The Marshall Center Papers, No. 2 The Transformatio

n

of Russian Military

Doctrine: Lessons

Learned from Kosovo

and Chechnya

By Alexei G. Arbatov

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

The George C. Marshall Center, a leading transatlantic defense educational and

security studies institution, bilaterally supported by the US and German

governments, is dedicated to the creation of a more stable security environment by

advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships; promoting active,

peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of

North America, Europe, and Eurasia.

The Marshall Center Papers

The Marshall Center Papers seek to further the legacy of the Center’s namesake,

General George C. Marshall, by disseminating scholarly monographs that contribute

to his ideal of ensuring that Europe and Eurasia are democratic, free, undivided, and

at peace in the 21st century. Papers selected for this series are meant to identify,

discuss, and influence significant defense–related security issues. The Marshall

Center Papers’ focus is on comparative and interdisciplinary topics to include

international security and democratic defense management, civil military relations,

strategy formulation, defense planning, arms control, peacekeeping, crisis

management, and cooperative security. The Marshall Center Papers are authored by

Marshall Center faculty and staff, Marshall Center alumni, or by individual, invited

contributors.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily

reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for

Security Studies, the United States Department of Defense, the German Ministry of

Defense, or the United States and German Governments. This report is approved for

public release; distribution is unlimited. 

We invite comments and ask that you address them to: 

International Address: US Address:

Director Director

George C. Marshall Center George C. Marshall Center 

ECMC-CL-O-MCP ECMC-CL-O-MCP

Gernackerstrasse 2 Unit 24502

82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen APO AE 09053

Deutschland

Address Changes and Requests for Copies of Marshall Center Papers: Please write

to the above address, or TEL 49-(0)8821-750310, FAX 49-(0)8821-750688, or via

the internet at mcpapers@marshallcenter.org.

ISBN 1-930831-02-1
The Transformation of 

Russian Military Doctrine:

Lessons Learned from 

Kosovo and Chechnya 

By Alexei G. Arbatov

Dr. Alexei G. Arbatov has been a member of the Russian State Duma

(Parliament) since 1994. He is deputy chair of the Duma Defense

Committee, where he is responsible for the defense budget and processing

of arms control treaties. He also serves as Director of the Center for

Political and Military Forecasts at the Institute of World Economy and

International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Foreword

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies takes great pride

in presenting this second edition of the Marshall Center Papers. Dr. Alexei G.

Arbatov’s paper, “The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons

Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya,” continues our tradition of publishing

monographs that are current and challenging, even when they may prove

controversial. This series has been specifically created to disseminate scholarly

monographs that explore and influence the resolution of

Atlantic–European–Eurasian security issues. Dr. Arbatov’s paper provides an

authoritative analysis of national security thinking in Moscow, as well as some

pointed suggestions on how to improve relations between Russia and the West. To

assist readers who may want more details from official documents, as opposed to

the opinions of an individual scholar and parliamentarian, we have also included

extracts from the current Russian Military Doctrine and National Security Concept.

The conflicts in Kosovo and Chechnya deserve careful study as models for the

conduct of future wars and, more urgently, for insights on how to prevent them. It

is hardly surprising that scholars from different countries find dissimilar lessons.

Writing from the Russian perspective, Dr. Arbatov criticizes NATO for conducting

its air campaign without prior authorization by the United Nations or the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He strongly defends

traditional views of state sovereignty and international law–as opposed to recent

Western emphasis on the need to protect human rights. This is a new and important

debate, which will affect a wide range of security agreements and institutions.

Dr. Arbatov also criticizes some aspects of Russia’s war against the Chechens.

Indeed, he asserts that the use of force in Chechnya was based on “a flimsy legal

foundation, just like NATO’s action against Yugoslavia.” He worries that this

conflict is far from over, and he warns that the growing involvement of the Russian

armed forces in domestic conflicts might threaten a young and growing Russian

democracy, unless it is properly regulated by the rule of law.

Western readers may or may not agree with Dr. Arbatov, when he claims that

NATO’s actions in Kosovo greatly affected the conduct of Russia’s war in

Chechnya. However, his overall assessment of the Russian security situation is both

logical and important. He addresses many of the same questions that concern

Western defense planners. What are the different threats to Russian national

interests? How have Kosovo and Chechnya altered possible scenarios of future

iii
conflicts? How important are the strategic nuclear forces and arms control

agreements? And, what is the right balance among forces designed for sharply

different kinds and levels of conflict?

When colleagues from different countries disagree about pressing issues of

international security, they should study each other’s views dispassionately and

continue their dialogue. For this reason, I believe that Dr. Arbatov’s monograph

deserves both a wide readership and a spirited response.

Robert Kennedy, PhD

Director

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

iv
Executive Summary

The use of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

aircraft and missiles against Serbia on March 24, 1999 ended

the post–Cold War phase of international affairs. The Serbs

conducted ethnic cleansing against the Albanians on an

unprecedented scale, but these attacks escalated after the

initiation of the NATO air campaign.

The attack on Serbia suddenly removed a Russian taboo

against the use of military force that followed the first war in

Chechnya of 1994–1996. NATO’s military action was a final

humiliation and a “spit in the face” for Russia, which more

than ever before demonstrated the Western arrogance of power

and its willingness to ignore Russian interests.

Russia has learned many lessons from Kosovo. Above all,

the end justifies the means. The use of force is the most

efficient problem solver, if applied decisively and massively.

Negotiations are of dubious value and should be used as a

cover for military action. International law and human

suffering are of secondary significance in achieving the goal.

Massive devastation and collateral fatalities among the civilian

population are acceptable in order to limit one’s own

casualties. Foreign public opinion and the position of Western

governments are to be discounted if Russian interests are at

stake. The key to success is a concentrated campaign in the

mass media and tight control over information about the war.

After an unprecedented decade of disarmament,

de–targeting of nuclear missiles, cooperation, and

transparency in defense and security matters between Russia

and the United States, Kosovo has revived the worst instincts

and stereotypes of the Cold War. It is likely that US–Russian

v
vi

relations will never be the same as before March 24, 1999. The

Clinton administration and its European allies bear full

responsibility for this change.

The growing rift between Russia and the West is reflected in

new editions of the highest official documents: Russia’s

National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. They

emphasize nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use as the

principal pillars of Russian security; robust conventional

defense against a “Balkan–type” attack by NATO; and regular

employment of the armed forces to deal with local, including

domestic conflicts. Russian military spending will probably

rise from the present 2.8 per cent of Gross National Product to

about 3.5 per cent. That level of expenditure would permit

several different options for future force structure, which are

explored in the text.

To prevent further tensions and military confrontation

between Russia and the West, US–Russian and

NATO–Russian security cooperation must be patiently and

consistently rebuilt step–by–step. Pragmatically and without

excessive expectations, the zone of cooperation must be

expanded and given solid public support. The ratification of

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty–II (START–II) by the

Russian State Duma (Parliament) on April 14, 2000 gave a

good start to such a policy. Now it depends largely on the

United States whether a new START–III/Anti–Ballistic

Missile (ABM) package can be negotiated. Other steps should

be a tacit understanding that there will be no further NATO

expansion during the next several years. The NATO–Russia

Permanent Joint Council (PJC) could become the forum for

planning joint peacekeeping operations, on which Moscow by

definition should participate as an equal with NATO member

states. At least tacitly, it must be recognized that NATO will
vii

not implement any new out–of–area military action, except by

authorization of the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

Deep reductions and restructuring of conventional forces for

joint peacekeeping operations could be a goal for the

Conventional Armed Forces of Europe–2 (CFE–2) treaty

process.

Even if all these goals are achieved, the great dreams of

post–Cold War integration, partnership, and even strategic

alliance of the early 1990s will hardly be revived. However,

further disintegration of the international security and arms

control regimes can be stopped, and a reasonable measure of

cooperation between Russia and the West can be enhanced—

until the time when major new reforms in Russia’s domestic

life, as well the West’s foreign policy and strategy, may open

the door to much closer economic, political, and military

integration. 

The Transformation of Russian Military

Doctrine: Lessons Learned from 

Kosovo and Chechnya

Introduction1

The first wave of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) aircraft and missiles that hit Serbian targets on March

24, 1999 marked the end of the post–Cold War phase of

international affairs—a period of world history that Russian

President Mikhail Gorbachev had initiated some 10 years

earlier. The United States–led action in Kosovo also deeply

undermined the emerging framework of international security.

This new security system was allegedly based on an

enhanced role for the United Nations (UN) and the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

It assumed strict conformity with the UN Charter; compliance

with international law; respect for existing agreements

between Russia and the West (especially the NATO–Russia

Founding Act of 1997),2 and a partnership between Russia and

NATO, to include joint conflict–management and

peacekeeping operations, as well as comprehensive arms

control and disarmament regimes. 

Kosovo reversed these trends. The war resulted in Russia’s

experiencing an unprecedented surge of anti–American and

anti–Western sentiments, and these sentiments had many

ramifications. The Russian public became markedly

disenchanted with the West. Moscow initiated a desperate

search for other foreign partners and renewed its efforts to

build up a defense capability against the United States (US)

and its allies. The war in Yugoslavia did away with the

remaining hopes for a genuine security partnership and

Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

1
Alexei G. Arbatov

2

military cooperation between Russia and NATO. Once again,

Russia perceives NATO as its primary defense concern for the

foreseeable future.

As a result, a number of crucial treaties, that had been

signed, planned, and/or finalized, were “frozen” without

ratification: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty–III

(START–III); Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the

Open Skies Treaty; and the adaptation of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). (START–II,

however, was ratified by Russia on April 14, 2000. The State

Duma [Parliament] approved the CTBT on April 21, 2000.)

