Report of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

Integrated Fire Support 

in the Battlespace 

October 2004 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrated Fire Support

in the Battlespace

The Integrated Fire Support in the Battlespace Task Force applies the methodology

developed in the 2001 Defense Science Board Summer Study on Precision Targeting to shorter

range ground and sea launched weapon systems which operate under the control of the on scene

commander and are designed to provide fires, both organic and inorganic, in support of

maneuver forces.

This Task Force was asked to assess adequacy of current and proposed munitions; adequacy

of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) techniques and mechanisms to meet the

needs of the tactical and operational battlefield forces; adequacy of battlefield command and

control; impediments to fully integrated Air, Land and Sea fire support; and need for predictive

engagement tools and derived intelligence products to guide the battlefield commander in the use

of forces to shape the outcome.

In the course of its deliberations, the Task Force reached the following conclusions:

.

.

A mix of unguided unitary weapons and precision discriminatory weapons will be

needed to provide the full range of options for ground fires in support of

maneuver warfare under conditions where the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) are

becoming more restrictive. To support this end, MEMS-based INS/GPS guidance

systems and an updated Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) will be

needed. Additionally, low-cost seekers and data links will be required for hard

(tanks, APCs) and moving targets.

We must be able to accurately detect, locate, identify and assess post attack

damage on targets if precision discriminatory weapons are to be effectively

utilized. Continued development and deployment of new organic tactical ISR

assets and improvements to vehicle-mounted and man-portable targeting systems

are needed. Critical to the development of these organic ISR and targeting assets

is the need to reduce the target location error produced by the sensors to a level

comparable to the weapon guidance errors for precision munitions.

It is becoming more and more difficult to provide positive identification of enemy

and neutral targets in the battlespace. Development of a blue force situation

awareness (SA) capability will provide an accurate baseline on the location of

friendly forces and thus enable a better understanding of the combat identification

problem.

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD
. A truly integrated fire support system must employ an approach to command and

control that ensures that the best available targeting and attack resources are

available to the maneuver commander. The primary challenge is to transform the

current collection of multi-Service fire support functions into a net-centric system.

