Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SELECTED NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND POINTS OF TRANSSHIPMENT

Persian
Gulf
IRAN

Nuclear Facility _"

Key Airfield___ +
Key Por_&

Boundary reprasentatons are net nacessalyauthonatve

\ ~ i
ARMENIA. UZBEKISTAN
“x AZERBANJAN f MH
we ‘ong
} . i TURKMENISTAN
cf Caspian
“| Sea
Karaj “#: ‘
4 ® TEHRAN |
+

Mehrabad /

(

rs

\

( AFGHANISTAN
‘Esfahan

IRAQ \

IRAN ‘
er 4. Bushehr ‘ PAKISTAN
‘SAUDI ARABIA

Bandar Abbas |

aoe

Gulf of Oman

Major ports and airfields serve as key transshipment points for the delivery of NBC and missile related material.

CHEMICAL PROGRAM

Iran’s offensive chemical warfare program began in
1983 in response to Iraq’s use of mustard gas against
Iranian troops. By 1987, Iran was able to deliver
limited quantities of blister (mustard) and blood
(cyanide) agents against Iraqi troops using artillery
shells.

Iran has been producing chemical agents at a
steadily increasing rate since 1984, and has cumu-

latively produced at a minimum several hundred
tons of blister, blood, and choking agents. Tehran
has weaponized some of these chemical agents —
a weapons stockpile to support ground combat
operations. In addition, Iran could attempt to
deliver chemical bombs against targets such as
airfields, ports, or oil installations across the Persian
Gulf.

Iran has increased defensive and offensive chemical
warfare training for its ground forces in the last two



Section I
SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan would be catastrophic, both in terms of the
loss of life and for potentially lowering the thres-
hold for nuclear use in other parts of the world,
particularly the adjacent Middle East/North Africa
region.

Deployment of ballistic missiles would pose espe-
cially troubling security risks given the relatively
short distances between major population centers in
South Asia and the brief time required for missiles
to travel such distances. This factor will compress
decisionmaking cycles for national leaders and
battlefield commanders, reducing stability during
times of crisis.

In addition to the immediate risks to regional
security, the development of NBC weapons in
South Asia has the potential to undercut broader
U.S. and international nonproliferation objectives.
Both India and Pakistan, for different reasons, have
refused to sign the NPT. Their nuclear programs,
outside of this widely accepted international norm,
serve as dangerous examples for nations in other
regions.

The NBC weapons and missile infrastructures in
South Asia also pose potential proliferation threats,
as possible sources of supply. India and Pakistan’s
slowness to adopt export controls consistent with
established international control regimes is reason
forconcern. As each nation continues its programs,
the danger of transferring technology to states out-
side the region remains possible.

THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE:
REGIONAL CAPABILITIES,
INTENTIONS, AND TRENDS

India and Pakistan

The bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan,
which dates to the partitioning of the subcontinent
in 1947, remains the impetus behind the prolif-
eration of NBC weapons and missiles in the region.
The security dynamics of the region are compli-
cated further by India’s perception of China as a
threat. Pakistan’s efforts to develop NBC weapons
and missile systems are intended primarily to
counter India’s substantial conventional military
advantage and its perception of India’s nuclear
threat.

36

India and Pakistan continue to cloak their NBC
weapons programs in secrecy or deliberate ambi-
guity. Both continue to deny possessing nuclear
weapons, while periodically issuing veiled threats
alluding to their capability to employ these weapons
if necessary. India and Pakistan deny possessing
chemical and biological weapons, but point with
pride to the progress of their indigenous missile
development programs.

India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred
by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing’s
1964 nuclear test. New Delhi continues to view its
northern neighbor as a long-term threat despite
recently improved relations. It sees Pakistan’s NBC
weapons and missile capabilities as a more imme-
diate threat. Nuclear rhetoric from Pakistani
leaders and Islamabad’s pursuit of a mobile SRBM
capability reinforce India’s perception that New
Delhi continues to need a nuclear capability.

Pakistani leaders believe that a nuclear capability is
essential to deter war with India, or failing that, to
ensure the survival of the nation. Its nuclear pro-
gram has widespread political and popular support.
Missile procurement and development, initially to
counter the Indian missile program which began in
the mid-1980s, are driven by a desire to augment
limited offensive air capabilities against India
(which holds almost a 3:1 advantage in combat air-
craft) and to field a more effective delivery system.

NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

India’s very active nuclear energy development
program has enabled it to obtain all of the essential
materials and facilities for producing nuclear
explosives. It has not signed the NPT, but is a
member of the IAEA, and several Indian nuclear
reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.

India’s program, older and larger than Pakistan’s,
included a nuclear detonation in 1974, described by
India as a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” India is
currently capable of conducting another test within
a short time of deciding to do so. It has an advanced
nuclear program, with facilities to support the
complete nuclear fuel cycle. India produced its
stock of weapons-grade plutonium in reactors at the
Bhabha Atomic Research Center near Bombay,
which are not subject to IAEA safeguards.



Section I
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Additionally, serious concerns exist regarding the
potential for illegally acquiring and trafficking in
industrial nuclear and radioactive materials, which
are commercially available in Russia. This type of
material is particularly vulnerable to theft from
nuclear power plants and research facilities.

By May 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons had been
removed from Ukraine to Russia. Further, on
January 14, 1994, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine,
and the United States signed a statement regarding
the withdrawal and dismantlement of all remaining
strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine. One month
later, Moscow and Kiev reached a further under-
standing concerning specific measures to imple-
ment the January statement. In December 1995,
Ukrainian officials said that about 1,410 warheads
had been removed from their country. All warheads
probably will have been withdrawn by mid-1996.

By April 1995, all nuclear weapons had been
withdrawn from Kazakstan. This occurred under a
March 1994 bilateral agreement between Almaty
and Moscow. The ICBM airframes that remain in
Kazakstan probably will be withdrawn in 1996.

Belarus has agreed with Russia to return the nuclear
weapons located on its territory. These weapons
include tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn by July
1992 and the SS-25 ICBMs and their associated
nuclear warheads being withdrawn currently. As of
December 1995, only 18 SS-25 missiles and war-
heads remained in Belarus. Belarus is expected to
complete all SS-25 withdrawals by the end of 1996.

Chemical Programs

The United States has a number of questions and
concerns regarding the chemical warfare program
Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia has
the largest and most advanced chemical warfare
program in the world and maintains a considerable
stockpile of nerve, blister, and choking agents.
Moscow has repeatedly stated that its chemical
weapons stockpile consists of 40,000 metric tons of
toxic agents in weapons and in bulk storage. A
consolidation effort has been underway since the
mid-1980s, and President Yeltsin declared in
January 1992 that all former Soviet chemical
weapons had been transferred to Russian territory.

32

Russia has signed but not yet ratified the CWC.
Under the Convention, Russia would be obligated
to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons and
destroy or, consistent with CWC requirements, con-
vert former chemical weapons production facilities
to peaceful purposes.

Currently, Russia has no large-scale chemical war-
fare destruction facilities and is unlikely to begin
full-scale destruction before the late 1990s. The
Russian chemical warfare destruction program has
been stymied by delays in formulating a plan,
building facilities, obtaining needed foreign tech-
nical and financial assistance, and obtaining legis-
lative approval.

Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have no known
chemical warfare programs and no intention of
establishing them.

Biological Programs

The United States continues to have concerns about
Russian compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention, despite President Yeltsin’s decree in
April 1992 banning all activities contravening the
Convention. Russia may be retaining capability for
the production of biological warfare agents. The
Soviet Union’s offensive biological warfare pro-
gram employed thousands of its best scientists at
numerous facilities, almost all of which are located
in Russia. In addition, as with its nuclear materials,
Russia’s biological warfare technology may be
vulnerable to leakage to third parties.

Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have no known
biological warfare programs and no intention of
establishing them.

Ballistic Missiles

Some 1,300 ICBMs and SLBMs are deployed in
Russia. In addition, another 50 deployed opera-
tional ICBMs are located in Ukraine and slated for
dismantlement, and the 18 ICBMs remaining in
Belarus are to be returned to Russia. Many Russian
ICBMs and SLBMs are slated for dismantlement
under START I, and more will be destroyed under
START II. Russiaalso has an inventory of SCUD-B
and SS-21 SRBMs.


Section I
SOUTH ASIA

Nuclear
‘Weapons

Chemical
Weapons

Biological
Weapons

Delivery
Systems

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: STATUS OF PROGRAMS

Both possess fissile material.

India, with its large industrial base, can produce precursors for chemical warfare agents.
Pakistan must obtain precursors for chemical agent production.

Pakistan is conducting research and development with potential biological warfare applications.
India’s efforts are geared towards defense.

Both have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear and chemical weapons.
Both are developing missiles.
** India: Has two missile programs:
~ Prithvi - short range (150-250 km)
— Agni — intended range (2,000 km)
** Pakistan: Has two missile programs:
— Hatf I - short range (80 km)
— Mobile SRBM — approximately 300 km range

4l



Section I
NORTHEAST ASIA

The North Koreans are looking well beyond the
NODONG. Currently, they are designing two new
missile systems — the TAEPO DONG 1 and
TAEPO DONG 2 — which have estimated ranges
greater than 1,500 and 4,000 kilometers, respec-
tively. Though neither missile has been flight
tested, the designs of both are likely based on new
combinations of existing missile system com-
ponents.

CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF
DELIVERY

North Korea has four types of land- and ship-based
anti-ship cruise missiles. Since the 1980s, North
Korea has produced two variants with ranges of
about 100 kilometers based on Soviet and Chinese
technology. It is developing a longer-range anti-
ship cruise missile, flight-tested in 1994.

North Korea has a wide variety of combat aircraft
capable of delivering NBC weapons, including
MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21, Su-25, and Su-7
fighters; Il-28 bombers; and Mi-2, Mi-4, and Mi-8
helicopters. The North could use its indigenously
produced artillery, multiple rocket launchers,
mortars, and agricultural sprayers to disperse
chemical agents. North Korea has a very limited
air-to-surface missile capability.

ROLE AS SUPPLIER

North Korea has provided hundreds of SCUD
missiles to countries in the Middle East, such as Iran
and Syria, and is developing and marketing the new
1,000 kilometer-range NODONG missile. These
sales provide Pyongyang with critically needed
foreign exchange. North Korea has received
millions of dollars worth of bartered goods and ser-
vices and hard currency for its deliveries, and it will
continue to market missiles and missile-related
technology to support its weak economy. Although
North Korea is an active supplier of missiles and
related production technology, it has not yet become
a supplier of nuclear, chemical, or biological war-
fare-related technology.

China

Since mid-1991, China has shifted from avoidance
to participation in international arms control

regimes. In 1992, it acceded to the NPT and agreed
bilaterally with the United States to abide by the
guidelines and parameters of the MTCR. In 1993,
Beijing signed the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). And, in October 1994, Beijing reaffirmed
its commitment to abide by the 1987 version of the
MTCR Guidelines and committed not to export
ballistic missiles inherently capable of reaching a
range of 300 km with a payload of 500 kg in
exchange for the United States agreeing to lift the
MTCR Category II sanctions it imposed in August
1993 for China’s transferring M-11 related equip-
ment to Pakistan. In addition, China has expressed
support for negotiating a multilateral convention
banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and endorsed the 1994 U.S.-North
Korean Agreed Framework. While China con-
tinues to conduct underground nuclear tests, it has
stated that it intends to sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty in 1996.

Nonetheless, some Chinese commercial trans-
actions, particularly transactions involving nuclear-,
missile-, and chemical-related technologies to
unstable regions such as the Middle East and South
Asia, raise serious proliferation concerns. The
Chinese continue to modernize their inventory of
nuclear weapons systems, which now includes over
a hundred warheads deployed operationally in
medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Since
becoming a nuclear weapons state in 1964, Chinese
officials have declared a policy of “no first use”
repeatedly, and have stated that China’s nuclear
arsenal is for self-defense only.

China has a mature chemical warfare capability and
may well have maintained the biological warfare
program it had prior to acceding to the Biological
Weapons Convention in 1984. It has funded a
chemical warfare program since the 1950s and has
produced and weaponized a wide variety of agents.
Its biological warfare program included manu-
facturing infectious micro-organisms and toxins.
China has a wide range of delivery means available,
including ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft,
and is continuing to develop systems with upgraded
capabilities.

China plans to expand its already substantial
nuclear power program by constructing several new
plants during the next 20 years. China continues to



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,

AND CHEMICAL DAMAGE CONTOURS

t ) Nuclear

The damage contours shown indicate
the 450 Rad dose region for the
prompt radiation effects and the
distribution of fallout from the surface
5 burst of a 20kt nuclear device.

Cross Range (km)
°

Chemical

The damage contours shown indicate
the chemical dosage effects (ranging
from 0.1 mg-min/m® to 100 mg-min/m*)
for a large missile filled with large
sub-munitions containing GB (Sarin).

Cross Range (km)
°

a
°
a
3
a
0
8

O Biological

The damage contours shown indicate
the areas of biological contamination
for a missile filled with multiple

ee bomblets containing anthrax agent.

The areas correspond to 80, 50, and
5 35 percent casualties.

Li
Ke

Cross Range (km)
°

“Ss 0. 5 10 15 20
Down Range (km)

more difficult to produce. More weapon- and
program-unique technologies are needed. How-
ever, the cases of Iraq and South Africa suggest that
programs designed to produce a small number of
weapons are feasible and may be difficult to detect.

more expensive to produce than chemical and
biological munitions.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS

The incremental costs of proliferation vary. Little
additional investment may be needed to transform

Introduction

a civilian chemical or biomedical capability into a
weapons program, particularly one for low-rate
production. More weapon-program-specific costs
are likely to be associated with nuclear prolif-
eration. The same cost relationships hold on a per-
weapon basis. Nuclear weapons are significantly

A number of delivery system options are available
for terrorist or paramilitary delivery of NBC
weapons. States that want toemploy NBC weapons
to support military operations are likely to make use
of combat aircraft, ballistic missiles, or cruise
missiles.



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

on requirements to prepare for major regional
contingencies that may involve adversaries with
NBC weapons.

The threat of the use of ballistic missiles has grown
enormously over the past two decades. Ballistic
missiles have been used in six regional conflicts
since 1973. During the Gulf War, the United States
and its Coalition partners were unable to locate
Iraq’s mobile launchers and halt ballistic missile
attacks. Ballistic missiles — coupled with NBC
weapons — will pose an even greater threat to U.S.
security and that of allies and other friendly nations.
To effectively counter such threats, a layered
defense is optimal, with effort being made to attack
prior, at, or immediately after launch so that NBC
warhead debris and contamination do not land on
friendly territory or troops. While engagement
prior to launch is optimal, it may be more practical
in some situations to engage missiles after they are
launched. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organi-
zation (BMDO) has the lead in this technology and
acquisition effort.

To achieve active defense against missiles armed
with NBC warheads in a theater conflict, DoD has
developed a theater missile defense (TMD) arch-
itecture that will entail deployment of multilayered
defenses. These layers consist of a lower tier
including Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3),
Navy area TMD, and Corps Surface-to-Air Missile/
Medium Extended Air Defense System (SAM/
MEADS), and an upper tier comprising Theater
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy
wide-area TMD; and boost phase intercept.

The technologies necessary to destroy enemy
ballistic missiles during boost phase soon after
launch are still being developed. Additional efforts
are aimed at gaining a better understanding of the
dispersion of BW/CW agents in flight and methods
for neutralizing them to reduce collateral effects
associated with ballistic and cruise missile engage-
ments.

BMDO is currently conducting several TMD
programs including: (1) boost phase intercept; (2)
demonstration, validation, and engineering manu-
facturing development for various TMD concepts
including Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, the Navy Upper
Tier and Lower Tier Systems and Corps SAM/
MEADS; (3) advanced sensor technology and

52

innovative science and technology RDT&E pro-
grams for post-2000 defense systems; (4) threat and
countermeasures projects that define adversary
military systems to ensure a robust defense system;
and (5) assessment, modeling, and experimental
activities involving collateral effects release assoc-
iated with attacking cruise and ballistic missiles
armed with NBC weapons. BMDO has budgeted
approximately $2.4 billion in FY 1996 to support
these programs.

BMDO active defense programs are supplemented
by a number of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), Navy, and Air Force
programs. In its air defense initiative, DARPA is
developing the Mountain Top radar for defense
against manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater
ballistic missiles; $45.6 million has been budgeted
for the program in FY 1996. BMDO and the Navy
will also provide FY 1996 funding for the Mountain
Top ACTD (Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration). DARPA’s Enhanced Program for
Cruise Missile Defense will provide additional
sensor platforms and fire control capabilities to
accelerate its overall air defense initiative; $57
million has been budgeted for this program in FY
1996.

The Air Force is managing three programs in this
area: the Theater Missile Defense program, the Air-
borne Laser (ABL) program, and the Space Sensor
and Satellite Communication Technology program.
The Air Force will field one ABL prototype with a
contingency capability in 2001. The ABL destroys
theater ballistic missiles in the boost phase, causing
debris to fall on enemy territory, and it also provides
a rapidly deployable wide-area defense capability.
Approximately $47 million has been budgeted for
these activities in FY 1996.

COUNTERFORCE

This component of counterproliferation involves
development of military capabilities to target (using
battlefield surveillance and other intelligence
assets), plan attacks, seize, disable, destroy, disrupt,
interdict, neutralize, or deny the use of NBC
weapons and launch platforms and their supporting
command, control, and communications (C3);
logistics structure; and reconnaissance, surveil-
lance, and target acquisition platforms while mini-
mizing collateral effects. Attack operations include
action by air, land, sea, space, and special opera-
tions forces.



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

is released anyway, perhaps over U.S. or coalition
forces.

Other items on the CINCs’ priority list being
pursued and discussed later in this section include
improvements in capabilities for the detection and
tracking of NBC shipments; prompt mobile target
kill; support for Special Operations Forces; and the
ability to locate, detect, and disarm NBC weapons
in the United States and overseas.

Acquisition

The CINCs, working through the JCS, identify their
requirements for passive defense, active defense,
counterforce, and capabilities against covert/para-
military threats. The DoD acquisition strategy
accelerates programs to meet these requirements,
redressing shortfalls and funding research and
development (R&D) to provide capabilities that
cannot be met with current systems and technol-
ogies. The JWCA Counterproliferation Team is a
mechanism for providing linkage between regional
commanders’ requirements and the Department’s
R&D investment programs.

To provide focus for the Defense acquisition
strategy, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Atomic Energy has been designated as the lead
for counterproliferation programs within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The same
official serves as the oversight authority for
chemical/biological defense programs.

At the direction of Congress, a Non-Proliferation
Program Review Committee (NPRC) was con-
stituted in 1994. In its May 1994 report to Congress,
the primary volume of which has been made
available to the public, this committee identified
key areas in which progress was needed to improve
government-wide capabilities for proliferation
prevention and protection. DoD established the
Counterproliferation Support Program specifically
to address the DoD shortfalls in operational capa-
bilities identified by the NPRC. Congress provided
the Counterproliferation Support Program with $60
million in FY 1995 to jump-start the program, and
$108.2 million has been requested by the Admin-
istration in FY 1996 to accelerate the development
and deployment of essential military counterpro-
liferation technologies and capabilities. In addition,
$57 million was added to the existing cruise missile

50

defense programs (in the FY 1996 President’s
Budget Submission), bringing the total DoD
enhancement for FY 1996 to $165.2 million. These
funds assist the Department in addressing specific
counterproliferation priorities in tandem with the
existing DoD-wide FY 1996 investment of approx-
imately $3.8 billion in programs related to counter-
ing proliferation (of which $2.4 billion is research,
development, test and engineering (RDT&E) fund-
ing to provide an active defense capability).

A follow-on Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee (CPRC) comprised of the Secretary of
Defense (chairman), Secretary of Energy, Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI), and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff was constituted by Congress to
provide status reports on activities to accomplish
improvements identified by the NPRC. The result
is a coordinated national investment strategy for
counterproliferation. Details are contained in the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
Report on Activities and Programs for Countering
Proliferation, May 1995. Again, in the interest of
informing the public, most of this committee’s
product has been released for general distribution.

The Department is focusing its investments in
military systems to support counterproliferation in
four areas: passive defense; active defense; counter-
force; and measures to counter paramilitary, covert,
and terrorist NBC threats.

It should be noted that the programs outlined below
represent proposed, new, and ongoing DoD projects
and new initiatives strongly related to countering
proliferation. General purpose and defense infra-
structure programs, such as the development and
procurement programs for the various military
weapon delivery platforms, are not included
because they contribute to the basic capabilities of
USS. forces as well as capabilities for countering
proliferation. Most of the new investments leverage
existing and other in-development capabilities.

PASSIVE DEFENSE

In response to congressional direction, the Defense
Department has established an integrated Chemical-
Biological Defense (CBD) program under the
oversight of the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Atomic Energy. The same’official has
oversight responsibility for the Joint Program
Office for Biological Defense created to provide



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

This has expanded from a primarily nuclear focus to
include chemical and biological weapon threat
detection, characterization, and analysis.

International Cooperation

It is very likely that we will not fight alone on the
battlefields of the future. Future conflicts are likely
to involve coalition operations, as was the case in
the Gulf War. Building and maintaining coalitions
in such conflicts will be one of the keys to successful
military operations. The ability to protect our
populations, territory, and forces, and those of our
friends and allies, therefore, becomes a paramount
consideration in building and maintaining coali-
tions, as well as succeeding in military operations.
As aresult, the Defense Counterproliferation Initia-
tive places great emphasis on international coopera-
tion in preparation for future crises or conflicts
where the threat or use of NBC weapons may be
present.

DoD has been working with America’s long-time
allies in Europe and Asia to develop a common
approach to counterproliferation. Following Presi-
dent Clinton’s emphasis at the January 1994 NATO
Summit on the danger to Alliance members from
NBC proliferation, significant progress has been
made in integrating counterproliferation policy into
the new, post-Cold War agenda of the Alliance.

At the summit, NATO Heads of State directed that
the Alliance intensify and expand its political and
defense efforts against proliferation. Three groups
were subsequently created: the Joint Committee on
Proliferation (JCP), which monitors overall
Alliance efforts; the Senior Politico-Military Group
on Proliferation (SGP), which focuses on how
NATO can reinforce traditional nonproliferation
efforts; and the Senior Defense Group on
Proliferation (DGP), which examines the defense
aspects of proliferation, including the military
capabilities needed to discourage NBC prolif-
eration, deter NBC weapons use, and if necessary,
to protect NATO territory, populations, and forces.

In May 1994, NATO approved two milestone
documents: a political framework paper structuring
the broad political-military approach of the
Alliance to proliferation, and a three-phase work-
plan for the DGP to address the defense impli-

56

cations of proliferation. The DGP is co-chaired by
the United States and one of the European Allies on
arotating basis. France provided the first European
co-chair. Having assessed the risks posed by the
proliferation of NBC weapons to the Alliance, the
DGP has begun the next phase of its work, in which
it is grappling with the operational implications of
the threat or use of NBC weapons for Alliance
military capabilities. In this task, NATO is building
on the relevant capabilities of the national militaries
and the ongoing work of NATO planning groups.
NATO is working to establish a framework for
defense activities related to proliferation and to
reach conclusions on the full spectrum of Alliance
and national capabilities needed to deal with the
range of proliferation threats.

The DGP’s work is an important part of the
Alliance’s continuing adaptation to the new security
environment. NATO shows that the United States
is not alone in its concern for the defense dimension
of proliferation. Today, the Alliance sees dealing
with proliferation as one of its key missions. This
demonstrates that the Alliance remains committed
— indeed, well-qualified — to address emerging
security concerns. It also provides a tangible
example of the continued interest of the European
allies in cooperative transatlantic security with the
United States.