Still worse, the implementation of previously ratified treaties

and/or unilateral agreements was placed in doubt: START–I

(which is undermined as well by renewed American plans for

a strategic defense program); CFE; Intermediate–Range

Nuclear Forces and Shorter–Range Missiles (INF–SRM);

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); parallel reduction of

tactical nuclear arms; and de–targeting of strategic missiles.3

NATO’s decisive and efficient

military action against Yugoslavia

served as an example to Russia and

provided Russia a powerful push

toward a new military campaign in

Chechnya. Western employment of

large–scale forces in the Balkans

lifted the taboo against the use of

military force as an instrument for

resolving ethnic problems and

conflicts that had been in place since

the end of the first Chechen war of

1994–1996. (From 1996–1999 there

was not a single instance of Russian

Yugoslav war

destroyed

remaining hopes

for genuine

security

partnership 

and military

cooperation

between Russia

and NATO 
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

3

armed forces firing a shot in any “hot spot,” in or outside of

Russia.) Following September 1999 clashes with the

Wahhabis4 in Daghestan, Russia once again engaged military

force in Chechnya. 

Altogether, the NATO bombing of the Balkans resulted in

strong public support for the Kremlin’s new war in Chechnya.

It caused an overwhelming vote for hard–line politicians and

nationalist parties in both the parliamentary elections of

December 1999 and the presidential elections of March 2000.

And, it very significantly triggered a major revision of both the

Russian Federation National Security Concept (See Appendix

B) and the Russian Federation Military Doctrine (See

Appendix A).

The official new version of the National Security Concept

was adopted by the Security Council in January 2000.5 In April

2000 the new Military Doctrine was approved by the Security

Council.6 These revised documents provide a general security

strategy framework for the new Russian President, Vladimir

Putin, for many years ahead. 

The Evolution of Russian Military Requirements

The new, revised, Russian official Military Doctrine was not

written on a blank sheet of paper. Its basis, Principal Guidance

on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, was

approved by the Security Council on November 2, 1993, and

became law that same day as Presidential Decree No. 1833

(PGMD). The new doctrine retains some of the principal

points of the PGMD, but it reprioritizes, elaborates on, and

presents a sharper and more straightforward substance. 
Alexei G. Arbatov

4

In the past, official documents were purely declaratory and

had nothing to do with actual diplomatic, military, and

budgetary circumstances. However, the new Security Concept

and Military Doctrine are notably very much in line with the

current practice of Russian foreign and defense policies and

programs. 

During the last phase of the Cold War (from the mid–1970s

to the mid–1980s) Moscow’s geopolitical space directly

bordered on territories controlled or protected by the United

States and China. Hence, Soviet armed forces were built,

deployed, and assigned to meet specific strategic military

goals: 1) to limit damage in a global nuclear war with any

combination of the other four nuclear powers; 2) to win in

large–scale, multi–theater wars in Europe and the Far East;

and 3) to be able to conduct sub–regional operations in support

of Russia’s Third World clients (e.g., Afghanistan). 

In the early 1980s, at the apogee of the Cold War, the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had the world’s second

largest economy. Its military budget was equal to that of

America, although its Gross National Product (GNP) was

roughly half as large. Of the almost four million men in the

Soviet armed forces, about 70 per cent were allocated to the

European theater, 20 per cent to the Far East, and 10 per cent

to the southern zone. These forces were deployed under the

umbrella of 10,000 strategic and 30,000 tactical nuclear

weapons. The Soviet Union produced approximately 3,000

tanks, 600 aircraft, 1,000 missiles of all classes, and 20 large

combat ships and submarines annually. 

All of this appears in stark contrast to the present and

foreseeable future. Currently, the former Soviet Republics lie

to the west and south of Russia. They are marked by a high
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

5

degree of internal instability, are vulnerable to external

influences, and are engaged in tense relations, or even open

armed conflict, with secessionist groups, with each other, or

with Russia. The actual borders between Russia and the former

Soviet Republics are mostly symbolic and are exposed to

illegal migration and massive smuggling activities. 

Russian GNP has fallen to 2.5 per cent of that of the US.7

The Russian defense budget has shrunk to 2 per cent of the

American budget and the armed forces have been reduced to

1.2 million. Nuclear forces consist of 5,000 strategic and

approximately 2,000 tactical warheads (which due to serial

obsolescence will be reduced to around 1,000–1,500 in the

next 10 years). Russian defense output is on the average 10–20

times smaller than it was in the 1980s.

Beyond dealing with the new countries that occupy former

Soviet territory, Russia now faces a number of states and

alliances with superior armed forces. NATO has enlarged its

military power and moved much closer to Russian borders by

accepting new member states. During the next 10 years, in

addition to holding a conventional superiority in Europe of

approximately 2:1, or even 3:1, NATO will also possess a

substantial nuclear superiority in both tactical and strategic

nuclear forces.8

Altogether, this is certainly a major shift in the military

balance of Europe. Less than 10 years ago the Warsaw Pact

enjoyed a 3:1 conventional force superiority over NATO, and

a 2:1 superiority in theater and tactical nuclear weapons, as

well as parity in strategic forces. The USSR alone was twice as

strong in conventional forces as all European NATO states

combined.
Alexei G. Arbatov

6

A numerical comparison of armed forces is an insufficient

basis upon which to estimate the real war–fighting capabilities

in offensive or defensive operations. However, due to the

failures of Russian military reform from 1992–1997 and the

chronic underfunding of Russian defense from 1997–1999 (in

constant prices, during these 3 years, the military budget has

fallen by 50 per cent), qualitative factors (training, combat

readiness, command and control, troop morale, and technical

sophistication of weapons and equipment, etc.) are presently

even more favorable to NATO than pure numerical ratios

might indicate. Such a fundamental shift is not conducive to

Russian interests, irrespective of all other circumstances. 9

At Russia’s southern rim, Turkey, Pakistan, and

Afghanistan, and less likely Iran, may present security issues

during the next 5–10 years. Most likely, such threats will not

take a direct form, but rather will consist of support for

regimes, political movements, or policies in the Transcaucasus

and Central Asia, directed against Russia or its allies. Another

possibility is that these states will engage in secessionist

activities against Russia’s government (e.g., Chechnya), or

against regimes friendly to Russia (e.g., Tajikistan). 

In the Far East, Japan and China could pose a threat to

Russia during the next 10–15 years. Japan’s conventional

offensive capabilities in contrast to those of Russia will be

quite limited for at least the next 10 years. The possible

remilitarization of Japan and a revival of its expansionist

strategies would represent a major change in the security

environment of the Far East. A remilitarized Japan would

require a profound revision of Russia’s regional military

requirements, particularly its naval and air power. Of course

this would not happen overnight, and Russia would have

sufficient time to take adequate countermeasures. 
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

7

China’s current military buildup, its geostrategic situation,

and a long history of territorial disputes with Russia and the

USSR might in the future encourage expansionist policies

toward Russian Siberia and the Far East, or against

Kazakhstan and other Central Asian allies of Moscow. In

10–15 years, China may achieve conventional offensive

superiority along the Transbaikal and Maritime Province

borders. Such an advantage would allow China to interdict

Russian reinforcements from its European territory. 

Whatever problems Russia faces in the former Soviet space

around its current borders, prior to 1999 it was commonly

accepted within the Russian political elite and strategic

community that Russian armed forces were unlikely to be

called upon to fight in a large–scale, theater–wide war in the

foreseeable future, either in the east or in the west. In the

Military Doctrine of 1993 there were references to the need for

“defending against massive naval air strikes with

high–precision weapons” (apparently mindful of the 1991

Gulf War precedent). However, this requirement for a defense

against massive naval air strikes was not taken seriously and

was never reflected in the military appropriations of

1994–1999. In fact, the inclusion of this scenario in the 1993

Military Doctrine was perceived as a tribute to Russia’s

traditional military theorists and to the domestically motivated

pandering to the defense establishment. 

Former Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov advocated

preparations for theater–wide conventional war with NATO.

This, in turn, implied open–ended defense requirements and

the need for a major increase in defense appropriations and

force levels.10 Rodionov’s stance eventually led to conflict

with the Secretary of the Defense Council, Yuri Baturin, and

Boris Yeltsin, himself. The conflict ended with Rodionov’s

demotion.
Alexei G. Arbatov

8

The Military Doctrine of 1993 postulated two main defense

policy tasks: the simultaneous occurrence of stable nuclear

deterrence and sound preparation to handle local conflicts (to

include simultaneous peace enforcement and peacekeeping

operations). However, President Yeltsin did not clearly

formulate these principal doctrinal points until the

appointment of Igor Sergeev as Minister of Defense in May

1997.

Despite tensions with NATO over the issue of its

enlargement, the western military districts of Russia (Moscow,

Leningrad, and Ural-Volga) were largely considered basing

areas, providing a supply and training infrastructure for forces,

and were assigned to missions in the south and southeast (in

the North Caucasus military district, the Transcaucasus, and

Central Asia, where Russia had security commitments and was

engaged in local conflicts or in peacekeeping operations). 

The defense budgets of 1997–1999 were structured

accordingly, with a predominant portion (up to 70 per cent)

allocated to the maintenance of the armed forces—while

deeply cutting personnel numbers, altogether by 30 per cent.

At the same time the investment appropriations—Research

and Development (R&D), procurement, and production—

were barely sufficient for modernization of the minimal

strategic forces. This was all the more the case in that the

federal budgets from 1994 on had never been fully

implemented—with the exception of the 1999 budget—and

annual cuts led to an even greater dominance of maintenance

over investment (80:20 per cent). 

Kosovo’s Impact on Russian Perceptions of War and Politics

NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia in March 1999 marked a

watershed in Russia’s assessment of its own military
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

9

requirements and defense priorities. For the first time since the

mid–1980s, within operational departments of the General

Staff and Armed Forces, the Security Council, and Foreign

Ministry crisis management groups, and in closed sessions of

the Duma, serious discussions took

place concerning military conflict

with NATO. All of a sudden the

apocalyptic scenarios of a Third

World War (the types of scenarios

so superbly presented in Tom

Clancy’s best–selling suspense

novels), which were presumed to

have been permanently discarded with the end of the Cold

War, returned to the table as practical policy making and

military operational planning issues. Following an

unprecedented decade, for both Russia and the United States,

of disarmament, de–targeting, cooperation, and transparency

in defense and security matters, this was like a cold shower,

reviving the worst instincts and stereotypes of the Cold War. 

However short the period—those first few weeks of NATO

bombing in the Kosovo war—its impact will probably scar the

US–Russian relationship forever. The relationship will never

again be what it was before March 24, 1999. The Clinton

administration and its European allies bear full responsibility

for this upheaval. 

