Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

March 2006 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Improved Business 

Case Is Needed for 

Future Combat 

System’s Successful 

Outcome 

GAO-06-367 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-367.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-367, a report to 

congressional committees 

March 2006

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Improved Business Case Is Needed for 

Future Combat System's Successful 

Outcome 

The FCS entered the development phase in 2003 and has not yet reached the 

level of knowledge it should have attained in the pre-development stage. The 

elements of a sound business case—firm requirements, mature technologies, 

a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and 

sufficient funding—are still not demonstrably present. The Army will 

continue building basic knowledge in areas such as requirements and 

technologies for several more years. 

Requirements stability. The Army has reached agreement on FCS system 

of systems requirements—about 11,500—that help define how FCS units are 

expected to work as a whole. But the Army must continue to work out the 

technical feasibility and expected costs of the requirements for individual 

FCS systems. These requirements may not be completely stabilized until 

2008. Until then, the Army expects the system-level requirements to change 

and to make trade-offs to offset technical risks and cost. 

Technology maturity. None of FCS’s 49 critical technologies was at a level 

of maturity recommended by DOD policy at the start of a program. Some 

technologies may not reach full maturity until after production starts. Not 

having firm requirements matched with mature technologies at the start of 

development is a key indicator of program risk. Also, the Army is depending 

on 52 complementary programs, each of which is essential for FCS to 

perform as intended. Some of these programs have significant technical 

challenges; some do not have the funding needed to complete development. 

Soundness of acquisition strategy for design and production. The 

current acquisition strategy for FCS is improved over the original strategy 

but still calls for maturing technologies, designing systems, and preparing for 

production at the same time. Even if requirements and technologies proceed 

without incident, FCS design and production process maturity will not be 

demonstrated until after the production decision is made. Although 

production representative prototypes will not be available, the Army plans to 

test all FCS systems before committing to production. If problems are 

discovered in testing at that stage, they will be very expensive to correct. 

Reasonableness and affordability of program costs. The estimated cost 

of the FCS program now stands at $160.7 billion, a 76 percent increase since 

program start. This is a better estimate than the original, as it embodies a 

more realistic schedule and scope. Including the total investment for the 52 

essential complementary programs, the FCS program cost estimate would 

reach the $200 billion range. The Army has taken steps it believes will 

control FCS costs. Yet, the current level of knowledge about FCS is low, 

which makes it difficult to have a solid basis for cost projections. FCS’s longterm affordability depends on the accuracy of cost estimates, an increased 

level of procurement funding, and the level of competing demands. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

anticipates that the Future Combat 

System (FCS) will modernize the 

U.S. Army’s ability to move, shoot, 

and communicate on the 

battlefield. It is an impressive 

concept that is the product of 

holistic, non-traditional thinking. 

The Army describes FCS as one of 

the most complex weapon 

acquisition programs ever executed 

because it involves developing and 

integrating a family of 18 systems 

and an information network. Army 

leadership started the program 

early as part of its effort to change 

Army culture and believes that the 

program risks are manageable. 

GAO is required by law to review 

the program annually. In this 

report, GAO analyzes FCS’s 

acquisition business case and 

assesses requirements stability, 

technology maturity, soundness of 

the acquisition strategy, and 

reasonableness and affordability of 

program costs. 

What GAO Recommends

In order to improve the FCS’s 

business case, GAO is making 

recommendations to the Secretary 

of Defense that involve setting 

clear expectations for progress and 

evaluating that progress by 2008. 

DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendations. This report also 

contains matters for congressional 

consideration to ensure FCS has a 

sound business case before future 

funding commitments are made. 
Page i GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 4 

Army Has Made Progress but Feasibility and Affordability of 

System-level Requirements Remain Uncertain 10 

FCS Success Hinges on Numerous Undemonstrated Technologies 

and Complementary Programs 16 

FCS Acquisition Strategy Will Demonstrate Design Maturity After 

Production Begins 25 

As FCS’s Higher Costs Are Recognized, Funding Availability 

Becomes a Greater Challenge 29 

Conclusions 36 

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Matters for Congressional Consideration 39 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 43 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44 

Appendix III Critical Technologies’ Current Status and Projections 

for Reaching Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6) 47 

Appendix IV Technology Readiness Levels 49 

Related GAO Products 51 

Tables 

Table 1: Number of FCS Critical Technologies Sorted by TRLs 17 

Table 2: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost 

Estimate for FCS Program (in billions of then-year dollars) 29 

Table 3: Annual and Cumulative FCS Funding and Planned Events 

and Achievements 32 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Figures 

Figure 1: FCS’s Core Systems 5 

Figure 2: Flow of FCS’s Overarching Requirements to System-level 

Requirements 11 

Figure 3: Comparison of Projected Dates for Technology Maturity 18 

Figure 4: FCS Acquisition Compared with Commercial Best 

Practices’ Approach 26 

Figure 5: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost 

Estimate for FCS Program between Fiscal Years 2003 and 

2026 (in millions of then-year dollars) 30 

Figure 6: Comparison of FCS Budget with Total Army Procurement 

Budget (in billions of then-year dollars) 35 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

FCS Future Combat System 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

TRL technology readiness level 

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

March 14, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

The Department of the Army (Army) is in the midst of transforming itself 

into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force that will be 

better equipped to meet the defense challenges of the future. One of the 

centerpieces of the Army’s transformation is the Future Combat System 

(FCS), a weapon systems acquisition program that embraces a new 

concept of operations, new technologies, and a new information network 

of numerous ground and air vehicles, sensors, and munitions. The Army 

itself calls this the “greatest technology and integration challenge the Army 

has ever undertaken.” The FCS concept demonstrates the Army’s desire to 

be proactive in preparing for the changing scope of modern warfare. When 

factoring in other Army programs needed to deliver FCS’s full capability, 

the total investment costs are on the order of $200 billion. Spending of this 

magnitude has drawn attention in Congress because the nation is facing a 

large and growing deficit. Fiscal realities are putting pressure on the Army 

and the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD) to take a hard look at 

how it is managing its resources for weapon acquisition programs, such as 

FCS. 

Given the Army’s challenges to date and the cost and scope of the FCS 

program, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 

requires GAO to report annually on the product development phase of the 

FCS’s acquisition. Congressional Committees and GAO agreed that this 

report should analyze FCS against the basic elements of an acquisition 

business case, namely: (1) firmness of requirements, (2) maturity of 

critical technologies, (3) soundness of the acquisition strategy as it relates 

to design and production, and (4) reasonableness and affordability of 

program costs. 

In conducting our work, we have contacted numerous DOD and Army 

offices. We reviewed many documents pertaining to the FCS program, 

attended meetings at which DOD and Army officials reviewed program 

progress, and we held discussions with key DOD and Army officials on 

various aspects of the program. Officials from DOD and the Army have 

provided us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments 

on the matters in this report. In addition, we drew from our large body of 

past work on weapon systems acquisition practices. We reviewed DOD’s 

acquisition policy, the experiences of successful and unsuccessful DOD 

programs, and the best acquisition practices of leading commercial firms. 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

We performed our work from June 2005 to March 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I further 

discusses our scope and methodology. 

Today, about one-third of the way and $4.7 billion through FCS’s 

development, the Army does not yet have the level of knowledge—such as 

firm requirements and mature technologies—it needed three years ago 

when it began product development. Army leadership started the program 

early as part of an overall effort to change the culture of the Army and 

believes that the risks in the program are manageable. While progress has 

been made and efforts are continuing in the requirements and 

technologies areas, the Army has not yet fulfilled the basic elements of a 

sound business case for a weapon system acquisition, including firm 

requirements, mature technologies, a sound strategy for attaining design 

and production maturity, realistic program cost estimates, and sufficient 

funding. 

The Army has made significant progress defining the initial FCS system of 

systems requirements, having reached agreement on nearly 11,500. 

However, FCS requirements are not yet matched with program resources 

because the Army still faces the daunting task of defining about 90,000 

more requirements for FCS’s 18 individual systems. Although firm 

requirements should have been established at the start of the program, the 

process of setting and refining FCS system-level requirements may not be 

complete until 2008. The initial system-level requirements defined to date 

are likely to change as technical feasibility and expected costs of the 

system-level requirements become clearer. The Army plans to trade off 

system requirements to offset technical risks and cost, but this flexibility is 

not unlimited as FCS overall capabilities are still expected to be as good as 

or better than those of the current Army forces in terms of lethality, 

survivability, responsiveness, and sustainability. 

None of the FCS’s 49 critical technologies were at an acceptable level of 

maturity1

 when the product development began. Since the FCS program 

began, projected dates for maturing critical technologies have slipped, and 

some technologies are not expected to mature until very late—well into 

 1

 According to DOD policy, technology maturity means a technology must have been 

demonstrated in a relevant environment (or, preferably, in an operational environment) 

and considered mature enough to use for product development in systems integration. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

the design phases of the program and possibly into production. Other 

challenges have arisen as well. Several of 52 complementary systems 

considered essential to FCS may not be able to complete development 

when needed. Some of these programs have not yet been fully funded, and 

others are facing their own technical challenges. For example, the Joint 

Tactical Radio System could be a deciding factor in FCS’s overall success, 

but it is being restructured because of significant development problems. 

The FCS acquisition strategy is not knowledge-based: the strategy calls for 

maturing technologies, designing systems, and preparing for production 

concurrently. Even if requirements definition and technology maturity 

proceed without incident, FCS design and production maturity will not be 

demonstrated under the current acquisition strategy until after the 

production decision is made. At this point, the critical design review is 

planned for the seventh year in a nine-year development, leaving little time 

to demonstrate the design will work as intended before the scheduled 

decision to begin production. In fact, the Army does not plan to build and 

test production-representative prototypes before committing to low-rate 

initial production. Design integration promises to be a major challenge, 

particularly for FCS’s manned ground vehicles, which have been likened in 

sophistication to fighter aircraft. The late accumulation of design and 

production knowledge called for by the FCS acquisition strategy increases 

the likelihood that problems will be discovered in late development and 

early production, when the costs of fixes will be very high. 

The low level of knowledge available today on requirements and 

technologies makes FCS cost projections very uncertain. Costs of the FCS 

program are estimated at $160.7 billion—an increase of 76 percent since 

the program began. The growth is attributable, in part, to the restructuring 

that increased the program’s scope and extended the development 

schedule by four years. The projected costs also rose as program 

managers attained more knowledge about system of systems 

requirements. While the latest estimate may be better than earlier 

estimates, the essential complementary programs are not included. 

Including the costs of these programs would bring the required total 

investment to the $200 billion range. DOD has not yet prepared an 

independent estimate to validate the Army’s current cost estimate. The 

Army is taking steps to control the costs of the program, but these steps 

may require changing or eliminating some requirements. The long-term 

affordability of FCS depends on the soundness of several key assumptions, 

including the accuracy of the cost estimate, the overall level of 

development and procurement funding available to the Army, and the level 

of competing demands. 
Page 4 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

We are making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to 

take a number of actions, prior to DOD’s long-term commitment to the 

program, to improve the FCS business case and establish knowledgebased measures to guide oversight of FCS progress. DOD concurred with 

the intent of our recommendations; however, it did not agree to limit its 

commitment to the FCS program or to do much beyond what it had 

already planned to do. As a result, this report also contains matters for 

congressional consideration to ensure FCS has a sound business case 

before future funding commitments are made. 

