OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

NO 32 | April 2020 | ISSN 1863-602 0

The COVID-19 Pandemic: A Preliminary 

Assessment of the Impact on Terrorism in 

Western States 

James K. Wither
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

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The COVID-19 Pandemic: A Preliminary Assessment of the Impact 

on Terrorism in Western States 

James K. Wither

Executive Summary

• The paper analyzes the terrorism threat against western states during the novel

coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and, in particular, whether the crisis has

created particular vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit both to mount attacks and

attract new recruits. The paper also explores the extent to which the pandemic might

make western societies more vulnerable to terrorism in the longer term.

• Salafi-jihadist and far-right extremists have greeted the COVID-19 crisis with

enthusiasm, viewing its impact on the West as both vindicating and advancing their

ideologies and objectives. However, despite the calls for attacks on social media, the

pandemic’s lockdowns, increased surveillance, travel restrictions, and the heavy police

and military presence on the ground have created a challenging environment for terrorist

operations.

• The security services have been drawn directly into the campaign against the corona

virus. This has diverted resources and assets away from counterterrorism duties in the

short term, which might create potential opportunities for terrorists. As a result of the

pandemic, governments will need to review national security priorities in the longer term.

This is likely to result in a much greater emphasis on domestic and international public

health issues. Counterterrorism may not retain its post 9/11 position in the hierarchy of

western national security priorities.

Introduction

It is already a truism to state that the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic will have 

an incalculable economic, social, and political global impact. World-wide trade has shrunk 

dramatically as borders have closed, stock markets have plummeted, numerous businesses have 

ceased trading, and unemployment has soared to unprecedented levels. Governments have been 

overwhelmed by the speed and scale of the crisis. Many have introduced sweeping emergency 

powers drastically restricting societal and personal freedoms. An ugly form of “coronavirus 

nationalism” has emerged, although such a reaction is ill-suited to address a global problem that 

requires an international cooperative response. Lockdowns have affected more than half the 

world’s population; it is hard to gauge the physical and psychological impact on people after 

months of social isolation. Public health officials suggest that the crisis might continue for many 

months, with public health and economic aftershocks that could last for years. The UN Secretary 

General has described the pandemic as the worst global emergency since World War II. 

People all over the world are shocked and disturbed by the crisis, but conversely, although 

terrorists are no more immune than anyone else to the COVID-19 disease, many terrorist groups 

have reacted to the pandemic with enthusiasm. Both Salafi-jihadists and far-right extremists 

claim that the pandemic vindicates their very different ideological stances. Islamic State (IS) 

sources have described the virus as God’s will, a revenge for crimes against Muslims, and 
2

celebrated its spread in China, India, and across the West. Far-right extremists have also 

responded with interest, viewing the pandemic as an opportunity to accelerate their agenda and 

even exploit the virus as a biological weapon. It remains to be seen to what extent terrorists, both 

groups and lone actors, will actually capitalize on the current crisis, although historically terrorist 

groups of all persuasions have tended to be quick to target perceived political and societal 

vulnerabilities. Both the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the NATO Secretary 

General, Jens Stoltenberg, have already warned that terrorists will seek to take advantage of the 

pandemic. 

This paper analyzes the terrorism threat against western states during the pandemic.1 It addresses 

the question of whether the current situation offers greater opportunities for terrorists, not just to 

mount attacks, but also to spread their ideology to radicalize and motivate potential supporters. 

The paper also examines the particular vulnerabilities created by COVID-19 that terrorists might 

seek to exploit. Of particular importance is the degree to which the security services’ ability to 

prevent and respond to terrorism will be affected by their commitment to public health and 

public order tasks during the pandemic. Finally, the study will explore the extent to which 

government measures during the crisis and their impact on a traumatized public could make 

societies in the West more vulnerable to terrorism in the longer term.

The Terrorist Threat during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Salafi-Jihadists

IS has described the pandemic as “the crusaders’ worst nightmare.”2 Initially IS warned fighters 

not to travel to areas affected by COVID-19, but subsequently, in numerous statements, the 

group has urged its supporters to exploit opportunities presented by overstretched security forces 

and social disorder caused by the pandemic in western states. IS has encouraged lone actors to 

mount attacks to increase the level of fear already present in affected states, referring to previous 

successful operations in Paris, London, and Brussels, stressing that no mercy should be granted 

to enemies who had previously shown no restraint when bombing Muslim civilians.3 IS 

supporters have welcomed the pandemic as a punishment from God and called for attacks in 

western countries, India, and China, whilst they remain especially vulnerable. 

