REBALANCING FORCES 

Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve 

Prepared by

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

(Readiness, Training, and Mobilization) 

15 January 2004 

Final

 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................ V

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1

RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO DOD MISSIONS ..........................2

THE CHALLENGE: HOW TO ACHIEVE JUDICIOUS AND PRUDENT USE...........4

Key Indicators of Stress....................................................................... 6

Approaches to Rebalancing................................................................ 9

ENHANCE EARLY RESPONSIVENESS .................................................................10

Army.................................................................................................... 10

Navy and Marine Corps ................................................................... 11

Air Force.............................................................................................. 12

RESOLVE STRESSED CAREER FIELDS .................................................................13

Army.................................................................................................... 13

Navy and Marine Corps ................................................................... 14

Air Force.............................................................................................. 16

EMPLOY INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES..........................................17

Continuum of Service........................................................................ 18

Rotational Overseas Presence .......................................................... 24

Reachback Initiatives......................................................................... 25

Mobilization Process Improvements............................................... 27

THE WAY AHEAD..............................................................................................31

APPENDIX A. COAST GUARD REBALANCING INITIATIVES ............................33

iii 
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT TO TOTAL FORCE MISSIONS.......2

FIGURE 2. RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATIONS..........................................3

FIGURE 3. DEPLOYMENTS TO U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND................................4 

FIGURE 4. THE CONTINUUM OF SERVICE........................................................18 

FIGURE 5. MOBILIZATION TIMELINES..............................................................29 

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. HIGHER USE CAREER SPECIALTIES ....................................................7 

TABLE 2. SELECTED HIGHER STRESSED SPECIALTIES .......................................8

iv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense is undergoing a transformation to a more 

responsive, lethal, and agile force based on capabilities rather than threats. 

As the transformation has progressed, it has become evident that the 

balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components is not the 

best for the future. There is a need for rebalancing to improve the 

responsiveness of the force and to help ease stress on units and 

individuals with skills in high demand. The Global War on Terrorism, 

which began after September 11, 2001 and has included Operations

NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, has 

accelerated the need for change. 

This report provides a comprehensive review of the Services’ 

rebalancing initiatives—both ongoing as well as those planned for fiscal 

year 2005 and beyond. Easing the stress on the force requires a multifaceted approach—no single solution will resolve the challenges faced by 

the Services.1 Three areas are the focus of the Services’ rebalancing 

initiatives described in the following pages:

 Enhance early responsiveness 

 Resolve stressed career fields 

 Employ innovative management practices 

To address the first two areas, the Services rebalanced about 10,000 

military spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve 

components in fiscal year 2003 and are rebalancing about 20,000 military 

spaces during fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2005, the budget supports an 

additional 20,000 force structure changes to resolve imbalances that put 

pressure on the force. The Services based these force structure changes on 

the planning metrics, established by the Secretary of Defense in his July 9, 

2003 memorandum, Rebalancing Forces, to: a) reduce the need for 

involuntary mobilization during the early stages of a rapid response 

operation, using the initial 15 days as the planning metric; and b) limit 

involuntary mobilization to reasonable and sustainable rates, using not 

more than one year in every six as the planning metric. 

 

1 The strategy that formed the basis for the Department’s rebalancing initiatives originated in

the Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense, December, 2002. 

v 
While these metrics seem appropriate for the current tempo of 

operations, lessons learned during the current operations will be 

examined to determine if additional or other metrics should be applied in 

the future. 

By employing innovative force management practices, the Services can 

perhaps achieve the greatest degree of flexibility in utilizing the Total 

Force, while reducing both the stress on critical career fields and the need 

for involuntary mobilization. Approaches such as the continuum of 

service, reachback operations, rotational overseas presence, and 

improvements in the mobilization process can help to ensure that the 

Services have access to individuals with the skills and capabilities 

required for both emergent operations and sustained, day-to-day 

activities. 

In total, the initiatives described in this report reflect a cohesive 

rebalancing strategy that will ease the stress on the Reserve forces.2 Many 

of these initiatives are already being implemented; others will require 

legislative changes, some of which are already being proposed for fiscal 

year 2005. As these initiatives are implemented and begin to take affect, 

the Services must monitor their impact and look for opportunities to 

implement additional measures that will further improve the balance of 

forces between the Active and Reserve components. Efforts to rebalance 

the force will be iterative and ongoing, as demands on the Total Force 

change and new requirements create different stresses on the force. By 

proceeding in this fashion, the Department will be able to achieve its 

transformation goals, ensure the judicious and prudent use of its Reserve 

components, and ultimately assure victory in the Global War on 

Terrorism. 

 

2 In the July 9, 2003 memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, in 

coordination with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Services and Joint Staff, was directed to determine 

Total Force requirements for Homeland Defense and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 

Based on these requirements, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is 

preparing a report on Reserve Component Contributions to Homeland Defense and Civil Support that

will recommend the appropriate roles, force mix, priorities, command relationships, and

resources required for conducting these missions. This report is due in early 2004. 

vi 
INTRODUCTION

What we have to do is make sure we recognize that the single most 

important thing we’ve got in the Department of Defense are the people, and

we have to make sure we manage that force—the Total Force—the Active 

component and the Reserve component in a way that’s respectful of them. 

To do that you’ve got to be very sensitive about the risk of back to back 

deployment for active service, you’ve got to be very careful about short call 

up periods for the reserve, you’ve got to give them as much certainty as

possible, you have to use volunteers to the greatest extent possible and you

have to undertake a project to rebalance the Guard and the Reserve with the 

Active force. 

Donald Rumsfeld 

 Remarks at the Eisenhower

National Security Conference 

September 25, 2003

On July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, 

Rebalancing Forces, in which he directed the Services to promote 

judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components. The 

memorandum further directed the Services to implement force 

rebalancing initiatives—that combine more efficient use of manpower 

with technological solutions—to ease the strain on Guard and 

Reserve forces. These initiatives, along with a disciplined force 

requirements process, are critical to the Department’s ongoing efforts 

to relieve pressures on the force that are a result of today’s high 

operational tempo. 

This report provides a comprehensive review, for the Secretary of 

Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, of the Services’ 

rebalancing initiatives—both ongoing as well as those planned for 

fiscal year 2005 and beyond. In total, these initiatives reflect a 

cohesive rebalancing strategy across the Services, yet opportunities 

still exist to implement additional measures in the future. Before 

reviewing these initiatives in detail, this report begins with an 

overview of Reserve component contributions to DoD missions and 

the challenges that lie ahead. 

1 
RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS 

TO DOD MISSIONS

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM proved the viability of the 

Reserve components as Total Force partners. Following this conflict, 

between 1996 and 2001, Reserve component contributions to ongoing 

DoD missions maintained a relatively consistent rate of between 12-

13 million duty days annually. This rate changed dramatically, 

however, during the two years following the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, respectively, reserve 

contributions to Total Force missions totaled about 42 million and 62 

 Figure 1. Reserve Component Support to Tota

million days of support, as figure 1 illustrates. 

l Force Missions

mobilized reservists has actually declined—a result of the change in 

mis

M, the

in

57

0.9 M Duty days

DESERT SHIELD / STORM

CONTRIBUTION

NOBLE EAGLE / ENDURING FREEDOM / IRAQI FREEDOM

CONTRIBUTION

FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03

NOTE: DATA SHOWS “DIRECT SUPPORT” ONLY, NOT “INDIRECT SUPPORT” (e.g., RECRUITING, USPFO, MOST

AGR SUPPORT).

