nezavisimaya Gaeseta).

14 Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 2002

15 Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects, May 2003
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perceived American hegemony. Moreover, new terrorist threats can suddenly emerge 

from isolated conspiracies or obscure cults with no previous history of violence.”16 

To the extent that recent events characterize the future, terrorist groups are likely 

to target icons of American society with a goal of human casualty. Attacks are likely to 

be directed toward civilian targets in urban areas where heat, blast and fallout are the 

dominant problems. Almost none of our civilian systems are designed to operate in a 

nuclear environment. Additionally, terrorist groups might attempt to detonate a 

nuclear device at high altitude to generate an EMP (see discussion in Section 2.3). It is 

unlikely that these groups would have access to a specifically designed EMP weapon; 

but even crudely designed nuclear devices can produce significant impacts on 

electronic and communications systems. Again, while terrorist capabilities to conduct 

an EMP attack cannot be ruled out, the terrorist use of most concern involves a ground 

detonation of a nuclear device.

2.3 Special Cases 

Missile Defense 

Nuclear environments may result from missile defense intercepts occurring 

within either a strategic or non-strategic context, if a nuclear weapon is delivered by an 

adversary missile. Within today’s context, this could occur if the threat missile employs 

a nuclear-armed re-entry vehicle that is salvage fused, i.e., designed to detonate if 

impacted by a kinetic interceptor of the type being developed by the United States. 

These environments would be produced at high altitude and likely result in global 

effects, including both EMP and enhanced space-radiation environments. These effects 

could be produced over the open ocean in the case of a mid-course intercept of some 

threats over the Pacific, or over the country that launched the missile.17 In the latter 

case, U.S. forces deployed in the theater could also be subject to EMP and other 

collateral effects of the engagement. 

The above circumstances underscore the importance of developing missile 

defense kill vehicles that can operate in a nuclear environment produced either by 

direct attack by an adversary or by the explosion resulting from intercepting an 

incoming nuclear warhead. The operational requirements attending these engagement 

scenarios are discussed in detail in the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) HAENS 

 

16 National Council on Terrorism, Countering the Threat of International Terrorism, June 7, 2000

17 Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threats Through 2015, Unclassified Summary of National 

Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, December 2001
 - 15 - 

standard. This nuclear environment standard was created by the MDA as a basis for 

system hardness considerations to be addressed with each cycle of system acquisition. 

Issues related to this standard and its impact on U.S. nuclear weapons effects testing 

and simulation needs are discussed in subsequent chapters of this report. The 

description of the MDA system concept and acquisition strategy is described in more 

detail in Appendix D. 

High-Altitude EMP Attacks 

An intense pulse of electromagnetic energy is produced (as is an enhanced spaceradiation environment) when a nuclear weapon is detonated above approximately 40 

km altitude. The scope of this phenomena and its potential use by a number of nuclear 

players, as well as its consequences for electronics systems were the subject of a 

Congressional Commission that recently finished a two-year effort to characterize this 

effect and its implications, particularly on the U.S. infrastructure. Refer to the 

Commission’s report,18 which is partially quoted below: 

“The high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is one of 

a small number of threats that has the potential to hold our society 

seriously at risk and might result in significant degradation of our military forces. 

Briefly, a single nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude above the United States 

will interact with the Earth’s atmosphere, ionosphere, and magnetic field to produce 

an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) radiating down to the Earth and additionally create 

electrical currents in the Earth. EMP effects are both direct and indirect. The former 

are due to electromagnetic “shocking” of electronics and stressing of electrical 

systems, and the latter arise from the damage that “shocked”—upset, damaged, and 

destroyed—electronics controls then inflict on the systems in which they are 

embedded. The indirect effects can be even more severe than the direct effects. 

The electromagnetic fields produced by weapons designed and deployed with the 

intent to produce EMP have a high likelihood of damaging electrical power systems, 

electronics, and information systems upon which the U.S. military and American 

society depends. Their effects on dependent systems and infrastructures could be 

sufficient to qualify as catastrophic to the Nation. 

China and Russia have also considered limited nuclear attack options that, unlike 

their Cold War plan, employ EMP as the primary or sole means of attack. Indeed, as 

recently as May 1999, during the NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia, high-

 

18 Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 

Volume 1: Executive Summary, July 22, 2004
 - 16 - 

ranking members of the Russian Duma, meeting with a U.S. congressional delegation 

to discuss the Balkans conflict, raised the specter of a Russian EMP attack that would 

paralyze the United States. This emphasis on non-strategic use of nuclear weapons is 

in addition to the more traditional strategic employments, which, although reduced in 

priority, have certainly not been eradicated. 

This type of detonation is likely to damage key weapon systems and support 

capabilities, including satellite navigation systems, intelligence and targeting 

systems, and many other militarily significant platforms. Battlefield impacts will be 

significant, particularly if our small, technically superior but electronically dependent 

force is transformed into a small, impaired and vulnerable force.” 

2.4 Survivability Concerns 

Several factors have combined to produce the potential for a “perfect storm” 

with regard to nuclear survivability risks. These factors include the following: 

DoD has moved from requirements-based acquisition to a capabilities-based 

protocol. This has left nuclear survivability an implicit rather than explicit issue 

to be addressed by program offices, contractors and review boards, largely as 

they see fit; 

The decade or more following the Cold War produced a diffuse threat spectrum 

marked by uncertainty, until galvanized by the events of 9/11. During this 

period, the DoD nuclear weapon effects enterprise eroded markedly in testing 

and test facilities, in research, and in the health of the workforce; 

Both acquisition policy and strategy during the past decade have encouraged 

commercial best practices as the key principle of evolutionary acquisition. This 

has lead to a proliferation of commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) technology mixed 

with non-COTS technologies in military systems. Little to no attention has been 

given to performance of these systems in nuclear environments. 

Moreover, the digital electronics industry, particularly the telecommunication 

industry, has revolutionized the way the world lives. Most classes of emerging 

digital technologies are being designed to respond to increasingly lower signal 

levels. These trends result in greater challenges for the radiation hardening 

community in attempting to assure the nuclear survivability of such sensitive 

components. 

 
 - 17 - 

Finally, and as a counterpoint to the above issue, a significant number of in-place 

military systems are decades old. Little is known about the way hardened 

technologies, systems, and protocols change with age, both with and without an 

aggressive hardness assurance program. Moreover, the past decade or more has 

seen erosion in attention to these programs in general. 

 At odds with these factors is the assessment of the Task Force that in future 

threat environments, nuclear survivability will become more important to a range of 

military systems beyond (but including) the traditional strategic systems. Moreover, 

the nuclear environment issues are different than during the Cold War. Figure 2.3 

illustrates how particular elements of a nuclear environment should be prioritized, 

given the scenario concerns shown previously in Figure 2.1. The first six environment 

components relate to nuclear detonations at high altitude, whereas the last three are 

intrinsically low altitude detonation concerns. Consistent with Figure 2.1, the colorcoding indicates the scenario concerns for the next decade or two. In Chapter 5, each of 

the environments is discussed and related to nuclear hardening protocols and the test 

facilities and simulation tools needed to validate system and component hardness 

levels. 

Scenario

Nuclear 

Environment 

Component 

Strategic 

Exchange

Non-strategic

Exchange Terrorist 

Use

X-rays (High Fluence) •

Prompt Gamma-Rays •

Prompt Neutrons •

X-rays (Low Fluence) • •

Fission Decay Products 

(Trapped Electrons, etc.) 

• •

EMP • •

Blast/shock • • •

Thermal • • •

Fall out • • •

 Figure 2.3 Scenarios and dominant nuclear environment concerns 

The need for nuclear survivability must be assessed intentionally and rigorously 

for each system that enters the acquisition process. The elements of the new triad, 

particularly the defensive and the C4ISR components (including space systems), 

warrant attention at technology block changes and upgrade points, as well as a 

continuing hardness maintenance and assurance program. A periodic scorecard or 
 - 18 - 

checklist process that requires the Services and Commands to test operational resources 

to certify and validate hardening could inject discipline into the process. Since nonstrategic resources may also be required to operate in nuclear environments, these 

systems should also be subjected to the scorecard audit process initially and annually. 
 - 19 - 

CHAPTER 3 

TRANSLATING THREAT TO REQUIREMENTS 

The contributors to the “perfect storm” of nuclear survivability risks are growing 

in size and potential impact on U.S. warfighting capabilities, affecting not only future 

forces being developed through the DoD requirements and acquisition processes, but 

also today’s in-place forces and support systems. 

The intensity level of this “storm” relates directly to the evolving threat and the 

growing likelihood that a nuclear weapon will be used to gain asymmetric leverage 

against conventionally superior U.S. forces. A significant portion of the storm relates to 

the ongoing erosion of any nuclear survivability discipline within DoD in both the 

requirements and surveillance processes. The fact that few of today’s decision makers 

appear interested in understanding the seriousness of this threat only multiplies the 

potential intensity of the storm and its impacts on U.S. forces. 

The dangers associated with not acknowledging the potential for the “perfect 

storm” and its attendant risks make crucial the need to better accommodate nuclear 

survivability in DoD’s requirements process. This translation of threat-to-requirements 

should focus on two important areas: integration into the evolutionary acquisition 

strategy for future forces, and development of a methodology for assessing 

survivability of in-place forces. 

3.1 Current Service, Agency, and System Practices19

U. S. Army 

The Army has taken nuclear survivability seriously for new development 

programs for decades. Although somewhat out of date, the Army directives provide 

excellent guidance on the process for determining survivability requirements. The U.S. 

Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) has responsibility for reviewing the 

specifications for all new Army systems and for recommending the nuclear 

survivability requirements for those systems. USANCA also advises the program 

offices on how to achieve and verify that the system meets these specifications. For a 

system to receive a waiver of these requirements, the waiver must be approved by the 

Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 of the Army. The program office knows what the 

 

19 See Appendices E, F, and G for a more expansive description of practices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 

respectively. 
 - 20 - 

requirements are, what to do to prove that they meet the requirements, and how to do it 

– or how to make the case as to why the need for hardening is unimportant. Once 

fielded, however, systems are not periodically checked to assure that hardness levels 

have been maintained. 

Late in the course of this study, the Task Force learned that the Army is 

considering the move of USANCA from the Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) to the Chemical Corps. The Task Force believes that this would be a serious 

mistake and lead to the erosion of the Army’s current exemplary process among all the 

Services. 

U. S. Navy 

The directives and instructions regarding nuclear survivability in the Navy are 

out of date. As an example, the waiver process called out in the Navy instructions 

references Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 4245.4, “Acquisition of Nuclear 

Survivable Systems” which was canceled in the early 1990s without replacement. The 

organization that is called out as the waiver authority for nuclear survivability, PMS423, was dissolved in 1993. 

In spite of this, critical systems within the Navy continue to maintain nuclear 

survivability requirements. The Strategic Systems Program Office (SSPO) has 

maintained clear hardening requirements for the Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 

(SLBM) portion of the nuclear deterrent. As these systems are upgraded, the nuclear 

hardening requirements are maintained. They have an effective program to analyze, 

test, and verify that the system still meets the requirements. 

Navy systems other than the strategic systems are less clearly focused on 

survivability and hardening. Surface combatants continue to have nuclear survivability 

requirements levied (although at lower levels than previously required). However, 

nuclear survivability validation is performed primarily through engineering analysis 

rather than testing. The Standard Missile-3 upper tier defense has hardening 

requirements from the MDA HAENS standard. However, the Standard Missile-2 lower 

tier defense Block IV has no hardening. For naval aircraft, several specific platforms 

such as the E-6Bs have requirements levied on them because of their missions. 

Otherwise, Navy air platforms do not have to address nuclear survivability 

requirements. 
 - 21 - 

U. S. Air Force 

The information provided to the Task Force concerning the process for 

addressing nuclear survivability requirements reflected, with some exceptions, a 

general decline in attention paid to nuclear survivability requirements. After the 

demise of the Nuclear Criteria Group Secretariat in 1994, it is not obvious who is 

responsible for establishing and implementing nuclear survivability requirements. Air 

Force Air and Space Operations (AF/XOS)12 is the designated advocate for nuclear 

issues. However, AF/XOS only acts in an advisory capacity. In general, the Air Force 

directives and instructions are out of date. The organization assigned the responsibility 

for this area, the Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition (SAF/AQQS), no longer exists. 

 

As is the case with the Navy, the Air Force strategic platforms continue to assess 

nuclear survivability. These platforms include the Minuteman III Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the B-52 and B-2A strategic bombers, and the Air-Launched 

Cruise Missile (ALCM) and Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). Assessments appear to 

be conducted on an aperiodic, as opposed to routine, basis and do not include testing. 

The ICBM community maintains a hardness surveillance program and took care to 

address hardening in the recent upgrade to the Minuteman III. In addition, some of the 

enduring command and control and communications systems have continuing nuclear 

survivability requirements. The National Space Systems Office (NSSO) of the USAF is 

currently establishing a policy concerning nuclear survivability for space assets 

although the Task Force was unable to get any insight into the effort. 

Among conventional weapon platforms or support hardware, there is almost 

universal silence concerning any requirement to operate in or after a nuclear 

environment. 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

MDA is required to engage and negate incoming targets that may include 

nuclear warheads. Consequently, the BMDS has nuclear hardening requirements. As 

mentioned in Chapter 2, these requirements are defined in the HAENS. The HAENS 

standard is a three level standard that provides a yardstick for evaluation of BMDS 

capability against nuclear weapon threats, both now and in the future. MDA is 

following the evolutionary acquisition strategy mentioned earlier and described more 

fully in Appendix D, with the goal of progressive improvements in capability as the 

system matures. Survivability is one of the attributes to be included in a later block 

 

12 Formerly the Directorate of Nuclear and Counterproliferation (AF/XON), which has been recently 

dissolved.
 - 22 - 

change to the system. The MDA Director is the approving authority for system 

survivability requirements. 

Command and Control (C2) 

The primary focus of DoD’s transformational C2 improvements is 

implementation of a network-centric, collaborative architecture. This architecture will 

be capable of incorporating sophisticated and fused intelligence inputs as well as 

enabling rapid, collaborative and adaptive planning and will provide military and 

civilian leaders superior decision capability. The C2 architecture will ride on the 

bandwidth-expanded Global Information Grid (GIG), the Transformational 

Communications Architecture, and Net-Centric Enterprise Systems (NCES). 

Survivability of specific C2 systems as well as complementary space- and 

ground-based communications and ISR assets is vital for the U.S. to maintain its 

superiority against any potential adversary. However, dual problems of growing 

system vulnerabilities (stemming from inattention to hardening requirements and 

surveillance, use of COTS electronics, etc.) and an evolved, ever-more-likely nuclear 

threat combine to raise the threat to survivability to a high level of concern. The 

growing potential for U.S. forces to lose some or all of its C2 agility and advantage on a 

future battlefield is unacceptable. These are critical problems requiring high-level 

attention in the requirements process. 

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

Similar to C2, transformational ISR systems will depend upon a diverse, robust 

and tiered-sensor architecture to tie fused intelligence information into the networkbased C2 system. This tiered-sensor array will include space-based and penetrating 

airborne platforms, close-in airborne sensors, and ground-based sensors. The 

transformational vision for ISR includes responsive, persistent and agile surveillance 

and reconnaissance platforms feeding into a process for netted, collaborative, real-time 

signal-level sensor exploitation. Responsive, agile ISR coupled with netted, 

collaborative C2 will increase U.S. advantage and leverage on the battlefield – 

particularly in terms of allowing us to operate inside the decision loop of the adversary. 

Survivability challenges similar to those facing C2 systems are evident for 

transformational ISR platforms and supporting systems. “Current surveillance and 

reconnaissance systems lack hardness against nuclear effects, including electromagnetic 
 - 23 - 

pulse (EMP).”20 DoD decision makers must address the tough questions and difficult 

trade-offs involving nuclear survivability requirements for future ISR systems. 

3.2 Transitioning from Requirements to Capabilities-Based Acquisition 

Evolutionary Strategy 

In the current reality of asymmetric and evolving threats, DoD has recognized 

that the methods used for determining military system requirements to support U.S. 

warfighting goals is in need of change. In May 2003, the DoD Instruction 5000.2, 

“Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” introduced the evolutionary acquisition 

strategy: 

“Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of mature 

technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, 

recognizing, up front, the need for future capability improvements. The objective is to 

balance needs and available capability with resources, and to put capability into the 

hands of the user quickly. The success of the strategy depends on consistent and 

continuous definition of requirements and the maturation of technologies that lead to 

disciplined development and production of systems that provide increasing capability 

towards a materiel concept.” 

Two approaches are defined for implementing the evolutionary acquisition strategy: 

1) Spiral Development. In this process, a desired capability is identified, but the 

end-state requirements are not known at program initiation. Those requirements 

are refined through demonstration and risk management, there is continuous 

user feedback, and each increment provides the user the best possible capability. 

The requirements for future increments depend on feedback from users and 

technology maturation. 

2) Incremental Development. In this process, a desired capability is identified, an 

end-state requirement is known, and that requirement is met over time by 

developing several increments, each dependent on available mature technology. 

 

Assuring Joint Capabilities 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is assigned the responsibility to provide 

advice regarding military capability needs for defense acquisition programs. The 

 

20 Future Strategic Strike, Defense Science Board report, November 2003.
 - 24 - 

process through which the Chairman provides this advice is described in Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01C, “Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System” (JCIDS), dated 24 June 2003. In conjunction with representatives 

of other DoD communities, the Chairman is to formulate broad, time-phased, 

operational goals and is directed to consider affordability, technology maturity, and 

responsiveness in the process. Figure 3.1 is a flow diagram of the JCIDS process. 

 Figure 3.1 The JCIDS Process 

3.3 Nuclear Survivability – A Reduced Priority in the Joint Process? 

DoD Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System”, dated May 12, 2003, focuses 

on a total systems approach, and in doing so, relegates survivability to one of the 

competing characteristics to be considered in the process of making acquisition 

decisions: 

“The PM [Program Manager] shall be the single point of accountability for 

accomplishing program objectives for total life-cycle systems management, including 

sustainment. The PM shall apply human systems integration to optimize total system 
 - 25 - 

performance (hardware, software, and human), operational effectiveness, and suitability, 

survivability, safety, and affordability. PMs shall consider supportability, life cycle costs, 

performance, and schedule comparable in making program decisions. Planning for 

Operation and Support and the estimation of total ownership costs shall begin as early as 

possible. Supportability, a key component of performance, shall be considered throughout 

the system life cycle.” 

 While the JCIDS process is intended to introduce a streamlined and agile process 

for generating requirements within DoD, this capabilities-based approach removes 

nuclear survivability from its former status as an explicit requirement to be addressed 

and places it in the trade space. Any stated need for building nuclear hardness into a 

system is likely to be a non-winner in most trade space competitions. This is true in 

part because of the widespread perception throughout DoD that nuclear use is an 

unlikely event and that nuclear hardening is expensive. Although the consequences of 

a nuclear detonation would be catastrophic, its assumed low likelihood – assessed 

against the low relative costs of COTS equipment and perceived high costs of hardening 

– stacks the competitive deck against nuclear hardness requirements. 

To be more specific, a capabilities-based acquisition process will gravitate toward 

the development of various complementary or competing capabilities in order to reduce 

the risk of technological surprise. In addition, resource constraints require that the 

relative worth of various capabilities be rank-ordered in some manner. Such a rank 

ordering of capabilities will usually involve a cost/benefit trade that includes the 

relative probability that a capability will be required, the effect on U.S. interests if the 

capability does not exist, and the relative cost to develop and deploy the capability. 

Given the mechanics of this new process, nuclear survivability will not be competitive. 

The evolutionary strategy can aggravate the problem by allowing the option to 

defer hardening to a later stage or spiral in acquisition even where nuclear hardening is 

a clear requirement, as in the case of missile defense systems. Yet history and recent 

studies tell us that nuclear survivability is best incorporated into a system during the 

initial design (see Chapter 5, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 for a discussion of design for 

hardening). If nuclear survivability is not addressed in the initial design, the cost of 

incorporating such features downstream into an existing design will likely be much 

more expensive, if possible at all. 

3.4 Nuclear Survivability for In-Place Forces 

From 1990 to the present, widespread avoidance of nuclear survivability issues 

put many in-place systems and platforms in high-risk (possibly vulnerable) categories. 
 - 26 - 

Some, fielded with hardened components, are in question because of little or no 

surveillance and/or testing. Others were simply built and fielded with COTS-based 

electronics in an era of inattention or lack of concern about hardening requirements. 

Added to the current situation is a low-level of understanding of the impact on 

operations of unhardened platforms and supporting systems. Wargames and exercises 

do not routinely include the use of a nuclear weapon such that operational 

workarounds and/or mitigation actions are not being developed in parallel with 

conventional concepts of operation. 

Consider the example of an adversary EMP attack. Any potential for U.S. units 

in a large geographical area to experience significantly degraded electronics would be 

unacceptable. A series of questions puts the issue in perspective. What would be the 

impact on a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) or an Army division debarking at a Middle 

Eastern or Korean port and/or airfield (C2, computer-driven equipment, weapons 

systems, etc.)? What impacts would a carrier battle group (weapons platforms, 

avionics, ship systems, etc.) experience in the Straits of Taiwan? What vulnerabilities 

does a forward-deployed Air Force wing have with regard to EMP (platforms, C2, 

avionics, ground and test equipment, etc.)? The crucial issue here is that commanders 

and planners cannot be assured that current weapons platforms, C2, ISR and associated 

support systems will be available should a nuclear detonation occur. We simply do not 

know! 
 - 27 - 

CHAPTER 4 

WEAPON OUTPUT CALCULATIONS 

4.1 The Red Book 

In order to link information about current and emerging threats to design efforts 

for hardness or to the assessment of operational workarounds to assure operations in a 

nuclear environment, estimates of the temporal and spatial aspects of the radiation 

environments produced by threat devices are needed. For many years, publication of 

these estimates has been the responsibility of DTRA and its predecessor organizations 

(Defense Nuclear Agency and Defense Special Weapons Agency) through its Nuclear 

Warhead Output Modeling Program. The Defense Nuclear Agency) publication 6500H 

– known more commonly as the “Red Book” – was first published in 1981 and has been 

updated periodically since then, with the latest revision scheduled for completion in 

late 2004. The program also produces a parallel document, the “Blue Book,” that 

provides output radiation characteristics of U.S. devices. 

The Red Book is intended to provide bounds on hostile environments. Nuclear 

weapon models described in the handbook represent generic weapon technologies that 

may be used to obtain rough estimates of yield and radiation output for given weapon 

system configurations and to allow tradeoffs among warhead mass, dimensions, special 

nuclear material (SNM), and various weapon technologies. Information on model 

definition, yield/mass and dimension/mass ratios, fission fraction vs. yield, interstage 

time vs. yield, SNM cost vs. yield, and radiation output (X-rays, neutrons, and gammarays) are included. One-dimensional calculations have been the source of handbook 

information prior to the latest revision of the Red Book. Validation of the results has 

been based on the limited underground test data generated for this purpose up to the 

cessation of underground testing. 