The FCS concept is part of a pervasive change toward what the Army 

refers to as the Future Force. The Army is reorganizing its current forces 

into modular brigade combat teams, meaning troops can be deployed on 

different rotational cycles as a single team or as a cluster of teams. The 

Future Force is designed to transform the Army into a more rapidly 

deployable and responsive force and enables the Army to move away from 

the large division-centric structure of the past. Each FCS brigade combat 

team is expected to be highly survivable and the most lethal brigade-sized 

unit the Army has ever fielded. The Army expects FCS-equipped brigade 

combat teams to provide significant warfighting capabilities to DOD’s 

overall joint military operations. The Army is implementing its 

transformation plans at a time when current U.S. ground forces are playing 

a critical role in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The FCS family of weapons includes 18 manned and unmanned ground 

vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an 

information network. The systems include 

• eight new types of manned ground vehicles to replace current tanks, 

infantry carriers, and self-propelled howitzers; 

• four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles; 

• several unmanned ground vehicles; and 

• an attack missile. 

At a fundamental level, the FCS concept is to replace mass with superior 

information—that is, to see and hit the enemy first rather than to rely on 

heavy armor to withstand a hit. This solution attempts to address the 

mismatch that has posed a dilemma to the Army for decades. The Army’s 

heavy forces had the necessary firepower but required extensive support 

and too much time to deploy. Its light forces could deploy rapidly but 

lacked firepower. If the Future Force becomes a reality, then the Army 

would be better organized, staffed, equipped, and trained for prompt and 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

sustained land combat. This is expected to translate into a force that is 

responsive, technologically advanced, and versatile. These qualities are 

intended to ensure the Future Force’s long-term dominance over evolving, 

sophisticated threats. The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and 

will employ revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new 

technology. The Army envisions a new way of fighting that depends on 

networking the force, which involves linking people, platforms, weapons, 

and sensors seamlessly together in a system of systems. 

Figure 1: FCS’s Core Systems 

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 6 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

If successful, the FCS system of systems concept will leverage individual 

capabilities of weapons and platforms and will facilitate interoperability 

and open system designs. This would be a significant improvement over 

the traditional approach of building superior individual weapons that must 

be retrofitted and netted together after the fact. This transformation, in 

terms of both operations and equipment, is under way with the full 

cooperation of the Army warfighter community. In fact, the development 

and acquisition of FCS is being accomplished using a uniquely 

collaborative relationship between the Army’s developers, the 

participating contractors, and the warfighter community. 

The Army has employed a management approach that centers on a lead 

systems integrator. Although there is no complete consensus on the 

definition of a lead systems integrator, those we are aware of appear to be 

prime contractors with increased program management responsibilities. 

These responsibilities have included greater involvement in requirements 

development, design, and source selection of major system and subsystem 

subcontractors. Boeing is the lead systems integrator for the FCS system 

development and demonstration phase of acquisition. The FCS lead 

systems integrator acts on behalf of the Army to optimize the FCS 

capability, maximize competition, ensure interoperability, and maintain 

commonality in order to reduce life cycle costs. The Army advised us that 

it did not believe it had the resources or flexibility to use its traditional 

acquisition process to field a program as complex as FCS under the 

aggressive timeline established by the then-Army Chief of Staff. The Army 

will maintain oversight and final approval of the lead systems integrator’s 

subcontracting and competition plans. 

As a key element of its efforts to transform itself, the Army has recognized 

FCS from its outset as the greatest technology and integration challenge it 

has ever undertaken. In May 2003, DOD approved the FCS program to 

begin the system development and demonstration phase, a milestone that 

ideally marks the completion of technology development and the start of 

product development. However, FCS’s entry into this phase was 

premature given that the program had failed to satisfy basic tenets of DOD 

acquisition policy. We have reported that, as FCS started product 

development, it did not have mature technologies or adequately defined 

requirements. 

Responding to direction from the Army Chief of Staff, the Army 

announced in July 2004 its plans to restructure the FCS program. The 

Army added four years to develop and mature the manned ground 

FCS Restructures the 

Program and Changes 

Contracting Approach 
Page 7 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

vehicles, added more demonstrations and experiments, and established an 

evaluation unit to demonstrate FCS capabilities. The restructuring 

reintroduced four systems that previously had been left unfunded, raising 

the total number of FCS-related systems to 18. The restructure also 

included plans to spin off mature FCS capabilities as they become 

available to current force units. With the restructuring, the FCS program 

now plans to achieve initial operational capability in fiscal year 2015 and 

full operational capability in fiscal year 2017. FCS low-rate production is 

expected to start in fiscal year 2012, and full-rate production in fiscal year 

2016. The Army intends to continue FCS procurement through fiscal year 

2025, eventually equipping 15 brigade combat teams. 

The restructuring was not the only major modification to the FCS 

program. Because of congressional concerns that the Army’s contracting 

approach incorporated insufficient safeguards to protect the government’s 

interests, the Army is preparing a new contract that is to be completed and 

finalized in March 2006 and is based on the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation, which governs acquisitions within the federal government. The 

new contract will incorporate standard Federal Acquisition Regulation 

clauses such as those relating to procurement integrity, Truth in 

Negotiations, and Cost Accounting Standards. Previously, the lead systems 

integrator had been performing FCS work for the Army under a 

contractual instrument called an “other transaction agreement” that was 

not subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The other transaction 

agreement gave the Army considerable flexibility to negotiate the terms 

and conditions for contractors involved in FCS development. The Army’s 

purpose for using such an agreement was to encourage innovation and to 

use its wide latitude in tailoring business, organizational, and technical 

relationships to achieve the program goals. In April 2005, the Army 

decided to incorporate into its agreement the procurement integrity, Truth 

in Negotiations, and Cost Accounting Standards clauses from the 

regulation. 

After the Congress raised questions about the Army using an other 

transaction agreement for the development of a program as large and risky 

as FCS and about the Army’s choice not to include standard Federal 

Acquisition Regulation clauses in the agreement, the Secretary of the Army 

directed that the other transaction agreement be converted to a Federal 
Page 8 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Acquisition Regulation-based contract. 2 All of the work performed under 

the product development phase as of September 2005 will be accounted 

for under the prior other transaction agreement, and all work after 

September 2005 will be performed under the new contract. The Army 

expects the content of the program—its statement of work—will remain 

largely the same, and it does not expect the cost, schedule, and 

performance of the overall development effort to change materially. 

We have frequently reported on the importance of using a solid, 

executable business case before committing resources to a new product 

development effort. In the case of DOD, a business case should be based 

on DOD acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial 

firms and successful DOD programs. The business case in its simplest 

form is demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter’s needs are valid 

and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen 

concept can be developed and produced within existing resources—that 

is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and 

adequate time to deliver the product when it is needed. A program should 

not go forward into product development unless a sound business case 

can be made. If the business case measures up, the organization commits 

to the development of the product, including making the financial 

investment. 

At the heart of a business case is this knowledge-based approach to 

product development that is both a best practice among leading 

commercial firms and the approach preferred by DOD in its acquisition 

regulations. For a program to deliver a successful product within available 

resources, managers should demonstrate high levels of knowledge before 

significant commitments are made. In essence, knowledge supplants risk 

over time. This building of knowledge can be described as three levels or 

knowledge points that should be attained over the course of a program: 

• First, at program start, the customer’s needs should match the 

developer’s available resources—mature technologies, time, and 

funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of 

the technologies needed to meet customer needs. The ability of the 

 2

 In Section 212 of the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Authorization Act, the Congress also 

stipulated that the Secretary of the Army procure the FCS through a Federal Acquisition 

Regulation contract. 

Elements of a Business 

Case 
Page 9 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

government acquisition workforce to properly manage the effort 

should also be an important consideration at program start. 

• Second, about midway through development, the product’s design 

should be stable and demonstrate that it is capable of meeting 

performance requirements. The critical design review is the vehicle for 

making this determination and generally signifies the point at which the 

program is ready to start building production-representative 

prototypes. 

• Third, by the time of the production decision, the product must be 

shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and 

have demonstrated its reliability. It is also the point at which the design 

must demonstrate that it performs as needed through realistic systemlevel testing. 

The three knowledge points are related in that a delay in attaining one 

delays the points that follow. Thus, if the technologies needed to meet 

requirements are not mature, design and production maturity will be 

delayed. On the successful commercial and defense programs we have 

reviewed, managers were careful to conduct development of technology 

separately from and ahead of the development of the product. For this 

reason, the first knowledge point is the most important for improving the 

chances of developing a weapon system within cost and schedule 

estimates. DOD’s acquisition policy has adopted the knowledge-based 

approach to acquisitions. DOD policy requires program managers to 

provide knowledge about certain aspects of a system at key points in the 

acquisition process. Program managers are also required to reduce 

integration risk and demonstrate product design prior to the design 

readiness review and to reduce manufacturing risk and demonstrate 

producibility prior to full-rate production. 

The FCS program is about one-third of the way into its scheduled product 

development. At this stage, it should have attained knowledge point one, 

with a strategy for attaining knowledge points two and three. Accordingly, 

we analyze the FCS business case first as it pertains to firming 

requirements and maturing technologies, which indicate progress against 

the first knowledge point. We then analyze FCS’s strategy for attaining 

design and production maturity. Finally, we analyze the costs and funding 

estimates made to execute the FCS business case. 
Page 10 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

The Army has made significant progress defining FCS’s system of systems 

requirements, particularly when taking into account the daunting number 

of requirements involved—nearly 11,500—at this level. Yet system-level 

requirements are not yet stabilized and will continue to change, 

postponing the needed match between requirements and resources. Now, 

the Army and its contractors are working to complete the definition of 

system-level requirements, and the challenge is in determining if those 

requirements are technically feasible and affordable. Army officials say it 

is almost certain that some FCS system-level requirements will have to be 

modified, reduced, or eliminated; the only uncertainty is by how much. We 

have previously reported that unstable requirements can lead to cost, 

schedule, and performance shortfalls. Once the Army gains a better 

understanding of the technical feasibility and affordability of the systemlevel requirements, trade-offs between the developer and the warfighter 

will have to be made, and the ripple effect of such trade-offs on key 

program goals will have to be reassessed. 

The Army has completed an FCS operational requirements document, a 

mandatory step in the DOD acquisition process. This document outlines 

552 requirements intended to meet the warfighter’s needs and discusses 

the characteristics needed for the FCS-equipped brigade combat teams to 

achieve the Army’s desired tactical concepts and capabilities. 3 FCS is 

described in this document as a family of systems comprising advanced, 

networked air- and ground-based maneuver, maneuver support, and 

sustainment systems. The program has seven key performance 

parameters: network-ready, networked battle command, networked 

lethality, transportability, sustainability/reliability, training, and 

survivability. In simpler terms, the Army has stated that the FCS-equipped 

brigade combat teams must be as good as or better than current Army 

forces in terms of lethality, responsiveness, sustainability, and 

survivability. Since the FCS program started in May 2003, the Army and the 

lead systems integrator have been working to translate those warfighter 

requirements first into system of systems requirements at the FCS level. 