The Government of Japan has also recognized the
growing danger from attacks with missiles,
including those armed with NBC warheads, the
need to strengthen the defensive capabilities of U.S.
and Japanese forces, and the necessity of main-
taining capabilities for combined joint operations.
To meet this threat, the United States and Japan are
working to identify the theater missile defense
capability Japan will need and to evaluate options
for acquiring that capability in future years,
including opportunities for cooperative programs.

DoD is currently beginning other cooperative
efforts with allies. A defense science symposium
involving participants from the United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia was con-
ducted in the United States in March 1995. This
symposium focused on counterproliferation tech-
nology applications and on the identification of
opportunities for collaborative research and develop-
ment to enhance counterproliferation capabilities.
The United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom have initiated a cooperative R&D



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE,

escort and monitoring requirements under the
verification provisions of several U.S. treaties and
agreements. A total of $84.6 million has been
budgeted for OSIA inspection support in FY 1996.
The primary export control and international non-
proliferation regimes are outlined below, with
specific DoD contributions highlighted.

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR
MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS
(COCOM) SUCCESSOR REGIME

COCOM was a Cold War era export control regime
in which the United States and allies restricted the
export of technologies to the Soviet Union and other
communist countries. DoD has played a central role
in negotiations designed to replace COCOM with a
new export control regime. The aim is to provide
transparency, responsibility, and restraint in the
transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use
technologies to countries and regions of concern, to
include areas where U.S. and allied forces might
face hostile military actions. This regime is
designed to complement and reinforce other export
control regimes. Through cooperation and sharing
of information, it will enable the United States and
other participating countries to better track and
monitor sensitive arms and technology transfers as
they occur. Russia and other formerly COCOM
proscribed countries have been given incentives,
such as greater access to advanced technologies, to
join the regime — provided they agree to follow the
regime’s rules. This parallels other DoD efforts,
such as CTR, to address the potential spread of NBC
weapons and their delivery systems, advanced
conventional weapons, and sensitive dual-use tech-
nologies from Russia and other states of the former
Soviet Union.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
(MTCR)

The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement of 28 states
including the United States, Canada, Western
Europe, Russia, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
Argentina, and Hungary. It controls exports of
equipment and technology — both military and
dual-use — that are relevant to missile develop-
ment, production, and operation. DoD provides
intelligence and operational expertise for the
national-level decisions that are made, on a case-

60

by-case basis, concerning implementation of this
regime’s controls.

NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS’ GROUP (NSG)

This group, comprising 30 countries, seeks to
control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and
technology, both nuclear-specific and dual-use.
Russia is a member of this group. Other former
Soviet Republics — notably Belarus, Ukraine, and
Kazakstan — are not. China and Brazil are among
the major potential suppliers of nuclear resources
that are not members. The United States’ position
is that observance of NSG guidelines for nuclear
exports by all potential suppliers (irrespective of
their decision to join the group) is crucial for
controlling the flow of nuclear materials and
technologies.

AUSTRALIA GROUP

The Australia Group is an informal arrangement of
29 industrial countries including the United States,
Canada, most of Western Europe, Japan, New
Zealand, and Australia. It seeks to prevent the
spread of chemical and biological weapons material
and dual-use technology. The group holds informa-
tion exchanges and prepares lists of chemical
precursors, microorganisms, and related equipment
for member countries to control by export licensing
and monitoring.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

The United States is seeking to conclude negoti-
ations in the Conference on Disarmament on a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. A CTBT
will strengthen the global norm against prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons and constrain development
of nuclear weapons capability in both proliferant
states and acknowledged nuclear weapon states.
DoD provides technical expertise in the CTBT
negotiations. The Defense Department’s Advanced
Research Projects Agency has a program to demon-
strate the capabilities of seismic and nonseismic
monitoring systems for use in verification of a
CTBT (approximately $14 million has been
budgeted for FY 1996). The Air Force also has a
program, the Nuclear Detonation Detection
System, which is aimed at improving capabilities to
detect nuclear detonations. Approximately $16
million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for this
program.



Section IT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

completed to ensure that all aspects of the issue are
assessed. DoD assessments have been coordinated
with congressionally mandated national reviews.
Several acquisition programs already in the pipeline
have been augmented to remedy identified short-
falls. Proliferation protection measures can be
grouped into five areas of emphasis: policy, mili-
tary planning and operations, acquisition, intelli-
gence, and international cooperation initiatives.
While much work is yet to be done to acquire the
required capabilities, there have been significant
achievements to date.

Policy

President Clinton’s September 1993 policy state-
ment to the United Nations General Assembly
established the groundwork for building a new
consensus within the United States and with our
friends and allies abroad concerning counter-
proliferation objectives.

Early in his Administration, President Clinton
issued guidance defining national nonproliferation
policy objectives. Responding to this guidance, the
Secretary of Defense issued DoD implementation
instructions. Counterproliferation objectives and
capabilities are now routinely addressed in the
Department’s planning and programming proc-
esses, with prominent emphasis in the Defense
Planning Guidance. Military planning, training,
and exercises now give much more emphasis to
proliferation when potential major regional contin-
gencies are addressed.

The underlying objective of the Defense Counter-
proliferation Initiative is to make counterpro-
liferation one of the matters that is routinely given
consideration within the Department’s activities.
Counterproliferation is not of a unique nature
requiring a stand-alone organizational structure.
Rather, counterproliferation considerations have
ramifications for virtually every aspect of the
defense mission in this new security era and,
therefore, should be embedded in the day-to-day
operations. Secretary Perry has directed the estab-
lishment of a DoD Directive to fully reinforce
implementation of counterproliferation policy. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy has been assigned responsibility for

48

the development and implementation of DoD’s
counterproliferation policy.

Proliferation protection is based on the enhance-
ment and utilization of existing resources. Pro-
liferation protection requires a broad range of
capabilities, including effective strategic and tacti-
cal intelligence; battlefield surveillance; counter-
force; active defense; passive defense; and response
to paramilitary, covert, and terrorist threats.

Military Planning and Operations

One of the objectives of the DoD Counterprolif-
eration Initiative is to integrate proliferation con-
cerns into the existing DoD defense planning
process. At the request of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CICS) conducted a review of the missions of the
CINCs and functions of the armed services in
support of the counterproliferation policy. To guide
his study, the CJCS issued terms of reference for
counterproliferation activities to combatant com-
manders that cover situations where the military
might be called upon to support U.S. policy. The
study addressed how the Services organize, train,
and equip their forces to support the counter-
proliferation policy and the missions, responsibil-
ities, and force structure of each combatant command.

The final report of the Missions and Functions
Study was approved by the Secretary of Defense on
May 5, 1995. It recommended that counter-
proliferation be assigned to the U.S. armed forces as
amilitary mission. On May 24, 1995, the President
subsequently revised the Unified Command Plan to
reflect this decision. The mission to counter the
proliferation of NBC weapons was assigned to
those combatant commanders (CINCs) most
directly responsible for carrying out the defense of
USS. national interests overseas where proliferation
occurs and its immediate impact is felt — namely,
the CINCs with geographic areas of responsibility.
The assignment of counterproliferation as a defini-
tive military mission will result in optimized
organizational arrangements between supported
and supporting CINCs, development of counter-
proliferation-specific operational concepts, and
tailored relationships between the CINCs and the
USS. Intelligence Community and other govern-
ment agencies that will improve U.S. forces’ ability
to operate and prevail against an NBC-armed adver-

sary.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SELECTED NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, AND MISSILE FACILITIES

TURKEY

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Despite severe war damage and over four years of UN inspections, Iraq retains some infrastructure to resurrect many

of its NBC weapons and missile programs.

the Osirak and Isis reactors, part of Iraq’s large
nuclear research complex at Tuwaitha in Baghdad.
From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, Baghdad
experienced several setbacks, the most notable
being the Israeli air strike on the Osirak reactor in
June 1981 shortly before its first fuel was to be
loaded. With the loss of this reactor, Baghdad
apparently refocused its nuclear weapons effort on
producing highly enriched uranium. Its interest in

19

acquiring plutonium as fissile material for weapons
continued, but at a lower priority.

Iraqi scientists concurrently investigated almost
every viable uranium enrichment technique. Docu-
ments seized by IAEA inspectors in 1991 revealed
a broad-based Iraqi effort to design and develop a
nuclear weapon. In addition, in August 1995, the



Section I
SOUTH ASIA

NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SELECTE

D INDIAN AND PAKISTANI

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India's program, older and larger than Pakistan's, culminated in 1974 with a nuclear detonation and

has progressed from there.

As additional indigenously-built nuclear power
reactors become operational, India’s capability to
produce plutonium without safeguards will in-
crease. India has the resources for producing and
reprocessing plutonium and for enriching uranium.
It also has the ability to conduct nuclear tests, which
would support attempts to produce more advanced
weapons. However, New Delhi’s willingness to
refrain from conducting additional nuclear tests
could inhibit the development of such weapons.

India is believed to have a stockpile of fissile mate-
rial sufficient for fabricating several nuclear weap-
ons and could probably assemble at least some of
these weapons within a short time of deciding to do so.

37

Pakistan began its nuclear weapons program in
response to losing the 1971 war with India and
accelerated it following India’s 1974 nuclear test.
Pakistan has not signed the NPT, but it has taken the
public position that it would do so if India were to
sign it also. Like India, not all of Pakistan’s nuclear
facilities are under IAEA safeguards.

Relying heavily on foreign assistance, Pakistan has
developed a diverse, clandestine procurement net-
work to support its weapons development effort.
Although it has become increasingly self-sufficient
in producing highly enriched uranium and in
engineering and fabrication technologies, Pakistan
will remain dependent on foreign suppliers for
sophisticated materials and technical assistance



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

Military Significance

Biological weapons can inflict casualties over a
very large area. Much of their military effectiveness
is due to this area coverage. A number of additional
factors impact on the effectiveness of a BW attack.
It may not be immediately evident that an attack has
taken place. The attack may employ novel agents
that are not well-characterized and for which there
may not be vaccines or treatments. Decontam-
ination may be difficult if deployed sensors cannot
detect the agents utilized.

Even if immediate effects on military personnel are
mitigated, perhaps through the use of protective
masks, the impact on affected civilian populations
may have a major effect as civilians evacuate and
military forces render assistance to afflicted
personnel. Furthermore, personnel effectiveness is
reduced when the protective mask is worn, and
psychological impact may be significant.

Biological weapons are a horrifying reality. A
number of states have BW programs. Experience in
the Gulf War showed the hazards our forces might
face during contingency operations:

“By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had
developed biological weapons. Its advanced and
aggressive biological warfare program was the
most extensive in the Arab world. Although
Baghdad stated in 1991 it was in compliance with
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, the program probably began in the
late 1970s and concentrated on the development
of two agents — botulinum toxin and anthrax
bacteria. (United Nations inspection teams were
later to find evidence of these two toxins, as well
as clostridium perfingens.) Large scale pro-
duction of these agents began in 1989 at four
facilities near Baghdad. Delivery means for
biological agents ranged from simple aerial
bombs and artillery rockets to surface-to-surface
missiles.”

Source: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 15.

A-5S

COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL
WEAPON EFFECTS

All three types of NBC weapons have effects that
can cause damage or contamination over large
areas. Each of these areas would be sufficient to
cover the typical port or airfield that might support
USS. forces during a major regional conflict. The
example presented below is biased against chemical
and biological munitions. A line source carried by
an aircraft might provide 10 times as much coverage
for a biological munition, particularly if weather
conditions were favorable.

Some differences between the effects of NBC
weapons merit attention. While all three types of
weapon can kill or injure personnel and spread
contamination over broad areas, only nuclear
weapons can destroy equipment and facilities.
Some military effects are weather-dependent —
dispersal of chemical and biological agents and the
distribution of fallout or radiological contam-
ination.

Military efficacy can vary over time. Once chem-
ical or biological weapons are first used, informa-
tion becomes available concerning the agents used,
which allows agent-specific antidotes to be identi-
fied and protective postures adopted. While some
protective measures can be implemented subse-
quent to initial use of nuclear weapons, such as
dispersal of forces, the efficacy of nuclear weapons
does not have the same variation over time.

Particularly in situations in which a small number of
NBC weapons are delivered through unconven-
tional means, attacks may be anonymous. In the
case of biological warfare, the existence of an attack
may be open to question — the cause of the disease
may not be obvious.

Any state that has biomedical or chemical research
and production facilities or that has radio-
therapeutic centers in hospitals has the basic
technologies needed to develop biological, chemi-
cal, or radiological weapons. Nuclear weapons are



SECTION II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE 47
Introduction ... 47
Protection ..... 47

Overview .. 47

Policy .... 48

Military Planning and Operations . 48
Acquisition 50
Intelligence 55
International Cooperation 56
Prevention ..... 57
Overview . . 57
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program : 57

Denial ..........- 60s eee eee eee : 58
Reassurance and Dissuasion . . 61

Actions to Reverse Proliferation . 62
Conclusion 2.62... 6. cece eee eee eens see 62

TECHNICAL ANNEX

ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES . A-l

Overview .. 2... c ieee eee eee : A-1

Nuclear Weapons ... A-l
Chemical Weapons . . A2
Biological Weapons .. A-3
Comparison of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapon Effects A5
Delivery Systems ............-0-000005 A-6
Acquisition and Protection of Strategies ... A-8
Supporting Technologies . . A-10
Conclusion A-12
GLOSSARY .020200 0c es B-1

vi



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

While technological aspects of developing ballistic
missiles are challenging, they are well and widely
known. Thus, attempts to block a determined
adversary are likely only to slow development. As
more nations begin deploying ballistic missile
defenses, their adversaries will likely begin devel-
oping countermeasures to these defenses, which
need not be expensive or involve high technology,
to create difficulties for the defense, especially for
missiles targeted to terrorize civilians.

Cruise Missiles

Article two of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty provides a useful definition:
“A cruise missile is an unmanned, self-propelled
vehicle that sustains flight through the use of
aerodynamic lift over most of its flight.” Cruise
missiles may be even less expensive and more
accurate than ballistic missiles, and their smaller
size may make them an even more elusive target for
counterforce operations. Furthermore, they may
also be more difficult to defend against than manned
aircraft because of their lower radar cross-sections.
Even though short-range anti-ship cruise missiles
are already widely available, there are only a few
countries that possess long-range land-attack cruise
missiles. However, there are no technological
barriers preventing developing nations from devel-
oping or purchasing these relatively inexpensive,
potentially very accurate delivery systems.

Even unsophisticated unpiloted aerodynamic vehi-
cles — or cruise missiles — could be configured to
accomplish a variety of missions. Such aero-
dynamic vehicles are widely available, inexpensive
(to purchase, support, and operate), small, mobile,
easy to hide, capable of being launched from a
variety of launch platforms (air, ground, ship, or
submarine) without significant modifications to the
missile, potentially hard to detect in-flight, and
(with global positioning systems (GPS)) accurate to
afew tens of meters. Depending on the details of the
design, they could be difficult to detect, track, and
defeat with current active defenses.

Although they can be designed to deliver their
payloads to great distances (both the United States
and the former Soviet Union built cruise missiles
with range capabilities of more than 3,000 km), the
majority of aerodynamic vehicles can only achieve

A-8

short ranges of less than 250 km. It should be noted
that the effective range of an aircraft-carried cruise
missile is a function of both the aircraft’s range
(when carrying this load) and the missile.

There is little proliferation, as yet, of long-range
land-attack cruise missiles. But because of the
Tomahawk’s apparent success in the Gulf War,
indigenous development programs for long-range
cruise missiles can be anticipated among proliferant
nations. These nations may also purchase tech-
nology, hardware, and complete systems from other
countries.

ACQUISITION AND PROTECTION OF
STRATEGIES

Countries intent on obtaining NBC weapons or
missile capabilities must either buy the necessary
hardware or establish their own capability. In the
case of military attack, they also must devise ways
to protect their capabilities from destruction. These
countries use a variety of covert and overt strategies
to attain their goals, all of which make it difficult for
us to determine the status of their programs.

= Some countries establish purchasing networks
to conceal the supplier or recipient of foreign
assistance. Typical networks feature the use of
front companies and intermediaries in several
countries to mask the transfer of the technology
or equipment. Other key linkages of a covert
network include banks, false end user cer-
tificates, numerous transshipment points, and
several methods of shipment.

= Some countries exploit dual-use technologies
to conceal the actual intended application of
imported items. Much of the technology,
components, or production facilities needed for
the production of NBC weapons or missiles
may have peaceful purposes. Such dual-use
items are difficult to track, particularly as a
proliferator is likely to claim a benign or
legitimate use for them. For example:

== The key ingredients of nuclear weapons,
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
plutonium, have potential civil uses as
reactor fuel to produce electricity or for
research,



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

Combat Aircraft

Combat aircraft are already available in every
country that has or is suspected of acquiring NBC
weapons — and are being modernized in most.
Such aircraft can carry more payload than either
ballistic or cruise missiles. Piloted aircraft offer
flexibility in delivering NBC weapons and perhaps
superior capabilities in dispersing chemical or
biological agents. They can be used effectively in
most circumstances, if they can be affordably
employed in sufficient numbers to overcome
modern air defenses. If involved in a conflict with
the United States, they must also overcome U.
offensive air capabilities. However, even small
numbers of aircraft armed with NBC weapons can
cause significant damage.

Major investments are required to acquire and
sustain a combat aircraft capability and the
associated infrastructure, training, operations,
support, and technology improvements needed to
maintain a viable ability to penetrate modern air
defenses — which are increasingly effective and
widely available. Transfer of stealth technology
could strengthen the effectiveness of combat
aircraft in delivering NBC weapons — but not
simply or cheaply. Such high technology combat
aircraft would be very expensive to acquire,
operate, and maintain — and would become
particularly high value military targets, inherently
dependent on fixed, usually well known, airfields
— vulnerable to attack in any sustained regional
conflict. (Harriers and other vertical take-off and
landing aircraft are exceptions to this generali-
zation.)

For most nations developing NBC weapons,
advanced fighters and strike aircraft offer the
capability to strike at greater range than their
current ballistic or cruise missiles. The market for
advanced aircraft is highly competitive, involving
economic, political, and military considerations
that preclude any significant reduction in the
availability and modernization of such aircraft that
would permit NBC weapons delivery to ranges
between 500 and 1500km. Military aircraft capable
of delivering NBC weapons to greater ranges are
generally limited to the industrial powers; this is
likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future.
Note, however, that the effective range of an NBC

delivery system aircraft can be extended if the
weapon is carried as an air-launched cruise missile.

Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles offer potential proliferators
several advantages over manned aircraft — as
evidenced by the fact that over two-thirds of the
NBC weapons states of concern also have programs
to acquire them. They are less expensive to acquire
and sustain than a modern air force. Their mobility
makes them far less vulnerable to U.S. offensive
operations than manned aircraft with their ties to
fixed air bases. Perhaps of most importance, until
the Gulf War, the absence of any defense against
ballistic missiles offered them a free ride to their
targets. Furthermore, we can anticipate that states
with more launch capability than demonstrated by
Jraq during the Gulf War will launch large scale
salvo attacks against high priority targets, with
smaller numbers of missiles being directed against
targets of opportunity. Salvo attacks maximize
damage and compensate for the inaccuracy of older
technology missiles.

The potential for coercion is perhaps the long-range
ballistic missile’s greatest value to a proliferator and
the greatest challenge for those seeking to restrain
that state. Beyond their coercive value in threat-
ening distant cities and ability to drain military
resources seeking to counter that coercive threat,
missiles — if sufficiently accurate and/or lethal —
can also pose major direct military threats.

From the perspective of the leader of a state,
ballistic missiles are an effective instrument —
even the weapon of choice — to threaten the rear of
U.S. and coalition forces in the face of U.S. air
superiority. Missiles are much less expensive than
acquiring and maintaining a world-class air force
competitive with U.S. military aviation; missiles
with a low profile infrastructure and mobile
launchers are much less vulnerable than aircraft to
U.S. offensive operations; missiles are easier to
control than other means of deep strike; and even
when armed with high explosives, missiles can have
considerable psychological effects when used
against urban targets.

Attempts may be made to accelerate development
by purchasing ballistic missile technology and
technological know-how from other countries.



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

== With the removal of specialized equipment
for tracking an airplane, surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) can be adapted as single-
purpose ballistic missiles as shown on the
chart:

PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC
MISSILES DERIVED FROM
RUSSIAN SA-2
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE

China Produced its own SA-2 — the CSA-1

Modified CSA-1 into SRBM — the
CSS-8 (range — 150 km)
Sold CSS-8 to Iran

Attempted to convert SA-2 into
300 km range SRBM (AI Fahd 300)

Attempted to use SA-2 as second stage
sustainer for 2,000 km range IRBM.
(Tammouz 1)

Traq

India

Developed two versions of Prithvi
SRBM — ranges 150 km and 250 km

Used Prithvi as second stage for Agni
IRBM — intended range 2,000 km

Some countries conceal NBC facilities to pro-
tect them from attack by constructing under-
ground and other hardened facilities. Placing
an NBC capability — a weapon, a delivery
system, or a production complex — within a
hardened facility enhances a country’s ability to
conceal the facility’s location, while providing
additional protection against attack. Outer
perimeter protection in such facilities may
involve concrete and steel roofs with earth
cover. Other options include use of tunnels,
including existing coal and salt mine com-
plexes and natural caves that can be both deep
and extensive. Within a hardened complex
such measures as blast doors, barriers, turns in
tunnels, and expansion chambers can channel
and deflect blast waves, mitigating weapon
effects.

The Iraqi facilities attacked during the Gulf War
were for the most part from an early generation
of protective facilities construction. Because of
the success achieved by U.S. weapons against
these type facilities, a new trend has been
observed: the use of deep underground facili-
ties such as abandoned mines or tunnels into
hills and mountains. Modern excavating equip-
ment has speeded the process of constructing
such facilities and has reduced construction
costs.

Countries routinely use denial and deception to
in order conceal research, development, pro-
duction, and storage programs and facilities; to
prevent detection of illicit technology acqui-
sition efforts; to degrade international efforts to
detect and confirm undeclared programs; to
hide noncompliance with arms control agree-
ments; and to ensure wartime survival of sensi-
tive programs and facilities.

States use methods such as official secrecy,
clandestine acquisition programs, signals security,
emissions control, disguised or fake installations
and equipment, underground facilities, environ-
mental shielding, and technical camouflage to hide
their programs. Finally, states use deceptive
measures such as false official cover stories and
disinformation.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES

Introduction

A number of technologies and technology applica-
tions support the development and use of NBC
weapons and associated delivery systems. Among
the most critical are those that improve proliferants’
ability to locate targets, accurately deliver muni-
tions, and thwart non- and counterproliferation.

Target Acquisition

In order to make effective use of NBC weapons,
proliferants must have accurate information con-
cerning the location and status of targets — what is
the precise distance and direction between the
launch points of the NBC delivery systems and the
intended target? — what ports and airfields are
supporting operations?



Section I
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

and actions regarding the safety, security, and
dismantlement of this massive inventory and
commitment to cease all offensive BW activities
have been positive, although Moscow still needs to
fully implement these commitments, and_ its
adherence to some proliferation control norms has
been uneven.

The magnitude of the numbers, the complexity of
weapons systems to be moved, dismantled, or
destroyed, and the vast distances involved have
been and will continue to be daunting challenges to
Russia and to U.S. interests for several years to
come. In the face of serious economic and political
challenges, most of Moscow’s actions regarding its
strategic programs — and the actions of Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus — demonstrate a commit-
ment to denuclearization and nonproliferation.
Nonetheless, the United States continues to have
concerns about Russian biological and chemical
warfare programs, including about information
provided by Russia regarding those programs.