Terrorist groups are well aware that millions of people are largely confined to their homes and 

consequently spending more time on the internet and social media. It has been common practice 

for jihadist groups to claim that any natural disaster in enemy states is God’s will and provides 

an opportunity to mount attacks. Consequently, both al Qaeda and IS have stepped up their 

propaganda, including apocalyptic YouTube videos that variously blame Jews and America for 

COVID-19.4 But while both groups claim that the virus manifests God’s anger against the West, 

their messaging has been noticeably different. Al Qaeda’s propaganda wing As-Sahab has 

highlighted the damage inflicted on the U.S. economy, a long-term campaign objective promoted 

1 For the purposes of the paper, the term “western states” applies to North America and Europe. 2 “Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus,” International Crisis Group, March 31, 2020, 

https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus. 3 Ibid. See also Raffaello Pantucci, “Don’t Lose Sight of the Enduring Global Terrorist Threat,” RUSI Commentary, 

March 30, 2020, https://raffaellopantucci.com/2020/04/08/dont-lose-sight-of-the-enduring-global-terrorist-threat/. 4 Nikita Malik, “Self-Isolation Might Stop Coronavirus, but It Will Speed the Spread of Extremism,” Foreign 

Policy, March 26, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/26/self-isolation-might-stop-coronavirus-but-spreadextremism/. 
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by its leader Ayman al Zawahiri, but has also urged westerners to use the time to study Islam and 

convert.5 Along with some other Islamist groups, al Qaeda has actually promoted ways to restrict 

the spread of the disease. IS media groups, such as Ribat and Murhafat have been more forceful 

and uncompromising, calling for attacks to enhance what the group describes as God’s campaign 

of vengeance against the West. However, it is uncertain whether either group’s approach will 

attract new converts or active terrorist recruits. Many extremist religious leaders seem to believe 

that Muslims cannot be infected by the virus and have advised believers to ignore public health 

warnings,

6 thus exposing potential terrorists to unnecessary risks.

Far Right 

According to the Global Terrorism Index, far-right terrorist incidents in the West have increased 

by 320% in the past five years.7 Like IS, far-right groups have signaled their intent to exploit the 

effects of the COVID-19 outbreak. Already, at the end of March, the FBI shot dead a selfproclaimed neo-Nazi in Missouri who was plotting to car bomb a hospital treating COVID-19 

victims. Some extremists believe that the pandemic will accelerate social and political change 

that will favor the authoritarian right.8 Supporters have been active online in promoting 

conspiracy theories, disinformation, and violence against minorities, critical infrastructure, and 

even Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) agents.9 Ostensibly banned groups such 

as the Atomwaffen Division and the Nordic Resistance Movement, along with individual neoNazis and white supremacists, have called for attacks against the police and, inevitably, the 

Jewish community.10 Right-wing chat groups have gone further than Salafi-jihadist groups in 

identifying specific targets and attack methods. Techniques discussed include the use of spray 

bottles filled with bodily fluids from infected persons or the spread of the virus by coughing or 

touching any surface handled by people in shops and on public transport. 

Far-right extremists have been particularly active on social media led by “accelerationists,” who 

believe that acts of violence can speed up the inevitable collapse of what they regard as a 

globally-connected, degenerate society. The far right has offered their ideology as a solution to 

an audience made captive by the virus and perceived to be increasingly susceptible to fake news, 

conspiracy theories, and extremist material. Terrorist analyst Rita Katz has described the far right 

as “weaponizing information” to create greater panic by disseminating disinformation such as 

claims that urban areas are subject to martial law and that competition for scarce essential 

 5 James Gordon Meek, “Terrorist groups spin COVID-19 as God’s smallest soldier attacking West,” ABC News, 

April 2, 2020, https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/world/terrorist-groups-spin-covid-19-as-gods-smallest-soldierattacking-west. 6 MEMRI, “Al-Qaeda Central: COVID-19 is Divine Punishment for Sins of Mankind; Muslims Must Repent, West 