Having this information in hand gives the Army a good understanding of 

what FCS brigade combat teams should be capable of, but more detailed 

knowledge is needed for each of the 18 individual systems. Now, the Army 

 3

 The Army’s concept for future warfighting is documented in The United States Army 

Future Combat Force Operational and Organizational Plan for the Future Combat 

System Brigade Combat Team. The FCS operational requirements document was derived 

from the operational and organizational plan. 

Army Has Made 

Progress but 

Feasibility and 

Affordability of 

System-level 

Requirements Remain 

Uncertain 

Army Has Largely 

Completed the Definition 

of FCS System of Systems 

Requirements 
Page 11 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

and the lead systems integrator are delving much deeper and more 

precisely to translate system of systems requirements into more specific 

requirements for individual systems within FCS. Figure 2 illustrates how 

the requirements laid out in the operational requirements document flow 

down to the FCS’s system of systems and later to the individual system 

level. 

Figure 2: Flow of FCS’s Overarching Requirements to System-level Requirements 

During the requirements definition process, the Army, its lead systems 

integrator, and other contractors provided feedback on the feasibility of 

the requirements being proposed. The feedback sometimes resulted in 

several rounds of negotiations and trade-offs before requirements could be 

finalized. For example, the Army has invested much time and effort in 

deciding how best to meet the FCS transportability requirements while 

continuing to meet its lethality and survivability requirements. A series of 

design concepts were used to examine the possibilities, and the Army and 

the lead systems integrator have conducted numerous design trade 

studies. Since program start, the Army has made a number of design tradeNet ready

Networked battle command

Networked lethality

Transportability

Sustainability/reliability

Training

Survivability

552 requirements

7 key performance parameters

·

· 11, 500 Requirements with 

threshold and objective 

values

Brigade combat team 

functionality

·

· ·

·

·

·

·

·

·

8 types of Manned Ground Vehicles

4 types of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

1 unattended sensor

2 unattended munitions

3 types of Unmanned Ground Vehicles

Information network

Soldier systems

Training systems

Logistics systems

Plus complementary 

and associated programs

System and platform

functionality ·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

Done

FCS operational

requirements document

System of systems

requirements

System-level

requirements

Hardware subsystems

Software subsystems

Done Not done Not done

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
Page 12 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

offs that have been incorporated into the current design concepts. For 

example, the current manned ground vehicle design concepts feature a 

basic, lightly armored vehicle (each weighing about 19 tons) and 

additional armor (bringing the total vehicle weight up to about 24 tons). 

This trade-off was intended to achieve an acceptable level of survivability 

while maintaining a limited capability for the vehicles to be transported on 

the C-130 Hercules air lifter. The Army also decided to accept a higher 

weight to achieve the lethality of the 120-mm cannon for the mounted 

combat system. Finally, the Army decided to accept a reduction in range 

inherent in the lighter weight 38-caliber 155-mm cannon for the non-lineof-sight cannon vehicle. 

In August 2005, the Army and the lead systems integrator conducted the 

System of Systems Functional Review, which is a multi-disciplined 

technical review used to ensure that a system can proceed into 

preliminary design. The review is conducted to ensure that all system of 

systems requirements have been defined and are consistent with program 

budget, schedule, risk, and other constraints. The Army and the lead 

systems integrator demonstrated that they had (1) essentially completed 

the definition of the system of systems level requirements, (2) established 

the functional baseline for the program, and (3) made an initial allocation 

of functional requirements down to the individual FCS system level. As 

shown in figure 2 above, at the system of systems level, there are about 

11,500 requirements. The Army anticipates that there eventually could be 

eight times the number of requirements at the FCS system level, or roughly 

90,000 requirements. 

For the System of Systems Functional Review, the Army prepared a 

number of performance evaluations, including assessments of the entire 

brigade combat team’s capabilities as well as more focused evaluations of 

individual FCS design concepts or requirements. The Army is conducting 

performance evaluations while continuing to evaluate requirement tradeoffs and refine system-level requirements. These evaluations will be 

valuable in understanding the impact of individual requirement trade-off 

decisions on FCS capabilities as well as the Army’s pledge that FCS would 

be as good as or better than the current Army forces in terms of lethality, 

survivability, responsiveness and sustainability. 

The Army deserves credit for having decided on so many requirements at 

the system of systems level and for beginning the process allocating 

functional requirements to the individual system level. However, 

according to DOD policy and best practices, requirements should be 

FCS System-Level 

Requirements Are Not Yet 

Firm 
Page 13 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

firmed up at the beginning of the product development phase. System 

requirements—how big, how heavy, how fast, how strong—can each be 

expressed in multiple ways. In deciding how best to address those systemlevel requirements, trade-offs may be necessary. Ideally, solutions go 

through a prioritization and refinement process before final decisions can 

be agreed upon. But continuing to define and refine system-level 

requirements three years after product development began creates a real 

challenge for the other elements of the FCS business case. 

Signs of instability in FCS system-level requirements are already evident. 

At the System of Systems Functional Review, an initial assessment was 

made of the technical feasibility of the functional requirements allocated 

to the individual FCS systems. While many are expected to be achievable, 

there would be technical risk in the full achievement of some system-level 

requirements including 

• mine detection; 

• automatic target recognition for weapon terminal guidance; 

• real-time battle damage assessment; 

• chemical and radiation detection; 

• weapon self-loading for some of the unmanned ground vehicles; 

• manned ground vehicle countermine capabilities; 

• safe operation of unmanned ground vehicles; 

• network latency, quality of service, and intrusion detection; 

• improvised explosive device detection and suppression; 

• reliability, availability, maintainability, and testing; 

• unmanned air vehicle size and weight; 

• hidden target detection; and 

• sensor data fusion. 

The Army’s System of Systems Functional Review also underscored how 

critical the FCS information network is to the achieving of many of FCS’s 

requirements. For example, FCS survivability depends on the brigade-wide 

availability of network-based situational awareness plus the inherent 

survivability of the FCS platforms. There is hardly any aspect of FCS 

functionality that is not predicated on the network, and for many key 

functions, the network is essential. As we will discuss later in this report, 

there is considerable technical uncertainty surrounding several key 

aspects of the FCS network. 

In the coming months, FCS teams working on individual systems will 

continue to evaluate the technical feasibility of addressing the allocated 

requirements within their current design concepts. Program officials also 
Page 14 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

will be conducting functional reviews at the system level. According to 

Army officials, it is almost certain that some of the FCS system-level 

requirements will have to be changed; it is only uncertain by how much. 

The Army does have the ability to reallocate a requirement from one 

system to another. The Army plans to evaluate its progress in defining and 

refining FCS system-level requirements at the August 2006 initial 

preliminary design review, which signals the start of the systems 

engineering process as well as the beginning of preliminary design work. 

However, the Army may not have a stabilized set of technically feasible 

and affordable system-level requirements until 2008. 

Concurrently, the system-level teams will be evaluating the affordability of 

fully developing and producing each of the FCS systems and platforms to 

meet the allocated requirements. The Army has stated it will not exceed 

the target cost of $20.9 billion for the lead systems integrator’s 

development contract and will attempt to produce the FCS systems and 

platforms within specific procurement cost targets. Key FCS program 

officials have indicated to us that additional system-level requirements 

changes will be needed to meet these targets. 

Applying the discipline of affordability is a good step, but it can make the 

requirement definition process more difficult. For example, to meet the 

weight goals for the manned ground vehicles, the Army expects to use 

advanced, light weight materials, such as ceramics, rather than traditional 

steel for armor protection. However, these materials are expected to be 

much more costly to produce than steel. To meet the individual manned 

ground vehicle’s survivability requirements, each vehicle will have to be 

equipped for detection avoidance, target acquisition avoidance, hit 

avoidance, ballistic protection, and kill avoidance. Further, each manned 

ground vehicle would have to carry sensors that can detect, classify, 

recognize, identify, and locate enemy combatants. All of these capabilities 

will add to the cost of developing and producing the manned ground 

vehicles. Finally, the FCS concept depends, among other things, on the 

capabilities of the unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned air vehicles 

to enhance the survivability of the rest of the brigade combat team. 

However, a high number of unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned air 

vehicles themselves are expected to be lost to enemy fire. In the end, the 

Army may have to either provide additional unmanned ground vehicles 

and/or unmanned air vehicles or risk the loss of even more valuable 

manned ground vehicles and soldiers. Either option would involve 

additional costs. 
Page 15 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Since the start of the program, the Army has already made some 

requirements trade-offs. The Army realizes that the ripple effects of 

requirements trade-offs on the anticipated FCS capabilities will need to be 

thoroughly assessed to determine if the fundamental tenets of the 

program—such as being as lethal and survivable as the current Army 

force—are still intact. For example, in deciding to maintain a requirement 

for the manned ground vehicles to be transportable on C-130 aircraft, the 

Army determined that the vehicles could still meet their survivability and 

lethality requirements while meeting the size and weight restrictions 

needed to be compatible with the C-130 operating limitations. This 

solution involves, in part, the use of additional armor that would be put on 

the vehicle after it had been flown by a C-130 to its new operating location. 

The Army made this decision with the knowledge that the C-130 aircraft's 

capability to transport the FCS vehicles would be very limited and that the 

solution would require more C-130s to transport vehicles than previously 

planned. Also, as we pointed out in our March 2005 testimony, the 

development and integration of manned ground vehicle technologies was 

made vastly more difficult by the Army's decision to retain the C-130 

transportability requirement. As the FCS development effort proceeds, the 

Army will have to regularly assess whether the manned ground vehicles 

will still be able to meet their lethality, survivability, and other 

requirements as well as the assumed operational value of maintaining the 

C-130 transportability requirement. Decision makers need to be kept 

informed on the status of the program’s basic tenets, such as FCS 

capabilities being as good as or better than those of current Army forces. 

As the technical feasibility and affordability of requirements are better 

understood, additional FCS requirements trade-offs will have to be made 

and their ripple effects identified. For example, if the requirements for 

FCS missile and munition terminal guidance are changed due to feasibility 

or cost issues, that may not have an impact only on lethality, but also on 

overall FCS survivability because the Army maintains that FCS 

survivability will be enhanced if it is able to see first and kill first. Also, if 

the FCS weapon terminal guidance requirements are changed, the brigade 

combat teams may have to carry and use more weapons than expected, 

which would have an impact on the team’s sustainability. As another 

example, if the FCS countermine requirements are changed, then FCS 

manned ground vehicles may be less survivable and mobile. The Army 

may have to add additional armor to the manned ground vehicles, directly 

affecting their weight and impacting their transportability and 

sustainability. Finally, if the reliability, availability, maintainability, and 

testing requirements are adjusted, the brigade combat teams may have to 

Cumulative Effects of 

Individual Requirement 

Trade-Offs Must Be 

Measured 
Page 16 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

carry more spare parts and use more maintenance personnel than 

originally anticipated. 