NOTE: DATA SHOWS “DIRECT SUPPORT” ONLY, NOT “INDIRECT SUPPORT” (e.g., RECRUITING, USPFO, MOST

AGR SUPPORT).

RC CONTRIBUTIONS INCLUDING 

HAITI, BOSNIA, SWA, KOSOVO PRCs

44.2 M Duty days

13.5 M Duty days

12.7 M Duty days

62.8 M Duty days

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

 0

In recent months, as shown in figure 2, the total number of 

sion in the Iraqi theater from major combat operations to 

sustainment operations. However, as a new rotation of forces is 

brought into the theater to support Operation IRAQI FREEDO

number of mobilized reservists needed to replace forces currently

theater will increase for a time, before falling to a new sustainment 

level. 

2 
0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Coast Guard Reserve

Marine Corps Reserve

Naval Reserve

Air Force RC (Guard & Reserve)

Army RC (Guard & Reserve)

36,486

77,455

223,3 33

163,981

52,207

181,459

2 0 01 2002 2003

Figure 2. Reserve Component Mobilizations

Between October 2001 and December 2003, over 350,000 Active 

and Rese ntral 

Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility, which includes the 

Iraq

ed from

ped by

a longree, it

will, for the foreseeable future, remain substantially higher than the 

lev

ntral 

Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility, which includes the 

Iraq

ed from

ped by

a longree, it

will, for the foreseeable future, remain substantially higher than the 

lev

rve Service members were deployed to the Ce

i Theater of Operations (figure 3). During that period, the 

number of reserve forces supporting the OIF mission, increas

about 5 percent of the Total Force to as high as 34 percent. Since the

peak in May 2003, the number of deployed personnel has drop

over 180,000, as major combat operations ended. On December 31, 

2003, the total number of forces in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility was 190,955, of which 30,988 were reservists. 

Fighting the Global War on Terrorism is expected to be

term effort. While operational tempo should ease to some deg

i Theater of Operations (figure 3). During that period, the 

number of reserve forces supporting the OIF mission, increas

about 5 percent of the Total Force to as high as 34 percent. Since the

peak in May 2003, the number of deployed personnel has drop

over 180,000, as major combat operations ended. On December 31, 

2003, the total number of forces in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility was 190,955, of which 30,988 were reservists. 

Fighting the Global War on Terrorism is expected to be

term effort. While operational tempo should ease to some deg

els prior to September 11, 2001. Moreover, rapid-response

operations will continue to cause temporary spikes in operational 

tempo, as have operations such as NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), 

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

els prior to September 11, 2001. Moreover, rapid-response

operations will continue to cause temporary spikes in operational 

tempo, as have operations such as NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), 

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

3 
0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

400000

Aug-01

Oct-01

Dec-01

Feb-02

Apr-02

Jun-02

Aug-02

Oct-02

Dec-02

Feb-03

Apr-03

Jun-03

Aug-03

Oct-03

Dec-03

Active Reserve

Figure 3. Deployments to U.S. Central Command 

Today’s high level of operational tempo is beginning to stress the 

Reserve force. Though recruiting, attrition rates, and end strength 

achievement rates remain good, other indicators, described in the 

next section, suggest that continued use of the Reserve components at 

current levels may have a negative impact on the stability of the 

Reserve force. The rebalancing initiatives, directed by the Secretary 

of Defense and discussed in this report, are an important step in 

preserving this important component of the All-Volunteer Force. 

THE CHALLENGE: HOW TO ACHIEVE 

JUDICIOUS AND PRUDENT USE

The Department of Defense, Congress, and the American public 

are concerned about overuse of the Reserve components. Specific 

concerns include the following: 

 How frequently are the reserves mobilized and for 

how long?

 When should they be available? 

 How quickly should they be expected to respond? 

4 
There is also concern about the impact of involuntary 

mobilization on reservists early in an operation. A recent analysis of 

the first 15 days of a hypothetical rapid response operation indicated 

that the Services, in their current configurations, would have to 

depend on about 9,000 early involuntary mobilizations. Such early 

mobilizations could preclude the Department from giving reservists, 

their families, and their employers the time needed to prepare for 

smooth transition to active duty. 

With these concerns in mind, the Secretary of Defense established 

a number of planning considerations to govern future force structure 

decisions regarding the Active and Reserve components—

considerations that are being incorporated into Service rebalancing 

initiatives. The guidance calls for applying the following two metrics 

to force structure planning decisions in order to help ensure the 

judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components: 

 Structure the force to reduce dependence on 

involuntary mobilization of reservists during the 

early stages of a rapid response operation, using the 

initial 15 days as the planning metric 

 Structure the force to limit involuntary mobilization 

to reasonable and sustainable rates, using one year 

out of every six as the planning metric 

While these metrics seem appropriate for the current tempo of 

operations, lessons learned during the current operations will be 

examined to determine if additional or other metrics should be 

applied in the future. 

The Services are also directed to develop innovative management 

practices to support force rebalancing. The expectation is that by 

employing these metrics and innovative management techniques, the 

Department will ease the stress on the Reserve components and help 

ensure their viability over the long run. 

5 
KEY INDICATORS OF STRESS

As the Department examines ways to rebalance the Total Force, it 

is useful to understand how choices in using the reserves can lead to 

stress on the force. A review of current Reserve component usage 

pointed to three measurable factors that, when taken together, 

provide a good assessment of stress on the force. The three factors 

are frequency, percent of inventory used, and duration. 

Frequency 

Frequency refers to how often Reserve component members are 

called up—for multiple contingencies or multiple deployments 

within a given contingency. The review showed that, since 1996, less 

than 12,000 Reserve component members (including some 

volunteers) in the Selected Reserve force of around 880,000, have 

served in both current operations (ONE, OEF, OIF) and another 

ongoing contingency such as Bosnia, Southwest Asia, or Kosovo. 

Thus, over the past seven years, the frequency of call-ups for most

reservists does not appear to have been a significant problem. 

However, the data also show that about 16,000 reservists have been 

called up more than once for various intervals of time to support 

current operations. As the Department continues to mobilize the 

Reserve components, it will need to monitor the frequency factor to 

prevent undue stress in any specific career specialty. 

Percentage of Inventory Used 

The percentage of the inventory used is the amount of the force 

used as compared to a target usage rate. To limit involuntary 

mobilizations to one year out of every six, consistent with the current 

force structure planning metric, the Services would have to maintain 

a Reserve component base force that is large enough and with the 

appropriate skill mix so that no more than 17 percent of the force, in 

any particular functional area or career field, is used per year. 

In current operations, the data suggest that some functional areas 

are being used at rates that cannot be sustained for long durations. 