NATO attacks against Yugoslavia were perceived as a clear

demonstration of a genuine transformation of the alliance.

During the Cold War, NATO really was a defensive coalition

of states, capable of protecting their territories and deterring

the superior offensive military power of the Warsaw Pact. With

the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the

immediate military threat very suddenly evaporated, and

Bombing of

Yugoslavia

revived worst

instincts of the

Cold War 
NATO inadvertently became by far the most powerful military

force in the world. 

Absent the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO

discovered the military missions of peace enforcement and

peacekeeping. This redirection would have been welcome and

expedient if the alliance had trimmed its forces and structures

radically and provided its services to the legitimate

international security organizations: the UN and OSCE. 

However, NATO was too powerful, exclusive, and

sophisticated to succumb to such a modest secondary position.

Therefore, it made claim to a loftier, post–Cold War mission:

that of being on an equal footing to, and possibly at a much

higher level of status and power than the UN and OSCE.

NATO, by implication, proclaimed its right to act

independently of UN or OSCE authorization. UN and OSCE

authorization is still recognized as desirable, but not essential,

for NATO to initiate military action. Moreover, the new

alliance strategy allows for offensive military action beyond

the territories of NATO member states. For those countries that

do not belong to, nor aspire to membership in the alliance,

there is profound reason to fear possible NATO military action

based on arbitrary decisions. The legitimate judgments of the

UN and the UN Security Council—as the highest international

court of justice to make such verdicts and to execute just

punishments—are no longer the basis for NATO decisions.

On top of it all, Russia viewed

NATO’s military action as a final

humiliation and a “spit in the face.”

NATO’s attack, more than ever

before, demonstrated a Western

arrogance of power and willingness

Alexei G. Arbatov

10

NATO's attack

demonstrated

Western 

arrogance
to ignore Russian interests—especially when they diverged

from those of the West.11 Kosovo also demonstrated Russia’s

total impotence in supporting its own declarations and

commitments with even minimally tangible actions. It was a

particularly painful humiliation for Moscow, in that President

Yeltsin had personally guaranteed Yugoslav security and had

taken many initiatives to solve the crisis peacefully. 

The explosion of national pride and enthusiasm that took

place in June 1999, when a battalion of Russian paratroopers

made its blitz–march from Bosnia to Kosovo, testified to

Russia’s pain.12 This burst of enthusiasm, however, gave way

to an even deeper sense of gloom and disappointment after the

failure of Viktor Chernomyrdin’s mediatory mission. Far from

achieving a negotiated settlement to the crisis, his visit did

little more than to impose NATO dictates on Slobodan

Milosevic and disperse Russian peacekeepers among NATO’s

“occupation zones,” where they were subordinated to NATO

commanders. 

The military dimensions of the 1999 war are a subject to be

explored in a separate study. Suffice it to say that NATO turned

the war into a major military production, where the most

advanced and sophisticated weapons, command and control

systems, and operations and tactics were demonstrated. The

campaign “Allied Force” continued for 78 days, with the

participation of 14 out of 19 NATO member states. Altogether

the NATO campaign employed 1,260 aircraft and 30 combat

ships, including three aircraft carriers and six nuclear attack

submarines with cruise missiles. NATO air power conducted

35,000 sorties, and about 15,000 bombs and missiles hit

Yugoslavia. In preparation for a ground offensive, 27,000

troops were re–deployed to Albania and Macedonia. During

Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

11
Alexei G. Arbatov

12

the war the newest technology was extensively employed:

stealth B–2 and F–117 airplanes; long–range, sea– and

air–launched cruise missiles; guided bombs; cluster and

penetrating munitions; space reconnaissance, communication

and navigation systems; new, airborne warning and control

systems; electronic warfare and counter–radar systems; and

various kinds of drones, etc. 

All of this frightening panoply of military power

(representing almost 20 per cent of NATO’s full potential) was

thrown against a small country with a population no larger

than New York City, with a GNP smaller than the US military

R&D budget, and an army of only 100,000 (armed with 1960s

vintage Soviet weapons). Yugoslavia essentially failed to resist

the massive air–campaign thrust upon it, symbolically firing

back with only anti–aircraft guns and obsolete SA–6 and SA–7

missile systems.

As a preliminary conclusion it may be suggested that, oddly

enough, this strange war in a post–Cold War Europe was

technically well executed, but totally failed on the tactical and

operational levels. It was a short–term strategic success, but

appears to have failed to achieve the long–term strategic and

political goals.

The initial goal of NATO was to degrade the Serbian Army,

and its supply and infrastructure assets in Kosovo and across

the rest of the country. The goal was to make the Serbian Army

curtail its operations in Kosovo and retreat from the province,

bringing an end to a humanitarian catastrophe and leading to

the victory of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), trained and

supplied by the West. However, when Serbian troops finally
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

13

did depart Kosovo, it became apparent that only 13 tanks were

destroyed, while 300 tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers

remained intact. The Serbian Army survived a terrible beating

in Kosovo and was prepared to meet a ground offensive and to

inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. Apparently Western

statistics on the Yugoslav Army’s losses in Kosovo, and

elsewhere, were highly exaggerated. In fact, the Serbian Army

and police continued their operations in Kosovo up to the very

last day before the truce. The KLA was fully defeated and

driven out of the province. Ethnic cleansing was conducted

against Albanians at an unprecedented scale (ethnic cleansing

of the Albanians escalated only after the initiation of the

NATO air campaign). And, the Kosovo war expanded the

humanitarian catastrophe to almost a million Albanian

refugees (plus 200,000 Serbian refugees) who fled the

province to escape ground pogroms, the fighting, and NATO

bombing.

In addition to the failures just discussed, NATO’s war failed

to achieve a very basic early goal. As in the 1991 Gulf War,

NATO used the tactic of attempting to provoke all of the

enemy’s Surface–to–Air Missile (SAM) radars into operation

against the first waves of aircraft. The purpose here was for

NATO to discover and then destroy the SAM radar system

with anti–radiation missiles, thus depriving Yugoslavia of any

air defense capability. Having disabled Yugoslavia’s air

defense, Western aircraft would then be in a position to attack

the Serbian Army with precision–guided weapons from a low

altitude and to provide close air support to NATO forces in the

case of an eventual ground invasion. However, the Serbs

thwarted this ploy by not switching on their radar at the time

of the early NATO air attacks. They chose to preserve their air
Alexei G. Arbatov

14

defense system for a potential NATO ground invasion,

retaining their system for use when NATO aircraft would have

to fly at low altitudes in order to provide air cover for ground

forces. 

Then, failing to destroy Serbia’s air defense, NATO avoided

flying at lower altitudes. That is why, in the end, NATO losses

were so amazingly small: two airplanes and 16 drones, and not

a single pilot killed in combat. At the same time, however, the

Serbian Army was not seriously crippled. 

Not having achieved its initial goal, the NATO alliance

apparently changed its strategy to focus on the destruction of

Yugoslav industrial assets, infrastructure, administrative, and

communications facilities. In this pogrom against a

defenseless country from an altitude of 10,000 meters, NATO

air power was highly “successful” (although the famous

precision–guided weapons sometimes hit the wrong targets:

embassies, like that of China, and even the wrong countries—

Macedonia and Albania). Seven weeks of bombarding

Yugoslavia destroyed 100 per cent of the oil refineries, 70 per

cent of the defense industry, 60 per cent of the fuel storage

facilities, 100 per cent of the electrical line transformers, and

40 per cent of the TV and radio stations—including the

Belgrade TV center, where 16 civilian employees were killed

by missiles. In addition, 68 bridges were destroyed, and 70 per

cent of the roads and 50 per cent of the railroads were put out

of action.

Altogether 1,500 people were killed—two–thirds of them

civilians—2,500 lost their homes, and two million became

jobless. Other collateral damage included 86 historic

monuments, and more than 300 schools, hospitals, etc. 
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

15

The destruction of oil refineries, oil storage, and chemical

plants caused significant ecological damage. The heavy

pollution from all this destruction entered the Danube, one of

Europe’s main rivers, and was carried into the Black Sea and

the Eastern Mediterranean. 

In late 1999, the Chief Prosecutor of the UN International

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Carla del Ponte,

reviewed complaints, not only of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo,

but also of NATO crimes committed during the course of the

bombing campaign, including the issue of gross violations of

the Geneva Convention on the rights of civilians during

combat.13

Overall, the Kosovo war caused Russia to reconsider the

basic tenets of its security structure. The new versions of the

National Security Concept and Military Doctrine largely

reflect Moscow’s military reaction to the Balkan war. 

New Defense Priorities

The principal point addressed by the new National Security

Concept is that military threats to Russia are on the increase

and the main danger emanates from the West: “Elevated to the

level of strategic doctrine the shift of NATO to the practice of

force employment outside its area of responsibility and

without UN Security Council sanction is prone with the threat

of destabilization of the whole strategic situation in the

world.”14

One way for Russia to respond to this threat is to enhance its

nuclear forces to deter not just nuclear, but also, large–scale

conventional attacks of the type demonstrated in the Balkans.

The new Military Doctrine states: “The Russian Federation
Alexei G. Arbatov

16

reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use

of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons—weapons

[used] against Russia and its allies—as well as in response to

a large–scale conventional aggression in critical situations for

Russia and its allies.”15

Russia’s preference for a strong nuclear posture and its

acknowledgement of the possibility of a first nuclear strike

were already proclaimed in the 1993 Doctrine. During these

times of economic, political, ideological, and military

weakness and uncertainty, a combat ready (in contrast to

de–alerted) nuclear arsenal is perceived by the majority of the

new Russian political elite as the only legacy of its former

status and influence in the world. 

Russia’s historical position, as one of two major world

powers, based on earlier nuclear and military might, allows it

to symbolically remain equal to the United States and superior

to all other nations. Russia’s traditional, conventional military

superiority vis–à–vis NATO, Japan, and China has in fact

declined during the last decade. Russia is now seriously

inferior in terms of both quantitative and qualitative factors

relating to theater military balances. Just as NATO employed a

nuclear first use strategic concept during the decades after

1945 (when NATO needed to emphasize its nuclear forces in

order to offset its conventional force vulnerabilities), Russia

has chosen the same strategy. Since 1993, it has adopted a

nuclear first use strategic concept in order to de–emphasize the

weaknesses in its conventional military forces. 