The Army is aiming to field FCS systems and platforms that meet all of its 

minimally acceptable threshold requirements, but according to program 

officials, that may not be possible for all requirements. Further, it is 

unclear at this point if the resulting set of system-level requirements will 

yield an overall FCS capability that will be acceptable to the Army as a 

whole and its user representative, the Training and Doctrine Command. 

The Training and Doctrine Command has had extensive involvement in the 

program to date and would have to approve any major changes in FCS 

requirements. At the System of Systems Functional Review, the Training 

and Doctrine Command representatives pledged their continuing 

cooperation in the process but also vowed to appeal to the Army 

leadership if the FCS design concepts do not provide sufficient capabilities 

to meet their wartime needs. 

According to the latest independent assessment,4

 the Army has not fully 

matured any of the technologies critical to FCS’s success. Some of FCS’s 

critical technologies may not reach a high level of maturity until the final 

major phase of acquisition, the start of production. The Army considers a 

lower level of demonstration as acceptable maturity, but even against this 

standard, only one-third of the technologies are mature. We have reported 

that proceeding into product development without demonstrating mature 

technologies increases the risk of cost growth and schedule delays 

throughout the life of the program. The Army is also facing challenges with 

several of the complementary programs considered essential for meeting 

FCS’s requirements. Some complementary programs are experiencing 

technology difficulties, and some have not been fully funded. These 

difficulties underscore the gap between requirements and available 

resources that must be closed if the FCS business case is to be executable. 

Technology readiness levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to 

determine whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be 

incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has found TRLs to be 

 4 Technology Readiness Assessment Update, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Research and Technology, April 2005. 

FCS Success Hinges 

on Numerous 

Undemonstrated 

Technologies and 

Complementary 

Programs 

Critical Technologies Are a 

Long Way from Reaching 

Maturity 
Page 17 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

a valuable decision-making tool because they can presage the likely 

consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity 

into a product development. The maturity level of a technology can range 

from paper studies (level 1), to prototypes that can be tested in a realistic 

environment (level 7), to an actual system that has proven itself in mission 

operations (level 9). The definitions of each TRL can be found in appendix 

IV. According to DOD acquisition policy, a technology should have been 

demonstrated in a relevant environment (TRL 6) or, preferably, in an 

operational environment (TRL 7) to be considered mature enough to use 

for product development in systems integration. Best practices of leading 

commercial firms and successful DOD programs have shown that critical 

technologies should be mature to at least a TRL 7 before the start of 

product development. 

In the case of the FCS program, the latest independent technology 

assessment shows that none of the critical technologies are at TRL 7, and 

only 18 of the 49 technologies currently rated have demonstrated TRL 6. 

None of the critical technologies may reach TRL 7 until the production 

decision in fiscal year 2012, according to Army officials. Five technologies 

that the Army previously considered to be critical to FCS are no longer 

being monitored for technology maturity, although those technologies 

continue to be under development by either the Army or another military 

service. Table 1 sorts FCS’s critical technologies according to readiness 

levels, and their progression over the last two years. 

Table 1: Number of FCS Critical Technologies Sorted by TRLs 

TRL 

Critical technology 

assessment as of April 2003 

Critical technology 

assessment as of April 2005

TRL 7 and higher 1 0

TRL 6 7 18

TRL 5 and lower 24 31

Total 32 49

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation) 

Note: The April 2003 assessment was organized into 31 technology areas, one of which had two 

different TRL ratings for separate technologies. For the April 2005 assessment, the original 31 

technology areas were subdivided into 54 individual technologies. Five of the original technologies 

are no longer being tracked, leaving a total of 49. 

Projected dates for FCS technologies to reach TRL 6 have slipped 

significantly since the start of the program, as shown in figure 3. 
Page 18 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Figure 3: Comparison of Projected Dates for Technology Maturity 

In the 2003 technology assessment, 87 percent of FCS’s critical 

technologies were projected to be mature to a TRL 6 by 2005. In April 

2005, 31 percent of the technologies were expected to mature to a TRL 6 

by 2005, and all technologies are not expected to be mature to that level 

until 2009. Several key technologies have slipped. For example, to meet 

FCS survivability and sustainability requirements, the Army requires High 

Density Packaged Power, a technology designed to provide high-output, 

constant-level, stored power to the FCS manned ground vehicles. This 

technology was originally projected to reach TRL 6 maturity by fiscal year 

2003. In the latest assessment, however, that date slipped nearly five years 

to fiscal year 2008. Another technology, Quality of Service Algorithms, 

which are protocols implemented in network software and used to 

determine how information is moved and tracked to users, was originally 

expected to reach TRL 6 by fiscal year 2004, but now projected maturity 

has slipped three years. The Army originally anticipated the Lightweight 

Hull and Vehicle Armor to reach TRL 6 by fiscal year 2003; however, this 

has been delayed by five years. Appendix III lists all 54 critical 

technologies, their current TRL status, and the projected date for reaching 

TRL 6. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Percentage at TRL 6

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Years

April 2003 assessment

April 2005 assessment
Page 19 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

FCS features eight types of manned ground vehicles, each requiring the 

development of numerous technologies that must be brought together in 

an integrated design to deliver required capabilities. The Mounted Combat 

System will require a newly developed lightweight weapon for lethality; a 

hybrid electric drive system and a high-density engine for mobility; 

advanced armors, an active protection system, and advanced signature 

management systems for survivability; and the Joint Tactical Radio System 

with the wideband networking waveform for communications and 

network connectivity. FCS manned ground vehicles are expected to be 

revolutionary, not only because of their proposed capabilities but also in 

terms of their size and weight. They have been likened in complexity to 

fighter aircraft. Under other circumstances, each of the eight manned 

ground systems would be a major defense acquisition program in its own 

right. 

Since 2003, the Army has been working to develop a series of design 

concepts and is currently evaluating the technical feasibility and 

affordability of the system-level requirements that have been allocated to 

each of the eight vehicles. By August 2006, the Army expects to decide 

which of those requirements will be pursued in the preliminary design, and 

which ones will have to be changed or deleted. Among many others, the 

achievement of the following manned ground vehicles requirements have 

been identified as involving technical and design challenges: 

• engine, 

• silent watch (which relates to battery capacity), 

• 14.5-mm survivability, 

• signature management, 

• lightweight track, and 

• power distribution. 

As we noted earlier, several critical technologies are not projected to 

mature to a TRL 6 until fiscal year 2008 or 2009, at or around the point 

when the program should be starting detailed designs for each vehicle. 

Further, it should be noted that the step to mature technologies from a 

TRL 6 to a TRL 7 is often difficult and unpredictable. All told, the Army is 

unlikely to be able to match requirements with technical and design 

solutions until at least fiscal year 2008. 

Technology and 

Integration Challenges for 

Manned Ground Vehicles 
Page 20 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

In addition, manned ground vehicles face several technology and 

integration challenges. 

• The Active Protection System is expected to protect manned ground 

vehicles by sensing and destroying such threats as incoming tank 

rounds and rocket-propelled grenades. However, technology 

assessments have recognized that (1) it may not be possible to have a 

single, integrated active protection system that protects against all 

threats, (2) the Threat Warning System, a technology used to detect 

and track incoming threats at extended ranges, will not be mature to 

TRL 6 until fiscal 2009, (3) the part of the system to defeat kinetic 

energy threats will require significant effort from the science and 

technology community,5

 and (4) protection technology may have 

limited utility in urban environments due to collateral effects. 

• The Army is considering integrating an electromagnetic armor as a 

defense layer for manned ground vehicles. However, electromagnetic 

armor is still an immature technology and poses integration issues, 

including requiring a large amount of power storage capability that may 

not be possible within vehicle design and weight constraints. 

Component maturation and size reduction will be needed to keep 

electromagnetic armor as a viable survivability approach. 

• The integration of the 120-mm cannon on the Mounted Combat System 

vehicle poses design challenges. While the lightweight 120-mm cannon 

has achieved TRL 6 maturity that meets baseline requirements for the 

gun, this testing was conducted on a stationary hardstand and not on a 

turret or vehicle prototype. Those tests are planned for fiscal years 

2007 and 2009, respectively. Realistic testing is important because 

program officials cannot be certain whether the turret and vehicle 

design will be able to withstand the gun blast without damage to the 

vehicle. 

• The integration of the Lightweight Hull and Vehicle Armor in manned 

ground vehicles may also prove to be difficult, and there is a risk that 

the proposed lightweight armor will not satisfy transportability 

requirements while providing adequate protection. The design and 

integration issues must be addressed by large-scale ballistic testing, 

particularly for the cutting-edge ceramic armors being considered. 

 5

 Defeating kinetic energy threats is an objective, not a threshold, FCS requirement. 
Page 21 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

• Mine protection technology, intended to protect manned ground 

vehicles and occupants from mine blast, is still immature and has 

significant challenges that include blast armor development, armor 

repair, and structural and weight integration. Because of its immature 

status, the program is considering alternatives for its development. 

The acceptable resolution of at least some of these issues—such as those 

involving the active protection system, lightweight hull and armor, and 

mine protection—may be important enough that they represent “go/no go” 

markers in the development of manned ground vehicles. For example, if 

the active protection system technology and integration issues cannot be 

acceptably resolved and its capabilities may be less than needed, it is 

unclear if the FCS program will be able to complete the detailed designs of 

the manned ground vehicles and meet the expectations for critical design 

review. 

To meet the program’s goal to have manned ground vehicle prototypes 

available in late fiscal year 2010 or early fiscal year 2011, their fabrication 

would probably have to start well before design stability is achieved. If 

technology and integration issues identified to date are not resolved by 

that point, it is questionable whether the level of system integration that 

may be available for the prototype designs and if their demonstration will 

be able to yield acceptable results. 

The FCS program may have to interoperate or integrate with as many as 

170 programs, some of which are in development and many are currently 

fielded programs. Many complementary programs are not being developed 

exclusively for FCS and are outside the direct control of the FCS program. 

Because of the complementary programs’ importance to FCS, the Army 

closely monitors how well those efforts will synchronize with the FCS 

program. Of all the complementary programs, 52 are considered essential 

to meeting FCS key performance parameters. However, many of these 

programs have technical or funding problems and generally have uncertain 

futures. 

We reported in June 2005 that two key systems of the FCS network, the 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and Warfighter Information NetworkTactical (WIN-T), were struggling to meet ambitious user requirements, 

steep technical challenges, and aggressive schedules, which raised 

uncertainty about the ability of the FCS network to perform as intended 

Many Complementary 

Programs Are at Risk 

FCS Information Network 

Depends on Complementary 

Programs 
Page 22 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

and threatened the schedule for fielding Future Force capabilities. 6 We 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish low-risk schedules 

for JTRS and WIN-T and synchronize the FCS schedule with a 

demonstration of JTRS and WIN-T capabilities. DOD generally concurred 

and indicated it has begun taking action to address our recommendations. 

Since our report, JTRS has been undergoing a major restructuring to 

reduce technical and programmatic risks. In addition, WIN-T is being 

rebaselined to address the Army’s recent shift in focus to meet both nearand future-term requirements, as well as to better synchronize with FCS. 