When the Secretary’s planning metric is employed, specialties 

6 
experiencing stress are those where more than 17 percent of the 

capability is used annually. Table 1 shows some of the career fields

that are experiencing high use. Table 2 specifies the percentage of the 

inventory that has been used in a sample of eight higher stressed 

specialties (defined here as specialties reflecting a usage rate of more 

than 34 percent during the 2 years of current operations). Tracking 

such data will help point to specialties that are candidates for 

mitigating action. 

Table 1. Higher Use Career Specialties 

FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY CAREER SPECIALTIES

Logistics/Service Law Enforcement

Transportation

Materiel 

Combat Arms Special Forces 

Installation Security 

Aircraft Crews 

Intelligence General Intelligence

Electronic Countermeasures 

Counter Intelligence 

Civil Engineering/ 

Utilities 

Construction Related 

Utilities 

Maintenance Aircraft Related

Automotive 

Other Equipment 

Electronic Repair Communications-Radio 

Communications-Navigation 

Electronic Instruments 

Technical & Misc Civil Affairs 

NBC Specialists 

Memorial Activities 

Administrative/ 

Functional Support 

Information and Education 

Data Processing 

Finance 

Health Care Medical Care 

Physicians

Nurses

7 
Table 2. Selected Higher Stressed Specialties 

OFFICER

SPECIALTIES

% OF RESERVE 

INVENTORY CALLED-UP

RESERVE COMPONENT % 

OF TOTAL FORCE

INVENTORY

Civil Affairs 56 72 

Police 51 45

Intelligence 48 37

Fixed Wing Pilots/Crews 42 33 

ENLISTED

SPECIALTIES

% OF RESERVE 

INVENTORY CALLED-UP

RESERVE COMPONENT % 

OF TOTAL FORCE

INVENTORY

Installation Security 86 30 

Law Enforcement 69 44 

Air Crews 67 25 

Special Forces 65 24 

Duration 

Duration is the amount of time for which Reserve component 

members are called up—the duration of the mobilization tour. The 

data on this factor revealed that tour lengths have increased. For 

example, in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the average tour 

length was 156 days. For regional contingencies such as Kosovo, 

Southwest Asia, and Bosnia, the majority of tours between 1996 and 

2003, were 200 days or more. For recent operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, most tours were 300 days or more. Importantly, of the 

approximately 300,000 Reserve component members called up for 

these operations, about 10 percent, or 30,000, have been extended 

from one to two-year tours. More extensions are likely. 

The data suggest that overall, the frequency of deployments is 

moderate to low; the percentage of inventory used is moderate to 

high, with the highest stress factors concentrated in selected career 

fields; and the duration of deployments is also moderate to high. 

Thus, force rebalancing—or more specifically, changing the mix of Active 

and Reserve forces—is necessary in some areas, but in other areas innovative 

management actions may be sufficient to reduce stress. Those areas where 

force rebalancing may be necessary are few—we estimate only about 

8 
10 to 12 percent of the force—and are concentrated in select career 

fields. 

APPROACHES TO REBALANCING 

Easing the stress on the Guard and Reserve requires a multifaceted approach—no single solution will resolve the challenges 

faced by the Services. Three approaches, as described in the 

December 2002 Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National 

Defense, should be the focus of the Services’ efforts to rebalance the 

force. They are: 

 Enhance early responsiveness 

 Resolve stressed career fields 

 Employ innovative management practices 

A number of assumptions underlie how these approaches will be 

implemented by the Services. These assumptions address end 

strength considerations, expected operational tempo, and choices 

about how Active and Reserve component forces will be employed. 

More specifically: 

 Existing end strengths should be properly 

distributed and utilized before recommending an 

increase in end strength. 

 The allocation of capabilities both within and 

between the Active and Reserve components may 

change. 

 The steady state for the next three to five years will 

find the Reserve components supporting operations 

NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and 

IRAQI FREEDOM, and other posture of engagement 

operations with a total of about 100,000-150,000 

personnel. This requirement will be filled primarily 

by Army Guard and Reserve component forces, but 

all Reserve components will contribute. 

9 
 Mobilizations of up to one year or more will be the 

norm for Reserve component members during the 

next three to five years. 

 The early conflict phase of future operations will be 

met by immediate response forces consisting of both 

Active and Reserve components, with a minimal use 

of involuntary mobilization. 

The sections that follow discuss the Services’ force rebalancing 

initiatives, both ongoing as well as those proposed in the fiscal year 

2005 budget.3 

ENHANCE EARLY RESPONSIVENESS

As stated in the assumptions above, during the early phases of a 

conflict, both Active and Reserve component forces will be among the 

early responders. However, the Services have reviewed their 

requirements and are structuring their forces to reduce the need for 

involuntary mobilizations during the early stages of a rapid-response 

operation using the initial 15 days as the planning metric. Through a 

variety of measures, the Services are positioning themselves to rely 

more on Active structure, Reserve component volunteers, and 

enhanced readiness to meet early response requirements. 

ARMY

The Army’s force structure rebalancing efforts are indicative of its 

emphasis on joint and expeditionary operational capabilities. The 

Army conducted an analysis of various rapid-response scenarios and 

identified areas where rebalancing and innovative management were 

needed. As a result of this analysis, the Army is converting 5,600 

spaces of lower priority active structure to higher priority active 

 

3 Because of the unique relationship between DoD and the U.S. Coast Guard in supporting 

combat operations in the Global War on Terrorism and conducting maritime homeland

security operations, the rebalancing initiatives of the Coast Guard are included in this 

report in Appendix A. 

10 
structure. These conversions will add capabilities in chemical, 

military police, engineer (bridging and fire fighting units), medical, 

quartermaster (fuel, water, and mortuary affairs units), and 

transportation specialties. The conversion will take place over 

several years, with the Army converting 800 spaces in fiscal year 

2004, 2,200 spaces in fiscal year 2005, and an additional 2,600 spaces 

between fiscal years 2006-2009. The Army is further developing 

plans to convert an additional 129 spaces of active force structure in

fiscal year 2005 in the transportation and medical specialties. In 

addition, the Army supports current efforts to increase accessibility 

and flexibility of Reserve component capabilities during the early 

phases of an operation. 

To ensure that the Army remains capable of providing ready 

forces in a timely fashion, particularly in the key opening days of any 

major deployment, an increased emphasis on modularity is being 

integrated into force structure planning and doctrine. Modularity 

permits detaching selected functions and capabilities from a parent 

unit and tailoring the capabilities of the detached assets to meet the 

unique needs of the force. Modularity provides a combatant 

commander with a force that is interchangeable, expandable, and 

responsive to changing requirements. 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The Navy and Marine Corps envision support to rapid-response 

operations coming from those forces already forward deployed or 

capable of being surged. The Navy has taken a proactive approach to 

minimizing involuntary mobilizations through the following actions: 

 Added over 7,200 new Active component and over 

1,800 Reserve component antiterrorism/force 

protection billets primarily for ship and port security 

to meet Force Protection Condition (FPCON) “B” 

and the first 60 days of FPCON “C” without 

mobilization 

 Established new Reserve Flexible Drilling Contracts 

Programs that will be especially valuable in helping 

11 
to meet the Navy’s Reserve medical program 

requirements 

 Proposed Naval Reserve Component First Call 

Program which allows rapid accessing of a limited 

number of key Selected Reservists through 

volunteerism 

 Ensured adequate additional funding to maintain a 

high state of readiness for high demand units and 

individual skills such as those required by the 

organic fleet airlift units (VR) 

Typically, mobilization of Marine Corps Reserve forces is only 

necessary for large-scale contingencies. For rapid-response 

operations, the majority of reserve unit deployments are tied to 

combatant commander requirements beyond the early stages of a 

rapid-response operation. One exception is units associated with the 

Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) Fly-in-Echelon. In a rapidresponse operation, Marine Corps Reserve personnel could be 

activated through volunteerism for the early phase of operations to 

assist in the preparation and offload of MPF equipment. Other 

reservists deployed within the early stages of an operation are 

generally individuals who augment Marine and joint staff 

headquarters without the need for involuntary mobilization. 