Promising advances, enabled by DOE’s Advanced Simulation and Computing 

(ASC) program, are currently being made in computational transport algorithm 

development that will extend our ability to calculate the output of devices of critical 

interest to the nation and help mitigate the limited test data set. The latest version of 

the Red Book will introduce 2-D results and be more comprehensive in addressing a 

broader array of potential threats. Its content is expanded to four volumes: 

 Volume I - Foreign Strategic Nuclear Weapons 

 Volume II - Foreign Tactical Systems and Improvised Nuclear Devices 

 Volume III - Foreign Proliferant Weapon Systems 
 - 28 - 

 Volume IV - Advanced Foreign Nuclear Weapons 

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL) have complementary roles in providing input to the Red Book. Peer 

review is an integral part of the program. Validation and verification is being 

augmented to include code-to-code comparisons in addition to checks against simulator 

and existing underground test data. The customers of the Red Book are the Services 

and supporting contractors, and DOE/NNSA and its laboratories. Current principal 

users include STRATCOM, Navy SSP, and the Air Force. 

4.2 Uncertainties in the Calculations

The majority of the outputs for all weapon models are known to within a level of 

~20%. However, the effects of nuclear outputs on some military systems can be driven 

by the details of the upper and lower 1% of the spectrum. Uncertainties in those 

regions can vary by factors of two to three and, in some important cases, can vary by an 

order of magnitude (i.e., the upper 1% as calculated may actually be the upper 10%). It 

is important to systematically study the uncertainties in output calculations across the 

full range of weapon types, perform experiments to validate the models and reduce the 

uncertainties where they are extreme, and make certain that the Red Book appropriately 

bounds the remaining uncertainties.

Some plans exist to address the issue. Uncertainty quantification for X-ray 

output of a specified weapon system will be delivered in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005. The 

Science and Engineering Campaigns of DOE’s Stockpile Stewardship Program will 

support development and validation of improved weapon output models. Nuclear 

weapon effects simulators such as pulsed-power accelerators (ZR) and the pulsed 

reactors, as well as high energy density physics laser facilities such as National Ignition 

Facility (NIF) and Omega (University of Rochester), will be used for development and 

validation of these models. 

4.3 Variabilities in the Calculations 

There are differences between uncertainty in weapon outputs and variability in 

weapon outputs–and both have hardening consequences that are often mixed up or 

ignored. In this Chapter we have highlighted some fundamental issues associated with 

uncertainties in output estimates that may relate to material opacities, scattering crosssections, radiation transport details and other phenomenon, even for idealized isotropic 

output models. These uncertainties are important since they help to establish an upper 
 - 29 - 

limit to the threat environments used for vulnerability and hardening analyses and 

testing. 

In reality, there is a potentially large “lumpiness” or spatial variability in the 

prompt radiation output at any given point, particularly for high-altitude detonations, 

that results from mass absorption shadowing. The flux or fluence of prompt gammas, 

neutrons and X-rays is by no means isotropic about the burst point of a high-altitude 

detonation. Clumps of materials (thrusters, gas bottles, propellant tanks, firing units, 

etc., for example) surround a warhead in a non- symmetric fashion and make radiation 

output estimation inherently three-dimensional. In realistic situations, some warhead 

components will shield the prompt radiations from other components, creating a large 

shadow cone in a preferential direction. For example, the STARFISH test warhead was 

inverted prior to the high-altitude test over Johnston Island in 1962 because of concerns 

that some masses within the design would cause an undesirable shadowing of prompt 

gamma rays and mask selected nuclear effects that were to be tested. In another 

example, a nuclear driven kinetic kill warhead (that destroys a reentry vehicle with steel 

pellets) will have a very low yield-to-mass ratio, which will greatly suppress the X-ray 

output. The Russians reported on their 1962 high-altitude testing of such a device at an 

International Conference on Electromagnetic Effects in 1994 held in Bordeaux, France. 

The impact of shadowing by the heavy metals on prompt radiation outputs is an ideal 

problem to be addressed within the ASC program. Both DOE Laboratories should 

evaluate the impact of such weapon system design variabilities on hardness testing, in 

addition to the impact of weapon output uncertainties. 

4.4 Programmatic Observations 

The DTRA Red and Blue Book program is expected to be funded at ~$1M/yr 

through FY07. The supporting DOE campaigns contribute an additional ~$3M in 

related model development activities, but the FY05 program in nuclear weapons effects 

at DOE is targeted to be reduced by ~2/3 of its FY04 funding of $27M by Congress, 

because it is viewed as being unresponsive to changes in the threat environment. The 

Task Force came to some important observations about this area, which serves as the 

lynch pin between threat and mission assurance: 

Adversary weapon output calculations have historically been a modestly funded 

effort compared to calculations of U.S. weapons outputs; as such, the transition 

to 2- and 3-D calculations has lagged. The shift to higher fidelity is revealing 

uncertainties in the estimates that prior 1-D calculations did not. 
 - 30 - 

Pinning down these uncertainties and providing the highest fidelity possible for the full 

spectrum of radiation effects for both red and blue systems should be a priority for the 

DOE program. For red systems, we need to understand the drivers for design and 

certification of critical U.S. systems. For blue systems, we need to fully understand the 

collateral effects as we move to limited strike planning scenarios. 
 - 31 - 

CHAPTER 5 

HARDENING SYSTEMS AND ASSESSING PERFORMANCE – 

PAST AND PRESENT 

Systems that are expected to operate in a nuclear environment within the 

atmosphere may be subject to thermal, blast, and shock effects, as well as EMP, neutron 

and gamma (γ) radiation. Systems that operate in space may be subject to all types of 

ionizing radiation, including neutrons and radioactive debris decay products and low 

earth orbiting systems may be exposed to a dispersed EMP. In this chapter, we first 

address the overall problem of formulating hardening design strategies and how the 

hardening design process and design assessment should proceed. The environments 

and the means for modeling and simulating them are discussed in the following 

sections. The chapter concludes with a description of the current DoD and DOE 

business models for radiation hardening. 

5.1 Design Strategies 

 For most military systems with radiation hardness requirements, a protocol of 

well understood design rules, parts screening, and testing in high fidelity radiation 

environments is sufficient to assure adequate performance. These methods are 

straightforward and generally do not add more than a few percent to the cost of developing and 

building the system if incorporated early in the design process. 

 The challenge is much greater for those few systems with high-level 

requirements. In these cases, it is essential that rigorous design measures be considered 

for assuring survival. These can include: the use of radiation hardened parts; radiation 

shielding; the use of special radiation absorbing materials that minimize shock 

generation; rigorous electrical shielding and grounding schemes; avoiding materials 

with exceptionally high neutron capture cross sections; specialized techniques for 

laying out, coating, and potting electrical assemblies; and accounting for the 

performance degradation from radiation exposure of parts and components in the 

overall system design. The dilemma is that these techniques can add complexity, 

weight, and procurement cost to the system. 

 There is always a tradeoff between using best “rad-hard” design practices and the 

desire to maximize nominal system performance and minimize costs. However, failure 
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to follow best rad-hard design practices can turn a straightforward protocol for 

assessing performance in radiation environments into a much more difficult and costly 

process for assessing performance. Furthermore, options for fixing vulnerabilities that 

are uncovered late in the design process are much more constrained and can force a 

redesign or compromise in performance. 

 A positive trend, especially over the last decade, has been the growing use of 

sophisticated computational tools in system design as they become available. This 

approach should be encouraged since it improves our ability to design systems with 

lower performance margins above the system requirements. and mitigates the tradeoffs 

necessary to design hardened systems. It also provides information to make informed 

design choices that can ameliorate difficulties in assessing system performance, as 

discussed in the next section.

5.2 The Hardening Process and Design Assessment 

The difficulty and cost of assessing system performance can be impacted dramatically by 

the approach taken in designing the system. For systems with high-level requirements, it is 

essential to consider hardening and assessment issues at the beginning of the design process.

The nuclear hardening and validation process is conceptually simple and has 

been done well many times in the past. It generally proceeds as follows: 

 The design specification describes the range of radiation environments that may 

be encountered by the system, including details concerning energy spectrum and 

time history. 

 Radiation transport calculations determine the radiation environment at each 

subsystem or component, based on a preliminary design and appropriate 

assumptions about the orientation of the system to a nuclear burst. 

 This is an iterative process, since the radiation environment at one component 

will be modified by nearby components. Shielding is often used to protect 

components that are particularly sensitive to prompt x rays, at the cost of added 

weight and volume. 

 For electronic systems, the need to test candidate parts depends on the radiation 

levels in the design specification. In some cases, extensive screening is done early 

in the design to provide response data for parts that may be useful in the design. 

As circuits are designed, these data are used to predict their response to 
 - 33 - 

radiation. These are then combined into a model of how the subassembly or 

system will respond. 

 If there is a large margin between the predicted response and one that would 

cause a failure, testing at the subassembly or system level may not be necessary. 

Otherwise, testing is done in radiation environments that simulate the threat 

requirements to verify the accuracy of the circuit models and to assure the 

survival of the system. 

 When testing reveals vulnerability in the system, the models are used to analyze 

the problem and modify the design. This continues until the design meets the 

system requirements. 

A similar process is followed to assess other types of responses, such as mechanical 

shocks generated in the system, currents generated in cables, or heating of materials. 

The testing needs depend on the margin between predicted responses and failure 

thresholds, accounting for uncertainties in the modeling. 

 Methods for assessing the performance of systems in radiation environments 

vary widely, depending on the type of system and the radiation levels of interest. For 

the preponderance of military systems, the requirements are relatively modest and 

performance can be assessed in a straightforward fashion. Especially for systems that 

do not operate in space or at high altitude, the neutron, γ, and EMP environments can 

be simulated in the laboratory with high fidelity. Performance is often assessed directly 

with full system tests at existing facilities. Space systems with prompt requirements 

must be addressed with more care because of the potential degradation that they might 

suffer in a full system exposure test. In those cases, a combination of subsystem testing 

and wide design margins help assure survivability. 

 Assessing the performance of space-based systems which do not have prompt 

radiation requirements is also straightforward, although again, full system tests are 

rarely done. The main concerns are long-term degradation of electronic parts from total 

ionizing dose slowly accumulated during the mission and single-event upset of digital 

electronics from proton or heavy ion strikes. Parts are screened by testing them with 

Co60 sources for total dose and with ion accelerators for single-event upset. By choosing 

parts that meet the performance and lifetime needs of the system, designers can assure 

survival in the space radiation environment without doing full system tests.

 For a small number of systems having the highest level requirements, including 

prompt X-ray requirements, performance assessment can be extremely challenging. 
 - 34 - 

Examples include strategic nuclear weapons and their ballistic missile delivery systems, 

National Missile Defense systems, and a small number of satellites. In many cases, 

some of the X-ray environments of interest cannot be generated in the laboratory. In 

past years, underground nuclear effects tests were used to assess performance. Today, 

we must rely on modeling and simulation, backed up with a rigorous experimental 

validation protocol, to assess system performance when we cannot do appropriate 

system tests. Each new or refurbished system generally requires a focused research 

program to develop confidence in the assessment methods. 

5.3 Nuclear Weapon Effects Simulators 

 There is a wide range of radiation facilities operating in the U.S. to reproduce 

various radiation environments and stimulate effects caused by radiation. This variety 

is driven by the diversity of radiation environments that military and space systems 

may have to survive. The direct output of a nuclear burst consists of neutrons, γ rays, 

and X- rays, and there are facilities designed to simulate each component of these 

prompt environments, as well as radioactive debris producing delayed radiation 

environments of consequence. In addition, the direct radiation may interact with the 

ambient environment to produce an EMP, produce a blast wave in the atmosphere, or 

generate a modified neutron and γ ray environment. Moreover, the radioactive Betadecay of fission debris can pump up the space radiation belts and produce an enhanced 

trapped electron environment. There are facilities that attempt to simulate each of these 

environments. The radiation may interact with a system to generate a severe shock, 

induce vibrations in the system, or produce an electromagnetic pulse within the system 

called system-generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) or internal electromagnetic 

pulse (IEMP), depending upon the production mechanisms. There are facilities that can 

stimulate these effects in test articles. Finally, there are facilities that can simulate other 

radiation environments, such as the normal space radiation environment, or the 

radiation produced by radioactive materials within a system. 

Prompt γ Simulators

 Sandia National Laboratories operates the High-Energy Radiation Megavolt 

Electron Source (HERMES) pulsed-power facility to simulate prompt γ environments at 

extreme dose rates (well above 1012 rad/s over substantial volumes). This is more than 

adequate for testing systems with high fidelity in the most extreme γ environments. 

HERMES is a unique capability. 

 Since most systems do not have to survive the extreme environments produced 
 - 35 - 

at HERMES, there are a number of smaller γ-ray facilities that are used to test systems at 

lower levels. These include the PulseRad 1150 at Titan International, Sphinx at Sandia 

National Laboratories, Relativistic Electron Beam Accelerator (REBA) at White Sands 

Missile Range, and machines at Little Mountain and at Boeing. Like HERMES, they 

generate bremsstrahlung by hitting a target with an electron beam. In addition, 

electronic parts are often tested at electron linear accelerators (LINACs). These are 

available at a number of facilities, such as White Sands Missile Range, Naval Surface 

Warfare Center (Crane), Boeing, Little Mountain, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and 

Idaho State University. LINACs produce a short burst of electrons with sufficiently 

high energy that they will pass through a small part without stopping, thus simulating 

the ionizing dose produced in a prompt γ environment. Institutions that operate the 

smaller γ-ray machines and LINACs make cost/benefit decisions based upon the 

convenience of having local test capability and the scope of the programs they support. 

Market forces will determine how many of these machines continue to operate. 

Prompt Neutron Simulators

 Until recently, prompt neutron and sustained γ environments have been 

simulated at three fast-burst reactors: the Sandia Pulsed Reactor III (SPR III) at Sandia 

National Laboratories, the Army Pulsed Reactor Facility (APRF) at Aberdeen, and 

Molly-G, or the Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) at White Sands Missile Range. SPR III is 

unique in that it has a relatively large central cavity (17-cm diameter) in which articles 

can be tested at high levels. Unmodified environments produced by these reactors are 

characterized by hard neutron energy spectra and short pulse durations (40-76 μs). 

These reactors are versatile facilities because materials placed in and around them can 

be used to tailor the neutron spectra, modify the neutron to γ ratio, and broaden the 

pulse to more than a millisecond. Because these reactors have metal cores consisting of 

highly enriched uranium, the steadily increasing standards for their security have 

dramatically increased their cost of operation. As a result, Aberdeen ceased operation 

at the end of 2003. Operation of SPR III was suspended in 2000, and the core was placed 

in secure storage. Sandia plans to resume operation in 2005 to support qualification of 

the W76-1 electronics, but the Secretary of Energy has announced that operation at 

Sandia will terminate no later than the end of 2006. At present, White Sands has the 

only operational fast-burst reactor. 

 While fast-burst reactors have been the only means of creating these 

environments to date, other concepts have been proposed that do not require highly 

enriched uranium (HEU). The most promising that the Task Force learned about is a 

hybrid utilizing an electron accelerator and a sub-prompt critical reactor assembly 

consisting of low enriched uranium (LEU). A large pulsed-power electron accelerator 
 - 36 - 

generates the initial burst of neutrons. The electron beam hits a metal target, typically 

tungsten, to produce bremsstrahlung radiation. Subsequently, (γ,n) reactions in the 

reactor assembly provide a pulse of neutrons. The initial pulse is multiplied by a factor 

of several hundred by the reactor assembly as the neutron flux decays exponentially. 

The resulting neutron environments are equivalent to those provided by existing fastburst reactors. The concept provides increased experimental flexibility without the 

security and safety burden of HEU materials. While this concept appears technically 

sound, it would take the construction of a major new facility to provide such a 

capability. 

 Some devices and some military systems are potentially susceptible to neutron 

and γ combined effects. The simple configurations and large exposure cells typical of 

fast burst reactors make them a suitable venue for experiments in combined 

environments by co-locating a γ source in the reactor cell. 

X-ray Simulators

 X-ray environments are the most challenging to simulate in the laboratory. 

Historically, underground nuclear effects tests were done principally to study X-ray 

effects. Existing X-ray facilities only partially compensate for the loss of underground 

testing, and opportunities for improving the capabilities of X-ray facilities are both 

limited and costly. Recent investments in advanced modeling and simulation tools have 

focused on X-ray effects to provide an alternate means of assessing the performance of 

systems in severe environments that cannot be produced in the laboratory. 

 X-rays are only of concern for systems that operate in space or at high altitude, 

since X- rays are rapidly absorbed in the atmosphere. In addition, the X-ray 

environment within a system is a strong function of location and orientation of the 

system with respect to the nuclear burst. A nuclear weapon generates X-rays with a 

spectrum similar to a blackbody radiator, over a wide range of energies. It is common 

to characterize regions of the nuclear spectrum according to where they dominate 

damage mechanisms within the system: 

 The lowest energy X-rays of concern, cold X-rays, are stopped in the first, 

outermost layer of a system, where they can generate severe shocks in the 

absorbing material. Differential, rapid heating also can cause large vibrations of 

the system structure. Most of the total X-ray energy emitted in a nuclear burst 

will be in the cold X-ray portion of the spectrum. 
 - 37 - 

 The more penetrating warm X-rays will mostly pass through the outer layer and 

dominate energy deposition in internal components. They can also generate 

large currents in cables. X-ray shields around sensitive components will stop 

most warm X-rays. 

 The most energetic hot X-rays will penetrate internal shields. Even though only a 

tiny fraction of the X-rays created in a nuclear burst are in the hot portion of the 

spectrum, their penetrating power makes them a threat to upset or destroy 

sensitive electronic systems. 

The cold, warm, and hot descriptors are not defined by precise energy bands, but 

depend on the output of adversary weapons of concern and on the design of a 

particular blue system. 

 There are a number of pulsed power facilities that generate X-ray environments. 

The major facilities are operated by Sandia National Laboratories (Saturn and Z) for 

DOE and DTRA (Decade, Pithon, and Double Eagle). There are two important physical 

mechanisms used to generate X-rays at these facilities. Bremsstrahlung sources use 

intense electron beams to hit a target made from a material with a high atomic number, 

generally tantalum. The X-ray energy spectrum created from bremsstrahlung 

production is broad, with an endpoint determined by the energy of the incident 

electrons. Since the bremsstrahlung production cross section rises with energy, these 

sources are most efficient for simulating the hot portion of the threat spectrum. 

 While there are differences in terms of the achievable X-ray intensity, spectra, and 

pulse width that are important for specific applications, all of these facilities except Z 

have a significant capability to simulate hot X-ray environments of interest. When 

operated at relatively low voltages (around 300 keV or less), they can approximately 

simulate the warm X-ray spectrum for some applications. However, bremsstrahlung 

production is so inefficient at these energies that the resulting X-ray environment is 

frequently several orders of magnitude below threat conditions. 

 For cold X-rays, imploding plasma z-pinches are used to generate X-rays from kshell line radiation. Different materials are used in the implosion to make X-ray sources 

at various energies. However, the pulsed-power current needed to drive an efficient 

implosion rises rapidly as the k-shell energy of the material increases. Decade, Double 

Eagle, and Saturn have useful sources up to 3 keV. The Z facility has a unique 

capability to create useful sources up to about 8 keV, and this will be extended slightly 

when an upgrade (ZR) is completed. In general, these facilities are able to test material 

samples and small items at interesting levels. For systems with the highest level 
 - 38 - 

requirements, we are not able to do cold X-ray testing of entire systems at threat 

conditions. 

 After four decades of pulsed-power development, opportunities for improving 

our capability to simulate cold and warm X-ray environments using these methods are 

limited. Relatively modest incremental improvements are gained with great difficulty 

and considerable cost. A dramatically better test capability requires a breakthrough, 

such as achieving high-yield inertial confinement fusion (ICF) in the laboratory. Even 

this is not straightforward, since the ratio of X-rays to neutrons in an ICF capsule is 

expected to be orders of magnitude lower than in a typical thermonuclear weapon, and 

the pulse width will be orders of magnitude shorter. Scattering schemes to stretch the 

pulse and improve the X-ray to neutron ratio require at least several hundred MJ of 

capsule yield to generate interesting environments. Shielding the DoD test object from 

the blast and debris of an ICF explosion that is not characteristic of the real threat while 

passing the X-rays characteristic of the threat environment is a technical challenge, but 

at the high energies typical of Z-pinch sources, doable. 

Modified Neutron/Gamma Simulators

 The Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) is operated by Sandia National 

Laboratories to simulate a broad range of modified neutron and γ environments. ACRR 

is a pool reactor that is capable of both pulsed and steady-state operation. In pulsed 

mode, it generates large neutron fluences in pulses of several ms duration. The neutron 

energy spectra are much softer than those created by free-field metal fast-burst reactors, 

with significant thermal and epithermal components. ACRR also simulates a broad 

range of sustained γ environments, delivering total doses up to several MRad in pulsed 

mode. ACRR is a unique facility for simulating an important set of radiation 

environments. ACRR also provides neutron radiography for imaging low atomic 

number materials. 

EMP Simulators

 Since EMP is a propagating electromagnetic wave, the impact on a system can, at 

least in principle, be calculated with a computational model of the system. The practical 

difficulty is creating the model of a (typically) highly complex system. The more 

tractable approach is to partition the system into electromagnetically shielded boxes 

and limit electromagnetic currents and voltages between boxes by designed-in 

protection. Most large systems require the calculated protection and survival of the 

system to be validated through testing. Systems are tested using current injection at 

openings to simulate calculated voltages and currents that would result from an 
 - 39 - 

electromagnetic pulse. They can also be tested using free field or bounded wave 

simulators to simulate the electromagnetic pulse itself. 

 Free field EMP simulators are currently available at Patuxent River Naval Air 

Station and at White Sands Test Range. While these facilities can test most systems, 

they cannot test large systems to the most stringent environments. In particular, a 

capability does not exist to test ships or airplanes. 

 Building a full scale facility presents two problems. First, facilities for large test 

objects are both expensive and technically challenging, and have in the past required 

high levels of expertise to make them operate successfully. There are only two top level 

technical designers of EMP facilities left in the country, and they are at or past 

retirement age. Second, the last two facilities built or partially built (Empress II for 

irradiating ships and vertically polarized electromagnetic pulse simulator [VEMPS II] to 

test large Army equipment) were both stopped because of environmental concerns 

about the effects of radiated electric fields. Any new facility will have to consider both 

environmental issues and the availability of qualified designers to be successful. 

Impulse Simulators 

 Magnetic Flyer Plates and Light Initiated High Explosive (LIHE) are both 

methods of simulating the large impulse that X-rays from a nuclear event would 

introduce into a structure. These are only used for strategic systems where the 

requirement for nuclear survivability is such that the X-ray environment could cause 

major structural deformation or damage to the structure. 