However, until the Yugoslav crisis, Russia’s National

Security Concept was really a theoretical exercise, in that there

was no serious external military threat—at least from the

direction of the West. From 1993–1999 Russian strategic and
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

17

tactical nuclear forces were consistently

underfunded. Plans for modernization,

operational plans, target lists, C3I

systems and procedures were all

stagnant. Nuclear forces were de–alerted

and de–targeted, and their general

readiness status was significantly

relaxed.

“Today Yugoslavia—Tomorrow Russia.” This is the deeply

felt public consensus since NATO’s attack. A serious

reassessment of Russian military reform became essential.

Once again conventional forces would need to be ready for the

type of high–technology warfare dictated by NATO and the

West, rather than focusing on the requirements of local or

regional ground wars in the south. In reality, however,

development and deployment of sophisticated military

capabilities, analogous to that of NATO’s massive,

precision–guided, conventional air and naval potential, would

for a long time be beyond Russia’s financial capacity.

Therefore, the most probable Russian response, a response that

is already taking shape, would be to place even greater

emphasis on a robust nuclear deterrence, relying on enhanced

strategic and tactical nuclear forces and their C3I systems.16

Accordingly, on March 18, 1999 a new law, On Financing

the Defense Contract for Strategic Nuclear Forces, was

adopted by the Duma and approved by the President. This law

envisions stable, long–term funding for strategic forces R&D

and procurement at a level of about 40 per cent of the

investment portion of the defense budget. 

Of equal importance, this law emphasizes tactical nuclear

forces as the prime candidate for first use against a large

Russian fear:

“Today 

Yugoslavia –

Tomorrow 

Russia”
Alexei G. Arbatov

18

conventional attack. The Iskander, a new, tactical ballistic

missile (with a range of below 500 km—the INF–SRM limit)

and a new, naval tactical nuclear weapons system were

specifically discussed as nuclear options. Russian Minister of

Defense Igor Sergeev pointed out that the highest priority was

“creating an integrated system of different forces, including

strategic and tactical nuclear components, which will permit a

reasonable concentration of efforts and resources of state for

enhancing deterrence and preserving Russia’s nuclear

potential.”17

Nonetheless, some Russian critics claim that the threat

of nuclear first use would not be a credible deterrent

against NATO. Due to Russia’s shortage of funding for

maintenance and modernization of its nuclear forces,

NATO will acquire a clear–cut nuclear strategic and

tactical superiority over Russia during the next 10 years.

Whereas a suicidal threat of nuclear escalation could

present a credible deterrent against a full–scale,

theater–wide conventional aggression—including major

ground warfare—Balkan–type selective air and naval

strikes, even if massive and prolonged, might not be

deterred.

The NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia has left

the Russian people with a vivid image of a possible future

scenario—with Russia on the receiving end of surgical strikes

against industrial, infrastructure, and military targets. These

strikes would be especially targeted against nuclear forces and

C3I sites, and would be sufficiently selective not to provoke a

nuclear response. They would, however, efficiently destroy

Russia’s deterrence capability within a few days or weeks.

This possible scenario has been of serious concern to the

Russian military for quite some time. Since Yugoslavia, it has

certainly moved up to the very top of the list of military

challenges. 
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

19

Hence, the new emphasis on building up and modernizing

Russia’s conventional air defense, air force, and naval assets

(in particular S–300 and S–400 SAMs, a new air superiority

fighter, Multi–role Front–line Fighter [MFI], and new

Yahont–type naval missiles, as well as a new

precision–guided, long–range, conventional Air–to–Ship

Missile [ASM] to be based on heavy bombers). These should

be capable of inflicting sufficient losses on attacking NATO

forces and bases to induce NATO either to stop its aggression,

or to escalate it to the level of massive conventional warfare,

including a ground offensive. This would then justify Russia’s

first use of tactical nuclear weapons. The main portion of the

supplemental appropriations for the year 2000 defense budget

(approximately 26 billion rubles) was allocated to such

programs.

Still, even if Russian military expenditures are raised from

the present 2.8 per cent to 3.5 per cent of GNP, the new

funding will hardly be enough to support: a) strategic nuclear

forces at the START–III level (2,000–2,500 warheads); b)

enhanced, tactical nuclear capability to deter large–scale,

conventional threats in the east and in the west; c) strong

conventional defenses to prevent Balkan–type aggression; and

d) at the same time address the requirements of managing local

conflicts around Russia’s perimeters, plus peacekeeping

operations. The requirement to manage border conflicts has

just recently arisen with the new, Kosovo–influenced, war in

the North Caucasus.

Actually, in spite of all the emphasis on enhanced

nuclear deterrence, a clear shift of defense priorities exists.

In the short–run, the new defense priorities are local,

conventional combat and peacekeeping operations along

Russia’s borders, in post–Soviet space. In the longer term,
the new defense priorities include planning for a robust

conventional defense against a “Balkan–type” threat to

Russia and its allies. 

The New Chechen War

A crucial provision of the new National Security Concept

and the Military Doctrine is that they clearly spell out the

possibility of employing armed forces in domestic conflicts.

The armed forces are, by definition, militarily superior to

Russian internal troops and police. The use of military forces

to resolve domestic problems, however, must be regulated by

strict legal rules and procedures. Otherwise, the practice of

their use will potentially be a major threat to a young and weak

Russian democracy. Although at present this doctrinal point is

evidently and directly related to the war in Chechnya, the

precedent of using military force to control domestic conflicts

could be extended to any other domestic issue. This could then

lead to dictatorial rule by a commander in chief, some military

leader, or politician, supported by the armed forces.

It has to be recognized that Russia’s new war in Chechnya,

initiated in the Fall of 1999, and its effect on the relationship

between Russia and the West are closely tied to the events that

took place in Kosovo earlier in the year. The war in Yugoslavia

had a significant impact on Russia’s leadership and public

opinion. 

The main lesson learned is that the goal justifies the means.

The use of force is the most efficient problem solver, if applied

decisively and massively. Negotiations are of dubious value

and are to be used as a cover for military action. Legality of

state actions, observation of laws and legal procedures, and

humanitarian suffering are of secondary significance relative

Alexei G. Arbatov

20
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

21

to achieving the goal. Limiting one’s own troop casualties is

worth imposing massive devastation and collateral fatalities on

civilian populations. Foreign public opinion and the position

of Western governments are to be discounted if Russian

interests are at stake. A concentrated and controlled mass

media campaign is the key to success.

All of these lessons learned were

applied beginning in September 1999

with deadly results in the Chechen war, a

“counter–terrorist operation” that

transformed into a large–scale war. The

first Chechen war syndrome was over.

The taboo against the use of force in a

Chechen–like environment no longer

existed. Because NATO proclaimed its right to attack a

sovereign state to achieve NATO’s own aims, Russia was all

the more entitled to use force on its own territory. Russia

would make it clear that no one would be allowed to intervene

in Russian domestic affairs. The West would be taught that

Russia is not Yugoslavia. This is how Russia thinks today.

The use of force in Chechnya is based on what is, in fact, a

flimsy legal foundation, just like NATO’s action against

Yugoslavia. According to the Russian law On Defense, the use

of armed forces (in contrast to internal troops and special

police units) to resolve domestic problems is regulated by the

law On the State of Emergency. On the State of Emergency was

adopted in 1999 and is now outdated. It permits the use of

armed forces only for relief operations in natural and

man–made catastrophes. Armed forces may never be used for

domestic combat actions. 

Kosovo

removed the

taboo against

using force in

Chechnya
Alexei G. Arbatov

22

However, as was shown by both the Chechen war of

1994–1996 and the current campaign, internal troops and

police, lacking heavy weapons and training in field combat

actions, cannot cope with well–armed, organized, skilled, and

motivated guerilla forces. For that reason, in both cases,

Russian armed forces were employed. And, they were used

without introducing the legally required State of Emergency.

Lacking a declared State of Emergency, the wars were

deprived of a proper federal legal foundation. The cost was

high. There were huge additional losses and damage to the

civilian population and federal forces, and many new problems

were created for both Russian domestic politics and foreign

policy.18

Although not based on the State of Emergency, the use of

armed forces in the new Chechen campaign was officially

sanctioned by, but not strictly covered by, another law, On

Struggle with Terrorism. This law allows the use of armed

forces in concrete operations against specific cases of

terrorism and clearly defined terrorists. It does not authorize

their use in long, large–scale military campaigns that use

aircraft, armor, and artillery, nor in campaigns that devastate

whole cities and villages, resulting in huge losses among

federal troops (8,000 killed and wounded in 8 months), plus

even heavier losses among the local population.

Russia’s dubious justification for the Chechen war and the

war’s weak legal foundation are, among other things, serious

reasons for the West’s strong condemnation of Russia’s

actions. The results of the second Chechen war are

questionable at best. The Chechen territory was re–conquered,

but not without expense. Great losses occurred among federal

troops and the local civilian population. There was large–scale

devastation of property and of the local economies—foremost
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

23

in the city of Grozny, but in many smaller towns and villages

as well. Guerilla warfare will continue in Chechnya and will

prevent social and political stabilization or economic

restoration. Moreover, the threat of a horizontal escalation of

massive warfare to the neighboring North Caucasus Republics

and the Transcaucasus remains quite serious.

Hence, one of the crucial dilemmas of Russian domestic and

military policy is whether using Russian armed forces in

internal conflicts should be legalized by amending On the

State of Emergency. Is it better to amend the law, given all the

political dangers and devastating collateral effects inherent in

that action, or to lose control over armed secessionist

movements, armed revolts, and violent civil, ethnic, and

religious conflicts, knowing that they can not be effectively

dealt with by internal troops and police? Another important

issue is whether funding the use of armed forces and

operations in Chechen–type conflicts will consume resources

needed for nuclear deterrence and robust, sophisticated,

conventional defense systems against a “Balkan–type” threat. 

Russian Defense and Budget Options

Even the broadest defense and budget assessments reveal

that the principal priorities of Russian defense policy are

hardly realistic under present and projected budget levels.

Moreover, these priorities are clearly unattainable alongside

the implementation of an actual Chechen–type military

operation.

