alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher Sellers, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered March 23, 1978, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial ordered. We reverse on two grounds: 1. It was error for the trial court to deny challenges for cause directed to two jurors. The first was a customs officer whose duties included the enforcement of the law through making arrests. The circumstances of the case made it advisable that the challenge for cause be sustained (see *People v Culhane,*33 NY2d 90, 104, n 2; *People v Branch,*46 NY2d 645, 650; *People v Oddy,*16 AD2d 585, 587-588; cf. *Commonwealth v Colon,*223 Pa Super Ct, 202, 205-208; *State v Langley,*342 Mo 447; *State v West,*200 SE2d 859 [W Va]; *Rippy v State of Tennessee,*550 SW2d 636 [Tenn]). The second juror was a woman whose son had been the victim of a robbery in the course of which he had suffered serious injuries, and whose husband had been the victim of a mugging at knifepoint. Again, the challenge for cause should have been sustained (see *People v Branch,*46 NY2d 645, *supra; Sims v United States,*405 F2d 1381, 1384). In case of doubt the better practice is to excuse the juror on *voir dire (People v Branch, supra,*pp 651-652). 2. During a side-bar conference in the course of the trial, one of the jurors made an approving gesture with her hand to the arresting officer who was then on the witness -stand. The court conducted an inquiry, out of the presence of the other jurors. The juror admitted to the court that she had signaled to the witness, and that her intention was to indicate to him that "He was answering the questions beautifully.” The court did not discharge the juror upon motion of the defendant, nor did it conduct a further inquiry whether the other jurors had observed the gesture and what its significance may have been to them. Under these circumstances the court should have discharged the juror (cf. *People v Argibay,*57 AD2d 520, affd 45 NY2d 45; *Mark v Colgate Univ.,*53 AD2d 884). A new trial is therefore required. Mollen, P. J., Hopkins, O’Connor and Lazer, JJ., concur.
950.7002 Definitions. *DOE contractor* means any DOE prime contractor, including any agency of the Federal Government with which DOE has entered into an interagency agreement.
*Nuclear incident* means any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing, within or outside the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material. The term includes any such occurrence outside the United States if such occurrence involves source, special nuclear, or byproduct material owned by, and used by or under contract with, the United States.
*Person indemnified* means— ( 1 ) With respect to a nuclear incident occurring within the United States or outside the United States as the term is defined above and with respect to any nuclear incident in connection with the design, development, construction, operation, repair, maintenance, or use of the nuclear ship Savannah, the person with whom an indemnity agreement is executed or who is required to maintain financial protection, and any other person who may be liable for public liability; or
( 2 ) With respect to any other nuclear incident occurring outside the United States, the person with whom an indemnity agreement is executed and any other person who may be liable for public liability by reason of his activities under any contract with the Secretary of Energy or any project to which indemnification under the provisions of section 170d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, has been extended or under any subcontract, purchase order, or other agreement, or any tier under any such contract or project.
*Public liability* means any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation (including all reasonable additional costs incurred by a State, or a political subdivision of a State, in the course of responding to a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation), except: ( 1 ) Claims under State or Federal workmen's compensation acts of employees of persons indemnified who are employed at the site of and in connection with the activity where the nuclear incident occurs;
( 2 ) claims arising out of an act of war; and
( 3 ) whenever used in subsections a., c., and k. of section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, claims for loss of, or damage to, or loss of use of property which is located at the site of and used in connection with the licensed activity where the nuclear incident occurs. *Public liability* also includes damage to property of persons indemnified: Provided, that such property is covered under the terms of the financial protection required, except property which is located at the site of and used in connection with the activity where the nuclear incident occurs.
[49 FR 12039, Mar. 28, 1984, as amended at 50 FR 12185, Mar. 27, 1985; 56 FR 57827, Nov. 14, 1991; 74 FR 36368, July 22, 2009]
#### James D. Kiely, Respondent, v Kathleen H. Miller et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

— Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered May 13, 1977 in Tompkins County, upon a verdict rendered at a Trial Term, in favor of the plaintiff. On January 29, 1973, the plaintiff was operating his Mustang automobile in a generally westerly direction near the hamlet of Dryden when it was struck head-on by a Mercury station wagon owned by the defendant Ithaca Journal News, Inc., and operated by the defendant Miller. As a result of this accident, plaintiff commenced suit for personal injuries against the above-named defendants and the jury rendered its verdict awarding $40,000 in damages against Miller and the Ithaca Journal News, Inc., and found no cause for action in favor of the defendants Gilhooley, Padget and McNerny Chevrolet Co., Inc. The appellants appeal from the judgment upon the sole ground that the verdict in favor of the plaintiff was excessive. We do not agree. So well established are the principles that an appellate court should not disturb a verdict in a personal injury action absent irregularity, bias, unfairness or inadequate consideration of the testimony and that it should not substitute its judgment on the issue of damages for that of the jury unless the amount is so excessive as to shock our conscience that the citation of authority is unnecessary. The medical evidence establishes that this plaintiff, 22 years old at the time of the accident, suffered a herniated disc as a result thereof. It further demonstrates that the injury was a competent producing cause of pain which the plaintiff testified had been continuous since the accident. Moreover, the medical testimony indicates that the plaintiff’s condition will worsen in the future with a 50-50 chance that surgery will be required. Perusal of this record clearly indicates that the trial was a fair one, unaffected by any improper influence and the injury was a serious one and permanent in nature. The verdict in no way shocks our conscience and should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellants. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Kane, Staley, Jr., and Main, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-60038

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DARON DEMETRIS KENNEY, also known as “Tall Dog,”

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC Nos. 3:01-CV-102-S and

4:93-CR-134-8-S

--------------------

February 20, 2003

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Daron Demetris Kenney, federal prisoner # 02255-112, pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and

distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. He now appeals the

district court’s denial of his FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion for

reconsideration of the denial as untimely of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255

motion. He argues that his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was timely

based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Kenney has
No. 02-60038

-2-

also requested leave to file an out-of-time reply brief in

further support of his argument.

Kenney’s Apprendi argument is foreclosed by this court’s

decision in United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 310 (5th Cir.

2002), wherein the court held that Apprendi “is not retroactively

applicable to initial petitions under § 2255.” Accordingly, the

district court’s judgment denying Kenney’s Rule 60(b) motion is

affirmed. In light of the foregoing, Kenney’s motion to file an

out-of-time reply brief is denied.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
#### Seyedeh Fatemah JANHAMIR, Petitioner, v. Peter D. KEISLER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-1905.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 12, 2007.

Decided: Nov. 5, 2007.

Seyedeh Fatemah Janhamir, Petitioner Pro Se. Eric Warren Marsteller, Michelle Gorden Latour, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Seyedeh Fatemah Janhamir, a native and citizen of Iran, seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying relief from removal. Janhamir challenges the Board’s finding that she was an arriving alien and inadmissible, and claims that the Notice to Appear charging her with removability is thus null and void. We have reviewed the administrative record and the Board’s decision and conclude that Janhamir’s claims are without merit. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2000). We accordingly deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *In re: Janhamir,*No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ] (B.I.A. July 26, 2005). We deny Janhamir’s motions to strike Respondent’s reply brief, for reproduction of relevant portions of the administrative record, and to substitute certain pages of the administrative record. Finally, we dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
-       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2023-09-01T22:50:15-0400
      - Government Publishing Office, Washington, DC 20401
      - Government Publishing Office
      - Government Publishing Office attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by Government Publishing Office
#### § 1.182 When EAJA applies.

EAJA applies to any adversary adjudication pending or commenced before the Department on or after August 5, 1985, except with respect to a proceeding covered under § 1.183(a)(1)(iii) of this part, which is effective on or after October 21, 1986. In addition, the provisions of § 1.185(b) relating to award for excessive demand apply only to adversary adjudications commenced on or after March 29, 1996. Changes in maximum rates for attorney fees are effective as of October 11, 2002.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. §1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Crystal Rock Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended October 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifies, to the best knowledge and belief of the signatory, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/ Peter K. Baker


Peter K. Baker


Chief Executive Officer





Date: January 27, 2011
#### Henry Brott for use of Harry Wilk and Joseph Rozen, trading as Wilk & Rosen, defendant in error, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, plaintiff in error.