The results of the JTRS and WIN-T program restructurings are not 

expected to be completed and approved until later this year, however; 

preliminary indications are that the programs will focus on delivering 

incremental capabilities to support the needs of FCS and other users. 

JTRS is a family of software-based radios that is to provide the high 

capacity, high-speed information link to vehicles, weapons, aircraft, and 

soldiers. The JTRS program to develop radios for ground vehicles and 

helicopters—referred to as Cluster 1—began product development in June 

2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and lack of 

clearly defined and stable requirements. The Army has not been able to 

mature the technologies needed to provide radios that both generate 

sufficient power as well as meet platform size and weight constraints. In 

addition, the radio design is not sufficient to meet security requirements 

for operating in an open network environment. These factors have 

contributed to significant cost and schedule problems. In early 2005, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to stop work on 

portions of the Cluster 1 development and have a newly established JTRS 

Joint Program Executive Office7

 conduct an assessment of the program 

and develop options for restructuring the program. 

A second JTRS program—referred to as Cluster 5—to develop different 

variants of small radios that will be carried by soldiers and be embedded 

in several FCS core systems, also entered product development with 

immature technologies and a lack of well-defined requirements. Since the 

 6

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army’s Networked 

Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force. GAO-05-669. (Washington, 

D.C.: June 15, 2005). 

7

 Joint Program Executive Office was established in February 2005 in response to the fiscal 

year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act which directed DOD to strengthen the joint 

management of all the JTRS program components. 

JTRS 
Page 23 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

program began in 2004, it has faced significant technical challenges due to 

the small size, weight, power, and large data processing requirements for 

the radios. As a result, the Army recognized in 2005 that the Cluster 5 

program was not sufficiently synchronized with the FCS program and it 

began assessing the feasibility of accelerating the development of some of 

the small form Cluster 5 radios. However, in light of the problems 

encountered with the Cluster 1 program, DOD directed the JTRS Joint 

Program Executive Office to conduct a broad assessment of all the JTRS 

components and identify more well defined and executable increments for 

Cluster 5. 

In December 2005, DOD approved a preliminary plan for restructuring the 

JTRS program, including Clusters 1 and 5. Details of the restructuring, 

however, are still to be worked out and the new program is not expected 

to be formally approved by DOD until late 2006. According to JTRS Joint 

Program Executive Office officials, the proposed program will address 

many of the concerns we raised in our July 2005 report and be structured 

to deliver capabilities in increments rather than all at once. The first 

increment is intended to support the FCS schedule. However, there are 

still cost, schedule, and technical risks associated with the planned 

delivery of increment one capabilities, and therefore it is unclear whether 

the capabilities will be available in time for the first spin-out of FCS 

capabilities to current forces in 2008. 

The WIN-T program is intended to provide an integrated communications 

network to connect Army units on the move with higher levels of 

command and provide the Army’s tactical extension to the Global 

Information Grid, a separate, DOD-wide networked force. The WIN-T 

program began with an aggressive acquisition schedule and entered 

product development with only three of its 12 critical technologies close to 

full maturity. The program office expects that all 12 critical technologies 

demonstrated during a November 2005 developmental test/operational test 

event will be assessed as close to fully mature. In August 2005, the 

Department of the Army conducted a study which explored options for 

better synchronizing three of its major system development efforts— 

FCS, JTRS, and WIN-T. As a result of this study, the WIN-T program will be 

rebaselined to meet emerging requirements. A new WIN-T capability 

development document will support the rebaselining of the program and is 

currently under review. A milestone B reexamination to rebaseline the 

program is planned for July 2006, and a new date for the WIN-T production 

decision will be established then. 

WIN-T 
Page 24 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

The restructuring of the JTRS and WIN-T programs and the success in 

developing these capabilities could well be deciding factors in the overall 

success of the FCS program. If JTRS and WIN-T do not work as intended, 

there will not be sufficient battlefield information for the FCS units to 

operate effectively. Because the network is so crucial to the overall 

success of FCS, we have suggested that its development and 

demonstration should precede major commitments to other elements of 

the FCS program, particularly the manned ground vehicles. However, the 

Army has admitted that the development of the network is several years 

behind the development of other elements of the FCS program. 

The future of other complementary programs is in doubt primarily 

because of funding issues. The Compact Kinetic Energy Missile was to 

provide superior lethality against current tanks, bunkers, buildings, and 

future threat armor. The Joint Common Missile was to provide line-of-sight 

and beyond-line-of-sight capabilities and could be employed in a fire-andforget mode or a precision attack mode. The Army has not yet decided if it 

will fund the full development of the Compact Kinetic Energy Missile. In 

December 2004, a DOD program budget decision deleted all procurement 

funding for the Joint Common Missile.8

 The absence of these systems 

could reduce the brigade combat teams’ ability to fight at stand off ranges, 

thereby reducing lethality and the ability to dictate the terms of the 

engagement. The Mid-Range Munition is to provide beyond-line-of-sight 

precision munitions for the mounted combat system, but its development 

is unfunded after fiscal year 2007. Elimination of the Mid-Range Munition 

would compromise the beyond-line-of-sight capability------which is a FCS 

threshold operational requirement------as well as the Army’s ability to shape 

the battle space and dictate the terms of the engagement. The Precision 

Guidance Kit is a technology for projectiles that provides greater accuracy 

at extended ranges, but the development of this technology is partially 

unfunded. If this technology is not available for FCS, then long-range 

projectiles would be less accurate, reducing their effectiveness and 

requiring additional rounds to be fired at the threat. As a result, the 

brigade combat team may need to carry additional munitions, an outcome 

that imposes a logistical and transportability burden. The Army also 

concedes that there is no funding to develop the following munitions 

needed to meet selected requirements: Advanced Kinetic Energy munition, 

 8

 In the fiscal year 2006 defense appropriation act, H.Report 109-359, page 372, Congress 

provided some funding to continue development of the Joint Common Missile. 

Funding Issues Cloud Future of 

Other Complementary 

Programs 
Page 25 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Advance Multi-Purpose Munition, Javelin Block II missile, Loitering Attack 

Missile, and non-lethal munitions. 

Recognizing the multiple issues surrounding complementary programs, 

the Army is reassessing its list of 52 essential programs. When that list is 

finalized in the coming months, the Army will have to determine how to 

replace any capabilities eliminated from the list. As with requirements, the 

cumulative effects of changes in technologies and complementary 

programs on overall FCS capabilities are important to measure. The 

Army’s inability to fund all essential complementary programs raises 

concerns about the gap between requirements and resources. 

The knowledge deficits for requirements and technologies have created 

enormous challenges for devising an acquisition strategy that can 

demonstrate the maturity of design and production processes. Even if 

requirements setting and technology maturity proceed without incident, 

FCS design and production maturity will still not be demonstrated until 

after the production decision is made. Production is the most expensive 

phase in which to resolve design or other problems. Several efforts within 

the FCS program are facing significant problems that may eventually 

involve reductions in promised capabilities and may lead to cost overruns 

and schedule delays. 

FCS Acquisition 

Strategy Will 

Demonstrate Design 

Maturity After 

Production Begins 
Page 26 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

The Army’s acquisition strategy for FCS does not reflect a knowledgebased approach. Figure 4 shows how the Army’s strategy for acquiring 

FCS involves concurrent development, design reviews that occur late, and 

other issues that are out of alignment with the knowledge-based approach 

outlined in DOD policy. 

Figure 4: FCS Acquisition Compared with Commercial Best Practices’ Approach 

Ideally, the preliminary design review occurs at or near the start of 

product development. Activities leading up to the preliminary design 

review include, among others, translating system requirements into design 

specifics. Doing so can help reveal key technical and engineering 

challenges and can help determine if a mismatch exists between what the 

customer wants and what the product developer can deliver. Scheduling 

the preliminary design review early in product development is intended to 

FCS Acquisition Strategy 

Involves Concurrent 

Development and Is Not 

Knowledge-Based 
Page 27 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

help stabilize cost, schedule, and performance expectations. The critical 

design review ideally occurs midway into the product development phase. 

The critical design review should confirm that the system design performs 

as expected and is stable enough to build production-representative 

prototypes for testing. The building of production-representative 

prototypes helps decision makers confirm that the system can be 

produced and manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. 

According to the knowledge-based approach, a high percentage of design 

drawings should be completed and released to manufacturing at critical 

design review. The period leading up to critical design review is referred to 

as system integration, when individual components of a system are 

brought together, and the period after the review is called system 

demonstration, when the system as a whole demonstrates its reliability as 

well as its ability to work in the intended environment. 

The Army has scheduled the preliminary design review in fiscal year 2008, 

about five years after the start of product development. The critical design 

review is scheduled in fiscal year 2010, just two years after the scheduled 

preliminary design review and the planned start of detailed design.9

 This is 

not to suggest that the two design reviews for the FCS could have been 

scheduled earlier but rather that commitments to production are 

scheduled too soon afterward. The timing of the design reviews is 

indicative of how late knowledge will be attained in the program, 

assuming all goes according to plan. The critical design review is 

scheduled just two years before the initial FCS production decision in 

fiscal year 2012, leaving little time for product demonstration and 

correction of any issues that are identified at that time. The Army is 

planning to have prototypes of all FCS systems available for testing prior 

to low-rate initial production. For example, manned ground vehicle 

prototypes are expected to be available in late 2010 and early 2011 for 

developmental and qualification testing. However, these prototypes are 

not expected to be production-representative prototypes and may not be 

fully integrated. Whereas the testing of fully integrated, productionrepresentative prototypes demonstrate design maturity and their 

fabrication can demonstrate production process maturity, neither of these 

knowledge points will be attained until after the production decision is 

made. 

 9

 The 2008 preliminary design review and the 2010 critical design review are culminating 

events; system-level preliminary design reviews and critical design reviews will be 

conducted prior to those dates. 
Page 28 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

The FCS program is thus susceptible to late-cycle churn, a condition that 

we reported on in 2000.10 Late cycle churn is a phrase private industry has 

used to describe the efforts to fix a significant problem that is discovered 

late in a product’s development. Churn refers to the additional—and 

unanticipated—time, money, and effort that must be invested to overcome 

problems discovered through testing. Problems are most serious when 

they delay product delivery, increase product cost, or “escape” to the 

customer. The discovery of problems in testing conducted late in 

development is a fairly common occurrence on DOD programs, as is the 

attendant late cycle churn. Often, tests of a full system, such as launching 

a missile or flying an aircraft, become the vehicles for discovering 

problems that could have been found out earlier and corrected less 

expensively. When significant problems are revealed late in a weapon 

system’s development, the reaction—or churn—can take several forms: 

extending schedules to increase the investment in more prototypes and 

testing, terminating the program, or redesigning and modifying weapons 

that have already made it to the field. While DOD has found it acceptable 

to accommodate such problems over the years, this will be a difficult 

proposition for the FCS given the magnitude of its cost in an increasingly 

competitive environment for investment funds. 