AIR FORCE

With its focus on joint and expeditionary forces, the Air Force 

integrates its Reserve components into every aspect of the Air Force 

mission. Air Reserve components are fully engaged in full-time, 

daily missions and operations. Volunteers from the Reserve 

components provide between 15 and 25 percent of the capability 

embedded in the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF). Because 

the Air Force is organized around readily deployable units, it is able 

to source, deploy, and tailor forces to meet theater requirements 

without full-scale mobilization. Based on their “one tier of readiness” 

concept, all components whether Active, Guard, or Reserve are ready 

to deploy globally within 72 hours. 

12 
During the AEF planning process, reserve volunteers are solicited 

to fill requirements. This force rotation process is a key to the Air 

Force’s ability to use volunteers for sustained periods of time without 

mobilization. At the same time, the Air Force is continuing to pioneer 

new policies and practices that support volunteerism in order to 

improve the rotational pool available to the AEF and preclude the 

need for early involuntary mobilizations. One area of particular 

interest is Reserve component support and availability to 

TRANSCOM since the Air Reserve components make up 53 percent 

of TRANSCOM’s capabilities and provide approximately 25 percent 

of strategic airlift support on a continuous, ongoing basis. Air 

Reserve component intelligence squadrons are also making 

significant mission contributions since they are integral to Air Force 

mission tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination of 

intelligence data related to the Predator and Global Hawk. 

RESOLVE STRESSED CAREER FIELDS

Under the current level of operational tempo, each Service has 

experienced high demand for some capabilities and career specialties, 

which have required resolution. Some of the Services were able to

identify rebalancing requirements early and have already 

programmed initial efforts to address stressed career fields; other 

Services are putting plans in place for the near term years ahead. 

ARMY

As part of its transformation efforts, the Army identified certain 

parts of the force that were likely to experience excessive stress in the 

changing global security environment. Beginning in 2001, the Army 

reprogrammed over 30,000 spaces in the Active and Reserve 

components. Almost 3,000 of these conversions were implemented in 

fiscal year 2003, providing additional capabilities in the areas of civil 

affairs, psychological operations, special operations forces, 

intelligence, and military police. In addition, the Army has 

accelerated the conversion of 2,000 National Guard field artillery 

spaces to military police in fiscal year 2004. Over 4,000 additional

13 
Reserve component spaces have also been identified in the military 

police, transportation, quartermaster, and medical specialties and will 

be converted beginning in fiscal year 2005. 

The Army continues to develop rebalancing initiatives that could 

result in the conversion of an additional 3,600 reserve spaces in the 

special forces and military police specialties across the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP). Beginning in fiscal year 2006, the Army 

will undertake a major rebalancing effort involving over 80,000 

spaces to further relieve stress on the force and continue to improve 

its Reserve component capabilities and readiness. For example, the 

Army Guard Restructuring Initiative will convert approximately 

14,000 heavy combat brigade forces to more agile and useful Mobile 

Light Brigade forces. All of these actions posture the Army to 

achieve its goals of relieving stress on high demand career specialties 

by building a larger rotational base and rebuilding a lighter and more 

flexible force structure, thereby adding additional capabilities and

improving the readiness of existing forces. 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The Navy began rebalancing forces following the October 12, 2000 

attack on the USS COLE. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Navy 

recruited and converted 4,477 active sailors and 2,300 Naval 

reservists to the security force career field. This rebalancing effort 

continues into fiscal year 2005, with 1,200 additional active 

recruitments and conversions to the security force career field. In 

addition, the Navy has converted 1,275 active spaces to its Naval 

Coastal Warfare units, and 500 active spaces to its medical career 

fields. In fiscal year 2004, the Navy rescinded an earlier decision to 

decommission an active Seabee battalion, and instead 

decommissioned several reserve Seabee units as a neutral cost action. 

As a result, the Navy retained the ability to meet the construction 

requirements of the first 60 days of surge using active Seabee forces. 

In fiscal year 2004, the Navy plans to rebalance its hospital 

corpsman capability by converting 525 vacant and non-corpsman 

reserve billets to active corpsman billets. These corpsmen are 

14 
specifically designated for assignment to Marine Corps combat units 

and will ease the pressure on the reserve corpsman career specialty 

experienced in recent deployments. The existing reserve corpsmen 

billets will continue to be used to support Marine Corps combat units 

that deploy later in a conflict and to backfill positions vacated by 

Active component corpsmen deployed with the Marines. 

Additionally, there are several ongoing efforts to relieve stress in the 

naval intelligence field. 

The Marine Corps stood up one Air Naval Gunfire Liaison 

Company in the Active component in fiscal year 2003, and will man 

two additional Active component companies in fiscal years 2004–

2005. Where previously this capability resided entirely within the 

Marine Corps Reserve, there is now a mix of 55 percent Active and 45 

percent Reserve forces, relieving stress in this capability area. In 

fiscal year 2004, fixed-wing aviation will be rebalanced as a result of 

tactical air integration with the reassignment of 93 Active Reserve 

personnel from a Reserve component squadron to the Active force. 

The Marine Corps also created the Intelligence Support Battalion 

(ISB) to consolidate command and control of reserve intelligence 

assets which will increase the number of reserve intelligence billets as 

early as fiscal year 2005. As a result, more of these specialists can be 

used to support real-world intelligence requirements, with the added 

benefit of improved career progression opportunities for reserve 

intelligence specialists. In fiscal year 2005, ISB detachments will be 

established and drill at 12 of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers 

located nationwide. 

Future actions include the establishment of two additional 

Reserve component military police companies and four new reserve 

anti-terrorism/force protection companies (approximating 1,000 

additional Reserve component security personnel). To meet the 

requirement for civil affairs personnel during ONE/OEF/OIF, the 

Reserve component civil affairs units operated with overstaff 

personnel within existing Reserve component end strength. A 

rebalancing course of action has been identified to increase the size of 

the units as well as to integrate active personnel into this stressed 

field. 

15 
The heavy use of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve since 

September 11, 2001, was ameliorated by the use of the Individual 

Ready Reserve (IRR). The activation rate of the entire Ready Reserve 

was 17 percent. Continued study is warranted to ensure the Marine 

Corps IRR has the appropriate mix of career fields and grades to be 

able to relieve stressed career fields in the future. 