Gen. No. 34,555.

Opinion filed April 15, 1931.

Hoyne, O’Con-nor & Rubinkam, for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendant in error.

Mr. Presiding Justice Wilson

delivered the opinion of the court.
#### 950.7007-950.7008 [Reserved]
536.571 Contractor responsibilities. Insert the clause at 552.236-71, Contractor Responsibilities, in solicitations and contracts if construction, dismantling, demolition, or removal of improvements is contemplated. Use the clause: ( a ) With its Alternate I when a design-build project delivery method will be followed.
( b ) With its Alternate II when a construction-manager-as-constructor project delivery method will be followed.
[84 FR 69633, Dec. 19, 2019]
From: "Higgins, Cortney" <Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov> To: RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA Date: 11/04/2011 05:08 PM Subject: RE: E.O. 12866 Meeting on EGU MACT Rule

Hi Bob,

This list will be posted on our meetings website, but attached is the sign in sheet.

Regards, Cortney

-----Original Message----- From: Wayland.Robertj@epamail.epa.gov [mailto:Wayland.Robertj@epamail.epa.gov] Sent: Friday, November 04, 2011 5:07 PM To: Higgins, Cortney Cc: Maxwell.Bill@epamail.epa.gov Subject: Re: E.O. 12866 Meeting on EGU MACT Rule

Thanks - we'll get them in the docket. Do you by any chance have a list

of attendees?

thanx!

bob

Robert J. Wayland, Ph.D. Leader, Energy Strategies Group U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Quality Planning & Standards Sector Policies and Programs Division Mail Code D243-01 RTP, NC 27711

Phone: (919) 541-1045 Cell: (919) 306-2290 Fax: (919) 541-5450

e-mail: wayland.robertj@epa.gov

********************************************************* DRAFT/Deliberative Document -- FOIA Exempt

********************************************************* From:"Higgins, Cortney" <Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov> To: RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Thomas Gillis/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Karen Thundiyil/DC/USEPA/US@EPA Date: 11/04/2011 05:05 PM Subject: E.O. 12866 Meeting on EGU MACT Rule

Hi all, Attached are the handouts from the EO 12866 meeting yesterday.Regards, Cortney

-----Original Appointment----- From: Echols, Mabel E. Subject: E.O. 12866 Meeting on EGU MACT Rule When: Thursday, November 03, 2011 10:00 AM-10:30 AM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada). Where: Room 9104 New Executive Office Building

Theresa Pugh, APPA has requested this meeting.(See attached file: 2060AR31_2011_11_3_appa_Handout1.pdf)(See attached file: 2060AR31_2011_11_3_appa_Handout2.pdf)(See attached file: EGU MACT Comment Excerpt.pdf)

2060AR31_2011_11_3_appa_Signin_filledin.pdf
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, T. Paul Bulmahn, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ATP Oil & Gas Corporation (the Company), do hereby certify that this Amendment No. 1 to the
Annual Report on Form 10-K (the Report) for the year ended December 31, 2004, filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof:



| | 1) | fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |     |  |                                                
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | -----------------------------------------------
|Date: April 29, 2005 |  | By: |  | /s/ T. Paul Bulmahn                            
|                     |  |     |  | T. Paul Bulmahn                                
|                     |  |     |  | Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President
----

|   | 1. | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;  and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition, results of operations, and cash flows      of the Company. |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  January 13,      2010 | By:    | /s/ Jeffrey M. Gorden                          |
|----------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------|
|                                   |   |                                           |
|                                   |   | Jeffrey      M. Gorden, Chief FinancialOfficer |

----
#### 970.2201 Basic labor policies.
#### RUSSELL, Respondent, v. LEHIGH VA LEY R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, A pellate Division, Fourth Department.

Mar 21, 1906.)

Action by James R. Russell again the Lehigh Valley Railroad' Company.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment and order a firmed, with costs.