The Army is proceeding with its plans to mitigate FCS risks using 

modeling, simulation, emulation, and system integration laboratories. This 

approach is a necessary aspect of the Army acquisition strategy and is 

designed to reduce the dependence on late testing to gain valuable insights 

about many aspects of FCS development, including design progress. 

However, on a first-of-a-kind system—like FCS—that represents a radical 

departure from current systems and warfighting concepts, actual testing of 

all the components integrated together is the final proof that the FCS 

system of systems concept works both as predicted and as needed. 

 10GAO, Best Practices: A More Constructive Approach is Key to Better Weapon System 

Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000). 
Page 29 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

The total cost for the FCS program, now estimated at $160.7 billion (thenyear dollars), has climbed 76 percent from the Army’s first estimate. 

Because uncertainties remain regarding FCS’s system-level requirements 

and the Army faces significant challenges in technology and design 

maturity, we believe the Army’s latest cost estimate still lacks a firm 

knowledge base. Furthermore, this latest estimate does not include 

complementary programs that are essential for FCS to perform as 

intended, or the necessary funding for spin-outs. The Army has taken some 

steps to help manage the growing cost of FCS, including establishing cost 

ceilings or targets for development and production. However, program 

officials told us that setting cost limits may result in accepting lower 

capabilities. As FCS’s higher costs are recognized, it remains unclear 

whether the Army will have the ability to fully fund the planned annual 

procurement costs for the FCS current program of record. FCS 

affordability depends on the accuracy of the cost estimate, the overall 

level of development and procurement funding available to the Army, and 

the level of competing demands. 

At the start of product development, FCS program officials estimated that 

the program would require about $20 billion in then-year dollars for 

research, development, testing, and evaluation and about $72 billion to 

procure the FCS systems to equip 15 brigade combat teams. At that time, 

program officials could only derive the cost estimate on the basis of what 

they knew then—requirements were still undefined and technologies were 

immature. The total FCS program is now expected to cost $160.7 billion in 

then-year dollars, a 76 percent increase. Table 2 summarizes the growth of 

the FCS cost estimate. 

Table 2: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost Estimate for FCS 

Program (in billions of then-year dollars) 

Original 

estimate

Revised estimate 

(as of 1/2006) 

Percentage 

increase

Research, development, 

testing, and evaluation $19.6 $30.5 56%

Procurement $71.8 $130.2 81%

Total $91.4 $160.7 76%

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

According to the Army, the current cost estimate is more realistic, better 

informed, and based on a more reasonable schedule. The estimate 

accounts for the restructure of the FCS program and its increased scope, 

As FCS’s Higher Costs 

Are Recognized, 

Funding Availability 

Becomes a Greater 

Challenge 

FCS Costs Have Increased 

as Army Attains More 

Information, but Firm 

Knowledge Base Still 

Lacking 
Page 30 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

the four-year extension to the product development schedule, the 

reintroduction of four systems that had been previously deferred, and the 

addition of a spin-out concept whereby mature FCS capabilities would be 

provided, as they become available, to current Army forces. Under the 

original estimate, the program planned to acquire enough FCS equipment 

for an average of two brigade combat teams per year and to equip all 15 by 

fiscal year 2020. Army officials told us that the current cost estimate 

incorporates the lengthened development schedule and a more realistic 

procurement plan under which the program will procure 1.5 brigade 

combat teams per year (versus two per year in the original cost estimate), 

reaching 15 complete brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2025. This cost 

estimate has also benefited from progress made in defining the FCS 

system of systems requirements. 

Figure 5 compares the funding profiles for the original program and for the 

latest restructured program. 

Figure 5: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost Estimate for FCS 

Program between Fiscal Years 2003 and 2026 (in millions of then-year dollars) 

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

202

2025

3

201

2015

2017

2019

2021

3

200

2005

2007

2009

2011

3

Dollars in millions

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Year

Original estimate

Current estimate
Page 31 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

The current FCS funding profile is lower than the original through fiscal 

year 2013, but is substantially higher than the original after fiscal year 

2013. Stretching out FCS development by four years freed up about $9 

billion in funding through fiscal year 2011 for allocation to other Army 

initiatives. Originally, FCS annual funding was not to exceed $10 billion in 

any one year. Now, the cost estimate is expected to exceed $10 billion in 

each of nine years. While it is a more accurate reflection of program costs 

than the original estimate, the latest estimate is still based on a low level of 

knowledge about whether FCS will work as intended. Also, the latest cost 

estimate has not yet been independently validated, as called for by DOD’s 

acquisition policy. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group will not provide 

its updated independent estimate until spring 2006, for the planned 

Defense Acquisition Board review of the FCS program in May 2006. 

The latest cost estimate does not include all the costs that will be needed 

to field FCS capabilities. For instance, the costs of the 52 essential 

complementary programs are separate, and some of those costs could be 

substantial. For example, the costs of the Joint Tactical Radio System 

Clusters 1 and 5 programs were expected to be about $32.6 billion (thenyear dollars).11 Some complementary programs, such as the Mid-Range 

Munition and Javelin Block II, are currently not funded for their full 

development. These and other unfunded programs would have to compete 

for already tight funding. Furthermore, program officials told us the 

procurement of the spin-outs from the FCS program to current Army 

forces is not yet entirely funded. Procuring the FCS items expected to be 

spun out to current forces is expected to cost about $19 billion, and the 

needed installation kits may add another $4 billion. Adding these items to 

the FCS cost estimate brings the total required investment from the Army 

to the $200 billion range. 

The Army is planning to make substantial financial investments in the FCS 

program before key knowledge is gained on requirements, technologies, 

system designs, and system performance. Table 3 shows the annual and 

cumulative funding and the level of knowledge to be attained each fiscal 

year. 

 11 The operational assessment of the Joint Tactical Radio System functionality has resulted 

in an ongoing program restructure, which could have an impact on the program’s costs. 
Page 32 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Table 3: Annual and Cumulative FCS Funding and Planned Events and Achievements 

Fiscal 

year 

Percentage 

of funding 

spent to date 

Annual research, 

development, testing, 

and evaluation funding

(in millions of dollars)

Cumulative research, 

development, testing, and 

evaluation funding

(in millions of dollars) Planned events and achievements 

2003 0.5 158.9 158.9 Start of product development 

2004 5.9 1,637.3 1,796.2 Program restructured 

2005 15.5 2,929.9 4,726.1 System of Systems Functional Review; 

system of systems requirements stabilized; 

cost estimate updated 

2006 26.7 3,398.4 8,124.5 Initial preliminary design review; initial systemlevel requirements 

2007 38.7 3,669.4 11,793.9 

2008 50.7 3,655.6 15,449.5 Preliminary design review; most technologies 

reach TRL 6; initial critical design review; final 

system-level requirements 

2009 61.9 3,419.2 18,868.7 All technologies reach TRL 6 

2010 72.6 3,256.0 22,124.7 Critical design review; limited user test 2; 

some prototypes available 

2011 81.8 2,799.9 24,924.6 Design readiness review; all system 

prototypes available 

2012 88.2 1,952.3 26,876.9 Technologies reach full TRL 7 maturity; initial 

production decision; limited user test 3; initial 

system of systems demonstration 

2013 92.9 1,410.8 28,287.7 

2014 96.7 1,167.3 29,455 Limited user test 4; full system of systems 

demonstration; fielding start brigade combat 

teams 

2015 99.6 901.7 30,356.7 Initial operational capability 

2016 100 108.3 30,465 Initial operational test and evaluation; full-rate 

production decision 

2017 Full operational capability 

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analyst and presentation) 

Through fiscal year 2006, about $8 billion will have been spent on FCS 

development efforts. However, many pre-development activities, such as 

requirements definition and technology development, were slated for this 

period. About one-half of FCS’s development funding, or about $15 billion, 

will be spent by the time most critical technologies are mature to TRL 6 

and the preliminary design review is conducted. About $22 billion, or over 

70 percent of the total funding, will be spent by the expected time of the 

critical design review. Further, about 88 percent will have been spent 

before an initial demonstration of FCS capabilities is accomplished. 
Page 33 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

The Army has taken several steps to help manage the growing cost of FCS. 

Program officials told us they have budgeted for development risk by 

building a total of $5 billion into the FCS cost estimates to cover risk. Also, 

program officials have said that they will not exceed the $20.9 billion cost 

ceiling of the lead systems integrator’s development contract, but may 

have to modify, reduce, or delete FCS requirements to stay within this 

target. For example, the Army has prioritized each of the FCS 

requirements. If one or more of the highest priority requirements 

ultimately cost more to develop than anticipated, the Army plans to 

modify, reduce, or delete a lower priority requirement. In addition to the 

ceiling on FCS development costs, the Army says it will focus on reducing 

the average unit production cost of the FCS brigade combat teams. To do 

this, the Army is evaluating and improving producibility of designs early in 

the program and has given the contractor incentives to reduce the unit 

costs. 

The Army monitors the FCS program’s development progress through its 

earned value management system. This is a tool by which the program 

manager can monitor the technical, schedule, and cost parameters of the 

contract. As the program proceeds, the Army and the lead systems 

integrator can determine the status of each portion and can take 

corrective actions as problems occur. While the earned value system 

currently shows that the program slightly exceeds schedule expectations 

and is below estimated cost against the restructured baseline, program 

officials said it is too early to broadly interpret these data in light of the 

recent rebaseline of the program. At this point, the Army believes that the 

data are not yet mature enough to develop trends and make predictions. 

In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in early fiscal year 2006, 

asked each military service to provide additional adjustments to their 

projected budgets. The Army, in particular, was asked to decrease its 

budget by $11.7 billion from fiscal year 2007 to 2011. At this point, the FCS 

funding profile has not been affected. 

The affordability of the FCS program depends on several key assumptions. 

First, the program must proceed without exceeding its currently projected 

costs. Second, the Army’s annual procurement budget is expected to grow, 

from about $11 billion (then-year dollars) in fiscal year 2006 to at least $20 

billion in future years. The Army’s projected budget also includes $5 

billion per year from fiscal year 2007 through 2011 for its initiative to 

convert current Army forces to modular units. The Army is counting on its 

modularity initiative for brigade combat teams to be completed by fiscal 

Army Has Taken Steps to 

Control FCS Program 

Costs 

Future Funding May Not 

Be Sufficient to Cover 

Projected FCS 

Procurement Costs 
Page 34 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

year 2014, just as FCS procurement dollars begin to ramp up. However, 

recent GAO work12 has indicated that modularity efforts to date have 

exceeded original estimates and remain likely to further exceed current 

cost estimates. Army officials further told us that they expect to rely on 

supplemental funding for the war on terrorism and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom for the duration of those efforts plus two additional years. Within 

that supplemental funding, about $4 billion per year is projected to be 

needed to refurbish Army equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

Army also assumes that (1) it will realize savings of about $5 billion per 

year from fiscal year 2005 through 2011 from business process engineering 

and (2) Congress will continue to provide additional annual funding of 

about $3 billion for higher Army troop levels. 

Figure 6 compares the projected FCS budget with the funds the Army 

projects for its total procurement budget. 