Must Embrace Islam,” Special Dispatch No. 8671, April 1, 2020, https://www.memri.org/reports/al-qaeda-centralcovid-19-divine-punishment-sins-mankind-muslims-must-repent-west-must. 7 Global Terrorism Index 2019, Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 44,

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GTI-2019web.pdf. 8 Cathrin Schaer, “Germany’s Other Neglected Plague Far-Right Terrorism,” Daily Beast, March 18, 2020,

https://www.thedailybeast.com/germanys-other-neglected-plague-is-far-right-terrorism and Cassie Miller, “White 

Supremacists See Coronavirus as an Opportunity,” Southern Poverty Law Center, March 26, 2020,

https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/03/26/white-supremacists-see-coronavirus-opportunity. 9 Far-right extremists posting on Telegram claim that FEMA will set up population-wide prison camps during the 

crisis.

10 Josh Margolin, “White supremacists encouraging their members to spread coronavirus to cops, Jews, FBI says,”

ABC News, March 23, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/US/white-supremacists-encouraging-members-spreadcoronavirus-cops-jews/story?id=69737522.
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supplies has caused a widespread outbreak of inter-personal violence.11 Violent imagery has 

included attacks against Asians posted on extremist-friendly platforms such as Telegram, 8chan,

and Gab.12 Posts on Telegram, the messaging site of choice for the far right, have asserted that 

white nationalists have an obligation to spread coronavirus.13

Mainstream social media companies have recently become adept at removing obviously terroristrelated material from their sites and are currently working together to combat pandemic 

disinformation, 14 but extremists have exploited the gray area of public health disinformation, 

which is not covered by social media restrictions.15 The British Nationalist Socialist Movement, 

among other groups, has used Facebook to post material variously blaming the pandemic on 

homosexuals, Jews, and other minority groups. There have been unconfirmed reports that 

Russian activists are behind some of the extremist materials posted on social media. If so, it 

reflects long-term Russian government support for anti-democratic elements in the West. In an 

unprecedented development, the U.S. Government recently designated the ultranationalist 

Russian Imperial Movement as a terrorist group.16

Bio Terror

The pandemic has raised the specter of bio-terrorism, using COVID-19 as a biological weapon 

(BW). In a speech to the Security Council, Secretary General Antonia Guterres singled out the 

corona virus bio-terrorism threat, warning that “Non-state groups could gain access to virulent 

strains that could pose similar devastation to societies around the globe.”17 Many terrorist groups 

have aspired to use BWs, but historically these have proved very difficult for terrorists to 

weaponize.18 BW dispersal is difficult and unpredictable. The heat from an improvised explosive 

device designed to disperse the agent would kill most of the organisms, while wind or rain can 

significantly degrade their effects. The wealthy Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo spent a small 

fortune trying to create a BW in the 1990s, but failed. 

During the Ebola crisis in Africa in 2014, there were reports that IS had tried to use Ebolainfected individuals as delivery systems for the virus, but there is no hard evidence that this was 

actually attempted. However, right-wing extremists see potential to use the corona virus in a 

 11 Rita Katz, “The Far Right’s Discourse on the COVID-19 Pandemic,” March 24,

https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/inSITE-Reports/the-far-right-s-online-discourse-on-covid-19-pandemicforthcoming.html. 12 Malik, “Self-Isolation.” 13 Gabriel Weimann and Natalie Masri, “The Virus of Hate: Far Right in Cyberspace,” International Institute for 

Counter Terrorism, April 5, 2020, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2528/The_Virus_of_Hate#gsc.tab=0. 14 EEAS Special Report, “COVID-19 Disinformation,” March 19, 2020, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-reportdisinformation-on-the-coronavirus-short-assessment-of-the-information-environment/. 15 Malik,“Self-Isolation.” 16 Charles Savage, Adam Goldman and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Will Give Terrorist Label to White Supremacist Group 

for the First Time,” New York Times, April 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/terrorist-labelwhite-supremacy-Russian-Imperial-Movement.html. 17 Giles Clarke, “COVID-19 threatening global peace and security, UN chief warns,” UN News, April 10, 2020,

https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061502. 18 See, for example, Lasha Giorgidze and James K. Wither, “Horror or Hype: The Challenge of Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism” Occasional Paper Series, No. 32, December 2019, pp. 12-13, 

