ocW No. S WO22 

A~usta Westla rod comments & the FAA SAR Modes 8-q dih 

Foreword The porhrhons ofthe FX.4 Special Condition are in red characters. 

Agusta W~thnd conwnents are in black characters 

(a) SIR F@hf rf. TIpe mpbd SIR mht rn- rnmtpmw: 

This requirement sounds like a request for a mode that is similar to what is provided in case of an 

aborted ILS approach. Any way some clarification is required 

Does this mode autdcally engage in case of an dmrted transition to Hover or should it 

be ~dly engaged by the pilot? If it needs to be mually engaged, what is the difference 

with respect to what is required in the previous point (2) 7 

Should this mode perform an automatic ascent and acceleration to an D?R flight condition or 

should it just disengage any coupled Flight Director mode ? 

Should the mode be made available only during automatic transition to Hover (i.e., 

Transition Down, Mark On Target) or should it be available in any flight condition with 

AFCS SAR mode engaged (Transition to Elover, Hover, Departure fkom Hover, Low Height 

Cruise flight, Search Pattern LNAV coupling) ? 

For which SAR system failure should the Go Around mode tnade available? 

AW does not concur with a requirement for a function that possibly perform an_autdc ascent in 

case of a detected Mure. This could be even an unsafe maneuver during Hover while operating on 

the winch. What has been specified in the EASA CRI B-03 "The automatic collective control 

should provide a high integrity function tkatjlia up whenever a SAR made is coup2ed and the 

aimraft is below the minimum srcjety height, ifnee& to sati& thefbrlwe demo~'m in $ G, 

2. The minimum height must not re& on crew setting on&" is a more generic requirement 

that mes the safety aspects induced by SAR operatimi at low height. 

Those requirements should be better clarified. Are the pilot-selected heading, l&uW and 

lateral ground speeds the sensor variables used by the AFCS or are they the pilot selected heading 

taad ground speed references ? Shouldn't bath the sensor variables and the AFCS rnode refhence6 

be to the crew? 
Why should the wind indication be available only when the autmdc modes are engaged, or 

tmmitiming &om om mode to another ? Wind information should be made available, 

hdqmdently from any AFCS engaged mode, at the beginning of the transition bm cruise to 

hover. 

(3) For any shgkp &/irm army mmbhahim uf~ilums OlCUlie 

AC 29-1329 d (5) explains how the deviations caused by a mdfunctiw should be evaluated during 

an ILS approach. The requirement profi~Wg &viation more than a specific threshold from the 

desired glide slope is based on the assumption that, within that thshold, a sufficient margin still 

remains clear fiom otrstructions. The penetration ofthe region below the specified threshold would 

result in the erosion of the safety margin and eventually m a catastrophic event ic when the mrargin 

is completely eroded, an okhuction is present. When between the specified threshold and the 

obstructionlterrain, the condition should be considered (not more h) hazardous due to a "large 

reduction in safety margins." 

Specifying that half of the MUH of a particular AFCS mode must not be exceeded implies that the 

remaining half provi&s the sufficient safety margin clear l?om obtmctim. The condition becomes 

potentially catastrophic only if, due to a malfunction, the entire height is lost and the slrrface is 

reached 

Therefore the above paragraph should be modified m a way that the fail- that are not shown to 

be extremely remote (a sa&y objective for hazardous failures) must not result in a loss of height 

that is greater than half of the MUH with a minimum of 15 feet above the surface. 

(4) A &w/ure Mr'6n fiat 13 rwt show fo be twtnwnw irn- musi h 

(i-g-, wwews &a h andhis of fhe rrrdib whirnew -, btxd4rg, and 

The in-£light demonmation of failures should be required only for failures that cannot be shown to h 

extremely remote. This rsquirerrmt, with respect to what is specified in the above paragraphs, would 

provide some deviation for the db&on flight didation. This should be allowed in ~idedon 
that SAR missions are normally conducted by trained pilots and, once the mission has begun, they 

should b able to complete the mission even aRer some malfunction has occurred in flight. 

In particular, due to the considerable crew workload that a SAR mission ndly reqd, it is 

considered important to pentnit coupling of the Flight Director modes even aRer a malfunction, 

affecting the AFCS (e.g. loss of one autopilot channel), has occurred The reddon ofpilot workload 

provided by a coupled Flight Director would considerably reduce the risk of inadvertent dot 

operation, a hefit that should be considered in comparison to the probability of "an mtremely 

remote" failure. 

AgusbWcstW - Italy