 12 GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of Costs for 

Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926. (Washington, D.C.: September 29, 

2005). 
Page 35 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Figure 6: Comparison of FCS Budget with Total Army Procurement Budget (in billions of then-year dollars) 

The Army’s annual procurement budget—not including funds specifically 

allocated for the modularity initiative—is expected to grow from about 

$11 billion in fiscal year 2006 to at least $20 billion by fiscal year 2011. 

Even if this optimistic projection comes to pass, FCS annual procurement 

costs will dominate the Army procurement funding. If the Army budget 

remains at fiscal year 2011 levels, FCS procurement will represent about 

60-70 percent of Army procurement from fiscal years 2014 to 2022. With 

the remainder, the Army will have to address current force upgrades, 

including spin-outs from FCS, the procurement of FCS complementary 

programs, aviation procurement, trucks, ammunition, and other 

equipment. Further, FCS will have to compete for funding with other Army 

“big-ticket” items, such as missile defense systems and the future heavy lift 

helicopter. 

The large annual procurement costs for FCS are expected to begin in fiscal 

year 2012, which is beyond the current Future Years Defense Plan period 

(fiscal years 2006-2011). This situation is typically called a funding bow 

wave. The term bow wave is used to describe a requirement for more 

funds just beyond the years covered in the current defense plan that are 

subject to funding constraints. As it prepares the next defense plan, the 

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Dollar in billions

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Year

FCS

Army
Page 36 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Army will face the challenge of allocating sufficient funding to meet the 

increasing needs for FCS procurement in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 

According to an Army official, if all the needed funding cannot be 

identified, the Army will consider reducing the FCS procurement rate or 

delaying or reducing items to be spun out to current Army forces. 

However, reducing the procurement rate would increase the FCS unit 

costs and extend the time needed to deploy FCS-equipped brigade combat 

teams. 

The critical role played by U.S. ground combat forces is underscored today 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war of terrorism. That the Army 

should ensure its forces are well equipped with the capabilities they will 

need in the coming years is unquestioned. Moreover, the top-level goals 

the Army has set for its future force seem inarguable: to be as lethal and 

survivable as the current force, but significantly more sustainable and 

mobile. However, the Army’s approach to meeting these needs—embodied 

in the FCS and complementary systems—does raise questions. 

On the one hand, the FCS is the result of the Army leadership’s taking a 

hard look at how it wants its forces to fight in the future. Army leadership 

has had the courage to break with tradition on FCS; it would have likely 

been much easier to win support for successor vehicles to the Abrams and 

Bradley. Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the FCS solution is the 

fact that the Army defined the larger context within which it wants its new 

assets and capabilities to work, including command and organizational 

changes. This holistic approach will facilitate designing individual systems 

to operate together in a way that has not been done in the past. In this 

sense, FCS is being designed to be much more than the sum of its 

individual parts. 

On the other hand, FCS does not present a good business case for an 

acquisition program. It is necessary that a major new investment like FCS 

have a compelling, well-thought out concept, but this alone is not 

sufficient. FCS began product development prematurely in 2003, and today 

is a long way from having the level of knowledge it should have had before 

committing resources to a new product development effort. The elements 

of a sound business case—firm requirements, mature technologies, a 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and 

sufficient funding—are not present. FCS has all the indicators for risks 

that would be difficult to accept for any single system. They are even more 

daunting in the case of FCS not only because of their multiplicity, but 

because FCS represents a new concept of operations that is predicated on 

Conclusions 
Page 37 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

technological breakthroughs. Thus, technical problems, which accompany 

immaturity, not only pose traditional risks to cost, schedule, and 

performance; they pose risks to the new fighting concepts envisioned by 

the Army. 

The Army sees the foregoing as risk-averse thinking. The Army does not 

see immature technologies as an unacceptable risk, but as a “just in time” 

approach that is necessary to guard against technological obsolescence. 

The Army believes FCS technologies will mature predictably when needed 

and that they must have much latitude to make trade-offs across systems 

in case they do not mature. Similarly, the Army has set cost limitations for 

FCS and is prepared to make trade-offs in capability to offset future cost 

growth. Also, the Army is confident that advances in modeling and 

simulation reduce the reliance on physical testing to demonstrate 

performance. 

It is possible that the Army’s strategy for acquiring FCS could succeed as 

planned. But counting on it would require suspending credence in the 

lessons learned on other programs as well as the best practices of 

successful programs. Committing to the strategy also means setting aside 

DOD’s acquisition policies—which espouse an evolutionary, knowledgebased approach—for an entire generation of Army acquisitions. The Army 

has made important progress on setting FCS system of systems 

requirements and making key decisions, such as vehicle weights. But its 

progress thus far seems to have done more to confirm risk than to have 

refuted it; setting system-level requirements and maturing technologies 

have proven difficult and are taking longer than planned. 

In making decisions to commit additional resources to acquiring the 

capabilities represented by FCS, DOD must recognize the immaturity of 

the program and the amount of discovery that lies ahead. It is not a 

certainty that FCS will work and enable the concept of operations the 

Army envisions. A full commitment to the Army’s strategy for acquiring 

FCS is not yet warranted because the Army has not demonstrated 

sufficient knowledge to provide confidence that it can deliver a fully 

capable FCS within projected costs and time frames. Based on the Army’s 

plans, there should be sufficient progress on system-level requirements 

definition and technology development by the time of its preliminary 

design review in 2008 to realistically assess whether the program’s goals 

are achievable and at what cost. As DOD proceeds with its decisions, it 

must preserve its ability to change course on acquiring FCS capabilities to 

guard against a situation in which FCS will have to be acquired at any cost. 

It must also be able to hold the Army accountable for delivering FCS 
Page 38 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

within budgeted resources. In this vein, options are available to frame FCS 

capabilities around a business case that comports with acquisition policies 

and best practices and to minimize risk within the current acquisition 

strategy. Alternatives to the current FCS acquisition strategy must also be 

kept viable in the event that desired capabilities prove unattainable. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense limit DOD’s commitment to 

the FCS product development phase and eventual production until a 

sound business case that is consistent with DOD acquisition policy and 

best practices can be clearly demonstrated. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense lay the groundwork for 

the Army’s development of a sound FCS business case by tasking the 

spring 2006 Defense Acquisition Board to do the following: 

• Revaluate the FCS business case—including requirements, 

technologies, complementary programs, acquisition strategy, cost, and 

funding availability—in light of its own acquisition policies. In its 

reevaluation, the board should (1) assess both the program’s prospects 

for success and the consequences of not delivering desired capability 

within budgeted resources and (2) ensure that the Army has a 

disciplined way to measure and assess the cumulative effects of 

individual requirements, technology, design, and cost changes on the 

primary FCS characteristics of lethality, survivability, responsiveness, 

and sustainability. 

• If the business case for FCS is found not to be executable, determine 

whether investments in FCS design- and production-related activities 

should be curbed until system-level requirements are firm and 

technologies are mature. 

• If the deficiencies in the FCS business case are judged to be 

recoverable, establish the incremental markers that are needed to 

demonstrate that FCS is proceeding on a knowledge-based approach 

and to hold the Army accountable, through periodic reporting or other 

means, for achieving those markers. The markers should include, but 

not be limited to 

• the schedules for all critical technologies to realistically progress 

through TRL 7; 

• waypoints and criteria for reaching a set of system-level 

requirements that are both technically feasible and affordable; 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 39 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

• the schedule and funding availability for developing essential 

complementary programs; 

• waypoints and criteria to be used to lead up to and complete the 

preliminary and critical design reviews; 

• waypoints and criteria to be used to lead up to and complete testing 

of fully integrated prototypes of all FCS systems, including the 

network; and 

• waypoints and criteria to be used to demonstrate that key 

production processes are in statistical control. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reassess the FCS cost 

estimate and funding availability based on the independent cost estimate 

and any program changes to improve its business case. 

Finally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a milestone 

review by the Defense Acquisition Board following the Army’s preliminary 

design review scheduled for 2008. This should be a go/no-go review of the 

FCS program that is based on (1) the program’s ability to demonstrate 

whether it is meeting the knowledge markers outlined above at times 

consistent with DOD policy and best practices and (2) whether the funds 

can still be made available to afford its costs. 

Based on its response to our report, it does not appear that DOD plans to 

assess the FCS business case against best practices or its own policies. 

Nor has DOD agreed to hold a go/no-go milestone review in 2008 based on 

the preliminary design review. Congress will likely be asked to approve 

fiscal years 2008 and 2009 funding requests before the FCS business case 

is adequately demonstrated. In light of DOD’s response, the Congress 

should consider directing the Secretary of Defense to: 

• Report on the results of the May 2006 Defense Acquisition Board’s 

review of the FCS program business case in the areas of requirements, 

technologies, acquisition strategy, cost, and funding. 

• Direct DOD to conduct and report the results of a milestone review in 

2008, following the preliminary design review, that will be a go/no-go 

review of the FCS program that is based on its demonstration of a 

sound business case. 

The Congress should also consider restricting annual appropriations for 

fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the FCS program until definitive progress in 

establishing a sound business case is demonstrated in terms of firm 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 
Page 40 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding. Importantly, the 

Army must provide sufficient evidence that FCS will work. 

DOD concurred with the intent of our recommendations but did not agree 

to limit its commitment to the FCS program or to take any action beyond 

what it had already planned to do. DOD stated it is committed to the 

Army’s transformation and that effort, and in particular the FCS program, 

requires a disciplined, yet agile, acquisition construct. DOD added that the 

Defense Acquisition Executive has determined that the FCS program is 

based on a viable acquisition strategy. DOD stated that it would reevaluate 

the FCS acquisition strategy and reassess FCS cost estimates and funding 

in the spring 2006 Defense Acquisition Board review. DOD also noted that 

a Defense Acquisition Board review would be held for the timeframe 

(2008) of the FCS preliminary design review, but refrained from 

committing to making it a milestone decision review. 

DOD’s response to our draft report did not specifically address our 

findings on the FCS program’s lack of a sound business case. DOD was 

also not specific about what criteria or standards for knowledge it would 

use in making its assessments, but referred to the incremental markers 

contained in the FCS acquisition strategy and system engineering plan. It is 

important that these markers reflect standards for knowledge that are 

consistent with best practices and DOD policy. Thus far, the FCS program 

has been judged by its own markers. As we have pointed out in this report, 

these markers have allowed FCS to be judged as acceptable despite its 

falling far short of the markers that represent best practices and DOD 

acquisition policy. For example, the low state of technology maturity has 

not prevented DOD from concluding that the FCS strategy is viable. Using 

the program’s markers as a basis for future reviews raises the question of 

whether FCS will continue to be held to a lower standard than DOD 

policy. Over time, as the program’s markers are adjusted in light of actual 

performance and more money is invested, it will become increasingly 

difficult for the Army and DOD to conclude that program progress is 

anything other than acceptable. 

Regarding a commitment to a milestone review in 2008, we note that, in 

recognition of the fact that the FCS was allowed to proceed into Systems 

Development and Demonstration prematurely, DOD had directed a full 

milestone review update be held in November 2004. However, that review 

has not yet occurred and it now appears that it will not occur. Thus, there 

is no commitment by DOD to review the FCS business case (including all 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 41 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

elements in addition to the acquisition strategy), culminating in a go/no-go 

decision in 2008 based on the preliminary design review. The increased 

responsibility of making a declarative decision adds a higher level of 

discipline and accountability than a review implies. We maintain our 

position that such a decision is warranted. 