A Joint Integrated Fire Support System (JIFSS) is proposed which more tightly

integrates the Service-based components and includes decision support tools.

~~~

Mr. Robert Nesbit. Co- Chair
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

DSB Transmittal Letter............................................................................................ i 

Chairman’s Transmittal Letter............................................................................... iii 

CHAPTERS 

1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................1 

2. Introduction..........................................................................................................9 

3. Fire Support Weapons........................................................................................15 

4. Tactical ISR: Sensors and Targeting Systems ...................................................39 

5. BMC3

 for Integrated Fire Support .....................................................................55 

APPENDICES 

A. Terms of Reference.......................................................................................73 

B. Task Force Membership ...............................................................................75 

C. Briefings Received by the Task Force..........................................................77 

D. JMEM Analysis ............................................................................................81 

E. Cost-to-Kill Analysis Results .......................................................................89 

F. Acronyms......................................................................................................97 
vi
1

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

1.1 Task Force Background and Approach 

In 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)) directed the Defense Science Board (DSB) to study the precision targeting of air-delivered munitions. The results of the 2001 Task Force were well-received 

within Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and in June 2003, USD(AT&L) directed the DSB to study the closely related topic of “integrated fire support in the 

battlespace.” In this new study the 2003 Task Force applied an approach and methodology similar to the 2001 effort but focused instead on ground-based fires, sea-based fires, 

and close-air support. 

As directed in its terms of reference (TOR), the 2003 Task Force assessed the following: 

• The adequacy of current and proposed munitions, 

• The timeliness and accuracy of ISR systems, 

• The adequacy of battlefield C3

 systems, and 

• Impediments to integrated fires.1

From October 2003 through April 2004, the Task Force met monthly to gather information. Table 1 summarizes the topics the Task Force discussed.2

• Integrated Fire Support • ISR Architecture • MIDB Status

• Future Combat Systems • Joint Fires Network • Army Maneuver and Fire Support

• C4ISR for FCS • Joint Targeting Toolbox • Joint Close Air Support

• Single Int. Ground Picture • Surface Fires CONOPS • U.S.MC Air Support

• DCGS – Army • DD(X) Program • Jacknife ACTD

• Prophet • Advanced Gun System • Joint Urban Operations

• Aerial Common Sensor • ERGM/ANSR • SOCOM Fire Support

• ATCCS • Electromagnetic Rail Gun • GPS Guidance

• Force XXI • F-18 E/F and JSF • Joint Munitions Effectiveness

• Global Broadcast • Aviation Munitions • Seekers and Data Links

• Army Direct Fires • USMC Fire Support • Emerging Communications

• Air-to-Ground Missiles • OEF & OIF Lessons Learned • Adaptive C4ISR

• Close Ground Combat Missile • JBMC2 Roadmap • CDMA on the Battlefield

• Precision Guided Mortar • DCGS Integrated Backbone • Net Fires

• Mid-Range Munition • UAV Update • Emerging Weapons Concepts

• Cannon Transformation • Geospatial Intelligence • Tactical Network Technology

• MLRS Transformation • GRIDLOCK • Dynamic Tactical Targeting

• Naval Fire Support • Geopositioning Study • Emerging C4ISR Concepts

• FORCENet • Airborne Targeting Cell

Table 1-1: Topics discussed. 

As the Task Force transitioned from gathering information to synthesizing and writing, it 

divided into three working groups: weapons, sensors, and command and control. 

 

1

 See the complete terms of reference (TOR) in Appendix A. 

2

 Appendix B lists the Task Force members, advisors, and support personnel; Appendix C provides detail on the 

briefings received. 
2

1.2 Foundational Issues 

Before we summarize the body of the report and our key recommendations, we first review a brief set of foundational issues. 

Requirements for fires 

Fire support is often divided into three areas: shaping fires, counter strike, and close support fires. 

• Shaping fires are employed at tactical and operational depth against target sets 

such as command and control nodes, moving and stationary enemy armor and infantry formations, assembly areas, logistics stockpiles, staging points, and air 

defense assets. 

• Counter strike is used against opposing force weapon delivery platforms such as 

mobile missile launchers and long-range guns. It is also used to counter command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4

ISR) assets. 

• Close support fires are employed for decisive operations against (1) armor and infantry units in contact, (2) tactical command and control, (3) forward air defense, 

and (4) indirect fire assets such as cannons and mortars. 

A major challenge for future operations is to create synergy between maneuver 

and precision fires. Maneuver is designed to achieve positional advantage over the enemy 

by positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical 

momentum, and massed effects. Fires are used in combination with maneuver to place 

the enemy in a dilemma and a position of disadvantage. 

Indirect fires on the road to Baghdad 

The following list summarizes observations made by Army and Marine Corps artillery 

battalions based on their experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 

• Most of the fires employed were massed fires with unguided munitions. 

• These fires were judged to be quite effective in producing the desired results, 

although the efficiency of weapon utilization and overall integration was questionable. 

• Most information on enemy force location came through direct contact with 

those enemy forces. Organic sensing assets were used extensively--primarily 

scout patrols and counter-mortar and counter-battery radars. 

• Sensor information from sources beyond the organic assets was very limited. 

Products from imaging sensors, for example, were not generally available to 

the artillery units as they advanced toward Baghdad. 

• Close air support was used more by the Marines than the Army. Its utility was 

limited by what several called an unreliable and overly complex process for 

requesting and coordinating fires. 
3

• In many cases, the quality of target identification, collateral damage estimates, 

and bomb damage assessments were lacking. This deficiency often hampered 

maintaining the planned Op Tempo of the operation. 

• Training of the units did not match the scale of fires and pace of operations 

experienced in OIF. 

Targeting effectiveness examples 

Using the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) model, we generated some 

simple examples to examine the effectiveness of indirect fires against two different target 

sets. These examples illustrate many of the principles we will discuss further in the body 

of the report.3 Each of the three examples that follow features two cases: 

1. In the first case, an array of six trucks is parked randomly in a 300 x 100m 

area. The desired effect is to “suppress” the unit from being able to carry out 

its normal functions. 

2. In the second case, a single truck is situated randomly in a 300 x 100m area. 

The objective is to damage or destroy this single truck. 

The first example illustrates what would happen using unguided unitary rounds 

with an estimated target location error (TLE) of 25m: to suppress the array requires 18 

rounds; in contrast, to damage or destroy just the single unit requires 868 round (according to the model). While the JMEM model is judged to be quite conservative, even 

reducing the results by a factor of two leads to the same conclusion – unguided rounds by 

themselves are very inefficient if the objective is to impose serious damage on discreet 

targets 

In the second example, we reduced the TLE to zero. The results for the first case 

(suppressing the entire unit) are unchanged (18 rounds). There is some improvement in 

the second case (damage or destroy the single unit) for the single target, but it still requires far too many rounds to be practical (520 rounds). Weapon bias and/or dispersion is 

the issue – not TLE. 

In the third example, we eliminated the bias errors in the guns by using observer 

adjusted fire. Observer adjustment obviously has a major impact in both cases. (The first 

case is reduced to 12 rounds, while the second case is reduced to 45.) Weapon bias 

clearly was the dominant issue and can be ameliorated to a large extent by human interaction, at least in the case of soft targets. 

The conclusions to be drawn from these (overly) simplistic examples are as follows: 

1. Massed fires are effective for suppressing concentrated arrays of forces. The 

more targets in a given area, the better. Precise target location is not required. 

2. Massed fires are inefficient and ineffective for high confidence destruction of 

a single target. To do so requires both precise target location and a precision 

attack mechanism. 

3. Observer-adjusted fires make a huge difference in the effectiveness of current 

weapon systems. 

 

3

 Chapter 2 of this report revisits these examples and illustrates them using graphics. 
4

When looking to the future, the critical question is this: “What target sets will we 

be facing and what effects will we be trying to achieve?” The answer is certainly “both of 

the cases presented here,” but it is likely that we will be facing more of the second case 

than has been planned for in the past. The other obvious topic is observer adjustment. Is 

that the way to operate in the future (are the opportunities always there) or can the requirement for forward observer (FO) exposure be supplemented or replaced with more 

machine-oriented precision approaches? 

Today, the majority of indirect fires are unguided massed fires. That, however, 

will change. As we look at modern maneuver warfare and asymmetric threats and tactics 

(particularly operations within urban environments), we see a trend toward ever more restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs). These ROEs insist on minimizing collateral 

damage and blue-force fratricide and demand highly integrated, adaptive precision targeting solutions. While we will still need massed fires for certain situations (distributed 

target sets and fires for effect), we will also need to change procedures and weapons such 

that we can employ more air support and more accurate precision fires. 

The question here is “How do we get there from here?” In other words, how do 

we evolve the weapons, improve the sensors, and enhance the command and control systems to achieve accurate, fully integrated, cost-effective fire support? The following 

section addresses these questions and previews the main body of the report. 

1.3 Report Preview 

We have divided the main body of the report into four main chapters: (1) introduction; 

(2) fire support weapons; (3) sensors; and (4) battle management, command, control, and 

communications. In the introduction, we revisit the foundational issues discussed above. 

We add some additional charts and tables that further illustrate the chapter’s main points. 

In the following paragraphs, we discuss each chapter briefly in turn. 

Fire support weapons 

We discuss the trend toward increasingly restrictive ROEs and how this trend adds to the 

pressure to improve accuracy. We also discuss the value and cost of precision, which 

must be balanced with operational need, the nature of the target, the limits of our sensors, 

and the total cost-to-kill of the delivered weapon. We explore these tradeoffs in some detail and assess the utility, effectiveness, and cost-to-kill of various classes of weapons. 

The obvious question is whether the increased unit cost of more expensive precision 

weapons is offset by the decreased number of rounds required. We conclude that the transition point from a less sophisticated to a more sophisticated weapon is clear and not 

overly sensitive to even moderate cost variations (see page 35 for specific conclusions). 

In this context, we also address the need to update the JMEM and the need to balance 

weapon delivery error (WDE) and TLE for the type of weapon employed. 

We conclude that a mix of unguided unitary weapons and precision seeker-guided 

discriminatory weapons will be needed to provide the full range of options for ground 

fires in support of maneuver warfare under conditions in which discrete target destruction 

becomes more the objective and ROEs become more restrictive. Development of new 

precision unitary weapons will require continued development of MEMS-based Inertial 

Navigation System/Global Positioning System (INS/GPS) guidance with improved em-
5

bedded global positioning system (GPS) anti-jam capability and deployment of this capability within Army and Navy acquisition programs for precision gun-launched munitions 

(XCALIBER, Extended Range Munition (ERM), etc.). We have also demonstrated that 

precision discriminatory weapons, which include a low-cost seeker and a data link in addition to the INS/GPS system, will be required for hard (tanks, armored personnel 

carriers (APCs), etc.) and moving targets. The accelerated development of affordable 

seekers and data links is also recommended to make this capability a reality. We also recognize that the availability of a seeker and data link within a discriminatory precision 

weapon opens up new possibilities for an organic target identification and battle damage 

assessment capability. Observing the target prior to and after engagement and communicating seeker imaging data via the data link would enhance the information available for 

target identification and battle damage assessment (BDA). We recommend serious exploration of this potential. 

Sensors and targeting systems 

Having a precise weapon is not enough to achieve an operational precision targeting capability; we must also be able to detect targets, locate them, identify them, and assess 

damage to them post-attack. We must improve sensors and targeting systems in order to 

improve the accuracy and effectiveness of the overall integrated fire support system. We 

have assessed current tactical weapon targeting, aided visual indirect targeting, combat 

identification and blue-force situational awareness, and timely tactical targeting and battle damage assessment. In each case, we identify technologies and approaches to improve 

our sensing and targeting capabilities. 

Specifically, we call for the continued development and deployment of new organic tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets (Pioneer, 

Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV), etc.) and the need for improvements to vehicle-mounted and man-portable targeting systems. The required TLE for precision 

munitions must be less than 10 meters for those weapons to be effective. The current 

TLEs for airborne, vehicle-mounted, and man-portable systems range from tens to hundreds of meters. We identify the technology developments needed to improve these 

systems. We also recommend continued support for the “GRIDLOCK” Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and ultimate deployment of this capability. 

“GRIDLOCK” holds the potential for reducing TLE provided by ISR sensors by “locking” tactical imagery to a reference precision image. We also discuss the need to extend 

the tactical ISR assets to allow for timely airborne visual imagery collection to enhance 

organic battle damage assessment. 

It is becoming more and more difficult to provide positive identification of enemy 

and neutral targets within the complex battlespaces that we will encounter in the future. 

The success of precision blue-force tracking during recent operations and the continued 

deployment of digital communications and GPS receivers to all military personnel will 

make the possibility of a robust and timely precision blue force situation awareness (SA) 

capability a reality. We call for the development of a blue-force SA capability that will 

provide an accurate baseline on the location of friendly forces and thus enable a better 

understanding of the combat identification problem. 
6

Battle management, command, control, and communications 

A truly integrated fire support system must employ an approach to command and control 

that ensures that the best available targeting and attack resources across the Services are 

made available to the maneuver commander. The primary challenge is to transform the 

current collection of multi-Service fire support functions (initially conceived to operate 

independently) into a net-centric system. With the evolution of increasingly reliable and 

pervasive digital communications and fast and powerful tools for aiding commanders in 

decision-making and execution monitoring, it is time to rethink the approach to battle 

management, command, control, and communications (BMC3

) that our military employs 

both within and across service in supporting operations with joint fires and close air support. We have addressed a range of possible solutions to this problem, including a 

proposed system we call the Joint Integrated Fire Support System (JIFSS) as well as improvements to the current family of common operational pictures. 

The proposed JIFSS would have Service-based components that are more tightly 

integrated than today. In addressing a maneuver commander’s desired effects, the JIFSS 

decision support toolset would enable nearly continuous updates of dynamic fire support 

and airspace coordination and control measures to maximize both the safety of friendly 

forces and their flexible use of the entire battlespace. This is accomplished by establishing a common targeting picture that contains all information needed to link each target 

and its associated effect through a spatially oriented database that supports (1) decision 

making to coordinate the use of sensors to build the common picture and (2) fusion of 

diverse sensors for accurate TLE determination (e.g., “GRIDLOCK”). We propose development of a JIFSS that evolves by standardizing an Advanced Field Artillery Tactical 

Data System (AFATDS)-like capability across all Service-developed targeting systems 

(to include Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) coordination). We propose using the modeldriven architecture (MDA) approach to ensure adherence to standards and identify the 

need for extensive joint exercises and simulation development to evolve this system toward a joint integrated planning and execution system for maneuver and joint forces 

coordination and control. 

1.4 Summary of Recommendations 

The following table summarizes the Task Force’s key recommendations. As with the 

main report, we have grouped the recommendations by topic (weapons, sensors, command and control). The final column refers to the sections in the report that describe the 

recommendation: 

Topic Subtopic Agent Recommendation Section 

Weapons Systems cost USD(AT&L) Establish a systems engineering function to quantify the true 

total systems cost of delivery 

weapons into theater and to 

achieve a system balance in the 

acquisition process for weapons/ISR/C-3. 

3.4 
7

Topic Subtopic Agent Recommendation Section 

 Joint 

Munitions 

Effectiveness 

Manual (JMEM) 

USD(AT&L) Revitalize the JMEM process to 

improve usability of the JMEM 

toolset, to more readily accomodate today’s issues such as 

collateral damage and to integrate efforts of JMEMs analysts 

and operations personnel into 

the design process. 

3.5 

 Affordable seekers USD(AT&L) Stand up efforts that “pull” maturing technology out of the 

S&T community to make affordable seekers a reality. 

3.9 

 Affordable data 

links 

DARPA Revive efforts associated with 

affordable data links to support 

the integrated fire support objectives for moving or 

relocatable target acquisition 

and battle damage assessment. 

3.9 

 GPS SAASM requirements USD(AT&L) Eliminate the SAASM requirement for integrated fire support 

weapons. 

3.9 

 Organic Battle 

Damage 

Assessment (BDA) 

JFCOM Explore useful organic level 

BDA offered by modern precision weapons and integrate this 

capability in mission planning 

efforts. 

3.9 

 Organic BDA ASN Revamp efforts to develop dedicated BDA assets and avoid the 

fragmented approaches to 

these dedicated sensors observed to date—approaches 

that have denied deployment of 

operationally ready technologies. 

3.9 

Sensors 

and targeting 

systems 

GRIDLOCK USD(AT&L) Continue support for the 

GRIDLOCK ACTD and field the 

capability. 

4.2 

 GRIDLOCK The 

Services 

Universally adapt the 

GRIDLOCK capability to all tactical and theater airborne 

imaging sensors and make it a 

requirement for all new such 

systems. 

4.2 

 Tactical 

Unmanned 

Aerial 

Vehicles (TUAV) 

ASA(ALT) 

and 

ASN(RDA) 

Focus and coordinate efforts to 

develop tactical UAV systems 

for organic surveillance with 

improved TLE and BDA capabilities. 

4.3 
8

Topic Subtopic Agent Recommendation Section 

 TUAVs ASA(ALT) 

and 

ASN(RDA) 

Establish a vigorous S&T program to develop a technical 

base to improve target location 

accuracy of TUAV, vehicular 

and man-portable targeting systems. 

4.3 

 Combat 

Identification (CID) 

USD(AT&L) 

and 

ASD(NII) 

Develop a theater-wide joint 

blue force CID system. 

- All tactical networked 

radios should be configured to incorporate 

network assisted GPS 

capability.

4.4 

Command 

& control 

Joint Integrated 

Fire Support System (JIFSS) 

USD(AT&L) 

and 

ASD(NII) 

Work toward developing a tactical Joint Integrated Fire Support 

System (JIFSS). 

5.7 

 Dynamic control 

measures 

DARPA (coordinating 

with the 

Services) 

Extend dynamic fire support 

coordination measures. 

5.7 

 Common targeting 

picture (CTP) 

USD(AT&L) 

and 

ASD(NII) 

Augment current family of 

common operational pictures 

(FIOPS) with richer target information. 

5.7 

Tactics, 

techniques, and 

procedures (TTPs), 

experimentation, 

and training 

JFCOM Conduct joint exercises and 

develop simulation capabilities 

to enable evaluation of joint tactics enabled by integrated 

planning and execution of maneuver and joint fires. 

5.7 

Table 1-2: Summary of recommendations. 
9

2. INTRODUCTION 

2.1 Requirements for Fires 

Fire support is often divided into three areas: shaping fires, counter strike, and close support fires. 

• Shaping fires are employed at tactical and operational depth against target sets 

such as command and control nodes, moving and stationary enemy armor and 

infantry formations, assembly areas, logistics stockpiles, staging points, and 

air defense assets. The goals of shaping fires are to 

- Isolate the current close fight, 

- Shape the next fight—set conditions for decisive operations, 

- Protect the force, and 

- Prepare the battlespace for decisive operations. 

• Counter strike is used against opposing force weapon delivery platforms such 

as mobile missile launchers and long-range guns. It is also used to counter 

C4

ISR assets, particularly sensors and reconnaissance. The focus of counter 

strike is to attack the enemy preemptively before he fires by targeting the enemy’s total strike system-weapons, sensors, and command and control.

• Close support fires are employed for decisive operations against (1) armor and 

infantry units in contact, (2) tactical command and control, (3) forward air defense, and (4) indirect fire assets such as cannons and mortars. The intent of 

close support fires is to 

- Attack enemy troops, weapons, and positions; 

- Fix the enemy and ensure freedom of maneuver for friendly forces; and 

- Fully synchronize the fires with the scheme of maneuver. 

A major challenge for future operations is to create synergy between maneuver 

and precision fires. Maneuver is designed to achieve positional advantage over the enemy 

by positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical 

momentum, and massed effects. Fires are used in combination with maneuver to place 

the enemy in a dilemma and a position of disadvantage. 

• If the enemy remains in position, his forces may be isolated and destroyed by 

fires. 

• If the enemy withdraws, attempts to establish new defensive positions, or maneuvers for counterattack, he may be exposed to effective use of fires. 

Combining joint fires and maneuver requires a force to synchronize its capabilities in time, space, and purpose. The challenge is twofold: (1) to devise new concepts of 

operation (CONOPS) and tactics for faster, lighter dispersed forces to take advantage of 

abundant precision fires and (2) to determine if new effects can be achieved and whether 

new concepts can be enabled in maneuver.
10

From Ö To 

Linked Ö Networked battle command 

Access to joint system Ö Interdependent with joint systems 

Connected to sensor outputs 

Less agile/heavy 

Ö Dynamic sensor to shooter 

linkages 

Strategic and tactical mobility 

Lethal (through mass) Ö Lethal (through precision and 

volume) 

Area effects with limited precision 

Ö Precise effects with area options 

Large logistics burden Ö Reduced logistics requirement 

Ability to mass fires Ö Ability to mass effects; lethal 

and non-lethal 

24/7, all weather Ö 24/7, all weather and all environments 

Table 2-1: Indirect fire: future composition. 

2.2 Indirect Fires on the Road to Baghdad 

Over the course of its deliberations, the Task Force met with several members of U.S. 

Army and Marine Corps artillery battalions who participated in OIF. Their informal but 

remarkably consistent combat observations underscored well both the overall challenge 

of fire support on the modern battlefield and the need to integrate its elements more fully. 

The following list summarizes their observations generically: 

• Most of the fires employed were massed fires with unguided munitions. 

• These fires were judged to be quite effective in producing the desired results, 

although the efficiency of weapon utilization and overall integration was questionable. 

• Most information on enemy force location came through direct contact with 

those enemy forces. Organic sensing assets were used extensively--primarily 

scout patrols and counter-mortar and counter-battery radars. 

• Sensor information from sources beyond the organic assets was very limited. 

Products from imaging sensors, for example, were not generally available to 

the artillery units as they advanced toward Baghdad. 

• Close air support was used more by the Marines than the Army. Its utility was 

limited by what several called an unreliable and overly complex process for 

requesting and coordinating fires. 

• In many cases, the quality of target identification, collateral damage estimates, 

and bomb damage assessments was lacking. 

• Training of the units did not match the scale of fires and pace of operations 

experienced in OIF. 

The Task Force found many of these observations quite striking, and they informed much 

of the task’s force’s subsequent analysis. 
11

2.3 Targeting Effectiveness Examples 

Using the JMEM model, the panel ran some simple examples to examine the effectiveness of indirect fires against two different target sets. The first is an array of trucks (6) 

parked randomly in 300 x 100 m area. The desired effect is to “suppress” the unit from 

being able to carry out its normal functions. The second is a single truck that “must be 

damaged/destroyed.” The results using unguided unitary rounds are shown in Figure 2-1. 

Figure 2-1. JMEM-derived firing requirements using unguided unitary rounds.

The objective of suppressing the fighting capability of the array of trucks can be achieved 

with just 18 rounds, but to assure destruction of a single truck requires 868 rounds (according to the model). While the JMEM model is judged to be quite conservative, 

reducing the results by a factor of two leads to the same conclusion. 

Figure 2-2 shows what happens when the TLE is reduced to zero. 
12

Figure 2-2. JMEM results with improved TLE. 

The results for the array of trucks are unchanged. There is some improvement for the single target, but it still requires far too many rounds to be practical. 

Finally, Figure 2-3 depicts the results of using observer adjusted fire, which 

eliminates the bias errors in the guns. 

Figure 2-3. Observer adjusted files. 
13

Observer adjustment obviously has a major impact in both cases. 

The conclusions to be drawn from these (overly) simplistic examples are as follows: 

1. Massed fires are effective for suppressing concentrated arrays of forces. 

The more targets in a given area, the better. Precise target location is not 

required. 

2. Massed fires are inefficient and ineffective for high confidence destruction 

of a single target. To do so requires both precise target location and a precision attack mechanism. 

3. Observer-adjusted fires make a huge difference in the effectiveness of current weapon systems. 

When looking to the future, the critical question is this: “What target sets will we 

be facing and what effects will we be trying to achieve?” The answer is certainly “both of 

the cases presented here,” but it is likely that we will be facing more of Case II than has 

been planned for in the past. The other obvious topic is observer adjustment. Is that the 

way to operate in the future, are the opportunities always there, or can that be supplemented or replaced with more technical precision approaches? 

In general terms, Figure 2-4 suggests a future composition for indirect fires. This 

is a qualitative rather than a quantitative assessment. 

Figure 2-4. Indirect fire—future composition. 

Today, the majority of indirect fires are unguided massed fires. In the future, we will still 

need massed fires for certain situations but also need to change procedures and weapons 

such that we can employ more air support and more accurate precision fires. 
14

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15

3. FIRE SUPPORT WEAPONS 

As defined for the purpose of this report, fire support weapons consist of various munitions and missiles used by the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. This chapter focuses 

on those gun-launched munitions that are central to accomplishing the objectives of the 

Army and Marine ground forces. These weapons consist of a variety of systems, both operational and in development, which offer different sensor (INS/GPS, seeker), range (10 

km to over 100 km), and lethality characteristics (high explosive to kinetic energy). Table 

3-1 identifies the major classes of weapon investigated in this study. 

Class Characteristics Projectile 

Unguided unitary • Volume fires/effects 

• Distributed/ area targets 

• $500 unit production 

cost (UPC) 

e.g. 155mm 

Guided unitary • Pre-designated targets 

• Add INS/GPS & control 

• $15,000 UPC 

e.g. Extended Range Munition 

Guided discriminatory • Difficult targets 

• Add seeker & data link 

• $35,000 UPC 

e.g. Loitering Attack Munition 

Table 3-1: Major classes of weapons investigated in study. 

DoD has overcome many of the developmental challenges (navigation, control) 

involved in making these weapons a reality. These efforts should continue in other sensor 

and planning areas. How these weapons are employed, the benefits in terms of system 

effectiveness, operational utility, cost of ownership, and performance assessment will be 

detailed in the following paragraphs. Now is the time to step back and reevaluate how we 

effectively integrate the capabilities offered into the planning for future military engagements.4

3.1 Rules of Engagement and Weapons 

ROE are usually established by the theater combatant commander (COCOM). They provide authorization for, and limitations on, the release of weapons by engaged forces. The 

 

4 While the material in this chapter focuses on the use of integrated fires from the standpoint of the ground soldier, the important contributions of the close air support (CAS) community in this area cannot be overlooked as 

part of the overall mission. However, the challenge of the CAS mission, and the precision weapons currently 

used in support of it, becomes one of a coordination issue handled as part of the joint integrated mission planning 

efforts. This material is discussed separately in chapter 5. 
16

COCOM’s authority comes from delegation of responsibility by the National Command 

Authority (NCA) for the management of all military actions in the COCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). This delegation of responsibility requires that the COCOM ensure 

that all military actions in his or her AOR are compatible with all relevant treaties and 

international agreements to which the United States is a signatory power. In addition, the 

COCOM must make every effort to assure that weapon release procedures are in place so 

that the possibility of fratricide, collateral damage, and civilian casualties are minimized, 

and that only targets of clear military value are attacked. 

In recent conflicts, the ROE have become progressively more restrictive. The media can be relied upon to report instantly each and every perceived violation of the rules 

of warfare, the effects of inadvertent fratricide, civilian casualties, and extensive and unnecessary collateral damage. Thus the NCA places great pressure on the COCOM to 

assure that the occurrence of such undesirable events is minimized. The constraints of 

current and future ROE will be satisfied by 

• Maximum use of coordinate seeking weapons with the minimum explosive 

yield compatible with target destruction; 

• Improved blue-force tracking (BFT) systems; 

• Minimal TLE; 

• Reliable and precise target identification; and 

• Rapid bomb damage assessment (BDA) capabilities. 

ROE does and will continue to vary with circumstances within a theater. When 

the engaged enemy is an established military force in an open desert area where no civilians are present the use of unguided weapons (artillery shells and dumb bombs) will be 

permissible if the BFT system assures that the possibility of fratricide is vanishingly 

small. When combat is undertaken in urban areas, present and future ROE are likely to 

discourage the use of non-coordinate seeking weapons. In such circumstances the weapon 

of choice is likely to become the weapon with the smallest warhead compatible with target destruction. Small yield, precision weapons clearly minimize collateral damage. 

TLE is one of the ultimate limitations on weapon delivery accuracy for any 

weapon that does not have its own means of determining precise target location. If a target’s location cannot be specified with a level of precision that equates to the precision 

with which a coordinate seeking weapon can be delivered, weapon performance will degrade seriously. We may anticipate that in the future, when forces are engaged in an 

urban environment and the TLE exceeds some threshold value, the ROE will prohibit 

weapon release. Improved techniques for the reduction of TLE are urgently needed and 

are being developed by all Services. 

For the foreseeable future, ROE will strongly prohibit weapon release in situations that may result in fratricide. In Operation Desert Storm, an estimated 24 percent of 

U.S. casualties resulted from “friendly fire.” In OIF, the number of deaths from “friendly 

fire” was less than 3 percent. This favorable outcome resulted from a vastly improved 

BFT system that employed beacons, special panels, and interrogation systems. Again we 

may anticipate that when the location uncertainty of blue forces exceeds certain threshold 

levels, future ROE will limit the use of large warhead, non-coordinate seeking weapons 

in the areas of uncertainty. There is little likelihood that the ROE for future combat situa-
17

tions will be less restrictive with regard to possible fratricide. 

3.2 Utility of Precision in Integrated Fires 

Precision in integrated fires refers to the weapon approaching its intended target closely 

(i.e., a small total miss distance). This requires accuracy in both locating the target and 

guiding the weapon. The statistical measure of precision targeting and engagement is total circular error probability (TCEP), the radius of a circle encompassing 50 percent of 

the final distances between weapon and target. 

Those with operational experience in land warfare consistently advise that fires 

need not—in fact cannot—always be conducted with precision. Situations arise in which, 

for example, the enemy’s presence is only a possibility, moving forward quickly is essential, and prudence dictates a covering fire. A small TCEP has no operational benefit in 

such situations and firing unguided unitary (or “dumb”) rounds in the general direction of 

concern is the appropriate course of action. In a wide range of other situations, however, 

(wider than has apparently been well understood previously) precision has an operational 

utility that outweighs its cost. 

Precision’s operational utility in integrated fires derives from a few interrelated 

benefits. First, use of fewer, smaller, and lighter weapons reduces total mass that must be 

brought to theater to kill a given target. Second, it increases launch platform equivalent 

effective magazine size. Third, smaller, more accurate weapons reduce the probability of 

collateral damage. Fourth, the ability to conduct the “one-shot/one-kill” mission increases 

the operational tempo. Finally, the accuracy and control of a precision weapons system 

design allows its delivery at significant stand-off range and permits effective lethality 

performance of these systems using smaller warheads. 

Reducing total mass that must be brought into theater is critical to the force transformation DoD seeks. Reducing total mass will improve speed of response, reduce the 

cost of any given operation, and reduce the life-cycle cost of sustaining the force required 

for lift, logistics, etc. 

Use of smaller, lighter weapons enables any given launch platform to carry more 

weapons, kill more targets, and stay on station longer. This endurance can be a key factor 

in enhancing operational tempo. 

Reducing probability of collateral damage is another imperative in a world in 

which casualties of the uninvolved are broadcast to the world, exploited by the enemy, 

counterproductive to U.S. political objectives and become a political impediment to action. Attention to limiting collateral damage is so intense that it is often a pacing factor. 

Therefore, a capability to nullify targets with high confidence of doing no other harm can 

accelerate the tempo of operations. “One shot/one kill” is yet another aid to operational 

tempo; it increases the rate of killing targets and enables lighter, faster forces. 

The extended range and control authority of precision weapons offers considerable advantage to the warfighter. The standoff range capability of these weapons will 

allow the soldier to reach targets up to 100 miles forward of the fire line. This capability 

is enabled by the ability to control the weapon in both flight to the target and in angle of 

fall (the angle at which the weapon hits the target) which increases the effect of the delivered warhead. Furthermore, in addition to the safety this offers the ground forces, it will 
18

also improve the ability to conduct logistical re-supply activities by keeping the enemy 

force at significant stand-off distances. 

In short, the advancement of precision weapons is making possible the ability to 

move from an environment of large, unguided, high-energy, short-range inaccurate weapons toward one of small, guided, minimal/kinetic-energy, long-range precision weapons 

that will provide the capability to hit the intended target with a single shot. Eventually 

this capability will not only minimize collateral damage but will also help to eliminate 

one of the leading causes of civilian injury and casualty: unexploded ordinance. 

Unexploded distributed submunitions are a leading cause of injury in the aftermath of a 

conflict due to their reliability performance. With precision weapons now a reality, it is 

time to reassess the usage of distributed submunitions as the primary explosive of choice 

in order to minimize and eventually eliminate the significant and unnecessary lethal collateral damage associated with the aftermath of their deployment. 

3.3 TCEP: How Small is Small Enough? 

How small does TCEP have to be to provide the above advantages? At what point does 

the cost of achieving a given TCEP outweigh its operational value? Answering these 

questions requires working the trade space between warhead size and TCEP, with the 

driving parameters being (1) the target type and (2) the warhead’s lethality against the 

target type together with (3) the type and proximity of non-combatant elements that the 

ROE demand must be protected from damage. Answers are sought by designers of the 

materiel involved and by its users. Today, efforts of designers and users are frustrated by 

inadequacies of the JMEM, the only readily and universally accepted available source for 

how effective a given munition is at a given distance against a given target. 

JMEM was developed for officers in the field to use in specific, defined operational conditions. It contains effectiveness information on specific munitions in the 

inventory against very specific target types; information derived from tests of these 

weapons over previous decades. Its format and content are not well suited for exploratory 

development and broad trade-offs. It lacks generalized data useful in designing a new 

weapon and is difficult to use in answering “what if” questions. JMEM’s empirical foundation does not permit “physics-based” extrapolations. Furthermore, the tests on which 

its data is based were often for larger warheads and larger miss distances than are applicable for tomorrow’s precision targeting and engagement systems. A revised or new form 

of JMEM is needed for these new purposes and new environment. 

3.4 Dealing with the Total Cost of Ownership 

The economic and military objective of a weapon system design should be to produce a 

weapon that neutralizes a wide variety of targets at minimum overall delivered cost. The 

overall cost of target neutralization is the product of the sum of unit weapon procurement 

cost, ownership costs, and transportation (delivery) costs times the number of weapons 

required to achieve the weapon’s military objectives. 

The four factors in the cost equation (procurement, ownership, delivery, and numbers) are generally difficult to estimate and are not inherently independent variables. Unit 

weapon procurement costs are rarely known with precision while a weapon is in the de-
19

velopment stage. Even when weapon programs have transitioned into production, unit 

weapon procurement costs are a strong function of the total number of weapons that are 

procured. The unit procurement cost of an individual shell, bomb, or missile varies significantly with the weapons warhead weight and designed WDE. 

As an example, the conventional, unguided 155 mm artillery rounds have unit 

procurement costs on the order of $500. On the other hand, a round designed for the 

Navy’s Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) will have approximately the same 

explosive yield as a 155mm round at an estimated unit procurement cost somewhere between $30,000 and $50,000 in quantity purchases. In other words, the ERGM round will 

offer increased range and greatly reduced WDE at 60 to 100 times the cost of conventional 155mm artillery shells. 

Computing the number of weapons required to achieve a desired probability of 

target destruction is a complicated undertaking. It is a function that includes such factors 

as 

• The explosive weight of the weapon warhead; 

• The type of target (tank, bunker, truck, personnel carrier in defilade, etc.); 

• The TLE; 

• The angle of fall (AOF) of the weapon (re: control authority, which enables 

lethality); 

• The staleness of meteorological data; and 

• The WDE. 

For a given target type and AOF (which in the case of artillery shells is related to 

the range at which a target is engaged), the number of artillery shells that must be delivered to achieve a 30 percent fractional damage (FD) most strongly depends on the TLE 

and the WDE. For example, JMEM calculations5

 for a single tank point target show that 

347 unguided 155 mm artillery rounds will be required to achieve a 30 percent FD (when 

the AOF is 30 degrees and the TLE is 10 meters). Using a guided round with the same 

unitary warhead requires 10 rounds to achieve the same result. If a guided discriminatory 

round is used under the same scenario, only a single weapon is required to achieve the 

equivalent damage objective. 

Although one may argue with the JMEM assumptions that lead to the requirements of such a large expenditure of unguided weapons, it is clear that significant 

economies of cost may often be achieved even when expensive precision weapons with 

low WDE are used. On the other hand there will be target sets and situations involving 

large TLE where using multiple, low-cost, unguided artillery shells is cheaper than using 

expensive weapons with small WDE. Little advantage is to be achieved when an extremely accurate weapon is used against a target whose location is very poorly known. 

The result of such an engagement is one where the weapon(s) very precisely miss the intended target.

Unit procurement costs generally increase as performance increases (measured in 

terms of decreasing WDE). For rounds designed to deal with stationary targets, the use of 

deeply integrated GPS/INS will provide a WDE that will generally be less than the TLE. 

 

5

 See Appendix D for JMEM calculations. 
20

The cost of such a round in large-scale production has been estimated to be somewhere 

between 20 and 40 times the cost of an unguided round. If rounds are to be designed to 

counter moving targets in adverse weather, the weapon will probably require the use of 

deeply integrated GPS/INS, a data link, and a seeker designed to see through or below the 

weather. This weapon will also be effective against any target in the absence of extremely 

precise TLE. Estimates made by knowledgeable personnel place the unit procurement 

cost of a weapon with such capabilities in the range of about 70 times the cost of an unguided artillery shell (i.e., about $35,000 per round). This figure represents the best 

estimate available at this time since there is no historical basis for this class of precision 

weapons. Although this multiplier represents a large increase in unit procurement cost, it 

also provides a capability that could not be achieved without the use of an inconceivably 

large expenditure of unguided artillery rounds. 

Ownership costs of weapons in inventory are poorly documented and difficult to 

allocate on a per round basis. Significant costs are associated with maintaining weapons 

in inventory. The cost of ownership of weapons includes warehousing, guarding, testing, 

and batch re-certification costs. Most weapons have a finite shelf life so that even if they 

are not expended in combat (as many are not), they eventually have to be replaced. There 

is no uniformly accepted number that provides the true allocated cost of ownership of a 

weapon prior to its expenditure in combat. Many analysts estimate that the cost of 

weapon ownership equates to the initial unit weapon procurement cost. 

Weapon transportation costs associated with the delivery of weapons from factory 

to the point of weapon release in combat are also difficult to document. These costs represent a significant fraction of the total weapon cost. Inquires with present and retired 

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) officers failed to provide the panel with an 

agreed upon allocated cost of weapon delivery. 

The largest factor in weapon delivery cost is the number of tons of weapons that 

need to be delivered. The delivery cost of a ton of precision-guided artillery rounds is the 

same as the delivery costs of a ton of unguided artillery rounds. The difference is that for 

precision-guided rounds, fewer tons must be shipped to theater. 

The costs of weapons delivered in combat are difficult to assess. Separate organizations within DoD make weapon acquisition decisions, maintain them in inventory, 

transport them, deliver them within theater, and make decisions concerning their rate of 

employment. Cost tradeoffs between all elements above need to be worked, but no organizational home for such work currently exists. 

3.5 Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) 

The preceding discussion on the various classes of weapons that can be applied to the integrated fire support mission highlights the need to determine which combination of the 

following factors offers the “best” option: 

• Weapon selection 

• Type of environment 

• Level of probability of kill or fractional damage 

• Type of target 
21

In this context, “best” can be a very broad term but certainly encompasses such issues as 

number of weapons, degree of ISR support, minimum logistics, and least overall “cost-tokill.” 

JMEM is a valuable tool in assessing some of the issues above. Fundamentally, it 

is a complex computer program that calculates the quantity of a given weapon that is required to achieve a given level of fractional damage against various types of targets as a 

function of TLE, staleness of meteorological data, aim point biases, firing doctrine, and 

the like. A highly experienced analysis community runs and maintains JMEM, and analysis results are documented in a large, multi-volume manual broken into classes of 

weapons (e.g., indirect fire, direct fire, air to ground, etc.). Historically, JMEM has been 

used to assess existing weapon effectiveness and to guide users in terms of operational 

firing doctrine and number of munitions required for the various weapon types these users employ. 

Unfortunately, JMEM is not well matched to some of today’s needs. It is not easy 

to use as an on-line tool to explore emerging weapons concepts because it requires too 

much specificity in terms of its many inputs. The documented manuals are oriented toward specific combinations of existing weapons and targets and are not well suited to 

performing parametric analyses. Because JMEM had its roots in the Cold War era, the 

entire JMEM culture has tended to focus on what it takes to halt or disrupt massed forces 

on the attack. “Fractional damage” and its related levels of a few tenths to “suppress” or 

“neutralize” stem from historical data on the performance of large troop concentrations 

suffering from personnel casualties or equipment losses. Today, although some conflict 

situations may entail the suppression or destruction of large forces, the more common 

situation is dealing with much lighter dispersed forces (perhaps even a few individuals) 

mixed in with non-combatants. The notion of neutralizing such groups with fractional 

damage on the order of a few tenths is not a realistic goal. Many of these groups are willing to sustain 100 percent casualties in the pursuit of their objectives and the potential 

possession of weapons of mass destruction makes an equipment survival rate of even a 

few tenths unacceptable. 

Thus, the operational framework (as well as the toolset itself) needs to be improved. Building on the expertise that already exists, JMEM needs to be restructured to 

better support the performance of parametric analyses using a high degree of characterization of both weapons and target types. Users should be able to focus on high 

probability of catastrophic, functional, or mobility kill of individual target types. In addition, they should be able to specify confidence levels and easily delineate areas for 

specified levels of collateral damage. Such modifications (as well as JMEM analyst participation) would make JMEM an extremely valuable tool in supporting ongoing 

development activities, particularly in the early stages of concept exploration. It is also 

recommend that warfighter representatives become involved in the definition of JMEM 

improvements and modifications to ensure that the tool satisfies user needs as well. 

3.6 Weapons Effectiveness 

Despite the issues and limitations discussed above, JMEM proved to be very helpful in 

allowing the Task Force to assess the utility, effectiveness, and ultimately the cost-to-kill 
22

of three classes of weapons: an unguided weapon with a unitary warhead, a GPS/INS 

guided weapon with a unitary warhead, and an guided discriminatory weapon.6

 

For the unguided unitary weapon, we also considered the case where a FO is used 

to adjust the target of the weapon. In discussions with the Army and Marines, we learned 

that most integrated fire support missions involving non-line-of-sight targets used an FO. 

In such circumstances, the firing source can “walk” the weapon into the target to remove 

weapon bias, thereby using fewer rounds than when firing in non-line-of-sight conditions 

without the FO benefit. Our analyses in the following paragraphs take the use of the FO 

into account when evaluating the effectiveness of the unguided unitary weapon. For precision weapons, the addition of advanced sensor technology is intended to obviate the 

need for the FO. 

For these three classes of weapons, we determined how many rounds would be 

required to achieve a range of fractional damage. (We defined damage as a mobility kill). 

We treated TLE as a variable and characterized each weapon type by (1) its precision (the 

shot to shot random error in its ability to hit a given point) and (2) its mean point of impact (treated as a bias error over the entire distribution of fires). Table 3-2 provides these 

errors for the weapons considered. The results are representative of technologies that exist today. 

Table 3-2: Assumed weapon delivery errors. 

The results for a representative sample of the cases run are shown in the next two 

figures. (Figure 3-1 represents cases run for a soft target like a truck; Figure 3-2 represents cases run for a hard target like a tank). In each figure, a three dimensional plot is 

provided in which the base dimensions are TLE (ranging from 0 m to 30 m) and fractional damage of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.8. The bar height represents the number of rounds that 

must be fired to achieve the desired level of fractional damage at the given TLE. For the 

specific cases involving unguided unitary weapons, each bar has two levels – the lower 

being for the case of a forward observer and the higher for no FO. Held constant across 

the cases are the staleness of meteorological data (0.5 hours) and a weapon engagement 

range of two-thirds maximum range. 

The trends in the two figures make intuitive sense. As target difficulty, required 

fractional damage, and/or TLE increase, the number of rounds required also increases. 

 

6

 We specified an optical seeker-guided weapon (either semi-active laser-guided with a ground spotter or an imaging IR with aim point selection capability) with no warhead (i.e., a direct-hit, kinetic-kill weapon). 

Weapon Precision in down range 

dimension (m) 

Precision in 

cross range 

dimension 

(m) 

MPI in down 

range dimension (m) 

MPI in 

cross 

range 

dimension 

(m) 

Unguided unitary 57 15 112 35 

Unguided unitary 

(FO) 57 15 67 21 

INS/GPS unitary 5 5 6 6 

Guided discriminatory 1 0 0 0 
23

Conversely, increases in weapon sophistication, or, for the case of the unguided unitary 

weapon, through the employment of an FO, reduce the number of rounds required. What 

is not intuitive is the magnitude of these trends (note the log scale on quantities), particularly when a high degree of fractional damage is required. At a low fractional damage 

requirement against a soft target, the number of unguided unitary rounds that have to be 

fired seems reasonable. But at 0.8 fractional damage, the numbers exceed 1,000 (note that 

in all of the figures the bars are truncated at 1,000 rounds, since numbers in excess of 

1,000 are operationally irrelevant). In contrast, the use of a FO can significantly reduce 

the number of unguided unitary rounds required. Furthermore, depending upon TLE, an 

INS/GPS guided weapon requires between one and two orders of magnitude fewer 

rounds than the unguided unitary weapon. And the seeker-guided, discriminatory kinetickill weapon requires only one round to achieve its objective, independent of TLE or fractional damage. 

Against the hard tank target (Figure 3-2), the unguided unitary weapon requires 

an excessive number of rounds in all cases, even when an FO is available. The INS/GPSguided unitary weapon appears to be useful at low combinations of TLE and fractional 

damage but require excessive numbers of rounds elsewhere. And similar to the soft target 

case, the seeker-guided discriminatory weapon remains a “one round to kill” weapon. 

All of the cases represented in Figures 3-1 and 3-2 entailed the engagement of an 

isolated single target. We also analyzed the same cases for “area” targets, i.e., a group of 

six trucks or tanks spread out over a small area. The results are provided in Appendix D 

but yield the same trends and conclusions as the single target cases discussed here. Also 

provided in Appendix D are the results against a medium hard target such as an armored 

personnel carrier. The results for it are quite similar to those for the tank above. 

The obvious question that remains is whether the increased unit cost for the more 

complex INS/GPS guided unitary and/or seeker guided discriminatory weapons are offset 

by the decreased numbers of rounds required. The following section attempts to answer 

that question. 
24

TLE Meters

1

10

100

1000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

# of Rounds

1

10

100

1000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

# of Rounds

1

10

100

1000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

# of Rounds

TLE Meters

INS/GPS -Guided Unitary

TLE Meters

Unguided Unitary

0.8

0

FD

.3

0.1

FD

FD

# of Rounds

0.8

0

FD

.3

0.1

FD

FD

Forward 

Observer

Impact

1

10

100

1000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20

Seeker-guided Discriminatory

Figure 3-1: Soft target, truck. 

1

10

100

1000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

# of Rounds

Seeker-guided Discriminatory -

# of Rounds

1

10

100

1000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

# of Rounds

INS/GPS-Guided Unitary

1

10

100

1000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

# of Rounds

Unguided Unitary

0.8

0.3

FD

0

FD

.1 FD

Forward 

Observer

Impact

All Forward 

Observer

TLE Meters

TLE Meters

Figure 3-2: Hard target, tank. 
25

3.7 Total Cost-to-Kill 

In order to answer the question of whether the increased cost of weapon complexity is 

offset by the reduction in numbers of weapons required, the total cost to kill a target to a 

desired fractional damage level has to be determined for each of the weapon options. Total cost should consider unit procurement cost (UPC), the cost of getting the required 

weapon to theater, and the necessary support cost. For the UPC of the unguided unitary 

weapon, the Task Force used current figures for weapons of this class (about $500 a 

round). The one element of the unguided unitary weapon cost not included was the cost 

of training, fielding, and putting the forward observer on station to provide the firing solution updates during the IFS mission. This cost, which would be eliminated with the use 

of precision weapons, does not significantly alter the findings in this report. However, it 

remains one of the many “elusive” total cost of ownership variables that we believe a 

good DoD systems engineering capability would provide. 

For the INS/GPS-guided unitary weapon, the Task Force considered the cost of 

adding the INS/GPS guidance and the cost of providing the necessary aerodynamic control to divert the weapon to its guided aim point. Using projected figures for guidance 

systems of this type and considering the cost of existing weapons of this type, we determined a UPC figure of about $15,000. For the seeker-guided discriminatory weapon, the 

panel drew upon a two-year-old Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) 

study on inexpensive seekers. In that study, a body-fixed imaging IR seeker was projected to cost in the range of $10,000 to $20,000 per round. Using a mid-point figure of 

$15,000 for the seeker and associated electronics and $5,000 for a data link (another 

DARPA study projected the cost of a similar data link at $2,000), we added $20,000 to 

the INS/GPS-guided unitary weapon for the seeker and data link. This resulted in a projected UPC of $35,000 per round. 

To get a handle on shipping and support costs, we assumed crated rounds with a 

loaded crate weight of 300 lbs. We also specified crate dimensions. A commercial carrier 

provided a bid on shipping 1,000 rounds by sea from Houston, Texas, to Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia. The carrier proposed employing three barges, each carrying one-third of the total 

quantity at one barge per month (anytime the vessel was available to Jeddah). The total 

cost per barge was $165,000, or $495 per round. 

We further assumed that the rounds would be stored in-theater in a warehouselike structure. Allowing space for the crates (stacked four high) as well as aisle, access, 

and administration space, yielded a total requirement of slightly over 20,000 sq. ft. At $2 

per square foot per year, this came out to be $40,000 for warehouse space. The cost of 

providing two guards on a 24/7 basis at an enlisted soldier cost of $25,000 per year 

yielded another $150,000 (depending on how shifts and 7 day coverage worked out). 

Given the $40,000 for warehousing and the $150,000 for security, the total storage cost 

was $190,000, or $190 per round. Adding this $190 per round for storage for one year 

and the $495 per round for shipping, we rounded the total up to $750 per round to account for any other factors not considered. We assumed that any conflict involving these 

weapons would not last more than one year. 
26

Once we established the three UPC figures and the $750 per round support cost, it 

was a simple matter to calculate the total cost-to-kill for the three weapon types as the 

number of weapons required (from the JMEM results) multiplied by the sum of the UPC 

and support costs. Using these total cost-to-kill figures, we determined the least-cost 

weapon option for the various combinations of fractional damage, TLE, and target type. 

Figure 3-3 maps the results for the soft target, Figure 3-4 for the tank target. For example, 

against the truck target at a 0.1 level of fractional damage, the unguided unitary weapon 

was the least expensive option, independent of TLE within the range of 0 to 30 m. For the 

same target but at a fractional damage level of 0.8, the unguided unitary weapon was 

never the least expensive option. Rather, at a TLE of 10 m or less, the guided unitary 

weapon offered the least cost-to-kill and above that TLE the seeker-guided discriminatory weapon offered the least-cost approach. Some general observations are apparent: 

• In a situation in which the objective is low-level attrition (e.g., 0.1 FD) of soft targets (trucks, dispersed troops, etc.), the cost spent on precision has no financial 

payoff and the least UPC unitary weapon offers the least total cost to achieve the 

desired effect. 

• In contrast, in a situation in which the objective is a relatively certain level of kill 

(e.g., 0.8 FD) of hard targets (tanks, APCs, etc.), precision weapons—even at a 

UPC of nearly 70 times that of the unguided weapon—offer the least total cost-tokill. 

• In between these two extremes in target difficulty and kill expectation or fractional damage, a “half-priced” INS/GPS guided unitary weapon (no seeker) plays 

5

0

10

15

20

25

30

TLE (Meters)

0.1 0.3 0.8

5

0

10

15

20

25

30

TLE (Meters)

10

Unguided Unitary

Guided

Unitary

Guided

Discriminatory

*Note 1

Unguided Unitary

Guided

Unitary

Guided

Discriminatory

Unguided Unitary

*Note 1

Truck Target

Fractional Damage

0

0.1 0.3 0.8

Fractional Damage

Tank Target

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure 3-3: Truck target; 

least cost-to-kill weapon option 

Figure 3-4: Tank target; 

least cost-to-kill weapon option 

All unguided unitary data in above figures assumes the use of a forward observer. 

*Note 1: For Truck target, 0.3 FD and from 0m – 15m TLE the Guided Unitary option is the least cost when Forward Observer not available. 
27

an economically useful role. That said, an even stronger rationale for the INS/GPS 

guidance technology is to act as a critical enabler to make inexpensive seekerguided weapons a reality. 

In our cost analyses of these options, we examined the cost “crossover” points for 

the various weapons. We found that variations in UPC and support costs of 50 percent 

(and in some cases even 100 percent) had little effect on the maps above; when the number of weapons required to achieve a given fractional damage level starts to rise, it rises 

rapidly. This makes the transition point from a less to a more sophisticated weapon a 

sharp one that is not overly sensitive to even moderate UPC or support cost variations. 

Appendix E contains the detailed cost data underlying the maps above. 

3.8 Balancing WDE and TLE 

How total miss distance total circular error probability (TCEP) depends on WDE and 

TLE is a function of the weapon guidance scheme and the weapon employment concept. 

For weapons with seekers, the seeker must be designed to accommodate the TLE. 

Viewed in the context of a system-of-systems design, this involves balancing the seeker’s 

capabilities with those of the target location system (and possibly the weapon’s communication system). As we will discuss in Chapter 4, TLE should be no more than several 

tens of meters to keep seeker cost commensurate with weapon cost. For weapons with 

seekers, however, TCEP is normally semi-independent of TLE and depends on (1) the 

seeker’s ability to acquire the intended target (a weaker function of TLE) and (2) the 

weapon’s homing capabilities. 

If the weapon has no seeker and is employed against targets “one-on-one,” then 

WDE and TLE need to be in balance. This simple formula applies: 

TCEP = SQRT (WDE**2 + TLE**2) 

With TLE fixed, TCEP decreases significantly as WDE is reduced until WDE is about 

half the value of TLE (the point of diminishing returns). Similarly, we can reverse the 

roles of TLE and WDE in this statement. 

If the weapon has no seeker and is employed against targets “many-on-one,” then 

reducing WDE can provide benefit even when WDE is much smaller than TLE. “Manyon-one” employment concepts are useful when the target is distributed (e.g., troops 

spread over a wide area) or when TLE is very large. Precision in WDE enables operational commanders to fire weapons in a pattern and efficiently cover a wide area. In this 

case, the point of diminishing returns in reducing WDE is reached when WDE (expressed 

as circular error probable (CEP)) is about half the warhead effectiveness radius. 

As the above discussion suggests, TCEP is a total system concern. What warfighters need is a suite of systems for integrated fires flexible enough for a spectrum of 

operational situations, providing in each situation an appropriately balanced weapon and 

targeting system. Warfighters do not have this today, and neither DoD’s acquisition system nor the warfighters’ operational planning systems are geared to provide it to them in 

the future. 

What exists today in the acquisition system is a set of stovepipes, each setting requirements for, developing, and fielding some element of the integrated fires system. 

Weapons and targeting systems are procured independently. There is too little attention to 
28

targeting systems compared to that for weapons but, more to the point of the discussion at 

hand, no overarching system engineering exists. In the Task Force’s view this overarching system engineering and development oversight needs to be created. 

Operational planning systems also need to give war fighters the ability to explore 

“what if” questions, to examine implications of combining different available systems 

together, and to try out (via modeling and simulation) new concepts of operation. While 

first steps have been taken in this direction (e.g., JMEM is integrated into AFATDS), the 

full power of modern information technology has not been brought to bear on this problem. 

3.9 Weapon Design Issues 

GPS accuracy and anti-jam navigation 

One of the pressing challenges for precision guided gun-launched munitions has been that 

of affordable guidance technology. This has long hampered making precision weapons a 

reality for the warfighter. Recent advances in micro-electro-mechanical (MEMS) technology has solved this challenge and removed one of the major obstacles for this class of 

weapons. 

The advantages of MEMS inertial measurement units (IMUs) are smaller packaging designs, lower cost per unit verses other IMU technologies, and environmentally 

robust system designs. MEMS IMUs currently being pursued by the Army will provide 

units on the order of 2 cubic inches in size available at cost estimates of $1,200 per unit 

in expected quantities. These units will also deliver performance at approximately one 

degree per hour, which is more than sufficient to meet the system needs of today’s precision weapon designs. Finally, an added benefit of MEMS silicon solid-state designs is 

that these instruments eliminate the mechanical or electro-optical components that are 

environmentally sensitive to conditions that experience up to more than 12,000 Gs. 

The affordability of these military MEMS designs is made possible by the leverage provided by the commercial markets which utilize the same manufacturing processes 

and equipment. Commercially available MEMS inertial instruments typically perform in 

the hundreds of degree per hour range and are used in air bag and anti-skid systems for 

automotive designs and in game and photography applications. These markets have 

helped drive a larger commercial market demand for such MEMS instruments and permit 

the military to enjoy the economies of scale provided by these larger markets. 

The key to being able to use commercial-quality MEMS inertial technology in 

precision weapons applications is a systems design that includes GPS technology. This 

combination of MEMS inertial navigation with GPS navigation provides a system capability that meets precision weapon delivery requirements. The INS/GPS systems also 

needs to include jam resistant (anti-jam or AJ) techniques such as GPS Deep Integration, 

antenna switching, or other advanced signal processing techniques that will improve the 

AJ performance to meet military requirements in this area. 

The Navy/Marine Corps and Army have used these MEMS-based guidance systems to develop innovative projectiles demonstrate (1) weapon ranges of over 50 nm and 

(2) improved weapon lethality through the delivery of explosive energy at the proper geometries, or angle of fall, to maximize warhead effectiveness. Finally, when combined 

with data-link and seeker technologies, these MEMS-based INS/GPS systems can pro-
29

vide midcourse corrections and terminal abort capabilities necessary for neutralizing 

fixed and moving targets while at the same time minimizing the chances of collateral 

damage and fratricide. 

The system tradeoff to be made for INS/GPS sensor performance is demonstrated 

in figure 3-5. Three classes of IMUs are represented in the graph: 

• 100 degree/hour, 

• 1 degree/hour, and 

• .01 degrees/hour. 

The figure helps identify where to place the technology emphasis when considering system demands for anti-jam. 

Figure 3-5: IMU requirements driven by GPS jamming scenarios. 

The figure shows that in order to deliver a 20 m CEP and provide for anti-jam expectations, one can invest in inertial or GPS technologies. Given a fixed level of anti-jam 

in the INS/GPS system, one would need to invest in a higher quality IMU (better instrument performance) depending on how far from the target GPS might be lost. Conversely, 

given a fixed IMU quality, one could alternatively invest in more robust GPS (re: anti 

jam) depending when GPS is expected to be lost. The trade-off between more inertial or 

more AJ has to be determined at the system application level. 

DoD has mandated that the GPS Selected Availability Anti-Spoofing Module 

(SAASM) be a component of all military weapon system designs. It appears that this 

mandate unnecessarily burdens certain systems developments, particularly those found in 

the integrated fire support (IFS) area. It is the opinion of this Task Force that certain military missions such as IFS can meet their anti-jam (AJ) requirements without the SAASM 

component, which offers questionable mission benefit. In fact, SAASM adds needlessly 

to power, size, weight, and cost challenges involved in system design for these missions. 

While SAASM may offer other missions (e.g., missions involving aircraft or missiles) the 

benefits of signal authentication or over the air re-key, these are not required for integrated fire support weapons. We recommend that AT&L reevaluate its mandate for 

CEP vs Range-to-Go at GPS Cutoff

with Bias Estimate

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Range-to-Go at GPS Cutoff (nmi)

CEP (m)

100°/hr

1 °/hr

.01°/hr
30

SAASM in all military system designs and consider other alternatives for AJ performance 

that are available without over-specifying system requirements. 

Now that the Services have solved the integrated INS/GPS problem, they should 

undertake the challenge of developing a guided integrated fuse (GIF). This development 

would provide the potential of converting millions of existing unguided “dumb” projectiles into “smart” weapons. The GIF concept creates a “smart” NATO standard fuse 

replacement that users could easily retrofit onto existing munitions and mortars already in 

the inventory. This “smart” replacement would provide the guidance, navigation and control (hardware and software components including the canard surfaces for steering the 

projectile) capabilities to enable near-precision kill within the same physical volume constraints of the existing standard “dumb” fuse.. Such a concept would permit field 

conversion of existing dumb weapons into short-range precision weapons, thereby offering additional logistical and training savings. While the range and CEP estimates for such 

converted weapons are estimated to be less than those for the precision weapons discussed earlier in this report, a GIF-equipped weapon would provide an affordable and 

complimentary capability to the suite of precision weapons. A GIF replacement fuse 

would add an estimated $2,000 to the cost of the existing unguided unitary round, yielding a converted projectile UPC of approximately $2,500 (using the original estimate of 

$500 for an unguided projectile). NAVSEA/Dahlgren efforts in this area have shown 

promise in early exploratory tests. These efforts should continue. 

AT&L should be recognized for efforts in addressing the affordable INS/GPS 

challenge. Through the Common Guidance Inertial Measurement Unit (CGIMU) Program, it has exerted the proper technology pull from the science and technology (S&T) 

community that will make affordable precision weapon guidance a reality. The program 

will deliver an INS/GPS system package (3 cubic inches) that addresses the AJ trades 

mentioned above. An important point to note here is that both its size and performance 

will enable the use of these same systems in other military (personal navigation, autonomous systems, etc.) and commercial applications. These additional applications will 

further expand market quantities and allow the military to continue to enjoy the affordability offered by large-scale production. AT&L needs to demonstrate the same leadership 

in data-link and seeker technologies to make the entire precision weapon objective complete. 

Low-cost seekers and data links 

The previous sections have highlighted the benefits of precision. In benign environments 

and against fixed targets, precision weapon delivery error in the order of 5 m can be obtained with inexpensive guidance utilizing GPS-aided targeting and navigation and good 

precision inertial instruments. If GPS is denied because of electronic countermeasures 

(ECM) or if the target to be attacked is not fixed, then guidance based on a GPS target 

location at the time the attacking weapon is launched or fired will not yield precision. 

Under these conditions, something else is required to maintain the 5 m precision. And 

under any conditions, if weapon delivery of significantly less than 5 m is desired—as in 

the case of kinetic weapons (i.e., weapons that have no warhead and depend upon achieving a “hit” to be lethal)—something more than GPS/INS alone is required. 

Seekers and data links provide the added functionality needed to maintain precision against moving targets, to mitigate the effects of compromised GPS accuracy, or to 
31

achieve very small WDE (in the 1 m or so class). Data links alone can achieve this under 

certain conditions if precise external data is available to the accuracy required. One example of this was demonstrated in the DARPA Affordable Moving Surface Target 

Engagement (AMSTE) program, in which good range data from two off-board radars 

was provided to a weapon through a data link, allowing the weapon to construct and 

maintain a moving target’s precise location and to guide to a precise intercept. Such a 

technique, however, depends upon two or more airborne radars with precision in at least 

one dimension being available to maintain visibility and track on the target through a 

relatively wide bilateral angle. This may be difficult to achieve in some geographic situations or because of the scarcity of multiple persistent ISR or tracking assets 

The more general solution (in addition to the data link) is to place on the weapon 

a seeker which can track the relative target position to intercept. As the weapon closes on 

the target, the accuracy of the seeker grows and sub-meter accuracy is possible at intercept. The obvious drawback of such a solution is the cost of the seeker. If such a 

technique is to be feasible and practical, the seeker cost must be kept low. 

The key to keeping the seeker cost low is to ask it to do as little as possible. To 

achieve this, the whole weapon system must be architected to limit the required seeker 

functionality. Moving parts in a weapon always cost money, particularly if their absolute 

position must be known with great precision at all times. However, if the required field of 

view of the seeker is relatively small during the entire time it is employed, then no need 

exists to move anything; the seeker can be fixed and precisely aligned with the body axis 

of the weapon during manufacture. 

The least expensive type of seeker is one employing passive optics. Laser Detection and Ranging (LADAR) is moderately more expensive and radar or radio frequency 

(RF)—which, at certain frequencies provides the only true all weather modality—is significantly more expensive. If, however, the concept of operations for the seeker is to use 

it only in the very terminal part of the engagement, then it can approach “all weather” 

capability using optics by operating only at altitudes below which it is rarely cloudy. 

Ninety-five percent cloud ceilings in difficult weather areas such as Korea typically lie 

between 0.3 and 0.5 km in altitude. In more benign weather visibility areas, cloud ceilings are most often above 0.5 to 1.0 km. 

If passive optics are going to be used and day/night operation is required, then infrared (IR) is the spectral choice. To satisfy the requirement to “see” the target under 

restrictive ROE, one would want to employ an imaging IR capability. But to keep it inexpensive, it is preferable not to cool it to cryogenic temperatures, which is a significant 

added expense. Fortunately, uncooled optics are consistent with operating only below 0.5 

km altitude or so, because typical dive angles of 30 to 45 degrees and above yield short 

acquisition ranges of 1 km or less, which—again—is consistent with the use of uncooled 

optics. Lastly, processing is expensive, so any “heroic” signal processing such as is required with broad area automatic target identification/target recognition should be 

avoided. 

The obvious question at this point is how to architect the weapon system in such a 

way that the seeker does a useful job if it only operates (1) at very low altitude; (2) at 

very short range; (3) without having to look for targets over a wide field of view; and (4) 

without requiring any kind of sophisticated automatic target recognition, even under 

restrictive ROE. The answer lies in the guidance ability provided by today’s GPS/INS 
32

strictive ROE. The answer lies in the guidance ability provided by today’s GPS/INS 

navigation. 

Against a fixed target, today’s INS/GPS guidance can direct a weapon to within a 

5–7 m CEP of the target. Even with GPS denied for the terminal portion of the weapon’s 

flight, a 15 m CEP is achievable. Against a relatively fast moving ground target, the incorporation of a data link with as much as 300–500 m/s latency to update target position 

can maintain a 15 m CEP. This means that a high-probability seeker basket of about ± 50 

– 60 m can be established for the weapon. 

If the weapon is diving at 60° and the cloud ceiling is at 500 m, the required acquisition range of the seeker is about 600 m. This is consistent with low-sensitivity 

optics. The required field of view is also relatively small: about 10 degrees at acquisition. 

The driving requirement on the size of the focal plane array (FPA) is to have 300 pixels 

on target shortly after acquisition to confirm target ID and, if scanning optics are to be 

avoided, to cover the required acquisition field of view within the constraints of a reasonably sized focal plane. This all works out to an FPA of between 256 x 256 and 512 x 

512. Lastly, a “divert” of the weapon during the time after seeker acquisition is required 

to home out the INS/GPS delivery error. With typical weapon kinematics of about 250 

meters per second (m/s) velocity and 3 Gs of divert capability, the 50–60 m delivery error 

can be covered. All of this is self-consistent; enabled by today’s GPS/INS capability; and, 

at reasonable production rates, consistent with a seeker cost on the order of $10,000 to 

$20,000. 

The addition of a suitable low-cost data link with a cost on the order of $5,000 (a 

recent DARPA program—Banshee—had a bogey cost of $2,000) brings the total of the 

incremental electronics guidance package to between $15,000 and $25,000. As was the 

case with the seeker, the key to the low-cost data link is restricting its functionality to the 

minimum required and making it self-adaptable to a wide range of existing platform data 

links. Link bandwidth can be relatively small—a few kilobit (kb) to about 100 kb depending upon whether a final seeker “snapshot” of the target is to be sent back to the 

targeting network just prior to impact (for BDA purposes). The design philosophy of the 

electronics also has to be geared to low cost, exploiting the fact that the total operational 

lifetime of the data link is seconds, not months or years. Component cooling, battery life, 

derating factors—all can operate much closer to failure limits than conventional electronics, minimizing what is required for a few seconds of reliable operation. If realized, low 

functionality, an “expendable” design philosophy, and broad applicability to existing 

network protocols and interface requirements will guarantee low cost, both in acquisition 

and in terms of platform installation. 

The technology for creating such a data link exists today, and in effect, can come 

about by combining the two technologies of (1) today’s mobile ad-hoc networks and (2) 

real-time control. A few years ago, DARPA initiated Banshee (a pilot program built on 

the objectives described above), but no follow-up is evident today. In the interim, the 

U.S. Air Force seems to have become more supportive and aggressive on the subject of 

weapon data links. While this is commendable, the Air Force has not focused on universality and extremely low cost to the same degree as the earlier DARPA initiative. 

Even if achievable, a cost of $15,000 to $25,000 for a seeker and data link is not 

likely to be affordable as an upgrade to field artillery rounds, even though the JMEM data 

indicates a potential saving of hundreds of rounds per target. But where true, highly con-
33

fident, swift surgical kill is required, the low-cost seeker/data link combination on a small 

missile (as is being developed in NETFIRES for Future Combat Systems (FCS) or for a 

specialized guided projectile should be pursued with the same vigor and seriousness as 

INS/GPS was a decade ago. For a cost of about $20,000 a lethal kill can be delivered to a 

fixed or moving hard target in ECM or bad weather with one round utilizing off-board 

ISR assets without imposing heroic demands, either in quality of information or number 

of assets. And as we explain below, the low-cost seeker also can provide significant help 

in achieving the identification required under restrictive ROE and in fulfilling the elusive 

BDA that Army and Marine Corps combatants argue they need to achieve efficient fires. 

Identification (ID) and weapon design 

The imposition of restrictive ROE in recent conflicts has placed a greater degree of emphasis on obtaining very reliable target ID prior to prosecuting an attack on a target. This 

has always been a difficult task, and in an “eyes on target” environment requires either a 

forward spotter close to the target area to confirm ID or the presence of sophisticated, 

high-resolution ISR assets. 

In the previous section, a case was made for pursuing the development of inexpensive seekers and data links for guided projectiles and ground battle element strike 

missiles to enhance precision, low collateral damage strike capability, or more specifically, to obtain lower total CEP under a wide variety of conditions. It was envisioned that 

these seekers and data links would be employed as follows: 

1. After identifying the target from an ISR or C2

 asset, launch or fire the round 

with a stored IR “picture” of the intended target. 

2. Guide it in midcourse using its own inertial instruments and GPS data to a 

seeker “basket” under cloud cover. 

3. Acquire the target with the weapon’s imaging IR seeker over a narrow field of 

view. 

4. Correlate the image (which should cover a few hundred pixels of the seeker 

focal plane) with the image stored at launch, correcting for the geometry of 

the attack. 

5. Terminally guide the weapon to the target (or any point on the target) using 

the continual stream of imagery obtained through the seeker as the weapon 

closes. 

Figure 3-6: Combat Identification Scenario. 

G

P

S

/

Initialize 

& 

Launch 

GPS Guidance 

Data Link BDA 

Below Clouds, Seeker Corrections, 

Removes TLE Uncertainty 

Seeker/INS Guidance,

Abort Decision 

INS Guidance with GPS

10-15m Midcourse accuracies 
34

At one second before impact, the quality of the imagery will have improved to the 

point that between 1,500 and 3,000 pixels of target information will be available. This 

“medium quality” image could be used, if desired, to provide a final confirmation that the 

target under attack was the same as the one originally intended. A more stringent threshold could be established than at launch, based upon the increased number of pixels on 

target, and if this threshold was not exceeded, the engagement could be aborted or “called 

off.” At one second to impact, the weapon could be diverted by up to 50 feet, which 

would render the target relatively safe for a weapon that depended upon a kinetic impact 

for a kill or one that contained a small warhead (e.g., only a few pounds of high explosive). At the time the abort decision was made onboard the weapon, an appropriate 

message would be sent back through the data link to the launch or control platform. 

Although no time would exist for true human interaction in this process, it would 

provide an extra layer of confidence that the target that had been identified prior to the 

decision to attack remained the same target that was actually being attacked just prior to 

impact. The Task Force believes that using the weapon’s “eyes” for this purpose, particularly as the demands for ID surety increase, has merit and should be explored as part of 

the ongoing weapon development process and the search for effective BDA solutions. 

Battle damage assessment (BDA) and weapon design 

BDA is the after-action assessment of the degree to which a target has been disabled. Total destruction, functional disablement, the inability to move, and a host of other 

outcomes are all possible results of an attack on a given target and are critical inputs into 

a ground commander’s decision as to what to do next. Unfortunately, the Task Force repeatedly heard from units that had been operational in Operation Enduring Freedom that 

they had not been served well by the BDA function. Their requests to higher echelons for 

BDA support often went unanswered or at best took an unreasonably long time to get 

serviced. 

Lacking a responsive and accurate BDA, the ground commander has only three 

options: 

1. Assume the target has been neutralized to the desired degree and move on, 

which if wrong needlessly increases the risk to the forces under his command. 

2. Assume the target has not been neutralized to the desired degree and strike 

again, which if wrong needlessly wastes fires resources, extends the logistics 

tail, and slows the pace of battle.

3. Wait an additional amount of time until accurate BDA is available from external sources, which needlessly slows the pace of battle and reduces operational 

tempo and hampers synchronization of the total effort.

As in the case of the ID function discussed previously, reliable BDA requires eyes 

on target. Given that (1) time is critical, (2) ground units may not be in the immediate vicinity of the target, and (3) higher echelon ISR assets are often over tasked (causing them 

to serve the battle element BDA function slowly, if at all), an organic ISR function for 

BDA purposes could possibly be created or enhanced at the organic level. But as seen in 

the previous two sections, many modern organic battle element weapons may soon have 

“eyes” in the form of imaging seekers. This raises the question of whether those same 

eyes could be exploited for the purposes of organic BDA. The Task Force believes that 
35

the potential is inherent in these new weapons to provide useful supporting information to 

the BDA function and that USD(AT&L) should explore this function. 

At about one aerodynamic time constant before impact, any guided weapon has 

on-board knowledge of how close to the intended target point it will hit. There is not sufficient time left in the flight of the weapon to do anything with this knowledge to reduce 

miss, but that knowledge exists if needed for other purposes. The knowledge of where on 

(or off) the intended aim point a weapon will hit could provide a measure of predictive 

BDA, except for one critical consideration: lacking its own eyes, the weapon doesn’t 

know (nor, in fact, do the shooter or the targeting asset) the specific TLE for a given shot; 

only the statistics are known. In the case of modern weapons with seekers, however, TLE 

is irrelevant once the seeker locks on to the target. In this case, everything that is required 

to predict where the weapon will impact relative to the real target is known on-board the 

weapon and could be provided to the shooter or the C2

 network via the weapon data link. 

This kind of “predictive BDA” could serve a very useful function and not add any significant requirements to the weapon system electronics beyond what is already required to 

improve precision. 

But one could go a step further. As the weapon closes on the target and gets to 

perhaps one half second to impact, the image now approximates 10,000 to 20,000 pixels. 

Ten thousand (10,000) pixels of a medium size object like a truck or transporter/erector/launcher (TEL) can provide a highly recognizable picture. If that image 

were sent back over the weapon data link stretched out over the last half second of flight 

(when the data link is serving no other function), a picture of the target condition just 

prior to impact could be provided to the shooter or network. This picture could indicate 

actual cumulative battle damage resulting from all preceding attacks. No technological 

hurdle prevents this kind of actual BDA; the only thing that is required is to increase the 

bandwidth of the weapon data link from the few hundred bits per second (BPS) required 

for midcourse updates to a few tens of kilobits per second (kBPS) to send back a compressed image over a duration of one-half second. There will, of course, be a cost, but it 

appears minimal. 

For this form of BDA, the slower the weapon flies, the better. Some concepts now 

in their formative stages (e.g., the Loitering Air Missile (LAM) in DARPA’s NETFIRES 

program) might lend themselves naturally toward providing this kind of functionality; 

such concepts fly relatively slow, can loiter, and can view the target from multiple aspects and send back images as they fly. 

The panel recommends that the exploitation of the optical seeking function in developmental weapons for organic BDA purposes be pursued. In addition, the panel 

recommends that the development of dedicated company-level BDA assets to support the 

integrated fire support mission should be pursued. 

3.10 Conclusions and Recommendations 

As ROE continue to evolve and place greater emphasis on rapid but accurate measured 

response, reduced collateral damage, and minimizing the possibility of fratricide, a growing need exists to improve weapon accuracy. 

This study concludes that precision weapons are valuable. They enable our military to apply the appropriate response with necessary accuracy, and they do so while 
36

reducing logistical burden and supporting the goal of a lighter, more mobile, and more 

effective transformational force. In addition, analysts have shown these weapons to be 

effective across all target types (fixed and moving, in point and area scenarios). From this 

we conclude that AT&L should continue to pursue precision weapons development and 

transition these weapons as soon as feasible to the fielded force. 

The panel has struggled to understand the actual cost of delivering a weapon into 

theater. While weapon procurement cost is available, the associated storage, certification, 

and transportation costs of moving the weapon from CONUS to the area of concern are 

not readily understood. Serious concern exists that DoD may not be capable of determining the proper mix of precision weapons if the total cost of weapon ownership is not 

explicitly identified and shared with development, procurement, and operational components. We therefore recommend the following: 

• USD(AT&L) should establish a systems engineering function to quantify the 

true total systems cost of delivery weapons into theater and guide a balanced 

system acquisition process for weapons/ISR/C-3. 

• USD(AT&L) should also revitalize the JMEM process to improve usability of 

the JMEM toolset and to integrate efforts of JMEM analysts and operations 

personnel into the design process. 

USD(AT&L) has shown effective leadership in driving the performance, packaging, and application of navigation and guidance technology toward affordable solution 

that will be available to all of the Services engaged in fire support activities. This same 

leadership should be applied to addressing similar challenges with data link and seeker 

technologies in order to make precision weapons that will address point and area targets, 

whether fixed or moving, at an affordable price to the Services. The S&T community led 

the early way by retiring several of the risks associated with data links and seekers at the 

component level. AT&L now needs to lead the effort that will bring these component 

elements together in a system designs that will answer the need of the 21st century warfighter. On this count, then, we recommend that USD(AT&L) stand up efforts that “pull” 

maturing technology out of the S&T community to make affordable seekers a reality. We 

recommend further that DARPA revive efforts associated with universally applicable, 

affordable data links to support the integrated fire support objectives for moving target 

acquisition and battle damage assessment. 

The military has been too aggressive in mandating the implementation of the GPS 

SAASM requirement in every military weapon system. There are certain military missions and classes of weapons where the capabilities provided by SAASM are neither 

beneficial nor necessary. In the case of integrated fire support weapons, the SAASM dictate represents a needless over-specification of system requirements. As with any weapon 

system procurement, this relates directly to affordability. Including SAASM in IFS 

weapons when the anti-jam requirement can be met through more affordable alternatives 

should be reevaluated. We recommend, therefore, that USD(AT&L) eliminate the 

SAASM requirement for integrated fire support weapons. 

Timely and accurate BDA is a continuing challenge in today’s battlefield environment. Recent military engagements have demonstrated that the increasing pace of 

engagement increases the demand for BDA, but no effective way exists to meet the demands of soldiers at the brigade level or lower. At this tactical level the availability of 
37

BDA information is unsatisfactory and must be addressed. With the advent of precision 

weapons, a new capability is now available to field elements that can aid in the improvement of this deficiency. These weapons can now offer the soldier the ability to conduct 

both predictive and actual BDA activities organically without requesting battalion level 

or strategic assets (which are most often not readily available). This capability will add 

flexibility and mobility and will increase the overall confidence of warfighters. We recommend, therefore, that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) explore useful organic-level 

BDA offered by modern precision weapons and integrate this capability in mission planning efforts 

Furthermore, DoD has inadequately managed the development of dedicated organic BDA 

assets that would improve the situational awareness of fire support personnel. Numerous 

programs designed to provide our warfighters with critical capabilities have been underfunded and unfocused. Had DoD better utilized the resources it was provided and 

recognized the importance of organic BDA to the warfighter, a critical problem in the 

recent conflict could have been avoided. This deficiency was never before as evident as it 

was in the recent conflict in Iraq and will only become worse in the future without a 

change in priorities within the Services. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy (ASN) revamp its efforts to develop dedicated BDA assets and avoid the fragmented approaches observed to date—approaches that have denied deployment of 

operationally ready technologies. 

3.11 Summary of Recommendations 

• USD(AT&L) should establish a systems engineering function to quantify the 

true total systems cost of delivery weapons into theater and guide the acquisition process for weapons/ISR/C-3. 

• USD(AT&L) should revitalize the JMEM process to improve usability of the 

JMEM toolset and to integrate efforts of JMEMs analysts and operations personnel into design process. 

• The Assistant Secretary of the Army/Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

(ASA/ALT) and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy/Research, Development, 

and Acquisition (ASN/RDA) should stand up efforts to “pull” maturing technology out of the S&T community to make affordable seekers a reality. 

• ASA/ALT and ASN/RDA should work with DARPA to revive efforts associated with affordable data links to support the integrated fire support objectives 

for moving target acquisition and battle damage assessment. 

• ASA/ALT and ASN/RDA should continue to support integrated GPS/INS 

technology with improved anti-jam capability and transition to evolving precision weapon developments (Xcaliber and ERM). 

• ASA/ALT and ASN/RDA should extend GPS/INS systems to the development of a Guided Integrated Fuse (GIF) to upgrade unguided weapons to 

precision weapons. 
38

• USD(AT&L) and the GPS/JPO should consider elimination of the SAASM 

requirement for integrated fire support weapons. 

• ASA/ALT and ASN/RDA should work with JFCOM to explore useful organic-level BDA offered by modern precision weapons and integrate this 

capability into mission planning efforts. 

• ASA/ALT and ASN/RDA should revamp efforts to develop dedicated BDA 

assets and avoid the fragmented approaches observed to date—approaches 

that have denied deployment of operationally ready technologies. 
39

4. TACTICAL ISR: 

SENSORS AND TARGETING SYSTEMS 

Having a precise weapon is not enough to achieve an operational precision targeting capability; we must also be able to detect targets, locate them, identify them, and assess 

damage to them post-attack. We must improve sensors and targeting systems in order to 

improve the accuracy and effectiveness of the overall integrated fire support system. In 

this chapter we have assessed current tactical weapon targeting, aided visual indirect targeting, combat identification and blue-force situational awareness, and timely tactical 

targeting and battle damage assessment. In each case, we identify technologies and approaches to improve our sensing and targeting capabilities. 

4.1 Tactical ISR: A Key Element of Integrated Fire Support 

ISR sensors and platforms on the battlefield provide target detection, location, target ID, 

and BDA to support integrated fire support. ISR assets such as electro-optical (EO) sensors, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), surface moving target indicator (SMTI) radar 

provide multi-phenomenology products that remotely detect and discriminate targets 

from natural and man-made clutter. The detected targets can be accurately located within 

the battlespace either directly by the ISR asset or 

with additional processing 

applied to the ISR products. 

The TLE provided 

by the ISR products and 

downstream processing 

provides a fundamental 

limit on targeting. Previous 

DSB studies have shown 

that TLE should be “balanced” with weapon 

system delivery accuracy to 

achieve an effective kill 

chain. Precision TLE and 

weapon delivery are fundamental to improving efficiency and lethality. They are also essential to reducing collateral damage and fratricide, factors that are becoming increasingly important in an 

asymmetrical battlespace. 

Target identification is essential to effective target prosecution; remote target 

identification relying strictly on ISR products has proven to be an elusive goal and remains effectively a humans-in-the-loop operation. A key element of target ID is the 

identification of blue (friendly) forces to minimize fratricide. Finally, ISR assets provide 

products that support BDA. Like target ID, BDA relying strictly on ISR products has 

proven to be an elusive goal and generally requires other information as well as humans 

as part of the decision process. 

Figure 4-1 
40

Platforms, sensors, and products 

ISR sensors and platforms can be partitioned into those systems that are managed at the 

corps and above (theater) level and those that are managed at the brigade level and below 

(see Figure 4-1). Corps and theater assets include space-based sensors and other ISR systems.7

 Products from these systems are supported by national databases and provide the 

foundation for the effective precision targeting of fixed targets. In addition, manned airborne platforms such as Joint STARS, U-2, and Rivet Joint and unmanned platforms such 

as Global Hawk and Predator are considered to be corps 

and above assets. Brigade and below ISR assets include 

both dedicated manned airborne sensor systems (e.g., P3, Guardrail, Airborne Reconnaissance Low) as well as 

sensor suites that are integrated into manned reconnaissance and strike platforms, including fixed- (e.g., F-15E, 

F-18E/F, etc.) and rotary-wing (e.g., Apache Longbow) 

airborne assets. 

The most noticeable ISR system development 

activity in recent years has been in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are managed at 

the brigade level and below. Obvious benefits accrue from co-locating rapidly deploying 

forces and organic ISR capabilities that can be launched and interrogated in a timely 

manner. Accordingly, the Services are developing and deploying small, relatively inexpensive unmanned airborne assets that are simple to deploy and operate (e.g., Pioneer, 

Shadow, Dragon Eye, TUAV, etc.). 

Manned ground targeting systems 

(both vehicle-mounted and man-portable) have 

historically played a key role in targeting for 

integrated fires. Today, laser designating and 

visual targeting systems represent the state-ofthe-practice in line-of-sight targeting. There is 

also a growing awareness that unattended 

ground sensors (e.g., Steel Rattler/Eagle, 

ARGUS, etc.) can contribute information and 

features to support each phase of ISR’s contribution to integrated fires (detection, location, 

CID, and BDA). Unattended ground sensor 

technologies, however, are in still in their infancy and have only seen limited use to date. 

Imagery products have proven extremely effective when supporting the precision targeting of stationary or fixed targets. 

Brigade/theater-level assets provide high-quality imagery products and humans provide 

detection and target ID. The TLE produced by imagery products can be improved to support precision targeting by combining products with national databases. Significant 

improvements (accuracy and processing latency) have been made in automating targeting 

 

7

 Space-based sensors include those that fall within the category of national technical means (NTM) as well 

as commercial imagery satellites. 

Figure 4-2: Shadow UAV. 

Figure 4-3 
41

against fixed and stationary targets via imaging and continued progress is expected. Humans are again required to assess BDA via imagery. 

EO and forward-looking infra-red (FLIR) sensors have been the primary sources 

of imagery. Since these products can be affected by weather and environment, there has 

been some movement toward the use of SAR, which has demonstrated sufficient resolution to support target location accuracy. Still, the community has not yet widely accepted 

SAR imagery to support either target ID or BDA. 

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems are very effective at detecting and locating 

(stationary or moving) emitters but do not have single-platform capabilities that support 

TLEs for precision location and targeting. SIGINT can play a key role in the target ID 

process when combined with supplemental information. SIGINT can also contribute features to the BDA process. Surface moving target indicator (SMTI) radar systems8

 can 

easily detect moving targets but, like SIGINT, often do not have single-platform system 

TLEs that support precision targeting. SMTI provides some features that contribute to 

target ID and BDA but cannot be relied upon for these functions. Multi-lateration from 

multiple platforms has been demonstrated for both SMTI and SIGINT, developing TLEs 

that support precision targeting. This approach requires simultaneous multiple platforms, 

communications, and processing. 

Significant improvements have been achieved in video sensors and processing, 

and this technology supports real-time CID and BDA against stationary, fixed, and moving targets, although the systems have a limited field of view and must be cued. Further, 

current system TLEs do not support precision targeting, but it is reasonable to expect that 

the TLE improvements via processing that are being developed for high-end EO and imagery can be extended to support video processing. Finally, there is increasing interest in 

proximity sensing modalities such as acoustic, seismic, magnetic, and so on that can be 

used to detect and help characterize fixed, stationary, and moving targets. These systems 

will require multi-lateration for target location. 

General observations 

A great deal of insight into the future use of ISR systems in support of integrated fires 

can be gained from reviewing the related lessons learned in recent OIF and OEF activities. From a sensor-use perspective, a tremendous reduction in the sensor data to targeting 

coordinate cycle for stationary targets has been demonstrated. Also, OIF provided the 

first deployment of a widely used cooperative BFT, which, although limited, proved extremely effective in providing local situation awareness which in turn helped to minimize 

fratricide. Remote target ID and BDA remained a vexing problem and still require humans in the loop, although UAVs did through video provide additional “virtual eyes” on 

targets to support target ID and BDA. Finally, there was a significant increase in the demand for responsive ISR data to support integrated fire support within the asymmetric 

battlespace. 

From an adversary perspective, there are additional lessons learned that must be 

understood and will greatly impact future ISR asset development, deployment, and utility 

for integrated fire support. Stationary and fixed targets will be located in difficult (political or physical) to strike locations requiring both precision targeting and precision 

 

8

 SMTI was formerly known as known as ground moving target Indicator (GMTI) radar. 
42

weapons. Further, our adversaries have realized that they are easier to target if they remain stationary. Our adversaries have demonstrated a growing commitment to use 

mobility extensively. They have also demonstrated the desire to use increasing amounts 

of camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D). 

Hence, the trend in ISR platforms and sensors is toward the proliferation of “organic ISR assets” at the brigade level and below to provide responsive ISR products in a 

dynamic battlespace. These can be made more effective if they are networked with, and 

take advantage of, the synoptic views and cues from assets at the corps/theater level and 

above. This will provide the ability to surge ISR capabilities where needed and keep pace 

with the movement of battle. The network of ISR assets will leverage multi-lateration and 

processing to improve single-sensor TLE to support the precision targeting needed in the 

future battlespace. Finally, the network of ISR assets will also provide the multiphenomenology required to support target ID and BDA and to counter CC&D. 

4.2 Tactical Weapon Targeting 

Sensor Platforms and TLE Requirements 

The basic targeting sensors of interest range from the human spotter—who calls in indirect air, ground, or shipborne fire—to high flying (and potentially space-based) radar and 

EO/IR sensor systems. Theater assets such as Joint STARS are primarily sensor platforms, whereas tactical aircraft carry both sensors and weapons (the sensors in this latter 

case primarily being SAR and moving target indicator (MTI) radar and EO/FLIR targeting pods). We discuss the targeting needs of each type below. 

There are essentially three classes of weapons in use today, and each places different demands on the targeting system: 

1. Unguided munitions, 

2. Laser-guided munitions, and 

3. Coordinate-seeking weapons. 

The most familiar is the ubiquitous unguided munition, which basically traverses 

a ballistic trajectory and has limited precision, suffering the vagaries of ballistic dispersion and related effects such as surface winds. To compensate for these errors, visual 

observers or “spotters” are used to observe where an initial round impacts then issue correction commands to the shooter to “walk” the impact points of successive rounds onto 

the target. An added benefit of visual targeting is target ID and immediate BDA. 

Laser-guided munitions, on the other hand, are very precise and basically strike a 

laser designation spot. The laser designator can be aimed manually by a forward-based 

spotter who places the crosshairs of an optical sighting device (boresighted with a laser 

designator) on the target to guide an indirect fire weapon. Laser guided bombs can also 

be very effectively guided by airborne illuminators (generally used in conjunction with a 

FLIR or television (TV) imaging system). In many cases, the quality of the image available to the operator is not sufficient for target ID, although reasonably good BDA is 

generally possible. 

Coordinate-seeking weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) 

rely on a variety of techniques for target designation. These techniques range from coordinates obtained from previously obtained target databases (in the case of preplanned 
43

missions) to real-time target detection and designation using on-board sensors such as 

airborne radar of FLIR/TV systems. For situations where standoff range is important, the 

angular errors of most airborne sensor systems introduce an unacceptably large TLE, and 

thus some method is needed to obtain additional accuracy. Representative sensors and 

associated TLEs are shown in the table below. 

Sensors TLE today Required TLE Technique(s) 

Space-based Classified Classified DPPDB and 

GRIDLOCK 

Theater airborne Up to 100s of m <4m GRIDLOCK 

Tactical airborne 10s to 100s of m <4m GRIDLOCK 

Vehicle-mounted visual 7-16 m at 10 km 5-10 m at 10 km Some development required 

Man-portable visual Up to 200 m at 

10 km 

5-10 m at 10 km Significant development required 

Counter-mortar/ 

counter-battery (TPQ-36/37) 

30 m (range dependent) 5-10 m (range 

dependent) 

Some development required 

Table 4-1: Tactical weapon targeting: sensor target location error. 

A very useful technique is a process known as “GRIDLOCK,” which makes use 

of previously obtained reference imagery (in the form of the Digital Point Positioning 

Data Base) containing accurately located geographic points. By precisely registering a 

given real-time image of the same area with the reference image, very small TLEs can be 

achieved, as described in the next section. 

“GRIDLOCK”—A Common Reference for Joint Operations

“GRIDLOCKING,” or accurately registering tactical airborne imagery to the Digital 

Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB), appears to be an almost universal method that will 

facilitate unambiguous, precise targeting by the joint force. However, today’s routinely 

achievable target location accuracies derived from space-based or airborne imagery currently appear to be of substantially higher quality than that obtainable by man-portable or 

other ground-based optical systems. This is of particular concern when it is noted that 

these ground-based systems generally provide the targeting information for relatively 

low-yield weapons, while the space-based and airborne imagery generally provide targeting for much higher-yielding weapons, making that overall construct more effective. It is 

clear that the ground-based targeting community, with its lower-yielding supporting 

weaponry, needs to make great technical strides in order to efficiently support their mission needs. 

In 2001, the DSB Task Force on Precision Targeting recommended that the 

DPPDB become the de-facto standard for joint precision targeting, and that an approach 

know as GRIDLOCK be employed to register timely (but often inaccurate) tactical imagery to the national DPPDB standard. The DPPDB consists of accurately located stereopair imagery provided by the National Geo-spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). Although 

the database is large (even a relatively small area, 60 nmi x 60 nmi, occupies 10 to 15 

GB, it is being increasingly used by ground forces, who register their organic tactical imagery to the DPPDB (“GRIDLOCK” their imagery) and transfer highly accurate 

“national” coordinates to timely organic imagery. 
44

GRIDLOCK is also the name of an ongoing ACTD that will provide real-time 

field demonstrations of this capability as applied to Global Hawk imagery in Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX) ’04, and will be working to improve the speed and 

automation of the process. The process to be demonstrated by the ACTD is only the first 

step in “rolling out” the GRIDLOCK capability to the joint targeting community. 

2

NA TIO N A L G EO SP A TIAL-IN TE LLIG E N C E AG EN C Y

Know the Earth... Show the W ay UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Sm art Im age Com ponent Process

Figure 4-4: GRIDLOCK ACTD processing concept. 

Today the DPPDB database occupies a lot of “real estate” in terms of bulk storage, making it difficult for some users to access. However, with the meteoric 

improvements in $/GB and GB/ in3 that are occurring due to the natural evolution of the 

commercial market, it is anticipated that this momentary difficultly will correct itself 

within the next few years. USB “flash drives” that supported only 128MB of memory 2 

years ago, are currently available with 1 GB, and 2- and 4-GB models will be available 

within a year. This explosion of cheap removable memory is probably the technology that 

will facilitate the widespread distribution of the DPPDB to the Joint Force within the next 

5 years. The only other impediment to the widespread deployment of this technology is 

the sheer computing power required, which, as we know, still benefits from Moore’s 

Law. 

Counter-mortar/counter-battery systems 

For ground units on the move, one of the most used organic targeting systems has been 

the counter-mortar/counter-battery (CM/CB) radar, which essentially detects enemy projectiles, tracks and establishes their trajectory, and then rapidly computes their likely 

coordinates of origin through track extrapolation techniques. Accuracy of these systems 

depends on the CM/CB radar characteristics and the situational geometry of the projectile 

track relative to the location of the sensing radar. Most of the current CM/CB radars are 

of legacy vintage and do not make use of the most sophisticated techniques now available 

(e.g., highly agile active apertures with adaptive digital beam forming, super-resolution 
45

signal processing, and other approaches for enhancing track accuracy and trajectory estimation). Given the demonstrated utility of this class of sensor systems, it would be 

prudent to conduct additional R&D to develop improved capabilities. It is estimated that 

the accuracy of current systems can be improved by at least a factor of two and perhaps 

by more that an order of magnitude simply by applying currently available solid state 

technology and much more powerful signal processing capabilities.

4.3 Aided Visual Indirect Targeting 

For purposes of bounding the targeting problem for visual designation, we will define the 

goal of “precision targeting” to be an accuracy of 10 m. This represents an accuracy that 

is much better than the performance of historical indirect fire systems and achieving it 

will provide dramatic efficiency (kills per round) and collateral (fratricide per kill) advantages. Because achieving accuracy can result in an operational cost that increases nonlinearly, careful choice of the accuracy goal is important. We selected 10 m based on the 

upcoming Excalibur precision weapon, which has a weapon delivery accuracy of 10 m. 

While other air-dropped weapons with higher precision do exist, the Excalibur is likely to 

be used extensively in future conflicts. To achieve a balance of error contribution and 

cost between targeting and weapon delivery, then, we have chosen to also define the target location accuracy goal as 10 m. 

Direct targeting and the targeting of enemy air defenses, fixed assets, and strategic 

capabilities has led to the evolution of a complex variety of ISR and target acquisition 

systems using both EO and RF signals and automated recognition algorithms. Most of the 

air strikes that occur in theatre employ targeting systems of this type. Conversely, a very 

large percentage of indirect fires used in support of ground maneuver is called in with 

“eyes on target” combined with a measurement or designation of location. Thus visualbased targeting systems are of particular importance to the conduct of ground operations. 

While a lot is to be gained from automated recognition capabilities, human recognition retains the highest recognition performance. The ability to distinguish objects, 

recognize and classify threats, and recognize and adjust for the potential for collateral 

damage are integral advantages of a targeting system that has a human interpreter. While 

human observers are excellent for recognition, however, they depend on the visual targeting system for magnification, night viewing, and especially orientation and target 

location determination. The magnification, night viewing, and ranging capabilities of today’s vehicular mounted systems are reasonable. However, man-portable systems have 

significant deficiencies. Chief among them is the inability to determine the absolute 

pointing direction accurately, which precludes the ability to locate objects precisely. 

In the following discussion, we group visual targeting systems into the broad 

categories of vehicular and hand portable. We also discuss the distinct targeting modes 

of geolocation for GPS guided weapons and laser designation for semi-active laser weapons. We do not discuss direct-attack weapons and their targeting systems, except as they 

also relate to indirect targeting. 

Existing indirect fire targeting systems produce target coordinates and sometimes 

accuracies. As systems move to precision targeting of moving objects, that information 

approach will become inadequate. If the approach taken is to transmit a sequence of fixed 

precision observations of 10 m resolution to represent the state of a moving object and 
46

allow the weapon to perform the projection of future target state, it will place a large demand on communications bandwidth and communications latency for the overall system 

to be effective. It will be preferable for future visual precision targeting systems to be 

able to track and estimate target trajectory and report that to the network in order to reduce the demand for low-latency between sensor and shooter and to reduce the amount of 

communication required. 

Vehicle-mounted aided visual targeting 

The vehicles that were considered for this report were the TUAV, the Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST), the Knight fire support vehicle (FSV), the Kiowa helicopter, and the 

M3A1/A3 Bradley. 

 

 

Max Range Nom Range Median 2D TLE Source 

TUAV EO/IR 3km (T) 5km (O) 195 m USA_Eval_Ctr 

BFIST A3 10 km 7 m USA_Eval_Ctr 

Knight FSV 10 km 9 m USA_Eval_Ctr 

Kiowa 14.2 m USA_Eval_Ctr 

M3A1/A3 

Bradley 

 10 km 16.3 m USA_Eval_Ctr 

Note: With the exception of the TUAV, these target location errors roughly meet the precision criterion 

of 10 m and they typically do so at ranges out to 10 km. There are some weaknesses in these systems. 

Some systems are poorly integrated. 

Table 4-2: The status today—representative platform TLEs. 

In the document “3ID(M) DIVARTY Observations from OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM,” Colonels Torrance and Nicolle point out the following about the BFIST: 

• It does not have a mounted laser designation capability. The only way for a 

BFIST crew to designate a target is to dismount and set up the 

Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (G/VLLD), which takes up half 

of the internal crew space when stowed. This is not practical during offensive 

operations. 

• The optics package on the BFIST requires the crewman to switch between two 

separate modes, “Direct Fire Mode” and “FIST Mode.” Company fire supporters cite the need for one fire control sight to alleviate the need to change 

sights between these two modes. The time required to change over hampers 

indirect fire target acquisitions and increases the risk due to local threats. 

• BFIST direct-fire sites are effective out to the maximum range of the Bradley 

TOW weapon system (3.7 km). The Long-Range Scout Sight (LRSS) for indirect-fire in contrast, can acquire targets beyond the 10 km range with great 

clarity. Permitting LRSS to be used for direct-fires on the BFIST would significantly upgrade the ability to acquire and identify such targets before 

maneuver forces close into enemy direct fire range. 

Of the current vehicular visual targeting systems, the targeting platform that needs most 

dramatic improvement is the TUAV. Accuracy on the order of 195 m at ranges of 3 to 5 
47

km is inadequate for precision fire, and lack of a thermal imaging system makes it unusable in dark night conditions. Since the subsystem technology needed for the TUAV is 

quite small compared to other vehicles, it may well be that the improvements called for 

below under hand-portable systems will result in technology that can also benefit the 

TUAV. On vehicles such as BFIST, feedback from Operation Iraqi Freedom points out 

the need for a greater degree of integration of vehicle visual systems and laser designation systems to provide the crew with overall situation awareness—both information 

required to steer or drive the vehicle as well as targeting situational awareness (SA), resulting in more effective capability and reduced crew burden. 

Vehicular targeting and weapon systems should be enhanced in future generations 

to permit aided manual tracking in order to provide target velocity vector data in addition 

to only position information. This will improve accuracy against moving targets and will 

also provide more useful situational awareness of target locations over time. 

Man-Portable Aided Visual Targeting 

Table 4-3 displays the performance of some sample man-portable systems. These performance levels (especially at medium and long ranges at night) are far less than 

“precision” requires. 

System Range 3D Median TLE (M)* Source 

LLDR/day 10 km 17/43/117 JCAS_Test 

LLDR/Night 10 km 35/90/201 JCAS_Test 

LH-40C/day 10 km 15/28/58 JCAS_Test 

LH-40C/night 6 km 11./25 JCAS_Test 

Mark VII/day 10 km 20/68/161 JCAS_Test 

Mark VII/night 6 km 11./21 JCAS_Test 

Vector 21/day 10 km 28/78/103 JCAS_Test 

Vector 21/night 6 km 19/62 JCAS_Test 

Viper II/day 6 km 17/52 JCAS_Test 

VIper II/night 6 km 27/165 JCAS_Test 

* Note: Location accuracy for short (.5-3 km)/medium (3-6 km)/long (6-10 km). 

Table 4-3: Performance of select man-portable 

aided visual targeting systems.

The following observations apply to man-portable visual aided targeting systems: 

• Geolocating systems (those other than LLDR) have reasonable size (large 

binoculars), weight (roughly 4 lb.), and cost (roughly $15,000 to $30,000). 

• Laser designation systems such as LLDR are too heavy (32 lb.), too large, 

power hungry, and too costly ($250,000). However, unlike the other systems, 

LLDR does include a thermal sight, which permits long-range use at night and 

use in complete darkness,. Even so, improvement in the above parameters is 

needed. 
48

• Hand-held designators require knowledge of “down” and “north” to determine 

the relative location of a target from the current position. The determination of 

“down” is accomplished with an electronic inclinometer which measures the 

local gravitational field. Stephen Malys of NGA reports that deviations of the 

local gravitational field rarely amount to more than 0.1 milliradian, or a 1 m 

error at 10 km. 

The measured performance of the designators in the previous table for 

pointing are given below: 

 

Median Az Error 

(mils) 

Median Elevation Error 

(mils) 

LLDR/Day 6.4/4.5/5.7 6.8/6.3/6.7 

LH40C/Day 7.7/5.4/6.4 1.5/1.5/1.7 

Mark VII 13.5/13.4/13.3 1.2/1/1 

Vector 21 21.1/20.9/11 0.5/0.6/0.6 

Viper II 9.6/13 

Note: Some of the inclinometers are providing elevation accuracies of 5 m at 10 

km, which is adequate for most purposes. 

Table 4-4: Pointing accuracy of select man-portable 

aided visual targeting systems. 

• Azimuth pointing accuracy is much worse than elevation. This occurs for 

these systems and not for the vehicle mounted systems because the compasses 

in current generation hand-held systems are magnetic. This approach has 

many inadequacies for precision targeting. 

- The local magnetic deviation is not easily predicted. Even with the best 

available charts, errors due to deviations in the local field can be of the order of tens of milliradians, which will cause hundreds of meters of error. 

- Even if the local deviation were known, the JCAS organization found that 

self-influence of the local field either due to metal objects on the person or 

insufficient care during a substantial calibration process could generate 

similar errors. 

- Finally, the calibration process itself takes significant time and requires 

the operator to perform a series of substantial movements reorienting the 

compass in many directions to accomplish the calibration. 

• Near-IR imaging is limited to short ranges without illumination. The JCAS 

test group also found that the generation of night vision equipment used in all 

but the LLDR designation system depends upon ambient illumination. This 

limits range on most nights, and on moonless and cloudy nights it limits it to 

hundreds of meters. 

The following list summarizes proposed system improvements in the area of manportable visual aided targeting systems: 

• Improve geolocation accuracy to 10 m TLE at 10 km. Based on emerging 

technologies such as compact fiber or micro electro mechanical systems 
49

(MEMS) gyros and self-calibrating inclinometers it is possible to develop a 

next generation hand-held targeting system with an error of 10 m at 10 km. 

• Achieve “dark-night” operation out to 10 km. Such a system should employ a 

thermal sight (leveraging the recent investments in thermal weapon sights) to 

permit operation at full range in complete darkness. 

• Narrow the range finder beam by a factor of four. The rangefinder and designator beams should be reduced from the .5 milliradian spread to more like .1 

milliradian to assure the ability to illuminate the target unambiguously at 10 

km. 

• Develop a practical laser designator. 

- The existing 32 lb LLDR configuration is seen as an excessive burden by 

soldiers and its $250,000 price makes broad fielding unfeasible. A more 

practical designation option which reduces size by a factor of five, weight 

by a factor of 10, and power by a factor of five should be achieved for 

these systems. Note that with the deployment of lower echelon semi-active 

weapons like the Precision Guided Mortar Munition (PGMM), the need 

for wider availability of designators will increase. 

- It is conceivable that a more limited power output and therefore weapon 

lock range (little power is lost on the way to the target due to the narrow 

beam) would permit development of a dual-mode laser integral to the 

rangefinder. 

- Enable stabilized operation. The technology that has been developed for 

image stabilization in high-quality cameras and video equipment would be 

a valuable addition to these hand-held systems. The cost of adding those 

capabilities to commercial telephoto lenses is measured in the hundreds of 

dollars. The addition of stabilization would allow the current tripod to be 

eliminated for many uses providing for more effective tactics and operational convenience. 

• Size and cost targets: 

- Given the current price point of $25,000 without designator and the current weight point of 4 lb., and given the need to add thermal sights, 

stabilization, and a more precise laser system, reasonable goals for the system would be 7.5 lb weight without laser designator, 12.5 lb with laser 

designator and $75,000 cost without laser designator, $100,000 cost with 

laser designator. 

• Needed technology development. In order to achieve these goals, DoD should 

undertake the following S&T goals: 

- Low-cost fiber laser or equivalent North seeking gyro with .5 mrad accuracy, 

- Low-cost integral thermal imaging (leverage Thermal Weapon Sight investments), 

- Low-cost eye safe 0.1 milliradian ranging laser (diffraction limited), 

- Low-cost, lightweight, > 20 percent efficient designation laser, and 
50

- Low-cost image and beam stabilization. 

4.4 Combat Identification (CID) and Blue Force Situational 

Awareness 

After decades of effort and billions spent on both cooperative identification friend or foe 

(IFF) systems and non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) approaches, we have only 

a marginal theater-wide CID capability. Recent fratricide incidents in OIF are tragic examples of this deficiency and are but a small fraction of what could happen under less 

favorable circumstances against a more capable adversary. 

Cooperative systems have historically been plagued with a fundamental issue: if 

the IFF system is inoperative due to a malfunction or an operator intentionally turns it off, 

there is no inherent method for a “shooter” to distinguish the resulting lack of response 

from that of an enemy (red) target. Also, many friendly (gray) targets are not equipped 

with IFF gear, making a response to a “shooter’s” interrogation impossible. Recently, urban targets and individual enemy personnel—often in close proximity and intermingled 

with gray components—have become frequent and high priority targets, where complex 

and expensive cooperative IFF systems are totally impractical. 

Non-cooperative target recognition systems are useful against expensive aircraft 

and certain vehicular targets, but in general are not effective against the majority of other 

target candidates. This situation is exacerbated with the emergence of urban warfare as a 

frequent and high priority occurrence. From this it is clear that another approach is required if we are to make a significant improvement in this complex but critical area. 

As mentioned above, there are three components to the “target” population: 

1. “Red” (enemy forces, vehicles, or individuals); 

2. “Gray” (friendly or neutral target candidates); and 

3. “Blue” (U.S. or coalition forces, vehicles, or individuals). 

True combat ID requires situational awareness (i.e., location and identity) of each one of 

these three target candidate categories, but the location and identity of red and gray are 

quite often unknown most of the time. However, recent deployment of blue-force tracking capability proved to be of major benefit in OIF for at least removing the uncertainty 

associated with our own forces. This suggests that a more comprehensive deployment of 

this approach, with guaranteed low latency and employed on essentially all blue elements, would provide a quantum improvement in the CID arena. 

The concept of BFT was recently introduced very successfully in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom through employment of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 

(FBCB2) system, where at the end of formal hostilities, ground elements in various parts 

of the entire theater were using it. By and large, FBCB2 was received enthusiastically by 

the troops and has been credited with preventing more than one incident of potentially 

very serious fratricide. It makes use of existing communications and satellite links and 

was available down to elements such as individual tank commanders. BFT employs modern network technology and demonstrated an impressive capability to adapt to rapidly 

changing situations. 

The unfolding expansion of DoD global communications capability through programs such as the Transformational Communications System, Joint Tactical Radio 
51

System, and the Global Information Grid, along with the availability of small, low-cost 

GPS transceivers, now makes it feasible to expand the existing blue force tracking concept to the entire friendly force. With essentially all elements of the force precisely 

reporting their up-to-date position on a timely basis, the ability to minimize fratricide can 

be reduced by a very large amount while simultaneously enhancing the warfighter’s offensive effectiveness. 

The construct for an improved and significantly expanded blue force situational 

awareness (BFSA) approach would have the following cardinal attributes: 

• Ubiquitous deployment of accurate GPS/self-location transceivers that aperiodically report precise present location. Like the current BFT system, the 

reporting rate would vary from a minimum of, say, once per 5 minutes for a 

stationary location to appropriately more frequently on a moving location, 

such that the reported location did not differ from the actual by more than a 

prescribed amount (e.g., 50 m). 

• In the objective system, these GPS/transceivers would be deployed on every 

blue force asset (possibly down to the individual foot soldier). 

• This blue force position information from each individual report would be received and assimilated by a local hub and forwarded up the hierarchal chain. 

This composite local picture would be transmitted periodically back to each 

local site with a need to know to provide them SA on their local area. The 

next level in the hierarchy would aggregate information from several local 

sites and pass along the composite picture both to higher as well as lower 

echelons. 

• Higher-level hubs would mosaic multiple local area BFSA “pictures,” forming 

a composite BFSA view of increasingly larger areas, and then transmit this up 

and down the network hierarchy. This composite information would be available to all on the network with an appropriate need-to-know. 

Although BFSA is in broad terms a cooperative system, it has several characteristics that 

avoid most of the pitfalls associated with conventional IFF systems. In particular, an individual node in the system is able to see itself in its local picture; absence or error in this 

position can thus be self-detected and reported through other communication channels in 

most cases. Further, if a friendly strike aircraft or other source of fires plans to launch a 

weapon against a specific target location, for example, a friendly located at or near that 

location can send a “don’t shoot” priority message to avoid a fratricide incident. 

This of course requires a good multi-level access encryption process built into the 

BFSA system to avoid exploitation by an adversary, which suggests the need for inclusion of a robust over-the-air key transmission process, etc. Additional techniques for 

attaining one’s own coordinates precisely (supplementary to GPS, especially in urban environments)—such as the “Network Assisted GPS” technique now employed by the cell 

phone industry—should be explored. 
52

4.5 Timely Tactical Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment 

Remote targeting and responsive BDA remains a problem for integrated fires when it is 

not possible for human observers to be present. Development activities that will provide 

increasingly longer range weapons will exacerbate this problem and there is the increasing need to develop tactical sensors that can provide “virtual eyes” for target ID and for 

BDA. 

There is a corresponding significant amount of activity to develop small UAVbased video systems to support rapid target ID and BDA. However, these systems do not 

have the inherent accuracy to support precision TLEs that will be needed to balance future precision weapon systems. There have been some limited S&T activities 

investigating the ability to “grab video frames” and process these with existing databases 

to provide additional sensor system targeting accuracy. These S&T activities should be 

supporting and encouraged to mature. 

Researchers have investigated technologies that may provide an inexpensive solution to providing BDA for long-range artillery and rocket systems. In the late 1990s, 

several organizations investigated the feasibility of innovative ISR assets that were dedicated, or responsive, to address the BDA mission for these weapon systems. The key 

concept was that of an ISR “round” that was launched in a similar manner to artillery 

(gun or missile) systems. The ISR round would have longer loitering capability than the 

weapon round and would also have a data link such that the ISR round could loiter at the 

target site and provide real-time BDA information. Obviously, the ISR round could also 

be launched prior to launching the weapon itself and could provide timely “virtual eyes” 

that are “on site” at the targeting location. 

Several S&T programs (WASP, Quick-look, SOAR, etc.) have investigated the 

supporting technology for this capability. One of the most attractive approaches is the use 

of small, man-portable UAVs equipped with visible TV cameras or uncooled IR cameras. 

However, the Services have failed to adequately fund and pursue this capability and none 

has been fielded. Figure 4.5 identifies a number of potential organic autonomous vehicles 

that could be utilized to provide target ID and BDA. 
53

Dedicated Organic Targeting and BDA Assets Needed

• Dedicated organic assets can provide 

timely targeting and BDA information

• Air-launched observation rounds 

should be revisited

– Uses same launch system as weapon

– Longer duration than precision weapon

– Timely ISR at targeting location

– LCC savings—averts need to “equip” 

every precision weapon 

– Addresses unanswered requests for BDA 

from recent conflicts

• Services have failed to adequately 

fund and pursue this capability despite 

need and available technology

• Lack of follow-through has prevented 

fielding of ready capability

FASM

Quick-Look

SOAR

WASP

LAM

Commitment to transition existing development is required

Figure 4.5: Typical tactical bomb damage assessment assets.

4.6 Summary of Recommendations 

• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)) should continue support for the GRIDLOCK ACTD and field 

the capability. 

• The Services should universally adapt the GRIDLOCK capability to all tactical and theater airborne imaging sensors and make it a requirement for all new 

such systems. 

• The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 

ASA(ALT) and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, 

and Acquisition) ASN(RDA) should focus and coordinate efforts to develop 

tactical UAV systems for organic surveillance with improved TLE and BDA 

capabilities. 

• ASA(ALT) and ASN(RDA) should establish a vigorous S&T program to develop a technical base to improve target location accuracy of TUAV, 

vehicular, and man-portable targeting systems. 

• USD(AT&L) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) should develop a theater-wide joint blue force 

CID system. All tactical networked radios should be configured to incorporate 

network-assisted GPS capability.
54

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55

5. BATTLE MANAGEMENT, COMMAND, 

CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (BMC3

) FOR 

INTEGRATED FIRE SUPPORT 

Fires support the actions of friendly forces by disrupting, delaying, or damaging enemy 

forces through close, deep, interdiction, and counter-battery fires. As the scheme of maneuver in recent conflicts has become more non-linear and more distributed, the 

complexity of supporting maneuvers with fires has increased. With the advent of extended range, coordinate-seeking munitions, the number and ways in which fires can be 

employed in support of maneuver will increase substantially. With increased range and 

precision, fires will grow in potency as a supporting arms option, reducing its own vulnerability and increasing the span of potential targets. To plan and execute timely, safe 

and effective joint fires, a complex set of decisions relating to allocating and executing 

targeting and attack resources is required. To take advantage of the full potential for joint 

fires and close air support in a future characterized by non-linear battlespace operations, 

zero tolerance for fratricide and collateral damage and emerging expanded capabilities in 

coordinate-seeking weapons (CSW), there must be a commensurate improvement in the 

approach that our forces employ in command and control for fires, both within the Services and in joint fire support across Services. 

A variety of mechanisms for planning and executing targeting and fires both 

within and across services have been established through on evolutionary process that has 

spanned the past century. Those mechanisms serve two main purposes: effectiveness and 

safety – both of which are equal in importance. Effectiveness relates to achieving effects 

desired by the maneuver commander to support operations, and safety relates to ensuring 

that friendly forces and non-combatants are not put in harms way by our fires. These 

mechanisms have evolved over time into what has become a complex patchwork of decision-making and execution procedures that can, at times, be both slow and cumbersome. 

With the evolution of increasingly reliable and pervasive digital communications and fast 

and powerful tools for aiding commanders in decision-making and execution monitoring, 

it is time to rethink the approach to BMC3 that our military employs both within and 

across Services in supporting operations with joint fires and close air support.

5.1 Evolution of Precision Guided Weapons 

We have begun to see a proliferation in the development of precision weapons (coordinate seeking and discriminatory) that includes the small diameter bomb and a variety of 

extended range munitions (Excalibur, Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM), the 

Army's Multi-Role Armament and Ammunition System (MRAAS), variants of the Joint 

Common Missile, extended range guided multiple rocket launch system (GMLRS), and, 

further in the future, the possibility of an extended-range kinetic energy (KE) railgun projectile). Typically these weapons deliver relatively small amounts of high energy 

explosive (HE) mass; and, consequently, their effectiveness depends both on accurate 

weapon delivery guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) and on commensurate TLE. 

Employing artillery-launched extended-range munitions represents the potential 

for large numbers and a broad range of types of targets that can be addressed with this 
56

class of weapons during relatively short periods of time. As noted earlier, their effectiveness depends in large part on TLE being commensurate with the weapon’s CEP, with the 

added benefit of being able to address targets in close proximity to blue forces, noncombatants, cultural sites, etc. Achieving small TLE, positive target ID and possibly 

BDA for large numbers of targets requires a commensurate tasking of supporting ISR. 

The associated large numbers of weapon-sensor-target allocation decisions as well as the 

need for timely decision-making (reduced latency) will expand the decision-making burden on command and control elements for joint fire support. Finally, assuming that an 

auxiliary objective is to choose the best available sensor-weapon combination across Services—air, land, and sea—within latency constraints poses an additional significant 

challenge to joint fires command and control. 

5.2 Joint Fires Today: Coordination of Service Systems 

The following is an excerpt from Joint Pub 3-09: 

The JFC is responsible for ensuring the synchronization and integration of 

fires. The JFC must have systems that allow rapid response to changes as they 

occur. In this effort, liaison elements play a pivotal role in the coordination of 

joint fire support. The challenge for the JFC is to integrate and synchronize the 

wide range of capabilities at the JFC’s disposal to achieve the campaign and/or 

operation objectives. The JFC’s intent will often be to bring force against the 

opponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous manner that will overwhelm 

and cripple the enemy’s capabilities and will to resist. 

Currently a variety of service organizations participate in making decisions related to 

exploiting joint fires, the allocation of targeting resources and the distribution of 

Close Air Support (CAS) sorties in shaping the battlefield to assist maneuver objectives. These joint fire support decisions require coordination and integration of 

airspace as well as coordination of air and surface-to-surface targeting and attack 

resources. 
57

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

Army

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

USAF

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

Navy

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

Marines

Figure 5-1: Coordination within and across Services occurs via 

a variety of liaison functions. 

Table 5-1 summarizes the main Command and Control (C2) applications and 

suites employed in planning and executing fires and strike. Table 5-2 lists the agencies/elements within the Services that serve as coordination elements in support of 

planning and execution. Although these agencies work closely together to achieve mission objectives, they are separate organizations run by their respective service component 

commander. A joint agency has not been established to coordinate fire support; rather, 

liaison officers are assigned to facilitate communications between the agencies. The emphasis should be on integration rather than coordination to achieve mission success. 

System Description 

AFATDS: Advanced Field 

Artillery Tactical Data System 

AFATDS is a suite of decision support tools employed by the 

Army and Marine Corps to help plan, coordinate, and control 

fires. In supporting this decision-making, AFATDS takes into 

consideration the state of available fire support platforms, 

commander’s intent and firing solutions based on JMEM effectiveness models. 

ADOCS: Automated Deep 

Operations Coordination 

System 

ADOCS supports planning, coordinating, and managing data 

for deep operations fires. It displays friendly and enemy unit 

locations, air corridors, restricted fire areas, etc. 

TBMCS: Theater Core Battle 

Management System 

TBMCMS handles target nomination, approval, prioritization, 

and air asset resource allocation for planned and immediate/time-sensitive targets. It allocates and assigns assets for 

close air support (CAS). 

Table 5-1: Current Service systems for joint fires/strike in 

support of maneuver elements. 
58

Service Fire support C2 agencies 

Army • DOCC: Deep Operations Coordination Cell 

• FSCOORDs: Fire Support Coordinators 

• BCD: Battlefield Coordination Detachment (located in 

AOC to coordinate with JFACC) 

Navy/Marine Corps • SACC: Supporting Arms Coordination Center (coordinates artillery and naval surface fires) 

• NTACS: Navy Tactical Air Control System (plans and 

controls Navy air ops including CAS via the ASCS (Air 

Support Control Section)) 

• FSCC: Fire Support Coordination Center (coordinates all 

forms of fire support) 

• TACP: Tactical Air Control Party (advises maneuver 

units re supporting air missions) 

• SFCP: Shore Fire Control Party (liaison between Marine 

artillery and maneuver) 

Air Force • ASOC: Air Support Operations Center (Coordinates CAS 

for maneuver forces) 

• ABCCC: Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (Airborne ASOC) 

• Air Force TACP: Control element stationed with Army 

combat unit 

Special Ops • SOF Fire Support Coordination: Liaison between SOF 

and other service elements 

• SOCOORD: Special Operations Coordination Element 

(liaison with MEF or Army Corps) 

Table 5-2: Inter/intra-Service fire support C2 agencies.

Each of the services has begun or has plans for improvements to their C2 systems 

for fire support as outlined in the table below. However, none of these is specifically targeted for improving joint fire support. Rather, they will remain service-centric systems 

that will continue to provide joint fire support via coordination/liaison functions. That is, 

there are no plans to further improve, streamline, or standardize on inter-service coordination. 

System Description 

Army 

NETFIRES 

(FY08)

It will enhance AFATDS to improve its ability to plan and 

execute fires for emerging coordinate-seeking and loiter type 

rocket/missile munitions. In addition, it will employ improved 

considerations for airspace management/deconfliction. 

Navy/Marine Corps 

FORCEnet 

(Block1 FY06, Block2 FY10, 

etc. ...) 

FORCEnet is a network-centric concept that will support improvements to C2

 decision-support. The objective is 

improved integration of sensors, networks, command and 

control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed 

combat force. Furthermore, the objective is to build a scalable capability that spans support for seabed to space and 

sea to land. 
59

Naval Surface Fire Control 

(NSFC) System 

The NSFC has been proposed as a mission-planning system 

for Naval surface-fire support that will be interoperable with 

future Army and Marine Corps fire support systems. The 

maritime variant of ADOCS has been chosen as the baseline 

for NSFC. 

Air Force 

AT-AOC 

(FY08)

Advanced Technology AOC (AT-AOC) represents enhancements to the suite of AOC applications that will enable EBO 

through improved dynamic tasking. A further objective is to 

enable distributed C2 from fixed, deployed, afloat, or airborne 

platforms. 

Table 5-3: Currently planned evolution of Service systems. 

The primary C2 challenge for integrated fire support is to transform this collection 

of multi-Service fire support functions—initially conceived to operate independently—

into a net-centric system in which the globally (across Services) most favorable sensor(s) 

and weapon(s) are effectively deployed against each target. In particular, this transformation represents a system design that employs the minimum degree of coordination 

required to ensure safe, timely, and effective supporting fires. Here safety refers to clearance of fires, deconfliction of fires and air traffic, and, in general, adherence to 

established ROE. Timeliness is critical when addressing moveable or fleeting highvalued targets. Each coordination element represents an “intervention point” in the decision-making chain that may contribute to increased latency. 

5.3 Joint Close Air Support 

The following is an excerpt from Joint Pub 3-09.3: 

Close air support (CAS) can be conducted at any place and time friendly 

forces are in close proximity to enemy forces. The word “close” does not imply 

a specific distance; rather, it is situational. The requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires, or movement is the determining factor. At 

times CAS may be the best means to exploit tactical opportunities in the offense 

or defense. CAS provides firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemy forces. 

The JFC normally exercises operational control (OPCON) through component 

commanders. Most CAS in support of joint operations is allocated and tasked 

via the JFACC staff located in the joint air operations center (JAOC), using 

host component organic command and control (C2

) architecture. Reliable, secure communications are required to exchange information among all 

participants. In joint operations, components provide and operate the C2 systems, which have similar functions at each level of command. The JFACC tasks 

air capabilities/forces made available for joint tasking through the JAOC and 

appropriate Service component C2

 systems. 

Like sea and land-based fires, CAS supports the objectives of the maneuver element. As 

suggested by an analysis of air strike missions from OIF in Table 5-4 below, CAS and 

kill box Designated Mean Point of Impact (DMPIs) outnumbered strikes of pre-planned 

targets by nearly an order of magnitude. Although there were a large number of planned
60

strikes in support of the land component—12,893—only 234 of those targets were actually prosecuted due to the highly dynamic nature of the battle and the substantial lag 

between the time targets are nominated, approved and placed on the Air Tasking Order 

and the time at which that Order is executed. Those targets either moved or the original 

purpose for their being assigned was overtaken by events. 

OIF Strategy to Task Mission Areas 

In JIPTL Struck 

Maintain Air Supremacy 2,124 1,441

Support Land Component 12,893 234*

Suppress Iraqi Regime 4,559 1,799

Suppress TMD/WMD Delivery Systems 1,840 832

Support Special Ops 3,771 0

Support Maritime Component 113 0

Killbox Interdiction/Close Air Support DMPIs** 0 15,592

Totals 25,240 19,898

* Fixed targets only for this mission area. Mobile targets included in last row. 

** Spec. Ops, Maritime and mobile targets in support of Land Component. 

Table 5-4: Close air support in OIF.

CAS resources are allocated based on both pre-planned and immediate requests. Preplanned requests include submissions for scheduled and on-call CAS. Preplanned 

requests are of two types: scheduled and on-call. 

(1) Scheduled requests are based on identified targets and a desired time on target 

(TOT) well in advance. They offer greater opportunity for coordination and provide a greater chance that aircraft have the proper weapons load for the targets. 

This reduces the need for communications for final coordination. 

(2) On-call requests anticipate the need for CAS wherein the requesting commander 

indicates a time frame, probable target type(s), and place. Aircraft are configured 

with the proper ordnance for anticipated targets and are on either ground or airborne alert status for a specified period of time. 

Immediate requests arise from situations that develop once the battle is joined. Because 

immediate requests respond to developments on a dynamic battlefield, detailed coordination and preplanning of tailored ordnance loads is precluded. If on-call CAS is 

unavailable, a request may be made to divert a preplanned CAS mission. 

Figure 5-2 illustrates the complexity of the connectivity required to plan, coordinate and execute Navy/Marine Corps CAS.9

 Due to the dynamic nature of the battlespace 

and the rapid pace of maneuver force movements, recent conflicts have witnessed a substantial increase in immediate requests for CAS. The challenge is to streamline and 

standardize CAS planning, coordination and execution across the Services to reduce 

timelines for retasking CAS in response to immediate requests. In addition, a further 

challenge is to extend the transformation discussed above to include CAS and fires into a 

single joint maneuver support system. 

 

9

 This degree of complexity is not unique to the Navy and Marines – this figure was chosen to be representative. 
61

Figure 5-2: Navy/Marine Corps close air support connectivity (JP 3-09.3). 

5.4 Control/Coordination Measures 

The following is an excerpt from Joint Pub 3-09: 

An FSCL (fire support coordination line) is established and adjusted by the appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in 

consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. 

If possible, the FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features to assist identification from the air. In amphibious operations the FSCL is normally 

established by the CLF after coordination with the CATF. Changes to the FSCL 

require notification of all affected forces within the AO and must allow sufficient time for these forces and/or components to incorporate the FSCL change. 

Generally 6 hours is adequate in order to coordinate an FSCL change. 

Fire support and airspace coordination/control measures are key to ensuring the safe 

and efficient execution of fires. Though United States Message Text Format (USMFT) 
62

message formats support descriptions of these measures, there is currently no joint technical architecture that defines a rich internal representation and associated machine-tomachine exchange of coordination/control lines/measures. This representation should not 

only include the geospatial and temporal constraints embodied in these measures but also 

why they were established and who established them. As illustrated in Figure 5-3 below, 

these measures can be quite complex. The ability to rapidly redefine these measures rapidly in response to events is becoming increasingly important, as both the tempo and the 

distributed nature of operations increase. Effective joint decision support tools for integrated fires will require such a representation and mechanisms for rapid electronic 

exchange and understanding. 

Figure 5-3: Joint airspace control measures (JP 3-09.3). 

We highlighted the phrase “Generally 6 hours is adequate in order to coordinate 

an FSCL change” in the excerpt from Joint Pub 3-09 (above) to emphasize the disconnect between the expected timelines for changing coordination/control measures based on 

current doctrine and the pace of maneuver in recent conflicts. For instance, in OIF the 

management of fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) proved particularly noteworthy in 

this regard. The advance to Baghdad was so fast that the Army overran an established 

FSCL within an hour after it was established. Because the process of “moving” the line 

took 8 to 10 hours, air strike operations forward of the line had were impeded until it was 

“moved.” After finding that this same situation occurred several days in a row, they 

moved the line far to the north. As a result, planned air strikes were precluded over an 

extensive region. The challenge is to capitalize on the realized improvements in BFT and 
63

improved communications to update the procedures for creating, updating, and distributing control and coordination measures to ensure safe but rapidly changing battlefield 

operations. 

5.5 Common Targeting Picture 

To enable improved C2 decision-making for joint fire support, a need exists for more detailed information about each target and about its associated effect than may be available 

in, for instance, the SIGP (single integrated ground picture) or the MIDB (military intelligence database). To enhance the timeliness of decision-making, this information must 

be captured in a standard format that is accessible both machine-to-machine and to operators. To increase the likelihood that these technical standards will be universally adhered 

to, the so-called MDA approach to information system development described in Section 

5.2 should be employed. 

We outline here the types of information that are desired to support improved decision-making; however, we realize that for any given target, the entire set of this 

information may not be available. Common Targeting Picture (CTP) contains information required to support {sensor-weapon-target-effect} decision-making. In addition, the 

CTP is more than simply a database in that it is a spatially oriented repository (rather than 

target-ID oriented) that supports decision-making to coordinate use of sensors to build up 

a picture and fuse data from diverse sensors for accurate grid-locking. Furthermore. it 

represents the foundation for a standard/joint digital target folder. 

The CTP should contain the following attributes for each target: 

1. Links to desired effect, objectives and outcomes including target 

value/prioritization inherited from desired effect and information about who 

nominated the effect/target and why; 

2. Maneuver-related considerations such as minimum blue force-target separation; 

3. Constraints relating to non-combatant casualties, hazmat, nearby facilities and unexploded ordnance; 

4. Importance and timeliness of BDA including any explicit requirement for actual 

rather than probabilistic BDA and an indication of the potential cost to operations 

of making a BDA decision error; and 

5. Characterization of target rate uncertainty in target state including target type 

classification ideally characterized by probability mass functions (PMFs); mean 

and covariance of target position and velocity; status relating to degree of target 

damage or destruction (ideally as a PMF); and finally the history of observations 

(which sensors or sensor types and when) that have been accumulated.

 
64

5.6 OIF 3rd Infantry Division Lessons Learned 

The following excerpts from the Army 3rd Infantry Division’s (3ID) report on Operation 

Iraqi Freedom lessons learned10 reinforce the observations summarized above with respect to the shortcomings of current approaches to planning and execution and control 

and coordination measures for fire support operations. 

Command and Control: Planning and Execution 

• The battle staff planning cell should contain a maneuver planner, intelligence planner, logistics planner, and fires planner 

• The division must have the capability to plan division level fires while in 

constant, rapid offensive operations 

• We must consider the use of all munitions available to the maneuver 

commander. 

• Targetable data and reporting throughout the levels of command need 

continuous refinement and training. 

• The Army needs to develop and purchase communications platforms that 

meet requirements for voice and data communications, working over extremely long distances, while on the move. 

• The Army needs to develop standardized digital systems across the force. 

Control Measures 

• Coordination at all levels is required for the placement of restrictive 

measures and units within all battlespace. 

• Movement of permissive measures requires thorough coordination with all 

elements, to include the movement of the fire support coordination lines 

(FSCL) based on the role of the maneuver advance. 

• A division forward boundary (DFB) is necessary to further delineate the 

battlespace. Worthy of consideration is adding the battlefield coordination 

line (BCL) to Army fire support doctrine. 

• Opening and closing CAS kill boxes requires improved planning and coordination. 

• The division must ensure that new tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTPs) for deconflicting airspace during offensive operations are captured 

and trained. 

• It is necessary to identify land suitable for field artillery units and establish 

position area hazards (PAHs)/position artillery areas (PAAs) so air coordination measures can be developed around them. 

 

10 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-lessons-learned.htm: Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Army July 2003 
65

5.7 Recommendations 

Joint Integrated Fire Support System (JIFSS) 

A truly joint and integrated fire support system will employ a command and control approach that ensures that the best available target acquisition, attack and BDA resources 

are made available across the Services, to achieve the maneuver commander’s desired 

effects and purpose, blurring the distinction among strike, fires, and close air support. In 

addressing the maneuver commander’s desired effects, these decision-support tools will 

enable nearly continuous updates to dynamic fire support and airspace coordination/control measures to maximize both the safety of friendly forces and their flexible use 

of the entire battlespace. As illustrated in Figure 5-4, such a system will have servicebased components that are much more tightly integrated than in today’s joint fire support. 

JIFSS: Joint Integrated Fire Support System

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

Army

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

USAF

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

Navy

Target

Acquisition

Command

& Control

Attack

Resources

Marines

JIFSS Integrated Information

Integrated Decision-Making

Figure 5-4: Achieving joint fires of the future— 

an integrated approach to joint fire support. 

The next sections discuss recommendations regarding (a) decision-support, (b) 

implementation, and (c) test and integration of the Joint Integrated Fires Support System 

(JIFSS). The last section summarizes the recommendations. 

Decision Support 

Figure 5-4 illustrates the tighter coupling of decision-making and information sharing 

that the recommended JIFSS will enable. Note that liaison functions will be maintained, 

but their effectiveness is enhanced substantially by improved functional integration. 

Here we discuss the recommended improvements in Integrated Fire Support Decision-Making for allocating, scheduling and employing sensing and shooting (targeting 
66

and fires) resources; for dynamic control and coordination measures that enable a more 

fluid battlespace when fires supports agile maneuvers; and for an enhanced suite of information regarding targets that will enable these improvements in decision-making. 

Figure 5-6a depicts the familiar elements of the targeting cycle while emphasizing 

that the decisions regarding choice of assets for executing these elements ought to be 

tightly coupled. The recommended JIFSS decision support system will account for this 

coupling while not limiting the choice of assets to a single service or level of echelon 

within a service. The decisions will be made to optimize the components of effectiveness 

as outlined in Figure 5-6b. The weightings among these components are determined as a 

function of the commander’s intent and the operational situation. 

Sense Target

3⁄4 Prioritize targets

3⁄4 Candidate sensors

3⁄4 Target localization

3⁄4 Target ID

3⁄4 Choose sensor(s)

BDA Target

3⁄4 Determine need

3⁄4 Candidate sensors

3⁄4 Choose Sensor(s)

Shoot Target

3⁄4 Target nomination

3⁄4 Prioritize targets

3⁄4 Clear for fires

3⁄4 Candidate shooters

3⁄4 Choose shooter(s)

Desired Effect 

3⁄4 Target set options

3⁄4 Timeliness

3⁄4 Risk

3⁄4 Cost

Coupled

Decisions

Figure 5-6a Coupled Decision-Making: Sensing, 

shooting and assessing decisions are coupled for a 

given desired target/effect. 

Components of

Effectiveness:

1. Ability to achieve

desired effect(s)

2. Timeliness in

achieving effect(s)

3. Risk in achieving

effect(s) (e.g.,

collateral,

fratricide, delivery

platform . . )

4. Cost of achieving

effect(s)

Components of

Effectiveness:

1. Ability to achieve

desired effect(s)

2. Timeliness in

achieving effect(s)

3. Risk in achieving

effect(s) (e.g.,

collateral,

fratricide, delivery

platform . . )

4. Cost of achieving

effect(s)

Figure 5-6b Each of these 

components of effectiveness should 

be considered in allocating and 

executing Joint Fires 

Inputs 

The JIFSS decision-support tools that will enable more effective planning and execution 

of joint fire support require a richer and timelier set of inputs than today’s approach. 

These inputs include the following: 

1. Improved ability to capture the maneuver commander’s desired effect and associated purpose; 

2. Improved target description/status (see Common Targeting Picture discussion below); 

3. Improved models of {sensor-target-weapon} effectiveness; 

4. Improved firing policies/strategies consistent with selected sensors, weapons, and 

knowledge of target status; 

5. Extension of blue-force tracking to include red and gray; and 
67

6. Improved knowledge of the current state and tasking of blue targeting and fires 

assets (air, land, and sea). 

Common Targeting Picture 

To support improved {sensor-shooter-target-effect} decision-making and situation 

awareness for Integrated Joint Fire Support we recommend that both the ground and air 

components (SIGP and Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP)) of the Family of Interoperable Operating Pictures (FIOP) be augmented to include standards for a much richer set 

of information for elements of the battlespace that are either identified as targets or have 

the potential to be nominated as targets. We refer to this augmented subset of the FIOP as 

the Common Targeting Picture (CTP). In addition we recommend that processes and procedures be developed and employed to improve the ability to create, update and 

disseminate the CTP. Finally, we note that the CTP can be envisioned as basis for a standard joint digital target folder for air, ground and maritime targets. 

Dynamic Asset Assignment/Command Relationships 

Although Figures 5-5 and 5-6a may seem to indicate that the JIFSS is based on a completely centralized approach to planning and execution; however, this is not the case. 

When decisions are time-critical and/or when the state of the digital communications 

network precludes timely sharing of the input information described above, the decisionsupport tools must be able to function in a distributed manner on less than complete information and must consider targeting and fires assets either under local control or those 

which can be negotiated locally. 

One approach to improving the timely availability of assets is by dynamic and anticipatory cross-service scheduling and assigning of sensing and shooting assets. This is 

analogous to the approach currently employed for joint close air support (CAS). When 

prior information is insufficient to pre-assign assets, JIFSS must provide decision-support 

aid in agilely reassigning assets as needed. This is analogous to the approach currently 

taken in assigning aircraft for time-critical-targets. 

Another aspect of the management of resources that JIFSS must support is ensuring the 

persistent availability of fires. Indeed, field artillery batteries must occasionally both reload and perform counter-battery self-protection maneuvers – during which times they 

are unavailable to provide fires. The JIFSS must support cross-battery coordination of 

operations and location of batteries that ensures availability of persistent fires over time. 

We anticipate that novel battery employment strategies will be enabled in the future by 

the extended ranges of precision munitions. 

Dynamic Fire Support Control/Coordination Measures 

The use of fire control and coordination measures has evolved over time to ensure safety 

and to preclude duplication of fires. We recommend that the approach to the development, dissemination and updating of these measures be reviewed to identify (a) how they 

can be made less complex and (b) how they can be developed and employed in a more 

timely fashion. We recommend that JIFSS provide decision-support for dynamic fire 

support coordination measures developed to accommodate the non-linear battlespace and 

higher tempo of operations that have been observed in recent conflicts and that take advantage of longer-range precision munitions and improved Blue Force Tracking. This 
68

will require a new suite of tools that simultaneously address airspace and fires deconfliction and that allow for rolling up measures when they become obsolete as the fight 

progresses. We recommend that new standard joint digital representations be developed 

for these measures that are specifically designed to support their rapid updating via automated reasoning and machine-to-machine dissemination. 

JIFSS Implementation: A Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) Approach 

The design, development, testing and integration of the Joint Integrated Fire Support System (JIFSS) called for in this report is an extremely challenging proposition. Many 

independently developed and managed systems must be modified to achieve the required 

functionality, and the resulting system of systems (i.e., JIFSS) must be tested to verify its 

correct dynamic operation. 

The conventional approach to implementing a large-scale system such as JIFSS 

would be to (1) develop a specification of the interface to which each system component 

must adhere and (2) specify the added functionality that each system component must 

implement (e.g., for making weapon-target pairing decisions and exchanging JIFSS messages). This specification would consist of text and diagrams, including perhaps models 

specified in the industry standard Universal Modeling Language (UML). The development of such a specification is itself an extremely challenging proposition and history has 

shown that employing the traditional approach inevitability leads to ambiguities and errors. Even if the specification were perfect, its implementation by system developers 

would contain errors. These errors are only discovered in expensive, large-scale testing. 

Moreover, even if each component developer got everything right the first time, the implementation would be extremely expensive as each system component would ultimately 

redundantly implement similar functionality. Finally, evolution of the system of systems 

would be complex: any change to the interface or functionality specification would require modifications to all the individual system components. 

The problems associated with implementing distributed systems are not peculiar 

to JIFSS, but are central to enterprise integration in large scale commercial as well as 

military systems (often referred to as network-centric systems in the latter context). Under the auspices of the Object Modeling Group (OMG), the industry standards 

organization that developed UML, an approach has been developed to address these 

problems. 

The OMG approach, referred to as the Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) approach, replaces the development of a paper specification for distributed systems of 

systems with the development of a so-called Platform-Independent Model (PIM).11 The 

PIM is specified in executable UML (xUML), an extension of UML that is sufficiently 

rigorous that a so-called Platform-Specific Model (PSM) can be unambiguously generated from the PIM. The PSM is the PIM functionality combined with platform-specific 

interfaces and services. Finally, the PSM is used to generate a Platform-Specific Implementation (PSI). The PIM is provided to the component developers instead of a paper 

specification and their job is to develop PSM and PSI for their computing platform or 

 

11 Note that platform here refers to a computing platform (i.e., a specific configuration of hardware, operating systems, and middleware, not an aircraft, land vehicle, or ship). 
69

platforms. This task can be heavily automated and supported by commercially available 

tools. 

The MDA approach has a number of advantages for the implementation of JIFSS 

and similar network-centric systems of systems. First, the functionality is developed only 

once, in the PIM, reducing costs and the potential for inconsistent implementations. Second, the PIM can be used to test the functionality of the distributed system of systems 

prior to its implementation. This is accomplished by generating a PSM or PSMs for the 

computing platform or platforms of a simulation environment. Errors in the PIM can be 

found by simulation testing prior to implementation and testing with the real systems. 

Third, changes in the system of systems, whether due to errors, advances in algorithm technology, or increases in functionality from a spiral development effort, can be 

readily accommodated by changes to the PIM. The correctness of these changes can be 

verified by simulation prior to dissemination of the revised PIM to the individual system 

developers. Since the system developers have a process for translating from the PIM to 

the PSI, the required changes to their systems can be made more quickly and at less cost, 

with less potential for error. 

Fourth, the use of a PIM isolates the system of systems from changes in computing platform technology. If, for example, an individual system developer wishes to move 

from a proprietary architecture to an open architecture, the developer needs simply to update his process for generating a PSI from the PIM. 

In summary, MDA isolates the functionality of the system from the implementation technology. The PIM and not the executable code becomes the fundamental configuration 

item. The MDA approach enables the testing of system interactions and performance at 

the architecture design stage, prior to implementation. It facilitates using code generators 

to automatically develop, evolve, and maintain enterprise-scale distributed applications. 

While the MDA approach appears to be the most promising for the development 

of large-scale, network-centric applications such as JIFSS, several cautionary notes are 

necessary. First, while it has been successfully employed in several large-scale commercial and military systems (notably, the F-16 mission software developed by Lockheed 

Martin) and is being used in the SIAP program for an application similar to JIFSS, the 

MDA technology base is not fully mature. For example, standards have not matured to 

the point where different vendors’ tools are fully inter-operable. Second, the MDA approach requires a significant up front investment in time and resources before its benefits 

can be seen. The initial focus is on the development of the PIM so that there is an extended design stage in which not much code is generated and progress may not be very 

visible and easily tracked using traditional metrics. Despite these caveats, we recommend 

that DoD employ and devote resources to both maturing the technology and gaining experience with the MDA approach and that the approach be used for the development of 

JIFSS and similar DoD large-scale system-of-systems.

TTPs, Experimentation, and Training 

Test, integration, training and experimentation are all elements of the development life 

cycle for the JIFSS. To support these elements of the life cycle, we recommend that exercises of realistic joint/coalition field exercises emphasizing integrated air, ground and 

maritime fire support operations be conducted. These exercises should stimulate JIFFS 

decision-making processes across the services and across echelons within the services. 
70

All inputs (requests) and outputs (decisions) should be exercised to stimulate the machine-to-machine dissemination of information and the communications infrastructure 

required to effect that dissemination. The DoD must ensure the participation of all services and evaluate the joint process down to the level of small units requesting fires, the 

planning and execution of the fires and the evaluation of the effects of the fires. 

In addition to supporting test, integration and training, exercises should be designed to experiment and evaluate the development of novel joint tactics, techniques and 

procedures (TTPs) enabled by more tightly integrated planning and execution of maneuver and joint fires. We recommend that existing simulation capabilities be enhanced to 

support the broad scope of these joint exercises. 

Finally we recognize that the Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2

) 

Roadmap is the key DoD management plan that has been designed to ensure interoperability of C2

 systems involved in Joint Fires. The scope of that plan includes: Integrated 

fires, Joint Close Air Support, Joint Ground Maneuvering and Time Sensitive Targeting 

as well as Air and Missile Defense. A plan for experimentation, simulation and exercises 

under the direction of JFCOM are an integral part of the roadmap and we recommend 

that the roadmap be followed and augmented to include the exercises required for test, 

integration, evaluation, experimentation and training for the JIFSS. 

5.8 Summary of Recommendations 

1. USD(AT&L) and ASD(NII) should work toward the development of a tactical Joint 

Integrated Fire Support Systems (JIFSS). The JIFSS will be a truly joint decisionsupport system for allocating, scheduling, assigning, and executing all sensing and 

shooting activities for joint fire support. This includes coordinating JCAS decisions 

with ground and sea-based fires and targeting. The JIFSS will also be based on 

standardized dynamic fire support coordination/control measures that accommodate 

longer-range weapons and higher tempo operations. Finally, to enable improved 

and more timely fires and targeting decision-making provided by the JIFSS, we 

recommend augmenting the current family of common operational pictures (FIOPS) 

with richer target information embodied in the Common Targeting Picture (CTP). 

2. USD(AT&L) and ASD(NII) should employ the Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) 

development approach for designing the JIFSS architecture and in implementing its 

component systems. The MDA approach ensures adherence to standards across the 

components and has been shown to substantially reduce costs in the development of 

large-scale systems-of-systems. 

3. USD(AT&L) and ASD(NII) should continue to follow the Joint Battle Management 

and Control (JBMC2

) roadmap to achieve the interoperability required for JIFSS. 

We recommend augmentation of the roadmap to ensure a phased transition from 

currently planned service systems to the future JIFSS. 

4. JFCOM should conduct joint exercises and develop simulation capabilities to support integration and test of the JIFSS, as well as joint training and joint development 

and evaluation of novel tactics enabled by integrated planning and execution of 

joint fires and maneuver. 
71
72

REPORT APPENDICES A-F 
73

APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE 
74
75

APPENDIX B: 

PANEL MEMBERS, ADVISORS & SUPPORT STAFF 

Chairmen 

Mr. Robert Nesbit MITRE Corporation 

Mr. Vince Vitto C.S. Draper Laboratory 

 

Executive Secretary 

Ms. Robin Quinlan Assistant Director, Force Integration USD(AT&L) 

 

Members 

Dr. Milt Adams C.S. Draper Laboratory 

Dr. Alan Berman ARL Pennsylvania State University 

Dr. Webster Dove BaE Systems 

Mr. Everett Greinke GMD Solutions 

Dr. Daniel Held Northrop Grumman 

Mr. Bruce Johnson MITRE Corporation 

Dr. David Kalbaugh The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab 

Hon. Noel Longuemare Private Consultant 

GEN (Ret.) David Maddox Private Consultant 

Dr. Joseph Markowitz Private Consultant 

Mr. John Matsumura RAND Corporation 

Mr. Thomas McNamara The Charles Stark Draper Lab 

LTG Randall (Ret.) Rigby Sandia Laboratories 

Dr. Nils Sandell ALPHATECH, Inc. 

Mr. Robert Stein Private Consultant 

 

Government Advisors 

COL (Ret.) John Bolger U.S. Army 

COL Paul Burke U.S. SOCOM 

CDR Calvin Craig Dep. Chief of Naval Ops Assess. Div. OPNAV N812E 

Mr. Jon Estridge NGA 

Lt. Col. Kirk Hymes Expeditionary Force Development Center 

Mr. Doug Richardson U.S. SOCOM 

Major John Sweeney U.S. SOCOM 

CDR Jesse Wilson J-8 

 

Support 

Mr. William Beasley USD (AT&L) 

Ms. Nicole Coene SAIC 

Mr. Mark Mateski SAIC 

 

DSB Secretariat 

CDR David Waugh Defense Science Board USD(AT&L) 
76

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77

APPENDIX C: 

BRIEFER LIST (OCTOBER 2003-APRIL 2004) 

Date/Briefer Organization Topic 

8 Oct. 2003

COL Chuck Waggoner U.S. Army Integrated Fire Support 

COL Mike Cannon U.S. Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) 

Dr. Gerardo Melendez PM Networks FCS C4ISR Overview 

COL Lance Carroll U.S. Army Single Integrated Ground Picture 

COL Walt Fountain U.S. Army - Distributed Common Ground SystemArmy 

- Prophet 

- Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) 

COL Kent Woods U.S. Army - Army Tactical Command and Control 

Systems, 

- Force XXI Battle Command and Control, 

- Global Broadcast Services 

9 Oct. 2003

COL Ricky Rife G8/FDV Army Direct Fire Systems:

- Air-to-Ground Missiles 

COL Mike Harrison G8/FDD - Close Ground Combat Missile System 

- Precision Guided Mortar Munitions 

- Mid-Range Munitions (MRM) 

COL Carlos Rodriguez G8/FDS NLOS Systems:

- Cannon Transformation: 

- Paladin, LWISS Howitzer, Non line-ofsite Cannon-C 

 (NLOS-C) 

- Multiple Launch Rocket System 

(MLRS) Transformation: 

- MLRS Family of Munitions, Launcher 

Evolution, Himars, 

- GMLRS, ATACMS Family of Munitions, NLOS-LS 

5 Nov. 2003

CDR Jesse Wilson J8 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

BG Charles Patton - Integrated Fired Introduction 

Col Steven Hogg EWTGPAC Naval Fire Support 

Dr. Michael Bell OPNAV N61 FORCENet Overview 

CDR David Foley OPNAV N20 ISR Architecture 
78

Date/Briefer Organization Topic 

CAPT James Huck OPNAV N61 - Joint Fires Network (JFN) 

- Global Command and Control System 

(GCCS) 

LCDR Bill Jones OPNAV N20 Joint Targeting Toolbox 

LtCol Jeffrey Seng OPNAV N75/76 Surface Fires Concept Operations 

(CONOPS) and Supporting Arms Coordination Center-Automation (SACCA) 

6 Nov. 2003 

- CDR Charles Marx 

- Ms. Dixon 

OPNAV N76 DD(X) Program and the Advanced Gun 

System (AGS) 

Mr. Brian Baudler NAVSEA 5”/62 and ERGM/ANSR 

Mr. Chris Ange NAVSEA Advanced Gun System (AGS) 

Mr. Fred Beach NAVSEA 

PMS405 

Electromagnetic Rail Gun 

- CDR Hal Murdoch 

- CDR James Dalberg 

OPNAV N78 F-18 E/F and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 

LtCol Christopher 

 St. Gerorge 

OPNAV N78 Aviation Munitions 

- LtCol Kirk Hymes 

- Col Robert Schmidle 

 U.S.MC Marine Corps Integrated Fire Support 

CONOPS and 

Transformation Efforts 

Maj Fred Woodaman U.S.MC Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(lessons learned) 

10 Dec. 2003 

Ms. Robin Quinlan AT&L Acquisition Process as it relates to 

JCID 

Mr. Dan Gonzales AT&L Joint Battle Management Command & 

Control (JBMC2

) Roadmap 

LtCol Scott Sanborn U.S.D(I) Distributed Common Ground System 

(DCGS) 

LtCol Judy Chizek U.S.AF DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB) 

CAPT Al Thomas U.S. Navy Joint Fire Networks (JFN) / Tactical Exploitation System (TES) 

Mr. Bill Beasley AT&L - Draft of Memorandum of Agreement 

for JCAS 

- Discussion on Future DSB Task Force 

Meetings 

- Recent Joint Munitions Effectiveness 

Initiatives 

Mr. Dyke Weatherington - UAV Updates 

 
79

Date/Briefer Organization Topic 

11 Dec. 2003

Mr. Scott Robinson NGA Future Warfare Systems Office NIMA 

Support to Future Combat Systems 

Ms. Michele Williams NGA Office of Geospatial Intelligence Management 

Mr. George Krakie NGA Gridlock Update 

Mr. Rob Thomas NGA Geopositioning Study (GPS AII Update) 

Mr. John Tuley NGA - Office of Precision Targeting/Navigation 

- Airborne Tgt Cell 

Mr. Gray Thompson DIA MIDB Status Issues 

14 Jan. 2004

BG Bob Durbin U.S. Army Introduction 

COL(P) Ben Allen U.S. Army Army Maneuver and Fire Support 

Col Bob Koster U.S. Army Army Maneuver and Fire Support 

Mr. Ray Carnes U.S. Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) 

Mr. Tim Puckett U.S. Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) 

Mr. John Wellman U.S. JFCOM J8 Joint Forces Command’s Efforts 

Col Peter Hayward U.S. JFCOM J8 Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) 

15 Jan. 2004 

LtCol Kirk Hymes U.S. MC Fire Support Planning 

Maj Brian Annichiarico U.S. MC Marine Corps Close-Air Support Overview 

- Mr. Joseph H. Francis 

- CAPT Al Thomas 

U.S. Navy - JACKKNIFE FY05 Act D Proposal 

- Joint Fires Network (JFN) 

Mr. Duane Schattle U.S. JFCOM J9 Joint Urban Operations 

Maj John Sweeney SOCOM SOCOM Fire Support 

11 Feb. 2004 

Mr. Bob Polutchko C.S. Draper Lab Precision Guidance (GPS Internal 

Guidance Systems) 

Dr. Erwin Atzinger JTCG/ME Joint Munitions Effectiveness 

Mr. Robert Chandler Joint Munitions Effectiveness 

Mr. Bob Nesbit MITRE Corp. DSB Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 

Summary 

BG Robert Schmidle USMC USMC Perspective on Integrated Fires 

Mr. Bob Stein - Seekers/Data Links 

12 Feb. 2004 

Dr. Dave Honey DARPA ATO Overview/Emerging Communications Concepts 

Dr. George Duchak DARPA Adaptive C4ISR Communications Node 
80

Date/Briefer Organization Topic 

Dr. Reggie Brothers DARPA CDMA on the Battlefield 

Dr. Jim Freebersyser DARPA - Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output Communications 

- FCS Communications 

Dr. Brad Tousley DARPA NETFIRES 

Dr. Art Morrish DARPA TTO Overview/Emerging Weapons 

Concepts 

Dr. Steve Waller DARPA Tactical Network Technology 

Dr. Bob Tenney DARPA - Dynamic Tactical Targeting 

- Joint Air/Ground Battle Management 

- IXO Overview/Emerging C4

ISR Concepts 

17 March 2004 

Mr. John Blomquist JTCG/ME 

Mr. Robert Chandler JTCG/ME 

Mr. Bill Clay JTCG/ME 

Joint Munitions Effectiveness – 

Presentation of Special Calculation Results 

21 April 2004 

COL Lance Carroll U.S. Army Combat Identification Initiatives 

Mr. Clay Davis OUSD(AT&L)/Air 

Warfare 

Ms. Diane Wright OUSD(AT&L)/Air 

Warfare 

Land Attack 
81

APPENDIX D: 

 JMEM ANALYSIS 

The following spreadsheets contain the results of several JMEM analyses that we conducted to arrive at the results presented in Chapter 3 of this report. These analyses 

calculated the number of rounds required to provide .1, .3 and .8 fractional damage (FD) 

at various TLEs using three different munitions against three different types of targets. 

The three munitions used were an unguided unitary round (combined with a forward observer), a guided unitary round, and a guided discriminatory round. The specific target 

classes were a truck (soft target), armored personnel carrier (medium target), and a tank 

(hard target). With the exception of the armored personnel carrier, which is provided for 

reference only, these attributes reflect the same variables mentioned earlier. 

The parameters used for the rounds are shown with their accuracy for 2/3 maximum range and 1/2 hour met staleness. The accuracy consists of precision and mean 

point of impact (MPI) errors in range (R) and deflection (D) that equate with those in Table D-1 of this report. Also shown is the angle of fall (AOF) for the rounds at these 

ranges which translate into warhead lethality performance for weapons so equipped. 

We have provided a point target and an area target case for each target class. The 

point target is one vehicle. To calculate the effectiveness of the weapon against this target, single rounds were shot until the desired effect was achieved. This represents the 

examples used previously in Section 3.4 of this report. 

The area target case was not discussed earlier in this report and is again provided 

for reference only. In this case, we assumed the following: a battery of six guns shoots at 

a target area, and the target consists of six vehicles. Therefore increments of six rounds 

were shot, one from each gun, until the desired effectiveness was achieved. As a result, 

all calculations are a factor of six rounds. 

Aiming policy for the area targets was also done two ways for the unguided unitary round. The blue shaded unguided unitary shows the results of distributed aim points. 