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have
stated publicly that they consider proliferation to be
a potential threat to their own security. Although
compliance with the various nonproliferation
norms varies, turbulent political, social, and
economic conditions continue to complicate their
nonproliferation efforts. Additionally, scientists
and technicians may be enticed to emigrate by
money from abroad, and could provide critical
knowledge to develop such weapons to nations with
emerging NBC weapons programs. Furthermore,
crime and corruption are significant threats to the
security of nuclear materials. The December 1994
Czech seizure of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is
one of several cases involving smuggled nuclear
material that serves as a stark example of the need
to safeguard these materials. These and other
factors could have an adverse effect on Western
efforts to prevent proliferation.

As a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union,
Russia assumed control over thousands of strategic
weapons. Russia is a party to the START I Treaty
and has signed the START II Treaty that will reduce

30

significantly the size of its strategic forces. It is also
removing nuclear weapons and delivery systems
from Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, primarily
for dismantlement.

In his February 1994 State of the Union Address,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin described one of
two priorities for Russia’s national security as:
“strengthening the arrangements governing the
nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and
sophisticated technologies, and enhancing control
over the international arms trade while watching
over Russia’s commercial interest in this sphere.”
Russia has continued to implement effective export
controls on missile-related items, and in August
1995, Russia joined the MTCR.

Ukraine agreed in January 1994 to return the
strategic nuclear warheads located on its territory to
Russia for dismantlement in exchange for security
assurances, compensation for the nuclear material
in the warheads and expanded Western assistance.
Ukraine has acted on its commitment by returning
strategic nuclear weapons to Russia. In accom-
panying letters to the Lisbon Protocol, the former
Republics of Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus
agreed to eliminate from their territory all former
Soviet nuclear arms. In addition, Ukraine acceded
to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state on
December 5, 1994. This action fulfilled a Russian
precondition for implementing START I, which
entered into force on December 5, 1994. In May
1994, Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing with the United States, committing itself to
adhere to MTCR Guidelines.

Kazakstan also faces major challenges, but has
demonstrated its commitment to denuclearization
and nonproliferation in several important ways. It
ratified START J and the Lisbon Protocol in 1992
and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons
state in 1993, Also, Kazakstan informed the United
States about a vulnerable cache of approximately
600 kg of HEU and cooperated with a joint
Department of Defense/Department of Energy
team in removing the cache from Kazakstani soil for
safe and secure storage in the United States.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

years. Furthermore, it is making efforts to buy
defensive chemical equipment from foreign
sources, perhaps a prelude to acquiring indigenous
production capability.

Although Iran has signed the CWC, its efforts to
establish an independent chemical production capa-
bility and a wider program to put chemicals into
battlefield weapons cast doubt on its adherence to
the agreement.

BIOLOGICAL PROGRAM

Tran began its biological warfare program in the
early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. It made agree-
ments with numerous countries for cooperative
research, scientific exchanges, and technology
sharing. The Iranians are conducting research on
toxins and organisms with biological warfare appli-
cations.

With their biotechnical support structure, the
Iranians are capable of producing many different
biological warfare agents. Iran has evolved from
piecemeal acquisition of bioprocessing equipment
and is now pursuing complete biological production
plants that could be converted to producing bio-
logical warfare agents. Some of its major univer-
sities and research organizations may be linked to
its biological warfare program.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Iran first acquired SCUD-B ballistic missiles from
Libya and North Korea and used them during the
Iran-Iraq war. Later it received SCUD-B and
SCUD-C missiles from North Korea, and CSS-8
missiles and other material from China. Iran fired
nearly 100 SCUD-B missiles at Iraq from 1985 to
1988. As was the case with chemical weapons,
Iran’s motivation to improve and expand its ballistic
missile force results from the war with Iraq, during
which Iran could not respond adequately to Iraqi
missile attacks on Iranian cities.

IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILES

Missile Estimated Range

Type (Kilometers) source

SCUD-B 300 Libya and North
Korea

SCUD-C 500 North Korea

CSS-8 150 China

(converted SA-2)

Iran has a two-track ballistic missile program. In
addition to acquiring SCUD missiles and missile-
related equipment from North Korea, it also seeks
to establish its own missile production capability.
Its production program is planned for both liquid-
fueled and solid-propellant missiles. As part of the
process, Iran has already begun assembling missiles
using foreign-made components and eventually it
may produce these components domestically. Fur-
ther, it is actively attempting to acquire other
assistance and missile-related technology from a
variety of foreign sources for its goal of producing
an MRBM.

With its current inventory of missiles, Iran can
strike targets in neighboring countries, including oil
installations and ports in Saudi Arabia. With a
longer range missile, such as the North Korean
NODONG, it would be able to strike targets in Israel
and in most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF
DELIVERY

Iran has Chinese land-based and shipborne anti-
ship cruise missiles and Russian air-to-surface
missiles, and has experience in employing some of
them in combat conditions. During the Iran-Iraq
war, for example, Iran fired at least 10 coastal-based
Chinese missiles at Kuwait, one hitting a U.S.-
flagged oil tanker. Iran will continue to rely on
China as its supplier of cruise missiles. In addition,
Iran has artillery and aircraft that can deliver
chemical and biological agents and Russian-made
Su-24 fighter-bombers that could deliver nuclear
weapons.



Section I

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

MISSILES IN DESIGN OR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE OPERATION DESERT STORM

GERMANY

\
\

upya\,

VA ’
ui
Baltic
Sea
AUss)

\

Vf

Tia _o tare

- ~,

RUSSIA N.

|
!
PAKISTAN

=== AlAbbas
—— Badr 2000

—+— Tammouz!

\ 7 ‘ INDIA
NIGER
CHAD
\,_. supan
i IRAQ *
Missile System Range (Km) SA 4
. AlFahd 300 300 l
—— AlFahd500 500 Indian Ocean 0

950

1,000 g
2,000 KENYA
A

Boundary representations are not necessary authoritative.

I Z

Missile
Al Fahd 300

Al Fahd 500

Al Abbas

Badr 2000

Tammouz I

Al Abid

Iraqi Declarations to the UN

Intended range of 300 km. Based on converting the Russian SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM)
into a ballistic missile. Abandoned in research and development.

Intended range of 500 km. Displayed at 1989 Baghdad Arms Exposition. A mock-up for a
disinformation campaign that never reached the design phase.

Claimed range of 950 km. Longer in length and carried a lighter payload than the Al Husayn.
Abandoned during research and development.

Intended range 750-1,000 km. Solid-propellant, 2-stage. Based on Argentine Condor missile.
Facilities constructed to support missile production. Under research and development.

Claimed range 2,000 km. Based on SCUD technology with SA-2 SAM sustainer for second
stage. In design stage, but not developed further for research and development.

A 3-stage space launch vehicle. First stage consisted of 5 Al Abbas airframes. Test launch of
first stage in December 1989.

22


Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

rebuild Iraq’s conventional military forces and
reconstruct its NBC warfare and ballistic missile
capability.

Historically, Iraq had developed NBC weapons and
missiles programs to support Saddam’s two primary
goals mentioned above. Saddam has demonstrated
his willingness to use chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles for their tactical, strategic, and
psychological value. Iraq orchestrated the develop-
ment of these weapons by diverting dual-use
technologies and creating extensive procurement
networks with front companies. Since the end of
Operation Desert Storm, the United Nations has
challenged Baghdad’s lack of cooperation and its
noncompliance with UN Security Council Reso-
lutions (UNSCR). Iraqi government officials have
used concealment, deceit, and intimidation with the
aim of eventually rebuilding their missile force and
their nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
programs.

RESOURCES

Iraq’s economy remains weak because of United
Nations’ sanctions. These sanctions, based on a
number of UNSCRs, prohibit arms imports as well
as most industrial imports that support the civilian
sector. Iraq also is not permitted to export oil or
other goods unless the proceeds are spent on food
and medicine (under UN supervision), and its assets
abroad remain frozen. Although industrial pro-
duction has increased since the end of the war, it is
only about one-third of its pre-war level. In
November 1993, Iraq accepted UNSCR 715 calling
for continued UN monitoring of Iraqi weapons
programs; unfortunately, all indicators suggest that
this acceptance does not signal Iraqi intentions to
forego eventually rebuilding its NBC weapon capa-
bilities.

STRATEGY

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, Iraq system-
atically misled foreign suppliers and governments
regarding the actual end-users of purchases.
Further, Iraq purchased controlling interests in
selected Western companies to obtain legal
mechanisms for placing orders for products subject
to export controls. It employed middlemen and
established front companies to facilitate covert
acquisition activities to funnel dual-use technol-

ogies to Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi government sent
numerous students to Western universities to study
nuclear technology so that these individuals could
eventually support Iraq’s nuclear program.

Iraq has continued its deceptive efforts to keep alive
elements of its NBC weapons and missile programs,
as demonstrated by the August 1995 public dis-
closures concerning the extent of Baghdad’s bio-
logical warfare effort. Another example of Iraq’s
noncompliance is a December 1993 incident
involving the interdiction of a shipment of
ammonium perchlorate — a dual-use chemical with
solid missile fuel applications. The shipment was
a violation of UNSCR 715, which Iraq had already
accepted.

The return of production equipment, computers,
and documentation removed from key facilities
prior to and during Operation Desert Storm has
expedited reconstruction of military industries.
Furthermore, Iraq is preserving enough of its NBC
weapons programs to provide the foundation for
revitalized efforts once sanctions are lifted and
inspections ease or are terminated.

Traq’s large number of scientists and technicians is
one of its most valuable resources for rejuvenating
its programs for NBC weapons and missiles. Iraq
retains the services of several thousand scientists,
engineers, and technicians who were previously
employed in its nuclear weapons program. With
this pool of expertise, together with significant
foreign assistance and supplies, Iraq could probably
rebuild its nuclear weapons program and
manufacture a device in about five to seven years.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Traq’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon pro-
duction capability constitute a textbook case of the
many avenues a country can pursue to reach this
objective. To realize its nuclear weapon ambitions,
Traq established a broad, multifaceted program to
produce fissile material and to develop the asso-
ciated technology essential for nuclear weapon
design.

Iraq began laying the groundwork for its nuclear
weapons program in the 1970s, when it attempted
unsuccessfully to purchase a plutonium production
reactor similar to the one France used in its nuclear
weapons program. In 1976, France agreed to build



Section I
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Kazakstan had returned to Russia all the strategic
nuclear warheads on its territory by April 1995.
Kazakstan does not possess, nor can it afford to
acquire, the infrastructure needed to maintain and
operate a nuclear force.

President Nazarbayev’s Comments
on Denuclearization
March 24, 1994

“Kazakstan is fulfilling its pledges for the
elimination of nuclear weapons. We were the
first CIS state to ratify START I and the Lisbon
Protocol. The only delays were due to the fact
that we were trying to secure guarantees that
this is our lawful property and that we will be
compensated for the cost of the enriched
uranium.”

Kazakstan inherited a small amount of the Soviet
Union’s defense industrial facilities. The outlook
for Kazakstan’s defense industry remains bleak.
There is limited demand for weapons internally;
few of the military systems are exportable; and most
importantly, Russian orders have been drastically
reduced. However, Russia and Kazakstan will
retain close military ties through a series of military
cooperation agreements, encompassing Moscow’s
20-year lease of the Baikonur Cosmodrome
(Tyuratam Space Missile Test Center), and various
military test ranges.

Belarus is also committed to denuclearization. In
February 1993, its parliament ratified the START
Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, and acceded to the
NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, thereby
codifying Belarus’ intent to become nuclear-free.
Also, Belarus and Russia have agreed that the
withdrawal — already underway — of nuclear
weapons and support equipment located in Belarus
will be completed by the end of 1996. Further, in an
effort to provide evidence of its commitment to
nonproliferation, Minsk is cooperating with the
United States on improving the Belarus export
control system.

31

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC

NUCLEAR WARHEADS
1991 1995
Russia 7,327 6,530
Ukraine 1,512 300
Kazakstan 1,360 0
Belarus 81 18
Total 10,280 6,848 *

* 33% reduction

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES

1991 1995

Russia 2,074 1,345

Ukraine 210 50

Kazakstan 144 0

Belarus 81 18
Total 2,509 1,413*

* 44% reduction

Nuclear Programs

Russia’s immediate challenge is to account for and
control the approximately 27,000 tactical and
strategic nuclear warheads that it inherited from the
former Soviet Union. Moscow maintains strong
operational launch control of the strategic nuclear
weapons it inherited. However, the large number of
tactical nuclear weapons and the need to protect
them from theft or sale are serious security and
proliferation concerns.

Russian statements and actions are consistent with
the large-scale dismantlement efforts now under-
way. These efforts will generate tons of recovered
weapons-grade plutonium and hundreds of tons of
highly enriched uranium by 2004. The United
States has contracted to buy low enriched uranium
(LEU) from 500 metric tons of HEU from dis-
mantled weapons. In addition, weapons dismantle-
ment requires Russia to construct new, or refurbish
old, storage facilities for this fissile material.
Frequent and often long-distance movements make
the materials vulnerable to loss or theft during
transit between sites within Russia, as well as from
Belarus and Ukraine to sites in Russia.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

THE PERSIAN GULF: A REGION VITAL
TO WORLD ECONOMIC STABILITY

2
&
8
os
%

Ras Tanurah:
BAHRAIN

® RIYADH

Boundary representations are nat necessarily

Say,

SAUD! ARABIA

PERSIAN GULF

Key Oil Facility

Key Logistics

IRAN

l

About 40 percent of world oil imports come from the Persian Gulf.

supporting Islamic activism in other areas in the
Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Iran’s efforts to add
to its military power and acquire NBC weapons and
missiles support these national objectives.

Since becoming president in 1989, Hashemi
Rafsanjani has sought to win international political
acceptance for Iran in order to gain European and
Japanese financial assistance to rebuild Iran’s
economy and military forces. Although some of
Iran’s public rhetoric has moderated, Iran’s covert
actions indicate its leadership is pursuing a policy of
sponsoring terrorism and assassinations of exiled
Iranian dissidents, opposing Middle East peace

efforts, and working to acquire and improve its
NBC weapons and means of delivery.

Iran has placed a high priority on possessing NBC
weapons and missiles since Tehran’s defeat in the
Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Iran has an adequate tech-
nological base to support chemical agent and
missile production activities and a biotechnical
structure capable of supporting the production of
biological agents. Nevertheless, Iran is attempting
to expand its current technological base to achieve
self-sufficient production in all phases of NBC
weapons and delivery systems. In the nuclear
weapons arena, Iran is attempting to acquire an



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

GENERAL PURCHASING NETWORK

|_| Supplier
Intermediary Consumer
ountr

Ml consumer (Country A)
PVUNUUOEUELOEUELEEE

—— Attempted Route uum

—» Actual Route

Government Agency

(Country A)

Front Company

(Country A) —_—————
Intermediary Intermediary Intermediary
Company Company Contact (Purchasing Agent)
(Country C) (Country D) Made (Country C)

Shipping Route
Attempted Routes
p Stop _ Intermediary
Halted by ——————]__ (Country E)
Government B

Supplier
Export Company —
(Country B)

(

In this example, the export company in Country B attempted to deliver illegal _material to Country A. After several unsuccessful
attempts, the company found an alternate route that circumvented export controls and it delivered the material to the customer
in Country A.

== Many precursor chemicals have dual uses: mone, can also be used to produce signifi-
Thiodiglycol, previously used for ball- cant quantities of biological warfare agent.
point ink, can be converted to mustard on .
agent by a simple (single) chlorination step. The hardware, technology, and production

facilities of SLVs are essentially inter-
changeable with those of ballistic missiles.

== Fermenters used in the production of beer, TM= UAVs for the delivery of insecticide are
antibiotics, enzymes, and other therapeutic adaptable as cruise missiles for the delivery
products, such as insulin and growth hor- of chemical or biological agents.

A-9



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

security, and control during movement and interim
storage. Projects provide assistance to enhance
effective controls over nuclear weapons and the
fissile materials removed from them throughout the
drawdown and dismantlement of these weapons.
This includes providing safe and secure trans-
portation of nuclear weapons from operational sites
and storage areas to dismantlement facilities;
improved security and accountability for weapons
in transit; safer and more secure storage and
transport of fissile material removed from nuclear
weapons by providing storage containers; and
designing, equipping, and assisting in construction
of centralized fissile material storage facilities.

Finally, CTR supports Demilitarization efforts.
CTR Demilitarization activities are encouraging
the demilitarization of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazak-
stan, and Russia by supporting conversion of NIS
defense enterprises, expanding defense military
contacts, and reemploying weapons scientists.
These activities are decreasing the long-term threat
by reducing the capacity and economic pressures in
the NIS to continue to produce weapons of mass
destruction.

CTR supported defense conversion industrial part-
nerships help to reduce the potential of a future
nuclear threat at its source, as do international
science and technology centers the United States
and other countries have set up in Moscow and
Kiev. Through these centers, former Soviet nuclear
scientists and engineers are being reemployed in

peaceful, civilian endeavors. These projects reduce,

the supply of weapons of mass destruction available
for foreign sale, the incentives for relying on such
sales for income, and provide job alternatives for
weapons scientists who might otherwise be tempted
to sell their nuclear expertise abroad. The defense
conversion investments under CTR are win-win-
win — they help reduce the threats from weapons
of mass destruction; they help the NIS build
peaceful, commercially viable market economies
while reducing excess military capacity; and they
provide opportunities for U.S. industry’s entry into
potentially large markets for civilian goods and
services.

58

CTR ACCOMPLISHMENTS

CTR has gone far to reduce the threat of pro-
liferation within and outside the former Soviet
Union in the three short years of its existence, and
the bulk of the achievements have been in just the
past year. The program has facilitated the return to
Russia of over 1,700 warheads from Belarus,
Kazakstan, and Ukraine; the removal to secure
storage of over 2,800 warheads from missile and
bomber bases; the deactivation of four regiments of
SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine; the removal of 750
missiles from their launchers; and the elimination of
approximately 630 strategic launchers and 91
bombers throughout the NIS. CTR assistance also
helped prompt Ukraine to begin early deactivation
and shipment to Russia of SS-19 and SS-24
warheads and to accede to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty as anon-nuclear weapons state,
thereby allowing the Start I treaty to enter into force
—akey nonproliferation success.

CTR has contributed to other efforts to prevent
proliferation. Over 5,000 former Soviet weapon
scientists and engineers once engaged in nuclear
weapons research are now or soon will be employed
on peaceful, civilian research projects, thus
reducing the threat of the transfer of their deadly
expertise to potential proliferant states. The Project
Sapphire mission in November 1994 to remove 600
kilograms of highly enriched uranium to the United
States from Kazakstan was partially financed with
CTR funds.

Denial

Denial involves carefully targeted export controls
and the disruption of weapons and technology trade
which would assist the potential proliferant in
obtaining NBC weapons and delivery systems.
U.S. export control policy has two principal
objectives. First, we want to stop — or at least
retard — the transfer to potential proliferant states
of those technologies which could permit them to
design, manufacture, or acquire NBC weapons and
their delivery systems and other dangerous
armaments. Second, we want to monitor flows of
dual-use technologies that are acceptable in them-
selves, but which if diverted or applied to military
end uses could have a negative impact on our



Section I

NORTHEAST ASIA
REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
NORTH KOREA Sea
Current Missile ont atsk
Delivery Systems. Range (Km)
— scupB 300 Q

— scudc

Future Missile
Delivery Systems

sexe NODONG

500

Approx 1,000

RUSSIA

‘Boundary representations ae not necessarly authoritative

North
Pacific
Ocean

North Korea's current inventory of ballistic missiles allows it to strike targets throughout the peninsula. When the longer
range missile — the NODONG — becomes operational, nearly all of Japan will be in range.

Despite its isolation, North Korea uses several
methods to acquire technology related to nuclear,
biological, or chemical warfare and missiles. For
example, the Japan-based General Association of
Korean Residents — the Chosen Soren — has
among other activities an ongoing effort to acquire

and export advanced technology to North Korea. In
addition, North Korean intelligence organizations
are involved in clandestine operations to acquire
technology, equipment, and scientific and technical
information to aid the full spectrum of North
Korea’s conventional and NBC weapons programs.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

program has made slow progress in its 13-year
history, and has succeeded only in manufacturing
liquid-fueled rockets with an approximate range of
200 kilometers. However, despite this lack of
dramatic gain, the program continues to receive
government support.

In addition to its liquid-fueled rocket program,
Libya also may pursue testing and production of
solid-propellant tactical rockets and missiles.
Although UN sanctions have impeded its ability to
obtain the technologies it needs for these programs,

Libya continues its research and development
efforts aimed at acquiring ballistic missiles.

CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF
DELIVERY

Libya has Soviet-made shipborne and European-
made land-based and shipborne anti-ship cruise
missiles. Libya has artillery and tactical rockets
well as several aircraft that could deliver chemical
agents, including MiG-23, Su-22, and Su-24 fighters;
Tu-22 bombers; Mi-2 and Mi-8 helicopters; and
AN-26 transports.

CURRENT AND FUTURE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

PORTUGAL

FRANCE

SPAIN

Attantic:
‘Ocean

Morocco...»

‘MAURITANIA
MALI

BURKINA FASO

a LIBYA a ~ ee Xo

Current Missile Delivery Systems Range (km) ~
— scupB 300

Future Missile Delivery Systems
Al Fatah

NIGERIA
200

41,000

-- Longer Range Missile CAMEROON

SAUDI
ARABIA

ERITREA

CHAD SUDAN ,

ETHIOPIA

CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC _soundary representations are not nacoseanly authoritative.

Should Libya acquire a longer range missile, such as the North Korean NODONG, it would have the capability to strike southem

Europe and Israel.

28



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

OVERVIEW

This annex addresses the technologies that enable
NBC proliferation. It provides an overview, not a
detailed technical appraisal. It begins with nuclear,
biological, chemical, and weapon technologies and
their military significance. Next, the effects of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are
compared. Attention is then given to the delivery
system and other technologies that facilitate devel-
opment and use of NBC weapons.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Weapons and Weapons Technology

The Manhattan Project that developed the nuclear
weapons employed in World War II identified the
two primary routes to a nuclear capability. The first
weapon used in conflict, at Hiroshima, was a
gun-assembly weapon that propelled a subcritical
mass of uranium-235 (U-235) into a second, also
subcritical, mass of U-235 producing the critical
mass needed for a nuclear explosion. The second
weapon, used at Nagasaki, was an implosion
weapon. In sucha device, an outer shell of chemical
high-explosives surrounds a subcritical sphere of
fissionable nuclear material, for example, plu-
tonium-239 (Pu-239). Precise detonation results in
an implosion that produces a critical mass and the
resulting nuclear explosion.

U-235 and Pu-239 are the optimal weapons grade
nuclear materials for a weapon. However, mixed
isotope plutonium (reactor grade material) can be
used in nuclear weapons; such a device would be
less efficient and might have a less predictable
yield. A weapon using nonweapons-grade plu-
tonium was successfully detonated in a 1960s test.
Another alternative would be a radiological weapon
that employed conventional explosives or other
means to scatter radioactive material. Such a
weapon would not produce a nuclear yield; how-
ever, it could spread contamination. While such
weapons would have less military significance than
devices that result in nuclear detonations, radio-
logical weapons have enormous potential for

intimidation. Targeting a nuclear reactor in an
antagonist’s territory to produce an accident
releasing nuclear material would be another option.

There are hundreds of nuclear reactors and many
more nuclear sources throughout the world, such as
radiological materials used in hospitals. Both
international and national measures control these
items and associated materials and thereby con-
tribute to proliferation prevention. However, post-
war investigations in occupied Iraq showed that at
least some of these control regimes could be cir-
cumvented, even by a state that was a nominal
adherent to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Near-term concerns include the accumulation of
large quantities of plutonium from reactors that is
intended for reprocessing and/or storage, and the
status of nuclear materials in the New Independent
States that previously comprised the Soviet Union.

Military Significance

A nuclear detonation releases vast amounts of
energy which is manifested as blast effects (roughly
50 percent of the total energy), heat (35 percent),
and nuclear radiation (15 percent). Height-of-burst
influences effects. If the fireball does not touch the
ground, there may not be militarily significant
fallout. At higher altitudes, the Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) from a nuclear weapon — a powerful
radio wave — can damage electronic equipment at
considerable distances. If launched on a theater
ballistic missile to very high altitudes, even a single
nuclear device might damage or destroy the com-
munications and intelligence satellites whose
importance was demonstrated during the Gulf War.

There are many uncertainties associated with
potential proliferant employment of nuclear
weapons. We do not know how successful the pro-
liferant will be in implementing fusing, yield
enhancement, delivery system accuracy, and other
technologies. For immediate purposes, it is reason-
able to use a baseline case of a weapon using 1950s
vintage U.S. technology —a simple fission weapon
with a tens of kilotons yield that could be delivered
by aircraft or tactical missiles. Such weapons
would have been devastating if detonated on the
small number of ports (two primary facilities) and



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

CW-suitable dual-use delivery systems are readily
available ranging from SCUD missiles and
unmanned aerial vehicles to sophisticated cruise
and ballistic missiles. If need be, crop duster
aircraft and simple spray generators can be readily
adapted for delivery of a variety of agents. The
quantities of chemical agent required are relatively
small when compared to industrial production of
similar commercial chemicals, which poses
significant problems for detection. The low tech-
nology required lends itself to proliferant and even
potential terrorist use. Terrorists could employ CW
agents in a variety of means utilizing simple
containers such as glass bottles, commercial com-
pressed gas bottles, or propane tanks.

Military Significance

Chemical weapons are the only NBC munitions that
have been used in post-World War II large-scale
conflicts, most recently during the Iran-Iraq war.
Consequently, there is cause for concern that pro-
liferators may perceive that international responses
(ranging from sanctions to military action) are less
likely, given the use of CW.

CW impacts military operations in a number of
ways. Large numbers of people (combatants and
civilians) can be killed if suitable protective equip-
ment or shelters are not available and properly
utilized. There may be large numbers of nonfatal
casualties. This was the characteristic experience
when CW was employed during World War I. The
volume of injured personnel can overwhelm the
military medical evacuation and treatment system,
impacting operations.

If CW employment is anticipated, forces are
required to operate in protective ensembles that
degrade operational performance, especially
under adverse climatic conditions. Even though
forces using appropriate protective equipment
may be immune to CW effects, their ability to
accomplish tasks is greatly reduced. Furthermore,
equipment, facilities, and territory are contam-
inated. This impacts the ability of forces to
maneuver. It also can have a major effect on ports,
airfields, and other essential facilities that support
operations.

Once CW use occurs, decontamination operations
are required. These operations can be time-

A-3

consuming. They may require forces to be diverted
from other missions. In some instances, current
technology decontamination equipment damages
equipment. Perhaps most significantly, psycho-
logical effects impacting the ability of personnel to
perform their missions can occur.

CW employment involves a number of factors,
including agent type; the dissemination method
(and its dispersion efficiency); droplet size; and
meteorological conditions, including temperature,
wind speed and direction, and inversion conditions.
Agent dispersion can be very dependent on environ-
mental factors, such as wind direction and speed.

Chemical agents can be used as limited area effects
(battlefield) or large area effects weapons, to
include areas with civilian populations. Unlike
nuclear or biological weapons (BW), effective
chemical agent attacks sometimes require signifi-
cant numbers of munitions to achieve large area
coverage. This can be an advantage in some situa-
tions since it means that the consequences of CW
use are more predictable and hence more readily
integrated into war plans.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Weapons and Weapons Technology

Biological weapons employ living agents or toxins
produced by such agents or synthetically to kill or
injure humans, domestic animals, and crops. Bio-
logical weapons are not as well understood as their
chemical and nuclear counterparts. It has been
more than two decades since the United States
terminated its offensive BW programs. U.S. forces
have never been attacked with BW.

BW agents can be disseminated in a number of ways
— insects, the contamination of water and food
supplies, and by aerosol. The dissemination of
infectious agents through aerosols, either as drop-
lets from liquid suspensions or by small particles
from dry powders, is by far the most efficient
method. Delivery means for such munitions
include artillery, missiles, and aerial sprayers.
These aerosol weapons cause death or injuries when
they are inhaled. Arthropod vectors and the con-
tamination of food and water supplies could also be
significant modes of dissemination for BW agents.



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

Genetic engineering and other new technologies
now can be employed to overcome product
deficiencies in the classic agents and toxins
normally addressed in such discussions. Moreover,
toxins that exist in nature in small amounts were
once considered not to be potential threat agents
because of their limited availability. Today,
however, a number of natural toxins conceivably
could be produced through genetic engineering
techniques in sufficient quantities for an adversary
to consider producing them as an offensive weapon.
There are many microorganisms, or their metabolic
byproducts (toxins), that meet all of the criteria for
effective BW agents.

Biological weapons and chemical weapons are
sometimes treated together as a single category of
threat. A key difference is that BW agents char-
acteristically have lethal effects over much larger
areas.

There are two basic types of biological munitions:
point source bomblets and line source tanks. Within
each category there can be multiple shapes and con-
figurations. BW munitions and delivery systems
are very interdependent; frequently the munition
dictates the delivery system. With the evolution of
sophisticated line source hardware, the agent, the
munition, and delivery system must be carefully
integrated. The effectiveness of BW munitions is
very dependent on meteorological conditions.

Different factors are relevant for potential terrorist
use of BW and for deliberate attacks against civilian
populations in urban areas. The quantity of agent
could be small (a single gram, possibly less),
production and purification methods extremely
simple, and the dissemination means simple-to-
complex. All elements of such a program might go
undetected until use has occurred. Individual
buildings are potential targets. | Off-the-shelf
aerosol generators could be used to disperse a BW
agent into the air inlet ducts of the target structure.
Especially in the case of toxins, much less toxic
agents could be employed and/or quantities of agent
required would be much less than for other targets.

Terrorist consideration of BW agents is not
unknown; in 1989, a cell of the German Baader-
Meinhof gang was discovered with a culture of
Clostridium botulinum. Contamination of food and
water supplies or aerosol dissemination are

A

possible. Because only relatively small quantities
of relatively impure agent would be required for
terrorist use, agent selection is almost unlimited.

In the United States and other Western countries,
public and private concern for the safety of the work
force and the surrounding community in the years
following World War II resulted in the development
of elaborate containment facilities for conducting
infectious disease research. Fort Detrick Biological
Warfare Research and Development Laboratories
were pioneers in development of these safety
concepts and procedures. Other countries do not
necessarily share these safety concerns.

The same point holds for the size of the facilities
used to develop biological weapons. A state might
elect to build large-scale facilities unique to this
function, as was done in the United States prior to
1969. Such facilities would be, in principle, more
susceptible to detection. However, there is no
requirement to do this. The lower cost (by a con-
siderable margin) and less readily observable
approach would be to employ an :a-place civilian
facility as the site for agent production.

Production equipment will vary, depending on the
quantity of material desired, the methods selected
for production, and the agent selected. Unlike CW
agents, where production is measured in the tons,
BW agent production is measured in the kilograms
to tens of kilograms. Assessments of BW verifi-
cation sometimes assume that the problem is to
detect production of as little as 10 kilograms of BW
agent.

There is nothing unique about the types of equip-
ment (or technology) that might be employed in a
BW program. For example, biological safety cabi-
nets have been adopted universally for biomedical
research as well as commercial production of
infectious disease products, reagents, and so forth.
Fermenters, centrifuges, purification, and other
laboratory equipment are used not only by the
biomedical community, but have other academic
and commercial applications as well, such as
wineries, milk plants, pharmaceutical houses, and
agricultural products. Production of beer, anti-
bodies, enzymes, and other therapeutic products,
such as insulin and growth hormone, involves the
use of fermenters ranging in size from 10,000 to 1
million liters; such fermenters could produce
significant quantities of BW agent. Key tech-
nologies have an intrinsic dual-use character.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

1969, Qadhafi has unsuccessfully attempted to turn
the Libyan state into a regional military power.

Qadhafi has demonstrated both his desire to acquire
ballistic missiles and an NBC weapon capability as
well as his willingness to use the capabilities at his
disposal. In 1987, when his military operation
against Chad was nearing defeat, Qadhafi ordered
his forces to use chemical agents against Chadian
troops. In response to U.S. retaliatory strikes for the
terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque, Qadhafi
fired SCUD missiles at the Italian island of
Lampedusa. Although the SCUD missiles did not
cause significant damage, the act constituted a
symbolic gesture of defiance directed at the United
States and the international community. Finally,
and more importantly, Qadhafi has ordered kid-
nappings and both supported and employed inter-
national terrorism against Western nations.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Qadhafi, who remains largely unchallenged as
Libya’s leader, controls nearly all policy decisions
for his country. His aim is to enhance Libya’s
military strength and power projection capability, in
part by possessing NBC weapons and missiles.
Qadhafi apparently believes these efforts promote
Libya’s status as a regional military power, enhance
national prestige, and provide Libya limited strate-
gic military capabiliti

RESOURCES

Libya probably dedicates several hundred million
dollars annually to acquire NBC weapons and
missiles, made possible by its substantial income
from oil and natural gas exports. However, since it
does not have the ability to produce these weapons
on its own, Libya will continue to rely heavily on
foreign technical assistance.

STRATEGY

Qadhafi’s efforts to become a recognized military
power in the region have been generally unsuccess-
ful. Despite accumulating a large military inven-
tory, Libya has failed to develop its conventional
military capabilities, as evidenced by its embarrass-
ment at the hands of Chadian forces in the 1980s.

25

Even though Qadhafi has been successful in
holding on to power in Libya, he has not become a
regional leader. His numerous schemes to form
political unions with other Arab states have failed,
and his support of insurgent and opposition move-
ments has done little to enhance Libya’s standing or
further its policy agenda. Qadhafi’s continued
support for terrorism has resulted in an extended
confrontation with the United States and, more
recently, has prompted United Nations sanctions.

As a result of these setbacks, Qadhafi has placed
greater emphasis on a more dangerous strategy:
developing NBC weapons and missiles. Qadhafi
views these weapons as critical in his drive to
establish himself as the leader of the Arab world. In
addition, he hopes that ongoing efforts to develop
and ultimately produce NBC weapons, especially
nuclear weapons, will give his nation prestige
among Islamic and other Third World nations,
recognition he has sought for three decades.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Qadhafi’s long-standing desire to acquire a nuclear
weapon is well-known. Nonetheless, despite con-
certed efforts, Libya’s program to establish an
independent nuclear research and fuel cycle capa-
bility remains in its early stages. Despite Libya’s
public pronouncements of its peaceful intent, the
underlying motivation behind this program con-
tinues to be acquiring nuclear weapons.

Libya deposited its instruments of ratification to the
NPT in 1975 and its declared facilities are under
IAEA full scope safeguards. Libya’s rudimentary
nuclear program includes a small research reactor,
provided by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, at
the Tajura nuclear research center near Tripoli.
Waning commitments by Russia to provide assis
tance to operate and maintain the center have
diminished activities at the site. To compensate,
and to build up its indigenous resources, Libya
continues to send scientists abroad for training and
actively recruits foreign nuclear scientists and
technicians. However, Libya’s program lacks well-
developed plans, technical expertise, consistent
financial support, and sufficient support from
foreign suppliers.



GLOSSARY

ABL
ACRS

ACTD

ALCM
BDA
BMDO

BW
BWC
cs

CBD
CFE
CINC
CJCS

COCOM

CONUS
CPRC

CTBT
CTR
CW
CWC
DARPA

DCI
DGP

DIA

DMZ
DNA
DoD

GLOSSARY
Airborne Laser DOE
Arms Control and Regional DTSA
Security (Middle East)
Advanced Concept Technology EMP
Demonstration EOD
Air Launched Cruise Missile FLIR
Battle Damage Assessment FSU
Ballistic Missile Defense GPS
ization

Organizati HEU
Biological Weapons IAEA
Biological Weapons Convention Ic
Command, Control, and ICBM
Communications
Chemical/Biological Defense INF
Conventional Forces in Europe IRBM
Commander in Chief
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Jcp
of Staff
Coordinating Committee for Jcs
Multilateral Export Controls JMIP
Continental United States JPO-BD
Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee JWCA
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Cooperative Threat Reduction km
Chemical Weapons LANDSAT
Chemical Weapons Convention LEU

MAD
Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency MEADS
Director of Central Intelligence

MRBM
NATO Senior Defence Group
on Proliferation
Det f MTCR

nse Intelli A
jefense Intelligence Agency NAVSTAR

Demilitarized Zone
Defense Nuclear Agency NBC
Department of Defense NEST

Department of Energy

Defense Tectinology Security
Administration

Electromagnetic Pulse

Explosive Ordinance Disposal
Forward Looking Infrared Radar
Former Soviet Union

Global Positioning System

Highly Enriched Uranium
International Atomic Energy Agency
Intelligence Community

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(Range: Greater than 5,500 km)

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
(Range: 3,000 to 5,500 km)

NATO Joint Committee on
Proliferation

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Military Intelligence Program

Joint Program Office for Biological
Defense

Joint Warfighting Capabilities
Assessment

Kilometers

Land Remote Sensing Satellite
Low Enriched Uranium
Mutually Assured Destruction

Medium Extended Air Defense
System

Medium Range Ballistic Missile
(Range: 1,000 to 3,000 km)

Missile Technology Control Regime

Navigation Satellite Timing and
Ranging

Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical
Nuclear Emergency Search Team



Section I
THE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE

THE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE

The quest for nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) weapons and the missiles to deliver them
creates serious challenges to U.S. interests around
the world. Many states have agreed voluntarily to
terminate their weapon development programs, but
others have not. This section discusses the threat
from proliferation to regional stability, U.S. defense
strategies, and other interests of the United States
and its allies.

The United States faces several regional prolif-
eration challenges. North Korea’s decades-long
threat to the security of Northeast Asia, and in
particular to South Korea and Japan, has become
more serious as the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea has in recent years significantly advanced
its nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missile
programs. The United States is leading inter-
national efforts, through implementation of the
October 1994 Agreed Framework, to bring North
Korea into compliance with its nonproliferation
obligations including the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and the North-South
denuclearization accord. In the Middle East/North
Africa region, the United States remains concerned
about the threat that Iran, Iraq, and Libya pose to the
stability of the region and to the security of U.S.
interests, allies, and friends. The United States
continues efforts to prevent Iran and Libya from
advancing and Iraq from reconstituting their
weapon programs. In both regions, the Middle
East/North Africa and Northeast Asia, where states
are seeking to incorporate these weapons of mass
destruction into their militaries, the Department of
Defense is working to ensure that the United States
retains the ability to defend its interests and to
maintain the credibility of U.S. defense commit-
ments to our allies and friends.

In the former Soviet Union, the vast amount of
nuclear technology and material in the region
presents an attractive target for determined
proliferators, including terrorist and criminal
groups. Maintaining control over the account-
ability of these capabilities and materials presents
a daunting challenge to the United States, the new
governments of the region, and the rest of the inter-
national community. Several bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements with Russia and the other states
of the former Soviet Union, such as those supported
by the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat
Reduction program, have significantly reduced the
proliferation threat from that region.

In South Asia, the United States has important
security interests in enhancing stability in the
region and preventing another Indo-Pakistani war.
The nuclear and ballistic missile programs of India
and Pakistan threaten the stability of the region and
could result in grave loss of life. The United States
seeks first to cap and then reduce and, eventually,
eliminate regional capabilities to produce NBC
weapons and the missiles that deliver them.

In some areas, nonproliferation efforts have already
greatly enhanced regional security. For example,
the proliferation threat in sub-Saharan Africa has
largely receded as South Africa has dismantled its
nuclear weapons program, joined the NPT, and
accepted full-scope safeguards on its nuclear facil-
ities. Similarly, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have
accepted full-scope safeguards on their nuclear
facilities and brought into force the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, and Argentina and Chile have joined the
NPT. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is
approaching full implementation with the antici-
pated ratification by Cuba. All these steps have
reduced the danger of nuclear rivalry in the Western
Hemisphere.



Section I
The Regional Proliferation Challenge



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

indigenous capability to produce weapons-grade
fissile material. Financial constraints, supplier
reluctance, and limited indigenous capabilities in
certain NBC programs have slowed Iran’s progress
in achieving these goals.

RESOURCES

Iran continues to suffer the negative economic
effects of revolution, war, and mismanagement.
Foreign debt has reached about $30 billion, and Iran
can afford only about $1 billion annually for
military-related imports. These financial con-
straints affect the pace of Iran’s programs for NBC
weapons and missiles, even though these programs
continue to have high priority.

Tran makes many of its efforts to purchase NBC
weapons and missile-related technologies on the
open market, and there are indications that Iranian
officials stationed abroad provide clandestine
support, obtaining information on foreign com-
panies and on employees susceptible to recruitment
and looking for ways to avoid relevant laws and
customs procedures. In addition, Iran employs
some students studying abroad to acquire technical
information and identify scientific researchers who
might cooperate with Iran.

STRATEGY

Expanding its NBC programs, improving means of
delivery, and improving conventional military
capabilities all strongly support Iranian national
objectives. Iran has emphasized the acquisition of
power projection capabilities — ballistic missiles,
combat aircraft, and submarines — to oppose
intervention by foreign forces during some future
conflict. In order to attain self-sufficiency for its
military industry, Iran purchases complete weapons
and components for assembly to facilitate the flow
of technology necessary for indigenous production.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Iran’s nuclear energy program began under the
Shah and included power plant development and a
small research reactor purchased from the United

States. The Shah also sponsored research aimed at
producing fissile material for weapons develop-
ment. In 1979, the country’s Islamic revolution
essentially halted the nuclear program, both
weapons-related work and civilian nuclear
activities (such as the construction of foreign-
supplied power reactors). Since the end of the war
with Iraq, the Islamic government has initiated
civilian and weapons-related nuclear efforts,
despite having signed the NPT. Of greatest concern,
however, are Iran’s efforts to acquire fissile material
and key nuclear technology to support nuclear
weapons development.

Iran has sought heavy water research reactors even
though such technology has no use or value in its
light water reactor-based civil nuclear power
program. Iran’s interest in uranium enrichment and
spent fuel reprocessing, activities with no economic
justification in Iran’s civil nuclear energy plans,
indicates Iran’s desire for the capability to produce
fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

China is a principal supplier of nuclear technology
to Iran, and Russia may soon become another key
supplier. The Iranians have purchased an electro-
magnetic isotope separation unit from China. (This
was one of the enrichment technologies pursued by
Iraq.) China has also sold Iran a research reactor
that could be used as a training model for a
plutonium-producing reactor. Iran’s procurement
activities provide strong evidence of this.

The Iranians state that nuclear energy is required to
meet their present and future energy demands.
They argue for using their own oil and natural gas
reserves to generate hard currency revenues, rather
than wasting them on domestic consumption. At
the same time, Iran’s nuclear power program could
be used to legitimize its attempts to acquire
capabilities in sensitive phases of the nuclear fuel
cycle — such as uranium enrichment or spent fuel
reprocessing — related directly to nuclear weapons
development.

At this stage, Iran’s scientific and technical base
remains insufficient to support major nuclear pro-
grams. The Iranians recognize their dependence on
foreign assistance and are encouraging younger
Iranians to study abroad to gain needed technical
expertise.



Section I
NORTHEAST ASIA

weapons and the means to deliver them. Prolif-
eration, particularly the broad-based NBC weapons
and missile programs that North Korea has
implemented, poses a significant challenge to U.S.
security interests as well as to those of our allies and
friends.

In the event of another war on the Korean peninsula,
these weapons present a significant threat to our
forces and the security of our allies. Should a
conflict occur, North Korea likely will try to
consolidate and control strategic areas of South
Korea by striking quickly and attempting to destroy
allied defenses before the United States can provide
adequate reinforcements. Pyongyang hopes to do
this with its large conventional force and its chemi-
cal weapons and ballistic missiles complement.

Strong bilateral relations with our allies and friends
are the foundation of our Asia-Pacific strategy, and
the North Korean NBC weapons and missile
programs have the potential to complicate relation-
ships within our bilateral alliances throughout the
region. Should a proliferant go unchecked, calling
U.S. capabilities and commitments into question,
states may seek unilateral alternatives to ensure
their security, thus stimulating proliferation. Nearly
100,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of the
US. Pacific Command maintain the strong forward
presence that deters aggression, reassures our allies,
and enhances stability throughout the region — a
critical mission.

China, which has been a nuclear weapons state
since 1964, remains a source of concern primarily
because of the role of Chinese companies in
supplying a wide range of materials, equipment,
and technologies that could contribute to NBC
weapons and missile programs in countries of
proliferation concern. Beijing has signaled some
willingness to adopt a more responsible supply
policy by adhering to international nonproliferation
norms such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(1992) and reaffirming to the United States its
pledge to abide by the basic tenets of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However,
Chinese firms’ continued willingness to engage in
nuclear and missile cooperation with countries of
serious proliferation concern, such as Pakistan and

Iran, presents security concerns in many regions
where the United States has defense commitments.
Counterproliferation will continue to be a strong
component of our regional strategy in Northeast
Asia as long as our defense commitments and our
forces are threatened by the spread of NBC weapons
and missiles.

THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE:
REGIONAL CAPABILITIES,
INTENTIONS, AND TRENDS

North Korea

As stated previously, the urgent threat of North
Korean nuclear proliferation has abated since
Pyongyang signed the Agreed Framework with the
United States in October 1994. If Pyongyang
adheres to this agreement, its current nuclear pro-
gram will phase out over time. In the near term, its
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
has halted under IAEA monitoring. Nonetheless,
North Korea continues developing missiles and
chemical warfare capabilities and exporting
ballistic missiles and related technologies, which
contribute to proliferation.

North Korea has significantly advanced its nuclear,
chemical, and ballistic missile programs during the
last 10 years. While agreeing to freeze activity at
and eventually eliminate its existing plutonium
production nuclear reactors and associated facil-
ities, North Korea maintains chemical warfare and
ballistic missile capabilities.

For many decades Pyongyang has mounted an
all-out effort to build and strengthen its military. As
a result, it has one of the five largest armed forces
in the world — over one million active duty
personnel. Over the years, Pyongyang has worked
to improve its capability to launch a surprise attack
against South Korea. With the right conditions, or
with the perception of the right conditions,
Pyongyang could launch an attack supported by
chemical weapons and SCUD missiles against any
military or civilian targets in South Korea,
including key logistics facilities at Pusan, Taegu,
and Kwangju.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Iraqis admitted that they had established a crash
program to build a nuclear weapon by April 1991.

Iraq’s nuclear weapon design and development
work, which was supported by at least 16 primary
and supporting facilities, was severely disrupted by
Operation Desert Storm. Most of the facilities were
in Baghdad and the outskirts of the city, but others
were in Mosul in the north and Al Qaim and Akashat
in the west near the Syrian border.

The extent and sophistication of the Iraqi nuclear
weapon program uncovered by UN and IAEA
inspectors surprised the international community.
The diversity and broad scope of the Iraqi program
prompted subsequent efforts to tighten up the IAEA
safeguards procedures and export controls.