It is important to note that Congress will continue to be asked to make 

funding commitments in advance of program events. Specifically, the 

budget request for fiscal year 2008, which will support the preliminary 

design review, will be presented to Congress for approval in January 2007. 

Conceivably, the request for the fiscal year 2009 budget, which will be 

presented in January 2008, will also precede the preliminary design 

review. Congress should safeguard itself against a situation in which 

budget decisions could preclude its ability to make adjustments to FCS as 

warranted by actual demonstrated performance against the business case. 

For example, the status of the FCS business case based on the knowledge 

demonstrated in the 2008 preliminary design review should be used to 

guide ensuing program activities and funding commitments. Accordingly, 

we have raised these issues as matters for congressional consideration. 

We also received technical comments from DOD which have been 

addressed in the report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Please 

contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any questions 

concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Other contributors to this report were Assistant Director William R. 

Graveline, Robert L. Ackley, Lily J. Chin, Noah B. Bleicher, Marcus C. 

Ferguson, Michael J. Hesse, Guisseli Reyes, Lisa R. Simon, John P. Swain, 

and Carrie R. Wilson. 

Paul L. Francis 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Page 42 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 43 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

To develop the information on the Future Combat System program’s 

progress toward meeting established goals, the contribution of critical 

technologies and complementary systems, and the estimates of cost and 

affordability, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Army G-8; the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Secretary of 

Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation; the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; 

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; the Program Manager for 

the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the Future Combat 

System Lead Systems Integrator; and LSI One Team contractors. We 

reviewed, among other documents, the Future Combat System’s 

Operational Requirements Document, the Acquisition Strategy Report, the 

Baseline Cost Report, the Critical Technology Assessment and Technology 

Risk Mitigation Plans, and the Integrated Master Schedule. We attended 

the FCS System of Systems Functional Review, In-Process Reviews, Board 

of Directors Reviews, and multiple system demonstrations. In our 

assessment of the FCS, we used the knowledge-based acquisition practices 

drawn from our large body of past work as well as DOD’s acquisition 

policy and the experiences of other programs. 

We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials from the 

Army and the Secretary of Defense, and made several changes as a result. 

We performed our review from June 2005 to March 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted auditing standards. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 
Appendix III: Critical Technologies’ Current 

Status and Projections for Reaching 

Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6) 

Page 47 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters 

TRL 

Ratings 

TRL 6 

Projections

Software programmable radio 

1 JTRS Cluster 1 5 2007

2 JTRS Cluster 5 5 2007

3 WIN-T 5 2007

 Interface and information exchange 

4 Army, joint, multinational Interface 4 2008

Network ready 

5 WIN-T strategic communication 4 2008

 Security systems and algorithms 

6 Cross domain guarding solution 4 2008

7 Intrusion detection—Internet Protocol Network 4 2008

8 Intrusion detection—Waveform 4 2008

9 Mobile ad hoc networking protocols 5 2007

10 Quality of service algorithms 5 2007

11 Unmanned systems relay 5 2006

 Wideband Waveforms 

12 Wideband waveform—JTRS 5 2007

13 Wideband waveform—Soldier Radio Waveform 4 2007

14 Advanced man-machine interfaces 6 Not applicable

15 Multi-spectral sensors and seekers 6 Not applicable

16 Decision aids/intelligent agents 6 Not applicable

 Combat identification 

17 Air (rotary wing/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle)—to—ground 6 Not applicable

18 Air (fixed wing)—to—ground (interim/robust solutions) Not rated Not applicable

19 Ground—to—air Not rated Not applicable

20 Ground—to—ground (mounted) 6 Not applicable

21 Ground—to—soldier Not rated Not applicable

22 Rapid battlespace deconfliction 5 2008

 Sensor/data fusion and data compression algorithms 

23 Distributed fusion management 4 2007

24 Level 1 fusion engine 6 Not applicable

Networked 

battle 

command 

25 Data compression algorithms 6 Not applicable

26 Dynamic sensor—shooter pairing algorithms and fire control 6 Not applicable

 Line-of-Sight/Beyond-Line-of-Sight/Non-Line-of-Sight 

Precision Munitions Terminal Guidance 

 

Networked 

lethality 

27 Precision Guided Mortar Munitions precision munitions, 

terminal guidance 

5 2007

Appendix III: Critical Technologies’ Current 

Status and Projections for Reaching 

Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6) 
Appendix III: Critical Technologies’ Current 

Status and Projections for Reaching 

Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6) 

Page 48 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters 

TRL 

Ratings 

TRL 6 

Projections

28 Mid-Range-Munitions precision munitions, terminal guidance 5 2007

29 Excalibur precision munitions, terminal guidance 6 Not applicable

30 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, terminal guidance 6 Not applicable

 Aided/automatic target recognition 

31 Aided target recognition for reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition 

5 2007

32 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System aided target recognition for 

seekers 

6 Not applicable

33 Recoil management and lightweight components 6 Not applicable

34 Distributed collaboration of manned/unmanned platforms 5 2006

35 Rapid battle damage assessment Not rated Not applicable

 High-power density/fuel-efficient propulsion 

36 High-power density engine 5 2007

Transportability 

37 Fuel-efficient hybrid-electric engine 6 Not applicable

Sustainability/ 38 Embedded predictive logistics sensors and algorithms 5 2009

reliability 39 Water generation and purification Not rated Not applicable

Training 40 Computer generated forces 6 Not applicable

41 Tactical engagement simulation 4 2008

 Active Protection System 

42 Active Protection System 5 2008

43 Threat Warning System 4-5 2009

44 Signature management 5-6 2006

45 Lightweight hull and vehicle armor 5 2008

46 Health monitoring and casualty care interventions 6 Not applicable

47 Power distribution and control 5 2006

 Advanced countermine technology 

48 Mine detection 6 Not applicable

49 Mine neutralization 6 Not applicable

50 Efficient resource allocation 6 Not applicable

51 Protection 4 2008

52 High-density packaged power 5 2008

 Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle propulsion technology 

53 Ducted fan 4 2006

Survivability 

54 Lightweight heavy fuel engine 4 2007

Source: Technology Readiness Assessment Update, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and 

Technology, April 2005 (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels 

Page 49 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Technology Readiness Level Description 

Hardware and 

Software 

Demonstration 

Environment 

1. Basic principles observed and 

reported 

Lowest level of technology readiness. 

Scientific research begins to be 

translated into applied research and 

development. Examples might include 

paper studies of a technology’s basic 

properties 

None (paper studies and 

analysis) 

None 

2. Technology concept and/or 

application formulated 

Invention begins. Once basic principles 

are observed, practical applications can 

be invented. The application is 

speculative and there is no proof or 

detailed analysis to support the 

assumption. Examples are still limited to 

paper studies. 

None (paper studies and 

analysis) 

None 

3. Analytical and experimental 

critical function and/or 

characteristic proof of concept 

Active research and development is 

initiated. This includes analytical studies

and laboratory studies to physically 

validate analytical predictions of 

separate elements of the technology. 

Examples include components that are 

not yet integrated or representative. 

Analytical studies and 

demonstration of non-scale 

individual components (pieces 

of subsystem). 

Lab 

4. Component and/or 

breadboard. Validation in 

laboratory environment 

Basic technological components are 

integrated to establish that the pieces 

will work together. This is relatively “low 

fidelity” compared to the eventual 

system. Examples include integration of 

“ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory. 

Low-fidelity breadboard. 

Integration of non-scale 

components to show pieces 

will work together. Not fully 

functional or form or fit but 

representative of technically 

feasible approach suitable for 

flight articles. 

Lab 

5. Component and/or breadboard 

validation in relevant environment 

Fidelity of breadboard technology 

increases significantly. The basic 

technological components are 

integrated with reasonably realistic 

supporting elements so that the 

technology can be tested in a simulated 

environment. Examples include “high 

fidelity” laboratory Integration of 

components. 

High-fidelity breadboard. 

Functionally equivalent but not 

necessarily form and/or fit 

(size, weight, materials, etc.). 

Should be approaching 

appropriate scale. May include 

integration of several 

components with reasonably 

realistic support 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate functionality. 

Lab demonstrating 

functionality but not 

form and fit. May 

include flight 

demonstrating 

breadboard in surrogate 

aircraft. Technology 

ready for detailed 

design studies. 

6. System/subsystem model or 

prototype demonstration in a 

relevant environment 

Representative model or prototype 

system, which is well beyond the 

breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested 

in a relevant environment. Represents a 

major step up in a technology’s 

demonstrated readiness. Examples 

include testing a prototype in a highfidelity laboratory environment or in 

simulated operational environment. 

Prototype—Should be very 

close to form, fit, and function. 

Probably includes the 

integration of many new 

components and realistic 

supporting 

elements/subsystems if 

needed to demonstrate full 

functionality of the subsystem. 

High-fidelity lab 

demonstration or 

limited/restricted flight 

demonstration for a 

relevant environment. 

Integration of 

technology is well 

defined. 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels 
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels 

Page 50 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Technology Readiness Level Description 

Hardware and 

Software 

Demonstration 

Environment 

7. System prototype 

demonstration in an operational 

environment 

Prototype near or at planned 

operational system. Represents a major 

step up from TRL 6, requiring the 

demonstration of an actual system 

prototype in an operational 

environment, such as in an aircraft, 

vehicle, or space. Examples include 

testing the prototype in a test bed 

aircraft. 

Prototype. Should be form, fit, 

and function integrated with 

other key supporting 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate full functionality 

of subsystem. 

Flight demonstration in 

representative 

operational environment 

such as flying test bed 

or demonstrator aircraft. 

Technology is well 

substantiated with test 

data. 

8. Actual system completed and 

“flight qualified” through test and 

demonstration 

Technology has been proven to work in 

its final form and under expected 

conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL 

represents the end of true system 

development. Examples include 

developmental test and evaluation of 

the system in its intended weapon 

system to determine if it meets design 

specifications. 

Flight-qualified hardware Developmental test and 

evaluation in the actual 

system application 

9. Actual system “flight proven” 

through successful mission 

operations 

Actual application of the technology in 

its final form and under mission 

conditions, such as those encountered 

in operational test and evaluation. In 

almost all cases, this is the end of the 

last “bug fixing” aspects of true system 

development. Examples include using 

the system under operational mission 

conditions. 

Actual system in final form Operational test and 

evaluation in operational 

mission conditions 

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data. 
Related GAO Products 

Page 51 GAO-06-367 FCS Business Case 

Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key 

for Future Combat System’s Success, GAO-06-478T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2006. 

DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T. 

Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005. 

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of 

Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926. 

Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army’s 

Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future 

Force, GAO-05-669. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects 

for Success, GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects 

for Success, GAO-05-442T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005. 

NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure 

Requirements Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, 

Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, 

GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program, 

GAO-03-1010R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems 

Challenges, GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 2001. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2001. 

Related GAO Products 

(120456) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER