I. Glossary 

A&P 

ACAR 

Anderson 

ASOS 

Baird 

Burr 

FAA 

FAA# 

FAR 

Gibbs 

Metadata 

N426SW 

NCAR 

OpSpecs 

Perkins 

Perry 

PIC 

SW# 

Rasmussen 

SGU 

SkyWest 

SLC 

u.s.c. 

SERVED: May 29, 2015 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

IN THE MATTER OF 

SKYWEST AIRLINES 

FAA DOCKET NO. [TO BE ASSIGNED] 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

FDMS.NO. FAA-2013- 0292 

INITIAL DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 

airframe and power plant ;, · 

aircraft communication and reporting system 

Daniel Joseph Anderson, Sky West pilot, passenger on N426SW 

Automated Surface Observing Station 

FAA employee who forwarded R-6 to Sky West 

Dennis Burr, N426SW First Officer 

Federal Aviation Administration, Complainant 

Federal Aviation Administration exhibits 

Federal Aviation Regulations 

Captain Thomas Gibbs, N426SW pilot . 

'metadata' is information that can be stored along with the file to keep 

things consistent across different formats -- different programs so they can 

speak together better. Everything digital has metadata. Metadata in 

photograph typically includes a file name and creation data and file size 

Bombardier CL-600-2B 19 aircraft 

National Center for Scientific Research 

Operations Specifications 

Aaron Perkins, FAA aviation safety inspector the FAA 

Dr. Kevin D. Perry 

Pilot in Command 

SkyWest exhibits 

Dr. Roy Rasmussen 

St. George, Utah Municipal Airport 

SkyWest Airlines, Inc., Respondent 

Salt Lake International Airport 

United States Code 

1 
II. Introductory Comment 

The Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter "FAA") charged SkyWest Airlines, 

Inc. (hereinafter "SkyWest") with violations of 14 C.F.R. §§ 119.5(g), 119.5(1), 121.629(b) and 

91.13(a). 

We find the FAA did not make a prima facie case with respect to the violations as set 

forth herein. 

III. Procedural History 

On June 19, 2013, SkyWest was advised through a Final Notice of Proposed Civil· 

Penalty that the FAA proposed to assess a civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 for violations 

set forth above. 

On July 3, 2013, SkyWest Airlines, Inc., through its legal counsel, submitted a request for 

a hearing. 

On July 9, 2013 the FAA filed a Complaint. SkyWest filed its Answer and Affirmative 

Defenses on August 13, 2013. 

The matter was heard in Salt Lake City, UT on February 10, 11 and 12, 2014. 

Post hearing briefs have been submitted. 

The matter is now ready for decision. 

IV. Jurisdiction 

SkyWest was at all times relevant herein the~holder of FAA issued Scheduled Air Carrier 

Certificate No. SWIA011A. 1 At all times relevant herein SkyWest was authorized to conduct 

operations pursuant to Part 121 ofthe Federal Aviation Regulations. 

V. Burden ofProof 

The FAA was the petitioning party with the initial burden of proof (J4 C.F.R. § 13.224). 

VI. Allegations 

A. Agency's recitation of facts 

The FAA alleged that paragraph D085 of Sky West's Operations Specifications 

(hereinafter "OpSpecs") authorized SkyWest to use civil aircraft N426SW, a Bombardier CL600-2B 19 (hereinafter "N426SW"), in the conduct of Sky West's Part 121 operations. Paragraph 

A023 of Sky West's OpSpecs authorized the use of SkyWest's Ground Deicing Program Manual 

1 FAA# -1. 

2 
SP2800 (hereinafter "GDPM SP2800")? GDPM SP2800 prohibited SkyWest aircraft from 

taking off when frost was present on an aircraft's upper wing surface. 

On or about December 7, 2011, SkyWest operated N426SW as Flight 7770 (a Part 121 

flight) between Salt Lake City (hereinafter "SLC"), Utah and St. George, Utah (hereinafter 

"SGU''). The FAA alleged N426SW departed Salt Lake City, Utah despite the fact that frost was 

adhering to-the aircraft's upper wing surfaces. 

By reason of departing Salt Lake City, Utah despite the fact that frost was adhering to the 

aircraft's upper wing surfaces, SkyWest operated as a direct air carrier in violation of its 

OpSpecs; operated an aircraft under Part 121 in violation of its OpSpecs; and operated an aircraft 

in a careless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. 

By reason of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the FAA alleged SkyWe~t violated 

the following sections of the Federal Aviation Regulations (hereinafter "FAR"s) (14 C.P.R.): 

a) Section 119.5 (g), when it operated as a direct air carrier when it failed to comply with its 

Operations Specification concerning aircraft deicing; 

b) Section 119.5(1), when it operated the aircraft under Part 121 when it failed to comply 

with its Operations Specification concerning aircraft deicing; 

c) Section 121. 629(b), when it took off~he airQ.raft with frost on the upper wing surface; and 

d) Section 91.13 (a), when it operated the ·aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to 

endanger the life or property of another in that it operated the aircraft with frost on the 

upper wing surface. 

The FAA alleged SkyWest was liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $27,500 for each 

violation noted in accordance with 49 United States Code (hereinafter "U.S.C.") §§ 46301 (a) and 

(d). The FAA requested we enter a civil penalty of$55,000. 

B. SkyWest's recitation offacts 

SkyWest admitted it was at all relevant times the holder of FAA Scheduled Air Carrier 

Certificate SWIAO 11 A and authorized to conduct operations pursuant to Part 121 of the F ARs. 

SkyWest admitted that at all relevant times, Paragraph D085 ofSkyWest's OpSpecs 

authorized SkyWest to use civil aircraft N426SW, a Bombardier CL-600-:2B19 in the conduct of 

SkyWest's Part 121 operations. 

SkyWest admitted that at all relevant times Paragraph A023 of SkyWest's OpSpecs 

authorized the use of Sky West's Ground Deicing Program Manual SP2800 . . l 

SkyWest admitted that at all relevant times the Ground Deicing Program Manual 

prohibited SkyWest aircraft from taking off when frost was present on an aircraft's upper wing 

surface. 

2 FAA# -2. 

3 
SkyWest admitted that on or about December 7, 2011, SkyWest operated the aircraft as 

Flight 7770 between SLC and SGU. 