KRUSE, J.,

dissents, upon the ground th; the failure to furnish explosives was not tl proximate cause of the accident.
EX-10.8



 Exhibit 10.8 

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 

AMENDMENT NO. 1 
 This
Amendment No. 1 to Employment Agreement (this “Amendment”) is entered into as of June 5, 2017 by and between Alex B. Rozek (the “Executive”) and Boston Omaha Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the
“Company”). 
 The Company and the Executive are parties to an Employment Agreement dated August 1, 2015 (the
“Agreement”). 
 Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants herein contained and for other
good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
 1.
Amendment to Article II, Section 2.01(A) of the Agreement. The Company and the Executive agree that the Agreement is hereby amended by deleting all of Article II, Section 2.01(A), and inserting the following in its place: 

“The Executive will serve for a Base Salary equal to the federal minimum wage for the period through December 31, 2017 and shall not
be entitled to any Base Salary in excess of the federal minimum wage for any period prior to such date. Commencing January 1, 2018, the Executive will receive a Base Salary at the rate of $275,000 per annum, payable in accordance with the
Company’s payroll payment policy as in effect from time to time.” 
 2. No Other Amendment. Except as expressly amended
hereby, the Agreement shall remain unamended and in full force and effect. This Amendment is only effective in the specific instance and for the specific purpose for which it is given and shall not be effective for any other purpose, and shall not
be deemed to be a waiver of, amendment of, or consent to or modification of any other term or provision of the Agreement. 
 3. Governing
Law. This Amendment, the performance of this Amendment and any and all matters arising directly or indirectly herefrom shall be governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the internal laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
without giving effect to the conflict or choice of law provisions and principles thereof. 
 4. Counterparts. This Amendment may be
executed in any number of counterparts including facsimile or PDF counterpart signature pages, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and the Executive have duly executed this Amendment as of the date first written above. 

 

			
	BOSTON OMAHA CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	/s/ Adam K. Peterson
		 	 Name: Adam K. Peterson
 Title: Co-Chief
Executive Officer

	
	EXECUTIVE
		 	 /s/ Alex B. Rozek

		 	Alex B. Rozek
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-15337

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20604-FAM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

ALFRED WAYNE LEE, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(October 25, 2019)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 18-15337 Date Filed: 10/25/2019 Page: 1 of 3 
2

Alfred Lee, Jr. appeals his sentence of 180 months of imprisonment for 

possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lee argues that 

section 922(g) is unconstitutional because intrastate gun possession by a convicted 

felon does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and he argues that 

the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e), based on facts about prior convictions not alleged in his indictment and 

that were not proved to a jury violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth 

Amendments. We affirm.

We ordinarily review de novo the constitutionality of a statute and a 

sentence, but because Lee raises his arguments for the first time on appeal, we 

review for plain error. See United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 

2010) (section 922(g)); United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d 1245, 1248 (11th Cir. 

2014).(sentence enhancement). To establish plain error, Lee must prove that error 

occurred that was plain and that affected his substantial rights. See Wright, 607 

F.3d at 715.

No error, much less plain error, occurred in sentencing Lee because, as he 

concedes, his arguments are foreclosed by our precedents. We have held that “the 

jurisdictional element of the statute, i.e., the requirement that the felon ‘possess in 

or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from 

[a] facial constitutional attack,” United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th 

Case: 18-15337 Date Filed: 10/25/2019 Page: 2 of 3 
3

Cir. 2001), and that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a defendant 

who possesses a firearm that “traveled in interstate commerce,” United States v. 

McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996). See Wright, 607 F.3d at 715–16. 

And in Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–47 (1998), the 

Supreme Court held that a prior conviction “relevant only to the sentencing of an 

offender found guilty of the charged crime” does not have to be charged in an 

indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, even if it increases the 

defendant’s maximum statutory sentence. Almendarez-Torres remains the law until 

overruled by the Supreme Court, and it expressly refused to do so in Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). Harris, 741 F.3d at 1249.

We AFFIRM Lee’s sentence. 

Case: 18-15337 Date Filed: 10/25/2019 Page: 3 of 3