The Russian 2000 defense budget is currently defined at 146

billion rubles (approximately 5 billion dollars, using the

commercial exchange rate, and probably 10–15 billion dollars,

in terms of purchasing capacity). This is 2.8 per cent of

Russia’s GNP and 16 per cent of its total federal budget. 
Given the ongoing Chechen war, and assuming that it

continues and spreads to other areas (at an annual cost of about

50 billion rubles), and that it receives further funding from

Ministry of Defense and Ministry for Internal Affairs

appropriations, there will be barely enough money to sustain

the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) at a level of around 1,000

warheads, or even less, by the year 2010. SNF at this level will

not provide credible, enhanced nuclear deterrence. Nor will

any funding be available for training and equipping even

minimal forces for other local contingencies or minimal

modernized forces for “Balkan–type” defenses. If the war in

Chechnya were to be over in the nearest future, then SNF

could be maintained at a level of 1,500 warheads, and minimal

forces for local conflicts could be funded by the year 2010.

If the defense budget were to be raised to 3.5 per cent of

GNP (as was planned, but never fulfilled, by the Yeltsin

administration)—an amount that would correspond to 180

billion rubles in the 2000 budget—and the armed forces were

maintained at their present level of 1.2 million personnel,

some additional options might be available. 

One would be to maintain SNF at a level of 1,500 warheads

in 10 years time; to expand, train, and modernize forces for

local conflicts; and to provide for a minimal defense against a

“Balkan–type” threat. (See Future Russian Force Options

below, Option A)

A second option would be to maintain SNF at a level of

2,000–2,500 warheads (corresponding to the START–III

framework agreement of 1997), but to retain minimal force

capability for local conflicts and virtually no defense

capability against a “Balkan–type” contingency. (Option B)

Alexei G. Arbatov

24
The third major alternative would be to raise defense

appropriations to 3.5 per cent of GNP, while at the same time

reducing the armed forces to 0.8 million personnel and

changing the ratio between the maintenance and investment

portions of the defense budget to 55:45 per cent or even 50:50

per cent. This would allow the maintenance of SNF at a level

of 3,000 warheads in 10 years (equivalent to the START–II

ceiling), and it would simultaneously provide for expanded

local conflict forces and a minimal “Balkan–type”

conventional defense. (Option C)

Another option might be to retain the 2,000 SNF level and

to fund moderate forces for local contingencies and

“Balkan–type” defenses. (Option D)

Finally, it would be possible to reduce the SNF warhead

level to 1,500 (modifying START–III) and to expand forces

Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

25
for local conflicts and robust defense against a “Balkan–type”

threat. (Option E) 

All of the above considerations are, of course, predicated on

the war in Chechnya being brought to a close and avoiding

similar operations for the next 10 years. For a number of

reasons, it is impossible at this time to provide more detailed

financial and technical descriptions of the various nuclear and

conventional postures described above. While the new Russian

President will make the decision about Russia’s long–term

defense strategy, the last option seems preferable to all others.

It does not pose new confrontations with the West and may

provide Russia with an increased national security confidence.

These two factors could result in more equal and stable

political and military relations with the United States and

NATO.

Restoring Cooperation between Russia and the West

It must be recognized that,

under the cover of empty

declarations and pompous summits,

Russian–US and Russian–Western

relations have deeply deteriorated

during the last half of the 1990s. The

growing rift is reflected in Russia’s

adopting new versions of its most

important official documents: the

National Security Concept and the

Military Doctrine. These documents

emphasize nuclear deterrence and

nuclear first use as the principal

pillars of Russian security, a robust

conventional defense against threats

Alexei G. Arbatov

26

Pillars of new

Military Doctrine:

nuclear

deterrence,

nuclear first 

use, robust

conventional

defense, military

role in domestic

conflicts
Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

27

posed by NATO, and the routine use of armed forces to deal

with local, including domestic, conflicts.

To prevent further tensions and military confrontation

between Russia and the West, US–Russian and

NATO–Russian security cooperation must be patiently and

consistently rebuilt step–by–step. This must be accomplished

on a pragmatic basis and without excessive expectations,

gradually expanding the zone of cooperation, while at the

same time building the required solid public support.

The United States should apply no official, public pressure

on Moscow on the issue of Chechnya. Moscow should revise

its Chechnya operation, curtailing large–scale offensive

actions and concentrating on special operations against

guerilla units and leaders. If NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping

operation were realigned to comply with UN Security Council

Resolution No. 1244,19 a revival of the NATO–Russian

“Partnership for Peace” would be encouraged.20 Ratification of

START–II by the Duma on April 14, 2000 provides a good

beginning for the development of a cooperative security policy

between Russia and the West. Now it depends largely on the

United States as to whether a new START–III/Anti–Ballistic

Missile (ABM) package can be negotiated.

Other steps to be taken should include a tacit understanding

that there will be no further NATO expansion during the next

several years. The NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council

(PJC), an integral part of the NATO–Russia Founding Act of

May 1997, was created to “be the principal venue of

consultation between Russia and NATO in times of crisis or

for any other situation affecting peace and stability.” The PJC

forum could be used to develop and finalize agreements, as

well as to plan and prepare joint peacekeeping operations, on
which Moscow by definition should participate as an equal

with NATO member states.

It must be recognized, at least tacitly, that NATO will only

implement any new out–of–area military action with the

authorization of the UN Security Council. Deep reductions

and a restructuring of conventional forces for joint

peacekeeping operations could be a goal for CFE–2.

Even if all these goals are

achieved, the great dreams of the

early 1990s of a post–Cold War

integration, partnership, and even

strategic alliance will hardly be

revived. However, it is possible to

stop further disintegration of

international security and arms control regimes. A reasonable

measure of cooperation between Russia and the West can be

enhanced, until the time when major new Russian domestic

and Western foreign policy and strategy reforms may open the

door for a much closer economic, political, and military

integration. 

Endnotes

1. Some preliminary considerations and conclusions of this paper were

presented at a lecture by the author at a conference on “The New World

Order: Russia Between East and West,” Tel Aviv University, April 3–5,

2000. 

2. The “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security

between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization” was agreed on May 14, 1997 and approved by the North

Atlantic Council on May 16, 1997. Among other things it declared that: 

. . . Russia and NATO do not consider each other as 

adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the 

vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of 

strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present 

Alexei G. Arbatov

28

Rebuild security

cooperation

between Russia

and the West 

step–by–step
Act reaffirms the determination of Russia and NATO

to give concrete substance to their shared commitment 

to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, 

whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making 

this commitment at the highest political level marks the

beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between

Russia and NATO. They intend to develop, on the 

basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency 

a strong, stable and enduring partnership. . . .

To achieve the aims of this Act, Russia and NATO will base 

their relations on a shared commitment to the following

principles:

— refraining from the threat or use of force against each

other as well as against any other State, its sovereignty, 

territorial integrity or political independence in any 

manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter 

and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding 

Relations Between Participating States contained in 

the Helsinki Final Act;

— respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial 

integrity of all States and their inherent right to choose 

the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability 

of borders and peoples’ right of self–determination as 

enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE 

documents.

3. On January 24, 1994, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed an

agreement on de–targeting both countries’ strategic nuclear forces by 

May 30 of that year. According to later official statements, that goal was

reached on schedule. Great Britain joined this agreement on February 15,

1994. On September 2, 1994, Russia and China signed a de–targeting

agreement. These agreements are primarily symbolic due to their

essentially unverifiable nature. Yeltsin undermined them even further in

April 1999 when he addressed the re–targeting of strategic missiles

against states engaged in the bombing of Yugoslavia. Although probably

just another of Yeltsin’s notorious improvisations on strategic matters

(there was no subsequent official confirmation), he put the validity of

these re–targeting agreements into question.

4. A strict Muslim sect.

5. “The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,”

Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), No. 1,

January 14–20, 2000, pp.1–6. (See Appendix B)

6. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Nezavisimaya

Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

29
Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), April 22, 2000. (See Appendix A)

7. Based on the commercial exchange rate.

8. Whether the West’s strategic nuclear superiority is 30 per cent, 2:1, or

3:1, depends on the outcome of future arms control treaties and the level

of funding for Russian strategic forces.

9. S. Oznobistchev, “Cooperation between Russia and NATO: Doubts and

Prospects,” PRISM, Vol. 3, No. 10, June 1997, pp. 5–11.

10. On October 1, 1996, Defense Minister Igor Rodionov told a Moscow

press conference that the 98.7 trillion rubles (18 billion dollars) allocated

to the armed forces in the draft 1997 budget would cover only one–third

of the military’s needs. Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), October 2, 1996.

11. Elsewhere I have emphasized the “wide consensus in Russia that the

Balkans remain the only region outside the post–Soviet space where

Moscow has retained serious economic, political and security interests.

At least Russia has much greater reasons to hold this view than the

United States. And this has nothing to do with the ‘Slavic orthodox

fraternity,’ which is a subject of speculation by nationalists in Russia and

Yugoslavia, as well as an easy and empty explanation of Russian behavior

in the West. The Balkans are directly adjacent to the Black–Caspian Sea

zone of vital Russian interests. The Balkans are a possible route for

Russian oil and gas pipelines (with terminals at the Russian Black Sea

shore and shipping across the Black Sea) to circumvent the Turkish Black

Sea Straits, which are periodically closed to Russian oil tankers.

Developments in the Balkans affect Russia’s relations with Ukraine,

Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the volatile Transcaucasus and

North Caucasus sub–regions. The Russian political and military presence

in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean is highly dependent on

Russian positions in the Balkans. Also, Moscow highly values the Serbian

stance against NATO expansion, fully shared by Russia and very few

other European countries. If this is one of the reasons why the West does

not like Milosevic, any military pressure on Yugoslavia would be as

disagreeable to Russia as Russian military pressure on countries that are

applicants to NATO would be unacceptable to the West.” Alexei G.

Arbatov, “The Kosovo Crisis: The End of the Post–Cold War Era,”

Occasional Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States,

Washington, DC: March 2000, p. 11. 