SkyWest admitted Flight 7770 departed SLC but denied that frost was adhering to the 

upper wing surfaces. Sky West further denied it took off an aircraft when frost was adhering to 

the wings of the aircraft. SkyWest further denied that it operated as a direct carrier in violation 

of its OpSpecs. SkyWest denied it operated an aircraft in Part 121 operations in violation of its 

OpSpecs. Further, SkyWest denied it operated an aircraft in a careless manner so as to endanger 

the life or property of another. 

As Affirmative Defenses, SkyWest asserted: 

1. The proposed penalty was excessive and violated FAA sanction guidance in Order 

2150.3B. 

2. SkyWest faithfully and fully executed its deicing program in complete compliance with 

its OpSpecs and applicable F ARs. 

3. The FAA failed to follow FAA Order 2150.3B Chapter 3, Section 3. 

VII. Issues 

Whether on or about December 7, 2011, SkyWest operated N426SW as Flight 7770 (a 

Part 121 flight) between SLC and SGU despite the fact that frost was adhering to-the aircraft's 

upper wing surfaces in violation of 14 C.F.R. §§ 119.5(g), 119.5 (l), 121. 629(b) and/or 91.13 (a). 

VII. Summary ofTestimony and Evidence 

All admitted testimonial and documentary evidence was reviewed and considered. Only 

brief highlights are summarized herein. · · 

A. Agency's Case 

Aaron Perkins 

Aaron Perkins (hereinafter "Perkins") was an aviation safety inspector for the FAA. He 

had held that position for three years. From 2003 to 2011 he had been a pilot with several 

airlines. He held an airline transport pilot certificate with a CL65 pilot certificate type rating for 

the CRJ aircraft. He had about 7,000 flight hours, ofwhichjust over 3,000 were in the CRJ. 

After being hired by the FAA he received training, including training on icing. 3 

On December 7, 2011, Perkins traveled to SLC arriving at approximately 0700 hours. 

The weather was clear, a cold morning, with light winds. Perkins first observed deicing at one of 

the deicing stations, then drove along the terminal to see ifthere were any SkyWest aircraft 

getting ready for departure. That's when he noticed a SkyWest aircraft at gate Echo 1. The time 

was approximately 07 41. Perkins parked his car behind the tail of the airplane, and approached 

the left wing of that aircraft, walking maybe 10 feet or so from the car. From that point Perkins 

3 Tr. p. 23, I. 13 top, 26, I. 19. 

4 
testified it was very obvious there was frost on the left wing. Perkins got back in his car to move 

it so he wouldn't interfere with the pushback operation. He moved the car around to the west 

side of the airplane to check the right wing to see if it looked the same as the left wing. He got 

out of the car, approached the right wing to do an inspection, and took a photograph of the wing. 4 

As part of his training as a CRJ pilot and as an FAA inspector he testified he was familiar 

with procedures to detect ice on aircraft. The training was to look at pictures of what 

contamination looked like on an aircraft wing, and other training was to touch the aircraft, do a 

tactile inspection to verify the presence of any foreign substance. A tactile inspection involved 

running your hand on the wing or other critical surfaces. The tactile check itself was typically 

for contamination that's difficult to see like clear ice. As you ran your hand across the wing, if 

you did not feel rivet heads, that would be an indication that there was some sort of 

contamination on the wing. Perkins testified the SkyWest manual stated that you should do a 

tactile inspection on the wing leading edge, the wing upper surface, and the wing rear surface. 

Perkins testified he did not touch the forward part of the wing, leading edge ofN426SW; he just 

did a visual inspection on the part where he saw the frost. He described the ice he observed as 

looking like a sheet ofpaper, it was at least as thick as a sheet of paper, if not thicker than a sheet 

of paper. 

5 

Perkins testified frost on the wing could cause aerodynamic problems including the loss 

of lift, increase of drag and roll instability. The CRJ wing was more fragile than other types of 

aircraft wings because it was a hard wing, meaning that there was no leading edge device so 

there were no slats on the front, and those types of wings could be more of a concern with frozen 

contamination. 6 

After he photographed the wing, Perkins got back in his car to observe deicing of the 

aircraft for what Perkins believed was contamination on the wing. Perkins observed N426SW 

taxi to Spot 23 rather than to a deicing station. N426SW remained at Spot 23 for several minutes 

before Perkins observed N426SW make a left turn at the taxiway which took them down to the 

runway for takeoff. 7 

During his investigation, Perkins obtained weather data for SLC8 on the date of the 

alleged violation; the Tail Audit Report generated by the Aircraft Communication and Reporting 

System (hereinafter "ACARS");9 and the dispatch release for Flight 7770 or N426SW. 10 

A CARS monitored out time and off times. The dispatch release showed additional flight 

information. 11 

Perkins identified a photograph allegedly showing frost on the upper surface of the wing 

4 Tr. p. 27, I. top. 30, I. 17; FAA# -3. 5 Tr. p. 30, I. 18 top. 33, I. 3. 6 Tr. p. 33, I. 14 top. 36, 1. 3. 7 Tr. p. 36, 1. 10 top. 37, 1. 10. 8 FAA# -5. 9 FAA# -6. 1

° FAA# -7. 11 Tr. p. 47, I. 14 top. 50, I. 22. 

5 
of the aircraft 12 and a photograph showing the aircraft registration. 13 Perkins testified he 

observed additional frost on aircraft surfaces, but did not take pictures of other portions of the 

aircraft except those exhibits received into evidence. Perkins testified that the area of the wing 

under the alleged frost was where CRJ aircraft had fuel tanks. The tanks started at the wing root 

(where the wing meets the fuselage) and ran span-wise across the wing, perhaps two-thirds of the 

way out of the wing toward the winglet (tip of the wing which turns up), arid then the outer 

·portion of the rest of the wing, like a honeycomb. 14 

Reviewing FAA# -6, Perkins testified he first observed N426SW at 0741 hours and 

N426SW pushed back at 0752. He testified he last ~bserved the alleged frost on the wing at 

0748 hours. After push back, Perkins was unable to observe N426SW to determine if there was 

frost on the wings. FAA# -6 showed N426SW took off at 0808 hours. 15 

Perkins referred to FAA# -4A and# -4B to mark the spot where he first observed 

N426SW and Spot 23 where N426SW stopped before takeoff. (Pencil marks on lower right 

center and right margin; SkyWest's SW# R-1, R-2A and R-2B gave a better view of SLC). 16 

Perkins testified he interviewed the first officer (Dennis Burr, hereinafter "Burr") of 

N426SW who told Perkins that he did perform a preflight walk-around. When Burr and Perkins 

approached N426SW Perkins said Burr did not mention ifhe checked the part of the wing 

represented in the photograph (FAA# -3). Burr did mention that he checked the wing leading 

edge and the flaps. 17 

Cross Examination 

Perkins finished his deicing training December 2, 2011, five days prior to this violation 

investigation. Perkins selected December 7, 2011 as the date to inspect for deicing because it 

was a clear, cold morning which was notoriously prone for frost. 18 

~~ . 