CHEMICAL PROGRAM

Since the early 1980s, Iraq has produced several
thousand tons of chemical agents, primarily at its
main production facility in Samarra. Other chemi-
cal warfare-related facilities were located at Al

UN Chemical Destruction Facility at Samarra, Iraq.

20

Habbaniyah. Iraq used some of its chemical
weapons stockpile against the Iranians and the
Kurds during the mid- to late-1980s. By the time it
invaded Kuwait, Iraq probably had 1,000 metric
tons of chemical agent on hand, split equally
between blister agents and nerve agents. Also, it
had become self-sufficient in producing many types
of precursors, had produced a variety of chemical
agents on its own, and had weaponized munitions
with some of these agents.

DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ’S
CHEMICAL ARSENAL

The chief inspector of the UN Special Commission
chemical destruction group said on May 11, 1994, that all
known Iraqi chemical munitions, agents, and precursors
had been eliminated. The group had been destroying
Iraq’s chemical warfare stockpile at the Samarra
chemical weapons complex since June 1992. Over
27,000 chemical-filled bombs, rockets, and artillery
shells had been destroyed, to include 30 SCUD chemical
warheads. About 500 tons of mustard and nerve agents,
and thousands of tons of precursor chemicals, were
burned off or chemically neutralized.

UN Photo 159108/H Arvidsson



19% 0924/77

Proliferation:

Threat and Response

y%
April 1996 —

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited
ee



Section I
THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT

organized criminal groups. Insurgents might also
attract sympathizers among knowledgeable scien-
tists and technicians who might aid in developing
weapons. Acquisition of such weapons could alter
the regional balance of power and change the terms
of conflict, if not its outcome, decisively.

Opposing factions in civil wars also could have
access to NBC weapons and missiles. Such factions
might be motivated to use these weapons as force
multipliers to achieve quick and decisive victories.
Factions could threaten or actually use the weapons
against civilians for psychological and strategic
effect. Tactically, the weapons might be used
against a larger conventional force to disrupt
staging or resupply efforts, thus prompting an
evacuation of noncombatants.

Recently, opposing factions in two civil wars
acquired and employed ballistic missiles with
conventional warheads. After the Soviets withdrew
from Afghanistan, Afghan rebel factions acquired
a number of SCUD missiles, some of which the
rebel groups fired at government forces in Kabul in
January 1994. The second instance involved the
Yemen civil war. During the spring of 1994, the

southern faction launched SCUD missiles against
civilians in the northern cities of Sana and Tai’z.
None of the strikes in these two cases caused
significant damage or casualties or affected the
fighting significantly.

ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS

The potential for international organized criminal
groups to obtain, use, or sell NBC weapons has
grown in the last few years. In the wake of the Cold
War, some of these groups have emerged as a
growing threat to U.S. interests. This situation is
particularly critical in the former Soviet Union.

A careful distinction must be made, however,
between material the criminal groups claim to offer
for sale and what they can deliver. For example,
numerous criminal elements throughout Europe
have been implicated in scams involving the sale of
what was advertised as weapons grade nuclear
materials. To date, those materials seized by law
enforcement officials have been well below
enrichment or quantity levels suitable for weapons.
Most appear to have come from research facilities
rather than from weapons-related facilities.

Arctic Ocean ‘a
Cos

tay

a Pacific Ocean
Nite ten
ES,
g Indian Ocean aa) Soe
. s
aoe)
uv

There are numerous ongoing insurgencies, separatist movements, and civil wars worldwide as shown in the shaded areas. The
greatest danger would be from the split up of government forces where an opposing group might gain access to NBC weapons

or missiles.

44



Section I
NORTHEAST ASIA

and areprocessing facility to extract weapons-grade
plutonium from irradiated fuel — the key materials
needed to produce nuclear weapons. This pluto-
nium production reactor became operational in
1986, with some refueling in 1989, thereby pro-
viding weapons-grade plutonium for at least one
nuclear weapon. Fuel from this reactor also was
discharged in May-June 1994 and, had it been
reprocessed, could have provided enough pluto-
nium for several additional nuclear weapons.

Additionally, North Korea was building a 50-
megawatt (electric) reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-
megawatt (electric) power reactor at Taechon.
Construction of these reactors has been halted under
IAEA monitoring as part of the Agreed Framework,
under which all of these facilities are obliged to be
dismantled. The 50-megawatt (electric) reactor
would have produced enough plutonium for North
Korea to build an additional 7-10 nuclear weapons
per year. Moreover, the reprocessing facility at
Yongbyon has been sealed. This large facility was
key because it would have enabled Pyongyang to
extract weapons-grade plutonium from irradiated
fuel from both the 5- and 50-megawatt (electric)
reactors.

North Korea has not allowed the IAEA to perform
inspections sufficiently comprehensive at all sites
to verify the operating history of the S-megawatt
(electric) reactor, the amount of reprocessing
accomplished, and whether special nuclear
materials have been diverted to develop nuclear
weapons. Under strict adherence to the Agreed
Framework, however, North Korea must make its
nuclear program completely transparent and must
allow the IAEA to perform special inspections prior
to the delivery of Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG)
controlled items to the Light Water Reactors. North
Korea also has obligated itself beyond its NPT and
IAEA requirements by agreeing to eliminate even-
tually all its existing or planned nuclear power and
related facilities.

CHEMICAL PROGRAM

North Korea began to develop a chemical industry
and a chemical agent production capability after the
Korean War. It had made significant progress by the
late 1960s, when it began to produce offensive
chemical agents experimentally.

Since the late 1980s, North Korea has intensified
and expanded its chemical warfare program as part
of its military preparedness plan. Today, it can
produce large quantities of nerve, blister, and blood
chemical warfare agents, and it maintains a number
of facilities involved in producing or storing
chemical precursors, agents, and weapons. A pre-
cursor is a commercial chemical that is necessary
for the production of a lethal chemical agent.

Since 1990, Pyongyang has placed a high priority
on military and civilian chemical defense readiness.
It has mandated training in chemical environments
as an integral part of armed forces training and is
attempting to equip all military forces, including
reserves, with full protective gear. In addition,
broad segments of the population engage period-
ically in simulated chemical warfare drills. These
drills ensure coordination and control of the popu-
lation should the North employ tactical chemical
weapons against opposing forces on its own
territory. The drills also reinforce Pyongyang’s
propaganda that the United States and South Korea
intend to employ chemical agents. Pyongyang has
emphasized building and _ installing protection
equipment at military production and civilian alter-
nate wartime relocation sites, and it directed that the
entire population be issued protective masks.

BIOLOGICAL PROGRAM

At the direction of President Kim Il-Song, North
Korea began to emphasize an offensive biological
warfare program during the early 1960s. With the
scientists and facilities for producing biological
products and micro-organisms, North Korea prob-
ably has the ability to produce limited quantities of
traditional infectious biological warfare agents or
toxins and biological weapons.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

North Korea has progressed from producing SCUD
missiles to establishing a broad based missile
industry, developing and producing a variety of
missiles both for its own use and for export. Serious
ballistic missile development began in the early
1980s, when Pyongyang started to reverse-engineer
SCUD-B missiles. North Korea now produces the
SCUD-B, with a maximum range of 300 kilo-
meters, and a variant, the SCUD-C, with a maximum



Section I
NORTHEAST ASIA

SELECTED NUCLEAR AND MISSILE FACILITIES

NORTH KOREA

Nuclear Facility,

Balto Missle Facity

Taechon .

Yongbyon

y
/ %® PYONGYANG
bn

NORTH KOREA

RUSSIA
CHINA fs \

Teop0 dong!

SOUTH KOREA \

While the nuclear complexes at Taechon and Yongbyon play a key role in North Korea's nuclear
program, it is the 200 megawatt facility at Yongbyon that would have enabled North Korea to
develop additional nuclear weapons. Taepo Dong is North Korea's main missile testing and

launch facility.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM

In the 1960s, under a “peaceful uses of atomic
energy” agreement, the Soviet Union provided
North Korea a small nuclear research reactor and
related training. This assistance vested North Korea
with a fundamental understanding of and practical
experience in nuclear physics and engineering as
well as reactor operations.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea
developed a complete nuclear fuel cycle that in-
cluded a plutonium production capability at the
Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. This center,
about 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang, comprises
facilities with capabilities to fabricate nuclear fuel,
a 5-megawatt (electric) reactor to produce plutonium,



Section IT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

program to improve capabilities for detecting,
characterizing, and providing protection against
biological and chemical agents based on lessons
learned during the Gulf War.

PREVENTION

Overview

Proliferation prevention is the United States’
primary objective. DoD contributions to prolif-
eration prevention are part of a coordinated national
effort involving multiple departments and agencies,
allied states, and international organizations.
Defense Department support includes the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro-
gram, export control activities and DoD inspection,
verification, and enforcement support for the
treaties and arms control regimes that limit NBC
weapons and associated delivery systems. The
Defense Department also plays an important role in
the four thrusts involved in proliferation prevention
— denial, reassurance, dissuasion, and actions to
reverse proliferation.

International norms and standards make an impor-
tant contribution to proliferation prevention. In
addition to creating an atmosphere of restraint, they
may provide the preconditions, e.g., inspections,
that impede proliferation. These international
norms can be specifically agreed to in export control
and arms control agreements or they can result from
informal arrangements between states.

A great success in the area of norm establishment
has been DoD support for the unconditional and
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The NPT, which became effective in 1970,
establishes obligations for both nuclear weapons
and non-nuclear weapons states regarding the
transfer, manufacture, or acquisition of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It
allows all parties to participate in the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy while at the same time prohibiting
transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapon capa-
bilities.

57

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

The CTR program provides the services, tools, and
technology required to help the New Independent
States (NIS) with the elimination or reduction of
weapons of mass destruction and to modernize and
expand safeguards against proliferation within the
NIS. The program consists currently of nearly 40
separate projects, grouped into three categories,
reflecting the objectives established by Congress.

First, Destruction and Dismantlement activities
help with the dismantlement and elimination of
weapons of mass destruction and their launchers in
the four eligible states where they remain (Russia,
Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine). The availability
of U.S. assistance encourages these countries to
undertake the dismantling of weapons, and then the
CTR program provides the actual equipment,
services, and training required to implement their
dismantlement decisions. Specifically, CTR Dis-
mantlement and Destruction activities are:

= Assisting Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan in
becoming non-nuclear weapons states.

TM Assisting Russia in accelerating strategic arms
reduction to START levels.

= Initiating and accelerating the destruction of
Russian chemical weapons.

Projects in this area assist in the dismantlement or
destruction of strategic nuclear missiles, silo
launchers, liquid and solid rocket propellants, and
Russian chemical weapons. Also included is
assistance in the destruction of the launcher tubes in
ballistic missile-firing submarines, the elimination
of heavy bombers, and the elimination or conver-
sion of the infrastructure (hardware and personnel)
that supports these systems.

Second, through chain of custody activities, the
CTR program decreases the dangers from the
nuclear weapons and fissile.materials that remain in
the NIS, particularly Russia. During the difficult
and uncertain period of transition in these states, the
continued secure chain of custody of nuclear
weapons and materials is vitally important to both
the United States and the NIS. Chain of Custody
activities enhance security, safety, and control of
nuclear weapons and fissile material in Russia by
assisting in centralizing fissile material in a limited
number of storage areas and strengthening safety,



Section I
SOUTH ASIA

RANGES OF CURRENT AND FUTURE BALLISTIC MISSILES

GI = ‘Boundary representations are nat necessarily authoritative.

~S RUSSIA } eR,

ey

(UZBEKISTAN >
JRKMENISTAN "e

\

5 \

1 Arabian
Sea ’
1
’
\
\ South
1 shina
4 THAILAND)” fin
- ,
\ CAMBODIA
\ f
\
\
\
\
\
\
N Current Missile
\ , Delivery Systems
\ Indian Ocean s — Prithvi?
‘ X Future Missile
Delivery Systems
° . Prithvi (Air Force) 250
. Pia Agni 2,000
. - (lends)
xe pea "Possibly available

India's ballistic missile program grew out of its space launch program of the 1960s. Today, India has one of the more self-sufficient
domestic missile production programs in the developing world, New Delhi will continue to be largely unaffected by multilateral
control regimes, and denying access to related technology will delay, but not stop, efforts to improve missiles now in development.

India’s. So far, it has produced only a few Hatf-I both countries in August 1993 for transferring M-11
SRBMs, which have a range of 80 kilometers and related components and technology to Islamabad.
are regarded as inaccurate. In 1994, the sanctions against Beijing were lifted

when China reaffirmed its bilateral commitment to
China remains Pakistan’s most important supplier the United States to adhere to the Missile
of missile-related technologies. The United States Technology Control Regime and made a number of
imposed Category II sanctions against entities in new, related commitments.

39



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

TARHUNAH UNDERGROUND CHEMICAL PLANT

Past international attention on Libya's Rabta chemical facility led the Libyans to construct an underground
facility at Tarhunah.

Libya claims it will not sign the CWC as long as
other countries in the region possess NBC weapons.
Libya almost certainly will keep its chemical war-
fare program as long as Qadhafi remains in power.

BIOLOGICAL PROGRAM

Libya continues its efforts to establish a biological
warfare capability. However, hampered by its
inadequate biotechnical foundation, the Libyan
offensive biological warfare program remains in the
early research and development stage. Libya may
look to small research and development programs
supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its
technical knowledge. These technical shortcom-
ings, combined with limitations in Libya’s overall
ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will

27

preclude production of militarily effective bio-
logical warfare systems for the foreseeable future.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Libya’s only operational ballistic missile system is
the SCUD-B, acquired from the former Soviet
Union in the mid-1970s. The acquisition of an
extended-range missile, such as the North Korean
NODONG, and the development of an indigenous
missile — designed to reach 1,000 km — would
give Libya the capability to reach regional adver-
saries.

International constraints make purchasing a longer
range missile, such as North Korea’s NODONG,
difficult. In addition, developing an indigenous
ballistic missile production program also requires
extensive foreign assistance. So far, Libya’s



Section I
THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT

Over the past several years, organized criminal
groups and smugglers have become increasingly
involved in trafficking illegal nuclear materials.
The growing number and sophistication of groups
attempting to acquire these materials or weapons is
an increasingly crucial concern for international
law enforcement.

Beginning in 1991, multiple incidents involving
criminal activity and the theft of nuclear material
surfaced in Europe. During a 1994 appearance
before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations, the head of the German Federal Criminal
Police (the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
German counterpart) offered his insight into
criminal trafficking of nuclear material. He
reported that the number of incidents involving
nuclear materials within Germany was increasing
over time: from 41 in 1991, to 158 in 1992, to 241
in 1993, and to 267 in 1994. In late 1994, respond-
ing to the incidents involving nuclear material
smuggled into Germany in August 1994, Moscow
and Bonn agreed to new bilateral security measures.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL
SECURITY

Controlling or containing proliferation involving
transnational groups is particularly difficult
because these groups evade or defy recognized

45

export controls or nonproliferation regimes.
Should these groups acquire NBC weapons or
missiles, they may be more inclined to employ them
in order to achieve their goals than would a member
in good standing of the international community of
nations. Countering the transfer of these weapons
and related technologies to or from these groups has
become increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the
sophistication of some of the groups — especially
organized crime — involved in the smuggling of
NBC-related materials has complicated the related
problems of locating stolen materials and disabling
weapons. In some cases, the difficulty is further
complicated by the dual-use nature and availability
of the raw materials associated with biological or
chemical agents.

Of the transnational groups discussed above, the
greatest dangers to U.S. interests stem from ter-
rorists and, to a lesser extent, organized criminal
groups. One of the most volatile and frightening
scenarios for U.S. defense planning posits a terrorist
group, whose actions are directed principally
against the United States, with nuclear material or
an actual NBC weapon. Though direct U.S.
interests are always exposed to some risks, it is
unlikely that attacks from insurgents or opposing
sides in a civil war that involved such weapons
would focus their main attacks on U.S. interests
specifically.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SELECTED NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL FACILITIES

Mediterranean Sea
|. TUNISIA
\ ae
\ TRIPOU sauna |
Rabta Tarhunah Gulf of Sidra (
_ )sor
\
\
\ 4
\ |
|
LIBYA |
|
( |
|
fo |
|
|
A \
\
ALGERIA |
|
a i
|
|
NIGER __|
[
LiByA
CHAD
Chemical Facity
Nuclear Facity SUDAN
Boundary representations ae not nocassarly authoritative,

While progress for its nuclear weapons program has remained elusive, Libya has had greater success in
producing chemical agents.

CHEMICAL PROGRAM Libya’s chemical warfare program to the attention
of the international media in 1988, Libya responded
Libya is one of few nations in the last decade to have in 1990 by fabricating a fire to make the Rabta
employed chemical weapons, having dropped facility appear to have been seriously damaged.
chemical agents from a transport aircraft against
Chadian troops in 1987. Iran supplied the agents in Although the Rabta facility appears inactive,
exchange for naval mines. Libya’s chemical weapons program continues to
flourish. To replace the Rabta facility, Libya has
In addition, Tripoli has looked to establish an begun constructing a large, underground chemical
indigenous chemical warfare program, and in late

warfare plant near Tarhunah, a mountainous region
1988, with extensive foreign assistance, completed about 60 kilometers southeast of Tripoli. Putting
construction of the Rabta chemical agent facility. the facility underground masks its activities and
During three years of operation, at least 100 metric

increases its survivability in case of an attack. In the

meantime, Libya will rely on foreign sources for its
precursor needs.

tons of blister and nerve agents were produced at
this facility. When the United States brought

26



Technical Annex
Accessible Technologies



Section I
NORTHEAST ASIA.

NORTHEAST ASIA

RUSSIA

MONGOLIA

CHINA 7
he

Pacific
Ocean

Nations of Northeast Asia

GOALS AND INTERESTS

Northeast Asia remains a region of vital importance
to the United States, particularly in view of the
growing prominence of the Pacific Rim nations as
trading partners and as important players in the
global economy. Security and stability in this
region are essential if our economic relations are to
continue to flourish. Our overarching long-term
objective in the region remains the peaceful

reunification of the Korean peninsula. The United
States will continue to maintain forces on the
peninsula to assure security for South Korea as long
as the Republic of Korea Government wants them
to stay.

Although the October 1994 Agreed Framework
with North Korea over its nuclear facilities
mitigated the immediate nuclear threat, Pyongyang
still possesses an unnecessarily large conventional
force, as well as militarily significant chemical



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

RANGES OF CURRENT AND FUTURE

BALLISTIC MISSILES SYSTEMS

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

SYRIA

SAUDI
ARABIA

.
.
.
IRAN
Current Missile

Delivery Systems Range (Km)

— = scuos 300

—  scue 500 YEMEN

Future Missile Delivery Systems
= = Long Range Missile

1,000

- ~

.
f Caspian
‘Sea

KAZAKSTAN

Meee ene

Aral .
Sea .

.
.
.
UZBEKISTAN ‘+ KYRGYZSTAN
.
‘
TAJIKISTAN . CHINA

1
1
1
1
AFGHANISTAN
1
1
1
‘
1
PAKISTAN
1
.
1
.
'

1 INDIA

Arabian Sea

Boundary ropresentaions are not necessarily authonNative,

North Korea is key to Iran's future missile program. Should Iran receive a longer range missile, such as the NODONG, it
will be able to threaten a much wider area.

Iraq

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Despite Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War and the severe
costs to its military forces and its civilian

infrastructure, Saddam Hussein’s goals remain
almost identical to those in effect prior to the war:
to establish Iraq as the leading Arab political and
military power in the Middle East and to dominate
the Persian Gulf. To these ends, Saddam, or any
successor with similar ambitions, will seek to



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

New DoD initiatives to counter paramilitary/covert
and terrorist NBC threats are being supported by the
Counterproliferation Support Program. These
efforts are focused on developing an effective
response to chemical and biological threats through
development of BW/CW emergency response
teams modeled on Department of Energy’s NEST.
Projects underway include evaluation of military
facility NBC defense and developing enabling
technologies and equipment to support and fund
joint training exercises to improve readiness of
NBC response teams. Just under $5 million has
been budgeted for these projects in FY 1996. The
Department of Energy national laboratories are also
contributing to these projects, including work with
DNA’s Nuclear Incident Program to improve
military base and mobilization/logistical node
defense against nuclear threats.

Finally, the Navy’s Joint Service Explosive
Ordinance Disposal Systems program develops
specialized EOD equipment and tools required for
detecting, locating, and rendering safe NBC
munitions. The Navy has budgeted about $4.8
million for this program in FY 1996.

Intelligence

Effective intelligence support is critical to all
aspects of the DoD counterproliferation effort. To
assist Department officials in taking advantage of
proliferation prevention and protection oppor-
tunities, the Intelligence Community must provide
accurate and timely intelligence assessments on the
motivations and plans of leaders in states that may
elect to develop NBC weapon capabilities, the
clandestine procurement networks used by these
states, the status of their NBC weapon programs,
and locations of both weapon production capa-
bilities and deployed weapons. Information on
NBC weapon-related intentions, capabilities, and
activities of transnational groups, such as ethnic or
regional movements, terrorists groups, or organized
criminal elements, also is needed. This is a
demanding set of requirements. The dual-use
nature of many technologies involved in NBC and
delivery systems development complicate these
tasks.

The Intelligence Community has taken steps to
improve the management and coordination of intel-

55

ligence support to DoD customers. As part of this
effort, additional DoD personnel — including the
addition of a military deputy — have been assigned
to the DCI’s Nonproliferation Center (NPC) — the
Intelligence Community body that orchestrates
intelligence activities related to proliferation. NPC
and the Intelligence Community have instituted a
new strategic planning, resource guidance, and
evaluation process that better serves overall
counterproliferation efforts. The Defense Intel-
ligence Agency (DIA), however, remains the prime
conduit for national-level intelligence support to the
Defense Department. To better focus its intel-
ligence support to counterproliferation, it created an
Office for Counterproliferation and Nuclear, Bio-
logical, and Chemical Assessments.

As the threat from proliferants has increased, the
Intelligence Community has provided timely infor-
mation in support of diplomatic, law enforcement,
and military efforts to prevent proliferation. The
successes of these efforts range from providing
actionable intelligence to decisionmakers so they
can attempt to stop specific activities to supporting
the development of U.S. strategies to deal with
proliferators.

Moreover, intelligence programs provide the
critical input to the challenges for military planning
and operations — chemical and biological agent
detection, characterization of underground activi-
ties, information on weapon design to facilitate
disabling activities, locating and identifying mobile
targets, and calculating weapons effects. In addi-
tion, increasingly accurate U.S. weapons require
even more fine-grained intelligence information on
proliferants’ facilities and weapons effects.

Particular emphasis has been given to providing
increased warning time before potential adversaries
translate technological potential for proliferation
into operational NBC weapon capabilities. U.S.
acquisition — and even training and doctrine —
lead times do not permit the luxury of a “wait and
see” approach. With lead times for new U.S.
capabilities sometimes as long as five to ten years,
DoD needs to be able to anticipate the threats that
might be faced in future regional contingencies
through early analysis of a proliferant’s NBC
weapons efforts. To meet this requirement, the
Intelligence Community has established new
working arrangements with the technical expertise
of the Department of Energy and its national labs.