AIR FORCE

Air Force efforts to address stress on the force date back to the 

months immediately following September 11, 2001. Systematic 

assessment tools were developed and used to identify areas of stress 

on the force. The Air Force took both programmatic and nonprogrammatic actions in its initial rebalancing efforts, including 

manpower and personnel realignments to the most stressed career

fields, utilization of technology to offset manpower requirements, 

and training pipeline adjustments. Two areas of notable concern are 

addressed below. 

The Air Force has already begun to reduce stress in the security 

force specialty by adding 500 civilian positions and 400 contractor 

guards in fiscal year 2004, and has plans to convert an additional 

2,700 military positions for selected force protection functions 

through the FYDP. In addition, the Air Force is using technology to 

offset up to 3,000 security force requirements and has invested $351.7 

million in fiscal year 2003 to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf 

technologies to improve force protection. Currently, the Army is 

providing force protection assistance to the Air Force in a unique 

joint venture that bridges the Air Force shortfall in capability until 

rebalancing and innovative management solutions can take effect. 

The Air Force will continue to plan and program for the integration 

of these technologies, provide a more effective protection capability, 

and further reduce its manpower requirements. 

Due to the stress on C-130 pilots and crews, the Air Force has been

authorized to mobilize up to 3,086 additional aircrew and support 

personnel, if required, to support a C-130 intra-theater rotation plan 

under the Air and Space Expeditionary Force concept for the next 

16 
two years. This rotation plan will support current known airlift 

requirements while the Air Force develops and implements a variety 

of mitigation proposals designed to alleviate the need for mobilized 

forces. Current proposals include validating current airlift 

requirements; giving incentives to volunteers; and optimizing the use 

of contract, intratheater, and strategic airlift. A review of Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet capabilities is also underway. Greater use of 

commercial assets in low-threat environments will provide improved 

availability of military aircraft for higher threat/priority missions. 

EMPLOY INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

By employing innovative force management practices, the 

Services can perhaps achieve the greatest degree of flexibility in 

utilizing the Total Force, while reducing the stress on critical career 

fields and the need for involuntary mobilization. Each Service is 

unique. Approaches such as the continuum of service, reachback, 

improved predictability through rotational overseas presence, as well 

as improvements in the mobilization process, can help to ensure that 

the Services have access to individuals with the skills and capabilities 

required for both emergent operations and sustained, day-to-day 

activities. 

Several of the approaches discussed in this section will require 

changes to current laws. The Department of Defense is working on 

legislative proposals for inclusion in its fiscal year 2005 Omnibus 

Legislative Program that support the continuum of service concept 

and a new mobilization training approach. These proposals, if 

enacted, will make it easier for Reserve component members to 

support military operations on both a voluntary and involuntary 

basis as well as improve responsiveness and effectiveness. 

17 
CONTINUUM OF SERVICE

One innovative management practice is a new availability and 

service paradigm, called the continuum of service, that provides 

individual service members greater flexibility in becoming involved

in and supporting the Department’s mission. The continuum of 

service sets aside the traditional definitions of Active and Reserve 

components, as described on the left side of figure 4, and recognizes 

that service may range from full-time duty to availability in the event 

of mobilization without participation in military training or 

performance of duty on a regular basis. Between these extremes is a 

pool of individuals who may participate at varying levels of service 

throughout a career, as depicted on the right side of figure 4, moving 

along the continuum as circumstances in their lives and needs of the 

Department evolve. Movement along the continuum should be 

transparent, or seamless, and supported by a continuum of benefits 

that match service member contributions. 

Traditional 

Reservists

39 Days

Full Time

365 days

TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE

• Separate systems; difficult to

transition between them

• RC employed using multiple

authorities 

• Mobilization or “workarounds”

needed for extended duty

beyond minimum obligation

• Multiple management

organizations

FUTURE STRUCTURE

Continuum of Service

Full Time

365 days

Variable

RC Pool

40-365 days

Traditional

Reservists

39 Days

New Affiliation

Programs

0-38 days

• Single system with ability to move between

full-time and part-time status

• Improves capability to manage workforce in

flexible manner

• Enhances ability to access “volunteers” and

attract civilian skills from outside

• “Contracts” with variable pool members set

expectations and improve access

• Reduces need for involuntary mobilization

• Potential to merge duplicative structures

Figure 4. The Continuum of Service 

The continuum of service focuses on all classes of affiliation: 

active status members of the force such as ready reservists, inactive 

status members such as military retirees, as well as civilians who 

18 
want to contribute their services. At issue is the need for programs 

that facilitate access to these individuals and their capabilities. 

Active status members of the force may be accessed through 

volunteerism—either by individual or unit. Inactive status members 

of the force can be accessed through affiliated unit programs and 

civilian auxiliaries. The Services are beginning to put in place 

initiatives that will incorporate the continuum of service concept into 

their force management practices and gain better accessibility to these 

individuals. However, to fully realize this concept, new personnel 

management and accounting legislative initiatives must be made into 

law. 

Personnel Management and Accounting 

Perhaps the most significant legislative initiative included in the 

Omnibus Legislative Program is a proposal to amend title 10 (and 

some relatively minor changes to title 32) of the U.S. Code to provide 

for more consistent management of and accounting for Reserve 

component members. Current practices are often convoluted and in 

many cases discourage participation by reservists beyond the 

traditional 39-day training requirement. Instead, the proposed 

amendments will eliminate barriers to changing levels of contribution 

and reward, rather than discourage additional service during a 

career. Key elements of this proposal are as follows: 

 Establish a separate strength category for Reserve 

component members serving on active duty or fulltime National Guard duty. (This does not include 

Active Guard and Reserve personnel who already 

have a separate strength authorization.) Specifically, 

this proposal eliminates the 180-day rule, which has 

been a major barrier to effectively employing Guard 

and Reserve personnel. Instead, all reserve 

personnel on active duty in support of a contingency 

operation would automatically be authorized as 

additional strength under this category—which 

provides visibility of the demand for reservists 

19 
without discouraging their use. No grade 

limitations would be imposed. 

 Keep reserve personnel who are paid from Active 

component appropriations and are on active duty 

for fewer than 1,095 days (three years) out of the 

preceding 1,460 days (four years) under the reserve 

personnel management system. Only when this 

threshold is exceeded, would a reservist be treated 

as an Active component asset for personnel and 

career management and strength accounting 

purposes. (This particular provision also does not 

affect Active Guard and Reserve personnel.) 

A second proposal would update the purpose of the Reserve 

components to reflect their current relevance in today’s force. The 

Reserve force is no longer used “during and after planned 

mobilization” [10 USC 10102], but instead is an integral part of many 

daily military operations. The legislative proposal accurately reflects 

this expanded role of the National Guard and Reserves in the Total 

Force. 

Another legislative proposal would change inactive duty training 

to inactive duty. This change is the first step in streamlining and 

reducing the number of statuses under which Reserve component 

members may perform duty. Under this proposal, unit commanders 

would have greater latitude to train and employ Reserve component 

members in an inactive duty status, and, in particular, to capitalize on 

technology that enables members to perform duty away from the 

traditional worksite. Mission requirements that are not classified and 

do not require direct supervision could be performed by Guard or

Reserve members at their home or alternate location. Inactive duty is 

an ideal means of accomplishing “virtual duty.” 

Individual Volunteerism 

By promoting volunteerism, the Services can better position 

themselves to meet some of the sudden requirements that emerge 

during times of national emergency. Many skills that are useful to 

the uniformed military are difficult to acquire through traditional 

20 
accession policies, are difficult to acquire on short notice, or have 

emerging requirements of limited duration. These skills might 

include cutting edge, technical skills such as those possessed by 

engineers, scientists, or information technology professionals. 

The Department needs to allow the Services greater flexibility in 

accessing civilians who have skills that can meet military 

requirements but who do not fit the traditional career-oriented 

profiles generally recruited by the Services. Many individuals are 

willing to volunteer for some form of military service for short 

periods of time or in response to specific emergencies. Often they are 

not motivated by financial compensation but by other incentives such 

as accelerated U.S. citizenship or simply a sense of patriotism. By 

accessing “ready volunteers” through direct entry programs, the 

Services can acquire additional manpower without affecting end 

strength, realize cost savings in certain specialty skills, open new 

avenues for developing community partnerships with industry and 

academia, and increase opportunities for using retirees. 

Several pilot programs have been established for the Reserve 

components to test direct entry concepts into the IRR. These 

programs target civilians who already possess “uniform-required”

skills and require little or no initial career sub-specialty training. 

 The Army’s Arab Linguist Program is focused on 

recruiting native Arab speakers into the IRR. These 

individuals are available for immediate mobilization 

and military service overseas once they complete 

their basic training. Since the program’s inception in 

August, 2003, the Army has successfully recruited 

120 native Arab speakers, exceeding its recruiting 

goal. Trained soldiers will soon be provided to 

combatant commanders to serve as translators and 

language facilitators for the military. 

 The Defense Wireless Service Initiative, that has 

recently been implemented, is aimed at attracting 

spectrum managers and wireless engineers into the 

military. Studies suggest that there is a significant 

pool of individuals in these highly technical fields 

21 
who are willing to apply their skills to military 

requirements. Once connectivity channels are in 

place, individuals accessed through this initiative 

will be able to participate remotely with flexible drill 

schedules that allow them to balance the demands of 

their civilian careers with the requirements of 

military service. 

Two legislative proposals are also designed to enhance the 

accession and deployment of individuals with unique or special 

skills. These proposals address expedited basic training requirements 

and the service obligation. 

 The Secretaries of the military departments would 

be able to establish expedited basic training (or 

equivalent training) requirements for a wider range 

of professionals in designated skill areas. This 

legislation would provide the same flexibility in 

determining the basic training requirement that is 

currently provided in law for healthcare 

professionals. 

 The Service Secretaries would be authorized to 

establish the minimum military service obligation 

for individuals accessed into the armed forces who 

have unique skills acquired in a civilian occupation, 

rather than imposing the existing six to eight year 

military service obligation. Since these individuals 

would be accessed because of their unique civilianacquired, cutting-edge skills and experience, there is 

no training investment, which helps to justify a 

shorter obligation period. 

Finally, legislation has been introduced to allow the Coast Guard 

Auxiliary and the Civil Air Patrol to transform into fully functioning 

service auxiliaries. The proposed legislation provides for other 

Services to develop their own auxiliaries as well. Service auxiliaries 

can provide a ready source of civilian volunteers who are trained to 

Service standards to perform a broad variety of missions. They also 

serve as a natural umbrella, if properly resourced, for the formation, 

22 
coordination, and execution of civilian volunteers wishing to provide 

service during times of national emergency or in response to 

homeland security threats. Auxiliaries provide an extremely costeffective bridge between civilian and military service and are a readymade model for retiree participation and volunteerism. 

Unit Volunteerism 

Another concept associated with volunteerism is the Variable Pool 

of Reserves (VPR) at the unit level. “VPR-Unit Level” builds on the 

positive aspects of volunteerism that are already present within the 

Reserve components at the individual level and applies them to the 

unit in order to increase the responsiveness of and access to reserve 

units needed in the early phases of an operation or to meet 

predictable overseas presence or other missions that are rotational in 

nature. Employing unit-level volunteerism is not meant to replace 

traditional processes to mobilize Reserve component personnel or

units for duty under appropriate mobilization authorization. Rather, 

reserve members would voluntarily participate in units with higher

readiness levels and deployment requirements, without being 

constrained by the current structure of the traditional 39-day training 

program for reservists. 

The VPR-Unit Level concept appears to be an advantageous 

option to the Department for accessing Reserve component 

capabilities. Initial evaluations suggest that force-generation or forceenabler type mission areas and “prime the pump” or “early 

responder” unit types are very compatible with this concept. An 

example of such a unit that has achieved outstanding results over the 

years is the 193rd Special Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air 

National Guard (Commando Solo) in which 100 percent of the Air 

Force’s psychological operations capability resides. Other mission 

areas being examined for applicability include stability operations

missions, reachback operations, and homeland defense requirements. 

Unit types being looked at for VPR include cargo handlers, 

psychological operations units, and security forces. 

23 
ROTATIONAL OVERSEAS PRESENCE

The predictability and long lead time associated with rotational 

overseas presence allows for substantial planning and preparation of 

units, individual service members, their families, and their 

employers. Thus, it is an attractive mission in which to use Reserve 

component units. By using reservists for rotational overseas 

presence, Active component units are free to support rapid-response 

requirements that may arise and the Services are able to better 

manage the operational tempo of the Total Force. Each of the 

Services has ongoing or planned activities in this area. 

The Army has developed long-range plans for the use of Reserve 

components in stability and support operations such as Bosnia, 

Kosovo, and the Sinai; and is developing plans for Operations 

NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. 

The Navy uses the “fleet response” concept to maximize the 

employment of resources while maintaining a sustainable overseas 

presence level. Naval Reserve logistics support plays a significant 

role in the Navy’s overseas presence posture. The Naval Reserve 

contains 88 percent of the Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift 

capability, and these assets are fully integrated into the continuum of 

Navy airlift requirements. The Naval Reserve maintains 13 aircraft at 

overseas bases and in fiscal year 2003 only required mobilization of 

11 percent of the community due to the high level of volunteerism. 

During this period they flew over 7,000 missions with a 99 percent 

completion rate. The Naval Reserve also provides 40 percent of the 

Navy’s maritime patrol capability. The Naval Reserve maintains 

three of the Navy’s 40 deployed maritime patrol aircraft using only 

volunteers as crew. 

The Marine Corps Reserve has assumed responsibility for 

supporting the UNITAS exercise every other year to provide 

operational tempo relief for the active duty Marine Corps and for 

supporting one Guantanamo Bay security platoon every year to 

provide operational tempo relief for the active duty Fleet 

Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST). The Marine Corps is 

24 
investigating other courses of action for employing rotational Reserve 

component forces. 

The Air Force uses the AEF concept to provide for a fully 

integrated Active and Reserve force that is trained and ready to meet 

national commitments. Air Reserve component personnel and units 

are aligned with and scheduled with Air and Space Expeditionary 

Forces in the same way as the Active Air Force. Air Reserve 

components provide about 25 percent of the aviation requirements 

and 13 percent of the expeditionary combat support requirements. 

The AEF uses a rotational approach to provide predictability and 

stability and enhances Total Force readiness and sustainment. 

REACHBACK INITIATIVES

In an effort to reduce the number of forward deployed personnel 

needed to support combat troops during an operation, DoD has taken 

a closer look at mission areas that might be accomplished remotely 

using a concept called “reachback.” Reachback refers to the ability to 

connect electronically to sites in CONUS or other locations around

the world to accomplish essential tasks and missions. By employing 

reachback, the in-theater force can be both smaller and more agile, 

while corresponding combat support and physical security 

requirements are also reduced. Reachback can also provide 

additional capabilities to the combatant commander without 

requiring additional mobilizations. By using computer connectivity, 

reserve units and individuals can provide mission support during 

drill periods as well as on short-duration active duty tours. This 

innovative concept adds tremendous value to operational missions, 

as the following examples illustrate: 

 The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program is comprised 

of 27 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC) 

located in CONUS where reservists provide mission 

support to supported commands. During Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, USCENTCOM used mobilized 

reservists in JRICs to perform targeting, bomb 

damage assessment, and imagery exploitation 

25 
functions. This construct provided ready forces 

that contributed to mission accomplishment while 

easing the burdens and costs associated with 

deploying members directly into the theater of 

operations. 

 The Marine Corps Reserve used reachback to 

support intelligence requirements during recent 

combat operations in Afghanistan. Brig. Gen. 

Michael E. Ennis, the Marine Corps' Director of 

Intelligence, stated that being able to use reachback 

for intelligence support in planning operations 

contributed significantly to the success of the 

deployed Marine Task Force and to the overall U.S. 

effort in the early stages of Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM. 

 After the terrorists’ attacks of September 11, 2001, 

personnel from three Air National Guard Imagery 

Intelligence Squadrons were activated and deployed 

to support the Air Combat Command at Langley 

and Beale AFB. Air Guard personnel were 

indispensable in supporting Air Force Global Hawk 

tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination 

operations from their deployed locations. The 

collection was accomplished in theater and the 

exploitation was conducted remotely using 

reachback. 

 The Army uses the Reserve components to provide 

reachback support in split-based operations at its 

Theater Support Commands and Corps Materiel 

Management Center. The Army has extensively 

employed its reserves in support of telemedicine for 

nearly all types of medical units. Additionally, the 

Army Reserve Unit – Consequence Management 

provides technical expertise on chemical and 

biological matters through reachback to deployed 

Technical Escort Units. 

26 
To build on these early successes, the Secretary of Defense 

recently established a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), 

chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration, to identify additional opportunities and 

mission areas where reachback can be employed. The GOSC will 

focus specifically on tasks that can be accomplished through 

connectivity to CONUS locations and will develop a “roadmap” and 

initial capabilities description document for implementation in the

2004–2010 timeframe. 

MOBILIZATION PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS

Since September 11, 2001, many improvements have been made in 

the mobilization process. From the establishment of standards that 

define judicious and prudent use, to improving visibility of reserve 

forces being activated, the mobilization process in its modified form 

is much more efficient than the one used to activate reserve members 

at the start of the Global War on Terrorism. These improvements are 

steps along the way to replacing a linear process with a collaborative, 

simultaneous, and balanced mobilization process that is responsive to 

the nation’s needs for reserve forces on active duty. 

Judicious and Prudent Use 

Clearly defining judicious and prudent use of reserve forces has 

provided the necessary guidance to ensure that reserve capabilities 

are used as an extension of the Department’s capability to wage war, 

not simply additional Active component end strength. Judicious and 

prudent use encourages volunteerism and the activation of members 

not previously used in the Global War on Terrorism. It underscores 

the need to use alternative manpower sources, to the extent they are 

legally and practically available—such as contractors, coalition forces, 

or foreign nationals—as well as technological solutions in lieu of 

reserve manpower. The use of alternate manpower sources reduced 

the need for reserve combat support and combat service support for 

OIF II by 35 percent, demonstrating the impact this policy has had on 

the mobilization process. 

27 
Individual Ready Reserve 

Access to the Individual Ready Reserve is being redefined to 

make IRR members a more viable source of military manpower and 

to provide greater depth of capabilities. Efforts on the part of the 

Services to reconnect with their IRR members and to clarify their 

mission and expectations will reduce the amount of cross leveling 

needed between units to prepare for mobilization. Reconnecting and 

redefining the role of the IRR will play a major role in shaping how 

the IRR is used in the 21st century. 

Approval Process 

Since the start of the Global War on Terrorism, the mobilization 

process has improved at all levels. The time it takes to generate, 

source, and approve a Reserve component capability for mobilization 

has been greatly reduced. During OIF I, the staffing process used to 

present Reserve component mobilization requests to the Secretary of 

Defense was modified so that requests could be presented within 24 

hours of approval by the Joint Staff and the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Requests at the Service level 

that initially took weeks to process can now be presented for decision 

to the Service Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

in days and in some cases hours, as shown in figure 5. The figure 

shows that a year ago the mobilization process took up to 123 days. 

Today that timeline has been shortened to no longer than 93 days. 

Visibility 

Since September 11, 2001, each Service has implemented 

automated systems to improve the visibility of activated reserve 

members. These improved legacy automation systems enhance the 

ability of the Services to meet mobilization requirements and are 

contributing to the long-term effort to provide a joint solution for 

operational visibility of the Reserve force. 

28 
Predictability 

Standards for the predictable use of reserve forces are guiding the 

Services toward rotational models and have had a significant 

influence on efforts to provide Reserve component members with 30 

days notification prior to activation. With predictability, the Services 

can maximize the efficiency of inactive training periods and shorten 

the time it takes between mobilization and arrival of forces in theater. 

In some cases, combat support and combat service support units have 

been able to deploy directly into theater from their home stations. As 

the concept of predictability matures, the delivery time between 

activation and deployment will continue to be reduced. 

FORCE REQUIREMENT

0 / 30 0 / 30 *

Component Commander identifies

force requirements; Consideration of

alternate manpower sources;

Combatant Commander generates

Request For Forces (RFF)

VALIDATION/SOURCING

31 / 90 31 / 60

Joint Staff runs validation process and

considers alternate manpower sources;

Services source the requirement;

SecDef approves Deployment Order;

Services notify Congress and units

RFF Alert Order

MOBILIZATION

91 / 93 ** Personnel Readiness/Medical/Dental

Post-Mob Readiness Enhancements

Mobilized Deployed

91 / 120 30-day notification 61 / 90

Notified Mobilized

ALERT

121 / 123**

Sept 01 – Nov 02 Nov 02 – Nov 03

* Consideration of alternate in-theater manpower sources before generating a request

for forces keeps the time at 30 days.

** Post mobilization training requirements vary by capability

Figure 5. Mobilization Timelines 

29 
Train, mobilize, deploy

Today’s National Security Strategy calls for swift, potentially 

preemptive action that requires more rapid access to Reserve 

component forces than in the past. Although the ability to respond 

rapidly varies among Reserve forces, all Reserve forces need to be 

trained and ready prior to starting the mobilization process to 

deploy. All too often during the Global War on Terrorism, combatant 

commanders’ requirements were met by either creating new units 

through cross leveling from other units or providing additional 

training. Creating new units breaks the readiness of the units left 

behind and disrupts unit cohesion. Providing additional training 

during the mobilization process can slow the mobilization process 

significantly. 

One solution to this problem is to increase training resources. 

However, resources are not the only solution to deploying cohesive 

organizations with increased unit integrity and morale. Timing of 

the training is also an issue. 

The Department has submitted a legislative proposal that will add 

flexibility to the traditional training program by promoting a “train, 

mobilize, and deploy” concept. Under this proposal, individuals or 

units may be mobilized for training related to their mobilization 

mission in advance of being mobilized to deploy. This approach 

would provide reservists increased access to the training they need to 

be able to deploy with their unit, thereby minimizing the need to 

cross level personnel between units. It would allow for better 

planning of training requirements and spread the demand on 

training facilities and materials more evenly throughout the year. 

Additionally, the predictable, planned nature of this method of 

training would reduce the duration of extended mobilizations and 

the related disruptions to members, their families, and employers. 

30 
THE WAY AHEAD

The military Services have successfully met the demands of the 

Global War on Terrorism and won a number of great victories. In 

doing so, it has become evident that changes are needed to better 

optimize the force to fight this new kind of war. This report has 

summarized the major rebalancing efforts underway and planned in 

fiscal year 2005 and beyond. 

As the Services continue to develop and refine approaches to 

reduce stress on the Reserve components, they will face a number of 

challenges. One of the greatest challenges for the Services is 

constructing a military force structure against an unknown or 

changing threat. Improvements are needed in defining requirements 

for capabilities. As the War on Terrorism ensues, the Services must 

closely monitor what capabilities are needed and ensure they are 

properly resourced in the force structure. 

A critical and related challenge is determining the right mix of 

Active and Reserve forces needed to meet the requirements of the 

operational commanders without causing undue stress on any 

particular component of the force. The Services must monitor 

changes in stress on the force and evaluate whether their rebalancing 

initiatives are having the right effect. They must also ensure that 

programmed initiatives complement the modifications made to date. 

Importantly, the Department must continue to refine the analytical 

tools that will improve the Services’ ability to accurately determine 

future requirements and distribution of capabilities across the force. 

Lessons learned from current operations are needed to inform the 

discussion about whether a modification is needed to the current 

force planning metrics described herein. 

As the process of rebalancing proceeds, it will be essential to 

monitor the effects of these efforts and, in particular, to evaluate 

whether increases in end strength are required. It is too soon to reach 

a definitive conclusion on whether more end strength is needed. But 

as the Services continue to implement and evaluate rebalancing 

initiatives, they will gain a better understanding of whether increases 

in end strength might be necessary. 

31 
There are additional steps that can be undertaken today to ease 

the pressure on the force and set the conditions for success in the 

future. They include implementation of the continuum of service, 

greater use of volunteerism, and continued efforts to improve the 

mobilization process. In addition, there are many opportunities for 

further innovation in management processes beyond those currently 

in place and proposed in legislation. Rebalancing efforts such as 

these are part of a process of implementing and evaluating changes in 

force mix as the threat evolves and places new demands on the force. 

32 
APPENDIX A. COAST GUARD REBALANCING INITIATIVES

The Coast Guard has relied heavily on Selected Reservists since 

September 11, 2001, to carry out its maritime homeland security 

duties and support combatant commanders overseas. Today the 

Coast Guard is increasing its Active and Selected Reserve forces to

ensure a more agile and flexible response to future contingencies. 

Unique among the federal Services, the Secretary of the Department 

of Homeland Security has the authority under title 14 of the U.S. 

Code to recall Coast Guard reservists for domestic emergencies, 

including actual or threatened terrorist attacks. Between October 

2001 and 2003, a cumulative total of over 5,400 Coast Guard 

reservists, or nearly 70 percent of the Service’s Selected Reserve were 

mobilized worldwide in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 

Over 1,000 Coast Guard personnel were deployed overseas in 

support of OIF, about half of them reservists. 

ENHANCE EARLY RESPONSIVENESS

The Coast Guard, initially under title 14 authority, relied heavily 

on its Port Security Units (PSUs) for early response to the September 

11, 2001 attacks, deploying units to safeguard New York, Boston and 

Los Angeles harbors and Puget Sound in the state of Washington. 

PSUs are reserve-staffed units intended to support combatant 

commanders overseas in strategic ports of debarkation, making them

a less-than-ideal fit for domestic security missions. Accordingly, in 

fiscal year 2002, in an effort to rebalance the force, the Coast Guard 

commissioned the first of several Maritime Safety and Security Teams 

(MSSTs) for domestic security operations. Each MSST has 71 Active 

component and 33 Selected Reserve members to ensure a flexible, 

rapid response to emergent security missions. Six additional MSSTs 

were commissioned in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and seven more are 

planned for fiscal year 2004. 

The Coast Guard has also placed increased emphasis on overall 

readiness, including implementation of systemic changes to ensure 

medical and dental examinations are current, to improve training and 

33 
tracking of personal qualifications, and to increase full-time support 

of the Reserve force. The Coast Guard is addressing mismatches 

between required billets and onboard strength and is working to fill 

undermanned ratings. These efforts are intended to ensure a rapid 

and balanced response to new contingencies while ensuring Active 

and Reserve forces are trained and ready for maritime homeland 

security missions under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 

2002. 

RESOLVE STRESSED CAREER FIELDS

I

Reservists in ratings associated with port security have been 

heavily impacted by the twin demands of maritime homeland 

security and Coast Guard support to combatant commanders. The 

commissioning of 15 Maritime Safety and Security Teams by the end 

of fiscal year 2004, is expected to significantly alleviate that burden. 

The Coast Guard Reserve is also working to increase strength in 

critical ratings, including boatswain’s mate, machinery technician 

and port security specialist. 

EMPLOY NNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 

The integration of virtually all Coast Guard reservists into Active 

component units during the mid-1990s has paid great dividends. 

Because approximately 85 percent of Coast Guard reservists are 

essentially individual mobilization augmentees, unit commanders 

enjoy the flexibility they require to leverage civilian and military 

skills through individual volunteerism. For instance, 85 percent of 

the reservists who are expected to be recalled to help implement the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 will be volunteers. 

Rotational Overseas Presence 

The commissioning of two additional Port Security Units in fiscal 

year 2004 is expected to provide greater flexibility in deployment of 

units overseas in support of combatant commanders. 

34 
Mobilization Process Improvements 

The Coast Guard has made a concerted effort to capture lessons 

learned from the post-September 2001 mobilizations to implement 

improvements in personnel readiness and the mobilization system. 

In addition, the adoption by the Coast Guard in the 1990s of a single 

pay and personnel system for the Active and Reserve components 

significantly reduced pay errors and other administrative problems 

previously associated with mobilization and demobilization of 

reservists. During fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard began 

consolidating all IRR records at the Coast Guard Personnel 

Command in Washington, D.C. Previously, 10 Integrated Support 

Commands throughout the United States kept IRR records. This 

move has already improved management and accountability of the 

IRR and enhanced its value as a mobilization resource. 

Better tracking of personnel readiness and qualifications, as well 

as measures to ensure command accountability for individual 

readiness, are expected to reduce the need to shift personnel among 

commands to ensure a unit is able to deploy. 

35