The distributed aiming policy means that the aim points were distributed evenly about the 

target area. 

The unshaded unguided unitary used only the precision aiming policy (this also 

applies to the guided unitary and the guided discriminatory table entries). The precision 

aiming policy means that the six aim points were aimed directly on each of the vehicles 

in the target area. The aim points and targeted areas are noted on the spreadsheet. 

The guided discriminatory concept round assumes laser designation. It is assumed 

that the target element is laser designated appropriately to guide the round. It is important 

to note that TLE will not affect the effects until this error becomes larger than the radius 

of the footprint. The level of delivery error played assumes the round is delivered close 

enough to the aim point so that the onboard seeker can acquire the laser energy and the 

round guides to the aim point. A footprint radius of 100 meters was assumed based on 

similar munitions of this type. 
82

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83

TRUCK - POINT TARGET

Common Parameters:

Range Rounds Per Volley MET Staleness Kill Aimpoint 

2/3 MAX 1 1/2 hr. M (0,0) 

Precision (m) MPI (m) 

Rounds required for each TLE in meters 

Munition 

R D R D AOF FD 

0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 

0.1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 0.3 17 17 17 17 17 17 19 21 22 

Unguided Uni- tary 57 15 112 35 30 

0.8 520 535 535 593 653 783 868 >1000 >1000 

0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

Guided Unitary 5 5 6 6 75 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 

0.8 2 2 2 3 6 15 61 331 >1000 

0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

* Guided Dis- criminatory 1 1 0 0 N/A 

0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

* Assumes laser designator on target 

Table D-1
84

TRUCK - AREA TARGET

Common Parameters: Range Rounds Per Volley MET Staleness Kill Aimpoints Target Area 2/3 MAX 6 1/2 hr. M (See below) 300m x 100m 

Precision (m) MPI (m) Rounds required for each TLE in meters 

Munition R D R D Angle of Fall 

FD 

0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 3

0.1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 10.3 54 54 54 54 60 60 60 60 6

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 0.8 912 912 912 930 942 978 >1000 >1000 >1

0.1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 10.3 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 54 5

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 0.8 678 678 696 708 714 738 786 834 9

0.1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 0.3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1

Guided Uni- tary 5 5 6 6 75 0.8 36 36 36 36 36 48 60 72 9

0.1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 0.3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1

* Guided Discriminatory 1 1 0 0 N/A 

0.8 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 3

* Assumes laser designator on target ** Cases not run due to extensive computer time. Precision Aimpoints (D,R): Distributed Aimpoints (D,R): (-125,20), (-75,-20), (-20,-40), (20,-40), (75,-20), (125,20) (-100,25), (-100,-25), (0,25), (0,-25), (100,25), (100,-25) 

Table D-2
85

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER - POINT TARGET

Common Parameters: Range Rounds Per Volley MET Staleness Kill Aimpoint 2/3 MAX 1 1/2 hr. M/F (0,0) 

Precision 

(m) 

MPI (m) Rounds required for each TLE in mete

Munition R D R D 

Angle 

of Fall 

FD 

0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 

0.1 57 57 57 58 62 67 67 75 0.3 278 278 281 291 309 333 372 410 

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 

0.8 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

0.1 1 1 1 2 3 5 9 16 0.3 3 3 4 7 16 52 274 >1000 

Guided Uni- tary 5 5 6 6 75 

0.8 17 19 34 326 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

* Guided Dis- criminatory 1 1 0 0 N/A 

0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

* Assumes laser designator on target 

Table D-3
86

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER - AREA TARGET

Common Parameters: 

Range Rounds Per Volley MET Staleness Kill Aimpoints 

2/3 MAX 6 1/2 hr. M/F (See below) 

Precision 

(m) 

MPI (m) Rounds required for each TLE in mete

Munition 

R D R D 

Angle 

Of 

Fall 

FD 

0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 

0.1 222 222 222 222 228 240 240 240 0.3 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 0.8 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

0.1 186 186 186 192 192 192 192 198 0.3 708 708 708 720 726 738 738 768 

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 0.8 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

0.1 12 12 12 12 18 30 36 48 0.3 24 24 30 42 72 126 222 396 

Guided Unitary 5 5 6 6 75 0.8 114 120 150 414 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

0.1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 0.3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 

* Guided Dis- criminatory 1 1 0 0 N/A 0.8 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 

* Assumes laser designator on target 

Precision Aimpoints (D,R): Distributed Aimpoints (D,R): (-125,20), (-75,-20), (-20,-40), (20,-40), (75,-20), (125,20) (-100,25), (-100,-25), (0,25), (0,-25), (100,25), (100,-25) 

Table D-4
87

TANK - POINT TARGET

Common Parameters: Range Rounds Per Volley MET Staleness Kill Aimpoint 2/3 MAX 1 1/2 hr. M/F (0,0) 

Precision (m) MPI (m) Rounds required for each TLE in meters

Munition R D R D Angle of Fall FD 0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 

0.1 71 71 71 74 78 78 83 85 95 0.3 327 327 327 347 372 397 445 502 583 

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 

0.8 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

0.1 1 2 2 3 4 7 13 24 49 0.3 4 4 5 10 24 89 491 >1000 >1000 

Guided Unitary 

5 5 6 6 75 

0.8 25 28 51 635 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

 * Guided Discriminatory 1 1 0 0 N/A 

0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

* Assumes laser designator on target 

Table D-5
88

2/3 MAX 6 1⁄2 Hr. M/F 

(See 

below)

Precision (m) MPI (m) Rounds required for each TLE in meters

Munition R D R D 

Angle 

of 

Fall FD 0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 

0.1 264 264 264 264 270 282 282 288 294 0.3 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 

0.8 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 0.1 228 228 228 228 228 234 234 240 240 0.3 858 858 858 858 882 894 894 912 930 

Unguided Unitary 57 15 112 35 30 

0.8 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 0.1 12 12 12 18 24 36 54 72 96 0.3 30 30 36 60 102 204 402 816 >1000 

Guided Unitary 5 5 6 6 75 

0.8 150 156 216 768 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 >1000 0.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 0.3 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 9 9 

Guided Smart 

5 5 6 6 N/A 

0.8 28 29 30 30 36 40 42 48 54 0.1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 0.3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 

 * Guided Discriminatory 1 1 0 0 N/A 

0.8 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 

* Assumes laser designator on target Precision Aimpoints (D,R): Distributed Aimpoints (D,R): (-125,20), (-75,-20), (-20,-40), (20,-40), (75,-20), (125,20) (-100,25), (-100,-25), (0,25), (0,-25), (100,25), (100,-25) 

Table D-6
89

APPENDIX E. 

COST-TO-KILL ANALYSIS RESULTS 

The following spreadsheets contain the results of the “cost-to-kill” analysis (see Chapter 

3 of the main report). Cases presented include the combination or three target types 

(truck, APC, and tank); three fractional damage objectives (0.1, 0.3 and 0.8); three 

weapon types (unguided unitary, INS/GPS guided unitary, and a seeker-guided discriminatory kinetic weapon); and three transportation and support costs ($500, $750, and 

$1,000 per round). Results for “break-even” unit procurement costs (UPC) are provided 

for all cases as a function of TLE varying between 0 and 30 m. 

The first row of the table contains the assumed UPC for the three weapon types. 

The next nine rows contain the data for the case of a truck target and a desired fractional 

damage of 0.1. For a TLE of 0 to 30 m (column 1), columns 2, 3, and 7 contain the 

JMEM numbers of unguided unitary, guided unitary, and seeker-guided discriminatory 

weapons required to achieve a mobility kill of the target at the desired level of fractional 

damage. For a transportation and support unit cost of $500, $750, and $1,000 respectively, columns 4, 5, and 6 present what the UPC of the GPS/INS weapon would have to 

be to break even, on a total cost-to-kill basis, with the $500 UPC unguided unitary 

weapon. If the break-even cost for the GPS/INS weapon is higher than the assumed 

$15,000 UPC, then the less expensive weapon to use is the GPS/INS. These cases are 

highlighted in green. A similar presentation is included in columns 8, 9, and 10 for the 

break-even UPC of the seeker-guided discriminatory weapon as compared to the 

GPS/INS unitary. Those cases in which the seeker-guided weapon is the less expensive 

option are highlighted in red. The first nine row case for the truck at 0.1 fractional damage is then repeated eight more times for the other combinations of three targets and three 

fractional damage levels. 

Focusing on columns 5 and 9 (the transportation and support cost of $750 per 

round discussed in the main body of the report), for those cases (rows) in which no green 

or red costs exist, the unguided unitary is the least expensive weapon. Where rows with 

green but no red cost exist, the INS/GPS guided weapon is the least expensive option. 

And where a red cost exists, independent of whether or not a green cost exists, the seekerguided option represents the least-cost approach. These “least-cost” cases are the ones 

that are presented in the “maps” (Figures 3-3 and 3-4 in Chapter 3 of the main report). 

Another thing to note is the lack of sensitivity of the least-cost results to either 

precise weapon UPCs or transportation and support costs. In the case of the latter, over 

the included range of a factor of two ($500 to $1,000), the least-cost approaches remain 

constant. For the $500, $15,000 and $35,000 UPCs of the three weapon options, examination of the spreadsheet’s break-even costs will indicate that in the vast majority of 

cases, once a break-even cost exceeds either the $15,000 or $35,000 assumed cost of the 

two guided weapons, it exceeds it by a large margin. This indicates that except for perhaps a boundary case shifting occasionally by a few meters of TLE, the overall results are 

largely independent of the details of assumed UPC. 

Two sets of tables are included below. Table E-1 includes the effect of the forward observer on the unguided unitary. Table E-2 is without the forward observer effect. 
90

Table E-1 

Cost-to-Kill Spreadsheet Results 

(Including Forward Observer Impact)

Cost of Unguided $500 Cost of Guided Unit $15,000 Cost of Guid Disc. $35,000

Truck 0.1 

TLE # unguid guid unitary $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

5 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

10 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

15 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

20 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

25 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

30 6 1 $5,500 $6,750 $8,000 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

 

UPC 0.1 

TLE # unguid guid unitary $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 57 1 $56,500 $70,500 $84,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

5 57 1 $56,500 $70,500 $84,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

10 58 2 $28,500 $35,500 $42,500 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000 

15 62 3 $20,167 $25,083 $30,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000 

20 67 5 $12,900 $16,000 $19,100 1 $77,000 $78,000 $79,000 

25 67 9 $6,944 $8,556 $10,167 1 $139,000 $141,000 $143,000 

30 75 16 $4,188 $5,109 $6,031 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000 

 

Tank 0.1 

TLE #unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 71 1 $70,500 $88,000 $105,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

5 71 2 $35,000 $43,625 $52,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000 

10 74 3 $24,167 $30,083 $36,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000 

15 78 4 $19,000 $23,625 $28,250 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000 

20 78 7 $10,643 $13,179 $15,714 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000 

25 83 13 $5,885 $7,231 $8,577 1 $201,000 $204,000 $207,000 

30 85 24 $3,042 $3,677 $4,313 1 $371,500 $377,250 $383,000 

 

Truck 0.3 

 #unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

5 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

10 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

15 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 

20 17 2 $8,000 $9,875 $11,750 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000 

25 19 2 $9,000 $11,125 $13,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000 

30 21 3 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000 

 

UPC 0.3 

 #unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 278 3 $92,167 $115,083 $138,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000 

5 281 4 $69,750 $87,063 $104,375 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000 

10 291 7 $41,071 $51,214 $61,357 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000 

15 309 16 $18,813 $23,391 $27,969 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000 

20 333 52 $5,904 $7,255 $8,606 1 $805,500 $818,250 $831,000 

25 372 274 $858 $947 $1,036 1 $4,246,500 $4,314,750 $4,383,000 

30 410 410 $500 $500 $500 1 $6,354,500 $6,456,750 $6,559,000 
91

 

Tank 0.3 

 #unguid #guid uni $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 327 4 $81,250 $101,438 $121,625 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000 

5 327 5 $64,900 $81,000 $97,100 1 $77,000 $78,000 $79,000 

10 347 10 $34,200 $42,625 $51,050 1 $154,500 $156,750 $159,000 

15 372 24 $15,000 $18,625 $22,250 1 $371,500 $377,250 $383,000 

20 397 89 $3,961 $4,826 $5,691 1 $1,379,000 $1,401,000 $1,423,000 

25 445 445 $500 $500 $500 1 $6,897,000 $7,008,000 $7,119,000 

30 502 502 $500 $500 $500 1 $7,780,500 $7,905,750 $8,031,000 

 

Truck 0.8 

 #unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 520 2 $259,500 $324,250 $389,000 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000 

5 535 2 $267,000 $333,625 $400,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000 

10 593 3 $197,167 $246,333 $295,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000 

15 653 6 $108,333 $135,292 $162,250 1 $92,500 $93,750 $95,000 

20 783 15 $51,700 $64,500 $77,300 1 $232,000 $235,500 $239,000 

25 868 19 $45,184 $56,355 $67,526 1 $294,000 $298,500 $303,000 

30 1100 22 $49,500 $61,750 $74,000 1 $340,500 $345,750 $351,000 

 

UPC 0.8 

 #unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 1000 3 $332,833 $415,917 $499,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000 

5 2000 4 $499,500 $624,250 $749,000 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000 

10 3000 7 $428,071 $534,964 $641,857 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000 

15 4000 16 $249,500 $311,750 $374,000 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000 

20 5000 52 $95,654 $119,442 $143,231 1 $805,500 $818,250 $831,000 

25 8000 274 $28,697 $35,746 $42,796 1 $4,246,500 $4,314,750 $4,383,000 

30 12000 1000 $11,500 $14,250 $17,000 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000 

 

Tank 0.8 

 #unguid #guid uni $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 1000 25 $39,500 $49,250 $59,000 1 $387,000 $393,000 $399,000 

5 2000 51 $38,716 $48,270 $57,824 1 $790,000 $802,500 $815,000 

10 3000 635 $4,224 $5,156 $6,087 1 $9,842,000 $10,000,500 $10,159,000 

15 4000 1000 $3,500 $4,250 $5,000 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000 

20 5000 1000 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000 

25 7000 1000 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000 

30 8000 1000 $7,500 $9,250 $11,000 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000 
92

Cost of Unguided $500 Cost of Guided Unit $15,000 Cost of Guid Disc. $35,000

Truck 0.1

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 3 1 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 3 1 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

10 3 1 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

15 3 1 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

20 3 1 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

25 3 1 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

30 3 1 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

UPC 0.1

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 27 1 $26,500 $33,000 $39,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 27 1 $26,500 $33,000 $39,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

10 27 2 $13,000 $16,125 $19,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

15 27 3 $8,500 $10,500 $12,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

20 27 5 $4,900 $6,000 $7,100 1 $77,000 $78,000 $79,000

25 27 9 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $139,000 $141,000 $143,000

30 27 16 $1,188 $1,359 $1,531 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000

Tank 0.1

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 31 1 $30,500 $38,000 $45,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 31 2 $15,000 $18,625 $22,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

10 31 3 $9,833 $12,167 $14,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

15 31 4 $7,250 $8,938 $10,625 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

20 31 7 $3,929 $4,786 $5,643 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000

25 31 13 $1,885 $2,231 $2,577 1 $201,000 $204,000 $207,000

30 31 24 $792 $865 $938 1 $371,500 $377,250 $383,000

Truck 0.3

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 7 1 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 7 1 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

10 7 1 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

15 7 1 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

20 7 2 $3,000 $3,625 $4,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

25 7 2 $3,000 $3,625 $4,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

30 7 3 $1,833 $2,167 $2,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

UPC 0.3

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 95 3 $31,167 $38,833 $46,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

5 95 4 $23,250 $28,938 $34,625 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

10 95 7 $13,071 $16,214 $19,357 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000

15 95 16 $5,438 $6,672 $7,906 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000

20 95 52 $1,327 $1,534 $1,740 1 $805,500 $818,250 $831,000

25 95 274 ($153) ($317) ($480) 1 $4,246,500 $4,314,750 $4,383,000

30 95 410 ($268) ($460) ($652) 1 $6,354,500 $6,456,750 $6,559,000
93

Table E-1 

Cost-to-Kill Spreadsheet Results 

(Including Forward Observer Impact)

Tank 0.3

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 116 4 $28,500 $35,500 $42,500 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

5 116 5 $22,700 $28,250 $33,800 1 $77,000 $78,000 $79,000

10 116 10 $11,100 $13,750 $16,400 1 $154,500 $156,750 $159,000

15 116 24 $4,333 $5,292 $6,250 1 $371,500 $377,250 $383,000

20 116 89 $803 $879 $955 1 $1,379,000 $1,401,000 $1,423,000

25 116 445 ($239) ($424) ($609) 1 $6,897,000 $7,008,000 $7,119,000

30 116 502 ($269) ($461) ($653) 1 $7,780,500 $7,905,750 $8,031,000

Truck 0.8

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 45 2 $22,000 $27,375 $32,750 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

5 45 2 $22,000 $27,375 $32,750 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

10 45 3 $14,500 $18,000 $21,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

15 45 6 $7,000 $8,625 $10,250 1 $92,500 $93,750 $95,000

20 45 15 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 1 $232,000 $235,500 $239,000

25 45 19 $1,868 $2,211 $2,553 1 $294,000 $298,500 $303,000

30 45 22 $1,545 $1,807 $2,068 1 $340,500 $345,750 $351,000

UPC 0.8

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 898 3 $298,833 $373,417 $448,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

5 898 4 $224,000 $279,875 $335,750 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

10 898 7 $127,786 $159,607 $191,429 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000

15 898 16 $55,625 $69,406 $83,188 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000

20 898 52 $16,769 $20,837 $24,904 1 $805,500 $818,250 $831,000

25 898 274 $2,777 $3,347 $3,916 1 $4,246,500 $4,314,750 $4,383,000

30 898 1000 $398 $373 $347 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

Tank 0.8

TLE # unguid 

using FO

guid 

unitary

$500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000 

0 1000 25 $39,500 $49,250 $59,000 1 $387,000 $393,000 $399,000

5 1000 51 $19,108 $23,760 $28,412 1 $790,000 $802,500 $815,000

10 1000 635 $1,075 $1,219 $1,362 1 $9,842,000 $10,000,500 $10,159,000

15 1000 1000 $500 $500 $500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

20 1000 1000 $500 $500 $500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

25 1000 1000 $500 $500 $500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

30 1000 1000 $500 $500 $500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000
94

Table E-2 

Cost-to-Kill Spreadsheet Results

(Without Forward Observer Impact)

Cost of Unguided $500 Cost of Guided Unit $15,000 Cost of Guid Disc. $35,000

Truck 0.1

TLE # unguid guid unita $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

10 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

15 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

20 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

25 5 1 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

30 6 1 $5,500 $6,750 $8,000 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

UPC 0.1

TLE # unguid guid unita $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 57 1 $56,500 $70,500 $84,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 57 1 $56,500 $70,500 $84,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

10 58 2 $28,500 $35,500 $42,500 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

15 62 3 $20,167 $25,083 $30,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

20 67 5 $12,900 $16,000 $19,100 1 $77,000 $78,000 $79,000

25 67 9 $6,944 $8,556 $10,167 1 $139,000 $141,000 $143,000

30 75 16 $4,188 $5,109 $6,031 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000

Tank 0.1

TLE #unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 71 1 $70,500 $88,000 $105,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 71 2 $35,000 $43,625 $52,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

10 74 3 $24,167 $30,083 $36,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

15 78 4 $19,000 $23,625 $28,250 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

20 78 7 $10,643 $13,179 $15,714 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000

25 83 13 $5,885 $7,231 $8,577 1 $201,000 $204,000 $207,000

30 85 24 $3,042 $3,677 $4,313 1 $371,500 $377,250 $383,000

Truck 0.3

#unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

5 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

10 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

15 17 1 $16,500 $20,500 $24,500 1 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000

20 17 2 $8,000 $9,875 $11,750 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

25 19 2 $9,000 $11,125 $13,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

30 21 3 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

UPC 0.3

#unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 278 3 $92,167 $115,083 $138,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

5 281 4 $69,750 $87,063 $104,375 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

10 291 7 $41,071 $51,214 $61,357 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000

15 309 16 $18,813 $23,391 $27,969 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000

20 333 52 $5,904 $7,255 $8,606 1 $805,500 $818,250 $831,000

25 372 274 $858 $947 $1,036 1 $4,246,500 $4,314,750 $4,383,000

30 410 410 $500 $500 $500 1 $6,354,500 $6,456,750 $6,559,000
95

Table E-2 

Cost-to-Kill Spreadsheet Results 

(Without Forward Observer Impact)

Tank 0.3

#unguid #guid uni $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 327 4 $81,250 $101,438 $121,625 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

5 327 5 $64,900 $81,000 $97,100 1 $77,000 $78,000 $79,000

10 347 10 $34,200 $42,625 $51,050 1 $154,500 $156,750 $159,000

15 372 24 $15,000 $18,625 $22,250 1 $371,500 $377,250 $383,000

20 397 89 $3,961 $4,826 $5,691 1 $1,379,000 $1,401,000 $1,423,000

25 445 445 $500 $500 $500 1 $6,897,000 $7,008,000 $7,119,000

30 502 502 $500 $500 $500 1 $7,780,500 $7,905,750 $8,031,000

Truck 0.8

#unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 520 2 $259,500 $324,250 $389,000 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

5 535 2 $267,000 $333,625 $400,250 1 $30,500 $30,750 $31,000

10 593 3 $197,167 $246,333 $295,500 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

15 653 6 $108,333 $135,292 $162,250 1 $92,500 $93,750 $95,000

20 783 15 $51,700 $64,500 $77,300 1 $232,000 $235,500 $239,000

25 868 19 $45,184 $56,355 $67,526 1 $294,000 $298,500 $303,000

30 1100 22 $49,500 $61,750 $74,000 1 $340,500 $345,750 $351,000

UPC 0.8

#unguid guid unit $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 1000 3 $332,833 $415,917 $499,000 1 $46,000 $46,500 $47,000

5 2000 4 $499,500 $624,250 $749,000 1 $61,500 $62,250 $63,000

10 3000 7 $428,071 $534,964 $641,857 1 $108,000 $109,500 $111,000

15 4000 16 $249,500 $311,750 $374,000 1 $247,500 $251,250 $255,000

20 5000 52 $95,654 $119,442 $143,231 1 $805,500 $818,250 $831,000

25 8000 274 $28,697 $35,746 $42,796 1 $4,246,500 $4,314,750 $4,383,000

30 12000 1000 $11,500 $14,250 $17,000 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

Tank 0.8

#unguid #guid uni $500 $750 $1,000 disc guid $500 $750 $1,000

0 1000 25 $39,500 $49,250 $59,000 1 $387,000 $393,000 $399,000

5 2000 51 $38,716 $48,270 $57,824 1 $790,000 $802,500 $815,000

10 3000 635 $4,224 $5,156 $6,087 1 $9,842,000 $10,000,500 $10,159,000

15 4000 1000 $3,500 $4,250 $5,000 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

20 5000 1000 $4,500 $5,500 $6,500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

25 7000 1000 $6,500 $8,000 $9,500 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000

30 8000 1000 $7,500 $9,250 $11,000 1 $15,499,500 $15,749,250 $15,999,000
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APPENDIX F. ACRONYMS

3ID 3rd Infantry Division 

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

ADOCS Automated Deep Operations Coordination System 

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 

AJ anti-jam 

ALT acquisition, logistics, and technology 

AMSTE affordable moving surface target engagement 

AOF angle of fall 

AOR area of responsibility 

APC armored personnel carrier 

ASA Assistant Secretary of the Army 

ASCS Air Support Control Section 

ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

ASOC Air Support Operations Center 

AT advanced technology 

BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment 

BCL Battlefield Coordination Line 

BDA battle damage assessment 

BFIST Bradley Fire Support Team 

BFSA Blue Force Situational Awareness 

BFT Blue Force Tracking 

BMC3

 battle management command, control, and communications 

BPS bits per second 

C2 command and control 

C3

 command, control, and communications 

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

CAS close air support 

CATF Commander, Amphibious Task Force 

CC&D camouflage, concealment, and deception 

CEP circular error probability 

CGIMU Common Guidance Inertial Measurement Unit 

CID combat identification 

CLF Commander, Landing Force 

CM/CB counter-mortar/counter-battery 

COCOM Combatant Commander 

CSW coordinate-seeking weapons 

CTP common targeting picture 

DFB division forward boundary 

DMPI designated mean point of impact 

DOCC Deep Operations Coordination Cell 

DoD Department of Defense 

DPPDB Digital Point Positioning Database 
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DSB Defense Science Board 

ECM electronic counter measures 

EO electro-optical 

ERM Extended Range Munition 

ERGM Extended Range Guided Munition 

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade Below 

FCS Future Combat System 

FD fractional damage 

FIOPs Family of Common Operation Pictures 

FLIR forward looking infrared 

FLOT forward line of own troops 

FO forward observer 

FPA focal plane array 

FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center 

FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line 

FSCOORDs Fire Support Coordinators 

FSV fire support vehicles 

G G force 

GB gigabyte 

GIF Guided Integrated Fuze 

GMLRS Guided Multiple Rocket Launch System 

GN&C guidance, navigation, and control 

GPS Global Positioning System 

G/VLLD Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator 

HE high energy explosive 

HIDAC2

 High Density Airspace Control Zone 

ID target identification 

IFF identification friend or foe 

IFS integrated fire support 

IMU inertial measurement units 

INS inertial navigation system 

IR infrared 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JAOC Joint Air Operations Center 

JBMC2

 Joint Battle Management Command and Control 

JCAS Joint Close Air Support 

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition 

JEFX Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander 

JFC Joint Force Commander 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JIFSS Joint Integrated Fire Support System 

JIFSS Joint Integrated Fire Support System 

JMEM Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

KE kinetic energy 

KB kilobit 
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kBPS kilobits per second 

LADAR laser detection and ranging 

LAM loitering air missile 

LLDR lightweight LASER designator rangefinder 

LRSS long-range scout sight 

MDA model drive architecture 

MEMS micro-electro mechanical 

MIDB military intelligence database 

MRAAS multi-role armament and ammunition system 

MRR minimum risk route 

m/s meters per second 

MTI moving target indicator 

NCA National Command Authority 

NCTR non-cooperative target recognition 

NGA National Geo-spatial Intelligence Agency 

NII networks and information integration 

NSFC naval surface fire control 

NTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System 

NTM National Technical Means 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OMG object modeling group 

OPCON operational control 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PAAs position artillery areas 

PAH position area hazards 

PGMM Precision Guided Mortar Munition 

PIM Platform Independent Model 

PMFs probability mass functions 

PSI platform specific implementation 

R&D research and development 

RDA research development and acquisition 

RF radio frequency 

ROA Restricted Operations Area 

ROE rules of engagement 

ROZ Restricted Operations Zone 

S&T science and technology 

SA situation awareness 

SAAFR standard use army aircraft flight route 

SAASM selected availability anti-spoofing module 

SACC Supporting Arms Coordination Center 

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 

SFCP Shore Fire Control Party 

SIAP single integrated air picture 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SIGP single integrated ground picture 
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SMTI surface moving target indicator 

SOCCORD Special Operations Coordination Element 

TACP tactical air control party 

TBMCS theater core battle management system 

TCEP total circular error probability 

TEL transporter/erector/launcher

TLE target location error 

TOR Terms of Reference 

TOT time on target 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicles 

UML universal modeling language 

UPC unit production cost 

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics 

USMFT United States message text format 

WDE weapon delivery error 
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