' The weather data Perkins received from the National Weather Service (FAA# -5) 

displayed temperatures in hourly increments. He was aware of no other source of data giving 

temperatures in less than hourly increments. He was not aware where on SLC the temf<erature 

readings were physically recorded. He did not request sunlight or solar radiation data. 9 

The first aircraft Perkins observed being deiced were at Spots 9 or 10 (left of center on 

FAA# -4A above Terminal C20). Perkins did not take pictures of the deicing operations at Spots 

12 FAA# -3. 13 FAA# -9. 14 Tr. p. 51, l. 1 top. 56, l. 7. 15 Tr. p. 56, l. 22 top. 59, l. 7. 16 Tr. p. 60, I. 11 top. 64, l. 7. 17 Tr. p. 67, I. 10 top. 68, I. 17. 18 Tr. p. 71, I. 6 top. 73, I. 9. 19 Tr. p. 73, I. 15 top. 75, I. 11. 

20 Look just left of center, just above the vertical midpoint and the horizontal midpoint, there's the control tower; 

drop down about an inch in the gray area, which is obviously apron, you see black circles with white numbers: 7, 8, 

9, 10, 12, 13, 15, and 17; those are the deicing spots. 

6 
9 or Spot 10. He used his iPhone to take the pictures, not an FAA issued camera. At the hearing 

Perkins testified he no longer had the iPhone; he emailed the picture to his computer and 

downloaded the picture (FAA# -3) onto his computer after visiting SLC; he believed the 

metadata was not included on the picture; by looking at just the photograph one could not 

determine the location ofthe photograph and/or whether it depicted N426SW; the picture was 

not a complete depiction of the entire right wing ofN426SW. FAA# -3 was a picture of the right 

wing ofN426SW. Perkins testified the picture depicted frost or pre-frost; Perkins did not recall 

ifthere was frost on the panel to the right of the area depicted in the photograph; he was not 

familiar with the number of panels each wing should have; he guessed the panels were 30 inches 

by 30 inches; guessed the wing was 30 feet; he knew the three panels in FAA# -3 had frost but 

was not sure ifthe 4th panel had frost; he did not know if the front of the wing had frost; he did 

not remember seeing frost outside the panels; he was not sure if there was frost on all four panels 

of the left wing; he did not observe frost outside the panels on the left wing. Perkins took FAA# . 

-3 holding an iPhone, looking through the view finder, aiming at approximately 45 degrees; he 

did not have the metadata to correlate the picture of the right wing with the aircraft and did not 

take a picture of the wing and the aircraft together to demonstrate in court the aircraft which had 

frost on its.21 

Perkins testified he did not believe the crew was aware of the frost when they pushed the 

plane back; he did not alert the ground crew or the aircraft crew that he had observed frost on 

N426SW.22 

Perkins reiterated his testimony about following N426SW from E-1 to observe it taxi and 

takeoff. Looking at SW# R-1, N426SW left the departure gate E-1 Gust off the bottom of the 

photo), headed westbound around the "Y" (the terminal complex resembles a "Y"), turned south 

along the path near theY toward the fence, turned westbound and held at Spot 23 (marked with 

an X inside a circle #2); he testified he came abeam ofN426SW at a spot marked with an X 

inside a circle (with #1 next to the X). FAA# -3 was taken with available light; he believed 

sunrise was 0738 hours; it appeared the picture ofN426SW was taken while N426SW was in the 

shadow of the terminal; the terminal was two stories; when N426SW was pushed back it 

immediately came into direct sunlight; he estimated taxi time to takeoff was eight (8) minutes. 23 

Reviewing his deposition of January 15th, Perkins confirmed the ACARS report that he 

relied on in court was the one he used to create his investigative report; he used the timelines in 

the investigative report based off ACARS and put that information into his report. At his 

deposition Perkins testified N426SW was at Spot 23 for approximately six minutes. Common 

pushback procedure was when the ground crew was done pushing the airplane back from the 

gate, they asked the captain to set the brake; m~anwhile, ground crew disconnected the towbar, 

moved the ground equipment out of the way; the aircraft crew would start the engines; then the 

aircraft crew released the brake at 8:00a.m. and started taxiing. 

Counsel queried " ... it takes them four minutes to move 1 00 feet, but then in two minutes 

they trace this trail all the way out to Spot 23 ... " Perkins responded " ... I believe that's what the 

21 Tr. p. 75, I. 16 top. 105, I. 3. 22 Tr. p. 105, I. 4 top. 106, I. 5. 23 Tr. p. 106, I. 13 top. 120, I. 2. 

7 
A CARS are showing us, yes ... "

24 

Further explaining the procedure, Perkins testified at 8:04 the captain released the brakes; 

N426SW began their taxi for the runway; at 8:08 they were off the ground. Perkins believed 

"out time" (the time N426SW was pushed back from the gate) happened at 7:52-- or 7:51. 25 

Perkins took no notes during his observations. Perkins agreed when N426SW started their final 

taxi at 8:04 was when Perkins realized that they were not intending to deice;26 Perkins admitted 

he had no evidence after 7:48 in the morning whethyr there was frost on the wings ofN426SW 

or not; a 20 minute gap, of knowing not knowing whether or not :frost was still there. 27 Perkins 

interviewed the first officer who said he did a preflight check. Perkins looked at a video tape to 

verify what the first officer told him, but the tape was inclusive.28 

Later the day of the incident Perkins interviewed the flight crew. Captain Gibbs (the 

pilot, hereinafter "Gibbs") said his first officer Burr performed the preflight walk-around; Burr 

did not report frost on the wings to Gibbs. Burr told Perkins he performed the preflight walkaround; Burr said he performed a tactile test ofthe surfaces of the aircraft; Burr said he touched 

the leading edge and the flaps; Perkins found the Burr's statement to be credible; Perkins 

believed Burr performed the preflight walk-around; Perkins believed Burr performed the tactile 

test; Perkins believed the frost formed after the walk-around. 29 

Perkins then interviewed Dan Anderson (hereinafter "Anderson"). Anderson was a 

company pilot and a passenger on N426SW. Anderson had submitted a report to SkyWest's 