 Flyer plates are the best match for the impulse on the outside of the structure but 

they are limited in the complexity of the structures that can be matched. There is a 

DTRA flyer plate facility in Albuquerque. It was in mothballs but resurrected and 

operated to validate the response of models for the W76 reentry body refurbishment. It 

is now being put back in mothballs until needed again. 

 Light initiated explosive tests utilize a thin layer of explosive sprayed on the 

outside of the structure to be tested. The explosive is initiated simultaneously over the 

entire surface with a pulse of ultraviolet (UV) light. The spraying technique allows very 

complex geometries to be tested. This provides a good simulation of shocks transmitted 

to the internal components of a missile or a reentry system. Sandia is currently reviving 

its LIHE facility to test the refurbished W76 warhead. 
 - 40 - 

Blast Simulators

 The Large Blast and Thermal Simulator (LBTS) built and operated by DTRA at 

the White Sands test range has the capability to test the shock, overpressure and 

thermal environment at ground level on systems up to and including those the size of 

battle tanks. 

 The system was built approximately ten years ago. It uses compressed nitrogen 

as a driving fluid for the air blast and aluminum powder and oxygen for the thermal 

simulator. Supplementing the system with air compressors in lieu of nitrogen would 

reduce the cost of a test by 50% and would upgrade LBTS test capabilities. The thermal 

capability of the simulator is currently not operational. Restoring this capability would 

require repairs and safety upgrades. Operations beyond FY04 are not supported in the 

current DTRA plan. 

 Sandia has a six-foot diameter blast tube. It was shut down in the early 90’s, but 

it has been returned to operation to support the W76 refurbishment.

5.4 Modeling and Simulation 

 The role of modeling and simulation has grown significantly over the last decade 

to support design of replacement components for the nuclear stockpile and assessments 

of their performance in radiation environments. This role will continue to expand over 

the next decade, creating many opportunities for applying new capabilities to a broad 

range of defense systems. Computational tools are used to translate system 

requirements to radiation environments at the subsystem or component level, to design 

for survivability, to define appropriate test environments for system assessment, and to 

assess performance in radiation environments that cannot be produced in the 

laboratory. In general, uncertainties in calculations are mitigated by adding margin to 

the design, so calculations that have higher fidelity and are more rigorously validated 

with experiments can reduce the cost of developing rad-hard systems. Better 

simulation helps identify problems in the design phase when they are much easier to 

address than when vulnerabilities are revealed downstream in system testing.

 The first step is to calculate the radiation output of the nuclear devices of concern. 

While many of the environments can be calculated with a high degree of certainty, there 

are some troubling areas, as discussed in Chapter 4. 

 Given an estimate of the adversary weapon output, the next step is to determine 

radiation environments at a component. Most systems are geometrically complex, and 
 - 41 - 

self-shielding within a system can be important. High-fidelity computations can reveal 

sneak paths for radiation through a system and greatly assist the optimization of 

shielding. If the system is on the ground or at low altitude, the radiation from a nuclear 

detonation will be modified drastically by interactions with the air and the ground. 

Most or all of the X-rays may be absorbed, but neutron interactions will spread out the 

neutron pulse to the system in time and shift the neutron spectrum to lower energies. 

Neutron interactions in the air, the ground, and the system itself will generate gamma 

rays that, in some cases, can dominate the ionizing dose in a component. Motion of the 

system can significantly shift the thermal and epithermal portion of the neutron 

spectrum. Frequently, these calculations define a set of radiation environments to be 

simulated at existing radiation facilities for assessing the performance of a system in 

nuclear environments. 

 The burden on modeling and simulation is more severe when a system must 

survive radiation environments that cannot be simulated adequately in laboratory 

facilities. Then the full complexity of radiation interaction with the system and its 

response must be simulated computationally. Radiation can cause damage in many 

different ways. Energy deposition from neutrons or X-rays will rapidly heat materials, 

causing deformation, decomposition, spallation, delamination, degradation of material 

properties, and the generation of intense shocks. Neutrons will cause displacement 

damage, activation, heating, and charged particle production in materials. X-rays and 

γ-rays will generate charge deposition and photocurrents that can upset or burn out 

electrical systems and cause dielectric breakdown in insulators. While impressive 

progress is being made in each of these areas, we are far from having a comprehensive, 

validated capability to simulate these phenomena. Each new assessment project is 

likely to identify gaps in capability that warrant further research. 

 DTRA has maintained a suite of legacy computer codes for modeling radiation 

effects. These are mostly one-dimensional codes that can approximate the response of 

complex systems, but often with large uncertainties. Within the Advanced Strategic 

Computing Program, DOE has sponsored the development of more sophisticated threedimensional tools to support the assessment of replacement components in nuclear 

weapons. These tools could be applied usefully to other military systems that must be 

capable of surviving severe radiation environments. The DoD could take advantage of 

these capabilities with a relatively modest incremental investment. 

5.5 Surveillance 

 After a system’s hardening design is validated by a rigorous protocol of 

simulation, testing, and analysis, it can be produced and fielded. However, its 
 - 42 - 

production and operational maintenance and support plan should include nuclear 

hardness assurance and surveillance elements. Such plans have been successfully 

implemented in the past, particularly for strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and 

warheads (e.g., the Navy Trident Weapon System and Air Force MM III). During a 

production run, a few systems are randomly selected and subjected to specific 

environmental tests, including radiation, to make sure hardness requirements are being 

met for each production lot. Additional parts testing at the component level and 

inspections are also used for hardness assurance. 

 Once fielded, hardened systems need to be monitored via a surveillance and 

maintenance program. Ongoing maintenance and repair, component wearout and 

replacement, and even normal aging can impact the hardness of a system. There are 

examples of 20-year old electronics parts that met all performance specifications for 

operation in normal environments, but failed to meet the hardness requirements 

exhibited when they were new. The Task Force found that the Services have been 

neglecting this surveillance and maintenance activity. As an example, Air Force XOS 

and its predecessor organizations had, in the past, received routine nuclear 

survivability management status reports on the various Air Force strategic systems 

having nuclear hardness requirements. However, the generation of these reports has 

dwindled and, since 1999, has become a non-routine event. There is therefore good 

reason to believe that many systems deployed with nuclear hardness designs are no 

longer able to meet their requirements or have smaller design margins than when first 

deployed. The Task Force found no evidence of surveillance testing of non-strategic 

systems with hardness requirements and little for strategic systems. 

5.6 Underground Nuclear Effects Testing

 The last underground nuclear effects test was Hunter’s Trophy in 1992. Until the 

moratorium on nuclear testing, underground tests (UGT) were important in assessing 

the performance of systems in extreme radiation environments. The test fidelity of 

underground experiments was not perfect. The experimental program was limited by 

cost, an infrequent test schedule, competition for space in the test alcoves, and the 

practical difficulties of working in the tunnel complex. Many radiation effects issues 

could be studied more efficiently at above-ground radiation facilities. Nevertheless, 

underground testing provided some radiation environments of importance that still 

cannot be matched in today’s radiation facilities.

 The unique role of UGTs was to generate extreme X-ray environments, especially 

in the cold and warm portion of the energy spectrum. The nuclear devices used on 

underground effects tests were designed to optimize X-ray environments for the 
 - 43 - 

proposed experiments, as far as was practical. Some experiments were conducted in an 

evacuated pipe with a direct line of sight to the nuclear device. Other experiments used 

a modified X-ray environment produced by scattering X-rays in a specially designed 

scatter station. The scatter station increased the temporal pulse width, reduced the 

intensity of neutrons and γ-rays relative to X-rays, and changed the X-ray energy 

spectrum. In both cases, filters were used to further modify the X-ray energy spectrum. 

While there were practical limits on how much the X-ray spectrum and pulse width 

could be modified, the X-ray fluence was essentially unlimited. Existing above-ground 

simulators produce less total X-ray fluence by orders of magnitude than what was 

available at the experiemental stations in underground tests. 

 Despite having unlimited fluence, there were important differences between 

threat environments and what could be achieved in underground simulations of those 

environments. Mining costs were a large fraction of the considerable expense of 

underground effects tests, so the nuclear device was designed to have the smallest 

practical total yield, orders of magnitude less than typical strategic nuclear weapons. 

This forced inevitable tradeoffs in the desired radiation output of the device. Even in 

scatter stations, the X-ray pulse width was generally not as long as desired. For many 

experiments, the X-ray energy spectrum was far from ideal, even after extensive 

modification with scatter stations and filters. Because experiments were located so 

much closer to the device than what would likely be the case in a warfighting scenario, 

the neutron pulse width was much shorter and arrived with a much smaller time delay 

after the X-ray pulse than in a threat environment. In fact, the neutron environment 

was so different from typical threat environments that neutron experiments were rarely 

done on UGTs. It was far more typical that neutrons were an unwelcome background 

that needed to be mitigated to perform a successful X-ray experiment. Neutron effects 

were almost always studied at nuclear reactors, even when UGTs were available. γ-ray 

effects could be studied more efficiently with pulsed power accelerators and reactors. 

 The principal impact of the moratorium on nuclear testing has been the loss of 

extreme X-ray environments. Above-ground simulators are able to adequately simulate 

only the hot X-ray environment relevant to heavily shielded components. While it is 

sometimes suggested that we lost the ability to do experiments in combined 

environments, this is a misconception: UGTs did not provide a high fidelity simulation 

of combined environments, and UGTs were not used to study synergistic effects caused 

by exposure to multiple radiation environments. 
 - 44 - 

5.7 Current Business Models 

DOE Program13

The nuclear survivability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile is the focus of the DOE/NNSA 

NWE program. An NWE program element for developing improved understanding of 

the relationships between warhead design features, outputs, and lethality and collateral 

effects has been scoped but has not been implemented. Only the survivability elements 

of the NNSA program are addressed in this report. 

 

The NNSA NWE Program develops and sustains capabilities to support the 

nuclear survivability of the enduring and evolving stockpile, its certification and life 

extension, without relying on underground tests, through research and development, 

radiation hardening, modeling and validation, and aboveground testing. It develops 

validated computational tools to evaluate threat nuclear weapon radiation 

environments and system radiation responses, develops radiation-hardened 

technologies, and improves radiation sources and diagnostics. 

NNSA NWE tools and technologies are provided through major program 

elements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the goal of which is to maintain and 

enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile to 

counter the threats of the 21st century. Survivability is an element of reliability. Science 

and Engineering Campaigns, in collaboration with Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), 

ASC, Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF), DoD, support Stockpile Life 

Extension Programs (SLEPs), Limited-life Component (LLC) replacements, and 

stockpile modifications. 

The Manager of the Nuclear Survivability and Effectiveness Program at NNSA 

Headquarters (who is also the manager of the Nuclear Survivability Activity within the 

Engineering Campaign) and science and technology (S&T) program directors at the 

NNSA national laboratories, together with the Manager, Radiation Effects Sciences 

Program at Sandia National Laboratories, and the Outputs and Survivability Program 

leaders at LLNL and LANL, are the primary NNSA proponents and champions for 

nuclear survivability technology development and stewardship. Laboratory and NNSA 

DSW program directors rely on developed and validated tools and technologies to 

qualify systems to their negotiated nuclear survivability requirements and are among 

 

13 See Appendix H for a more complete description of the DOE program. 
 - 45 - 

the strongest proponents when needed for their programs. At Sandia, Radiation Effects 

Sciences is among its suite of critical capabilities. 

 The ASC Campaign develops, verifies, and validates NWE simulation codes 

using experimental data generated by the Science and Engineering Campaigns. The 

Engineering Campaign, through the Nuclear Survivability Activity also supports the 

development and initial implementation of radiation hardened microsystems. RTBF 

sustains the simulators and microelectronics infrastructure so that, when combined 

with investments and utilization by the campaigns and DSW, they remain technically 

and economically viable. Upgrades and new capabilities are developed with operating 

funds when practical, or with construction funds when appropriate. Utilization by DoD 

of the NNSA NWE simulators is through Work for Others agreements on a cost 

reimbursable and non-interference with DOE programs basis. This access is relatively 

unencumbered in most cases. For some assets, such as Z (or ZR) or NIF (when it 

becomes operational at useful levels), long-term agreements need to be negotiated at a 

high level to provide significant access outside the DOE community. Access by DoD to 

the advanced scientific computing resources of the NNSA weapons laboratories on the 

same basis is possible, but problematical because of heavy utilization by the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program. Appendix H offers two charts that summarize the status of DOE 

effects simulators and the ASC codes at this point. 

The campaigns and ASC generally perform R&D and establish nuclear 

survivability technologies. DSW invests in research and tools development and 

improvement when needed for system-specific applications and problems. 

Issues and Trends Impacting NNSA NWE Programs14 

The most challenging issue facing the NNSA nuclear survivability program is the 

absence of a clearly articulated policy supported and enforced at the highest levels 

regarding the purposes of our nuclear stockpile. A substantial nuclear survivability 

program is clearly an imperative if, in addition to deterring the use of WMD by 

regional, state, or sub-state aggressors, its purposes are to counter the threat of 

emergence of a peer, or near peer adversary, and to hold at risk high value targets that 

might be defended by nuclear interceptors in the first third of the 21st century. 

Report language accompanying the House Energy and Water Appropriations 

Bill for 2005 explicitly questions “the continued high level of funding requested in the 

 

14 See Appendix L for results of Congressional and NNSA budget planning actions that occurred while 

this report was in review. 
 - 46 - 

Nuclear Survivability campaign to assess the ability of the weapons in the stockpile to 

continue to function as designed during a massive nuclear exchange.” It further states 

“In the post-Cold War world with no new weapon production ongoing, this activity is a 

waste of scarce resources.” These statements reflect a misunderstanding of the rationale 

for the nuclear survivability of our stockpile. Nuclear survivability enhances the 

credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, hedges against the emergence of a peer, or nearpeer adversary, enables the penetration of point nuclear defenses of high-value targets, 

reduces incentives for nuclear proliferation, and deters the use of weapons of mass 

destruction. As discussed throughout this report, new nuclear survivability challenges 

exist in the present security environment - new weapons production is ongoing in other 

nations, our stockpile is being refurbished with new technologies and materials 

susceptible to nuclear effects, and aging of the stockpile introduces new challenges to 

reliability, including nuclear survivability. 

Mindful of the current and emerging threat environment, both the Navy SSPO 

and the Air Force Ballistic Missile Office have revalidated their survivability 

requirements with the NNSA laboratories as active participants. Some Stockpile-toTarget-Sequence requirements have been significantly altered in these re-evaluations. 

An additional challenge is that gaps in stockpile refurbishment schedules make it 

difficult to defend nuclear survivability budgets for radiation effects research and 

development required to develop improved rad-hard design methods and tools in 

order to anticipate and solve problems before crises arise, and for hardness assurance 

verification of the enduring stockpile. 

 

The impact of either challenge is potentially to drive the currently viable NNSA 

NWE program to a sub-critical state in which neither the expertise nor the 

infrastructure is capable of sustaining nuclear survivability. The Task Force believes 

that this will undermine the credibility of our deterrent, provide increased potential 

returns on investment to the proliferant, and greatly increase the time needed to 

respond to new nuclear threat environments.15 

 15 To elaborate, strategic systems, which are currently hardened to survive severe environments, will be 

compromised when components are replaced. When components reach the end of their functional life, they are 

generally redesigned because the parts and materials used originally are no longer available. A typical electronics 

part will only be on the market for about 18 months when it will be replaced with the next generation device. Even 

items like epoxies and potting materials undergo an evolution. If the new component is not designed to meet 

strategic radiation requirements, it will compromise the entire system. Abandoning hardness requirements and 

qualification of strategic systems will be the first time in the nuclear age that the U.S. will not be guaranteed to hold 

at risk the vital assets of a potential nuclear-armed adversary. 
 - 47 - 

DoD Requirements 

 There is no clear guidance from DoD on the battle scenario or requirements for 

operating on a battlefield that has experienced a nuclear event; many in authority do 

not believe that a nuclear event will ever affect their system. The development and 

procurement system is not well integrated to force assessment of operations in nuclear 

environments. Because the design and manufacturing of DoD systems is awarded on a 

competitive basis, it is generally not economically viable for any single system 

contractor to maintain all of the disciplines and test facilities needed to validate the 

nuclear survivability of all types of systems. The tools (models and test facilities) for 

nuclear hardened design and verification are generally developed and maintained by 

DTRA for the use of DoD program offices and system developers. 

 Under current DoD procurement philosophy, nuclear hardening is part of the 

trade space allowed to the program office (as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3). 

Nuclear survivability or the level of nuclear survivability may be traded away to 

maintain program cost or schedule, even if it compromises the ability of the system to 

operate if there is a nuclear event. Moreover, systems are never audited to see if they 

will operate in a battlefield after a nuclear event. 

DTRA Nuclear Weapon Effects Technology Program 

 The DTRA NWE program is divided into five business areas. The following four 

areas are relevant for the test and simulation focus of this report: 

1) Radiation Hardened Microelectronics. This program develops and demonstrates 

radiation-hard, high performance prototype microelectronics to support the 

availability of radiation-hardened microelectronics and photonics for DoD missions 

in both private sector and government organizations. This program has two 

complementary components: a core program that develops and demonstrates 

enabling technologies; and an Accelerated Technology Development Program 

whose objective is to establish the capability to fabricate radiation hardened 0.15-

micron Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology at two 

domestic radiation hardened semiconductor suppliers, BAE Systems and 

Honeywell Defense and Space Electronic Systems (DSES). 

2) Simulation Technology. The Simulation Technology area develops technology 

and facilities to simulate nuclear environments in the laboratory. The program 

develops technologies to improve the intensity, fidelity reliability, reproducibility, 

and cost effectiveness of existing and future simulation facilities. It also develops 

test-beds and response databases for prompt radiation and thermal effects for the 
 - 48 - 

defeat of biological agents; and develops concepts, plans, and risk reduction 

strategies for affordable next-generation radiation simulators with improved 

intensity and fidelity. 

3) Assessments Technology. The Assessments Technology area develops design 

protocols, hardware, and software that enhance the ability of mission essential 

systems to survive a nuclear attack and to operate after a nuclear attack. It defines 

the engineering standards for hardening, develops testable design protocols, and 

develops effective nuclear threat mitigation technologies. The Assessments 

Technology area also develops the science and technology base for predictive 

nuclear effects assessment and maintains a core expertise in nuclear weapons 

effects methodologies. With the emergence of non-nuclear weapons that present a 

similar electromagnetic threat (high-power microwave or ultra-wideband 

weapons), this area includes a parallel development effort to predict and mitigate 

their effects. 

4) Environments. The Environments area provides fast running tools to enhance 

lethality, promote survivability, and enable assessment of strategic and tactical 

systems. This area validates existing codes, modifies current codes for end use, 

develops new codes, and sponsors work to fill gaps between our ability to 

predict nuclear weapon effects environments and the warfighter's needs for fast 

and reliable results. 

DTRA Program Execution 

Since there are few mandatory nuclear survivability requirements from DoD, 

DTRA currently assigns low priority to nuclear weapons effects technology programs.16 

Furthermore, the agency has said that DTRA 6.2 R&D money should be spent on R&D 

with “long term” goals rather than assisting in the hardening and validation of military 

systems. The agency position is that efforts to develop specific capabilities to harden 

and validate military systems should be reimbursed by the program offices. 

This low priority has led to reduced funding. Capability has only been 

maintained by industry consolidation. The only significant test capability is at the West 

Coast Facility operated by Titan Corporation for DTRA at a current cost ~$8.3M/year. 

Titan also maintains most of the DoD nuclear hardening modeling capability. Up until 

the draft findings of this Task Force, DTRA was spending a large fraction of its 

simulation R&D budget ($2.4M) on the DECADE facility at Arnold Engineering 

 

16 A principal exception is hardened microelectronics.
 - 49 - 

Development Center (AEDC). Lack of sufficient funding for a dedicated workforce and 

technical difficulty is leading DTRA to reassess that investment. 

Figure 5.1 Nuclear Weapon Effects S&T Budget Trend (Approximated) 

Figure 5.1 illustrates the dramatic budget drop in the program in FY94. The two 

funding lines shown starting in FY00 represent the total funding the program (top line) 

and for the program less the fenced rad-hard microelectronics program (bottom line). 

To the agency’s credit, the problem has been recognized and a plan developed to 

redress critical gaps that are emerging. A summary is provided in Appendix I. 

266 269

316 309

89 80 75 68 75 78 82 80 90

103 97 104

78

65 55 55

68 62 69

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

$ in Millions
 - 50 - 
 - 51 - 

CHAPTER 6 

HARDENING SYSTEMS AND ASSESSING PERFORMANCE – THE FUTURE 

6.1 Evolving Design Strategies

 It is expected that the process of designing nuclear hard systems in the future can 

still be accomplished using the mature hardening design strategies that had evolved by 

the end of the Cold War. Once the system CONOPS and threat environments have 

been defined and uncertainties in the actual nuclear environments have been reflected 

in the desired system capabilities, several options are available to the system engineers 

to help develop the best hardening strategy. 

 First, however, a broad system architecture review should be undertaken to make 

sure that there are no inherent, fundamental obstacles to arriving at a hardened overall 

system design. These obstacles could include the inability to verify that the design 

meets its requirements via a rational combination of simulation, testing, and analyses. 

Next, shielding at the system, box, or component level can be traded against weight and 

cost penalties. Use of hardened electronic parts is clearly an attractive option if such 

parts can be made cost effectively to meet performance requirements. Alternatively 

circumvention and recovery (C&R) schemes can be implemented wherein a nuclear 

event detector will be used to alert a system to shut down vulnerable subsystems, store 

critical data in non-volatile memory, and begin planning to restart its most vulnerable 

subsystems when it is safe to do so. In this way, components can be protected from 

some effects of prompt ionizing radiation and large current surges. The design and 

development can then proceed along the same lines as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 

5.2.

6.2 Future Radiation Hardened Technology Challenges

 The ability to design radiation hardened systems depends on a set of special 

technologies, particularly for systems that have the highest level requirements. The 

most significant of these technologies is rad-hard microelectronics, which are 

manufactured by a small and rapidly declining set of niche vendors. Most commercial 

electronic systems can be upset or destroyed by exposure to modest radiation 

environments. Special manufacturing techniques can reduce the sensitivity of 

electronic parts to radiation by orders of magnitude. 