12. ITAR–TASS, June 11–13, 1999.

13. On June 2, 2000, she informed the UN Security Council that there was

no basis for a formal investigation into whether NATO had committed

war crimes during the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. Barbara Crossette,

“U.N. War Crimes Prosecutor Declines to Investigate NATO,” New York

Times, June 3, 2000, p. 3. However, on June 6, Amnesty International

Alexei G. Arbatov

30
accused NATO of unlawfully killing civilians during the Kosovo conflict

and branded one attack that killed 16 people a war crime. Pauline Jelinek,

“Report Calls NATO Raid in Belgrade A War Crime,” Washington Post,

June 7, 2000, p. 26.

14. “National Security Concept.” (See Appendix B)

15. “Military Doctrine.” (See Appendix A)

16. Vadim Solovev and Vladimir Mukhin, “NATO declares its

preparedness for operations on a worldwide scale. Ministry of Defense of

the Russian Federation formulates a geopolitical counter-balance.”

Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), April

30–May 6, 1999, pp. 1–2. 

17. Igor Sergeev, “The Foundations of Military–Technical Policy of Russia

in the Beginning of the XXI Century,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star),

December 9, 1999.

18. The main point of the 1999 impeachment effort almost adopted by the

Duma against Yeltsin was the first Chechen war.

19. Sergey V. Lavrov, Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, has

pointed out a number of problems in the implementation of this

resolution. “Divergent Views Expressed as Security Council Hears

Kosovo Mission Report,” UN Press Release SC/6856, May 11, 2000,

pp. 4–5.

20. For the first time since NATO’s Kosovo operation, Russia participated

at the ambassadorial level in the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council

in Brussels and then at the ministerial level in Florence on May 24, 2000.

ITAR–TASS, May 25, 2000.

Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine

31
Acronyms

ABM – Anti–Ballistic Missile

ASM – Air–to–Ship Missile

CFE – Conventional Armed Forces of Europe

CTBT– Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CWC – Chemical Weapons Convention

GNP – Gross National Product

INF – Intermediate–Range Nuclear Forces

KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army

MFI – Multi–role Front–line Fighter

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation

PJC – NATO–Russian Permanent Joint Council

R&D – Research and Development

SAM – Surface–to–Air Missile

SNF – Strategic Nuclear Forces

SRM – Shorter–Range Missiles

START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Alexei G. Arbatov

32
Appendix A

Russian Federation Military Doctrine

(Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Decree of 21 April 2000)1

The Russian Federation Military Doctrine (hereinafter, the Military Doctrine)

constitutes the sum total of the official views (precepts) determining the

military–political, military–strategic, and military–economic foundations for

safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security.

The Military Doctrine is a document for a transitional period—the period of the

formation of democratic statehood and a mixed economy, the transformation of the

state’s military organization, and the dynamic transformation of the system of

international relations.

. . .

I. Military–Political Principles

Military–Political Situation

1. The state of and prospects for the development of the present–day

military–political situation are determined by the qualitative improvement

in the means, forms, and methods of military conflict, by the increase in

its reach and the severity of its consequences, and by its spread to new

spheres. The possibility of achieving military–political goals through

indirect, non–close–quarter operations predetermines the particular danger

of modern wars and armed conflicts for peoples and states and for

preserving international stability and peace, and makes it vitally necessary

to take exhaustive measures to prevent them and to achieve a peaceful

settlement of differences at early stages of their emergence and

development.

2. The military–political situation is determined by the following main

factors:

— a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large–scale war, including 

a nuclear war;

— the shaping and strengthening of regional power centers; the 

strengthening of national, ethnic, and religious extremism; the rise in 

separatism; 

— the spread of local wars and armed conflicts; an increase in the regional arms

race;

— the spread of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and 

delivery systems; the exacerbation of information confrontation.

Military Doctrine

33
3. A destabilizing impact on the military–political situation is exerted by:

— attempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding 

international security (primarily the UN and the OSCE);

— the utilization of military–force actions as a means of “humanitarian 

intervention” without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in 

circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of 

international law;

— the violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the

sphere of arms limitation and disarmament;

— the utilization by entities in international relations of information and other 

(including nontraditional) means and technologies for aggressive 

(expansionist) purposes;

— the activities of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist 

movements, organizations, and structures;

— the expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, and weapons and 

drug trafficking, and the multinational nature of these activities.

The Main Threats to Military Security

4. Under present–day conditions the threat of direct military aggression in traditional

forms against the Russian Federation and its allies has declined thanks to positive

changes in the international situation, the implementation of an active peace–loving

foreign–policy course by our country, and the maintenance of Russia’s military

potential—primarily its nuclear deterrent potential—at an adequate level. At the

same time, external and internal threats to the military security of the Russian

Federation and its allies persist and in certain areas are increasing.

5. The main external threats are:

— territorial claims against the Russian Federation; interference in the Russian

Federation’s internal affairs;

— attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation’s interests in resolving

international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one 

influential center in a multipolar world;

— the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian 

Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies;

— the creation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces) leading to the violation 

of the existing balance of forces, close to the Russian Federation’s state 

border and the borders of its allies or on the seas adjoining their territories; 

— the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian

Federation’s military security;

— the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the 

territory of friendly states adjoining the Russian Federation;

— the creation, equipping, and training on other states’ territories of armed

formations and groups with a view to transferring them for operations on 

the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;

Appendix A

34
— attacks (armed provocations) on Russian Federation military installations 

located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on installations and 

facilities on the Russian Federation’s state border, the borders of its allies, 

or the high seas;

— actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, not least by 

hampering the work of Russian systems of state and military rule, or at 

disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, missile–attack 

early–warning, antimissile defense, and space monitoring systems and 

systems for ensuring their combat stability, nuclear munition storage 

facilities, nuclear power generation, the nuclear and chemical industries, 

and other potentially dangerous installations;

— hostile information (information–technical, [and] 

information–psychological) operations that damage the military security of 

the Russian Federation and its allies;

— discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate 

interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states;

— international terrorism.

6. The main internal threats are:

— an attempted violent overthrow of the constitutional order;

— illegal activities by extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist 

movements, organizations, and structures aimed at violating the unity and 

territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and destabilizing the domestic

political situation in the country;

— the planning, preparation, and implementation of operations aimed at 

disrupting the functioning of federal organs of state power and attacking 

state, economic, or military facilities, or facilities related to vital services or

the information infrastructure;

— the creation, equipping, training, and functioning of illegal armed

formations; 

— the illegal dissemination (circulation) on Russian Federation territory of 

weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other means which could be used to 

carry out sabotage, acts of terrorism, or other illegal operations;

— organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and other illegal activities on a scale

threatening the Russian Federation’s military security.

Safeguarding Military Security 

7. . . . The Russian Federation:

— proceeds on the basis of the abiding importance of the fundamental principles 

and norms of international law, which are organically intertwined and 

supplement each other;

— maintains the status of nuclear power to deter (prevent) aggression against it 

and (or) its allies;

Military Doctrine

35
— implements a joint defense policy together with the Republic of Belarus, 

coordinates with it activities in the sphere of military organizational 

development, the development of the armed forces of the Union State’s 

member states, and the utilization of military infrastructure, and takes other 

measures to maintain the Union State’s defense capability;

— attaches priority importance to strengthening the collective security system 

within the CIS framework on the basis of developing and strengthening the 

Collective Security Treaty;

—views as partners all states whose policies do not damage its national 

interests and security and do not contravene the UN Charter;

— gives preference to political, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means 

of preventing, localizing, and neutralizing military threats at regional 

and global levels; 

— strictly observes the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the 

sphere of arms limitation, reduction, and elimination, and promotes 

their implementation and the safeguarding of the arrangements they 

define;

— punctiliously implements the Russian Federation’s international treaties as 

regards strategic offensive arms and antimissile defense, and is ready for 

further reductions in its nuclear weapons, on a bilateral basis with the 

United States as well as on a multilateral basis with other nuclear states, to 

minimal levels meeting the requirements of strategic stability;

— advocates making universal the regime covering the nonproliferation of 

nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, resolutely enhancing the 

effectiveness of that regime through a combination of prohibitive, 

monitoring, and technological measures, and ending and comprehensively 

banning nuclear testing;

— promotes the expansion of confidence–building measures between states in 

the military sphere, including reciprocal exchanges of information of a 

military nature and the coordination of military doctrines, plans, military 

organizational development measures, and military activity.

8. The Russian Federation’s military security is safeguarded by the sum total of the

forces, means, and resources at its disposal. Under present–day conditions the

Russian Federation proceeds on the basis of the need to have a nuclear potential

capable of guaranteeing a set level of damage to any aggressor (state or coalition of

states) under any circumstances. The nuclear weapons with which the Russian

Federation Armed Forces are equipped are seen by the Russian Federation as a

factor in deterring aggression, safeguarding the military security of the Russian

Federation and its allies, and maintaining international stability and peace. The

Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use

of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its

allies, as well as in response to large–scale aggression utilizing conventional

weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states party to the

Nonproliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons except in the event

Appendix A

36
of an attack on the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Armed Forces or

other troops, its allies, or a state to which it has security commitments that is

carried out or supported by a state without nuclear weapons jointly or in the

context of allied commitments with a state with nuclear weapons.

. . .

II. Military–Strategic Principles

Nature of Wars and Armed Conflicts

1. The Russian Federation maintains a readiness to wage war and take part in

armed conflicts exclusively with a view to preventing and repulsing aggression,

protecting the integrity and inviolability of its territory, and safeguarding the

Russian Federation’s military security as well as that of its allies in accordance with

international treaties.

2. The nature of modern wars (armed conflicts) is determined by their

military–political goals, the means of achieving those goals, and the scale of the

military operations. In accordance with this a modern war (armed conflict) may be:

— in terms of military–political goals: 

— just (not contravening the UN Charter and the fundamental norms and 

principles of international law, and waged as self–defense by the party 

subject to aggression); 

— unjust (contravening the UN Charter and the fundamental norms and 

principles of international law, falling within the definition of 

aggression, and waged by the party undertaking the armed attack);

— in terms of means utilized: 

— using nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction;

— using only conventional weapons;

— in terms of scale: local, regional, or large–scale.