Chief Pilot saying he did not see frost on the wings ofN426SW. Anderson told Perkins he 

boarded 20 minutes before pushback which would be about 7:31 a.m. Anderson said he was 

sitting in 6A. From that seat he could see a part of the wing; Perkins testified he saw the part of 

the wing represented in these photographs. Anderson told Perkins he did not see :frost on the 

wings. Perkins believed Anderson's statement to be true. 30 

Perkins testified the violation occurred when N426SW crew did not deice its wings; the 

violation occurred when the airplane left the ground with frost on its wings; otherwise Perkins 

believed th~t the flight crew complied with the deicing program in SkyWest's operations 

specifications. 31 

Redirect 

Perkins elaborated further on push/movement, referring to FAA# -6. Perkins explained 

the push/movement was generated by moving of the wheel, which was an input for the A CARS 

system to record the time. A typical pushback procedure entailed the ground crew using a tug or 

a pushback cart, moving the airplane rearward, typically at a fairly slow speed, out to a 

24 Tr. p. 127, II. I to 6. 25 Tr. p. 120, I. 8 top. 128, I. 12; SW# R-5. 26 Tr. p. 131, I. 6 top. 137, I. 16. 27 Tr. p. 154, II. 4 to 7. 28 Tr. p. 154,11. 12 to 18. 29 Tr. p. 157, I. I top. 160, I. 10. 30 Tr. p. 160, I. 11 top. 162, I. 9. 31 Tr. p. 163, I. 8 top. 164, I. 3. 

8 
predetermined location, the length of push back could vary by the position of the gates. 

Sometimes the pushback was quite far. Sometimes it was close. Sometimes the location of the 

pushback was dictated by air traffic or ground control controlling the ramp. The majority of 

push backs would be the aircraft would start moving for a period of time, and then stop at the end 

of the push back where ground personnel will ask the aircraft crew to set the brake. In other 

instances the ground crew might have to stop and restart the pushback. The speed and the push 

were controlled by the ground tug and the aircraft crew would typically not use their foot brake. 

Typically when the pushback was complete, the ground personnel asked the captain to set the 

brakes then the ground crew disconnected the towbar. Perkins believed N426SW was in direct 

sunlight for 16 minutes. Ifthey started their pushback at 7:52 local, from that point they would 

be clear of the building, from 7:52 to 8:08, 16 minutes. Perkins believed N426SW was in the 

shade while parked at the gate. 32 

Recross 

Perkins admitted the crew could wait for frost to sublimate. At Spot 23, N426SW would 

be oriented with the tail pointed east, the nose pointed west, the wings were canibered33 tilted 

downward more to the east. The wings would be bathed in sunlight for two to six minutes.34 

Thomas H. Bond35 

Thomas H. Bond, (hereinafter "Bond") was offered as an expert witness in the subject of 

aircraft icing and specifically the effects of frost on an aircraft's safety over objection of 

SkyWest. We accepted Bond as an expert, noting the objection would go to the weight given his 

testimony. 

Bond was the chief scientist and technical advisor for flight environmental icing for the 

FAA. He had been in that position over seven years. He had a degree in mechanical engineering 

from Penn State and had worked as an airframe and power plant (hereinafter "A&P") mechanic. 

He worked for NASA starting in 1983, first on intermittent combustion engines, then aircraft 

icing from 1986 to 2007. Within the FAA his duties were directly related to supporting aircraft 

certification services and flight standard services in regards to continuing operational safety. He 

oversaw all the research for the organization and directed it through the FAA tech center. He 

was responsible for the development of closeout of the 1997 aircraft icing plan, the generation of 

the 2012 new aircraft icing plan, and other duties. In the three years prior to the hearing he spent 

a good portion of his time working on ice crystal icing conditions associated with engine damage 

and air data. During his career he had studied ice and frost on aircraft surfaces as well as deicing 

methodologies. He had worked with a CRJ equivale'nt airfoil section. 

Bond testified in his opinion, based on the review of the evidence, frost could have 

32 Tr. p. 166, I. 4 top. 173, I. 4. 33 a slight arching, upward curve, or convexity, as of the deck of a ship; a slightly arching piece of timber. 

Aeronautics: the rise of the curve of an airfoil, usually expressed as the ratio ofthe rise to the length of the chord of 

the airfoil. (Dictionary.com) 34 Tr. p. 173, I. 5 top. 176, I. 13. 35 Tr. p. 180, I. 8 top. 229, I. 17. 

9 
formed on the wing ofN426SW during the period and time in question. 36 

FAA Evidence 

FAA#- 1 through# -7, FAA#- 9 and#- 11 and FAA#- 12 were offered by the FAA 

and admitted into evidence. 

Consistent with past policy of tQ.is court, we took Judicial Notice ofF AA# - 10, FAA 

Order 2150.38. ' '· 

There was no FAA# - 8. 

SkyWest's Motion for Judgment 

At the conclusion ofthe FAA case, SkyWest moved for Judgment in its favor. We 

denied SkyWest's motion at the hearing and affirm our ruling herein. We find the FAA met its 

initial burden of proof at that stage in the hearing. 