GLOSSARY

NFIP

NIP
NIS
NPC
NPRC

NPT
NSG
OPCW

OSCE

OsD
OSIA
PAC
PGM
PrepCom
Pu

R&D
RDT&E

SAM
SEI

National Foreign Intelligence
Program

Nuclear Incident Program
New Independent States
Non-Proliferation Center

Nonproliferation Program Review
Committee

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group

Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons

Organization on Security and
Cooperation in Europe

Office of the Secretary of Defense
On-Site Inspection Agency
Patriot Advanced Capability
Precision Guided Munition
Preparatory Commission
Plutonium

Research and Development

Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation

Surface-to-Air Missile
Specific Emitter Identification

B-2

SGP
SLBM

SLV
SOF
SRBM

SSM
START
TBM
TBMD
THAAD
TIARA

TMD
UAV

UGS

UN

U.S.
UNSCOM
UNSCR
USG

NATO Senior Politico-Military Group

Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missile

Space Launch Vehicle
Special Operations Forces

Short Range Ballistic Missile
(Range: 1,000 km or less)

Surface-to-Surface Missile
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Theater Ballistic Missile

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
Theater High Altitude Area Defense

Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities

Theater Missile Defense
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Unattended Ground Sensors
United Nations

United States

UN Special Commission on Iraq
UN Security Council Resolution
United States Government

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

emergency provision of excess U.S. defense
articles. These programs supplement U.S. overseas
presence and peacetime engagement by improving
the defense capabilities of allies and friends, while
demonstrating U.S. commitment to defend com-
mon interests.

Alliances and bilateral defense arrangements create
a powerful incentive for allies and friends to refrain
from the acquisition of NBC weapons. Through the
forward deployment of U.S. military forces, the
United States provides allies with tangible demon-
strations of our commitment to their security, not
withstanding proliferation by other nations in their
region. The forward deployment of capable combat
forces and periodic demonstrations of our ability to
deploy additional forces from the United States,
when and as required, may be the Department of
Defense’s most important contribution to prolifera-
tion prevention. These tangible demonstrations of
security commitments make it possible for respon-
sible leaderships in allied and friendly nations to
conclude that they can rely on U.S. security com-
mitments to provide for their security.

Military-to-military cooperation and contacts also
help reassure friends and allies while at the same
time dissuading the acquisition of NBC weapons
and technology. The extensive U.S. bilateral
military-to-military contact program builds trust
and promotes professionalism in the armed forces
of our friends and allies. These contacts also
reinforce basic tenets such as civilian control of the
military and the honoring of international norms of
behavior.

Regional arms control and confidence building,
security assistance and alliance efforts, and
military-to-military contacts, however, are only as
good as our ability to effectively communicate our
intent to proliferants and those threatened by that
proliferation. U.S. counterproliferation efforts are
part of this public diplomacy campaign. The
preparations we undertake through the Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative will provide the
ability to protect our forces, allies, and future
Coalition partners from the consequences of NBC
weapons and their delivery systems attack. This
initiative is designed to support our public
diplomacy campaign by not only convincing pro-
liferants they gain no advantage through NBC
weapons and their delivery systems proliferation (at

62

great expense), but also by helping states resist the
temptation to proliferate in response to an adver-
sary’s proliferation.

Actions to Reverse Proliferation

Measures to reverse proliferation are the final
component of prevention. In some instances, this is
involuntary, as in Iraq under UN supervision. In
other cases action is self-initiated, as appears to
have been the case in South Africa and the
non-Russian nuclear weapons states formerly part
of the Soviet Union. Available policy instruments
here include making available intelligence infor-
mation concerning the status of regional prolif-
eration (and proliferation reversal) efforts, initia-
tives to defuse regional tensions that might motivate
proliferation, and support for inspection and
verification activities. CTR in the nuclear-weapon-
possessing New Independent States formerly part
of the Soviet Union is particularly significant.

CONCLUSION

“Weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical — along with their
associated delivery systems, pose a major threat
to our security and that of our allies and other
friendly nations. Thus, a key part of our strategy
is to seek to stem the proliferation of such
weapons and to develop an effective capability
to deal with these threats. We also need to main-
tain robust strategic nuclear forces and seek to
implement existing strategic arms agreements.”

A National Security Strategy of Engagement

and Enlargement,
The White House, February 1995, p. 13.

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and bio-
logical weapons is not a hypothetical threat. A
number of states have NBC military capabilities; a
larger number are capable of producing such
weapons, potentially on short notice.



Section I
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Uncertainty persists concerning the long-term
implications of other types of technology transfers,
despite recent Russian actions to monitor and con-
trol illegal proliferation. The emigration of Russian
scientists, engineers, and technicians with exper-
ience in NBC weapons and missile development

34

technologies could provide certain nations with
access to critical research or production know-how
and thereby accelerate their acquiring such
capabilities. Finally, recent Russian declarations
regarding the extent of chemical and biological
warfare programs have not been complete.



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

Until very recently, it was difficult for most states to
obtain this information for distant targets. While
some mechanisms were available, for example,
overflight by reconnaissance aircraft, these entailed
risk and might not provide all of the needed infor-
mation. Maps might be consulted; however, many
are inaccurate or do not contain all of the military
targets of interest.

The availability of satellite imagery has had a major
impact on the ability of proliferants to obtain the
data needed for effective targeting. The key
systems here have been SPOT and LANDSAT —
French and American satellites, respectively, that
provide imagery. In peacetime, data from these
satellites is commercially available. More recently,
data from Russian imagery satellites has also
become available on the open market.

SPOT and LANDSAT can provide reasonably high
resolution images in the range of 10-30 meters.
Resolution refers to the size of an object on the
ground that can be seen in the sense that it can be
distinguished from other objects. Location accur-
acy depends on the availability of reference infor-
mation — visible known locations that can be
identified. For SPOT, accuracies on the order of 15
meters or better are possible when imagery covers
areas with known and precisely located reference
points. Depending on the number of SPOT or
LANDSAT satellites that are in orbit, considerable
time can transpire between successive images of the
same location.

During the Gulf War, Iraq did not have access to
imagery from SPOT and LANDSAT. Coalition
forces, on the other hand, made use of both sat-
ellites. While neither satellite has the very high
resolution needed to distinguish individual
vehicle-size objects, both provided useful wide-
area views of the theater to Coalition forces.

During peacetime, proliferants might make use of
imagery from SPOT and LANDSAT to develop
accurate maps of targets in other states. Civilian use
of these systems has shown that some maps,
particularly for areas in the developing world, can
have significant errors (cities mislocated by miles).
Useful information might also be developed
concerning military capabilities, such as the loca-
tions of airfields that might be used by military
forces during a conflict.

In the future, higher resolution data is likely to be
commercially available to include 1-meter-scale
data from U.S. firms and 5-meter-resolution
imagery from the next generation of SPOT sat-
ellites. Currently, advertised resolutions (which are
best possible values) might not be achieved if the
target of interest is not aligned with the satellite’s
track. The payoff from this access to satellite
imagery would be the ability to identify the ports,
airfields, and other facilities that are in use and to
obtain information concerning the dispositions and
locations of military forces not otherwise subject to
observation. Iraq, for example, might have used
such a capability to discover that Coalition forces
had shifted their positions prior to ground opera-
tions in Operation Desert Storm. Access to timely
imagery of at least moderate resolution would be a
significant improvement in military capabilities.

Accurate Guidance and Navigation

The availability of low cost systems that provide
high accuracy navigation and guidance is a recent
development. NAVSTAR GPS and GLONASS (its
Russian counterpart) use constellations of satellites
to send signals that can be utilized to provide high
accuracy navigation. GPS receivers are available in
stores and catalogs at prices of $200-$500.

GPS broadcasts protected military and in-the-clear
civil signals with accuracies of less than 10 meters
and 30-50 meters, respectively. If the Selective
Availability security feature is removed from GPS,
it will provide in-the-clear accuracy of approxi-
mately 3-5 meters.

The accuracy of navigation can be improved con-
siderably by performing sophisticated processing
on the GPS signal or by combining information
from GPS with location data provided by other
sources such fixed reference stations (differential
GPS) or inertial measurement systems.

GPS is based on signals that are broadcast by
satellites. As is the case with any signal, attempts
might be made to jam a GPS-equipped delivery
system. This might be done with systems that have
limited range located near probable targets (NBC
facilities). The effectiveness of such jamming
interference would depend on a number of factors;
for example, is GPS the only guidance system
employed or is it complemented by other navigation
aides?



Section I
SOUTH ASIA

SOUTH ASIA

Arabian
Sea

Madras,

Indian Ocean

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Calcutta,

Bay

o
Bengal

SRI
LANKA

Nations of South Asia

GOALS AND INTERESTS

The United States has important security interests in
South Asia, including preventing another Indo-
Pakistani war and enhancing regional stability. Our
nonproliferation goal is to persuade India and
Pakistan to first cap, then reduce, and eventually

35

eliminate their capabilities to produce nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. This approach
supports our global objective to reduce and ulti-
mately eliminate nuclear weapons. The conse-
quences of a nuclear war between India and



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

management oversight for critical BW defense
acquisition programs, including BW_ vaccine
production and BW agent battlefield detection
programs. The Counterproliferation Support Pro-
gram leverages existing programs to accelerate the
fielding of critical systems and technologies.

Passive defense involves military capabilities that
provide protection against NBC weapon effects.
Passive defense programs involve contamination
avoidance (reconnaissance, detection, and warn-
ing), force protection (individual and collective
protection and medical support), and decontam-
ination.

Within the contamination avoidance area, sensors
for joint task forces, mobile BW/CW recon-
naissance, and systems capable of detecting multi-
ple BW/CW agents and characterizing new agents
are being developed. Technological advances are
being pursued in remote detection, miniaturization,
lower detection limits, logistics supportability, and
biological detection capability.

In the force protection area, improved mask systems
and advanced protective clothing are being
developed under a joint program that will reduce the
weight, heat stress, and logistics burden of current
gear. Medical research is providing improved
prophylaxes, antidotes, treatments, vaccines, and
medical casualty management systems. Light-
weight BW/CW protective shelters and integrated
collective protection technology advances are also
supported.

For decontamination, modular systems are being
developed. Technology development programs to
examine advances in sorbents, coatings catalysis,
and physical removal are supported. The CBD
program also includes projects to protect U.S.
forces from nuclear and radiological weapons
effects, including detection and warning sensors,
individual and collective protection, medical
response, and decontamination. The total RDT&E
and procurement budget for the CBD program in
FY 1996 is about $350 million.

As a counterpart to these activities, the Counter-
proliferation Support Program leverages existing
programs to accelerate the deployment of important
systems. Specifically, the program is supporting
projects to: (1) accelerate (by up to six years) the

51

fielding of an advanced long-range eye-safe infra-
red lidar (laser detection device) to provide long-
range battlefield warning of CW/BW use; (2) ex-
plore whether ultraviolet multifrequency lasers can
be employed to detect and characterize biological
agents by their fluorescent spectra; (3) develop min-
iaturized BW/CW point detectors with increased
sensitivity that are amenable to installation on
unmanned aerial vehicles; (4) accelerate (by two
years) the procurement of improved individual
protective clothing and collective protective equip-
ment; (5) supplement the CBD decontamination
technology base; and (6) enhance existing joint
NBC doctrine and training procedures by intensi-
fied battlefield simulation. Approximately $30
million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for these
passive defense elements of the Counterprolifera-
tion Support Program.

The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and the
military departments also manage a number of
passive defense programs. DNA has programs to
ensure the survivability of weapons systems in a
nuclear environment; $95.5 million has been
budgeted for these investments in FY 1996. The
Navy’s Radiological Controls program provides
RDT&E of radiation monitoring equipment for
Navy and Marine Corps use. The Army’s programs
include the operation of Dugway Proving Ground,
Utah, as the primary test range for biological and
chemical defense equipment and the Nuclear
Effects Survivability program, which develops
technology to enhance the survivability of Army
systems in nuclear environments. Additional
details may be found in the May 1995 Counter-
proliferation Program Review Committee Report.

ACTIVE DEFENSE

This facet of counterproliferation involves pro-
grams that improve capabilities to detect, track,
identify, intercept and destroy, and neutralize NBC
warheads delivered by airborne launch platforms,
ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, while mini-
mizing collateral effects.

To address the security challenges posed by the
proliferation of NBC weapons and the ballistic
missiles used to deliver them, DoD is continuing to
implement the new priorities established for
ballistic missile defense identified in the Depart-
ment-wide Bottom-Up Review. These new prior-
ities respond to the end of the Cold War. They focus



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OPERATIONAL IRAQI MISSILE FORCE
DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

Black Sea UZBEKISTAN

GEORGIA

Caspian
Sea

ARMENIA

TURKMENISTAN
TURKEY

Mediterranean
Sea

Z

cyprus

“JORDAN

SAUDI
ARABIA

IRAQ
Operational Missile
Delivery System During

DESERT STORM Range (km)

— SCUD B Missile 300

UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES,

—— AlHusayn/Al Hijarah 650

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative

Range
(kilometers) Number Launched
SCUD-B 300 km 0
Al Husayn 600-650 km “84
Al Husayn-Short 600-650 km 3
Al Hijarah 600-650 km 1

23



Section IT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

Developing advanced penetrating weapons and
advanced warheads/payloads for enhanced lethality
and functional kill against hard underground targets
is required because some proliferants have opted to
locate their NBC capabilities in underground or
otherwise hard-to-defeat locations and facilities. In
FY 1996, $14.3 million has been budgeted to
develop an enhanced penetrating munition to defeat
underground targets. It will be compatible with
most tactical delivery platforms and have all-
weather, anti-jam precision guidance capability.
Additionally, $3.5 million has been budgeted in FY
1996 for development of a high temperature incen-
diary weapon payload and a classified payload.

Concern regarding collateral effects has prompted
efforts to develop new types of biological and
chemical agent neutralization weapons. Approxi-
mately $4 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for
development of prototype agent defeat munitions.

We are also emphasizing tunnel defeat concepts,
target response, and vulnerability assessment be-
cause some proliferants have opted to make use of
these very difficult-to-defeat facilities. Approxi-
mately $9.9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996
to assess tunnel response and vulnerability.

ACTDs are a new approach to acquisition. They
rapidly integrate and demonstrate new military
applications of current technologies. They are
performed for a warfighting command customer
and provide (following demonstration) a small
quantity of new prototype systems. Responding to
a CINC priority, a Counterproliferation ACTD is
being conducted to integrate advanced sensors,
mission planning tools, collateral effects prediction
capability, and enhanced conventional weapons.
The ACTD is designed to support rapid fielding of
these new capabilities; $2.7 million has been
budgeted for this program in FY 1996.

These new DoD counterforce initiatives are
supplemented by current DARPA and DNA
programs. The DARPA “Warbreaker” or Critical
Mobile Targets Project is focusing on Distributed
Interactive Simulation to support R&D activities
associated with sensor systems, communication
sites, and information processing systems to detect,
identify, and prosecute high value, time-critical
fixed and mobile targets such as theater ballistic

54

missiles, tanks, and artillery; $135 million has been
budgeted for this project in FY 1996. DNA’s
weapon system lethality program is developing
lethality criteria for a full spectrum of weapons,
including precision guided munitions and advanced
conventional and unconventional payloads. The
target base includes hard and superhard under-
ground facilities, fixed surface facilities, and sea-
based structures; $46 million has been budgeted for
this project in FY 1996.

MEASURES TO COUNTER PARAMILITARY,
COVERT, AND TERRORIST THREATS

Acquisition investments in this category are
intended to protect military and civilian personnel,
facilities, and logistical/mobilization nodes from
this special class of NBC threats, both in the United
States and overseas. This category of threat is
increasing. Particularly challenging is the threat of
covertly emplaced NBC weapons. The chemical
weapon attack on the Tokyo subway by Japanese
terrorists is a grim example. DoD is actively
pursuing several activities to counter paramilitary,
covert delivery, and terrorist NBC threats and
protect military facilities and logistical/mobili-
zation nodes against these threats. These include
supporting, training, and equipping Joint Special
Operations Forces, Explosive Ordinance Disposal
(EOD) teams, and NBC weapon response teams to
detect, neutralize, and render safe NBC devices
both in the United States and overseas. These DoD
capabilities can be provided to assist appropriate
U.S. government authorities in countering these
threats, operating within the parameters provided
by law and regulation; the Defense Department is
not a domestic police agency.

DoD is devoting significant resources to developing
the necessary technical means to counter NBC
paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist threats.
Much effort is underway in tactical intelligence and
related programs to conduct counterproliferation
missions. Other programs include development of
special warfare and C3 equipment, airbase protec-
tion programs, Nuclear Emergency Search Team
(NEST) support activities, multi-Service EOD
teams, and RDT&E of advanced technologies to
support the U.S. Special Operations Command and
EOD operations. Just over $12 million has been
budgeted for these programs in FY 1996.



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

Prevention of proliferation is the first priority. The
Department of Defense provides critical support to
national and international prevention efforts. The
Defense Department has unique responsibilities for
the military responses needed if prevention fails:
active defense, passive defense, counterforce, and
response to paramilitary/covert threats.

Our current appreciation of the counterproliferation
threat dates from the Gulf War, in which there were

63

a number of unpleasant surprises involving Iraq’s
NBC programs. Development of a coherent,
effective national response has required policy
initiatives, adaptation of military planning and
operations, acquisition of new capabilities, new
Intelligence Community programs, and _ inter-
national cooperation. In a brief period of time, con-
siderable progress has been made. Much, however,
remains to be done. _



TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I
THE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE ...............

NORTHEAST ASIA
Goals and Interests :
The Proliferation Challenge: Re;

North Korea

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA .

Goals and Interests

Tran
Traq .
Libya

THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: RUSSIA, UKRAINE,
KAZAKSTAN, AND BELARUS

Goals and Interests .. .
The Proliferation Challeng:
Nuclear Programs ....
Chemical Programs .
Biological Programs

Capabilities, Intentions, and Trend:

Ballistic Missiles
Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery .
Implications ........... 00.0000. e cee eee

SOUTH ASIA 2.20. .0ocececeete eee eect eaten
Goals and Interests
The Proliferation Challenge: Regional Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends .......

India and Pakistan ... .

THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT: DANGERS FROM
TERRORISM, INSURGENCIES, CIVIL WARS,
AND ORGANIZED CRIME ................

Terrorist Groups .
Insurgents and Civil War Factions ........... 0000 e ccc e cece eee e cece eee ees
Organized Criminal Groups
Implications for Regional Security .

43
43
43
44
45



Section I
THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT

THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT: DANGERS
FROM TERRORISM, INSURGENCIES,
CIVIL WARS, AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Transnational groups of proliferation concern
include terrorists, insurgents, opposing factions in
civil wars, and members of organized criminal
groups. Such groups are not generally bound by the
same constraints and mores or motivated by the
same factors as are nation-states, but pose
significant threats to the interests of the United
States and our allies and friends worldwide.
Terrorist acts pose an especially potent threat to
US. interests. When carried out by small, close-
knit groups, these attacks are difficult to detect in
advance, despite diligent intelligence efforts.

This category of proliferation threat is truly a global
problem, cutting across all regions. The threat has
been starkly demonstrated by the 1995 nerve gas
attack in Japan, the bombing of the New York World
Trade Center, and the increased involvement of
criminal groups in the smuggling of nuclear
materials. Furthermore, with numerous ongoing
insurgencies and civil wars worldwide, there are
additional dangers for escalation should NBC
weapons or missiles be introduced to the conflict.
Finally, there is an increased potential for leakage of
NBC weapons or missile technology, or individuals
with technological know-how. Such leakage would
most likely occur between states that have reduced
or dismantled their programs and states with pro-
grams under development.

TERRORIST GROUPS

Terrorist groups that acquire NBC weapons and
stridently oppose U.S. policies could pose signifi-
cant potential dangers to U.S. interests. Terrorists
armed with these weapons can gain leverage for
their demands because of the weapons’ nature.

Terrorists might wish to obtain NBC weapons for a
variety of motives. Such groups might threaten
using NBC weapons as “saber rattlers” to raise the
ante in response to Western political or military
actions or to achieve a specific objective, but would
risk losing its base of support.

43

Most terrorist groups do not have the financial and
technical resources necessary to acquire nuclear
weapons, but could gather materials to make
radiological dispersion devices and some biological
and chemical agents. Some groups have state
sponsors that possess or can obtain NBC weapons.
Nations such as Iran and Libya have backed num-
erous groups over the years, but no sponsor has yet
demonstrated a willingness to provide such groups
with NBC weapons, perhaps a testament to the
looming and certain threat of retaliation should the
state be identified as the supplier.

Terrorist acts involving NBC weapons represent a
particularly dangerous threat that must be coun-
tered. The ability of terrorists to take the initiative
in the choice of targets and timing of attacks
significantly complicates our ability to combat this
threat. U.S. policy in countering terrorism is four-
fold: make no concessions to terrorists, use political
and economic instruments to pressure states that
sponsor terrorism, exploit fully all available legal
mechanisms to punish international terrorists, and
help other governments improve their capabilities
to combat terrorism.

INSURGENTS AND CIVIL WAR
FACTIONS

Insurgent groups and separatist movements, should
they acquire NBC weapons or missiles, pose
another potential threat to U.S. interests. Presently,
there are dozens of insurgencies ongoing through-
out the world. Insurgent groups aim to overthrow
existing governments, thus destabilizing regional
balances of power. In some cases, such groups have
kidnapped U.S. citizens or conducted economic
retaliation against U.S. commercial interests
abroad. For the most part, these groups operate with
unsophisticated weapons, receive little financial
backing, and lack an industrial base to develop or
produce NBC weapons or missiles.

The primary proliferation concern about insurgent
groups is that they might capture such weapons,
acquire them from sympathizers in the govern-
ment’s forces, or purchase them, possibly from



Section I
SOUTH ASIA

RANGES OF CURRENT AND FUTURE BALLISTIC MISSILES

a a (7 KYRGYZSTAN

AFGHANISTAN CHINA

TAJIKISTAN

BHUTAN

BANGLADESH”
Arabian
Sea

BURMA

Bay

of
Bengal

PAKISTAN

Current Missile Range (Km)
Delivery System

HATF-1 80

Mobile SRBM'

Indian Ocean

300
(approximately)

‘Possibly available.
SRI y

LANKA

Boundary representations are not necessarily authottatve.

Concerned over its ability to deliver weapons using aircraft, Pakistan is establishing a ballistic missile delivery option.

CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF currently are its most viable delivery vehicles for
DELIVERY nuclear or chemical weapons. The most likely plat-
India has Russian and British ship- and air-launched forms are the Mirage 2000, MiG-27, MiG-29, and
anti-ship missiles, while Pakistan has Chinese and Jaguar. Similarly, combat aircraft are Pakistan’s
U.S. ship- and submarine-launched and French most viable delivery means for NBC weapons, with

air-launched anti-ship missiles. Because India is the most likely platforms being F-16 and Mirage III
still developing ballistic missiles, combat aircraft fighters.

40


Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

airfields that provided critical support during
Operation Desert Storm.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Weapons and Weapons Technology

Chemical weapons (CW) are compounds used in
military operations or as terrorist weapons to kill,
incapacitate, or seriously injure personnel through
their chemical properties. Most CW agents useful
as military weapons are not gases, although poison
gas is a term commonly used. While chlorine gas
was used in World War I, most agents are liquids,
which facilitate munitions loading and contribute to
stability in storage and transportation. When
employed, these liquids are dispersed as droplets.
These droplets can either penetrate the skin or
vaporize and become a respiration hazard.

Chemical agents are either persistent or nonper-
sistent. Persistent agents may last from hours to
days. Nonpersistent agents last minutes to hours.
Agents can be lethal or nonlethal. The effects
induced can include blistering, choking, blocking

the ability of body tissue to absorb oxygen, con-
vulsions, and paralysis. Reports indicate that the
1995 Japanese subway incident involved Sarin, an
agent that attacks the nervous system.

The precursor chemicals and intermediate stages in
the production process for two classical CW agents,
nerve and blister agents, have both agricultural and
industrial uses. For example, Thiodiglycol, which
has been used to produce ball-point pen ink, can be
converted to mustard agent by a simple (single)
chlorination step. The technology and most of the
production equipment, moreover, even the military
hardware necessary for delivery and dissemination,
are dual-use. Detection and discrimination between
legitimate and illegal production are difficult.
Facilities producing pesticides, insecticides, and
fire retardant chemicals could be converted to CW
production. There are strong external similarities
between civilian and military facilities, although
the latter may have observable security measures
such as restricted access areas and fences, and
possibly storage areas used for chemical munitions.
Knowledgeable personnel are readily available; a
relatively small number of chemical engineers and
technicians are needed for production of chemical
weapons.

difficult.

CW THREATS DURING THE GULF WAR

“While the defensive capabilities of U.S. and other Coalition forces improved rapidly, CW/BW defensive
readiness at the outset of the crisis was quite low. Coalition forces embarked on extraordinary measures to
correct these weaknesses, largely by building up the preparedness of individuals to protect themselves in the
event of CW/BW attack. On balance, these gains did lead to a significant potential for U.S. forces to operate
on a contaminated battlefield. While the outcome would have been unaffected, the tempo of the Operation
Desert Storm campaign could have been hindered had U.S. troops been forced to remain fully protected by
masks and suits. Temperatures during Operation Desert Storm were comparatively cool; data indicate that
risks of heat exhaustion would have been sharply higher in the summer, making protracted use of personal
protective gear impractical. Studies have also shown that protective equipment dramatically impedes crew
performance. The masks hinder communications, and the suits impair the ability to operate equipment.
High-speed combat requiring close coordination between crews manning complex systems becomes quite

THE IRAQI THREAT. Iraq had developed a substantial CW capability including research and development
facilities; stockpiles of CW munitions; a variety of delivery systems; and the doctrine and training to employ
integrated CW and conventional fire effectively on the battlefield. Iraq was the first nation to use nerve agents
on the battlefield — attacking unprepared Iranian troops in 1984. By 1990, Iraq had the largest CW agent
production capability in the Third World, annually producing thousands of tons of blister and nerve agents...”

Source: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 640.

A-2



Section I
NORTHEAST ASIA

market its growing expertise in nuclear power
technology to other countries, which adds to
concerns about proliferating nuclear materials and
know-how that may support weapons programs.

ROLE AS SUPPLIER

Because its conventional arms exports have
declined significantly since the late 1980s, China’s

10

defense industry is reluctant to reduce its remaining
arms exports. In the past, China has exported
chemical warfare-related material and missile
technology and components to Iran. Overall, China
continues to try to balance its role as an aspiring
global power that abides by international arms
control regimes with its need to use exports to
expand its influence abroad and sustain its defense
industries.



Section IT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

In the counterforce area, DoD is working to
improve capabilities to defeat NBC threats before
they can be used against U.S., allied, and coalition
forces and noncombatants. U.S. forces must be
capable of a rapid and effective response to contin-
gencies throughout the world. Resources are being
applied to improving capabilities for battlefield
surveillance, target characterization, and munition/
agent defeat.

For battlefield surveillance, DoD is improving
capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize
NBC forces and associated infrastructure elements
in a timely manner to support targeting, mission/
strike planning, and post-strike battle damage
assessments (BDA). Emphasis is being placed on
continuous wide-area surveillance; detection of
mobile targets (particularly NBC-armed mobile
missile launchers) and improved BDA capabilities.
DoD is also enhancing capabilities for the
integration and analysis of sensor inputs. These
capabilities are required to provide the data needed
to support attacks in the often very limited time
windows available before mobile targets move
from previously identified locations. As the Gulf
War demonstrated, this is an extremely challenging
problem. We were not successful in attempts to
detect and destroy mobile SCUD-class theater
ballistic missiles prior to launch. Such missions
require the orchestration of inputs from sensors in
near real-time and the prompt response of weapon
systems capable of defeating these targets.

Target characterization — accurate information
concerning the locations and characteristics of NBC
related facilities — is required for counterforce
operations. The detection and characterization of
hardened underground NBC facilities are partic-
ularly vital given the challenges of defeating these
targets. An underground location does not preclude
a facility from being located, characterized, and
defeated. The warfighter needs intelligence infor-
mation that characterizes the NBC facility, ideally
to the level of resolution needed to direct precision
munitions against the most critical elements within
it. This information needs to be supplemented with
modeling tools that can assist in target characteri-
zation and selecting the most effective weapon.

To make effective use of this target information, our
forces must have weapons that are capable of
penetrating through walls and other barriers that

53

provide protection for above- and below-ground
structures. They must also have munitions that can
defeat the NBC targets engaged. For biological and
chemical weapon targets, new types of agent defeat
munitions are needed. These systems must be able
to perform their missions in scenarios in which
NBC targets are protected by air defenses and (in
the future) missile defenses. Concurrently, there is
arequirement for a new system for the prediction of
the collateral hazards that might result from attacks
on NBC targets. The collateral effects induced by
damage to the chemical or biological weapon
targets may be far more significant than the direct
and collateral effects induced by the munitions used
in the attack.

The Counterproliferation Support Program is
supporting several specific projects in the counter-
force area. The investments focus on sensors,
collateral effects mitigation, weapon effects and
target response, advanced weapons and warheads,
munitions for neutralization of chemical and
biological agents, concepts for defeat of tunnels,
and a Counterproliferation ACTD.

Priorities for new sensors to support counterforce
operations include tactical Unattended Ground
Sensors (UGS) and airborne forward looking
infrared radar for target surveillance, characteriza-
tion, battle damage assessment and collateral
effects monitoring, and developing a weapon-borne
sensor to enhance underground target bomb dam-
age assessment; $9.3 million has been budgeted in
FY 1996 for these programs as part of the Sensor
Technology Project.

Improving our understanding of collateral effects
release phenomenology and transport is a priority
for counterforce attacks against NBC targets.
Approximately $8.9 million has been budgeted in
FY 1996 for source term characterization and
transport prediction, phenomenology experiments,
and assessment tools.

Improving the state of knowledge in weapons
effects and target vulnerability/response is required
to ensure that counterforce operations are effective.
Over $9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for
experimental and analytical assessment of NBC
target vulnerability response and automated target
planning for NBC targets/proliferation path assess-
ments to assist in target identification and strike
planning.



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

national security interests. Some of the key
objectives are as presented below:

“Although we recognize that export controls cannot
be 100 percent effective in preventing individual
transfers, we are convinced that such efforts buy us
time to implement other measures to mitigate the
impact of these transfers. We believe that a more
focused approach of the denial strategy —
concentrating on those key enabling technologies
that are produced by a limited number of states —
will, if applied universally, raise the cost to, and
increase the difficulty encountered by, even the most
determined proliferant.”

Mitchel B. Wallerstein

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Presentation to the Conference on Dealing
with the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The Hague, May 19-20, 1995

DoD’s technology security program is designed to
prevent the transfer of dangerous and sensitive
technologies to countries that pose security threats.
When technology is transferred to a country that
does not pose a threat, DoD contributes to national
efforts to ensure that the transfer is done in a manner
that does not endanger U.S. interests or compromise
our national security. In addition to controlling
transfers of destabilizing conventional weapons
and associated dual-use technologies, DoD’s tech-
nology security program supports the Department’s
Counterproliferation Initiative.

The Defense Technology Security Administration
(DTSA) provides unique military expertise in the
processes used to review export applications and
serves as the primary DoD agent for executing
DoD’s portion of the U.S. denial strategy. In order
to prioritize export control reviews as they apply to
chokepoints, DTSA applies the OSD Critical
Technology Support Program, a congressionally
mandated mechanism for identifying the most
important, militarily relevant technologies. Assis-
tance is provided by the Department of Energy’s
Office of Energy Intelligence, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and
other DoD components. Defense Department and

59

other U.S. Intelligence Community organizations
actively support the export review process by
identifying the key technologies that enable NBC
proliferation. Intelligence provides important
information on pending or ongoing foreign ship-
ments of critical materials, to include technical
assessments of materials and whether they are
intended for legitimate civilian use or for military
applications.

These analysts also provide critical information on
how proliferants acquire technologies and materials
through the use of complicated covert procurement
networks. Because many of these networks include
maritime transport, the Counterproliferation Support
Program is directly supporting the deployment this
year of the Navy’s Specific Emitter Identification
(SED) System to improve DoD’s capabilities to
identify and track ships at sea suspected of trans-
porting NBC weapons, delivery systems, and NBC
related materials. DoD has budgeted approxi-
mately $2.8 million to continue the development of
special SEI equipment in FY 1996.

These intelligence capabilities will help the United
States maintain and strengthen controls on critical
technologies. These controls can have a dramatic
effect on slowing the pace of programs and raising
their costs. This contribution is important to the
ongoing efforts to focus and strengthen key
international export control regimes. These capa-
bilities can also be used to support diplomatic
demarches and international inspections. Accurate
and timely information on a proliferant’s activities
and intentions can be used to build a global con-
sensus that international norms have been violated.

While DoD shares responsibility for U.S. policy on
international regimes with the State Department,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
others, the Defense Department provides unique
technical and military expertise vital to making
these regimes effective. In addition to intelligence
support, DoD participates in the negotiation of these
regimes, providing valuable operational and tech-
nical knowledge.

DoD also plays a leadership role in the implemen-
tation of many arms control and nonproliferation
regimes. For example, DNA has focused efforts on
technologies to assist in verification of arms control
agreements; the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)
is responsible for implementing inspection and



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

when U.S. and allied forces had to deal with real and
potential complications posed by Iraq’s arsenal of
NBC weapons and missiles. Iraq entered the Gulf
War with a known chemical warfare capability and
a demonstrated willingness to use it (Iraq used
chemical weapons against Iranian troops and its
own Kurdish population during the 1980s); a
known biological warfare capability; and a
developing, complex nuclear weapons program
(despite intense nonproliferation and export control
efforts by the United States and the international
community (for example, the IAEA)). During the
Gulf War, Iraq attempted to weaken the cohesion
and resolve of the U.S.-led coalition by using its
ballistic missiles as weapons of terror against Saudi
Arabia and Israel; however, Iraq did not use its
SCUDs with chemical or biological warheads.

In their quests to establish regional hegemony, Iran
and Iraq probably regard NBC weapons and
missiles as necessary to guarantee their territorial
integrity and national security. Possession of
nuclear weapons would likely lead to increased
intimidation of their Gulf neighbors, as well as
increased willingness to confront the United States.
The U.S. defense commitment, military presence,
and demonstrated ability to defend U.S. and allied
interests against such threats are vital to achieving
our goals in the region.

Libya remains a significant proliferation concern.
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he
is willing and capable of using chemical weapons
and missiles against his enemies. Libya sees the
United States as its primary external threat, owing
especially to U.S. support for UN sanctions against
Tripoli for its refusal to turn over suspects in the
terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103. Although
Libya’s capabilities to use chemical agents and
missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these
weapons to states he supports and that support him
in return.

THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE:
REGIONAL CAPABILITIES,
INTENTIONS, AND TRENDS

Iran poses the greatest threat to the stability of the
region and to U.S. interests; this will remain the case
as long as UN Security Commission on Iraq is able
to maintain its intrusive inspection regime in

12

neighboring Iraq. In the past, Iran has demonstrated
both the will and the ability to use NBC to advance
and defend national goals. Tehran used chemical
weapons and ballistic missiles with conventional
warheads during the Iran-Iraq war and has fired
conventionally-armed cruise missiles at U.S.-
flagged oil tankers.

In August 1995, Iraq admitted to a far more
extensive NBC weapons and missile program than
had been previously revealed. The Iraqis divulged
to UN inspectors that prior to the Gulf War they had
produced large quantities of biological warfare
agents, had loaded them into missiles and bombs,
had begun a crash program to build a nuclear
weapon, and had produced engines for SCUD
missiles.

In the future, the quality, scope, and staying power
of the UN inspectors and on-site monitoring and
verification processes will be central in determining
whether the Iraqi weapon programs are dismantled,
kept in check, or eventually succeed. However,
Iraq’s military production capabilities (not affected
by UN sanctions and monitoring), past use of
chemicals and missiles, and consistent efforts to
deceive UN inspectors are strong indicators that
Iraq will attempt to produce NBC weapons and
missiles when outside constraints are absent.

In October 1994, the Iraqis repeated their oft-
demonstrated willingness to threaten military
action to attain their goals when they deployed
Republican Guard forces to southern Iraq, thereby
threatening Kuwait and its oil fields. With recon-
structed conventional forces and NBC weapons and
missile capabilities, Iraq could again threaten states
in the region, oil fields and facilities, U.S. forces,
and key logistics facilities.

Tran

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Iran’s primary national objectives are threefold:
ensuring the survival of its Islamic government,
limiting foreign influence in the Middle East, and
spreading Islamic fundamentalism abroad. Tehran
seeks to strengthen its political, economic, and mili-
tary positions as a regional power and to reduce the
influence of the West, especially the United States,
in the Persian Gulf, and in the greater Middle East.
In addition, Iran champions Muslim causes worldwide,



PREFACE

1. Reduce the threat, by leading the U.S. effort to
help the former Soviet Union republics reduce,
dismantle, safeguard, and even eliminate these
weapons.

2. Deter against the threat, by maintaining strong
conventional forces and a smaller but robust
nuclear deterrent force.

3. Defend against the threat through the Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative.

The DoD Counterproliferation Initiative involves a
range of Department-wide activities that help to
prevent, protect against, and even reverse the

tog log

iv

danger from spreading nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons; technology; and missiles that
can deliver them. These efforts include developing
systems that can intercept or destroy these weapons,
providing vaccines and protective suits for our
troops, keeping track of the movement of weapons
and technology, and providing unique DoD support
for various nonproliferation agreements.

This document details the proliferation pheome-
non, the threat it poses to the United States, and the
programs and policies DoD employs through the
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to counter
this growing threat.



Section I
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Russia inherited the bulk of the Soviet Union’s
ballistic missile industrial base and remains capable
of developing and producing the full range of both
solid- and liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, and
all associated technologies.

In Ukraine, since mid-1993, about 75 percent of the
ICBM warheads have been removed from active
status and, as of December 1995, Ukrainian offi-
cials said that about 1,410 ICBM and air-launched
cruise missile (ALCM) warheads have been
returned to Russia. Under the Trilateral Statement
signed January 14, 1994, all the warheads asso-
ciated with these ICBMs, as well as those from
ALCMs, are to be transferred to Russia for dis-
mantlement. We expect all warheads will probably
be transferred by mid-1996.

Ukraine also has an inventory of SCUD-B and
SS-21 SRBMs, as well as fighter and bomber
aircraft that could be used to deliver NBC weapons.
It has extensive and highly developed missile
production capabilities and has indicated intense
interest in developing an indigenous space launch
vehicle program.

In April 1995, the Russians announced that all
nuclear warheads had been removed from Kazak-
stan, thereby removing all ICBMs in Kazakstan
from operational status. Moscow will probably
remove the remaining ICBM airframes and support
equipment from Kazakstan well before the 1997
agreed deadline. While Kazakstan also has an
inventory of SCUD-B SRBMs, strategic aircraft
which had been based in Kazakstan have already
been redeployed to Russia. With material and
technical assistance from Russia, Kazakstan has the
capability to continue producing ballistic missiles
and launchers, but has put a high priority on
converting the former missile production facility at
Petropavlovsk. Additional ballistic missile assem-
bly technology and expertise is available at the
Baikonur Cosmodrome (Tyuratam Space Missile
Test Center), which remains under Russian control.

In Belarus, as of December 1995, 63 SS-25 ICBMs
originally deployed there have been returned to
Russia. As of December 1995, Belarus had two
operational SS-25 mobile ICBM regiments remain-
ing on its territory, with a total of 18 nuclear war-
heads. In July 1992, Belarus signed an agreement
with Russia placing the regiments under exclusive

33

Russian control. In September 1993, Moscow and
Minsk signed an agreement requiring the return of
these nuclear missiles and all related missile
support equipment to Russia by the end of 1996.
Aftér withdrawal from Belarus, these SS-25s will
be stored or deployed in Russia. Belarus also has an
inventory of SCUD-B and SS-21 SRBMs, which it
will retain.

Belarus has a variety of aircraft capable of deliver-
ing NBC weapons. It has no capability to produce
missiles, but does produce the chassis for road
mobile missile launchers.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of
Delivery

The states of the former Soviet Union inherited the
largest inventory of cruise missiles in the world.
The majority of these missiles are now under
Russian control, are located on Russian territory,
and include large numbers of air-, sea- and land-
launched systems. However, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakstan have air-launched cruise missiles in their
air forces, while Ukraine may have a small number
of sea-launched and coastal defense cruise missiles
under its control.

Implications

Russia’s numerous cooperative actions with the
West in international arenas is evidence that
Russia’s overall policy appears to support nonpro-
liferation actions. Further, Russia’s military
doctrine lists proliferation of NBC weapons as a
threat to its own security. Russia has made some
progress in designing a system to control the sale of
sensitive technologies. Moscow has established
lists of controlled items and developed official
procedures governing their potential sale. Serious
concerns remain, however, ranging from certain
Russian exports policies to effective security
measures for fissile material. To date, theft has
focused primarily on small arms and military goods
that are readily convertible to cash. Interest in the
theft of advanced weapons, critical components,
and weapons-grade fissile materials has been
highlighted by several incidents in 1994 involving
the smuggling of nuclear material.



Technical Annex
ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

“Coalition targeting policy and air crews made every effort to minimize civilian casualties and collateral
damage. Because of these restrictive policies, only PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions) were used to
destroy key targets in downtown Baghdad in order to avoid damaging adjacent civilian buildings.
Planners were aware that each bomb carried a potential moral and political impact, and that Iraq has a
rich cultural and religious heritage dating back several thousand years. Targeting policies, therefore,
scrupulously avoided damage to mosques, religious shrines, and archaeological sites, as well as to
civilian facilities and the civilian population.

During December, a team was formed in the continental United States (CONUS) to determine the most
effective way to attack Iraq’s arsenal of CW/BW weapons. Several experiments were conducted which
attempted to find a way to destroy these weapons without releasing BW agents or causing significant
collateral damage. Finally, through the timing of attacks and choice of munitions, planners were able
to minimize the chance for toxins to spread. No chemical or biological agents were detected after the

attacks and no CW/BW collateral damage was experienced.”

Source: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress,

April 1992, pp. 99-100 and 154-155.

Measures to Challenge Non- and
Counterproliferation

A primary concern here involves the deliberate
collocation of NBC facilities near civilian pop-
ulations and facilities that the United States and its
allies and coalition partners might be reluctant to
attack due to civilian casualty considerations (see
above). Responses include development and utili-
zation of improved precision-delivery munitions
and improved capabilities for the prediction and
mitigation of collateral effects.

CONCLUSION

* Acquisition of NBC weapons, missiles and other
delivery systems, and supporting technologies is
considerably easier than was the case in the 1940s
and 1950s, when most of the declared nuclear
powers developed their nuclear arsenals. There has
been a diffusion of the technologies that enable
proliferation, a number of which have legitimate
civilian applications and are inherently dual-use.

Military counterproliferation planning must have
two focuses. The first involves current threats, as
reviewed in Section I. These risks involve known
instances of NBC proliferation. While there is no
question but that the world is a safer place than it
was at the height of the Cold War in terms of the risk
of a major strategic conflict, significant threats to
U.S. national security persist.

The second focus involves potential threats. Noone
writing this document 10 years ago would have had
the foresight to predict the end of the Cold War or
the Gulf War. In an uncertain world, all potential
antagonisms cannot be forecast. Hence, some
planning and investments cannot be adversary-
specific and must instead address the types of
threats that are enabled by the availability of rele-
vant, state-of-the-art technologies.

The character of warfare has changed. Just as
military planners must assume that antagonists may
have armored forces and combat aircraft, planning
for major regional conflicts must give consideration
to the possibility that adversaries may have NBC
weapons and the means to deliver them.



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

Iraq built its chemical program with assistance from
Western sources, both individuals and companies,
that supplied Iraq with vital chemical processing
equipment, chemical precursors, and technical
expertise. In the absence of UN monitoring or
import controls, Iraq could revive a viable chemical
weapon capability in a matter of months, despite
war damage to its production and storage facilities.
The Iraqis still have a domestic chemical industry,
and converting some of these plants from producing
chemicals to producing chemical warfare pre-
cursors and even agents would be relatively
straightforward. Iraq retains the capability to
deliver chemical agents using a variety of muni-
tions, including artillery shells and rockets, aerial
bombs, spray tanks, mortar rounds, and SCUD-type
missile warheads.

Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons demonstrates
its willingness to ignore international norms of
conduct. Iraq first used chemical agents in 1983,
when Baghdad attacked Iranian military forces with
mustard gas. In 1984, Iraq employed tabun-filled
aerial bombs against Iran, making Iraq the first and
only nation ever to have used a nerve agent on the
battlefield. Iraq’s successful integration of chemi-
cal weapons into offensive operations is widely
accepted as one of the reasons for its victory over
Iran in 1988. Baghdad used chemical weapons for
their tactical and strategic value, not to mention
their overwhelming psychological effect on Iranian
forces. Iraq also used lethal chemical agents against
its own Kurdish civilian population in 1988.

BIOLOGICAL PROGRAM

Iraq revealed to UN inspectors in August 1995 that
ithad a far more extensive and aggressive biological
warfare program prior to the Gulf War than it had
previously admitted. The Iraqis claim to have pro-
duced 90,000 liters of botulinum toxin and 8,300
liters of anthrax, as well as significant quantities of
an agent that causes cancer. Further, the Iraqis claim
to have loaded botulinum toxin and anthrax on
SCUD missiles warheads and aerial bombs. Bagh-
dad also admitted conducting research on myco-
toxins and infectious viruses. The Iraqis claimed in
August 1995 that they destroyed the agents after the
Gulf War (January-February 1991), but have yet to
produce evidence to support their claim.

21

Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi
declarations and UN inspections have exposed an
extensive dual-use fermentation capability and
additional facilities probably linked to the weapons
program. Because of their dual-use nature, most
equipment and procedures related to producing bio-
logical agents are rationalized as legitimate agri-
culture, biomedical, and biotechnical industrial
activities.

Coalition air strikes destroyed or damaged many of
Traq’s facilities associated with biological warfare,
including those at Al Kindi and Salman Pak.
However, before the Coalition operations began,
the Iraqis had relocated virtually all of their agent
production equipment to Al Hakam and other facili-
ties. All known fermentation and bioproduction
equipment remains intact, and key experts are still
available to serve Iraq’s military programs. Conse-
quently, Iraq retains the infrastructure that pre-
viously developed and produced biological war-
fare agents and weapons, and could easily renew
production of biological agents when intrusive UN
inspections are discontinued.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Soviet SCUD missiles were the basic building
block of Iraq’s missile development program.
During the late 1980s, Baghdad began to enlarge the
propellant tanks and reduce the SCUD warhead
weight to reach targets beyond the missile’s 300-
kilometer maximum range. Iraq also focused on a
domestic manufacturing capability for these modi-
fied SCUDs, as well as the Badr 2000, a solid-
propellant missile based on the Argentine Condor,
with a 750-1,000-kilometer range. Baghdad also
had plans for a 2,000-kilometer range missile,
called the Tammouz I. As a result, by the start of
Operation Desert Storm, Iraq had in place a support
structure for the eventual manufacture of liquid-
and solid-propellant ballistic missiles.

The principal missile launched during Operation
Desert Storm was the 600-650 kilometer SCUD
variant called the Al Husayn. A variant of the Al
Husayn was also produced, known as the Al Husayn
Short. The Iraqis claimed to have fired another
SCUD variant, the Al Hijarah, which may have had
a concrete-filled warhead, at Israel during Opera-
tion Desert Storm.



PREFACE

PREFACE

THE NEW THREAT FROM NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS

During the height of the Cold War, the Russian
physicist Andre Sakharov said, “Reducing the risk
of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an
absolute priority over all other considerations.”
The end of the Cold War has reduced the threat of
global nuclear war, but today a new threat is rising
from the global spread of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons. Hostile groups and nations
have tried — or have been able — to obtain these
weapons, the technology, and homegrown ability to
make them or ballistic missiles that can deliver the
massive annihilation, poison, and death of these
weapons hundreds of miles away. For rogue
nations, these weapons are a ticket to power, stature,
and confidence in regional war.

We received a wake-up call with Saddam Hussein’s
use of SCUD missiles during Operation Desert
Storm and new information on his ambitious
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons pro-
grams. The proliferation of these horrific weapons
presents a grave and urgent risk to the United States
and our citizens, allies, and troops abroad. Reduc-
ing this risk is an absolute priority of the United
States.

The way we reduce the risk from weapons of mass
destruction has changed dramatically. During the
Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union
lived under a doctrine known as Mutually Assured
Destruction, commonly known as “MAD.” MAD
was essentially a balance of terror that assumed
neither nuclear power would launch an attack and
risk nuclear retaliation. This nuclear stand-off has
ended. Instead, the United States and Russia are
working together to reduce and dismantle our
nuclear arsenals, and to prevent the export and sale
of those weapons and related technology through-
out the world.

Our progress is good news. The bad news is that in
this era the simple threat of retaliation that worked
during the Cold War may not be enough to deter

iii

terrorists or aggressive regimes from using nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. Terrorists
operate in a shadowy world in which they can
detonate a device and disappear, as the poison gas
attack in Tokyo illustrates. Rogue regimes may try
touse these devastating weapons as blackmail, or as
a relatively inexpensive way to sidestep the U.S.
military’s overwhelming conventional military
superiority. Aggressors may also actually use these
weapons in an attempt to gain a decisive edge in a
regional war. The bottom line is, unlike during the
Cold War, those who possess nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons may actually come to use
them. The increase in the likelihood of regional war
in today’s world raises the risk.

This new danger requires some new thinking and
new leadership on how to prevent, deter and, if
necessary, respond to this threat. Through the
Nunn-Lugar program, we have hastened dismantle-
ment of Russia’s nuclear weapon systems;
denuclearized Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus;
strengthened the safety and security of nuclear
weapons and fissile material; and removed 600
kilograms of highly enriched uranium from
Kazakstan in the dramatic Project Sapphire.
America’s diplomatic leadership helped bring the
nations of the world to extend — indefinitely — the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will serve
to stem regional or even new global arms races. In
one region in particular — the Korean peninsula —
American diplomatic leadership helped bring North
Korea to sign the Agreed Framework, which in
effect froze its nuclear program. These successes
demonstrate that U.S. diplomatic leadership in the
world is critical to nonproliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons.

At the same time, America’s defense leadership
bolsters the diplomatic nonproliferation effort by
helping to protect the United States and our citizens,
allies, and military forces abroad from aggressors
who may possess or obtain nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons. The Department of Defense
(DoD) provides this leadership through a three-part
strategy:



Section II
Department of Defense Response



Section I
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: RUSSIA,
UKRAINE, KAZAKSTAN, AND BELARUS

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.
Final boundaries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the former
Soviet Union are expected to be confirmed by agreement.

Reto

20g Arctic Ocean

“ * 8
KIEV,
Roms KEY

ee
Shroom) Pwoscow

RUSSIA

Occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945,
administered by Russia, claimed by Japan

KAZAKSTAN \
Baikonur \,
‘osmodrome . fc

€.
A oNcoua
IRAN ; ‘4, es
TAsKSTAN
La CHINA
AFGHANISTAN nf
Nations of the Former Soviet Union
GOALS AND INTERESTS Soviet Union and a regime emerge which is hostile
to US. interests; preventing the proliferation of
The fundamental interests of the United States NBC weapons; maintaining regional stability in and
regarding Russia and the independent states of the among the nations of the former Warsaw Pact; and
former Soviet Union, as articulated by President avoiding reestablishing an antagonistic global
Clinton, are to reduce the nuclear threat, to support rivalry with Russia.

the development of these states table democ-
racies, and to assist them to establish market THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE:

economies. CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS, AND
Within these broad foreign policy goals, the United TRENDS

States has five primary national security interests in From the former Soviet Union, Russia has inherited
this region: implementing START I and II and all the largest stockpile of NBC weapons and delivery
other arms control agreements, and safeguarding systems in the world. Although additional strategic
the enormous nuclear arsenal that is the legacy of weapons are still deployed in the new independent
the Cold War; deterring the use of nuclear weapons states of Ukraine and Belarus, these weapons are
should a strategic reversal occur in the former under Russian control. Russia’s public statements

29



Section I
SOUTH ASIA

necessary to improve and expand its nuclear
program. China remains an important supplier of
nuclear technologies to Pakistan. In addition,
Pakistan has acquired or attempted to acquire var-
ious materials and technology for nuclear weapons
and peaceful applications from firms in the United
States and Western Europe.

Most of Pakistan’s nuclear research and develop-
ment is conducted by its Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, which operates over a half-dozen facilities
throughout the country. Three of Pakistan’s oper-
ating nuclear reactors — the KANUPP power
reactor in Karachi and the PARR I and PARR II
research reactors near Islamabad — are under
IAEA safeguards. The Chashma nuclear power
plant, also near Islamabad, is under construction
and also will be covered by IAEA safeguards.

Pakistan possesses all the components necessary for
producing a nuclear device, and it probably has
sufficient fissile material now to assemble a few
nuclear weapons. In addition, Pakistan is building
an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor that will provide
it with a substantial capability to produce weapons-
grade plutonium. It is expected to become opera-
tional in the late 1990s.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMS

India and Pakistan are capable of developing chem-
ical weapons. India, a signatory of the CWC, has
never admitted to having an offensive chemical
warfare program. India’s large chemical industry
produces many dual-use chemicals that could be
used as precursors, and could support a chemical
warfare program of considerable size.

Like India, Pakistan has signed the CWC, and can
produce chemical agents and munitions. It has pro-
cured dual-use chemical precursors from foreign
sources and hopes to achieve self-sufficiency in
producing precursors.

While India possesses the infrastructure necessary
to support an offensive biological warfare program,
including highly qualified scientific personnel and
industrial production facilities, it apparently has
given priority to research and development appli-
cable only to biological warfare defensive meas-
ures. Pakistan has the resources and capabilities
appropriate to conducting research and develop-

38

ment relating to biological warfare. Both countries
have signed the Biological Weapons Convention.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

India has one of the more self-sufficient ballistic
missile programs in the developing world. It can
design and produce missiles with little foreign
assistance. However, New Delhi is working to
become self-sufficient in all areas of production by
the end of the decade. India has two ballistic missile
programs — the Prithvi SRBM and the Agni
MRBM. The Indians heavily used technological
assistance and parts from Western firms in devel-
oping these missiles. The Prithvi is a single-stage,
liquid-fueled missile using propulsion technology
from the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile, and is
designed to be deployed with a payload of 1,000
kilograms to a range of 150 kilometers (or 250 kilo-
meters with a 500-kilogram payload). The Indian
Army has completed user trials with the Prithvi.
The missile could quickly enter series production if
a deployment decision were taken.

In 1994, India successfully tested the two-stage Agni;
the missile achieved a range of 1,000 kilometers,
about half its intended range. Publicly, the Indians
call the missile a “technology demonstrator,” although
it could be used in developing a follow-on, longer
range MRBM that could reach China.

Additionally, India has had an ambitious space
launch vehicle (SLV) program since the mid-1970s.
The program includes three SLVs, which have pay-
load capacities ranging from 150 to 3,000 kg. India
could convert these SLVs into IRBMs or ICBMs
quite easily but has shown no indications of doing
so. It has already built guidance sets and warheads,
key components needed to convert an SLV into a
ballistic missile.

The Indian space program shares research, devel-
opment, and production facilities with the ballistic
missile program. Therefore, New Delhi could
apply the SLV technology it has obtained from the
former Soviet Union and the West to its ballistic
missile programs.

Pakistan has an SRBM industry that includes a large
solid rocket motor production complex and a
ballistic missile test facility. However, Pakistan’s
missile production capability is not as extensive as



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Country
Type of Origin Range (km)
LUNA/FROG-7 Russia 70
Astros II Brazil 60
SA-2 Russia Unknown
(potential SSM)
SA-3 Russia Unknown
(potential SSM)
Ababil-50 Iraq 50
Ababil-100 Traq 100-150

CURRENT IRAQI SURFACE-TO-SURFACE ROCKET AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS PERMITTED UNDER UNSCR 687

Status and Remarks
In service; limited potential for range extension.
In service; limited potential for range extension.

Currently widely used in Iraq as a SAM. Iraq aware of
Chinese ability to convert SA-2s into surface-to-surface
missiles (SSMs).

Also used widely as a SAM in Iraq. Iraq tried to convert
the SA-3 to an SSM prior to the Gulf War, but failed. No
evidence that the program has been revived.

Entering service in limited numbers. Potential for range
extension probably limited.

In development, with parallel solid- and liquid- propellant
versions being considered. Great potential for range
extension.

Even though most of Iraq’s missile production
facilities received heavy damage during the Gulf
War, Baghdad maintains some of the equipment
needed to produce ballistic missiles, in part because
of the dual-use nature of much of the equipment
required for producing SCUDs. Today, Iraq’s pro-
duction efforts are focused on developing the
Ababil-100, with an estimated maximum range of
150 kilometers, and the Ababil-50, a Yugoslav-
designed 50-kilometer range battlefield artillery
rocket. Many of the Ababil-100 liquid-propellant
missile production technologies are compatible
with SCUD production.

UNSCR 687 prohibits Iraqi possession of missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometers. Never-
theless, the United States believes Iraq has hidden
a small number of mobile launchers and several
dozen SCUD-type missiles produced before Opera-
tion Desert Storm.

CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF
DELIVERY

Traq has Chinese land-based and air-launched anti-
ship cruise missiles. Although its stockpile is likely
limited, Iraq used French air-launched and Chinese
land-based and air-launched missiles during the

Iran-Iraq war. Iraq enhanced its anti-ship capability
by forward-deploying aircraft and by using aerial
refueling to strike oil tankers in the Strait of
Hormuz. Iraq still possesses a variety of other
platforms capable of delivering both chemical and
biological weapons, including artillery and tactical
rockets, combat aircraft and helicopters.

Libya

Libya has a long history of subverting and destab-
ilizing Arab and African nations by supporting
coups, funding and training opposition forces and
guerrilla groups, and plotting the assassinations of
foreign leaders. Qadhafi has invaded, occupied,
and/or claimed territory in all of Libya’s neighbors
except Egypt. He has at times supported foreign
Islamic extremists, and he has frequently criticized
Arab governments that have attempted to open
dialogue with Israel.

Under Qadhafi’s leadership, Libya remains a
potential threat to the international community and
neighboring states. While pursuing his political and
military aspirations, he has squandered the coun-
try’s oil wealth on a program for NBC weapons,
missiles, and an enormous inventory of conven-
tional military equipment. Since seizing power in

24



Section I
NORTHEAST ASIA

RANGES OF CURRENT AND FUTURE
BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

NORTH KOREA
Current Missile Range (km)
Delivery Systems

—ScuDB 300

— Scud 500

Future Missile
Delivery Systems AUSTRALIA

-++-NODONG. ‘Approx. 1,000
TAEPO DONG 1 More than 1,500

TAEPO DONG 2. More than 4,000

‘eoundary reprseentations ae na necessaly authori

range of 500 kilometers. Several hundred of these
missiles are available for use in the North Korean
missile force.

North Korea is in the late stages of developing anew
missile, the NODONG, for its own military as well

as for export markets such as the Middle East and
North Africa. Flight tested in May 1993, this 1,000
kilometer-range missile will be able to strike nearly
all of Japan when it is deployed.



Section IT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

The BWC, signed in 1972, prohibits development,
production, and stockpiling of biological weapons.
The United States is promoting new measures that
provide increased transparency of potential bio-
logical weapons-related activities and facilities in
an effort to help deter violations of and enhance
compliance with the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion. DoD will participate in the U.S. delegation to
the forthcoming BWC Ad Hoc Group negotiations
and will play an important role in U.S. efforts to
develop off-site and on-site compliance verification
measures for consideration by the group. The
United States strongly supports the development of
a legally binding protocol of such measures to
strengthen the BWC.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

The CWC bans the use, development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical
weapons. Opened for signature on January 13,
1993, as of March 15, 1996, the CWC had 160
signatories and will enter into force 180 days
following deposit of the 65th ratification with the
United Nations (currently there are 49 ratifica-
tions). |The CWC Preparatory Commission
(PrepCom) is meeting to complete the details
necessary to have the Organization for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fully
operational at entry into force.

DoD has participated actively throughout the
PrepCom process, providing expertise on a range of
implementation issues such as inspection proce-
dures, data management, and inspector training.
Specifically, DNA is accomplishing the CWC Veri-
fication Technology Program, which focuses on the
technologies required for multinational verification
of the CWC. Approximately $12.6 million has been
budgeted for this program in FY 1996.

The nonproliferation regimes discussed above may
not be able to prevent proliferation by a determined
leadership. Experience suggests that a determined
proliferant is likely to succeed. The effectiveness of
denial strategy should be determined by the extent
to which it frustrates and slows proliferants’ efforts,
and in the message denial efforts convey regarding
our seriousness of purpose. This success is best
measured as a function of time — time to improve

61

regional instabilities that affect the motivations to
acquire or develop NBC weapons and their delivery
systems, and time to dissuade existing and potential
proliferants.

Reassurance and Dissuasion

Denial efforts put time on our side, but time is not
enough. Denial must be complemented by regional
security dialogue, arms control and confidence
building, security assistance, and other forms of
reassurance that security needs can be met without
resorting to NBC proliferation, and with a vigorous
public diplomacy campaign which emphasizes the
political, economic, and military costs of prolif-
eration.

Regional instability remains one motivation for
proliferation. By reducing regional tensions, we
can help reduce the demand for both NBC and
advanced conventional weapons. The Organization
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and
the Middle East Arms Control and Regional
Security (ACRS) working group are two regional
arms control and confidence building fora that work
to broker agreements to reduce regional tensions.
The OSCE has provided the framework for the
negotiation of several important European security
agreements such as the 1990, 1992, and 1994
Vienna Documents and the 1990 Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The OSCE Forum
for Security Cooperation agreed to a Code of
Conduct for political-military behavior, a Global
Exchange of Military Information, and Nonpro-
liferation Principles at the 1994 OSCE Budapest
Summit. Created in 1991 as part of the Madrid
Middle East peace process, ACRS is a forum for
developing regional confidence building measures.
ACRS is one of several multilateral working groups
in the Madrid process designed to complement the
bilateral peace talks. DoD has played a critical role
in supporting these efforts by providing operational
and technical expertise to these negotiations.

U.S. Security Assistance programs also can help to
defuse regional tensions by enabling friends and
allies to acquire conventional equipment, services
and training for legitimate self-defense and to
support participation in multilateral security efforts,
such as coalition warfare. U.S. Security Assistance
programs include Foreign Military Sales, Inter-
national Military Education and Training, and



Glossary



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
provokes regional instability and challenges to the
interests of the United States. The United States is
an international leader in developing and sustaining
global norms against the proliferation of these
weapons and missiles. The United States is actively
engaged in dialogues with several states in regions
around the world to persuade them not to acquire
these capabilities or to eliminate capabilities they
might have already developed. The United States
also is working with states to combat proliferation
by assisting them in gaining and assuring greater
control over their dual-use equipment and tech-
nology. States that gain weapons of mass destruc-
tion are able to pose a significant military threat to
the interests of the United States, our allies, and
friends. The Department of Defense actively con-
tributes to overall U.S. efforts to stem proliferation
wherever it occurs and from whatever source,
including through active and passive defenses, and
maintaining the credibility of our security commit-
ments against military threats, including from
adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons and the missiles to carry them.
This section outlines the steps the Department is
taking to respond to the challenge of proliferation,
and DoD measures to respond to the military threats
states pose with their NBC weapons, in support of
overall U.S. government efforts to respond to this
challenge.

Informed by lessons learned (and some unpleasant
surprises) from the Gulf War against Iraq and by the
systematic Bottom-Up Review that identified
post-Cold War military requirements, DoD has
developed the Defense Counterproliferation Initia-
tive. As part of this initiative, the Secretary of
Defense has directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), the operational Commanders in Chief
(CINCs) responsible for the planning and conduct
of military operations, and the military departments
and their uniformed services give greater emphasis
to counterproliferation requirements and considera-
tions.

47

Specific objectives of the Defense Counterprolif-
eration Initiative are to: (1) prevent the acquisition
of NBC weapons and their delivery systems, (2) roll
back proliferation where it has occurred, (3) deter
the use of NBC weapons and their delivery systems,
and (4) adapt U.S. military forces and planning to
respond to regional contingencies in which U.S.,
allied, and coalition forces face NBC threats. The
ordering of objectives is deliberate. In line with
national policy, proliferation prevention is the top
priority.

To achieve these objectives, the Department of
Defense has requested $165.2 million in FY 1996
for counterproliferation. This effort would fund
specific high priority acquisition activities to pro-
vide required military capabilities. DoD will also
use these funds to modify and adapt other programs
(totalling $3.8 billion) that are strongly related to
the counterproliferation mission.

The Defense Department plays a role in support of
all facets of national counterproliferation policy.
This overview begins with proliferation protection,
for which DoD has unique responsibilities, and then
reviews contributions to proliferation prevention.

PROTECTION

Overview

One of the core objectives in proliferation protec-
tion policy is to convince potential and actual
proliferants that NBC weapons will be of no value
because the United States and its coalition partners
will have the capability to deny or limit the political
and military utility of NBC weapons, and because
the damage inflicted by U.S. and coalition forces in
response will far outweigh any potential benefits of
use.

'
There is no simple solution or single response to the
threat posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons
and their delivery systems. As is essential with all
new initiatives, the right balance has to be struck
between thorough, step-by-step planning and early
action to remedy long identified shortfalls. A
comprehensive review of the military missions and
functions related to counterproliferation has been



Section II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

The CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff are already
engaged in planning activities to support the overall
U.S. government effort against NBC threats. The
Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA)
was commissioned by the CJCS to evaluate the
overall U.S. military effort to respond to the
challenges of the new global security environment.
The CJCS designated counterproliferation as one of
the nine central Joint Warfighting Capabilities to be
addressed in this ongoing series of assessments.
Working from national goals identified in the
President’s National Security Strategy, the JWCA
translates these national goals into military
objectives and requirements, and then identifies the
military capabilities and programs necessary to
meet those requirements.

The key to effective planning for the operational
challenges posed by proliferation is a detailed
analytical understanding of this new security
challenge and its implications for current U.S.
strategy. Based on this analysis, the Department is
determining initiatives that optimize solutions to
the complex and myriad challenges posed by a
future adversary’s use or threatened use of NBC
weapons.

Joint Staff planners have been working with the
CINCs to refine counterproliferation priorities and
required enhancements to U.S. military capabilities
for all warfighting missions. Asa result, the CINCs
have developed a list of required capabilities to
meet the NBC proliferation threat. The CINCs
place highest priority on those missions where the
most leverage could be exercised in a short time by
fielding quickly enhanced capabilities. This is in
line with their responsibility to be prepared to
employ their forces for deterrence and defense,
immediately.

The CINCs’ number one priority for enhancing
their counterproliferation capabilities is improved
equipment to detect and characterize chemical
weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW)
threats, particularly at long ranges. The wide
variety of chemical and biological agents calls for
a variety of protective measures. Detection and
characterization is one element of passive defense.
Thus, the ability to detect, range, and track CW and
BW clouds, particularly at long ranges, provides
additional early warning time for units at risk of
attack.

49

The next CINC priority is the ability to intercept
cruise missiles. Emphasis continues to be placed on
ballistic missile intercept, but the widening
availability of cruise missile technology (partic-
ularly the development and potential proliferation
of low-observable cruise missile technology)
requires military planners to prepare for this emerg-
ing challenge. For counterproliferation, these
intercept capabilities are termed active defenses.
These capabilities are particularly relevant for
counterproliferation because cruise missiles are an
extremely effective delivery system for BW and
certain CW attacks.

Improved capabilities for the identification, char-
acterization, and defeat of underground targets are
the next set of CINC priorities. Proliferants are
increasingly making use of underground facilities
as they respond to the demonstrated effectiveness in
the Gulf War of U.S. precision conventional muni-
tions. For counterproliferation, the capabilities to
address these targets are termed counterforce.
Further discussion of this issue can be found in the
Acquisition (Counterforce) portion of this section.
Similarly, CINC-designated requirements concern-
ing improvements in intelligence capabilities are
addressed in the Intelligence and Acquisition
(Counterforce/Battlefield Surveillance) sections.

The regional commanders have identified addi-
tional requirements for improved passive defense
capabilities to operate successfully in NBC
environments. Biological vaccines are one exam-
ple. One of the key ingredients to dissuading prolif-
erators from acquiring or using these weapons is
eliminating the value of NBC weapons and the
delivery systems to the proliferant. Passive
defenses that allow sustained combat and logistical
operations in the face of attacks by NBC weapons
and their delivery systems are among the best ways
to accomplish this.

Disabling above-ground NBC infrastructure, both
production capabilities as well as weapons in
storage and on delivery systems, is a CINC priority
that poses some unique challenges. Collateral
effects, e.g., the dispersal of nuclear, CW, or BW
material following an attack, are of concern.
Improved capabilities for prediction and mini-
mization of collateral effects are required. A related
priority involves new munitions for biological and
chemical agent defeat. It may do little good to
destroy an incoming missile if the CW or BW agent



Section I
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

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Nations of the Middle East and North Africa

GOALS AND INTERESTS

U.S. goals in the Middle East and North Africa
include securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive
peace between Israel and all Arab parties with
which it is not yet at peace; maintaining our
steadfast commitment to Israel’s security and
well-being; building and maint:
arrangements that assure the stability of the Gulf
region and unimpeded commercial access to its
petroleum reserves, which are vital to our economic
prosperity; ensuring fair access for American
business to commercial opportunities in the region;
combating terrorism; and promoting more open
political and economic systems and respect for
human rights and the rule of law. In this volatile
region, the proliferation of NBC weapons and the
means to deliver them poses a significant challenge
to our ability to achieve these goals. Iran, Iraq, and

Libya are aggressively seeking NBC weapons and
missile capabilities, constituting the most pressing
threats to regional stability. Iran and Iraq have
demonstrated their intent to dominate the Persian
Gulf and to control access to critical oil supplies.

Iran is actively attempting to acquire a full range of
NBC weapons and missiles. The United States
believes Iran is committed to acquiring nuclear
weapons, either through indigenous development
or by covertly acquiring enough fissile material to
produce them. During its eight-year war with Iraq,
Tehran initiated biological and chemical warfare
programs, the latter in direct response to Iraq’s use
of chemical weapons. In addition, Iran is dedicated
to expanding its ballistic missile programs.

Traq has long had NBC warfare and missile efforts.
The challenges these weapons pose in time of
conflict became clear during the Persian Gulf War