Since the early development of microelectronics was driven by applications in military 
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and space technologies, there is a long history of studying radiation effects in 

electronics and developing special rad-hard parts. There are significant technological 

and business challenges to maintaining these technologies. The technological challenge 

is the rapid evolution of commercial electronics, where 18 months is a typical product 

cycle. The radiation response of electronic parts changes as feature sizes decrease and 

manufacturing techniques evolve. Because the hardening techniques have to build upon 

commercially available technologies, there is a constant race to adapt hardening 

processes to the evolving commercial environment. The business challenge is that the 

market for rad-hard parts is a vanishingly small fraction of the overall commercial 

market for microelectronics. It is essential that the government continue to monitor and 

invest in the technical and manufacturing base for rad-hard parts, without which it will 

be impossible to design and build rad-hard systems. The one-time, USD(AT&L) 

Accelerated Technology Development Initiative to close the performance gap between 

commercial and rad hard parts was inaugurated in FY02 and ends in FY05. This 

successful effort, which has been managed by DTRA, will meet DoD's near term 

requirements through ~2012 and lays the foundation to reduce future industrial reliance 

on DoD for foundry recapitalization. The Department's long term needs will be met 

only through continuation of its core S&T investments to develop rad hard solutions as 

new commercial technologies emerge. Senior level attention to the DoD's corporate 

strategy for rad hard microelectronics, such as that provided by the Radiation 

Hardened Microelectronics Oversight Council currently chaired by the DDR&E, is 

essential for future success. 

 There are other special technologies that are important for certain systems and 

new ones will emerge as military capabilities evolve. One of the challenges faced by 

MDA is the need for survivable optical components. A multi-layer coating on a mirror 

may be damaged by X-ray exposure, vibration in the system can impair identification of 

a target, and material blown off of baffles onto the mirror can obscure a scene. These 

issues will have to be studied in detail to develop mitigation strategies. In the future, 

micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) may be incorporated in many military 

systems including nuclear weapons, and we may face new challenges in making these 

resistant to radiation. Another challenge is developing non-volatile rad-hard memories, 

which would be useful in many systems. Research programs in radiation effects and 

scientific expertise must be robust enough to tackle new hardening challenges as they 

arise. 

6.3 Future Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulators

 Radiation facilities will continue to be important for testing components and 
 - 53 - 

systems, research in radiation effects, and validation of computational models. While 

the total number of operational facilities will depend on the number and scope of radhard systems being developed, there is a core set of radiation facilities that must be 

maintained. This core set includes:

At least one facility to provide prompt neutron environments. These 

environments have historically been generated by fast-burst reactors. Existing 

facilities are at risk because of escalating costs for protecting HEU. DoD and 

DOE should work together to insure the availability of at least one of the two 

remaining facilities until an alternative capability can be developed.

A facility to simulate modified neutron and γ environments. Currently, ACRR 

at Sandia National Laboratories has unique capabilities in this area.

Facilities to simulate X-ray environments. Currently, the major facilities are 

operated by DTRA (Decade, Double Eagle, Pithon) and Sandia National 

Laboratories (Saturn, Z, and Z is undergoing a significant upgrade to ZR). There 

is enough work at these facilities to support both DOE and DTRA facilities. 

However, the capabilities at Decade and the DTRA West Coast Facilities (Double 

Eagle, Pithon) are largely redundant and are not heavily utilized. 

Prompt γ simulator. The HERMES facility operated by Sandia National 

Laboratories has unique capability that supports systems with the highest levels 

of radiation requirements. There are many smaller prompt γ simulators, which 

should continue to operate based on local cost/benefit considerations.

EMP simulators. DoD and DOE should maintain facilities to support their 

missions. These may be mothballed as long as the capability to restore operation 

when needed is maintained. The need for full scale facilities should be 

addressed soon while the leading experts are still available to contribute and 

educate successors.

Impulse simulators. Both flyer plate facilities and LIHE facilities have been 

important in studying impulse generated by extreme X-ray deposition. DoD and 

DOE should maintain facilities to support their missions. These may be 

mothballed as long as the capability to restore operation when needed is 

maintained.
 - 54 - 

Blast simulator. DoD and DOE should maintain the capability to support their 

missions. This is another area where facilities may be mothballed for extended 

periods.

The DOE continues to build ever larger pulsed-power accelerators (ZR) to 

support multiple programs. While it would be difficult to justify this investment 

strictly from the standpoint of radiation effects, the radiation effects community should 

take full advantage of this evolving capability. Similarly, NIF may provide some 

unique experimental capabilities, and these should be pursued once the facility is 

operational. 

In the far future, a high-yield ICF capsule could generate X-ray environments 

similar to what was available in underground nuclear effects tests. While this would 

not be a panacea for nuclear hardening, since an ICF facility would face fidelity issues 

similar to those on UGTs, high-yield ICF would be a breakthrough technology that 

would be important for a small number of systems with the highest-level radiation 

requirements. 

6.4 Improved Modeling and Simulation

 In the future, advanced computational tools will impact every aspect of rad-hard 

design, performance evaluation, and system surveillance. The same computer-aided 

design (CAD) description of a system that is produced in the engineering design phase 

will provide the input for assessing performance in radiation environments. Radiation 

hardening will be integrated into the design process from the beginning. 

 Realizing this future will require increased cooperation and coordination between 

the DOE and DoD. The advanced computational capabilities that DOE is developing in 

the Advanced Strategic Computing Program will address nuclear stockpile issues, but 

there are a number of DoD issues, such as the optics for MDA’s system, that are not 

being considered in this effort. By teaming with DOE, DTRA can build on the DOE 

investment to incorporate additional capabilities into the DOE suite of codes. DTRA 

can do this with a modest incremental investment. 

6.5 Surveillance 

 More rigorous protocols for assessing the hardness of systems as they evolve and 

age should be implemented in the future. Recent experiments have demonstrated that 

the radiation response of electronic components can change dramatically as they age. 

Depending on the design margin, this could cause the failure of a system that originally 
 - 55 - 

met its radiation requirements when new. Another issue is the possible degradation of 

EMP shielding as systems are used in the field and modified with periodic upgrades. 

6.6 A New Business Model

 The time has passed when DoD and DOE needed largely parallel programs 

supporting dedicated facilities and expertise. It is now important that DoD and DOE 

work together to make available critical capabilities and to provide access to facilities 

and expertise. The goal should be a single “national enterprise” shared by the two 

departments. 

 For large-scale radiation simulators, it is very difficult to sustain operation under 

a business model that relies on full funding from customers. While there may be 

periods of time when these facilities are very busy, inevitably there will be gaps in test 

programs that result in periods of underutilization. It is vital that the critical 

capabilities be sustained during these periods. This is not to say that facilities with 

extremely sparse utilization or long periods of inactivity are not candidates for mothball 

or shutdown, but DOE and DoD should ensure that critical, unique capabilities are 

maintained. Even more important, the two agencies need to ensure that the expert 

personnel are continually challenged with a combination of direct support to the design 

and surveillance communities, and ongoing R&D to improve fundamental 

understanding and the modeling tool set that goes with that understanding. 

 DTRA appears to be uncomfortable embracing routine operation of facilities as an 

important mission when it cannot tie this operation to its research program. DoD 

should endorse this critical role for DTRA. This will make it easier for DTRA to 

consolidate a set of simulators at its West Coast Facility to support routine testing across 

the broad range of DoD systems. 

 Test facilities operated by the military services also play a vital role. This is 

particularly true of the fast-burst reactor at White Sands Missile Range, which will be 

the only operational capability after 2007. 

 In its Stockpile Stewardship Program, DOE invested heavily in programs that 

support nuclear survivability. This created unique capabilities at their experimental 

facilities, a radically improved set of computational capabilities, and considerable 

scientific expertise at their laboratories. DoD, through DTRA, should work with DOE 

to facilitate utilization of this important national resource. 
 - 56 - 
 - 57 - 

CHAPTER 7 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

7.1 Summary of the Findings 

The findings of the Task Force as discussed throughout the preceding chapters 

can be summarized as follows: 

a) The nuclear threat is evolving, and in troublesome ways that should lead DoD 

leadership to expect that the military will be forced to operate in a nuclear 

environment at some point in the foreseeable future. 

b) With respect to vulnerabilities, have we created the elements of the “perfect 

storm”? The lax attitude to hardening requirements, the increasing reliance on 

COTS components, the move to net centric operations, and other contributing 

factors should raise concerns. 

c) Weapon output calculations can and should be higher fidelity based on advances 

in DOE codes. 

d) Survivability requirements for all but a part of the nuclear strategic force have 

been routinely waived or ignored. 

e) Expertise for assessing survivability has atrophied considerably in the DoD, but 

remains robust at the DOE laboratories.17 Simulator capabilities have largely 

been maintained although large scale EMP facilities are no longer available and 

the remaining fast neutron sources are in danger of disappearing. 

f) The MDA system presents new and unique challenges because of its 

evolutionary acquisition strategy and the need to harden or protect the optical 

components of the interceptor. 

g) The belief that hardening adds considerable cost is not uniformly true if 

hardening is addressed early in design. Design practices are well understood 

and supported by easy-to-use design tools. 

 

17 This is a true statement as of the time the report went into review. Subsequent FY05 Congressional budget 

decisions and out-year projections will dramatically reduce support for the DOE program. 
 - 58 - 

h) For those “soft” systems already fielded, a number of operational alternatives 

can offer workarounds or mitigation to effects, but they must be developed and 

tested with high fidelity simulations supporting games and exercises. 

7.2 Recommendations: Assuring Capabilities 

The Task Force recommendations are based on the principle that DoD/OSD, the 

Joint Staff, and the Services need to accept that the ability to assure the nuclear 

survivability of critical national security systems is an inherent governmental 

responsibility. The needs to support this endeavor – in particular, advanced code 

development and simulator infrastructure maintenance and improvements – cannot be 

met by the private sector. 

1) In order to assure capabilities, the Task Force recommends that: 

a) DEPSECDEF assure that the Department promptly and carefully considers the 

recommendations of the EMP Commission and this Task Force, prioritizes 

corrective actions, and provides appropriate funding. The recommendations are 

largely coincident, with this Task Force broadening those of the EMP 

Commission to include the full spectrum of NWE issues. 

b) In parallel, DEPSECDEF should reaffirm the authorities of ATSD(NCB) granted 

in Directive 5134.8, section 3, for ensuring that those recommendations are 

addressed and routinely audited. 

c) ATSD(NCB) should require of DOE a more complete characterization of weapon 

outputs, to include uncertainties in the calculations, for both adversary and U.S. 

systems, to enable survivability and effects based planning, respectively. 

2) For the tech base: 

a) DoD and DOE/NNSA should formally coordinate and collaborate in their 

nuclear weapons effects program under the oversight of their Nuclear Weapons 

Council. The goal should be to assure that adequate capabilities are developed, 

sustained, continuously improved, and utilized to meet the needs of both 

departments. The specific terms of the Joint program should be encoded as an 

addendum to the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear 

Weapons Effects Technology between DTRA and DOE/NNSA. 
 - 59 - 

b) Such a coordinated program should include investment plans and business 

models that support the needs of both departments to conduct R&D, to 

continuously improve “Red Book” output calculations, to support agency and 

Service users, and to provide contractor/supplier access to the facilities. 

c) DTRA should immediately provide resources and expand its core staff to 

include expertise capable of guiding contractor simulator and simulation efforts, 

including importing DOE/NNSA modeling tools as appropriate and of advising 

DoD developers and planners of approaches to understanding vulnerabilities 

and survivability options based on both DoD and DOE capabilities. 

3) For new system acquisition or existing system upgrades: 

a) J8 should ensure that nuclear threats and survivability assessments are 

addressed through the reference scenarios of the JCIDS process. DoD directives 

and instructions will probably need to be revised to include survivability as a 

required key performance parameter. 

b) Waivers to survivability requirements should be granted only by agreement of 

USD/AT&L and VJCS in the context of Joint operations, based on the 

recommendation of ATSD(NCB) and J8. This too may require a new DoD 

directive to grant these authorities. 

c) USD/AT&L should provide support to DTRA to develop the tools to characterize 

nuclear environment and assess system response to support military utility 

assessments. 

4) For currently fielded systems: 

a) DEPSECDEF should task the Services to identify and assess the hardness of 

critical current operational components. 

b) VJCS should direct JFCOM and the Services to introduce nuclear events into 

exercises and games, using the results of the assessments performed on critical 

operational components, in order to help define critical Joint capabilities whose 

vulnerabilities might create significant operational impacts. We note that the 

same tools that DTRA develops for new system survivability assessments should 

be used here as well to assure consistency in assessments between fielded and 

new systems. 
 - 60 - 

c) Where serious issues are identified, the CoCOMs and Services should be 

required to develop and implement operational and/or hardening fixes and/or 

workarounds. 

5) For both new and fielded systems: 

a) DTRA, in keeping with its mission as a combat support agency, should step up 

to the technical advisor and support role for the Services and Combatant 

Commands (CoCOMs). 

7.3 Recommendations: Simulators and Simulation 

1) With respect to qualifying MDA’s system: 

a) Because we were able to develop potential alternatives for MDA survivability 

validation during the course the study, the Task Force did not see a compelling 

case for the proposed Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP) 

upgrade to Decade. Therefore, we concur with canceling the CTEIP upgrade to 

Decade, and we recommend that DTRA consolidate its X-ray facilities at a single 

location, preferably the West Coast Facility where the last critical mass of 

expertise exists to support DoD. DTRA should have sufficient capability there 

and with the DOE to continue to conduct its R&D program. 

b) MDA should expand the HAENS Standard Verification Working Group to 

include national expertise from DTRA and DOE for develop a viable assessment 

and qualification approach. Simultaneously, MDA should plan for the necessary 

resources to support implementation of the approach in the context of its 

evolutionary development process. The Task Force believes that existing 

simulators combined with the state-of-the-art codes from DOE’s ASC program 

will provide most of the needed capabilities. New modeling tools may need to 

be developed to help in the assessment of specific interceptor components. 

2) As a part of the coordinated program between DOE and DoD: 

a) The first step should be agreement on the need for and assurance of a pulsed fast 

neutron source. For the near term, the two departments should develop and 

implement a strategy for maintaining at least one operational capability. For the 

longer term, the two departments should commit to building a capability that 

removes the security burden of current simulators, which rely on special nuclear 

materials. 
 - 61 - 

b) The next step should be to define the minimum necessary set of X-ray, EMP, 

gamma, and neutron effects simulators to meet the needs of both conventional 

and nuclear forces. This definition should be integrated with the ever more 

robust modeling tools expected to be continuously evolved from DOE’s ASC 

program. 

7.4 Deferring the Roadmap 

The terms of reference for this study indicate that the Task Force is to propose a 

roadmap for implementation of its recommendations. On the advice of USD/AT&L, the 

Task Force deferring that task as a follow-on based on DoD’s required response to 

Congress regarding the recommendations of the EMP Commission. The Task Force 

urges that its recommendations also be integrated into the response. 
 - 62 - 
 - 63 - 

Appendix A: Terms of Reference 
 - 64 - 
 - 65 - 

Appendix B: Task Force Participants 

Task Force Chairs

 Dr. Mim John, Chair, Sandia National Laboratories 

 Dr. Jay Davis, Vice Chair, Private Consultant 

Task Force Members

 Dr. Bob Barker, Private Consultant 

 Dr. John Crawford, Sandia National Laboratories 

 Dr. Bryan Gabbard, Defense Group Inc. 

 Dr. Jim Lee, Sandia National Laboratories 

 MG Tom Neary, USAF (Ret.), SAIC 

 Mr. Roy Setterlund, Draper Laboratory 

 Dr. Gordon Soper, Defense Group Inc. 

 Dr. Charles Stallings, Private Consultant 

Executive Secretaries

 Dr. Andrew (Butch) Cox, ATSD(NCB) 

 Mr. Derrick Hinton, DOT&E 

Government Advisors

 LtCol Doug Amon, MDA 

 Dr. Ted Luera, DOE/NNSA 

 Mr. James McComb, MDA 

 Jim Miller, AF/XOS 

 Ms. Joan Pierre, DTRA 

 LCDR Rome Ruiz, Navy Nuclear Affairs 

 Dr. Ralph Schneider, DOE/NNSA 

DSB Secretariat

 CDR David Waugh, USN 

Support

 Ms. Michelle Ashley, SAIC 

 Mr. R. C. Webb, SAIC 

 Dr. Bruce Wilson, Northrop Grumman 
 - 66 - 
 - 67 - 

Appendix C: DTRA/ NNSA Memorandum of Understanding
 - 68 - 
 - 69 - 
 - 70 - 
 - 71 - 
 - 72 - 
 - 73 - 

Appendix D: Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

The MDA Acquisition Strategy

 Since the BMDS is required to engage and negate nuclear weapons, the BMDS must be able to 

survive and operate in the environments produced by the detonation of a nuclear weapon regardless of 

whether that detonation was intentional or inadvertent. MDA has established the BMDS High Altitude 

Exo-Atmospheric Nuclear Survivability (HAENS) Standard that provides the basis for design and 

verification / validation of the BMDS Element Nuclear Survivability and Operation in the Nuclear 

Environments (OPINE) Capabilities. The HAENS standard is a three level standard that provides a 

yardstick for evaluation of BMDS capability against nuclear weapon threats. 

 The BMDS HAENS Standard relates the nuclear hardening and environmental levels that the 

BMDS must survive and operate in to effectively counter the evolving threat. The BMDS HAENS 

standard identifies all of the critical nuclear environments produced by a nuclear detonation in the BMDS 

battle space (e.g. HEMP, Prompt Radiation, Persistent Radiation, Disturbed Ionosphere, Optical 

backgrounds, Radar and RF Communication link parameters). BMDS System and Element effectiveness 

against a certain threat will be judged against the corresponding Level for that threat in the HAENS 

Standard. 

 MDA has embraced the new Evolutionary Acquisition approach which is DoD's preferred 

strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers 

capability in increments, recognizing, up front, the need for future capability improvements. 

 The MDA Capability-Based Acquisition Process includes spiral development and incremental 

development. In the Spiral Development process, a desired capability is identified, but the end-state 

requirements are not known at program initiation. Those requirements are refined through 

demonstration and risk management; there is continuous user feedback; and each increment provides the 

user the best possible capability. The requirements for future increments depend on feedback from users 

and technology maturation. In the Incremental Development a desired capability is identified, an endstate requirement is known, and that requirement is met over time by development of several increments, 

each dependent on available mature technology. 

 The Representative Test and Evaluation Approach for Qualification in Nuclear environments is 

based on analysis, test, and evaluation activities that will be necessary to verify/valuate the MDA 

contractor claims of capability against the threat. 

 The MDA approach is based on the DTRA Testable Hardware Protocols, Testable Hardware 

Toolkit, Hardware-In-The-Loop, and other DoD domain experience verifying and validating 

survivability. MDA needs to expand their survivability approach to include recent advancement made by 

the DOE Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) initiative. To demonstrate that the appropriate 

MDA Nuclear Survivability Level is achieved will require varying amounts of radiation testing to include 

testing at the piece part, module, circuit board/optical component, subsystem, and system level testing. 

The tests required will depend on the MDA Nuclear Survivability Level I, II, or III that is necessary to 

verify that the contractor has achieved the threat capability claimed. Gaps in simulator capability need to 

be bridged using Modeling and Simulation via a collaborative effort with the DOE ASC program. The 

modeling and simulation activity needs to be anchored by carefully planned benchmark tests. 
 - 74 - 

 BMDS hardening approach will involve a combination of radiation hardened and COTS 

electronic piece parts that will require burnout and upset screening to X-ray and gamma ray, total dose 

and dose rate, and neutron Single Event Upset (SEU) environments. The specific MDA Level to which an 

element is hardened will determine the amount of testing. For level I a minimum amount of testing will 

be necessary whereas for levels II and III a complete set of radiation testing will be necessary to include 

piece part and component, subsystem and system (i.e., EKV system level) tests in the hot and cold X-ray, 

the neutron, the debris betas and the debris gamma environments. To fully verify OPINE the sensor 

subsystem and the EKV tests will have to be performed in both single environments and in multiple 

environments properly spaced in time. For the Exo-EKV and LEO satellites, a cyro-test chamber will be 

required to simulate the space environment will be needed with IR background and targets. 

BMDS System Description

To counter the threat of ballistic missiles carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the 

Department of Defense established the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to manage and integrate all 

missile defense programs and technologies into one Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Our top 

Missile Defense priorities are: 

• To defend the United States, deployed forces, allies, and friends 

• To employ a BMDS that layers of defenses to intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight — 

boost, midcourse, and terminal — against all ranges of threats — short, medium, intermediate, and long 

• To enable early fielding for elements of the BMDS 

• To develop and test technologies and, if necessary, use prototype and test assets to provide early 

capability. 

 The BMDS program is structured in two-year “blocks,” with fielding opportunities occurring 

throughout the blocks. The first period, Block 2004, represents calendar years 2004-2005. Block 2006 

represents 2006-2007, and so on. The work done in each block will build upon the capabilities and 

development of previous blocks. Over time, this block approach will yield a fully integrated and layered 

BMDS, capable of defeating ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flights. 

• Block 2004 Objective: Field an initial capability to provide a modest defense of the United States 

• Block 2006 Objective: Increase the depth and breadth of our initial capability by adding interceptors, 

adding “deployable” radars, and integrating these systems to maximize their performance 

• Block 2008 Objective: Enhance our ability to protect our deployed forces and coalition partners, and add 

an initial capability to defeat the threats in the boost phase.
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Engagement Sequences 

MDA has developed an “engagement sequence” concept to demonstrate and measure how the 

components of the BMDS work together. An engagement sequence is a unique combination of detectcontrol-engage functions performed by BMDS components (e.g., sensors, weapons, and command control 

equipment) used to engage a threat ballistic missile. The engagement sequence defines the specific 

detection sensor, fire control radar, and weapon to be used, and is an innovative product of our efforts to 

create an integrated system, as opposed to a collection of diverse units. MDA’s testing program verifies 

the engagement sequences. These sequences, in turn, allow MDA to test the flexibility and 

interoperability of the system. Engagement sequence testing measures the effectiveness of data 

interchange between components, such as a sensor and the kill vehicle. A notional engagement sequence 

with the initial missile defense capability against a long-range ballistic missile is described with reference 

to the Engagement Sequence graphic above: 

(1) The Defense Support Program constellation of satellites monitors the entire globe. These satellites use 

infrared sensors to detect the heat generated during a missile launch. 

(2) The U.S. National Military Command and Control Network receives an alert of the possible launch of 

a long-range ballistic missile. The alert would be sent to several Department of Defense locations, 

including the Combatant Commands (COCOMS). Upon receiving the alert from the COCOMS, the BMDS 

directs its land- and sea-based sensors to search for the long-range missile flying along a predicted 

trajectory. 

(3) Forward-deployed U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers receive the launch notification and, using the 

upgraded SPY-1 radar, begin searching possible trajectory sectors for a ballistic missile. Upon detection, 

the tracking information is transmitted through the BMDS Data Network to the Ground-Based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD) system. An intercept course is calculated based on such tracking data. 

(4) A Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) is launched. 

(5) The Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) is alerted as the hostile missile approaches the radar’s 

area of coverage. Once the hostile missile has completed its boost phase, the booster separates and a 

reentry vehicle (RV) containing a weapon — chemical, biological, nuclear, or conventional — is deployed, 
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possibly with countermeasures (e.g., decoys). Using improvements in track accuracy, the UEWR 

identifies and begins to track the cluster containing the RV. 

(6) UEWR tracking data is used to provide interceptor course corrections. These corrections are 

transmitted to the interceptor missile so that it steers to the proper point in space where it releases its “kill 

vehicle.” 

(7) The kill vehicle, a 155-pound system of advanced sensors and state-of-the-art components, uses the 

information it has received from the command and control network to get into the proper position. Once 

there, the kill vehicle uses its onboard sensors to locate and acquire the target cluster and discriminate the 

RV from any accompanying decoys. 

(8) The kill vehicle adjusts its trajectory using small rocket motors to collide with the RV payload at a 

closing speed of more than 15,000 miles per hour. The force of the impact pulverizes the RV using only 

the kinetic force of the collision. This is called “hit-to-kill” technology. 

 MDA is laying the foundation of our nation’s missile defenses with the initial fielding of the 

BMDS. This initial set of capabilities is designed to meet the near-term ballistic missile threat to our 

homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. Extensive realistic testing is planned to take place for 

many years. MDA’s development program will provide improvements and upgrades to existing 

technology and will ensure that the missile defense system on alert is the most effective, reliable, and 

capable system, now and in the future, contributing greatly to homeland defense, public safety, and our 

overall national security. For the first time, the BMDS will be able to execute multiple engagement 

opportunities, a true test of an integrated, layered defense. In the future, based on lessons learned in the 

BMDS Test Bed, more advanced capabilities will be fielded in successive blocks. The ABL and our Kinetic 

Energy Interceptor program would allow us to exploit the advantages of a boost-phase intercept. 

THAAD would add an additional intercept opportunity in the terminal phase and would provide a 

greater area of coverage than existing terminal point defenses. Forward-deployed radars would provide 

additional layers of sensor capability and more effective tracking of hostile missiles. Over time, MDA’s 

acquisition approach will yield a fully integrated and layered BMDS capable of defeating ballistic missiles 

of all ranges in all phases of flight.

New -EKV Sensor Unique Conditions

• The MDA Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) has unique hardening and Operate in the 

Nuclear Environment (OPINE) requirements while the KV design constraints do not allow the 

normal radiation shielding to the gamma limit. After the EKV separation and the shroud is blown 

away the sensor including the telescope, mirrors, focal plane array and associated electronics are 

exposed to the full suite of nuclear environments that result when a nuclear explosions occurs. 

Because kill vehicles operate above the bulk of the atmosphere, there is little or no air mass 

shielding between the kill vehicle and the nuclear detonation. 

• The sensor must identity, discriminate, and home in on RV with numerous decoys while flying 

through the nuclear debris from prior explosions from previous nuclear detonation. Nuclear 

detonations can result from salvage fusing, inadvertent yield at intercept (not “one point safe”), 

or deliberate detonation of a nuclear warhead in the BMDS battle space. 

• The KV must survive the prompt X-ray, gamma and neutron radiation and must operate through 

the debris gamma and beta environment. Optical sensors are susceptible to gamma and beta 

induced noise spikes at radiation levels that are far below the levels that are of concern for digital 

electronics. The senor gain is so high that the radiation induced noise is amplified and interpreted 
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as a valid signal. Senor operability requires a combination of hardware and software to detect, 

reject spurious radiation induced noise, and discriminate the target from penetration aides 

including chaff, balloons, light weight replicas, and other decoys. 

• The combined effects of both the prompt radiation, thermal flash, and the delayed radiation 

debris (gammas and betas) while the neutrons arrive from multiple are single event upsetting, 

mirrors deforming, battles flaking off particulates, and the thermal flash are exacerbating the 

signal to noise at the same time the sensor is discriminate the targets from various decoys. 

• Exo-atmospheric nuclear detonations deposit tremendous amounts of energy into the ionosphere 

causing disruption of radar and RF communications systems via blackout, redout, and 

scintillation. 

Issues for Assuring Survivability with Simulators

X-Ray Gap. Gaps exist in the Cold and Warm X-Ray environment. It is difficult to accurately simulate the 

fluence, temporal, and spectral fidelity in these regimes using above ground simulators (Z-Pinch plasma 

radiation and bremsstrahlung sources). This gap can be partially bridged using modeling & simulation 

and benchmark tests conducted with nuclear radiation simulators. 

Example 1: MBS provides a critical capability in the warm x-ray regime. Even though the fluence from 

MBS is several orders of magnitude below threat levels, it is used to measure SGEMP drive currents that 

are scaled up to threat levels in higher level system models. Sub-fluence testing in the warm 

bremsstrahlung mode finds flaws and defects in the as built design that cannot be found using as built 

drawings and computer models and simulation. 

Example 2: Z-pinch Plasma radiation sources provide high fluence line spectra that are used to simulate 

the cold blackbody component of the weapon x-ray spectrum. Although, the fluence is approximately 

correct the spectral fidelity can drive artificial effects while potentially missing real effects. 

SGEMP Gap. Extensive work by DTRA and DOE has developed the testable hardware design philosophy 

for SGEMP that relies on 4 gamma limit radiation shields. However, open cavity SGEMP associated 

with homing optical sensors is not as well understood. The optical sensors on the MDA homing sensor 

kill vehicles are the first of a kind that require this phenomenology to be better understood. However, it is 

likely that homing sensors may become common on future weapon system of all kinds. 

Neutron Gap. Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) is critical. Security concerns are driving cost. Recommend 

maintaining a single FBR at WSMR. Linear accelerator driven 14 MeV neutron sources are also required, 

but these are typically small scale laboratory test sources. Thermal reactors also provide a useful tool for 

evaluating nuclear reactions that are driven by 1/v thermal cross-sections. 

Heavy Ion Gap. Heavy Ion Test Capability for Cosmic Ray Testing. The Berkley cyclotron is at risk of 

closure. It is important to keep at least one cyclotron that is capable of heavy ion testing. Texas A&M, 

University of Michigan cyclotrons can fill this role. 

Neutron Single Event Upset Gap. Modern electronics has shown an enhanced response to neutron radiation 

following prompt radiation exposure. There is a need for maintaining combined effects testing at the 

electronics piece part and circuit level. Data indicates that there can be both total dose and dose rate 
 - 78 - 

driven synergies depending on the specific design of the specific part. Recommend combined effects 

capability be co-located with the WSMR FBR. 

Combined Effects Gap. The timeline of radiation insult to a system can result in synergistic effects. As an 

example, prompt radiation lasts for several nanoseconds, neutron arrival follows several milliseconds 

later, lasting for seconds, and persistent fallout, delayed gamma, and trapped beta environments that last 

for hours to months after a nuclear detonation. Synergistic effects are difficult to predict a priori. 

However, Hardware-In-The-Loop testing can often be used to find and mitigate these effects. In many 

cases, HWIL testing can use software driven interrupts to simulate nuclear radiation events. It appears to 

be appropriate to perform combined effects testing at the circuit and subsystem level and bridge the 

remaining gap with Modeling and Simulation. 

System of Systems Gap. System of Systems verification should be based on modeling and simulation 

anchored by element and subsystem V&V data. Engagement Planner with nuclear battle planning 

algorithms consistent with the fielded hardware capability is essential. 
 - 79 - 

Appendix E: U.S. Army Survivability Procedures 

FACTS:

DODI 5000.2 states, “...the PM shall address personnel survivability issues including protection against 

fratricide, detection, and instantaneous, cumulative, and residual nuclear, biological, and chemical 

effects.” 

CJCS Manual 3170.01A, 12 Mar 04, pages E-A-5 and F-A-5, paragraph 14, Other System Attributes, states 

that Combat Developers (CBTDEVs) should address “conventional and initial nuclear weapons effects 

and nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination (NBCC) survivability.” 

AR 15-41, Nuclear and Chemical Survivability Committee (NCSC), 20 Feb 92, the Army G-3 serves as the 

approval or disapproval authority for proposed modifications or waivers to nuclear and NBC 

contamination survivability criteria. Establishes a Secretariat that provides the Committee with technical 

support and advice in the review of nuclear and NBC contamination survivability requirements, and 

requests for modification or waiver of nuclear and NBC contamination survivability criteria. 

AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy, 31 Dec 03, states that “the DCS, G-3 will approve or disapprove all 

waiver requests for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination survivability.” 

AR 70-75, Survivability of Army Personnel and Materiel, 10 Jan 95. The Materiel Developer (MATDEV) will 

ensure appropriate survivability requirements are included in the testing and evaluation master plan, the 

quality assurance plan, the integrated logistics support plan, and the life-cycle survivability maintenance 

plan. The Director USANCA will establish preliminary nuclear effects and NBC contamination 

survivability criteria for requirements contained in the MNS which specify nuclear and NBC 

contamination survivability. (See AR 10–6). The Director USANCA will establish final nuclear effects and 

NBC contamination survivability criteria for requirements contained in ORDs which specify nuclear and 

NBC contamination survivability. The Director USANCA will assist CBTDEVs with the application of 

nuclear effects and NBC contamination survivability criteria for systems and assist in the evaluation of 

system survivability shortfalls. The Director USANCA will provide a director and two members to the 

Nuclear and Chemical Survivability Committee Secretariat (NCSCS) and administrative support to both 

the NCSC and the NCSCS. The Director USANCA will monitor the Army’s nuclear and NBC 

contamination survivability programs. 

New TRADOC’s Guide for Development of Army Initial Capabilities Documents (ICDs), 22 Oct 03, Paragraph 

5.2, page 14, "In most cases, a statement should be included that the capability may have to operate in an 

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment. Even if an 

EMP/NBC environment will not affect the system, NBC must be mentioned. This will ensure the 

capability is designed and tested to ensure operability by soldiers wearing mission oriented protective 

posture (MOPP) gear.” 

New TRADOC’s Capabilities Development Document (CDD) Writing Guide, 10 Mar 04, contains the same 

projected threat verbiage as in the ICD and adds: 

14.6. Initial nuclear weapons effects. State if the system is mission critical. (“The system is (is not) mission 

critical”). 

 If it is mission critical, further define the initial nuclear survivability criteria (see below). 
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 - If the system is mission critical, as a minimum, you must include the statement "System will survive 

the Initial Nuclear Weapon Effects of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)." 

 - During a nuclear event, system electronics can be upset. As such, if HEMP is required, you must also 

identify one of the following: "System upset is acceptable during a nuclear event and may be rebooted or 

power cycled to bring the system back to operational configuration within XX minutes." or "System upset 

is not acceptable during a nuclear event and must operate through the event." 

 - If the system is mission critical and if system is a front line combat system, CDD must contain the 

words: "System must also withstand the initial nuclear weapon effects of blast, thermal radiation, 

and initial nuclear radiation to the same level where a sufficient percentage of operators remain combat 

effective long enough to execute the mission." 

 - This suggested wording above provides for minimum requirements to allow mission critical systems 

to conduct their mission in a nuclear environment. (see AR 70-75) 

 - For additional information or assistance, contact U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency or consult 

TRADOC Pam 71-9. 

14.7. Nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination (NBCC) survivability

 State if the system is mission critical. (“The system is (is not) mission critical”. This must match the 

statement in 14.6). 

 If it is mission critical, further define the NBCC survivability criteria (see below). 

 - If the system is mission critical, as a minimum, you must include the statement: "System must survive 

the effects of NBC contamination, must be compatible for use by soldiers in Mission Oriented Protective 

Posture (MOPP) 4, and must be able to conduct its mission while contaminated for 72 hours without 

failure due to contamination." 

 - If the system is mission critical, which requires survivability, you must also address decontamination. 

As such, you must include the words: "Operators, using on-board equipment, must be able to conduct 

Immediate Decontamination within 15 minutes, Operational Decontamination using on-board or crewserved equipment within 6 hours, and Thorough Decontamination when mission allows reconstitution." 

If in the event system does not need to be decontaminated, for example, a fire and forget sensor, the CDD 

needs to state: "System (or component) does not need to be decontaminated." Be sure to provide rationale 

that will justify not needing decontamination. 

 - This suggested wording above provides for minimum requirements to allow mission critical systems 

to conduct their mission in an NBC contaminated environment. (see AR 70-75) 

 - For additional information or assistance, contact U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency or consult 

TRADOC Pam 71-9. 

New TRADOC’s Capability Production Document (CPD) Writing Guide, 10 Mar 04, contains the same threat 

environment statement as in the ICD and the same paragraph 14.6 and 14.7 as the CDD. 

DISCUSSION: 

The methodology for ensuring NBC survivability, both nuclear survivability and NBC contamination 

survivability, begins with equipment characterization. Characterization includes identifying the 

equipment configuration, topology, operational requirements, and location of the equipment relative to 

the forward line of own troops. The CBTDEV establishes the equipment characterization in the 

requirements documents. These documents are sent out for worldwide staffing before seeking TRADOC 

approval. Once approved by TRADOC the final draft is sent to DAMO-RQ for Army staffing and 

approval. 
 - 81 - 

The equipment purpose is then used to establish whether or not the equipment supports one or more 

critical missions. If it does, the equipment must be nuclear and NBC contamination survivable. Nuclear 

survivability is further broken down into High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and initial 

nuclear weapon effects (INWE) survivability. All mission critical systems must survive HEMP. 

Additionally, front line combat systems must also survive the INWE of blast, thermal radiation, 

and initial nuclear radiation. 

The next question to address is whether equipment hardening is the preferred way to meet that 

survivability requirement, or if it can be addressed by tactics, techniques and procedures that address 

mitigation, redundancy and resupply. If the CBTDEV determines that hardening/mitigation is the 

preferred way to meet that survivability requirement, they must establish the threat spectrum. On the 

regional battlefield, specific threat yields less than 500 kT are expected. 

Assuming the CBTDEV determines hardening is the answer, USANCA will issue the Materiel Developer 

(MATDEV) HEMP criteria from Volume II, QSTAG 244, Nuclear Hardening Criteria for Military Equipment, 

and QSTAG 1031, Consistent Sets of Nuclear Hardening Criteria for Classes of Equipment, to address the 

HEMP requirement. Likewise, USANCA will issue criteria to the MATDEV for hardness, 

decontaminability, and compatability derived from QSTAG 747, NBC Contamination Survivability Criteria 

for Military Equipment, to meet the NBC contamination survivability requirement. 

If INWE survivability and human operators are required, USANCA issues nuclear survivability criteria 

to the MATDEV based upon the balanced-hardening methodology described in QSTAG 244. Using this 

methodology, criteria levels have already been specified in QSTAG 1031 for each of five equipment 

classes associated with troops. In this case, the balanced-hardening procedure is based on the inherent 

survivability of human operators documented in a database of human susceptibilities to each type of 

nuclear weapon effect. 

 It should be noted that some first-generation unmanned equipment, notably mobile, ground-based 

equipment, could be operated by nearby troops. In this case, nearby is defined as operators being less 

than 0.5 km from the unmanned equipment. Using this definition, the equipment should be balanced to 

man’s survivability levels as described in QSTAG 244. Thus, first-generation unmanned platforms and 

systems could have nuclear hardening criteria similar to manned legacy equipment. 

If human operators are not required and equipment is not operated near troops, USANCA issues 

hardening criteria to the MATDEV based on QSTAG 2041, A Rationale for Establishing Nuclear Hardening 

Criteria for Unmanned Operational Platforms and Systems. In this case, hardening is based upon isodamage 

curves of equipment susceptibility; curves that are not based on human vulnerability but on system 

design limits. One must not infer that this form of hardening sets nuclear hardening criteria at the failure 

levels of the equipment; instead, it means equipment hardening is based upon several major 

considerations: the anticipated range of battlefield nuclear threats, the role the unmanned equipment will 

play on the nuclear battlefield, the equipment physical configuration and topology, the electronics 

sensitivity, and the amount of risk commanders are willing to take. 

The MATDEV must then design the equipment to meet the criteria with technical assistance provided by 

ARL/SLAD. Experience has shown that appropriate nuclear hardening techniques, if incorporated in 

early system design, added about 1-2% to the overall system cost of manned legacy equipment. The least 

expensive procedure to nuclear harden equipment is to design it in during the original system design. 
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Protection techniques and even certification of nuclear survivability must be explicitly identified in the 

Test and Evaluation Master Plan. This document is managed by the Test and Evaluation Management 

Agency with input from Material Developers, CBTDEVs, Developmental Test Command (DTC), and 

Army Evaluation Command (AEC). 

NBC survivability can only be validated through breadboard and brassboard testing and analysis of 

subsystems and systems during the early phases of the equipment life cycle, through quality assurance 

testing on the assembly line, and by validation tests of prototype equipment. Implicit in this step is the 

need for test validation. The highest confidence method to assure adequacy is via some system-level or 

component-level test to the NBC survivability hardening criteria performed by DTC. 

The final determination on whether or not the equipment meets the criteria rests with AEC. If the 

equipment does not meet the criteria, the MATDEV can go to HQDA through USANCA and ask for a 

waiver. The waiver request does not negate the requirement for the equipment to survive. This request 

begins with the level the equipment achieved during testing. The MATDEV then addresses the costs 

associated with modifying the equipment to meet the criteria. The CBTDEV then discusses how tactics, 

techniques and procedures can address mitigation, redundancy and resupply to reduce the risk assumed 

by not hardening the equipment to the specified levels. This waiver request is forwarded to a panel of 

experts, the NCSCS. The NCSCS forwards their recommendation to a panel of general officers, the 

NCSC. The NCSC then forwards their recommendation the Army G-3, who makes the final decision. 

This might seem like we have reached the goal of procuring survivable equipment, but it is only the 

beginning. The MATDEV must develop a complete hardness maintenance, assurance, and surveillance 

program over the entire equipment life cycle. This can be achieved by executing simple, scheduled 

inspections for gross physical damage and circuit upset/damage, and shielding integrity and penetration 

control tests to ensure barrier control. 

SUMMARY:

There exists DoD and JCS regulatory guidance on NBC survivability. The services write and implement 

their own survivability regulations to provide further guidance and assign responsibilities. The Army 

decided to regulate the survivability program in the following ways: 

1) Write the appropriate regulations for the survivability program. 

2) CBTDEV make a determination if equipment is mission critical and requires hardening. 

a. CBTDEV can meet the survivability requirement via operational tactic, techniques, 

and procedures (TTP), which are analyzed to determine if nuclear and NBC 

contamination survivability can be met by mitigation, redundancy, or resupply. 

3) If it is mission critical and requires hardening, then the equipment must be designed to be 

nuclear and NBC contamination survivable. 

a. Nuclear survivability: All mission critical equipment must survive HEMP; 

additionally, front line combat systems must survive INWE. 

b. NBC contamination survivability: All mission critical equipment must demonstrate 

that they can survive hardness, decontaminability, and compatability criteria. 

4) Publish nuclear and NBC contamination survivability criteria. 
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5) MATDEV designs equipment with respect to published nuclear and NBC contamination 

survivability criteria. 

6) Verify equipment nuclear and NBC contamination survivability through the testing and/or 

analysis of the design/prototype equipment. Independent evaluation of test and/or analysis 

determines equipment nuclear and NBC contamination survivability. 

7) Inability to appropriately meet criteria via nuclear and NBC contamination survivability tests 

causes the results to be submitted to USANCA to initiate the waiver process review using the 

NCSCS, NCSC, and final DCS G-3 process described in AR15-41. 

8) MATDEV ensures that a life-cycle up survivability maintenance plan is developed and 

implemented. 
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 - 85 - 

Appendix F: U.S. Navy Survivability Procedures 

Conventional Systems

The Defense Science Board (DSB) requested a short summary of the Navy’s DSB presentation provided 

by LCDR Rome Ruiz on 17 March 2004. The purpose of the brief was to provide Navy’s responses to 

questions from the DSB Task Force to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning Navy’s nuclear 

survivability requirements process for its major systems and how systems are validated to ensure 

requirements are met. The following summary is provided. 

References

(a) DODD 4245.4, “Acquisition of Nuclear Survivable Systems,” (cancelled) 

(b) DODD 3150.3, “Survivability and Security of Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” (cancelled) 

(c) DODD 3150.3, “Nuclear Force Security and Survivability,” 16 August 1994 

(d) OPNAVINST 9070.1, “Survivability Policy for Surface Ships,” 23 September 1988 

(e) OPNAVINST 3401.3A, “Nuclear Survivability of Navy and Marine Corp Systems,” 05 

January 1989 

(f) NAVSEAINST C3401, “Nuclear Survivability Criteria for Surface Ship Classes,” 26 April 

1990 

(g) CJCSINST 3170.01 (Series), “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System” 

(h) SECNAVINST 5000.2 (Series), “Implementation of Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System” 

(i) MDA-STD-001, “BMDS High Altitude/Exoatmospheric Nuclear Survivability Standard” 

Background 

In 1988, references (a) and (b) updated DoD policy on the acquisition/requirements of nuclear survivable 

systems and established procedures consistent with the DoD 5000 series that directs defense acquisition 

processes. However, with the end of the cold war coupled with an ostensibly decreasing nuclear threat, 

references (a) and (b) were cancelled without an equivalent DoD level directive or instruction mandating 

nuclear survivability for tactical systems. Although reference (c) was issued in 1994 as an update to 

reference (b), it provided no requirements guidance and further de-emphasized nuclear survivability 

requirements for tactical systems. 

Given that references (a) and (b) were the underlining guidance for references (d) through (f), all Navy 

guidance mandating non-nuclear, conventional hardening requirements for the full spectrum of nuclear 

effects became, by default, obsolete. However, Navy never officially cancelled or updated references (d) 

through (f) and likewise continues to use these references as baseline guidance for nuclear survivability 

policy and criteria. 

Platform Requirements and Capabilities 

Ships. Per reference (d), ships are grouped into three general survivability levels for protection 

requirements: 

• Level III (highest) for aircraft carriers and battle force surface combatants, i.e. cruisers 

and destroyers 
 - 86 - 

• Level II (moderate) for frigates, amphibs, and certain replenishment ships 

• Level I (low) for patrol combatants, mine warfare and auxiliary ships 

Reference (f) establishes nuclear survivability criteria for all surface ships: 

• Level III balanced limits for blast, thermal, HEMP, and TREE requirements 

• Level II balanced limits for increased standoff ranges for blast, thermal, and HEMP 

without TREE (for large yield weapons) 

• Level I only requires HEMP 

There have been revisions to these requirements: 

• A CNO memo dated 12 January 1989, which reduced nuclear protection levels for 

destroyers and cruisers to Level II. 

• NAVSEA 05P memo dated 20 March 2003, which recommended reduction of nuclear 

protection levels for aircraft carriers to Level II. This was accepted by OPNAV N78 and 

included in revised CVN 21 ORD. It is being implemented on all carrier alterations and 

modifications. 

Aircraft. There are currently no identified NAVAIR requirements for placing the full spectrum of 

nuclear weapons effects requirements on NAVAIR platforms. However, VH/VXX platforms, as well as E6B’s, have the full spectrum of nuclear weapons effects requirements levied on them that are derived 

from and based on platform ORDs and system threat assessment reports (STAR). 

 Infrastructure. There is no identified requirement or guiding instruction for placing the full 

spectrum of nuclear weapons effects requirements on navy ashore infrastructure. However, there are two 

critical C3I navy facilities that have hardening requirements for EMP only: 

• NCTAMS PAC Honolulu 

• NAVCOMSTA Puget Sound 

The best-known guidance on shore infrastructure nuclear survivability is a series of eight Army 

Corp of Engineers documents that are twenty years old. 

Missiles. In accordance with reference (i), the SM-3 missile (upper tier defense) has nuclear 

hardening requirements. However, Navy has no hardened lower tier BMD missile to protect fleet assets 

since OSD cancelled the hardened SM-2 block IVA program in December 2001. 

Nuclear Survivability Validation 

In accordance with reference (e), NAVSEA ensures that nuclear survivability requirements are validated 

at the appropriate points of system development. Furthermore, per reference (f), nuclear survivability 

measures will be validated by tests. Validation by engineering analysis is allowed where testing is not 

feasible or warranted as determined by the technical authority of NAVSEA (previously PMS 423). 

However, given NAVSEA has no capability, for example, to validate an entire ship for EMP 

vulnerabilities, NAVSEA has no choice but to accept engineering analysis (EMP whole ship test 

capability, EMPRESS II, was decommissioned in 1994). 

Managing Nuclear Survivability Requirements 

 

Navy recognized that there were shortcomings to the general management and documentation 

instructions during Navy’s requirements and acquisition process. 
 - 87 - 

Consequently, in accordance with references (g) and (h), the Navy embraced and adapted the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process for the vetting of its warfighting 

requirements. Navy is an active participant in the Joint Capability Boards and Integrating Concept(s) 

working groups in order to ensure our requirements documentation is processed and validated through 

the JCIDS construct. 

Additionally, Navy recently adopted a Navy Capabilities Board (NCB) Charter that formalizes new and 

mature program reviews to ensure top leadership has an opportunity to view the programs in context of 

their performance, adherence to objectives, and future capability. Specifically, the NCB is an instrument 

of the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy to review, validate, and approve all Navy 

originated JCIDS documents. The NCB serves as a forum where Navy leadership can debate the merits of 

program contents, for example, nuclear survivability/hardening requirements, and leverage cost versus 

capability while considering risks and threats. 

Navy will continue to use references (d) through (f) as baseline guidance for nuclear survivability policy 

and criteria since reference (h) does not specifically reference or mandate nuclear survivability 

requirements. However, an overarching goal of the NCB will be to ensure nuclear survivability and 

hardening capabilities for all non-nuclear, conventional capabilities are considered prior to embarking on 

major acquisition programs and changes thereto. 

Strategic Systems Program (SSP)

The Defense Science Board (DSB) requested the following information as a result of an SSP Presentation 

provided by LCDR Mark Galvin to the DSB on 17 March 2004. The purpose of the brief was to provide 

SSP’s responses to questions from the DSB Task Force to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning 

Nuclear Weapons Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation. The SSP response focused on nuclear 

survivability and only addresses the Strategic Weapons System (SWS). 

1. SSP’s Mission Statement. “The Strategic Systems Programs team is dedicated to serving our nation by 

providing credible and affordable sea-based deterrent missile systems.” 

2. The requirements for Major Systems begins with an Initial Capabilities Document (replaced Mission 

Need Statement(MNS)). The Trident II (D5) SWS development was tasked by the 2 February 1981 

Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum (SDDM), which endorsed a Submarine Launched Ballistic 

Missile (SLBM) Modernization Report. By direction of the Secretary of Defense’s direction, the SDDM 

served as the MNS. The SLBM Modernization Report presented high level requirements for increased 

capability over the Trident I (C4) SWS, specifying the development of Trident II (D5) SWS including the 

Mk5/W88 reentry body. 

3. Nuclear survivability is a significant driver for credibility and affordability, key objectives of SSP’s 

mission. To be credible, the system must be able to operate in hostile environments, fratricide 

environments and natural space environments. To be affordable, the cost to achieve a credible level of 

nuclear survivability must be proportional to the value of the deterrent. 

4. Nuclear survivability is an integral aspect of a credible deterrence. In order for the deterrence to 

remain effective, current as well as anticipated future threats must be assessed. Over the next several 
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decades, formidable threats are expected to invest significant resources resulting in multiple 

opportunities to counter our deterrent systems. For example, existing tactical nuclear warheads can be 

mated to interceptors. The approach to selecting radiation environments must be insensitive to what 

cannot be known, i.e., the future threat. Technology-driven requirements, with intelligence-based threat 

inputs, allows for the maximum weapon system flexibility at a reasonable cost. 

5. Reentry body requirements originate through Military Characteristics (MCs), which describe the 

military capability to be achieved. The Stockpile to Target Sequence (STS) describes the normal and 

credible abnormal environments the weapon will encounter and specifies nuclear survivability 

requirements. Both the MCs and the STS are reviewed, approved, and promulgated by the Nuclear 

Weapons Council. 

6. The missile and guidance nuclear survivability are defined by the Weapon Specification (WS) for boost 

phase hostile environments. The WS, developed by the missile and guidance communities and approved 

by the Director (SSP), is based on intelligence analysis of potential nuclear threats prior to reentry body 

deployment and includes the natural radiation environment. Reasonable technology assumptions 

constrain the Nuclear Weapons Models (NWMs) and engagement scenarios used in the threat analysis. 

7. Strategic nuclear threat requirements generation starts with the NWMs provided in the DTRA “Red 

Book”. The Red Book defines the radiation output characteristics of all technologically feasible nuclear 

weapons. This information is reformatted in a Threat Summary for Navy usage. Engagement scenarios 

are then generated for interaction with enemy threats based upon the Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) 

mission. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides information for interceptor and engagement 

assumptions. Analysis using all feasible and reasonable threats over the range of likely scenarios results 

in a set of predicted radiation environments described in terms of x-ray, gamma and neutron spectra. The 

severity of these environments is then evaluated against U.S. technology capability. The envelope of these 

levels is summarized in the Trident nuclear specification of Radiation Requirements, which may also be 

constrained by our ability to test or otherwise demonstrate “Compliance” with the Radiation 

Requirements. The Radiation Requirements Document also defines peak flux and dose rates for each 

component of the environment, and provides number of nuclear events and relative size and altitude 

distribution of those events. This approach assures that the FBM System is survivable against all fieldable threats over its lifetime. 

8. The current Red Book was published in 1980. Since then, there have been tremendous improvements 

in computing power, allowing us to analytically investigate and define threat weapon outputs with 

greater resolution in time, space, and energy. Furthermore, based on development and use of radiation 

specifications derived from the 1980 NWMs, we better understand which weapon model output 

components and parameters are important, and hence, need to be refined for future specification 

development and application. The Red Book is currently under revision now and is expected to be 

completed and released over the next couple of years. Two of the four volumes have been completed. 

One of the volumes still in progress provides the key threat weapon models that drive the SLBM system 

requirements. Preliminary versions of the new models have been examined to determine the major 

significance of any changes, relative to 1980 NWM. 

9. SSP is, in fact, sponsoring development of a new radiation requirements specification in preparation 

for the D5 Life Extension Program. This re-examination involves both the nuclear weapon models and 

the threat operational scenarios. In addition, specification development must consider Nuclear 

Hardening & Survivability (NH&S) capabilities of the critical instrument and component technologies 
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needed to build the system to achieve performance requirements. It is not reasonable to set the radiation 

hardness requirements to levels that are unachievable using the best available technologies needed to 

meet mission objectives. Lastly, the specification must also consider the existing and projected radiation 

test capabilities that will be available to verify system compliance to that hardness specification. The D5 

SWS and many of its key subsystems went through rigorous hardness testing, using a variety of Above 

Ground Test (AGT) facilities, and Under Ground Tests (UGTs) with the final UGT serving as an 

“Admiral’s Test.” The D5 system included 12 UGT’s. Given the loss of UGTs, future systems must 

develop an alternate methodology based on AGT capability and advanced modeling and simulation. 

10. The acquisition process used for nuclear weapons is based upon the DoD Procedures for Joint DoDDOE Nuclear Weapons Life-Cycle Activities (DoD Instruction 5030.55 dated January 25, 2001) and the 

Joint DoD-DOE Nuclear Weapon Life-Cycle Activities (DoD Directive 3150.1 dated August 26, 2002). 

The acquisition process used for the non-nuclear subsystems is the DoD 5000 series. Both acquisition 

efforts are mapped together to achieve initial operating capability. 

11. Requirements flow down to the contractor as contractual requirements; MCs and STS for reentry and 

WS for remainder of the SWS. The Compliance Plan, prepared by the contractor, shows how MCs, STS, 

and WS requirements will be met, through one-to-one mapping of requirements to method of verification 

(testing, simulation, analysis). The Compliance Plan is approved and monitored by Project Officers 

Group (MCs and STS) and Program Office (WS). 

12. Nuclear Survivability Testing is combination of existing UGT data, AGTs, and analysis. An 

Integrated Test Plan describes tests to be conducted at component, board, package, subsystem, and 

system levels. It also maps the test objectives to the Compliance Plan to ensure that all testable 

requirements are tested in a suitable environment. The Integrated Test Plan is prepared by contractor 

and approved by Project Officers Group (reentry) or Program Office (missile and guidance). The 

Compliance Plan specifies analyses (or test/analysis combination) to be conducted for nuclear 

survivability requirements that cannot be tested to the design level. 

Other Board Questions Related to Nuclear Survivability 

1. How many major programs have nuclear survivability requirements? The SWS has nuclear 

survivability requirements 

2. At what point in the acquisition process was it decided to levy the requirements? Nuclear 

survivability requirements have been a part of the Strategic Weapons System since its inception. 

3. Who made the decision to levy the requirements? Nuclear Weapons Council 

4. How many systems have applied for a waiver to nuclear survivability requirements? The SWS has 

never applied for a waiver to nuclear survivability requirements. 

5. How many were granted waivers? N/A for the SWS 

6. On what grounds were the waivers granted? N/A for the SWS 

7. By whom were the waivers granted? N/A for the SWS 

Prepared by: 

LCDR Bryan Klir, USN, SP-280 
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Appendix G: U.S. Air Force Survivability Procedures 

U.S. Air Force Survivability Requirements 

Prior to 1994 nuclear survivability requirements were derived from threat, fratricide, and targeting data. 

The Air Force Nuclear Criteria Group (AFNCG), an assemblage of General Officers, approved the 

requirements levied upon major Air Force systems. The actual analysis of the data and planned 

operational requisites of the system under consideration was accomplished by the AFNCG Secretariat 

through Working Groups. These Working Groups were comprised of technical officers who made 

engineering judgments on a variety of offensive/defensive scenarios for each system then developed a 

composite nuclear environment. The scenarios considered both the weapon system and operational 

concepts in order to have the most cost-effective solution (hardening requirements vs. change in 

operational concept). Recommendations for system nuclear survivability/hardening specifications were 

then forwarded to the AFNCG for approval. The specifications were completed prior to Milestone II of 

the acquisition process, were included in the program management directive as a high-level system 

requirement, and were difficult to change. Other Services also relied upon AFNCG to either cross-check 

their own results or to use the same values if the systems were similar. 

These nuclear ‘criteria’ were thus imposed upon the System Program Office (SPO) and ‘user’ as 

requirements. The SPO then designed and developed the system to meet these requirements. Testing 

was performed on piece-parts, components, sub-systems, and in some cases the entire system to verify 

the hardening criteria and therefore survivability in the nuclear environment. The then Defense Nuclear 

Agency oversaw much of this testing at government managed, government contractor, and underground 

nuclear test facilities. Once the system was produced and in the field annual Nuclear Survivability 

Management Status Reports were produced and sent to the Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition 

(SAF/AQQS). These reports covered the maintenance of the baseline system, upgrades, and retrofits for 

all aspects of nuclear hardness and operational survivability in a nuclear environment. In 1990 there 

were 61 systems (aircraft, missiles, satellites, and ground stations) evaluated and reported on. When 

necessary, some of the system components or sub-systems were subjected to additional testing to verify 

that new or retrofitted units were just as hard as the initial units. 

With the fall of the Iron Curtain, reorganizations within the Air Force, and a new acquisition process 

within the Department of Defense (DoD), nuclear survivability requirements and reporting changed. The 

legacy Air Force strategic nuclear weapons systems (ICBMs, B-52s, B-2s, ALCM, ACM, missile fields, and 

the nuclear weapons) continued to impose the original requirements and evaluate nuclear hardness, 

however testing waned and design analysis evaluation was relied upon. In FY96 the Air Force Program 

Element funding cite was zeroed. This fund cite was for research, development, testing, and evaluation 

to assess the survivability and vulnerability of Air Force projected and operational systems that may be 

required to operate in nuclear weapons environments. On the contrary, other Air Force systems were not 

as rigorous with respect to nuclear survivability. 

The new DoD acquisition process is ‘capabilities based’ and not ‘requirements based.’ This is a top-down 

process to develop a concept of operations through a Joint Service environment. It brings operational 

considerations and assets from other Services into the national security strategy to provide the Combat 

Command the resources they need. If a desired capability is not available then a capability gap is 

identified and one of the Services pursues it. The Air Force prioritizes these capability gaps and the 

highest priorities are developed pursuant to funding levels. Therefore, the Joint Capabilities Integration 
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and Development System plays an important role in the initial stages of the acquisition process. Through 

this process, requirements are reviewed and approved by the Air Force Requirements for Operational 

Capabilities Council (AFROCC), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the Defense 

Acquisition Board. The Air Force through SAF/AQ instituted a Single Process Initiative (SPI) as the 

response to this acquisition reform. It is designed to reduce costs associated with doing business with the 

Government. It provides for a streamlined contract change process to allow industry to use best 

practices, performance requirements/specifications, and commercial processes, specifications, and 

standards. SPI allows block contract changes to implement common processes and replace or eliminate 

military standards and specifications and business requirements when they do not add value. SPI also 

allows contractors to reduce costs by adopting new acquisition reform initiatives on existing contracts. 

The overall Air Force Acquisition process is shown graphically below: 

Nuclear survivability is important for the Combat Commander who expects to operate in a nuclear 

battlefield. However most Combat Commanders apparently do not expect to this to be the case, but they 

do believe that chemical, biological, and radiological threats will be faced. As a result most of the Initial 

Capabilities Documents, Analysis of Alternatives, Capability Development Documents, and Capability 

Production Documents do not address nuclear weapon environment survivability but do include 

chemical, biological, and radiological requirements. A recent survey of Air Force systems in the 

Information Retrieval Support System (IRSS) showed 16 systems had nuclear weapon hardness 

requirements in their System Operational Requirements Documents, Mission Needs Statements, 

Statement of Needs, and Operational Requirements Documents while 33 systems had chemical, 

biological, and radiological survivable requirements and the rest (approximately 100) were silent on the 

entire subject. Of the 16 systems, only 3 were not directly related to the legacy strategic nuclear weapons 

systems. Combat Commanders using non-strategic and non-nuclear systems (tactical) are more 
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concerned with day-to-day operational needs and likely battlefield situations that do not include the 

possibility of nuclear war. Likewise, many of the space assets are expected to operate in a non-nuclear 

weapons environment and only include the natural radiation environment requirements. The Air Staff 

office responsible for Strategic Security coordinates on all documents in the IRSS and recommends if 

nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological survivability should be taken into account. However as seen 

in the graphic above, these documents and recommendations are reviewed by the AFROCC and later by 

the JROC. Apparently these reviewers also are more concerned with day-to-day operational needs and 

likely battlefield situations that do not include the possibility of nuclear war. 

Terms

NOTE: The purpose of this glossary is to help the reader understand the terms listed as used in this 

publication. It is not intended to encompass all terms. See pertinent Joint and Air Force specific 

publications for standardized terms and definitions for DoD and Air Force use. 

Acquisition Category (ACAT)--Categories established to facilitate decentralized decision-making and 

execution, and compliance with statutorily imposed requirements. The categories determine the level of 

review, decision authority, and applicable procedures. DoDI 5000.2, reference b, provides the specific 

definition for each acquisition category. 

Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)—Each program’s APB is developed and updated by the program 

manager and will govern the activity in the phase succeeding the milestone for which it was developed. 

 

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)--One of three technology transition 

mechanisms; the other two are ACTDs and experiments. ACTDs are used to determine the military 

utility of proven technology and to develop the concept of operations that will optimize effectiveness. 

ACTDs are not themselves acquisition programs, but are designed to provide a residual, usable capability 

upon completion, and/or transition into acquisition programs. 

 

Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD)--One method of technology transition. ATDs are used to 

demonstrate the maturity and potential of advanced technologies for enhanced military operational 

capability or cost effectiveness, and reduce technical risks and uncertainties at the relatively low costs of 

informal processes. 

 

Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)--The evaluation of the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of 

alternative systems to meet a mission capability. The analysis assesses the advantages and disadvantages 

of alternatives being considered to satisfy capabilities, including the sensitivity of each alternative to 

possible changes in key assumptions or variables. 

 

Architecture--The structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and guidelines 

governing their design and evolution over time. 

Attribute--A testable or measurable characteristic that describes an aspect of a system or capability. 

Capability--The ability to execute a specified course of action. It is defined by an operational user and 

expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities document or a DOTMLPF 

change recommendation. In the case of material proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to 

DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the CDD and the CPD. 
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Capability Development Document (CDD)--A document that captures the information necessary to 

develop a proposed program(s), normally using an evolutionary acquisition strategy. The CDD outlines 

an affordable increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, and technically mature capability. 

Capability Gaps-- Those synergistic resources (DOTMLPF) that are unavailable but potentially attainable 

to the operational user for effective task execution. 

Capability Production Document (CPD)--A document that addresses the production elements specific to 

a single increment of an acquisition program. 

Capstone Requirements Document (CRD)--A document that contains capabilities based operational 

requirements that facilitates the development of CDDs and CPDs by providing a common framework 

and operational concept to guide their development. 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence Support Plan (C4ISP)-- The 

acquisition authority develops the C4ISP during system development. The C4ISP development and 

review process provides a mechanism to identify and resolve implementation issues related to C4I 

support and information technology system (including National Security Systems [NSS]) interface 

requirements. The C4ISP identifies needs, dependencies, and interfaces focusing attention on 

interoperability, supportability, and sufficiency concerns. 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)--A high-level concept whose purpose is to describe a problem that 

combatant commanders may face, objectives to solve problem, desired effects, capabilities needed to 

achieve effects, and sequenced actions that describe the employment concept. 

 

Course of Action (COA)--The COA is a planning and decision process that culminates in a MAJCOM 

decision. The COA includes a series of alternative program choices developed by the MDA or his 

designate, presented to a MAJCOM commander and that once a specific COA is selected, becomes a 

formal agreement between the MDA and the operator (MAJCOM Commander) that clearly articulates the 

performance, schedule, and cost expectations of the program. The COA provides the basis for the 

Technology Development Strategy during the Technology Development Phase. The COA becomes the 

basis for the SAMP. 

Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)--The Department of Defense corporate body for system acquisition 

providing advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense normally chaired by the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 

DD Form 250--The DD Form 250 (Material Inspection and Receiving Report) is a multipurpose report 

used to: (1) provide evidence of acceptance at origin/destination; (2) provide evidence of Government 

contract quality assurance at origin/destination; (3) supply packing list(s); (4) document 

shipping/receiving; (6) as a contractor invoice; and (7) commercial invoice support. 

Distributed Mission Operations (DMO)--An Air Force readiness initiative to allow operators to train as 

they would expect to fight; in large horizontally and vertically integrated Joint Composite Force 

packages. DMO will fill gaps in training by providing operators the ability to train with current and 

emerging weapons systems, tactics, techniques and procedures that cannot be supported through existing 

ranges, airspace or simulations. DMO will enable operators to maintain primary combat readiness at 

home or deployed; and conduct mission rehearsal in a realistic operational environment. 

 
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DoD Components--The DoD components consist of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military 

Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the 

Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and all other 

organizational entities within the Department of Defense. 

Effects-Based Operations (EBO)--Military actions and operations designed to produce distinctive and 

desired effects through the application of appropriate movement, supply, attack, defense, and 

maneuvers. Effects-based operations focus on functional, systemic, and psychological effects well 

beyond the immediate physical result of a tactical or operational event. Furthermore, it is equally 

concerned with military actions and operations that trigger additional effects beyond those desired. 

Experiments--Experiments test candidate technologies alone and as components in new systems and are 

a critical part of the development of a new technology. Experiments facilitate the transition of a device 

from operation in the laboratory to operation as a component or system in the field. 

 

Evolutionary Acquisition (EA)--DoD’s preferred strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for 

the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing up-front the need for 

future capability improvements. 

Family-of-Systems (FoS)--A set or arrangement of independent systems that can be arranged or 

interconnected in various ways to provide different capabilities. The mix of systems can be tailored to 

provide desired capabilities, dependent on the situation. 

Functional Area Analysis (FAA)--An FAA identifies the operational tasks, conditions and standards 

needed to achieve military objectives. It uses the national strategies, Joint Operating Concepts (JOC), 

Joint Functional Concepts (JFC), Integrated Architectures (as available), Air Force CONOPS, and the 

Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as input. Its output is the tasks to be reviewed in the follow-on 

functional needs analysis. The FAA includes cross-capability and cross-system analysis in identifying 

operational tasks, conditions and standards. The FAA should be conducted as a collaborative effort. 

Functional Capabilities Board (FCB)--A permanently established body that is responsible for the 

organization, analysis, and prioritization of joint warfighting capabilities within an assigned functional 

area. 

Functional Needs Analysis (FNA)--The sponsor leads the FNA. It assesses the ability of the current and 

programmed joint capabilities to accomplish the tasks that the FAA identified, under the full range of 

operating conditions and to the designated standards. Using the tasks identified in the FAA as primary 

input, the FNA produces as output a list of capability gaps or shortcomings that require solutions, and 

indicates the time frame in which those solutions are needed. 

 

Full Operational Capability (FOC)--The full attainment of the capability to effectively employ a weapon 

system, item of equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics, which is manned and operated 

by a trained, equipped, and supported military unit or force. FOC is not necessarily a date; it defines the 

criteria necessary to declare full operational capability. 

Full-Rate Production--Production of economic quantities following stabilization of the system design and 

prove-out of the production process. 
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Gatekeeper--That individual who makes the initial joint potential designation of JCIDS proposals. This 

individual will also make a determination of the lead and supporting FCBs and JWCA teams for 

capability proposals. The Gatekeeper is supported in these functions by USJFCOM, DJ-6, DJ-7, and the 

JWCA team leads. DDJWCA serves as the Gatekeeper. 

Human Systems Integration--Part of the acquisition, and design process that includes such elements as 

manpower, personnel, training, environmental issues, safety, health, human factors, and personnel 

survivability for incorporation into the total human weapon system for the life-cycle of the system. 

Implementing Command--The command (usually Air Force Materiel Command or Air Force Space 

Command) providing the majority of personnel in direct support of the program manager responsible for 

development, production, and sustainment activities. 

Increment--A militarily useful and supportable operational capability that can be effectively developed, 

produced or acquired, deployed, and sustained. Each increment of capability will have its own set of 

threshold and objective values set by the user. 

Information Assurance (IA)--Information operations and technology that protects and defends 

information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 

confidentiality, and non-repudiation and includes restoration through protection, detection, and reaction 

capabilities. 

Information Exchange Requirements (IER)-- Requirements that define the interoperability KPP 

threshold and objective values documented in CDDs, CPDs and CRDs. The IERs should reflect both the 

information needs required by the system under consideration and the needs of other supported systems. 

The IERs should cover all communication and computing requirements for command, control and 

intelligence of the proposed system (See CJCS 3170.01 Instruction & Manual & CJCSI 6212.01). 

Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)--Documents the need for a materiel solution to a specific capability 

gap derived from an initial analysis of alternatives executed by the operational user and, as required, an 

independent analysis of alternatives. It defines the capability gap in terms of the functional area, the 

relevant range of military operations, desired effects, and time. In order to capture capabilities based 

planning along with capabilities development, the Air Force develops ICDs in two distinct stages. ICD 

Stage I covers capabilities based planning and ICD Stage II covers capabilities based operational 

requirements development. 

Information & Resource Support System (IRSS)--IRSS is a web-based Air Force-wide system, which 

facilitates and integrates operational requirements definition, coordination, and management activities of 

the warfighting commands, HQ USAF, MAJCOMs and other AF agencies. IRSS supports AFCIS 

development and coordination, AF CONOPS capabilities based planning, speeds up the development 

and processing of AF requirements documents and provides the much-needed links between planning 

and programming. IRSS provides a unique capability to tie Planning to Requirements across the AF 

Enterprise - long a goal of senior leadership. 

Initial Operational Capability (IOC)--That first attainment of the capability to employ effectively a 

weapon, item of equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics with the appropriate number, 

type, and mix of trained and equipped personnel necessary to operate, maintain, and support the system. 

It is normally defined in the CPD. NOTE: IOC will be event-driven and not tied to a specific future date. 
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Integrated Architectures--An architecture consisting of multiple views or perspectives (operational view, 

systems view, and technical view) that facilitates integration and promotes interoperability across family 

of systems and systems of systems and compatibility among related architectures. 

Interoperability--The ability of systems, units or forces to provide data, information, materiel and 

services to and accept the same from other systems, units or forces and to use the data, information, 

materiel and services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. NSS and ITS 

interoperability includes both the technical exchange of information and the end-to-end operational 

effectiveness of that exchanged information as required for mission accomplishment. 

Joint Capabilities Board (JCB)--The JCB functions to assist the JROC in carrying out its duties and 

responsibilities. The JCB reviews and, if appropriate, endorses all JCIDS and DOTMLPF proposals prior 

to their submission to the JROC. The JCB is chaired by the Joint Staff, J-8, Director of Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment. It is comprised of Flag Officer/General Officer representatives of the 

Services. 

Joint Functional Concept (JFC)--An articulation of how a future Joint Force Commander will integrate a 

set of related military tasks to attain capabilities required across the range of military operations. 

Although broadly described within the Joint Operations Concepts, they derive specific context from the 

Joint Operating Concepts and promote common attributes in sufficient detail to conduct experimentation 

and measure effectiveness. 

Joint Operating Concept (JOC)--An articulation of how a future Joint Force Commander will plan, 

prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force against potential adversaries’ capabilities or crisis 

situations specified within the range of military operations. Joint Operating Concepts guide the 

development and integration of Joint Function Concepts (JFCs) to provide joint capabilities. They 

articulate the measurable detail needed to conduct experimentation and allow decision makers to 

compare alternatives. 

Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC)--A concept that describes how the Joint Force intends to operate 15 

to 20 years from now. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of 

the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. 

Joint Potential Designator (JPD)-- designation assigned by DDJWCA to specify JCIDS validation, 

approval, and interoperability expectations. 

a. “JROC Interest” designation will apply to all ACAT I/IA programs and programs designated as 

JROC Interest. This designation may also apply to intelligence capabilities that support DoD and national 

intelligence requirements. These documents will be staffed through the JROC for validation and 

approval. All CRDs will be designated as JROC Interest. 

b. “Joint Impact” designation will apply to ACAT II-and-below programs where the concepts and/or 

systems associated with the document affect the joint force such that an expanded review is appropriate 

in order to ensure that the most appropriate and effective solution is developed for the joint warfighter. 

This designation will also apply to those intelligence capabilities supporting both national intelligence 

and DoD when they were not designated as JROC Interest. A Functional Capabilities Board (detailed 

below) will validate Joint Impact proposals, returning them to the sponsor for approval and acquisition 

activity. 
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c. “Joint Integration” designation will apply to ACAT II and below programs where the concepts 

and/or systems associated with the document do not significantly affect the joint force and an expanded 

review is not required, but C4 interoperability, intelligence, or munitions certification is required. Once 

the required certification(s) are completed, Joint Integration proposals are validated and approved by the 

sponsoring component. 

d. “Independent” designation will apply to ACAT II and below programs where the concepts and/or 

systems associated with the document do not significantly affect the joint force, an expanded review is 

not required, and no certifications are required. Once designated, these documents are returned to the 

sponsoring component for validation and approval. 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM)--Official JROC correspondence 

generally directed to an audience(s) external to the JROC -- usually decisional in nature. 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council Staff Memorandum (JROCSM)--Official JROC correspondence 

generally used for internal staffing and tasking, usually predecisional in nature and not releasable outside 

of JROC circles. 

Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment-- The JWCA leads/teams provide the analytical underpinning 

for the development and refinement of issues that support JROC priorities. This includes participation in 

the requirements generation process, development of JROC guidance, operational concepts, architectures, 

programmatic assessments and alternative programmatic recommendations. As such, JWCA efforts are 

governed exclusively by the JROC. Additional guidance on JWCAs is located in CJCSI 3137.01. 

Key Performance Parameters (KPP)--Those attributes or characteristics considered most essential for an 

effective military capability. 

Lead Command--The command that serves as operators’ interface with the PM for a system as defined by 

AFPD 10-9, not to be confused with that MAJCOM designated by HQ USAF/XOR as OPR for authoring a 

capabilities based operational requirements document. 

Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)--Production of the system in the minimum quantity necessary (1) to 

provide production-configured or representative articles for operational tests pursuant to §2399; (2) to 

establish an initial production base for the system; and (3) to permit an orderly increase in the production 

rate for the system sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon the successful completion of operational 

testing. 

Materiel Solution--A defense acquisition program (nondevelopmental, modification of existing systems, 

or new program) that satisfies identified operator capabilities. 

Milestones--Major decision points that separate the phases of an acquisition program. 

Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)--The individual designated, in accordance with criteria established 

by the USD(AT&L), by the ASD(C3I) for Automated Information System acquisition programs or by the 

USecAF(Space) for space programs to approve entry of an acquisition program into the next phase. 

Militarily Useful Capability--A capability that achieves military objectives through operational 

availability for and dependable, effective performance of mission functions, interoperable with related 

systems and processes, transportable and sustainable when and where needed, and at costs known to be 

affordable over the long term. 
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Modification--An alteration to a configuration item applicable to aircraft, missiles, support equipment, 

ground stations software (imbedded), trainers, etc. As a minimum, the alteration changes the form, fit, 

function or interface of the item. A weapon system is defined as a combination of elements that function 

together to produce the capabilities required to fulfill a mission need, including hardware, equipment, 

software, and all Integrated Logistics Support elements, but excluding construction or other 

improvements to real property. 

Objective-- The desired operational goal associated with a performance attribute, beyond which any gain 

in utility does not warrant additional expenditure. The objective value is an operationally significant 

increment above the threshold. An objective value may be the same as the threshold when an 

operationally significant increment above the threshold is not significant or useful. 

Operating Command--Those commands operating a system, subsystem, or item of equipment. 

Operator --An operational command or agency that employs acquired systems for the benefit of users. 

Operators may also be users. 

Operational Requirements--A system capability or characteristic required to accomplish approved 

capability needs. Operational (including supportability) requirements are typically performance 

attributes, but they may also be derived from cost and schedule. For each parameter, an objective and 

threshold value must also be established. 

Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)--Testing and evaluation conducted in as realistic an 

operational environment as possible to estimate the prospective system’s operational effectiveness and 

operational suitability. In addition, OT&E provides information on organization, personnel 

requirements, doctrine, and tactics. Within the Air Force, OT&E is conducted by the Air Force 

Operational Test and Evaluation Center, AFOTEC. 

Operational View (OV)--A view that describes the joint capabilities that the user seeks and how to 

employ them. The OVs also identify the operational nodes, the critical information needed to support the 

piece of the process associated with the nodes, and the organizational relationships. 

Performance Attributes--Attributes so significant they must be verified by testing or analysis. Whenever 

possible, attributes should be stated in terms that reflect the capabilities necessary to operate in the full 

range of military operations and the environment intended for the system, family of systems (FoS), or 

system of systems (SoS). These statements will guide the acquisition community in making tradeoff 

decisions between the threshold and objective values of the stated attributes. Operational testing will 

assess the ability of the system(s) to meet the production threshold values. 

Procurement--Procurement appropriations fund those acquisition programs that have been approved for 

production (to include low rate initial production (LRIP) of acquisition objective quantities), and all costs 

integral and necessary to deliver a useful end item intended for operational use or inventory upon 

delivery. 

Program Executive Officer (PEO)--A military or civilian official who has primary responsibility for 

directing several MDAPs and for assigned major system and non-major system acquisition programs. A 

PEO has no other command or staff responsibilities within the Component, and only reports to and 
 - 100 - 

receives guidance and direction from the DoD Component Acquisition Executive (this sentence does not 

apply to the PEO/Space). 

Program Management Directive (PMD)--The official Air Force document used to direct acquisition or 

modification responsibilities to appropriate Air Force MAJCOMs and FOAs for the development, 

acquisition, modification or sustainment of a specific weapon system, subsystem, or piece of equipment. 

It is used throughout the acquisition cycle to terminate, initiate, or direct research for development, for 

production, or modifications for which sufficient resources have been identified. States program unique 

requirements, goals, and objectives, especially those to be met at acquisition milestone B or later, or other 

program review. 

Program Manager (PM)--As used in this instruction applies collectively to System Program Director, 

Product Group Manager, Single Manager, or acquisition program manager. The PM is the designated 

individual with responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for development, 

production, and sustainment to meet the user's operational needs. The PM shall be accountable for 

credible cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the MDA. 

Rapid Response Process (RRP)--An expedited process for documenting and staffing urgent, timesensitive requirements. It is used to document deficiencies that arise during combat or crisis operations 

where there is a threat of loss of life or imminent loss of life is apparent. The process is fully described in 

AFI 63-114, Rapid Response Process. 

Sponsor--The DoD component responsible for all common documentation, periodic reporting, and 

funding actions required to support the capabilities and acquisition process. 

System-of-Systems (SoS)--A set or arrangement of interdependent systems that are related or connected 

to provide a given capability. The loss of any part of the system will degrade the performance or 

capabilities of the whole. 

Systems View (SV)--A view that identifies the kinds of systems, how to organize them, and the 

integration needed to achieve the desired operational capability. It will also characterize available 

technology and systems functionality. 

Technical View (TV)--A view that describes how to tie the systems together in engineering terms. It 

consists of standards that define and clarify the individual systems technology and integration 

requirements. 

Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)--The TEMP correlates and integrates T&E with the overall 

acquisition program strategy, schedule, and other program documentation, and defines the critical path 

for completing test and evaluation. The TEMP will place the most emphasis on the next phase of system 

development rather than provide a historical account of program progress. Update the TEMP prior to 

major milestones, program baseline changes, and when there have been significant changes to the 

program. 

Threshold--A minimum acceptable operational value below which the utility of the system becomes 

questionable. 
 - 101 - 

Trade-Space--Selection among alternatives with the intent of obtaining the optimal, achievable system 

configuration. Often a decision is made to opt for less of one parameter in order to achieve a more 

favorable overall system result. 

User--An operational command or agency that receives or will receive benefit from the acquired system. 

Combatant commanders and their Service component commands are the users. There may be more than 

one user for a system. Because the Service component commands are required to organize, equip, and 

train forces for the combatant commanders, they are seen as users for systems. The Chiefs of the Services 

and heads of other DoD components are validation and approval authorities and are not viewed as users. 

Validation--The review of documentation by an operational authority other than the user to confirm the 

operational capability. Validation is a precursor to approval. 

Document Coordination

A2.1. Document Coordination and Approval. AF/XOR has delegated tasking authority to AF/XORD for 

HQ USAF and Secretariat review on all ICDs (Stage I and II), CDDs, CPDs, and CRDs. Normally each 

MAJCOM/Agency is given one opportunity to review and comment on a capabilities based operational 

requirements document. The AFROCC reviews and validates all Air Force ICDs (Stage I and II), CDD, 

CPD, and CRDs. This review is the final opportunity to comment on these documents. Documents are 

validated and approved per Table 2.1. Use of the Information and Resource Support System (IRSS) is 

mandatory once IRSS is declared FOC. Current staffing flowcharts and guidance for the staffing process 

is located on the AF/XORD web site at: https://www.afreqs.hq.af.mil/.

A2.2. Review for Comment Phase. Each MAJCOM/Agency responsible for reviewing ICD Stage I and 

operational requirements documents establishes a single office with responsibility for receiving 

documents for comment, distributing the document within their organization, and consolidating and 

returning comments. A listing of applicable agencies and offices to be included in this review is located 

on the AF/XORD web site at: https://www.afreqs.hq.af.mil/.

A2.2.1. Air Force Review. Normally, ICDs (Stage I and II), CDDs, CPDs, and CRDs are submitted 

for simultaneous MAJCOM and HQ USAF review. After developing the document, the lead 

MAJCOM/Agency distributes it for Air Force-wide review. The sponsor (Lead MAJCOM/Agency) 

provides a copy of the document along with a transmittal memo to AF/XORD to start the HQ USAF 

review. AF/XORD designates an HQ USAF SME to accomplish the staffing of the document within 

the HQ USAF, Secretariat, and ANG. The HQ USAF and Lead MAJCOM/Agency SMEs send the 

document out for review based on the Document Distribution List maintained on the AF/XORD web 

site. AF/XOR has delegated the authority to AF/XORD to staff the document to the appropriate 

level. The intent is to obtain an O-6 level review to support the AF Flag review at the AFROCC. 

However, organizations may elevate the document to the appropriate level within their chain of 

command as they see fit. The normal review cycle is 35 calendar days. Since ICD Stage I documents 

are Air Force-only products, the review process for Stage I documents ends with AFROCC 

validation. The specific document staffing flow charts are located on the AF/XORD web site at: 

https://www.afreqs.hq.af.mil/.

A2.2.2. Joint Staff Review/Certifications. AF/XORD submits all operational requirements 

documents to the JCIDS Gatekeeper process. Per CJCSI 3170.01, the entry point for documents is 

through the Knowledge Management/Decision System (KM/DS) to J-8 for formal JPD determination 

by the Gatekeeper and then Joint Staff O-6 review/certification (Figure A2.1). The DDJWCA serves 
 - 102 - 

as the JCIDS Gatekeeper and determines the JPD for each document. This designation determines 

the level of Joint Staff involvement in the review, certification, validation and approval of a 

document as depicted in Table A2.1. The specific document staffing flow charts are located on the 

AF/XORD web site at: https://www.afreqs.hq.af.mil/.

Figure A2.1. Notional Air Force O-6/Flag & Joint O-6 Review. 

Table A2.1. Document Certification/Validation Authority. 

Certification/ 

Validation 

JROC 

Interest 

Joint 

Impact 

Joint 

Integration Independent Documents 

Threat Validation DIA/J-2 DIA/J-2 DIA/J-2 Service All ** 

Intelligence DIA/J-2 DIA/J-2 DIA/J-2 - All 

Insensitive 

Munitions* J-4 J-4 J-4 - CDD and CPD 

only 

Interoperability J-6 J-6 J-6 - CDD,CPD and 

CRD only 

 * Applies to munitions programs only 

 ** For programs that consume, produce, process, or handle intelligence data 

A2.2.2.1. JROC Interest and Joint Impact documents receive Joint Staff O-6 review before the AFROCC. 

Joint Staff Flag review and final certifications will be completed as part of the FCB/JROC process 

following AFROCC validation. Joint Integration documents must receive all the required certifications 

before the AFROCC. 

A2.2.3. Simultaneous Reviews. Only when an AF/XOR-approved HPT develops a document may 

simultaneous Joint Staff O-6 and Air Force-wide review be accomplished (Figure A2.2). 
 - 103 - 

Figure A2.2. Simultaneous Air Force O-6/Flag & Joint O-6 Review. 

A2.3. Joint Programs. A joint program is managed and funded by more than one Service. This should 

not be confused with the JPDs as described in the Glossary. One Service is normally designated as the 

lead for a joint program and, unless the program is designated “JROC Interest”, the Lead Service is the 

approval authority for the program’s operational requirements documents. 

A2.3.1. Air Force as Lead Service. When the Air Force is the Lead Service, AF/XOR will designate 

an Air Force Lead MAJCOM or Agency to sponsor the program. The Lead MAJCOM/Agency 

generally follows the document development and coordination processes described elsewhere in 

this instruction. In addition, the Air Force OPR identifies a counterpart office in each participating 

Service. Working through the other Service counterparts, the Air Force lead invites appropriate 

representation from the other Services to participate in drafting the document. Appropriate offices 

within the other participating Services will be included in the pre-AFROCC review and comment 

process. Using their own procedures, each participating Service should concur with the final 

version of non JROC Interest documents before they are submitted to the AFROCC. 

A2.3.2. Other Service as Lead. When another Service is designated as lead for a joint program, 

AF/XOR will designate a Lead MAJCOM or Agency for Air Force participation. The Air Force lead 

should participate in drafting the document and managing document coordination within the Air 

Force. The Air Force participating sponsor has the option of presenting the document to the 

AFROCC. 

A2.3.3. Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JROCBRN) Documents. JRO-CBRN is responsible for developing joint operational requirements for 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defenses with the participation of the Services. ACC 

is the Air Force Lead MAJCOM and AF/ILEX is the HQ USAF focal point for all JRO-CBRN 

documents. The AFROCC validates the requirements in the document, approves the Air Force 

Annex and forwards the document to the JRO-CBRN for final approval. 

A2.4. Review of Non-Air Force Operational Requirements Documents with Joint Integration or 

Independent JPD. The Air Force may have the opportunity to review operational requirements 

documents developed by other Services, Defense Agencies, and Joint organizations during the JCIDS 

process. AF/XOR approves the Air Force position on the document and recommends the level of Air 

Force participation. 
 - 104 - 

A2.5. Document Review. The MAJCOM/Agency review cycle begins when the document sponsor sends 

the document out for staffing. The HQ USAF review cycle begins when AF/XORD sends the document 

out for staffing. The Air Force review cycle for documents received from the Joint Staff (J-8) begins on the 

day J-8 forwards the document to AF/XOXR for staffing. No response by the suspense date is considered 

concurrence. Document reviewers use the Comment Resolution Matrix (or other automated format(s) as 

directed by AF/XORD) to provide their comments. Identify the significance of the comment as “Critical,” 

“Substantive,” or “Administrative” using descriptions below for reference. Convincing support for 

critical and substantive comments will be provided in a comment/justification format. 

A2.5.1. Critical. A critical comment indicates non-concurrence with the document until the 

comment is satisfactorily resolved. Critical comments are restricted to Cost/Schedule/Performance 

Attributes, particularly KPPs, Concept of Operations, and other fundamental issues (such as 

sustainment, security, or violation of policies and directives) that would bring into question the 

rationale for the document to be approved. Documents with unresolved critical comments will not 

go to the AFROCC unless approved by AF/XOR. Document reviewers will not make critical 

comments on issues not related to their area of responsibility. 

A2.5.2. Substantive. A substantive comment addresses a section in the document that appears to be, 

or is potentially unnecessary, incorrect, misleading, confusing, or inconsistent with other sections. 

A2.5.3. Administrative. An administrative comment addresses typographical, format, or 

grammatical errors. 

A2.6. Comment Resolution. Document sponsors consolidate all comments into a single comment 

resolution matrix (CRM) or other automated format as directed by AF/XORD and use the CRM to 

document actions taken in response to each comment. The document sponsor must document the 

rationale for not accepting a comment. The document sponsor resolves all critical comments before 

submitting the document for AFROCC review, unless otherwise approved by AF/XOR. Substantive 

comments should be addressed, but failure to do so does not result in non-concurrence on the final 

document. The sponsor must be prepared to address unresolved substantive comments at the AFROCC. 

The sponsor should address all administrative comments. 

A2.6.1. Comment Resolution Timing. The normal comment resolution period is 15 calendar days. 

The sponsor will notify AF/XORD if it is anticipated that it will take longer than 15 days to resolve 

comments. If the comment resolution period exceeds 120 days, AF/XOR may direct the document to 

re-enter the document coordination process. 

A2.6.2. Resolving Critical Comments. Resolve comments at the lowest possible level. If the 

document sponsor disagrees with a critical comment, contact the comment originator to seek 

resolution. If a critical comment cannot be resolved, the issue must be elevated as required to 

achieve final resolution. In extreme circumstances, the issue may go to the AFROCC for 

adjudication. The method and date of resolution must be documented in the CRM (e.g. “via telecon 

on xx date”). 

A2.7. Document Completion. After the document completes the staffing process, AF/XORD is 

responsible for obtaining final signature/approval and enters the approved document and all supporting 

material into the Requirements Document Library. 
 - 105 - 

Appendix H: Department of Energy (DOE) 

Department of Energy

NWE includes effects on our assets (survivability, vulnerability) and the assets of others (lethality, 

collateral effects). 

Nuclear survivability of a military system is the ability of that system to perform its intended functions 

with no more that acceptable degradation during or after exposure to specified natural, intrinsic, 

diagnostic, hostile, and/or fratricide radiation and nuclear environments. 

 

NNSA NWE Program 

The nuclear survivability of the nuclear stockpile is the focus of the NNSA NWE program. An NWE 

program element for developing improved understanding of the relationships between warhead design 

features, outputs, and lethality and collateral effects has been scoped but has not been implemented. 

Only the survivability elements of the NNSA program are addressed here. 

 

The NNSA NWE Program develops and sustains capabilities to support the nuclear survivability of the 

enduring and evolving stockpile, its certification and life extension, without relying on underground 

tests, through research and development, radiation hardening, modeling and validation, and 

aboveground testing. It develops validated computational tools to evaluate threat nuclear weapon 

radiation environments and system radiation responses, develops radiation-hardened technologies, and 

improves radiation sources and diagnostics. 

Business Model 

NNSA NWE tools and technologies are provided through major program elements of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program, the goal of which is to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and reliability of 

the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile to counter the threats of the 21st century. Survivability is an 

element of reliability. Science and Engineering Campaigns, in collaboration with Directed Stockpile 

Work (DSW), Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC), Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities 

(RTBF), and the Department of Defense (DoD), support Stockpile Life Extension Programs (SLEPs), 

Limited-life Component (LLC) replacements, and stockpile modifications. 

The Manager, Nuclear Survivability and Effectiveness Program at NNSA HQ (who is also the 

manager of the Nuclear Survivability Activity within the Engineering Campaign) and S&T program 

directors at the laboratories, together with the Manager, Radiation Effects Sciences Program at SNL, 

and the Outputs and Survivability Program leaders at LLNL and LANL, are the primary NNSA 

proponents and champions for nuclear survivability technology development and stewardship. 

Laboratory and NNSA DSW program directors rely on the developed and validated tools and 

technologies to qualify systems to their negotiated nuclear survivability requirements and are among 

the strongest proponents when needed for their programs. At SNL Radiation Effects Sciences is 

among its suite of critical capabilities. 

The ASC Campaign develops, verifies, and validates NWE simulation codes using experimental data 

generated by the Science and Engineering Campaigns. The Engineering Campaign, through the 
 - 106 - 

Nuclear Survivability Activity also supports the development and initial implementation of radiation 

hardened microsystems. RTBF sustains the simulators and microelectronics infrastructure so that, 

when combined with investments and utilization by the campaigns and DSW, they remain 

technically and economically viable. Upgrades and new capabilities are developed with operating 

funds when practical, or with construction funds when appropriate. Utilization by DoD of the NNSA 

NWE simulators is through Work for Others agreements on a cost reimbursable and non-interference 

with DOE programs basis. Access by DoD to the advanced scientific computing resources of the 

NNSA weapons laboratories on the same basis is possible, but problematical because of heavy 

utilization by the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

While the campaigns and ASC generally perform research and development and establish nuclear 

survivability technologies, DSW invests in research and tools development and improvement when 

needed for system-specific applications and problems. 

Status of DOE simulators and codes are depicted in Figures H-1 and H-2, respectively. 

Issues and Trends in NWE and Impacts – NNSA 

The most challenging issue facing the NNSA nuclear survivability program is the absence of a clearly 

articulated policy supported and enforced at the highest levels regarding the purposes of our nuclear 

stockpile. A substantial nuclear survivability program is clearly imperative if, in addition to 

deterring the use of WMD by regional, state, or sub-state aggressors, its purposes are to counter the 

threat of emergence of a peer, or near peer adversary, and to hold at risk high value targets that 

might be defended by nuclear interceptors in the first third of the 21st century. 

Report language accompanying the House Energy and Water Appropriations Bill for 2005 explicitly 

questions “the continued high level of funding requested in the Nuclear Survivability campaign to assess 

the ability of the weapons in the stockpile to continue to function as designed during a massive nuclear 

exchange.” And further states “In the post-Cold War world with no new weapon production ongoing, 

this activity is a waste of scarce resources.” 

These statements reflect a misunderstanding of the rationale for the nuclear survivability of our stockpile. 

Nuclear survivability enhances the credibility of our deterrent, hedges against the emergence of a peer, or 

near-peer adversary, enables the penetration of point nuclear defenses of high-value targets, reduces 

incentives for nuclear proliferation, and deters the use of weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, new 

nuclear survivability challenges exist in the present security environment - new weapons production is 

ongoing in other nations, our stockpile is being refurbished with new technologies and materials 

susceptible to nuclear effects, and ageing of the stockpile introduces new challenges to reliability, 

including nuclear survivability. 

In this regard, both the Navy SSPO and the Air Force Ballistic Missile Office have revalidated their 

survivability requirements with the NNSA laboratories as active participants. Some STS 

requirements have been significantly altered in these re-evaluations. 

An additional challenge is that gaps in stockpile refurbishment schedules make it difficult to defend 

nuclear survivability budgets for radiation effects research and development required to develop 

improved rad-hard design methods and tools and anticipate and solve problems before crises arise, 
 - 107 - 

and for hardness assurance verification of the enduring stockpile. In the near-term, adjustments in 

the NNSA nuclear survivability budget will likely occur when the development of nuclear 

survivability tools needed to qualify the W76-1 have been completed. 

 

The impact of either challenge is potentially to drive the currently viable NNSA NWE program to a 

sub-critical state in which neither the expertise nor the infrastructure is capable of sustaining nuclear 

survivability. This would undermine the credibility of our deterrent (paper tiger), provide increased 

potential returns on investment to the proliferant, and greatly increase the time needed to respond to 

new nuclear threat environments. 
 - 108 - 

 
 - 109 - 

Figure H-1. Fidelity and status of NNSA simulators 

HERMES

Saturn Z

ACRR

SPR III

GIF

neutrons (exo) x X

neutrons (endo) X x

gammas (prompt) X

gammas (sustained) X x

gammas (total) X

x rays (cold) x x

x rays (warm) x x

x rays (hot) X

HigUse

X

x

Whenever available, ucost-effectsimulators reliance on modeling. fidelity sim● develop 

computamodels 

● use phys

developmtools 

NIF

*Resume ops Dec ’04 ^Long term storage after FY06 +192 beams FY08

Status OP OP OP *Maint ^Storage OP +Dev

xx
 - 110 - 

Figure H-2. Status of NNSA survivability simulation codes

Electrical 

Circuits

Co

TM

SGEMP: Cable, 

Box, Cavity 

Alegra 

Radiation Transport

(γ,e- n, γ )

Heating 

Modified Environments (n,γ) 

Weapon Outputs 

(LANL / LLNL capability)

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Semiconductor 

Devices

Emphasis

Calore 

NuGET 

Xyce 

DavinciTM

& Charon

Blast & 

Impulse

BlowOff

ITS , CEPT
 - 111 - 

Ten Likely, High Consequence Nuclear Threat 

Scenarios 

Thermonuclear 3rd party asymmetric – high alt

Fission asymmetric against U.S. – high alt 

Fission 3rd party parity – high alt 

IND terrorist against U.S. - surface 

IND terrorist against 3rd party - surface 

RDD terrorist against U.S. - surface 

HE against nuc/rad terrorist against U.S. - surface 

HE against nuc/rad 3rd party parity - surface 

HE against nuc/rad 3rd party asymmetric - surface

HE against nuc/rad terrorist against 3rd party - 

surface 

Appendix I: DTRA Assessment of NWE Capabilities and Gaps 

 Weapons of mass destruction constitute, arguably, the most dangerous threat to national 

security. Their emergence marked the beginning of a new era; indeed, this represented a 

civilization-changing event. They are mechanisms by which we can expect potential adversaries 

to seek asymmetric means for countering the overwhelming superiority of conventional U.S. 

military forces. 

 The existence and proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) demands a broad spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities to deter WMD use, destroy them 

in combat, and protect against their effects. Nuclear threat reduction is achieved by 

understanding the lethality and collateral effects of U.S. deterrent forces, assuring the 

survivability of offensive and defensive systems and infrastructure, understanding the potential 

effects of enemy weapons, and protecting citizens and soldiers from nuclear weapon effects. The 

nation’s nuclear technical community has enabled these capabilities with computer models, 

simulator facilities, and protection 

technologies. However, since the end of the 

Cold War, U.S. investments in these areas 

have actually declined, even as threats have 

diversified and broadened. 

A recent analysis of possible nuclear 

threat scenarios against U.S. interests by 

experts in the field revealed the extent that 

the landscape has changed since the Cold 

War ended. Whereas the Cold War 

demanded that we address massive use of 

large yield nuclear weapons by peer 

adversaries and survivability of retaliatory 

strategic assets, the current environment 

emphasizes low yield terrorist or rogue nation use and survivability of infrastructure and 

mission capability. By analyzing a broad range of possible scenarios in terms of probability and 

consequence, experts concluded that the threats the U.S. should be most concerned with ranged 

from single, high-altitude use to terrorist devices in cities and conventional explosives at nuclear 

sites. The nuclear weapon effects community is fairly well equipped to predict high-altitude 

nuclear effects, but confidently predicting effects from terrorist use in cities and explosions 

against nuclear sites represents a new direction that must be addressed. However, in all areas, 

including the high-altitude effects area, U.S. capability is dwindling as experts age and retire 

without significant influx of new personnel. 

Capability gaps have appeared and widened in all three technical areas needed to reduce 

the nuclear threat: codes, simulators, and protection technologies. New models are needed to 

predict the effects of emerging enemy weapons and to allow the nation to prepare for and defend 

against attack. In the absence of underground nuclear testing, above ground simulators are 

needed to validate computer codes and to certify the survivability of current and future space 

and missile systems. Both codes and simulators are essential to develop technologies to protect 

the nation’s infrastructure, space assets, and combat systems against the widespread effects of 

enemy nuclear weapons. 
 - 112 - 

Once the threats are understood, protection technologies are needed to prevent or mitigate the 

impact of these threats. DTRA’s plan will close these gaps by investing in research and 

development (R&D) to model enemy nuclear weapon effects in modern codes, to consolidate and 

upgrade simulators to assure U.S. defense system survivability, and to produce hardened 

microelectronic systems for use in space and on the battlefield. By executing this eight-year 

program, governmental, industrial, and academic technical bases will be fortified and focused on 

the nation’s most pressing threat reduction needs. 

What the Nation Needs 

The nation must strengthen its capabilities to deter and defend against a full spectrum of 

future nuclear threats—from well-equipped adversaries with WMD to non-state enemies. To 

strengthen deterrence, U.S. nuclear forces must continue to be capable of defeating the most 

threatening targets, including enemy WMD and underground, hardened sites. We need 

knowledge and computer models to effectively plan retaliatory attacks and weapon effects 

simulators to assess and improve our knowledge and confidence in our deterrent capabilities. 

Our nation must be capable of conducting underground nuclear experiments, if necessary, to 

gain sufficient confidence in our capabilities to defeat future WMD threats. 

Codes, simulators, and test readiness, which are needed to protect against enemy nuclear 

weapon effects, are the products of a diverse team of government, industry, academic, and allied 

technical experts; and that team must be revitalized for nuclear threat reduction to succeed. 

Protection technologies are especially important in view of our increasing dependence on digital 

systems and their potential vulnerabilities to the widespread effects of nuclear weapons. New 

technologies, test capabilities, and design methods are needed to ensure that satellites, sensors, 

weapon systems, and communications are effective in the face of nuclear attacks. 

Concern about U.S. vulnerabilities to asymmetric threats, including improvised 

radiological dispersal devices, high-altitude nuclear threats (e.g., electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 

and radiation hazards in space), and radio frequency threats, extend nuclear survivability 

requirements to the commercial sector and the civilian infrastructure. Technical solutions for 

these problems will derive from defense applications. Strategic weapons and delivery systems 

are being extended beyond their originally designed life expectancy. A smaller, aging stockpile 

will require greater confidence that the remaining weapon inventory remains effective and 

reliable. Thus, current and future modifications to existing weapons require test facilities that can 

simulate the nuclear environments for system testing and validation. 

Requirements 

 Nuclear requirements are derived from a number of sources: broad national policy, 

planning guidance from the SECDEF and OSD, needs of the Combatant Commands and Services, 

and DTRA R&D. Requirements arise from the acquisition and warfighter communities, as well as 

the DTRA’s anticipation of the impact of new technologies and threats. Primary requirements 

areas are: 

Codes. Specific requirements are generated by combatant commands, military services, and 

contractors who design and build survivable weapon and communication systems. Nuclear 

weapon effects models are needed to support target planning, survivable system design, 

collateral effects estimation, and numerical simulations for response and recovery planning. 
 - 113 - 

Simulators. Simulators are needed to certify the survivability and operability of systems in 

nuclear environments and to certify replacement components for strategic systems. The need for 

combined radiation environment testing of missile defense subsystems and systems will be 

reviewed in detail in FY04 as part of a DoD-Wide NWE Test Requirements Study. Simulators are 

needed to support code validation, agent defeat, and precision strike effects studies. 

Protection Technologies. Protection technology requirements support both the acquisition 

community and warfighters directly for the hardness surveillance and maintenance of 

operational systems, and protection of personnel through dosimetry and radiation surveys. The 

Missile Defense Agency is a key customer as it develops survivable missile defense and spacebased tracking systems as mandated by the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Strategic 

modernization and life extension programs for the Air Force and Navy require options for 

affordable survivability tailored to these new technologies. Appendix A describes these 

requirements in detail. 

Gaps 

Gaps are derived from analyses of environments created by nuclear weapon outputs and 

their effects on military systems. This plan, which identifies current technology gaps and the 

actions to close them, is a comprehensive three-part program that focuses on critical national 

needs: 

Codes. Codes, which reflect our understanding of weapon effects, were primarily built for Cold 

War applications, in the northern hemisphere, where scenarios involved large numbers of highyield weapons and the achievement of the military objective was the primary measure of success. 

For 21st century scenarios, with their multiple adversaries distributed throughout the globe and 

emphasis on reducing collateral effects, the codes must be updated to increase fidelity, detail, and 

provide global coverage. Additionally, codes need to be adapted to run faster and be userfriendlier in order to accommodate a shorter planning cycle for decision support. 

Simulators. The nation needs the capability to verify that critical military systems can operate 

reliably in nuclear-disturbed environments and that our weapon systems are effective and 

reliable. Current simulators lack the fidelity and intensity necessary to provide threat-level 

environments for systems testing. X-ray simulators are limited in their ability to produce cold 

and warm x-rays for testing materials, optics, and structure; high-dose rates; and good spectral 

fidelity for electronics testing. The bandwidth of disturbed environments simulators must be 

increased to support new missile defense radars and interceptor communication systems. Scene 

generators for “red-out” simulation must be developed that can operate in the visible region of 

the spectrum to match advances in missile defense technology. Blast, shock, and EMP simulators 

must be enhanced to operate reliably and affordably, and with improved fidelity. Finally, 

simulators are needed to address agent defeat, code validation, and test readiness issues. 

Protection Technologies. With increased emphasis on space dominance, critical space assets must 

survive natural and nuclear-disturbed environments while meeting strict weight and 

performance requirements, placing increased demands on hardening technology as 

microelectronic feature size decreases. Our current understanding of EMP is derived from both 

high-altitude nuclear detonations and EMP simulator testing of military and civilian systems. 

These data have enabled our understanding of High Altitude EMP (HEMP) generation and of the 

validity of analytical codes. The Defense Standardization and Specification Program (DSSP) has 

institutionalized HEMP environmental criteria, hardening practices, and assessment methods. 
 - 114 - 

Unfortunately, DoD lacks the capability to accurately predict EM effects on systems, and the tools 

necessary to assess the impact of infrastructure degradation on DoD-related missions. Modern 

military systems, with increased reliance on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and 

commercial standards and design practices, require innovative, cost-effective hardening options 

so that DoD system developers can meet their requirements within cost and schedule. We lack 

the means for timely radiological survey and personnel exposure dosimetry to minimize and 

manage radiation exposure of personnel required to operate in a post-nuclear detonation or 

radiological environment. 

As funding for nuclear effects technology programs has declined, the number of 

experienced workers in government and industry has also declined substantially. This reduction 

impacts the nation’s ability to ensure that military systems are effective and reliable. 

This plan describes how revitalizing the nuclear technology program will reverse the 

erosion. Plans for closing gaps in each of these areas are provided, as well as timelines, 

milestones, and deliverables. The plan also describes the resources (people and money) necessary 

to reach the desired end-state in each area. 

The Nuclear Threat Reduction “End State” 

The desired “end state” for the DTRA Nuclear Weapon Effects Program is a revitalized 

nuclear technology work force that will provide technologies to reduce nuclear threats for the 21st

century and utilize the nation’s existing stockpile. The requirements for weapon effectiveness and 

system survivability must be institutionalized and enforced. The supporting technical 

community must include a critical mass of talent and expertise across government, industry, and 

academia that can respond to the challenges posed by 21st century threats. Stable and sustained 

funding is necessary to provide the intellectual stimulation to attract the best and the brightest 

scientists and engineers. Even as the threat from strategic weapons is being reduced, new threats 

are emerging. 
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Appendix J: Acronyms 

ACRR Annular Core Research Reactor 

AEDC Arnold Engineering Development Center 

AF/XON Air Force Directorate of Nuclear and Counterproliferation 

AF/XOS Air Force Air and Space Operations 

ACM Advanced Cruise Missile 

ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile 

APRF Army Pulsed Reactor Facility 

ASC Advanced Scientific Computing 

ASCI Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative 

ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs) 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

C&R circumvention and recovery 

C2ISR command and control 

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance 

CAD computer-aided design 

CONOPS concepts of operation 

COTS commercial-off-the-shelf 

CTEIP Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program 

DEPSECDEF Deputy Secretary of Defense 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoDD Department of Defense Directive 

DoE Department of Energy 

DNA Defense Nuclear Agency 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSES Defense and Space Electronic Systems 

DSW Directed Stockpile Work 

DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia 

FBR Fast Burst Reactor 

FY fiscal year 

γ gamma 

GIG Global Information Grid 

HAENS high altitude exo-atmospheric nuclear survivability 

HERMES High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source 

HEU highly-enriched Uranium 

ICBM Inter Continental Ballistic Missile 

ICF inertial confinement fusion 

IEMP internal electromagnetic pulse 

ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

J8 Joint Requirements and Integration 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

keV kiloelectron volt 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LBTS Large Blast and Thermal Simulator 

LEU low-enriched Uranium 
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LIHE light initiated high explosive 

LINAC electron linear accelerator 

LLC Limited-life Component 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

M million 

MEMS micro-electromechanical systems 

MM Minuteman 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

n neutron 

NCES Net-Centric Enterprise Services 

NIF National Ignition Facility 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NSSO National Space Systems Office 

NWE nuclear weapon effects 

OJCS/J8 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Requirements and Integration 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PM project manager 

R&D research and development 

REBA Relativistic Electron Beam Accelerator 

RTBF Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities 

S&T science and technology 

SAF/AQQS Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition 

SGEMP system-generated electromagnetic pulse 

SLBM Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile 

SLEP Stockpile Life Extension Program 

SNM special nuclear material 

SPRII Sandia Pulsed Reactor III 

SSP Strategic Systems Programs 

SSPO Strategic Systems Program Office 

STRATCOM Strategic Command 

STS Stockpile to Target Sequence 

TRADOC Army Training and Doctrine Command 

UGT underground test 

U.S. United States 

USAF United States Air Force 

USANCA United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency 

USD/AT&L Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

UV ultraviolet 

VEMPSII vertically polarized electromagnetic pulse simulator 

VJCS Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

ZR pulsed-power accelerators 
 - 117 - 

Appendix K: List of Briefings Received by the Task Force 

28-29 January 2004 

DTRA Nuclear Weapon Effects Program Col Dan Deforest DTRA 

NNSA Nuclear Weapon Effects Overview Dr. Ted Luera DOE/NNSA 

Overview of DOT&E Dr. Ernest Seglie OSD 

17-18 March 2004 

JCS JCIDS Briefing Col Walker JCS J5 

STRATCOM Briefing Maj Cross USSTRATCOM 

Army Briefing Dr. Chuck Davidson USANCA 

MDA HAENS Standard Dr. Bruce Wilson 

and Mr. R.C. Webb 

MDA 

Navy Briefings LCDR Rome Ruiz and 

LCDR Mark Galvin Navy SSP 

USAF Requirements Process Overview Mr. James Miller USAF 

7-8 April 2004 

EMP Commission Findings Dr. John Crawford EMP 

Commission 

Sandia Critical Skills/Capability in Nuclear Effects Dr. Jim Lee 

Sandia National 

Laboratories 

(SNL) 

Radiation Facilities & Applications Mark Hedemann SNL 

SNL W76-1 Design/Qualification Process 

Mark Rosenthal 

and Dave Beutler 

SNL 

ASC Hostile Environment Codes & Applications Len Lorence SNL 

Hardening by Design vs. by Process Dave Myers SNL 

EDNA Briefing Tom Lockner SNL 

Z Tour Jeff Quintenz SNL 

DECADE Briefing (DTRA) LTC Brent Bredehoft DTRA 

Mag Flyer Briefing (DTRA) David Ball DTRA 
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5-6 May 2004 

LLNL Outputs and Environment 

Thomas Thomson 

Todd J. Hoover 

Keith S. Bradley 

LLNL 

LANL Outputs and Environments Robert P. Weaver 

Arlen S. “Sharif” Heger LANL 

NIF Tour 

George H. Miller 

Craig R. Wuest 

F. Dean Lee LLNL 

DTRA West Coast Nuclear Weapons Effects 

Simulators 

Peter Sincerny 

Sik-Lam Wong 

Henry Sze 

DTRA 

NIF and Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) Charles P. Verdon LLNL 

NIF Use Planning Bruce E. Warner LLNL 

NIF Radiation Source Development Laurance J. Suter LLNL 

Uses of NIF for Nuclear Weapons Effect Testing Gregory J. Dipeso and 

Michael T. Tobin 

LLNL 

Z Division Current and Future Threats Briefing Z Division Staff LLNL 

Testing Protocol -- a Subset of Hardening 

Considerations Mike Bell DTRA 

Combined Effects Lew Cohn DTRA 

Testable Hardware Tool Kit Demonstration Jonathan Morrow Titan 

Modeling Capability for Nuclear Survivability Dolores Walters DTRA 

Business Models for Nuclear Weapons Effects 

Simulators -- Industry Perspective Peter Sincerny Titan 

West Coast Facilities Tour: 

1150, MBS, PITHON, Double-EAGLE, Decade 

Module 2 (DM2) 

DTRA/Titan Staff DTRA/Titan 
 - 119 - 

21-22 June 2004 

EMP Commission Briefing Dr. Bill Graham EMP 

Commission 

Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan and 

its Status Mr. Thomas Scheber OSD 

Nuclear Survivability Requirements Mr. Donald Diggs OSD 

USAF Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) 

Briefing Mr. Michael Schmidt USAF 

Additional HAENS Analysis & Verification Dr. Bruce Wilson MDA 

14-15 July 2004 

Russia's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Doctrine Staff CIA 

Asian Weapon Effects Staff CIA 

Test Site Objectives Staff CIA 

Foreign Output & Effects Review Staff CIA 

Trends in Worldwide Nuclear Forces Staff CIA 

Imagery Overview of Test Site Activities Staff NGA 

Nuclear Challenges in Defense Planning Scenarios Dr. Jim Thomason IDA 
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 - 121 - 

Appendix L: Congressional and NNSA Actions During the Review of This 

Report 

The Task Force became aware, after agreeing upon findings and 

recommendations, that actions related to the DOE budget about which we were 

concerned came to pass. The FY05 appropriation for DOE’s survivability 

campaign was indeed reduced by 2/3 from the request, which had represented a 

steady program profile from FY04. Moreover, the NNSA is planning to zero 

funding for the survivability campaign once qualification for the W76 is 

completed (FY07 in the current plan). 
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