B. SkyWest's Case 

David A. Katsilas 

David A. Katsilas (hereinafter "Katsilas") was the lead manager for SkyWest hubs 

including SLC. At the time of these alleged violations, Katsilas was the General Manager for 

SkyWest at SLC. Deicing fell under his purview. On December 7, 2011, there were fifteen (15) 

total SkyWest Aircraft departures of which five (5) received deicing prior to 0900 hours. Of the 

five (5) aircraft receiving deicing, all five (5) of them had overnighted at SLC. Of the other ten 

(10) departures, none of them had overnighted·at SLC, i.e., they came inbound in the morning, 

turned around and departed. In his opinion conditions were conducive for frost formation when 

aircraft were at SLC for extended periods of time, but not for quick turns.37 

Captain38 Thomas Gibbs 

Gibbs was a pilot for SkyWest at the time of the hearing. He had been in that position for 

eight (8) years and was qualified in CRJ200, 700, 900 aircraft. He had 8,000 hours in the 

CRJ200 as a first officer and CAPT. Gibbs had also flown the EMB120 for SkyWest as First 

Officer. He had about 9,500 hours flying at the time of the hearing. He attended the University 

of Maryland, spent twenty (20) years in the military and had taught at Unity Aerospace. After 

active military service Gibbs obtained his flight ratings, flight instructed, and then got hired at 

Sky West. He received his A TP in 2007 and had never had it revoked or suspended. 39 

36 Tr. p. 198, I. 6 top. 215, I. 16. 37 Tr. p. 248, I. 19 top. 254, I. 5. 38 In the aviation industry, this is abbreviated as "CAPT" consistent with U.S. Navy abbreviations. U.S. Army uses 

the abbreviation "CPT". We will use CAPT herein. 39 Tr. p. 254, I. 18 top. 259, I. 13. 

l' 

10 
Gibbs was the pilot in command (hereinafter "PIC") of Flight 7770, herein referred to as 

N426SW. On December 7, 2011, the weather was cold, clear skies, with unlimited visibility. It 

was cold enough to perform a tactile test, which was performed by the First Officer. Gibbs knew 

the First Officer performed the test because he saw Burr's reflection in the glass of the Terminal 

at Gate Echo 1. The First Officer reported no frost on return to the cockpit. The First Officer left 

the aircraft a second time to check the fuel doors, which was about five to ten minutes prior to 

departure, or approximately 0750 hours. The fuel door was located on the wing; to see the fuel 

door you would also have to look at the wing. The First Officer reported no frost the second time 

he exited the cockpit and looked at the wing. Gibbs marked on SW# R- 2B the route N426SW 

took from the gate. 40 Gibbs drew a line from Gate Echo 1 to Spot 21, which he marked with a 

large "X" (the aircraft headed west on the exhibit). Gibbs said they held at Spot 21 for 

approximately six minutes before going to 34 L (the black line going west then turning left or 

south, "34L" at the end of the arrow). N426SW taxied on 34L until the end, turned north and 

departed SLC. Gibbs estimated total taxi time was 10 to 12 minutes. Gibbs testified he would 

not have taxied to Spot 23 because that is an inbound route. The direction out of the south end of 

E concourse was west then north, south on 34L. Based on his evaluation of the ACARS (FAA#-

6) Gibbs estimated it could have been 16 to 17 minutes from push back to departure. 41 

Gibbs was based out of Phoenix and had flown in and out of SLC thousands of times. 

Gibbs never observed ice on the aircraft at any point. Taxi time from the spot the aircraft was 

pushed to until when it was airborne was eight minutes.42 

Dennis Michael Burr 

Burr was the First Officer for SkyWest. He had operated all three variants of the CRJ, 

being 200, 700 and 900. He had a college degree with honors and had worked as a flight 

instructor. He had never been disciplined nor had his certificate suspended or revoked. He had 

been trained in SkyWest's deicing program. He had never knowingly operated an aircraft with 

contaminant on its wings. He was the first officer on Flight 7770/N426SW. He performed the 

preflight on N426SW on December 7. He performed a cold weather inspection which included 

looking at the wings and making sure that there wasn't anything frozen on the airplane. He 

performed both a visual and tactile inspection of the wings on Flight 7770/N426SW. He 

detected no contaminants. There was sufficient light to perform the inspection. He described the 

wing span of the CRJ 200 as 69 Y2 feet from tip to tip, from wing root to tip about half that 

distance. The panels depicted in FAA# - 3 were approximately one foot square. Burr testified 

they taxied out to Spot 21. Burr testified the black line on SW# R-2B (red on the original) was 

the taxi route taken by the aircraft and the large "X" was the approximate location of Spot 21. 

From Spot 21 the aircraft taxied down the taxiway to the end ofthe runway. Gibbs was taxiing 

the aircraft. Burr testified it made no sense to taxi to Spot 23 because that was an inbound taxi 

40 Gibbs marked a large version ofthe SLC map with a red marker. SW# R-2B shows a black mark. The photo in 

evidence was unable to pick up the red color. The marks on R-2B in evidence are the marks the witness made 

except the exhibit is black, the original exhibit was red. 41 Tr. p. 259, I. 15 top. 273, I. 4. 42 Tr. p. 273, I. 16 top. 295, I. 8. 

11 
route. It would not make sense when leaving Gate E-1 to turn left and go south across the ramp. 

FAA# -3 did not represent the wing which Burr saw during his inspection. Burr saw a clean 

wing meaning it didn't have any frozen contaminants on it like frost, ice, snow; it was dry with 

no moisture on it. Burr felt no contaminants when he ran his finger along the wing. The 

atmospheric conditions on the morning when they pushed back from the §ate were a dry and 

clear, clear sky, no clouds, the sun was up. They taxied in full sunshine.4 

Burr believed he did the preflight approximately 20 minutes before departure. He 

performed a tactile and visual inspection of the wing. He believed the sun was up when he 

performed his inspection. The wing of the aircraft would have hit him in mid torso. Burr never 

noticed frost on the wing; he performed a tactile inspection of the wing; he performed a tactile 

inspection of the flaps; and performed a tactile inspection of the top of the wing as far as he could 

reach, which was two and half to three feet. He inspected the leading edge of the wing and the 

upper wing surface. The Tactile test was accomplished by dragging his fingers across the surface 

ofthe wing. During the preflight inspection he would have touched every part of the surface he 

could reach to be sure there was no frost on the wing. He touched the majority of the wing; he 

touched the entire surface of the flap. 44 

Redirect 

Perkins showed Burr an iPhone/iPad picture of the wing purportedly showing 

contamination on the wing. Burr testified that FAA# -3 was not the same picture that he saw on 

December 7. The picture Burr saw on December 7 was so close to the wing he could not tell 

what part of the wing it was. Burr asked Perkins to show him the area of the wing. Burr and 

Perkins went to the wing, Perkins showed Burr the area purportedly displayed in FAA# -3. Burr 

responded he had inspected that portion' of the wing prior to departure and there were no 

contaminants on the area of the wing Perkins pointed to. There was no degraded performance on 

takeoff. 45 

Recross 

Burr confirmed FAA# -3 was not the picture he saw on December 7. The picture he saw 

that day was so zoomed in Burr could not tell what portion of the wing was depicted. Burr tried 

to move the picture- i.e., scroll up down, move in and out- but could not get the picture on the 

iPhone on December 7 to move. That was the reason Burr had Perkins show him on the wing 

where it was on the wing he took a picture from. 46 

Daniel Joseph Anderson 

Daniel Anderson (hereinafter "Anderson") was a pilot for SkyWest with the rank of 

43 Tr. p. 297, I. 8 top. 317, I. 15. 44 Tr. p. 319, I. 17 top. 335, I. 9. 45 Tr. p. 337, I, 14 top. 344, I. 6. 46 Tr. p. 345, I. 6 top. 346, I. 11. 