3. The main general features of modern war are:

— its impact on all spheres of human activity;

— its coalition nature;

— the extensive use of indirect, non–close–quarter, and other (including

nontraditional) forms and means of operation, and long–range effective 

engagement and electronic engagement; 

— a desire on the part of the sides to disrupt the system of state and military 

command and control;

— the use of highly efficient state–of–the–art systems of arms and military

hardware (including those based on new physical principles); 

— highly maneuverable operations by troops (forces) in disparate areas with 

Military Doctrine

37
the extensive utilization of air–mobile forces, airborne troops, and 

special–purpose forces;

— attacks against troops (forces), rear–service and economic facilities, and 

means of communication throughout the territory of each of the warring 

parties;

— the implementation of air campaigns and operations; the catastrophic 

consequences of hitting (destroying) power–generation enterprises (above 

all nuclear), chemical and other dangerous production facilities, 

infrastructure, means of communication, and vital installations;

— a high likelihood of new states being drawn into the war, the escalation of 

warfare, and the expansion of the scale and range of the means employed, 

including weapons of mass destruction;

— the participation in the war of irregular armed formations alongside regular 

units conducted within the territory of a single state).

6. Armed conflict is characterized by:

— a high degree of involvement and vulnerability of the local population;

— the use of irregular armed formations;

— the extensive utilization of sabotage and terrorist methods;

— the complex moral and psychological atmosphere in which the troops

operate;

— the enforced diversion of considerable forces and assets to safeguard the 

security of transportation routes or areas and locations where troops (forces) 

are sited;

— the threat that it may be transformed into a local war ([in the case of an] 

international armed conflict) or civil war ([in the case of an] internal armed 

conflict).

. . .

9. A large–scale war may result from an escalation of an armed conflict, local or

regional war, or from the involvement in them of a significant number of states

from different parts of the world. A large–scale war utilizing only conventional

weapons will be characterized by a high likelihood of escalating into a nuclear war

with catastrophic consequences for civilization and the foundations of human life

and existence. In a large–scale war the sides will set radical military–political

goals. It requires the total mobilization of all the material and spiritual resources of

the states involved.

. . .

Appendix A

38
Principles Governing the Use of the Russian Federation 

Armed Forces and Other Troops

13. The Russian Federation considers it lawful to utilize the Russian Federation

Armed Forces and other troops to repulse aggression directed against it. The

Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops can also be used for protection

against unconstitutional actions or illegal armed violence threatening the integrity

and inviolability of Russian Federation territory, to perform missions in accordance

with the Russian Federation’s international treaties, and to perform other missions

in accordance with federal legislation.

14. The goals of the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops

are:

— in a large–scale (regional) war in the event that it is unleashed by a state 

(group or coalition of states): to protect the independence, sovereignty, and

territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, to repulse 

aggression, to effectively engage the enemy, and to force it to end its 

military operations on terms according with the interests of the Russian 

Federation and its allies;

— in local wars and international armed conflicts: to localize the seat of 

tension, to create the prerequisites for ending the war or armed conflict or 

for bringing it to an end at an early stage; to neutralize the aggressor and 

achieve a settlement on terms according with the interests of the Russian 

Federation and its allies;

— in internal armed conflicts: to rout and liquidate illegal armed formations, 

to create the conditions for a full settlement of the conflict on the basis of 

the Russian Federation Constitution and federal legislation;

— in peacekeeping and peace restoration operations: to disengage the warring 

factions, to stabilize the situation, and to ensure the conditions for a just 

peace settlement.

15. The main ways of utilizing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other

troops are:

— strategic operations, operations, and combat operations: in large–scale and 

regional wars;

— operations and combat operations: in local wars and international armed 

conflicts;

— joint special operations: in internal armed conflicts;

— counterterrorist operations: in the fight against terrorism in accordance with

federal legislation;

— peacekeeping operations.

Military Doctrine

39
16. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops should be prepared to

repulse aggression, effectively engage an aggressor, and conduct active operations

(both defensive and offensive) under any scenario for the unleashing and waging of

wars and armed conflicts, under conditions of the massive use by the enemy of

modern and advanced combat weapons, including weapons of mass destruction of

all types. At the same time, the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the

implementation of peacekeeping activities by the Russian Federation both

independently and as part of international organizations.

17. The main missions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops:

. . .

c) in domestic armed conflicts:

— the routing and liquidation of illegal armed formations and bandit and 

terrorist groups and organizations and the destruction of their bases, training

centers, depots, and communications;

— restoration of the rule of law, and of law and order;

— safeguarding of public security and stability;

— maintenance of the legal regime of a state of emergency in the conflict 

zone;

— localization and blockading of the conflict zone;

— termination of armed clashes and disengagement of the warring parties;

— confiscation of weapons from the population in the conflict zone;

— strengthening of protection of public order and security in regions adjacent 

to the conflict zone.

The performance of missions in the prevention and termination of domestic

armed conflicts, the localization and blockading of conflict zones, and the

elimination of illegal armed formations, bands, and terrorist groups is entrusted to

joint (multidepartmental) groups of troops (forces) created on an ad hoc basis and

their organs of command and control;

d) in operations to maintain and restore peace:

— disengagement of the conflicting parties’ armed groups;

— safeguarding of the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the 

civilian population and their evacuation from the conflict zone;

— blockading of the conflict zone with a view to ensuring the implementation 

of sanctions adopted by the international community;

— creation of the preconditions for a political settlement.

. . . 

Appendix A

40
20. With a view to forming and maintaining stability and ensuring an appropriate

response to the emergence of external threats at an early stage, limited contingents

of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be deployed in

strategically important regions outside the territory of the Russian Federation, in the

form of joint or national groups and individual bases (facilities). The conditions for

such deployment are defined by the appropriate international legal documents.

21. When mixed military formations of the CIS are created, they are manned by

servicemen of the member states in accordance with their national legislation and

the interstate agreements adopted. Servicemen who are citizens of the Russian

Federation serve in such formations, as a rule, under contract. Russian troop

formations located on the territory of foreign states, irrespective of the conditions

of deployment, form part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops

and operate in accordance with the procedure there established, taking into account

the requirements of the UN Charter, UN Security Council resolutions, and the

Russian Federation’s bilateral and multilateral treaties.

III. Military–Economic Principles

. . .

Military–Economic Provision for Military Security

. . .

4. The main principles of military–economic provision are:

— to bring the level of financial and material provision for the state’s military 

organization into line with the requirements of military security and the 

state’s resource potential;

— to focus financial, material, technical, and intellectual resources on 

resolving the key tasks of safeguarding military security;

— to provide state support for enterprises (production facilities) and 

institutions (organizations) determining the military–technical and 

technological stability of the defense–industry complex, factory–town 

enterprises, and closed administrative–territorial entities;

— to ensure scientific, technical, technological, information, and resource 

independence in the development and production of the main types of 

military output.

5. The basic guidelines for the mobilization preparation of the economy are: 

— the preparation of an economic management system to ensure stable 

functioning during the period of transition to work under martial law 

conditions and during wartime;

Military Doctrine

41
— the creation, improvement, and effective functioning of a system of 

mobilization preparation for organs of state power, as well as organizations 

and enterprises with mobilization missions;

— the optimization and development of the requisite mobilization capacity and

facilities;

— the creation, accumulation, preservation, and renewal of stockpiles of 

material resources in mobilization and state reserves;

— the creation and preservation of fallback stocks of design and technical 

documentation for wartime;

— the preservation and development of the economic facilities required for the

stable functioning of the economy and the population’s survival during 

wartime;

— the preparation of the financial, credit, and tax systems and the 

money–supply system for a special system of functioning under martial law

conditions;

— the development and improvement of the normative–legal base for 

mobilization preparation and the transition of the Russian Federation 

economy, Russian Federation components, and municipal formations to 

work in accordance with the established plans.

International Military (Military–Political) and 

Military–Technical Cooperation

6. The Russian Federation implements international military (military–political)

and military–technical cooperation on the basis of its own national interests and the

need to ensure the balanced performance of the missions of safeguarding military

security. International military (military–political) and military–technical

cooperation is the state’s prerogative.

7. The Russian Federation implements international military (military–political)

and military–technical cooperation on the basis of foreign–policy and economic

expediency and the missions of safeguarding the military security of the Russian

Federation and its allies, in accordance with federal legislation and the Russian

Federation’s international treaties, on the basis of the principles of equal rights,

mutual advantage, and good–neighborliness, and observing the interests of

international stability and national, regional, and global security.

8. The Russian Federation attaches priority importance to the development of

military (military–political) and military–technical cooperation with CIS Collective

Security Treaty states on the basis of the need to consolidate the efforts to create a

single defense area and safeguard collective military security. The Russian

Federation, reaffirming its fundamental adherence to the ideas of deterring

aggression, preventing wars and armed conflicts, and maintaining international

security and universal peace, guarantees the consistent and firm implementation of

the Military Doctrine.

Endnote

1. This is a shortened version of the original document, retaining the sections most relevant

to Dr. Arbatov's paper. A Russian text appeared in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 22, 

2000, pp. 5–6, and was translated by FBIS as CEP20000424000171, April 24, 2000. Text

and spellings reflect the Marshall Center format. 

Appendix A

42
Appendix B

Russia’s National Security Concept

(Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Decree of 10 January 2000)1

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation is a system of views

on how to ensure in the Russian Federation the security of the individual, society,

and state against external and internal threats in any aspect of life and activity. The

concept defines the most important directions of the state policy of the Russian

Federation. The national security of the Russian Federation is understood to mean

the security of its multinational people, in whom reside sovereignty and the sole

source of authority in the Russian Federation. 

I. Russia in the World Community

The situation in the world is characterized by a dynamic transformation of the

system of international relations. Following the end of the bipolar confrontation era,

two mutually–exclusive trends took shape. The first of these trends shows itself in

the strengthened economic and political positions of a significant number of states

and their integrative associations and in improved mechanisms for multilateral

management of international processes. Economic, political, scientific and

technological, environmental, and information factors are playing an

ever–increasing role. Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of

establishing a multipolar world on this basis. 

The second trend shows itself in attempts to create an international relations

structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international

community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (above all via

the use of military force) of key issues in world politics by circumventing the

fundamental rules of international law. The formation of international relations is

accompanied by competition and also by the aspiration of a number of states to

strengthen their influence on global politics, including by creating weapons of mass

destruction. Military force and coercion remain substantial aspects of international

relations. 

Russia is one of the world’s powers, with centuries of history and rich cultural

traditions. Despite the complex international situation and its own temporary

difficulties, Russia continues to play an important role in global processes by virtue

of its great economic, scientific, technological and military potential and its unique

strategic location on the Eurasian continent. There are prospects for the Russian

Federation’s broader integration into the world economy and for expanded

cooperation with international economic and financial institutions. The

commonality of interests of Russia and other states is objectively preserved in many

international security problems, including opposing the proliferation of mass

destruction weapons, settling and preventing regional conflicts, fighting

international terrorism and the drug trade, and resolving acute ecological problems

of a global nature, including providing for nuclear and radiation safety. 

National Security Concept

43
At the same time, a number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia

politically, economically, militarily and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s

interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict

situations, are capable of undermining international security and stability, and

hinder the positive changes achieved in international relations. 

Terrorism is transnational in nature and poses a threat to world stability. This

issue has been exacerbated sharply in many countries, including in the Russian

Federation, and to fight it requires unification of efforts by the entire international

community, increased effectiveness of existing ways of countering this threat, and

also urgent action to neutralize it. 

. . .

III. Threats to the Russian Federation’s National Security 

. . .

A weakened scientific and technological potential, reduction in research in

strategically–important areas of science and technology and departure abroad of

specialists and intellectual property mean that Russia is faced with the threat of loss

of its leading world positions, decay of its high–technology industries, increased

dependence on foreign technology and the undermining of its ability to defend

itself. 

Adverse trends in the economy lie at the root of the separatist aspirations of a

number of constituent parts of the Russian Federation. This leads to increased

political instability and a weakening of Russia’s unified economic domain and its

most important components–—industrial production, transportation links, and the

finance, banking, credit and tax systems. Economic disintegration, social

stratification and the dilution of spiritual values promote tension between regions

and the center and pose a threat to the federal structure and the socioeconomic

fabric of the Russian Federation. Ethno–egoism, ethnocentrism and chauvinism as

manifested in the activity of a number of public formations, and also uncontrolled

migration promote nationalism, political and religious extremism and

ethnoseparatism, and create a breeding ground for conflicts.

. . . 

Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the international sphere

can be seen in attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one

of the influential centres of a multipolar world, to hinder the exercise of its national

interests and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus,

Central Asia and the Asia–Pacific Region. 

Appendix B

44
Terrorism represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian

Federation. International terrorism is waging an open campaign to destabilize

Russia. 

There is an increased threat to the national security of the Russian Federation in

the information sphere. A serious danger arises from the desire of a number of

countries to dominate the global information domain space and to expel Russia

from the external and internal information market; from the development by a

number of states of “information warfare” concepts that entail creation of ways of

exerting a dangerous effect on other countries’ information systems, of disrupting

information and telecommunications systems and data storage systems, and of

gaining unauthorized access to them. 

The level and scope of military threats are growing. Elevated to the rank of

strategic doctrine, NATO’s transition to the practice of using military force outside

its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could

destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical advantage of

a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and

military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter

the forms and methods of warfare. 

Foreign special services and the organizations they use are increasing their

activity in the Russian Federation.

Adverse trends in the military sphere are being assisted by delays in reforming

the military and the defense industry of the Russian Federation, by inadequate

funding for defense and by a poor regulatory and legal framework. At the present

time, this can be seen in the critically low level of operational and combat training

in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and of the other troops and

militarized formations and agencies, and in the impermissible drop in equipment

stocks of the troops with modern armaments and military and special hardware, and

in the extreme acuteness of social problems; this leads to a weakening of the

military security of the Russian Federation as a whole. 

. . .

The threat of a deteriorating ecological situation in the country and depletion of

natural resources depends directly on the state of the economy and society’s

willingness to appreciate the global nature and importance of these issues. For

Russia this threat is especially great because of the dominating position in industry

of the fuel and energy sector, inadequate legislation for environmental protection,

lack or limited use of energy–saving technologies, and low environmental

awareness. There is a trend for Russia to be used as a place for reprocessing and

burying environmentally dangerous materials and substances. Against this 

background the weakening of state supervision and inadequate legal and economic

National Security Concept

45
levers for averting and relieving emergencies are increasing the risk of man–made

disasters in all sectors of the economy. 

IV. Ensuring the National Security of the Russian Federation 

The following are the principal tasks for ensuring the Russian Federation’s 

national security: 

— to promptly detect and identify external and internal threats to national 

security; 

— to take short– and long–term action to avert and remove internal and 

external threats; 

— to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation 

and the security of its border lands; 

— to improve the economy and pursue an independent and socially–oriented 

economic policy; 

— to overcome the Russian Federation’s scientific and technological 

dependence on external sources; 

— to ensure citizens’ personal security and constitutional rights and freedoms 

in Russia; 

— to improve the system of state power in the Russian Federation, the system 

of federal relations and local self–government and legislation; to create 

harmonious relations between communities, and to strengthen law and 

order and preserve socio–political stability in society; 

— to ensure unwavering compliance with Russian Federation legislation by all

citizens and officials, state bodies, political parties and public and religious 

organizations; 

— to ensure Russia’s cooperation, especially with the world’s leading 

countries, on equal and mutually advantageous terms; 

— to increase the state’s military potential and maintain it at a sufficient level; 

— to strengthen the regime of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons 

and their delivery vehicles; 

— to take effective action to identify, avert and intercept intelligence and 

subversive activities by foreign states against the Russian Federation; 

— to fundamentally improve the country’s ecological situation. 

. . .

Using the framework of international agreements, there must be effective

collaboration with foreign states and their law–enforcement and special agencies,

and also with international organizations tasked with fighting terrorism. Broad use

must be made of international experience of dealing with this phenomenon and

there must be a well–coordinated mechanism for countering international terrorism,

closing all available routes for illicit weapons and explosives within the country and

preventing their import from abroad. The federal state authorities should pursue

within the country persons involved in terrorism irrespective of where acts of

terrorism damaging to the Russian Federation were conceived or carried out. 

Appendix B

46
Assurance of the Russian Federation’s national security also includes protecting

the cultural and spiritual–moral legacy and the historical traditions and standards of

public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all Russia’s peoples. There must

be a state policy to maintain the population’s spiritual and moral welfare, prohibit

the use of airtime to promote violence or base instincts, and counter the adverse

impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries. 

A spiritual renewal of society is impossible without preserving the role of the

Russian language as a factor of spiritual unity of the people of a multinational

Russia and as the language of intercourse among CIS member states. 

. . .

The foreign policy of the Russian Federation should be designed to:

— pursue an active foreign–policy course; 

— strengthen key mechanisms, above all of the UN Security Council, for 

multilateral management of world political and economic processes; 

— ensure favorable conditions for the country’s economic and social 

development and for global and regional stability; 

— protect the lawful rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad, through the

use of political, economic and other measures; 

— develop relations with CIS member states in accordance with principles of 

international law, and developing integrative processes within the framework

of the CIS that meet Russia’s interests; 

— ensure Russia’s full–fledged involvement in global and regional economic 

and political structures; 

— assist in settling conflicts, including peacemaking activities under UN, OSCE

and CIS aegis; 

— achieve progress in nuclear arms control and maintain strategic stability in 

the world through states’ compliance with their international obligations in 

this respect; 

— fulfill mutual obligations to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass 

destruction and conventional arms, carrying out confidence– and 

stability–building measures, ensure international oversight of the export of 

goods and technologies and over the provision of military and dual–purpose

services; 

— adapt existing arms–control and disarmament agreements in line with the 

new climate in international relations, and also develop when necessary new

agreements especially for enhancing confidence– and security–building 

measures; 

— assist in establishing zones free of weapons of mass destruction; 

— develop international cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and

terrorism. 

. . .

National Security Concept

47
The following are crucial tasks for ensuring the Russian Federation’s information

security: 

— exercise of citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms in the sphere of 

information; 

— improvement and protection of the domestic information infrastructure and 

integration of Russia into the world information domain; 

— countering the threat of opposition in the information sphere. 

The use of intelligence and counterintelligence resources for the timely

discovery of threats and identification of their sources is of particular importance

when ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation. 

Endnote:

1. This is a shortened version of the original document. It retains the sections most relevant to

Dr. Arbatov's paper. A Russian text appeared in Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (Internet

Version), Moscow, January 14, 2000 and was translated by FBIS as LD1601160300. Text and

spellings reflect the Marshall Center format. 

Appendix B

48


The George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies

Dr. Robert Kennedy

Director

MG (Ret.) Franz Werner

German Deputy Director

Ambassador Victor Jackovich

Associate Director for International Affairs

College of International and Security Studies

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Dean

Dr. G. Paul Holman, Monograph Editor

Professor of National Security Studies

Ms. Jean Callaghan, Editorial Review

Research Program

Dr. Igor Zevelev, Editorial Review

Professor of Russian Studies

Ms. Sara C. Holman

Editor, Marshall Center Papers

Mr. Michael J. McNulty

Distribution
Alexei G. Arbatov

52

The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine:

Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya

by Alexei G. Arbatov, Deputy Chair of the Defense Committee,

Russian State Duma, Moscow

After an unprecedented decade of disarmament, de–targeting of

nuclear missiles, cooperation, and transparency in defense and

security matters between Russia and the United States, NATO's

attack on Serbia in 1999 ended the post-Cold War era. 

Dr. Arbatov provides an authoritative view of Russia's current

security position. Russian perceptions of the Kosovo conflict, as

well as lessons learned from their own war in Chechnya, have

transformed their highest official documents. The revised Military

Doctrine and National Security Concept reflect Russia's new

emphasis on nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use as the main

pillars of Russian security; robust conventional defense against a

"Balkan-type" attack by NATO; and regular employment of the

armed forces to deal with local, including domestic, conflicts. This

Marshall Center Paper not only examines the effects of Kosovo

and Chechnya, but also considers threats to national interests,

analyzes current military strategy, ponders the importance of arms

control agreements, and weighs several different options for

Russian force posture in the year 2010.

The Marshall Center Web Site:

http://www.marshallcenter.org

Designed and produced by VIB

July 20, 2000