https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/occasional-papers/horror-or-hype. 
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similar manner.19 Infected individuals have been encouraged to visit mosques and synagogues, 

ride on public transport, and even contaminate dollar bills. These attack scenarios may seem 

fanciful, but have raised the possibility that lone actors may try to practice crude bio-terrorism, 

especially if the coronavirus threat persists. Writing in The Economist in April, Robert Morley, a 

former member of the U.S. National Security Council, belatedly suggested that the money spent 

on America’s latest aircraft carrier would have been better used preparing for future bio-warfare 

threats.20

Other Terrorist and Insurgent Groups 

In comparison with Salafi-jihadists and right-wing terrorists, there has been a muted reaction 

from left-wing extremists during the pandemic so far. The German left-wing radical website 

Indymedia has called for insurrection, looting, and attacks against energy supplies, but overall 

there appears to have been negligible violent left-wing reaction.21 Some left-wing analysts claim 

that the pandemic demonstrates the ultimate failure of globalized market capitalism and call for 

its replacement by more egalitarian, environmentally-friendly, socialist systems in the aftermath 

of the crisis. However, it is too early to tell whether there will be sufficient public anger to 

trigger a violent attempt to push a left-wing political agenda following the pandemic. 

In contrast to the activity discussed above, long-established insurgency groups like the National 

Liberation Army in Colombia and the New People’s Army in the Philippines have proposed 

pandemic ceasefires. Taliban and Hezbollah insurgents have also responded to the pandemic in a 

measured and responsible fashion. The Taliban, for example, has offered safe passage to 

healthcare organizations and humanitarian workers fighting the virus in Afghanistan.22 However, 

these “mature” terrorist groups are not the ones calling for attacks against civilians in Western 

states. 

Finally, it is worth highlighting that some cranks and misanthropes have been charged with 

“making terroristic threats” in the U.S. and elsewhere. Individuals with no known affiliation to a 

terrorist group or ideology have been arrested for deliberately coughing on people or food and 

other actions intended to spread the virus.23 It is quite possible that the threat from such misfits is 

comparable to those from genuine lone actor terrorists. In late March, U.S. Deputy Attorney 

General Jeffrey Rosen sent a memo to attorneys and federal law enforcement agencies stating 

 19 “White Racially Motivated Violent Extremists Suggest Spreading the Coronavirus,” Federal Protective Service, 

Weekly Intelligence Briefing, February 17-21, 2020, https://www.scribd.com/document/452676693/WhiteSupremacist-Corona#fullscreen&from_embed. 20 Robert Morley, letter to the Economist, April 4, 2020, https://www.economist.com/letters/2020/04/02/letters-tothe-editor. 21 “Linksextremen rufen zum Plűndern auf,” Der Tagesspiegel, March 18, 2020,

https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/das-coronavirus-als-gelegenheit-linksextremisten-rufen-zum-pluendernauf/25657090.html. 22 Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban launches campaign to help Afghanistan fight coronavirus,” Al Jazeera, April 6, 2020, 

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/taliban-launches-campaign-afghanistan-fight-coronavirus200406055113086.html. 23 See, for example, Michael Balsamo, “US charges 2 with terror crimes over threats to spread virus,” AP News, 

April 8, 2020, https://apnews.com/6900cd336520d54a963e000a54720ec3.
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that those who deliberately exposed people to or infected others with the virus could be charged 

under federal terrorism-related statutes, although both the courts and the public may view such 

prosecutions as an improper use of terrorism legislation.24

1

How Likely Are Terrorist Attacks During the Pandemic?

Western states will remain a relatively hard target during the pandemic. The last successful, 

directed attacks by IS in the West took place in Brussels in 2016. It seems unlikely that the group 

will attempt to mount similar attacks during the pandemic for the reasons outlined below. There 

have, of course, been sporadic attacks by IS-inspired terrorists since 2016, but attacks by what 

Marc Sageman referred to as “groups of guys”25 will be more difficult for jihadists as long as 

emergency measures remain in place. Attacks by jihadist lone actors are, of course, unpredictable 

and difficult to prevent. They are likely to occur, although movement and targeting during the 

pandemic may be more difficult even for terrorists operating alone. Governments have 

implemented population lockdowns and severe restrictions on travel and gatherings. There is 

also an increased police and military presence on the ground in many cities. IS recognizes that 

the prisons in Syria and Iraq, where thousands of their fighters and families are being held in 

crowded and unsanitary conditions, are more realistic and accessible targets for their operations.

Freeing fighters while the authorities holding them are distracted or actually infected by the virus

might increase IS’s operational capabilities and represent a major propaganda coup.26 Such 

action would not be unprecedented; successful operations to free supporters from prisons were a 

feature of IS battlespace preparations before its seizure of territory in Iraq in 2014. 

Arguably, right-wing extremists pose a greater terrorist threat to western states during the 

pandemic than lone actors inspired by IS. However, many of the constraints noted above would 

also apply to terrorists of any ideological persuasion or motivation. The FBI and law 

enforcement agencies in Europe have recently put a much greater priority on countering white 

supremacist groups; arrests have weakened their operational strength. Some far-right 

organizations have been directly affected by the virus and several networking events have had to 

be canceled or postponed to keep members safe. According to the U.S. Southern Poverty Law 

Center, many right-wing extremists are content to shelter in place at the moment rather than risk 

exposure to the virus, not least because they believe that COVID-19 alone is creating the societal 

breakdown they seek to exploit.27 

How Does COVID-19 Affect the Security Forces’ Ability to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist 

Attacks?

The Impact of COVID-19 on the Armed Forces

In recent years, the security services in the West have proved increasingly able to prevent major 

terrorist attacks or disrupt plots during the preparation stage. Therefore, a critical issue is whether 

the environment for homegrown terrorist attacks will become more permissive due to the 

pandemic. While the discussion above asserts that the risk of home-grown terrorist attacks is 

likely to diminish during the pandemic, there will be vulnerabilities during and after COVID-19 

 24 Cassie Miller, “Prosecuting Purposeful Coronavirus Exposure as Terrorism,” Lawfare, March 31, 2020, 

https://www.lawfareblog.com/prosecuting-purposeful-coronavirus-exposure-terrorism. 25 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) p. 93. 26 “Contending,” International Crisis Group. 27 Miller, “Prosecuting.”
7

that might facilitate terrorism. Much depends on the continued readiness of the security forces. 

As governments focus their efforts and resources on combating the virus, normal security 

protocols may be reduced or abandoned. These include counterterrorism (CT) measures.

Members of the armed forces, including reservists, have been drawn directly into the struggle 

against the virus. The armed forces have readily-available, disciplined manpower and large-scale 

logistical assets to provide medical supplies, transportation, and communications to support the 

civilian emergency services. Soldiers are providing reinforcement to the police to enforce 

lockdowns and man check points, as well as helping to build and run emergency hospitals. 

Normal training, troop movements, and exercises have been postponed or cancelled, including 

major international maneuvers. This not only has an impact on domestic military preparedness, 

but also limits the international cooperation and interoperability on which effective operations 

against international terrorism depend. Soldiers not engaged in operations have also been 

subjected to restrictions, such as social-distancing, or have been confined to barracks. Many 

support and headquarters staff are teleworking. Military personnel are normally young and fit, 

but the exigencies of military service do not readily lend themselves to social-distancing. In the 

U.S. alone, military corona virus cases are already higher than the national average.28 Officials in 

Europe have not released figures for military coronavirus cases, but the impact appears to be 

significant.29 There are also concerns that infected military personnel may be spreading the virus 

as they assist the civilian emergency services. 

The pandemic will inevitably have a significant impact on military readiness in the short term. 

The armed forces do not normally take the lead in CT operations in Western states, but in some 

countries they provide specialized skills, such as firearms training and bomb disposal expertise. 

They also often supply direct support to law enforcement after major attacks. More than 10,000 

troops were deployed in France after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015; the UK also sent 

troops to support the police after IS-inspired attacks in 2017. Military action is also required to 

eliminate prospective “safe havens” abroad, such as that in northern Mali in 2013, where 

terrorists can plan, direct, or inspire attacks against Western states unhindered. Although IS has 

lost the territory of its self-proclaimed caliphate, the group remains active and lethal, both in the 

Middle East and through its affiliates elsewhere. There are also growing signs of unprecedented 

cooperation between al Qaeda and IS in the Sahel; some commentators are understandably 

skeptical about the Taliban’s assurances during current peace negotiations that al Qaeda will not 

be allowed to use Afghanistan again as a base for operations.30

 28 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Helene Cooper and Eric Schmidt, “U.S. Army Halts Training over Coronavirus but then 

Changes Its Mind,” New York Times, March 26, 2020, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/us/politics/coronavirus-military-defense-training.html and Ben Wolfgang and 

Mike Glenn, “U.S. Readiness at Risk as Coronavirus Rips through Ranks,” Washington Times, April 1, 2020, 

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/31/us-military-readiness-risk-coronavirus-rips-throug/. 29 Tangi Salaűn, Sabine Siebold and Luke Baker, “As infections balloon, coronavirus squeezes Europe’s armed 

forces,” Reuters, April 6, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-europe-militaryidUSKBN21O1BT. 30 Pantucci, “Don’t Lose Sight of the Enduring Global Terrorist Threat.”
8

Nevertheless, citing the danger of coronavirus contagion and the related suspension of CT 

training for the Iraqi armed forces, the UK, France, Canada, and Spain have withdrawn troops 

from the anti-IS coalition.31 The U.S. has also reduced its troop presence and has contemplated 

complete withdrawal from Iraq. It is not yet possible to measure the impact of COVID-19 on 

military CT operations, but it would be naïve to assume that it will remain business as usual. In 

the longer term, the armed forces may also be faced with significant budget cuts as scarcer, postpandemic financial resources are re-directed to public health and domestic social support 

programs.

The Impact of COVID-19 on Law Enforcement and Intelligence Services

Police services have the leading role in combating home-grown terrorism, but this is clearly not 

their current priority. In addition to normal policing duties, the police have had to deal with 

significant extra challenges as a result of the corona virus. Western governments have rushed 

through emergency legislation to allow the police to enforce lockdowns and social isolation. 

These measures have been draconian.32 In Italy and France, for example, people must carry a 

written declaration ready to show to the police on demand giving their reasons for leaving home. 

Spain has banned all outdoor exercise except for dog-walking. Tens of thousands of extra police 

and gendarmes have been deployed to enforce these lockdowns. Increasingly tightened 

restrictions have already started to cause some localized unrest in Italy, especially in poorer parts 

of the South as people run out of food and money.33 Even in the UK, with its tradition of lightertouch policing, the lockdown measures have generated complaints about heavy-handed police 

enforcement.34

Not only has the epidemic diverted the police from CT duties, it could also sour relations 

between law enforcement officials and the public, particularly with racial minorities and the 

poor. This would negatively affect the willingness of members of the public to share information 

with community police officers about radicalized individuals or potential terrorist planning 

activities in their communities. A relationship of trust between local people and community 

police officers has proved an enduring, valuable source of CT human intelligence.35

Intelligence-led policing has become a critical factor in domestic CT in the last two decades.

Since 9/11, police services have had to adapt to the changing character of terrorism. Against 

informal, networked terrorist cells and lone actors that aim to carry out indiscriminate masscasualty attacks against civilians, the law enforcement emphasis has shifted to an intelligence-led 

approach that seeks to identify and disrupt plots and arrest suspects at the earliest opportunity.36

This approach requires police forces to work closely with domestic intelligence services and 

usually involves additional legal authorities and interagency cooperation to conductsurveillance, 

 31 “Contending,” International Crisis Group. 32 Deutsche Welle, “Coronavirus: What are the lockdown measures across Europe?” April 1, 2020,

https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-what-are-the-lockdown-measures-across-europe/a-52905137. 33 “Social Unrest Spreads in Italy as Lockdown Nears Fourth Week,” AS English/Reuters, March 30, 2020, 

https://en.as.com/en/2020/03/29/other_sports/1585449524_787653.html. 34 See, for example, “Law and Order: Policing in a Lockdown,” The Economist, April 4, 2020, 

https://www.economist.com/britain/2020/04/04/policing-in-a-lockdown. 35 Stevan Weine, “How Local Law Enforcement Uses Community Policing is Combat Terrorism,” Lawfare, 

February 19, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-local-law-enforcement-uses-community-policing-combatterrorism. 36 Peter Clarke, “Intelligence Led Policing in Counter Terrorism,” in Combating Transnational Terrorism, James. K. 

Wither and Sam Mullins eds, pp. 149-161, (Sofia, Bulgaria: Procon Ltd, 2016).
9

seize property, and intercept personal communications. Understandably, governments have not 

been forthcoming about the impact of COVID-19 on their intelligence services. Although as far 

as the U.S. is concerned, the CIA and NSA claim that they are still able to perform their missions 

effectively, there are fears about the disease’s impact on the thousands of intelligence contractors 

whose work is vital to maintain operational capabilities.37 In the longer term, it seems likely that, 

barring a major terrorist outrage in a western state, the intelligence focus on terrorism will 

diminish as domestic and global public health issues assume a more central role in national 

security. 

Thousands of police in the U.S. alone have been put on sick leave or tested positive for the virus. 

Reports in early April suggested that 20% of the New York Police Department (NYPD) were 

infected. A similar percentage of Detroit’s police force was also quarantined. Comparable

problems appear to be affecting police forces in European states with high rates of infection.38

If infection rates continue to be high, the armed forces may have to shift from a supporting role 

to directly undertaking duties normally handled by the police.39 As historical experience during 

stability operations and counterinsurgency campaigns has illustrated, soldiers who have not been 

trained in policing can rapidly escalate tensions and violence when called upon to deter crime, 

defuse potentially violent incidents, or arrest suspects. Increased involvement by the armed 

forces in a domestic policing role could therefore present security and public order challenges. 

However, unlike the situation in war-torn states, enough law enforcement leadership should still 

be in place to ensure that police operational primacy is retained.

To What Extent Might the Pandemic Make Societies More Vulnerable to Terrorism in the Longer 

Term?

In 2008, a team of historians and medical ethicists assembled by the American Civil Liberties 

Union criticized the tendency to treat public health problems using approaches more appropriate 

to dealing with criminals.40 It is too early to claim that this is valid criticism of the response to 

the unprecedented crisis that COVID–19 presents. However, democratic governments have 

greatly increased their repressive powers to mount surveillance, prevent freedom of assembly, 

and detain people indefinitely. In the UK, for example, the recent coronavirus bill gives police 

and immigration officials the authority to arrest and detain people suspected of being infected 

with the virus “for screening and assessment.”41 Different regional police forces in the country 

 37 Patrick Tucker, “Weird Hours: Contractor Concerns: How the Intelligence Community is Grappling with 

Coronavirus,” Defense One, April 9, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/04/weird-hourscontractor-concerns-how-intelligence-community-grappling-coronavirus/164493/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl. 38 Charlie Smith, “Spain: More Than 700 police and Guardia Civil Officers Test Positive for Coronavirus as 7,400 in 

Isolation,” The Olive Press, March 26, 2020, https://www.theolivepress.es/spain-news/2020/03/26/spain-more-than700-police-and-guardia-civil-officers-test-positive-for-coronavirus-as-7400-in-isolation/. 39 John R. Allen, John Donohue, Rick Fuentes, Paul Goldberg and Michael O’Hanlon, “The Military, Policing, and 

COVID-19,” Brookings, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-military-policing-and-covid-19/. 40 Peter C. Baker, “We can’t go back to normal: how will coronavirus change the world,” Guardian, March 31, 

2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/31/how-will-the-world-emerge-from-the-coronavirus-crisis. 41 Department of Health and Social Care, “Delaying and Slowing the Virus,” What the Coronavirus Bill will do, 

March 26, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-bill-what-it-will-do/what-thecoronavirus-bill-will-do#delaying-and-slowing-the-virus.
10

have also interpreted their new powers arbitrarily. In Austria, Italy, and Belgium, emergency 

powers have given security agencies unprecedented authority to use data from major 

telecommunications companies to track people’s movements.42 

As noted above, there have been reports in Europe of social unrest as a result of COVID-19 

restrictions and complaints about police tactics in enforcing them. Domestic violent extremists in 

the U.S. have already called for the use of force to combat what they view as government 

overreach and the possible imposition of martial law.43 Gun sales in the U.S. spiked to two 

million during March 2020 alone. There are fears that temporary powers granted to governments 

and security forces during the current crisis may become permanent and be used for purposes 

unrelated to public health and safety. These emergency powers are antithetical to liberal 

democracies in peacetime, but from a narrow CT perspective would make the task of identifying 

and tracking potential terrorists much easier. 

Government repression is widely recognized by scholars and analysts as a trigger for acts of 

terrorism as it can turn already aggrieved citizens into violent insurgents.44 However, 

government repression in these situations almost always involves serious human rights abuses 

and violence. It usually represents the last straw for a minority group with concrete grievances 

fueled by real or perceived injustice and discrimination. The COVID–19 pandemic has 

highlighted governments’ lack of preparedness, social inequalities, and macro-economic failings. 

It has also created widespread fear and alarm, but it is premature to conclude that the crisis will 

inspire new forms of anti-state terrorism or turn largely non-violent anti-globalization and 

environmentalist groups into insurgents. At the height of the crisis, there is very little evidence 

that people in western states are contemplating violence in response to the unprecedented loss of 

their freedoms. At the end of the emergency, the vast majority of people are likely to focus on 

their immediate financial and employment challenges, as well as reconnecting physically with 

family and friends. Widespread violent resistance against government “repression” appears 

unlikely. Much may depend on when, and if, emergency powers are rolled back as the COVID19 threat diminishes. Other factors include the extent of continued government economic and 

social support to those most affected and, of course, the introduction of an effective vaccine. 

Conclusions 

Any conclusions about the impact of COVID-19 on terrorism are inevitably preliminary as the 

crisis is far from over. Even if restrictions are relaxed in the summer in the northern hemisphere, 

in the absence of a vaccine, it is probable that a second wave of infections and lockdowns might 

well be necessary in the autumn. 

Lone actor terrorist attacks, especially by right-wing extremists, can be expected to continue, 

although for the reasons discussed above the current security environment is a difficult one, even 

for single terrorists. On the other hand, attacks by groups of terrorists, such as those in Paris in 

2015, are unlikely while current emergency restrictions on travel and gatherings remain in force, 

42 Baker, “We can’t go back to normal.” 43 Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Domestic Violent Extremists Likely to Continue Exploiting COVID-19 Pandemic to 

Incite or Engage in Violence,” April 7, 2020, pp. 2-3. 44 For just two examples widely separated in time, see Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative 

Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4, July 1981, pp. 382-383 and Rachel Kleinfeld, “A Savage Order” (New York: Pantheon 

Books, 2018) pp. 80-81. 
11

backed by a heavy police and military presence on the ground. Extremist on-line rhetoric and 

threats will continue; these messages may resonate with a minority of individuals who have not 

hitherto been drawn into the extremist milieu. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, it 

remains possible that new forms of terrorism will arise, inspired by the perceived failure of 

capitalism, globalization, and even democracy itself, to deal with the biggest world-wide crisis 

since 1945. 

Predictions can be more certain regarding governments and security services’ readiness to deal 

with terrorism. The pandemic has created short-term vulnerabilities in the ability of the armed 

forces, police, and intelligence services to deal with domestic terrorism as resources have been 

diverted to fighting coronavirus and security institutions have been debilitated by infection or 

lockdowns. Thankfully, for the reasons discussed above, the terrorism threat level remains low. 

More threatening in the longer term will be the reduction of a military presence in regions with 

existing Salafi-jihadist activity. Potentially, this could create a security vacuum that will allow 

terrorists once again to plan and direct serious mass-casualty attacks against the West. It is 

unlikely that western states will be prepared to give CT the priority it has retained since 9/11 in 

terms of financial, technical, and manpower resources. Public health as a national security 

priority will command a much greater share of resources than ever before. Given the impact of 

the COVID-19 pandemic on public finances, budget cuts to the military in particular are likely to 

be even more severe than after the financial crisis in 2008-2009. 
Notes:
abouT The auThoR

James K. Wither is a Professor of National Security Studies at the George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. 

He is a retired British Army officer and former researcher in 20th century warfare at 

the Imperial War Museum, London. He has published widely on the subject of warfare, 

terrorism, and Western security and has lectured or taught at a variety of institutions, 

including the FBI Academy, the UK Defence Academy, the NATO School, the Geneva 

Centre for Security Policy, and the Afghan Army Staff College. 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European 

Center for Security Studies, INTERPOL, the U.S. Department of Defense, the German 

Ministry of Defense, or the U.S. and German Governments. This report is approved for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.
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