12 
Captain. He had a little over 5,900 hours in the CJR as a First Officer, but was at the time of the 

hearing a captain on an Embraer. He had performed many preflight inspections. He was a 

passenger on Flight 7770 or N426SW. When Anderson sat down in his seat, he looked out the 

window and observed the aircraft wing was clean of ice. He was in seat 6B, 6A was empty so he 

could see the port side wing. He was able to see from just outboard of the wing root to the 

winglet- about 80% of the wing. Based on his observations he did not believe the aircraft 

needed deicing. He acknowledged that FAA# -3 appeared to show the beginning of frost, but he 

did not see that on the wing of Flight 7770 or N426SW on December 7, 2011. Anderson testified 

the wing panels on the flight were about one foot square with 260 square feet of wing surface. 

During pushback from Gate E-1, the pushback would typically go two parking spaces; the push 

crew would typically push the aircraft backwards until the right wing of the plane pushed from 

Echo 1 would be pointing at either Echo 9 or Echo 11 (SW# R -1. The green circle is Echo 1, red 

"X" is where pushback would typically end, two circles are Gates Echo 9 and 11). Ifthe aircraft 

was going to us taxiway 34L, it would typically taxi to Spot 21. It would make no sense to taxi 

to Spot 23 because that is an inbound spot.47 

Anderson did not observe Perkins or a government car near the aircraft. He observed the 

port wing but not the starboard wing. 48 

Spencer Hyde 

Spencer Hyde (hereinafter "Hyde") was called as a rebuttal witness by SkyWest over the 

objections ofthe FAA. 

The FAA's objection to Hyde's testimony was that Hyde's identity had not been 

disclosed during discovery. SkyWest countered that the photographs which had been introduced 

into evidence in the FAA's case had been requested several times and SkyWest was told that 

they were destroyed. Only during the hearing did both parties learn that the photographs still 

existed. It was not until Perkins testified and disclosed the iPhone pictures did both parties 

become aware the pictures existed. The FAA acknowledged the first they learned the 

photographs existed in electronic format was when Perkins was on the stand at the hearing. 

Under 14 CFR 13.225 we allowed Hyde's testimony as an offer of proof. Upon consideration of 

the entirety of the evidence and testimony we now change our ruling and will allow Hyde's 

testimony. Both counsel are familiar to the court and individuals of high integrity. We take at 

face value the representations of the FAA that they were not aware of the existence of the 

electronic photographs until the hearing. We take at face value that SkyWest was prejudiced by 

their inability to examine the photographs prior to hearing. Both parties were equally surprised 

and prejudiced. This is an administrative proceeding, formal rules of evidence are relaxed. We 

find the photographs in question are relevant and material to the case. We find both parties were 

surprised by the existence ofthe photographs during the hearing. Any prejudice to the FAA was 

of its own making, i.e., it was not until the hearing that the FAA discovered that its own witness 

had possession of a photograph which was important to both parties. The FAA's witness caused 

47 Tr. p. 390, I. 16 top. 415, I. 16. 48 Tr. p. 415, I, 10 top. 419, I. 4. 

13 
the prejudice. We will allow Hyde's testimony, the objection will go to the weight given his 

testimony. Objection to the testimony of Hyde is overruled; the testimony will be received in 

evidence. 

Hyde was an employee ofSkyWest. He had a bachelor's degree from the University of 

Utah with a minor in graphic arts and a graduate degree from Westminster College in 

communications. He had been a graphic designer for about seven years. Hyde described 

'metadata' as information that can be stored along with the file to keep things consistent across 

different formats-- different programs so they can speak together better. Everything digital has 

metadata. Metadata in photograph typically includes a file name and creation data and file size. 

If a file has been modified, the original data should still be in the metadata. He examined the 

electronic photograph and was able to determine it was from an iPhone.49 

Hyde testified he received an electronic copy of a photograph (hereinafter "SW# R-6") 

from Mr. Baird (hereinafter "Baird") at the FAA. The FAA objected to admission of the 

photograph. We overruled the objection. The chain of evidence was from the FAA. We find 

Hyde was qualified to testify on metadata contained in the photograph based on his experience 

and working with various programs. The FAA failed to produce the photograph prior to the 

hearing as set forth herein above. The FAA's objection was overruled; SW# R-6 was received in 

evidence. 

SW# R-6 was forwarded by Baird to Verdean Heiner, who worked in the training 

department at SkyWest. SW# R-6 was a PDF file. The metadata showed the photograph was 

created on December 19,2011 (SW# R-9). The original format was JPEG. The file was 

subsequently converted from JPEG to PDF .. SkyW~.st had a PDF file which was the manner in 

which the photograph was transmitted to SkyWest. Hyde was still able to mine the metadata on 

the PDF and determine when and how the SWS# R-6 was taken. Examining the metadata, Hyde 

was able to determine that original SW# R-6 was taken with an iPhone 3GS (SW# R-8) and 

modified at 8:31 p.m. As a result, from a technical standpoint, the photograph provided SkyWest 

was not identical to the photograph originally existing on the iPhone at the moment the picture 

was taken. 50 

At some point the JPEG file on the phone was converted to PDF. SW# R-9 was 

originally created 12/7/2011 at 7:53 and 11 seconds a.m. The metadata was only as accurate as 

the data that captured it. 12/7/2011 at 8:31p.m. was the last modified date for the file. Different 

things could happen to modify the file. Hyde could not tell what happened to the file, merely 

that it was modified. 5

1 

Redirect 

There were two different dates that a PDF was created, December 7, 2011, 8:31:05 p.m. 

49 Tr. p. 433, I. 9 top. 442, I. 10. 50 Tr. p. 444, I. 3 top. 454, I. 21. 51 Tr. p. 460, I. 18 top. 477, I. 17. 

14 
and again on 12 --December 19,2011, at 10:18:51.52 

Dr. Kevin D. Perry 

Dr. Kevin D. Perry (hereinafter "Perry") was a professor at the University of Utah in the 

Department of Atmospheric Sciences. He held dual positions as associate professor and also as 

chair of the Department of Atmospheric Sciences. Atmospheric sciences are the study of the 

envelope of gases that surround the planet and all of the processes that involve those gases. He 

had a bachelor of science in meteorology from Iowa State University of Science and Technology, 

where he graduated with honors, followed by a Ph.D., in Atmospheric Sciences from the 

University of Washington in Seattle, and then a post-doctoral experience in air quality working 

for the National Park Services at the University of California at Davis. 53 

Perry testified about his credentials as set forth in SW# R-3 which was received into 

evidence. Perry was accepted as an expert in the area of atmospheric science over the objection 

ofthe FAA. As we stated at the hearing, the objection will go to the weight given Perry's 

testimony. 

Perry reviewed the FAA's evidentiary file, downloaded the official weather data from 

SLC system operated by the National Weather Service, downloaded information from the Utah 

Department of Air Quality, the National Weather Service and did literature review on frost 

formation. As a result of his review of data relevant to the facts of this case, Perry generated a 

report at SW# R-4. 

Perry testified that as a result ofN426SW's flight from SOU, the fuel in the aircraft wings 

would become 'cold soaked' 54 and reached the ambient temperature of the atmosphere at flight 

altitude. As the aircraft descended below 14, 500 feet the ambient temperature was actually 

warmer than the surface temperature and above the frost point. On the other hand, fuel from the 

fuel trucks was typically loaded the prior night in preparation for operations the next day and 

would- during this period of time- been exposed to temperatures of minus 9 degrees Celsius, 

which was very close to the frost point. As a result, when the fuel was loaded onto the aircraft it 

would have chilled the wing. 55 In his opinion: 

· Without the additional cooling mechanism of the fuel, the temperature of the 

airfoil would have been too warm for frost to form because the temperature of the 

airfoil would have been greater than the frost point temperature by evidence of the 

fact that there was no frost on the wing from touchdown to taxi to the gate. (Tr. p. 

514, 11. 13 to 20). 

As result of atmospheric influences, the temperature of the wing would adopt the 

temperature of the fuel put on board. Once the engines started, fuel would be circulated, some 

warm fuel returned to the tank and the atmosphere would contribute to wing warming. In his 

52 Tr. p. 477, I. 18 top. 482, I. 10. 53 Tr. p. 484, I. 4 top. 496, I. 12. 54 Tr. p. 511, I. 20 top. 512, I. 6. 55 Tr. p. 496, I. 12 top. 514, I. 9. 

15 
opinion: 

... the explanation for why the aircraft did not pick up frost from landing to the 

taxiway to the gate, because during flight the aircraft fuel had been heated in 

flight preventing the cold soak. (Tr. p. 524, 1. 19 top. 525, 1. 1). ".-~ I 

Perry testified there were sufficient heat sources to remove any frost in eleven (11) 

minutes, assuming there was frost on the wing. In Perry's opinion, based on: 

... the amount of energy that was available and the conservative nature of the 

report that was provided-- the conclusion of the report is that it's extremely 

unlikely thl;tt frost would remain from pushback through takeoff. .. based upon the 

evidence and the calculations that I have performed, I would say that the 

likelihood that the frost had been removed from the surface through these 

additional heat mechanisms would be 95 percent. 56 

Perry testified the dew point temperature and the frost point temperature were 

increasing from early in the morning through the time of the flight. If the amount of energy the 

aircraft absorbed during the taxi period was higher than the amount of energy required to 

sublimate the frost that had formed on the aircraft through his calculations, then there wouldn't 

have been frost at the time of the takeoff. In Perry's opinion any frost was caused by fuel that 

was at or slightly below the frost point temperature. Perry quoted from his report: 

-~ . 

The nature of the frost formation process is sufficiently complicated so that it is 

difficult to predict the rate of formation and its density at a particular time. Many 

of the important characteristics of the frost depend on how it was formed. "

57 

Evidence 

SkyWest offered exhibits SW# R-1 through R-9, all of which were received into 

evidence. 

C. FAA rebuttal 

Dr. Roy Rasmussen 58 

The FAA called Dr. Roy Rasmussen (hereinafter "Rasmussen") as a witness in rebuttal. 

He had been an atmospheric scientist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Boulder 

(hereinafter "NCAR"), CO for twenty-three (23) years. 

The main focus of his work has been on aircraft icing and deicing, essentially any 

weather associated with aircraft operations in the w~nter. He had extensive research, publications 

56 Tr. p. 540, I. 21 top. 541, l. 18. 57 Tr. p. 548, I. 11 top. 583, 1. 1, contains the substantive testimony ofthis witness. 58 Tr. p. 625 1. 22 top. 672, 1. 10. 

16 
and presentations on the subject matter. Prior to the hearing he reviewed Perry's report and the 

photographs in evidence. Rasmussen disagreed with Perry's calculations and assumptions with 

respect any frost on the wings ofN426SW. Rasmussen's testimony discussed heating 

differential between a black surface and the "silver" surface ofN426SW. The significance was 

that a silver object will radiate less energy than a black object, which was important to determine 

whether any frost would have remained on the wing ofN426SW. 

When shown a sample segment of a wing with Sky West colors Rasmussen admitted the 

sample was Silver-Gray. 

VIII. Analysis of Evidence and Testimony 

A. Agency's case 

The testimony of Perkins was that he saw frost and photographed frost on the wings of 

N426SW. Perkins did not perform a tactile test on the wing. 

Perkins testified N426SW left the terminal and traveled to Spot 23. N426SW remained 

at Spot 23 for several minutes before Perkins observed N426SW make a left turn at the taxiway 

which took them down to the runway for takeoff. 59 

Perkins believed there was frost on the wings ofN426SW. 

Rasmussen's testimony was predicated on radiation from a polished silver wing and frost 

was possible. Rasmussen testified it was possible that N426SW had frost on its wings in 

violation of the regulations. 

B. SkyWest's case 

Burr testified he performed a tactile test on the wings of the aircraft and found no frost on 

any surfaces. Thereafter Burr exited N426SW immediately prior to departure to check the fuel 

door. Burr observed no frost on the wings on his second walk around N426SW nor while 

checking the fuel door. 

Anderson was sitting in a position to observe the left wing ofN426SW. He observed no 

frost on any surfaces. 

Gibbs watched Burr perform part of the tactile test by observing his reflection in the 

terminal window. Gibbs said he taxied from the Gate to Spot 21, that it would make no sense to 

taxi to Spot 23 because to do so N426SW would be using an inbound taxiway and an inbound 

spot. 

Perry testified that it was unlikely there was any frost on the wing, but if there was heat 

59 Tr. p. 36, I. 10 top. 37, I. 10. 

17 
from the wing and other conditions would cause it to evaporate. 

There were inconsistencies between Perkin's testimony and that of Sky West witnesses. 

Perkins testified he observed frost on the wings but did not perform a tactile test. Burr 

performed a tactile test and found no frost. An,derson observed no frost on the wings while 

sitting in a position inside N426SW where he could observe the wing. Perkins testified N426SW 

departed the gate and traveled on one taxiway to Spot 23. SkyWest witnesses testified it would 

have been contrary to SLC traffic flow to travel in the direction Perkins indicated because to do 

so would be using an inbound taxiway and spot. SkyWest witnesses testified they traveled an 

outbound taxiway to Spot 21 prior to departure. 

The FAA's expert testified about N426SW's alleged frost accumulation on the 

assumption N426SW was silver in color. SkyWest's aircraft colors were silver-gray. According 

to Rasmussen's own testimony that would change the radiation emanating from the wing. 

The photographs are of little help based on a poor chain of custody and documented 

changes in formatting. We draw no conclusions and make no assumptions other than the format 

of the photographs were changed to the surprise of all parties. 

Clearly Perkins believed he observed frost on the wing ofN426SW. The FAA has failed 

to present any testimony and/or evidence to substantiate Perkins' conclusion. 

The SkyWest eyewitnesses observed no frost on N426SW. SkyWest witnesses contradict 

the FAA witnesses on the path N426SW took from the terminal to the holding spot and thereafter 

to the runway for departure. · ,: 

C. Credibility determination(s) 

We find the testimony of all witnesses to have been truthful and credible. 

The testimony of the expert witnesses was informative and instructive, but ultimately 

rebutted each other. 

IX. Law 

14 C.F.R. provides in part: 

14 C.F.R. Section 91.13(a) provides: 

(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No person may operate an 

aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. 

14 C.F.R. Sections 119.5(g), and 119.5(1), provide: 

18 
(g) No person may operate as a direct air carrier or as a commercial operator without, or 

in violation of, an appropriate certificate and appropriate operations specifications. No 

person may operate as a direct air carrier or as a commercial operator in violation of any 

deviation or exemption authority, if issued to that person or that person's representative. 

(I) No person may operate an aircraft under this part, part 121 of this chapter, or 

part 135 ofthis chapter in violation of an air carrier operating certificate, 

operating certificate, or appropriate operations specifications issued under this 

part. 

I 4 C.F.R. Section 121.629(b) provides: 

(b) No person may take off an aircraft when frost, ice, or snow is adhering to the 

wings, control surfaces, propellers, engine itl.Iets, or other critical surfaces of the 

aircraft or when the takeoff would not be in compliance with paragraph (c) of this 

section. Takeoffs with frost under the wing in the area of the fuel tanks may be 

authorized by the Administrator. 

X. Findings of Fact 

We find that the evidentiary facts, by a preponderance of the evidence standard, do not 

support findings that SkyWest violated either 14 C.F.R. Section 91.13(a), 14 C.F.R. Sections 

119.5(g), and 119.5(1), nor 14 C.F.R. Section 121.629(b). 

We find the FAA failed to make a prima facie case with respect to the violations as set 

forth hereinabove. 

We find the FAA failed to carry its burden of proof with respect to each of the 

violations alleged. 

XI. Conclusions 

'· 0 , il 

We find the evidentiary facts and testimony, by a preponderance of the evidence 

standard, do not support findings that violations of 14 C.F.R. Section 91.13(a), 14 C.F.R. 

Sections 119.5(g), and 119.5(1), nor 14 C.F.R. Section 121.629(b) occurred. 

Pursuant to 14 CFR §13.225, "offer ofproof'60 the FAA sought to have Bond testify 

whether N426SW took off with frost on its wings. Sky West objected to the question and we 

sustained the objection. The FAA then made an offer ofproofas set forth hereinabove. The 

question posed lacked a proper foundation, specifically: formation of any alleged contamination, 

dew point, frost point, ambient temperature, the amount of sunlight available. We also find the 

experience enumerated in Bond's answer was not relevant to the question posed. The question 

also goes to the ultimate determination of this court. Accordingly, our ruling sustaining the 

objection stands. 

60 Tr. p. 221, 1. 12 top. 229, 1. 4. 

19 
Objection to the testimony of Hyde is overruled; the testimony was received in evidence. 

The FAA's objected to the admission ofSW# R-#6 was overruled, SW# R-6 was 

received in evidence. 

WHEREFORE, evidence and testimony having been heard and considered and taking the 

totality of the evidence and testimony as a whole we find the FAA failed to establish a prima 

facie case supporting the violations enumerated above, inclusive. Therefore it be and is hereby 

ORDERED as follows: 

The Complaint be and is hereby dismissed, with prejudice. 61 

Richard C. Goodwin 

U.S. Administrative Law Judge 

Attachment- Service List 

61 This decision may be appealed to the Administrator of the FAA. The notice of appeal must conform to sections 

13.210, 13.211 (e) and 13.233 of the Rules of Practice, which require that a notice of appeal 1) be filed not later than 

10 days (plus an additional five days if mailed) from the service date ofthis decision, and 2) be perfected with a 

written brief or memorandum not later than 50 days (plus an additional five, if mailed) from the service date of this 

decision. The notice of appeal and brief or memorandum must either be a) mailed to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430, 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, or b) delivered personally or via expedited courier service to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, Washington, 

D.C. 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. A copy of the notice of appeal and brief or memorandum also 

must be sent to agency counsel. Service upon the presiding judge is optional. 

20