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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

BREAKING THE NORDIC DEFENSE DEADLOCK

Stefan Forss

Pekka Holopainen

February 2015

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ISBN 1-58487-667-0
v

FOREWORD

The Nordic states, just as other regions of Europe 

which neighbor Russia, are engaged in an urgent reexamination of their security and defense posture. 

Events in Ukraine in early-2014 threw into sharp 

focus a local lack of capability following decades of 

drawdowns and focus on crisis management operations instead of territorial defense. After an unpleasant awakening, countries in the region have turned 

their attention to the heightened security risks they 

face and their lack of preparedness for them. 

In an era of continuing austerity, the challenge 

for these states is how to design a working security 

and defense solution in the short and medium term 

which is both robust enough to survive in isolation, 

but also capable of being merged into a bigger framework such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) when the time is ripe. This would serve not 

just local, but also U.S. interests in safeguarding local 

allies and partners while limiting the need for permanent presence in the region. Deeper defense cooperation between the Nordic countries is an essential part 

of this solution. 

This monograph, by two highly experienced Finnish defense researchers with unparalleled expertise in 

assessing the problems posed by Russia as a neighbor, 

evaluates the options open to the Nordic region. It 

reviews both the opportunities available for regional 

cooperation (as well as ones from the past which have 

been missed), and the scope for enhanced engagement 

with the United States both within the framework of 

NATO and beyond. 

As such, it provides a valuable assessment from a 

local perspective of how regional security challenges 
can best be addressed, and an important review of 

opportunities for the United States to increase the 

effectiveness of defense cooperation with Northern 

Europe. It makes an important contribution to our understanding of the possibilities and constraints of Nordic defense, and is highly recommended to planners 

and policymakers working on European and NATO 

problem sets.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

STEFAN FORSS is a senior scientist and highly experienced defense researcher. Professor Forss joined the 

Finnish Technical Research Centre (VTT), where he 

eventually became Chief Scientist. In 2005, he moved 

to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy and 

Research Unit, attached to the National Defence University, where he advised on arms control and the 

security policy implications of new weapons and 

weapon systems. After retirement from government 

service in 2012, he has continued to publish on defense 

and security topics, including a series of high-profile 

reports on the implications for the Nordic States of 

a newly resurgent Russia. His title of Professor was 

awarded by the President of Finland in May 2014 in 

recognition of a distinguished career spanning 4 decades. Professor Forss holds a Ph.D. in physics from 

Helsinki University. 

PEKKA HOLOPAINEN served with the Uusimaa Jaeger (Light Mechanised Infantry) Battalion. In 1997, he 

took command of the Infantry Battalion in the Karelia 

Brigade, and 1 year later was appointed Chief of Staff 

of the brigade. He returned to Helsinki in 2001 and 

became Director of the Department of Education in 

the National Defence College. After a series of staff 

posts, he was nominated Director of the Department 

of Strategic and Defence Studies, Finnish National 

Defence University. Colonel (Ret.) Holopainen’s overseas assignments included Chief J9 at the HQ Kosovo 

Force, Chief of the Force Capability Unit, European 

Union Military Staff, and Deputy Chief Military Observer and the Deputy Head of Mission in the United 

Nation’s Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. Colonel Holopainen graduated from the Military 
Academy (The Finnish Cadet School), completed the 

General Staff Officer Course at the U.S. Army War College, National Defense Course, and the Senior Command Course, National Defense College. He holds an 

MA in defence and security analysis from Lancaster 

University, UK, and an M.Sc. in social science (recent political history) from Helsinki University. His 

awards include Commander of the Order of the Lion 

of Finland, Freedom Cross 2nd Class, and the Medal 

of Military Merit as well as Commander of the Order 

of the Eagle of Estonia.

viii
ix

SUMMARY

Events in Ukraine in early-2014 have prompted a 

re-evaluation of national defense capabilities across 

Europe. In the case of the Nordic states (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland), this renewed 

attention has highlighted the lack of military resources 

to fulfill nationally stated defense tasks. Two decades 

of underinvestment in defense, force reductions, and 

focus on expeditionary crisis management in support 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

have combined to hollow out the once fundamental 

principles of territorial defense. Northern Europe has 

been left dangerously exposed to military coercion in 

a time of greatly increased uncertainty.

As NATO member states, Norway and Denmark 

are better off than nonaligned Finland and Sweden, 

but common to all of them is the perception that security cannot be managed alone but has to be developed in cooperation with each other. During 2014, 

profoundly negative developments in Ukraine, mixed 

and disappointing signals from the NATO Summit in 

Wales, and the question marks left by the result of the 

Swedish parliamentary elections all combined to reinforce the stalemate in domestic politics over Swedish or Finnish membership in NATO. In this context, 

there is little that the United States can do to “help 

solve the problem,” since it is, in fact, self-inflicted in 

both countries. Attempts to influence public opinion 

in Finland or Sweden directly would, however wellintended, be counterproductive.

The Nordic countries, apart from their different 

security political solutions to date, have one thing in 

common. They all depend on the United States for their 

critical national defense. Strengthening these bilateral 
ties, as well as building on them within the framework 

of the Nordic Security Dialogue launched at the meeting 

between President Barack Obama and Nordic heads 

of state in Stockholm, Sweden, in September 2013, 

hold the potential to be fundamental building blocks 

for a new security assurance in the region. Conversely, meeting the Nordic and Baltic security challenges 

without the support of the United States is doomed to 

failure, and the entire region would be left vulnerable 

and exposed to extortion and external threat. 

There is significant scope for defense cooperation 

with and between the Nordic states, which have been 

notably less resistant to defense burden sharing than 

several established NATO allies in Western Europe. 

In particular, enhanced cooperation with the United 

States by Finland and Sweden, backed up by U.S. security guarantees in whatever form they may take, 

has the potential to lessen the current isolation and 

exposure of the Baltic States to intimidation by Russia. 

Based on both historical and current analysis of the 

problem, the authors propose that cooperation among 

the Nordic states (to the point of complete interoperability) and with the United States is essential. 

x
1

BREAKING THE NORDIC DEFENSE DEADLOCK

INTRODUCTION

Events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in early-2014 

provided a sudden demonstration of Europe’s vulnerability to new Russian capabilities and old Russian intentions. This prompted a re-examination of security 

policy throughout Russia’s western neighbors. In the 

case of the Nordic states (Finland, Sweden, Norway, 

Denmark, and Iceland), it highlighted the extent to 

which over 2 decades of spending cuts and increased 

focus on crisis management instead of territorial defense had hollowed out defense capabilities, leaving 

both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and non-NATO countries in the region dangerously 

exposed. In recent years, this has applied even to 

Finland, which previously had maintained a more 

conservative defense posture by comparison with its 

western neighbors.

But even if there were the political will and economic potential to re-invest in credible defensive 

deterrence, this would be a long process. In the 

meantime, in a time of increasing tension, as well as 

declining military strength and capabilities among 

friends and allies, the need is evident for states in the 

region to cooperate constructively with each other for 

mutual support, and with allies beyond the region too. 

All Nordic countries need each other and the United 

States for their security. Meanwhile, the United States 

needs friends and allies in the area if it wishes to 

secure peace, stability, and its own interests in the 

Nordic, Baltic, and especially Arctic regions.

As the deterrent and war-preventing value of 

the Nordic defense forces is increasingly challenged, 
2

building common capabilities should no longer be on 

hold, but should be pursued vigorously despite national political obstacles. Bearing in mind the need 

to synchronize Nordic defense, waiting for all Nordic countries to join NATO is not an option. Unless 

some extremely dramatic turn for the worse happens 

in the Nordic neighborhood, the wait will probably 

be too long. In the meantime, the national defense 

capabilities of Finland and Sweden are likely to 

deteriorate further. 

This monograph therefore explores the scope, potential, and benefits of closer defense cooperation between the Nordic states themselves and with the United States. The current state of cooperation is reviewed, 

together with the regional and national factors that 

hold it back; and the value of specific joint initiatives 

is considered. Particular strengths and weaknesses of 

each of the region’s militaries are highlighted, to give 

context to proposed defense synergies. This leads to a 

particularly close examination of the case of Finland, 

as the state with both the greatest exposure to Russia 

as a result of its long land border and (not coincidentally) the greatest emphasis on self-defense in its security policy. Finally, a range of policy recommendations is provided for U.S. decisionmakers considering 

the prospects for closer Nordic defense ties, and the 

role of the United States in European security overall. 

HISTORY AND CONTEXT

The potential for deeper security cooperation both 

between the Nordic states and beyond the region with 

the United States and NATO naturally depends on 

domestic political attitudes in each country. These in 

turn are heavily influenced not only by constitutional 
3

factors and contemporary political concerns, but also 

by each country’s historical experience during the 

20th century, which led each Nordic state to its own 

distinct solution for ensuring its security. This section 

therefore briefly considers the formative experiences 

of Nordic countries, in order to provide context for 

the present state of security cooperation and also to 

explain some of its limitations. 

For Europe, ghosts from the past came alive in 

early-2014, as senior Russian figures praised the early 

achievements of fascist Germany, but at the same time 

portrayed the democratically elected new president of 

Ukraine and his administration as Nazis.1

 Traumatic 

memories from World War II have been stirred in Poland, the Baltic States, and the Nordic countries, too. 

Although acute and grave security concerns are not 

yet universal, war, so unthinkable just a while ago, 

now has to be taken into account.

The experience of the Nordic countries during 

World War II shaped their subsequent defense policies. 

The Finnish performance in the Winter War 1939-40 is 

well-known, but less so is the closing months in the 

summer of 1944 of the “Continuation War” between 

the Soviet Union and Finland.2 The strategic assault 

of the Red Army was anticipated, but when it started 

on the Karelian Isthmus on June 9, the overwhelming 

size of the force deployed and its crushing firepower 

caught the Finnish High Command by surprise. The 

Finnish Army, dispirited at first, was forced to retreat 

but gradually recovered. The Russian onslaught, aiming at defeating the Finnish Army rapidly in a couple 

of weeks, slowed down and was repulsed altogether 

after a month of ferocious fighting. When an armistice 

came into force in early September 1944, the front 

line was entirely outside the present Finnish-Russian 
4

border. This was the only one of the Soviet strategic 

assault operations that failed, a remarkable defensive 

achievement by a small army against a superpower. 

Finland’s freedom and independence were saved. Later on, a number of very distinguished Finnish military 

officers emigrated to the United States and enlisted 

in the U.S. Army, bringing with them extraordinary 

expertise on Finnish combat tactics, winter warfare, and offensive and defensive warfare in rugged 

forest terrain.3

Sweden was one of the few European countries 

that managed to stay out of World War II. In 1939, the 

readiness of the Swedish Defense Forces was remarkably low, as the decision taken in 1925 to embark upon 

successive disarmament was still felt. War weariness 

in the aftermath of the Great War, the perceived weakness of Soviet Russia and Germany, the forming of the 

League of Nations and popular hopes for international achievements in the disarmament field all contributed to the perception among liberals in Sweden that 

reductions in defense spending were reasonable. The 

political left anticipated enduring and stable peace 

for several decades to come. If international relations 

were to deteriorate in Europe, ample time would be 

given to react and rearm, it was assumed. These sentiments in Sweden in the late-1930s unfortunately very 

much resemble the situation and thinking of presentday Sweden, which has led to reforms that leave the 

country relatively unprepared for territorial defense 

until at least the early-2020s. 

It was only the swift German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 that brought a complete change of attitude in Stockholm, as Sweden 

was suddenly squarely in the German orbit. Sweden 

changed its defense posture and embarked upon an 
5

ambitious armament program. The goals formulated 

in 1940 were not, however, achieved until several 

years after the conclusion of World War II. Even 70 

years ago, building capability and readiness was 

time consuming.

Although formally neutral, Sweden could not 

maintain strict neutrality during World War II and 

neither was it in her interest. Sweden was nonaligned, 

and adapted to the changing war situation. Strong 

popular support for Finland resulted in perhaps the 

largest ever deployment of a volunteer military force, 

about 8,500 men to Northern Finland in early-1940, 

including one-third of the Swedish Air Force.

For Germany, occupation of Norway brought logistical problems, and the Nazis immediately put strong 

pressure on Sweden for permission to use Swedish 

railways for transporting troops and supplies to the 

north. Sweden soon gave in, and transit transports of 

German soldiers “on leave” as well as military equipment began in July 1940. Finland accepted German 

transit traffic on essentially equal terms 2 months 

later. The German traffic through Sweden continued 

until August 1943. By this time, Germany’s strength 

was already fading. Allied powers had for some time 

demanded that Sweden cut down cooperation with 

Germany and improve relations with them. As the Allied bombing campaign gained strength and airspace 

control became increasingly difficult, Allied bombers 

returning from Germany on northerly courses occasionally intruded into Swedish airspace. Sweden 

had to respond. Anecdotes of radio conversations 

between Allied aircrews and Swedish air defenses on 

the ground suggest a cooperative attitude despite the 

formalities of challenging these overflights.4
6

While the Nordic countries all drew different formative experiences from World War II, the different 

paths of national defense that they then embarked 

upon were further influenced by the new geopolitical situation after 1945, the rise of the Iron Curtain, 

and the emerging Cold War, as well as the simple 

geographical location of the different countries. 

THE NORDIC COLD WAR EXPERIENCE

Finland. 

Immediately after the war, an entirely new political epoch started for the Nordic states. Finland, in particular, had to adapt to co-existence with the world’s 

indisputable new great power, the Soviet Union, 

whose ambitions to extend both its social system and 

geopolitical sphere of interest could not be mistaken. 

The role of Finland as a front-line state was thus set, 

and this is a role that Finland continues to fill today: 

the unique circumstances of being “neighbor to a superpower and next door to a military alliance” mean 

that the Finnish defense posture is key to the security 

of the Nordic region as a whole, and this posture receives close attention in this monograph accordingly.5

As put by one leading politician when considering a 

past proposal for a Nordic defense treaty: “Finland 

has always been the defender of Sweden. This would 

just be making it official.”6

At the outset of the Cold War, Finland was obliged 

to make significant concessions curtailing the country’s sovereignty. The most important of these two 

was the tough peace treaty of 1947 with former enemies, the Soviet Union and Great Britain; and the 

so-called 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
7

Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty) between Finland 

and the Soviet Union. Under these agreements, the 

peacetime military strength and permitted armament 

of the Finnish army were limited so dramatically that 

her defense capability rapidly collapsed. The Finnish 

government energetically attempted to acquire some 

sort of preferential right of interpretation regarding 

the true content of the treaty during the next 40 years, 

but naturally the Soviet Union and the Western powers drew their own conclusions. Finland’s policy of 

neutrality hence became hotly disputed. Most authorities were not sure how to take Finland, and there was 

particular uncertainty concerning the question of how 

she would act in crisis situations.

Author and journalist Jukka Rislakki has conducted a thorough and convincing study of the relations of 

the U.S. and other Western powers to Finland during 

the Cold War.7

 One of Rislakki’s specific findings is 

that the main western actors were surprisingly willing 

and ready to support Finland, without definite military undertakings. Possible military support would be 

given on an ad hoc basis in a war situation and only if 

Finland chose the West rather than the Soviets. 

Finnish neutrality during the Cold War, of course, 

demanded defense in all directions. In reality, however, intrusions from the West into Finnish territory 

apparently would not have been met with more than 

token “resistance,” if at all.8

 An attack from the West 

simply was not considered a very serious option. Real 

contingency plans were aimed at fighting potential Soviet ground forces attacks. For security reasons, these 

were not put on paper, but rather entrusted to selected key military personnel responsible for maintaining them. In 1974, newly appointed Chief of Defense 

General Lauri Sutela offered to present operational 
8

plans to his Supreme Commander, President Urho 

Kekkonen, but the latter respectfully declined, saying: 

“I’m not interested in details, but I rely on you and 

trust that you know what you have to do.”9 Prudence 

apparently dictated his choice: What he didn’t know, 

he couldn’t inadvertently reveal in the frequent talks 

he had with the Russians.

Finland’s policy of neutrality during the Cold War 

sought particular support from the so-called Nordic 

balance, a term coined by the Norwegians, or Nordic 

stability as the Finns called it, and from Sweden’s impressively strong defense. During the period, Nordic 

collaboration was thus more important for Finland 

than for other Nordic countries. This gave Finland 

an opportunity to profile herself in her natural reference group, the Nordic countries. Great efforts were 

made, particularly in Finland and Norway, to reach 

mutual understanding on defense, but this did not 

always succeed.

The cornerstone of the Finnish defense concept 

was, and still is, compulsory conscription. In the 

1970s, this could generate a 700,000-strong wartime 

force consisting mostly of trained reserves. The drawback, obvious to all informed observers at home and 

abroad, was that adequate weaponry and equipment 

sufficed only for a small fraction of the mobilized 

army. Many would only have been provided with 

worn-out wartime weapons. This choice was one of 

necessity, since the Finnish national economy was 

too small to provide for well-equipped armed forces 

capable of defending the country alone against a superpower. Therefore, neutral Finnish foreign policy, 

and good, friendly and mutually beneficial relations 

with the Soviet Union became Finland’s main security 

tool, and military policy was relegated to a minor role. 
9

Accordingly, defense capability was measured so as 

to provide an initial threshold capability, high enough 

to give an adversary serious pause for thought about 

costs and risks. 

The extent of Soviet pressure against Finland varied over the years, but very serious challenges by the 

Russians were felt on more than one occasion. A crisis 

situation arose on October 30, 1961, when the Soviet 

Union made a formidable demonstration of power, 

exploding the enormous “Tsar bomb” equivalent to 

57 megatons of TNT over Novaya Zemlya. On the 

same day, Finland received a diplomatic note from 

the Soviet Union regarding a review of bilateral relations, which led to great concern in Finland and also 

in its neighboring countries, and more generally in 

the West. Russia’s timing was well judged; Kekkonen 

was on a state visit to the United States. He was then 

ordered to travel not to Moscow, but all the way to 

Novosibirsk for talks with the Soviet leaders. It was 

later assessed that Kekkonen had overreached in his 

attempts to edge Finland slowly in the direction of the 

West, and the Soviet leaders did not tolerate this.

Another serious incident occurred in 1978 during 

an official visit to Finland, when Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Ustinov suggested joint military 

exercises between the Finnish and Soviet armies. Kekkonen’s approach was to ignore the proposal, and he 

successfully avoided discussing the topic altogether. 

However, the Finnish Chief of Defense, with skillful 

diplomatic assistance, rejected the proposal politely, 

but decisively.10
10

Sweden.

Through good luck and good judgment, Sweden 

had succeeded in staying out of World War II, and so 

emerged from the war stronger than any of her Nordic neighbors. The imminent threat to Sweden from 

Nazi Germany in 1940 was contained as a result of 

British resistance. Later, the Allied Powers’ war effort against Germany largely removed the existential 

threat against Sweden.11

After the war, however, all Scandinavian countries 

had to decide their security direction. As relations 

between the former Allies began to deteriorate and, 

in Winston Churchill’s words, “an iron curtain descended across the Continent,”12 Sweden, in particular, began to explore the possibility of a Scandinavian 

defense alliance of neutral countries between East 

and West. Negotiations between Sweden, Norway, 

and Denmark took place in 1948-49, but eventually 

broke down as Norway and Denmark opted out. This 

defense alliance was not felt to be robust enough to 

counterbalance Soviet power, and, in addition, Oslo 

and Copenhagen saw no particular value in neutrality. 

Therefore, they instead joined those western countries 

that founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) in 1949.13

Throughout the Cold War, defense planning in 

Sweden, Norway, and Denmark was based on territorial defense and general conscription. In Sweden, defense spending was of the order of 3-4 percent of gross 

domestic product (GDP), and the capability generated 

in all three military branches to repel invasion well beyond Swedish borders was most impressive. At the end 

of the Cold War in 1988, the Swedish wartime strength 

was about 850,000, including a 100,000-strong Home 
11

Guard. The army consisted altogether of 29 brigades 

or brigade equivalents, five of which were armored. 

The air force had about 350 combat aircraft, equipped 

with state-of-the-art air combat and anti-ship missiles, 

in 24 interceptor, attack, and reconnaissance wings. 

The navy’s battle order consisted of over 70 surface 

combat ships, mine warfare vessels, and a dozen very 

capable and silent submarines. In addition, there were 

over 20 Swedish coastal artillery units with high firepower, most of which were placed in strongly fortified 

permanent positions, in addition to four mobile units 

equipped with high-precision anti-ship missiles.14

So-called armed neutrality became the trademark 

of neutral Sweden. The military capability of Sweden 

and its domestic military technology were respected 

worldwide, and Sweden’s role in upholding Nordic 

balance/stability was crucial. This also served Finland 

well. In the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden’s neutrality was, however, revealed to be rather less than it had 

been supposed to be during the Cold War. Thorough 

later research by Dr. Robert Dalsjö15 and Mr. Mikael 

Holmström,16 security policy reporter at the Swedish 

daily Dagens Nyheter, has disclosed conclusively that 

Sweden engaged in secret but elaborate military cooperation arrangements with her NATO neighbors 

Norway and Denmark, and more importantly with 

the United States and the United Kingdom (UK). 

According to Dalsjö: 

Sweden not only based parts of its Cold War security 

policy on the expectation that the Western powers 

would provide military assistance in case of a Soviet 

attack. In addition, the [Swedish] cabinet had also secretly authorized the military authorities to undertake 

preparations for this event, and a number of measures 

had been taken.17
12

This Swedish secret arrangement evolved during several decades parallel with the Soviet military 

build-up, and was only known to extremely few government and military leaders. It is, however, not very 

likely that the Russians were unaware of it. Only the 

Swedish people knew nothing about it, which clearly 

created operational difficulties. The major drawback 

was that the arrangement could not be trained or 

tested among the professional military, which raises 

questions about its viability in a true armed conflict.

In addition, Dalsjö has tested Swedish neutrality in 

five counterfactual gaming scenarios covering a broad 

spectrum. In two cases, Sweden succeeded in staying 

out of the war, but in the other three (Soviet policy of 

extortion, an attack on Sweden alone, and a major conflict in Europe), Sweden was pulled into the conflict. 

In the first case, the East was victorious, and the Soviet 

side gained control of continental Europe, including 

Norway and Denmark. The outlook for preserving 

democracy and independence would have been grim 

in the long term. In the second case, the West won, 

and it was only in this case that Sweden’s stated goals 

regarding its neutral policy would have been met.18

Norway and Denmark.

Peace in Europe in 1945 was the beginning of a 

golden age for the Norwegian armed forces, based on 

general conscription. After joining NATO in 1949, defense expenditure rose steadily and was 4.7 percent 

of GDP (30 percent of the state budget) in 1952-53. 

The peak of strength and resources came in the 1950s 

and 1960s, with a 350,000-strong force being included 

in contingency planning of the time.19 A quarter of a 
13

century later, mobilized wartime strength had been 

reduced by about 100,000.20 General conscription remained in force, but only a few were chosen for duty. 

This remains the case today.21

Throughout the Cold War, Denmark’s “total defense policy,” based on general conscription, generated 100,000 personnel for the armed forces upon 

mobilization, backed by the 80,000-strong voluntary 

Home Guard. Given Denmark’s strategic position as 

the “cork in the Baltic Sea bottle” and the “bridge” between NATO’s central front and northern flank, allied 

reinforcements were deemed critical.22

As NATO members, Denmark and Norway skillfully played their role in the Nordic balancing act 

during the Cold War. Both countries refused to have 

foreign troops stationed permanently on their soil or 

nuclear weapons deployed. They also showed reluctance toward NATO exercises in the Baltic Sea and 

close to the border of the Soviet Union. This policy of 

nonprovocation toward the Soviet Union contributed 

to stability in the area.23

For Denmark, the question of military protection 

has altogether been a NATO matter. Denmark can be 

described as an especially staunch ally of NATO and 

the United States, in particular. Although Denmark 

is a long-time member of the European Union (EU), 

Denmark has not and does not participate in EU’s 

military policy, which it deems counterproductive to 

its own national interests. 

The Danish view is rather critical of the Nordic 

position, as displayed by Sweden and perhaps also 

Finland, of being different from Europe and better 

than Europe, and unique in offering a cooperative alternative to the Cold War policies of the superpowers 
14

and the old great powers in Europe. According to one 

argument: 

Nordic identity politics and Cold War value promotion in the [United Nations] was a ‘luxury good’, only 

affordable because the Nordics were allowed a free 

ride on a security order created by the presence of an 

American security guarantee to Western Europe and 

the institutionalization of the European continent.24

Hidden Cold War Cooperation with the 

United States. 

In order to understand the possible forms of military-related cooperation between Finland, Sweden, 

and the United States during the Cold War, it is useful 

to see how this played out between the Nordic countries themselves. As members of NATO, Norway and 

Denmark were free to discuss any matter within that 

framework. Discussions with non-NATO members 

were more complicated. “Serious defense and security 

policy discussions at the formal Nordic fora were . . . 

officially taboo,” leading Finnish defense expert and 

former government official Dr. Pauli Järvenpää wrote 

in early-2014.

In reality, though, the situation was not so clear-cut. 

The Nordic countries’ military intelligence organizations continued to talk to each other behind the 

scenes, and the same Nordic officials and experts who 

gathered to discuss UN peacekeeping issues could in 

the margins privately discuss more hardcore defense 

policy matters.25

Basic geopolitical and geographical facts and national policies largely defined the framework of mili-
15

tary cooperation between the United States and Sweden and Finland, respectively. Sweden was clearly in 

a more favorable position than Finland, but the latter 

had certain qualities, generated through Finland’s war 

experience with the Soviet Union and the profound 

need to understand Russian thinking thoroughly, that 

were of interest to the United States and which the 

United States wanted to exploit through state-to-state 

cooperation, but also covertly. A more general U.S. 

policy interest was to prevent Finland from falling 

entirely into the Soviet orbit.

Sweden benefitted from the basic military fact that 

Norway’s defense in depth was far too narrow and 

had to be extended. U.S. and NATO contingency planning therefore largely covered Swedish territory, too. 

Sweden thus took steps to facilitate receiving aid and 

U.S. forces on her soil and also made some technical 

preparations to be able to fight jointly. One particular example of such a step was secret links between 

NATO air control systems in Norway and those of 

the impressive Swedish air force. The flip of a switch 

“instantly lit up the maps in the situation room considerably,” according to one insider.26 The drawback 

was that strict Swedish neutrality determined what 

was and was not possible. These arrangements were 

secret and could not be used for joint training purposes. They were items in a toolbox to be used, but only 

in war.

Intelligence cooperation between Sweden and the 

West, and the United States in particular, is perhaps 

one of the most important forms of long-time military 

cooperation between the countries.27 The Swedish National Radio Establishment (FRA) is an acknowledged 

and respected actor in the signal intelligence field and 

has cooperated with the National Security Agency for 

a very long time.28
16

One particular feature of Swedish neutrality during the Cold War was to emphasize reliance on domestically built arms, such as fighter aircraft and army 

and navy equipment. The results were impressive. 

But Sweden increasingly had to rely on subsystems, 

components, and spare parts from foreign sources, 

most often American. Defense industrial cooperation between Sweden and the United States therefore 

also has a long legacy. Sweden was among the first 

countries to receive U.S. built heat-seeking and radar 

guided air-to-air missiles, as well as licenses to produce these domestically.29 Sweden, which had a serious domestic nuclear weapons development program 

in the 1950s and 1960s that the United States wanted 

to end, skillfully negotiated benefits from the United 

States as a compensation for abandoning the military 

nuclear program, which eventually took place in 1968 

as Sweden was among the first signatories of the NonProliferation Treaty. U.S. National Security Council 

policy recommendations in 1960 specifically stated:

Provide no grant military assistance to Sweden. However, be prepared to sell to Sweden military materiel, and 

to provide training to Sweden on a reimbursable basis. 

With due regard to NATO requirements, and provided 

that prior offer to NATO allies has been made, be prepared to sell to Sweden modern weapons systems from 

NATO or U.S. production or to authorize licensing arrangements for manufacture in Sweden.30

Finland, by contrast, emerged from having twice 

only barely avoided military defeat against an overwhelmingly strong adversary, which would have led 

to complete loss of its sovereignty. Finland was wartorn and poor, with its economy in shambles. Politically, Finland’s freedom of action was curtailed, and, 
17

for that reason, it had to turn down such vitally important U.S. initiatives as Marshall Plan aid. 

At the time, U.S. understanding of the Finnish 

dilemma and balancing act was perhaps not deep 

enough, as U.S. good intentions and acts of support 

and good will were rejected for reasons that Washington could not always comprehend. From a Finnish 

viewpoint, the American overtures were often counterproductive. Under these circumstances, FinnishU.S. defense cooperation during the Cold War was an 

extremely sensitive issue.

It was, however, also very much in Finland’s interest to establish military communication links between 

Finland and the United States. Not surprisingly, military intelligence was the preferred tool. As chief of 

Finnish intelligence, Colonel Lauri Sutela made his 

first visit to Langley in the early-1960s, disguised as a 

Belgian scientist.31 The Americans were interested in 

Finnish views and assessments concerning the Soviet 

Union in particular. Procedures for exchange of military information were agreed upon, and this arrangement has been developed ever since.

During the first years of the Cold War, when U.S. 

National Technical Means were in their infancy, the 

United States recruited seasoned, highly decorated 

Finnish war-time rangers to collect information and to 

scout on Soviet territory, particularly in the Kola and 

the Karelian Isthmus. This activity was also related to 

the Scandinavian plans for a stay-behind network of 

partisans, a countermeasure against possible Soviet 

invasion.32

Perceptions of Finland as some kind of a semi-Soviet state were, however, deeply rooted. When Sutela 

first visited the United States as Chief of Defense 13 

years later in 1975, he was greeted at the reception by 
18

a U.S. general: “Now you finally got permission of the 

Soviet Union to travel here, did you?”33 To put these 

remarks in context, former chairman of the UK’s Joint 

Intelligence Committee (JIC) Sir Paul Lever noticed on 

a tour of Soviet secret police (KGB) headquarters in 

Moscow that the photo gallery of foreigners that had 

spied for the Soviet Union did not include any Finns 

at all.34 Nevertheless, Sutela established good working 

relations with the United States and communicated 

directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The United States also benefitted from a number 

of particularly distinguished Finnish military officers, 

who left Finland for various reasons after the war and 

ultimately settled in the United States. The two most 

famous were Finland’s war-time Chief of Intelligence, 

Colonel Aladár (a.k.a. Andrew) Paasonen and Army 

Colonel Alpo K. Marttinen. Both were strongly urged 

by Finnish Supreme Commander Marshal Carl Gustaf 

Mannerheim himself to leave Finland in 1945, partly 

for reasons of their personal safety but also in the 

greater interest of Finland. After Mannerheim’s death 

in January 1951 in Switzerland, Paasonen, who had 

assisted Mannerheim in writing his memoirs, offered 

a Central Intelligence Agency representative in Bern 

his services. The Agency recruited him immediately. 

Paasonen was, of course, a very valuable source, but 

he was also useful in educating and training agents. 

Later, he was transferred to Germany where he interrogated defectors from the East.35 He also played a role 

in cooling down the U.S. organized scouting patrols 

and reconnaissance flights into Soviet territory from 

Finland, which had become so frequent and daring as 

to cause the Finnish government concern. 
19

Marttinen had distinguished himself as a young 

Captain in the Winter War, having planned a number of the spectacular operations where several Soviet 

divisions were annihilated. During the massive Russian onslaught in the summer offensive in 1944, his 

regiment was the first to stop the Russian advance 

into Finland proper. Marttinen later made another 

distinguished military career in the U.S. Army, rising 

to the rank of colonel. Like his colleague and friend 

Paasonen, Marttinen also offered U.S. intelligence 

valuable services.

The U.S. Army recognized the particular skills 

of the Finnish officers, especially in winter warfare, 

and they were tasked to write new field manuals as 

well as to train U.S. Soldiers in these skills. A series of 

field manuals were published in 1951-52 (Field Manual 

[FM] 31-70, Basic Arctic Manual; FM 31-71, Northern 

Operations; FM 31-72, Administration in the Arctic; and 

FM 31-73, Skiing and Snowshoeing).36 Marttinen died 

in 1975 and is buried in the military cemetery in Ft. 

Leavenworth, KS.

POST-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS 

Finland. 

Nobody could know for sure where the dramatic 

geopolitical changes at the end of the 1980s were to 

lead, but in Finland, developments were followed 

carefully, and the Finns were prepared to take calculated risks to improve their political-security situation. 

On September 21, 1990, Finland’s government unilaterally declared that the provisions of the Paris Peace 

Treaty of 1947 limiting Finland’s sovereignty had lost 

their meaning. At the same time, President Mauno 
20

Koivisto reinterpreted the FCMA Treaty, which finally disappeared into history on the fall of the Soviet 

Union in December 1991. 

Having loosened the political chains of the Cold 

War, the next step of integration into Western political structures was an application for Finnish membership in the EU. Finland, Sweden, and Austria became 

Union members on January 1, 1995. Finland has consistently striven to penetrate to the core of the EU. 

There is active collaboration over a joint foreign and 

security policy and a wish to strengthen the Union’s 

crisis-management capability. Finland, however, decided not to aim for NATO membership, but rather 

engaged in a very ambitious Partnership for Peace 

program.

Finland adapted to the new European security order after the end of the Cold War and, while retaining 

general conscription, adjusted the wartime strength of 

the Finnish Defense Forces accordingly. While there 

were no longer restrictions on Finnish peace-time 

strength, which was about 30,000 and progressively 

shrinking because of demographic reasons, the total 

wartime strength had been reduced to 450,000 in 1997, 

in 2008 to 350,000, and, after the conclusion of the present defense reform, it dropped to 230,000 in 2015.37 A 

more detailed description of this process follows.

Sweden. 

The basic structure and operational doctrine of the 

Swedish defense forces—territorial defense against 

invasion—survived well into the new millennium. 

Spending levels, however, constantly exceeded what 

was allocated in the budget, and manpower and capability levels could not be maintained. Business as usual 
21

proved untenable in the long run. In 2009, the Swedish 

Parliament adopted a bill on Defense Structure 2014, 

a very radical departure from previous arrangements 

toward a small professional army, primarily tailored 

for crisis management operations and rapid reaction 

defense capability, adapted to a defense spending 

level of about half the 2.5 percent GDP level of 1988.

The former Swedish defense organization was rapidly dismantled as introduction of the new structure 

met with profound difficulties. It is generally believed 

that the new personnel structure will not be implemented until 2023 and that arms procurement will not 

nearly meet the equipment needs originally stated. 

The Swedish Parliamentary Defense Commission’s report in May 2014 does not dispel these misgivings.38 At 

the time of this writing, the debate is in high gear, and 

tough criticism from defense experts, often members 

of the prestigious Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, has been leveled at the Swedish Government’s 

reluctance to adapt spending to the revised security 

and threat assessment and the real needs perceived.39

Norway and Denmark. 

Norway has undergone the same kind of defense 

structure reforms as most other NATO countries. Mobilization defense has been abandoned in favor of a 

rapid reaction capability defense, which shall provide 

a war prevention threshold based on NATO membership.40 Peacetime strength in 2014 is about 23,000, and 

83,000 after mobilization.41 According to Professor 

Paal Sigurd Hilde: 

Both traditionally and at present, Norway’s security 

focus has to a significant degree been maritime in 
22

nature and directed towards the west and north. The 

High North, equating in Norwegian usage roughly 

the wider Barents Sea region, has since the early 1950s 

been Norway’s primary security concern. It remains 

so today, though obviously for somewhat different 

reasons than during the Cold War. 

. . . Throughout the Cold War, Norwegian priorities in 

NATO included ensuring that the defense of Norway 

was tied to that of Central Europe, that the US and 

UK were represented on a high level in NATO commands in Norway, and that the US and other major 

allies committed land forces to the reinforcement of 

Norway in case of conflict.42

The key passages in the White Paper submitted to 

the Norwegian Parliament concerning the main tasks 

of the Norwegian Armed Forces read:

The intention of a war preventing threshold is to 

achieve that a potential aggressor abstains from using military force against Norway. The Armed Forces 

shall have a capability to react immediately, efficiently 

and with relevant means if Norway is pressured, assaulted or attacked, and shall have capability to joint 

action within the framework of the collective defense 

of NATO. A capability to manage such military challenges shall contribute so that they don’t materialize. 

NATO membership is the basis of the war preventing 

threshold.43

In other words, as stated in a nutshell from former 

Chief of Defense General Sverre Diesen, “Norway has 

to ensure that there is no vacuum between what is too 

big for Norway and too small for NATO.”

Prepositioning U.S. military equipment in Norway 

has been a key component of U.S.-Norwegian bilateral military cooperation. The quantitative scale, of 
23

course, has diminished since the Cold War, but the 

arrangement (Marine Corps Prepositioning Program 

Norway) has nevertheless survived.44 In August 2014, 

it was reported that the United States will preposition 

Abrams M1A1 main battle tanks and other armored 

vehicles in Norway.45 In addition, Norway is also 

tasked with providing facilities for a NATO detachment and deployment of airborne early warning systems at the Air Force Base in Ørland. But Norway’s 

continuing military vulnerability was acknowledged 

in late September 2014, when Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide announced that defense will have to be 

radically upgraded, as a direct result of the increased 

concern over Russia.46

After the end of the Cold War, Denmark, too, 

adapted to the “new realities” and began restructuring the army from a force exclusively dedicated to 

local defense to an army able to project the Danish 

International Brigade and other rapid reaction forces 

abroad in contingencies reaching from humanitarian 

operations, peacekeeping, and peacemaking to outright combat operations in support of UN, NATO, and 

the United States. 

The present purpose and task of the armed forces 

of Denmark is defined in a law that came into force on 

March 1, 2001.47 This defines a number of purposes and 

tasks. The primary purpose is to prevent conflicts and 

war, preserve the sovereignty of Denmark, secure the 

continuing existence and integrity of the independent 

Kingdom of Denmark and further a peaceful development in the world with respect to human rights. Its 

primary tasks are: NATO participation in accordance 

with the strategy of the alliance; to detect and repel any 

violation of sovereignty of Danish territory (including 

Greenland and the Faroe Islands); defense coopera-
24

tion with non-NATO members, especially Central and 

East European countries; international missions in the 

area of conflict prevention, crisis-control, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking, and peacekeeping; participation in total defense in cooperation with civilian 

resources; and finally, maintenance of a sizable force 

to execute these tasks at all times.

Denmark clearly stands out from the other Nordic 

countries in this respect. Denmark has not refrained 

from using force even in UN operations—as in the 

case of a tank battle against Serbian armored units 

in Bosnia.48 Denmark has participated as a U.S. ally 

in Iraq and deployed a significant force in Afghanistan. An American former Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) colonel commended the Danish input in the 

counterinsurgency role in the difficult Helmand province in March 2009: “The Danes have the best trained 

and equipped force in Afghanistan. They take the 

hardest assignments, which they execute with outstanding professionalism and resilience. They never 

complain.”49

Nordic Cooperation: Early Steps. 

In June 2008, former Norwegian foreign and defense minister Thorvald Stoltenberg was asked by 

Nordic foreign ministers to draw up proposals for 

closer foreign and security policy cooperation between 

the Nordic countries. At the same time, the Chiefs of 

Defense of Norway, Finland, and Sweden submitted a 

common report, the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures Report, to their respective governments and 

presented the essential contents in an op-ed article 

published in their three leading national newspapers, 

Aftenposten, Helsingin Sanomat, and Svenska dagbladet.

50
25

The Chiefs had identified 140 areas of possible defense 

cooperation, 40 of which could be carried out rather 

rapidly. From the perspective of defense planning, 

the Chiefs’ report was significant. Aftenposten later 

reported that the U.S. ambassador to Norway had expressed concern over this development. In the view 

of Ambassador Benson K. Whitney, the Nordic move 

contained clear dangers to U.S. interests. Politically, 

it was feared, Nordic cooperation could weaken the 

traditionally strong defense ties between the United 

States and Norway.51

Stoltenberg presented his report in February 2009.52

Its essence was a list of 13 specific proposals, starting 

with setting up a Nordic Stabilization Task Force for 

international peace-building purposes. Stoltenberg’s 

proposal for air surveillance over Icelandic airspace 

took a big step forward in February 2014, as aircraft 

from NATO partners Finland and Sweden gathered in 

Iceland for the Iceland Air Meet event, together with 

the Norwegian Air Force, which had assumed the 

NATO peacetime preparedness mission over Iceland.

Stoltenberg presented four specific proposals concerning maritime monitoring and arctic issues, which 

were widely perceived to reflect specific Norwegian 

interests. Only two proposals addressed direct military cooperation. They built on the earlier proposals 

by the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish Chiefs of 

Defense, and concerned cooperation on issues such as 

transport and lift capability, medical services, education, materiel and exercise ranges. A separate proposal 

was to establish a Nordic amphibious unit, built on already existing units and cooperation between Finland 

and Sweden. Stoltenberg’s last proposal regarded a 

declaration of solidarity:
26

The Nordic governments should issue a mutual declaration of solidarity in which they commit themselves 

to clarifying how they would respond if a Nordic 

country were subject to external attack or undue 

pressure.53

The language used by Stoltenberg can be interpreted as indicating the magnitude of the political difficulties entailed in discussion of binding security guarantees between the Nordic countries. For guarantees to 

be at all realistic, each country should, as a starting 

point, be capable of both giving and receiving military 

aid. This is not currently the case, although work is in 

progress, for non-NATO nations Finland and Sweden, 

for whom legally binding host nation support agreements with NATO would be needed.54

The Danish and Norwegian views are that the 

question would be resolved if Finland and Sweden 

were to change political course and join NATO. At 

present, NATO membership is still a domestic political minefield in both Finland and Sweden, with the 

question of membership the subject of a political stalemate that has remained rock-solid over decades.55 But 

the abrupt change in the political landscape of Europe 

signaled by Russia’s invasion and annexation of parts 

of Ukraine has triggered a real debate and the first significant shift in public opinion polls for some time.56

With a new sense of urgency over the issue of membership, it has been suggested that Finland’s upcoming elections in the spring of 2015 could in effect be a 

referendum on joining NATO.57
27

Nordic Defense Cooperation.

Meanwhile, however, the Nordic military communities have long understood that capabilities cooperation will be a key issue for their respective countries. 

Austerity measures and the general decline of military 

capability in European NATO and elsewhere, as well 

as the U.S. “Asia pivot” policy, have exacerbated this 

need still further. Great expectations have therefore 

been attached to the rather less ambitious Nordic 

Defense Cooperation structure (NORDEFCO).

Also in 2008, Nordic Ministry of Defense officials began to explore the possibilities of replacing 

the existing multiple defense-related cooperation arrangements between their countries with one single 

structure. The advantages and possible benefits were 

recognized in all Nordic capitals, and NORDEFCO 

was established in 2009, with a stated aim of: 

The main aim and purpose of the Nordic Defense 

Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is to strengthen the participating nations’ national defense, explore common 

synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions.58

NORDEFCO is flexible in its format, and the participants can choose the projects in which they want to 

take part. Decisions are taken by consensus, but without veto rights. This means that a country can opt out, 

but not prevent other countries from going ahead if 

they wish to do so. In practice, this means that much 

of the cooperation is likely to be carried out bilaterally or trilaterally, but not to the detriment of other 

members.59

NORDEFCO has an annually rotating chairmanship, and the Ministers of Defense and Defense Policy 
28

Directors of member states meet twice a year. Practical work is coordinated by a Defense Policy Steering Committee, which, in turn, gives tasks to and receives military advice from the Military Coordination 

Committee (MCC).

The military level of NORDEFCO is divided into 

five Cooperation Areas (COPAs) subordinate to the 

MCC, namely Capabilities, Human Resources and 

Education, Training and Exercises, Operations, and 

Armaments. The COPAs cover the whole defense 

force spectrum, but with different time perspectives. 

Finland assumed the chairmanship of NORDEFCO for the second time in 2013. Reflecting on 

achievements during the year, the Political Steering 

Committee stated: 

Perhaps the most important achievement . . . was the 

development of the NORDEFCO ‘vision 2020’; renewing the political commitment in deepening our cooperation and giving guidance to our armed forces in 

areas such as maritime and air surveillance, exercise 

cooperation and rapid deployment in the framework 

of the EU and NATO. The vision will form the basis of 

the political guidance of the Nordic defense cooperation as we move towards 2020.60

The activities and achievements for 2013 listed by 

MCC Chairman Lieutenant General Mika Peltonen included a 4-year action plan for 2014-17, coordinated 

on the military and political level. This plan includes a 

clear ambition to test the future Nordic Battalion Task 

Force 2020 during Exercise Cold Response in 2016.61

But despite advancing rapidly over the course of 

5 years, NORDEFCO still has a long way to go from 

information exchange toward effective cooperation. 

Peltonen’s report for 2013 also highlighted that: 
29

Nordic defense cooperation has become more systematic and goal-oriented; day-to-day cooperation and 

the exchange of information have increased considerably. Although top-down (Mil/Pol) long-term commitment is still needed to reach desirable effects, 

progress is made in small steps in the right direction. 

Nordic thinking in our nations has increased on the 

military level from a chair-nation driven Annual Action Plan to a more Nordic Action Plan with a longer 

horizon. Furthermore, NORDEFCO has been recognized as an attractive regional military cooperation 

forum for cooperation, benchmarking and exchanging 

information.62 [author’s emphasis] 

For all its qualities, NORDEFCO is and will remain 

only a military-political tool. NORDEFCO was formed 

at a time when no traditional external threats were 

felt in the Nordic countries and, except for Finland, 

national territorial defense was no longer deemed 

relevant. For nonaligned countries like Finland and 

Sweden, NORDEFCO is not a game changer in the 

same sense as joining NATO or forming a coalition 

of the willing, committed to binding solidarity with 

each other.

Joint Procurement. 

Coordinated multinational military procurement 

is a field that Nordic politicians like to see as a pragmatic way to increase efficiency and save costs. Unfortunately, practice does not reflect theory, and, all 

too often, ambitious joint procurement projects have 

misfired. Denmark, Sweden, and Norway could not 

agree on Project Viking, an attempt to develop a common submarine. Finland and Sweden cooperated in 

designing and producing the AMOS 120 millimeter 
30

twin-barreled mortar turret, which was then dropped 

by Sweden and shelved as artillery in its reorganization.63 More recent failures include the SwedishNorwegian archer artillery system, and a major joint 

Swedish-Norwegian purchase of military trucks is 

in jeopardy.

The Nordic Standard Helicopter Project initiated 

in the late-1990s is a prime example. After lengthy 

deliberations, all four countries went their separate 

ways: Denmark eventually settled for the Italian 

Agusta EH-101, while Finland, Sweden, and Norway 

chose different versions of the French-German NH-90. 

Differing technical demands and preferences slowed 

down deliveries to such a degree that the NH-90 project has not been fully concluded even now, some 15 

years later. 

This is, however, not an unusual outcome when 

dealing with multinational European contractors. Defense company ownerships in Europe are complicated, and it is not always easy to ascertain that purchase 

is based on fair competition. Synchronizing national 

needs with more common multinational ambitions 

has proved to be a tricky business. Furthermore, 

equipment life-cycles in different countries may differ too much from each other for joint purchases to 

make sense, and operational demands, including usage and deployment in differing environments, also 

contribute to the difficulties.

Bilateral Finnish-Swedish Cooperation. 

Finland and Sweden signed a bilateral action plan 

for deepened peace-time defense cooperation in May 

2014.64 When announcing the contents of plan, ministers Karin Enström (Sweden) and Carl Haglund (Fin-
31

land) listed nine specific areas for bilateral cooperation. Among those were the following two concerning 

the army:

1. Explore the possibilities to deepen bilateral cooperation in exercises, education, gender issues, and 

training, for example in the area of artillery, basic military training, winter training, and mechanized units, 

as well as in common use of training facilities.

2. Explore the possibilities to contribute combined 

units to international exercises and operations, as well 

as to force registers in the UN, the EU and NATO.

Furthermore, the plan stated:

The Defence Forces will deliver a preliminary joint 

report on feasible cooperation areas by October 2014. 

The Defence Forces will continuously make suggestions for concrete cooperation areas as their work progresses but no later than January 2015. The political 

decisions concerning deepened bilateral cooperation 

in specific areas both at the MoD and Defence Forces 

level will be made continuously starting in February 

2015. 

The practical cooperation areas will be incorporated in 

the regular planning process of the respective Defence 

Forces beginning no later than in the spring of 2015.65

A NEW ERA OF VULNERABILITY?

In a report published in June 2014, researchers 

from the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOI) summarized the major consequences 

for European security of Russia’s illegal annexation of 

Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine as follows: 
32

Geopolitical struggle has returned with a vengeance 

and will not go away . . . this presents a fundamental challenge to the permanent formation of a liberal, 

rules-based security order in Europe. This has been at 

the center of political efforts in Europe during at least 

the last quarter-century. What has happened, as an immediate consequence of the crisis over Ukraine, is that 

geopolitical struggle and traditional balance of power 

issues have been brought out into the security policy 

daylight again. This may influence the European security order in a long-term perspective. What is actually 

most likely is that the current antagonism between, 

on the one hand, Russia, and on the other, the United 

States and most of Europe, generates several forms of 

negative spirals.66

“Little did we know a year ago what kinds of challenges we would face during the coming year,” Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt wrote in his blog at the 

time.67 Later, Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb 

echoed the sentiment, asking “Were we blind?” in a 

major speech in Berlin.68 These astonishing admissions 

were by no means unique since, with the exception of 

a few Eastern European countries such as Poland and 

the Baltic States, the dramatic events in Ukraine beginning in November 2013 came as a major strategic surprise for Western nations—a situation that a report by 

the UK’s Parliamentary Defence Committee blamed 

on the wasting away of analytical expertise covering 

Russia.69 These surprises simply should not occur. 

Ample warning had been given over many years, but 

the major western governments in particular did not 

pay attention.70 One especially noteworthy warning 

was the open letter to the Barack Obama Administration published by 22 prominent Baltic and Eastern European leaders in July 2009. They noted that “Russia 

is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century 

agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods.”71
33

Previously, Finnish minister of defense Jyri Häkämies had voiced the concern of the Finnish defense 

community in a speech in Washington in September 

2007 titled, “The three main security challenges for 

Finland today are Russia, Russia, and Russia. And 

not only for Finland, but for all of us.”72 Mr. Häkämies’ remarks, however prophetic, created a political 

storm back home in Finland. Despite its well-deserved 

reputation for knowing and understanding Russia, 

Finland did not act as a whistleblower, but kept well 

in line with other countries that read the signs on Russia wrongly or simply did not care. It should be noted 

that defense researchers in Finland and Sweden contributed a consistently more sober view of the increasingly disturbing developments in Russia, but their 

analysis was not fully appreciated by policymakers 

and academics, who were inclined to be more optimistic. In some important decisionmaking circles, defense 

researchers’ findings were found too disturbing to be 

taken seriously and were therefore either treated with 

silence or rejected outright.73

From a Nordic viewpoint in particular, it is alarming and highly regrettable that the European security 

order, tediously built over a span of more than 4 decades, is in disarray. This includes the Helsinki Final 

Act of 1975 and particularly its clause regarding the 

sanctity of borders between states. In 1975, this agreement that borders could be changed only peacefully 

in the future was an unexpected and remarkable diplomatic achievement—especially given its signing in 

the capital of a nation whose position was still uncertain. This is the backdrop to the comment by Haglund 

in June 2014: “Are we in Europe returning to a time 

when state borders can be unilaterally displaced by 

use of military force or threat thereof?”74 Conversely, 
34

the assurance by President Obama in Tallinn, Estonia, 

in September 2014 that “borders cannot be redrawn 

at the barrel of a gun” rather overlooks the repeated 

demonstration by President Vladimir Putin that, yes, 

they can.75

While major western powers are, for the time being, rejecting the notion of a new Cold War for the 

simple reason that Russia is perceived to be too weak 

to threaten their core interests, Russia nevertheless accuses the West of reintroducing Cold War mentality 

and diplomacy, forcing Russia into a new Cold War 

by refusing to adhere to the principle of indivisible 

and equal security for all. The return of hardline antiwestern Russian policy is favorably received by the 

majority of the Russian population, saturated with 

disinformation about Western ill will toward Russia and how the Motherland is besieged by enemies. 

Putin’s approval ratings are very high. These Russian sentiments are read loud and clear in small states 

neighboring Russia. From this perspective, the new 

Cold War is real enough. 

Alarm at the Russian trajectory is reaching public opinion across the Nordic states,76 mirroring the 

awakening of public consciousness in other countries 

such as Latvia77 and Poland.78 But the role of Finland 

as the border state that safeguards Nordic security as 

a whole makes Finnish reactions especially vital. Finnish public opinion is, of course, divided. Some voices 

try to reassure the Finnish people by simply claiming 

that the country is safe because Finland is so different 

from Ukraine. Others are not convinced. But, despite 

the fact that Finns as a whole have been rudely awakened by events in Ukraine, the Finnish economy is 

faltering, austerity measures have already hit Finnish 

defense hard, and most politicians are not willing to 
35

spend significantly more on defense. President Sauli 

Niinistö stated in June 2014 that Finland does not have 

the resources to maintain a credible national defense.79

Few experts, if any, think that Finland will be able to 

build its defense alone. It follows that deeper cooperation between the Nordic states is essential. 

PRESENT POLITICAL TRENDS 

AND PROSPECTS

In political terms, the situation in the Nordic countries remains deadlocked. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland are firmly in the NATO camp, while Finland and 

Sweden remain nonaligned, but no longer neutral. A 

distinct majority of the Finnish and Swedish peoples 

still do not see NATO membership as the preferred 

solution. This clearly complicates options for finding 

a rational long-term regional defense solution for the 

High North and the Baltic Sea area.

Given the nonalignment status of two Nordic 

countries, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that only 

Finland does not a priori assume that others will come 

to its aid if it is attacked. Nevertheless, building on 

historical experiences and international accords, the 

Finnish political leadership does not expect to be left 

entirely alone if sovereignty is threatened. Finland 

often refers to the EU solidarity clause stated in the 

Lisbon Treaty, which commits member states to help 

each other by all available means. 

Sweden behaves otherwise and works on the assumption that others will rush to her aid, as if the 

unofficial security guarantee from the Cold War still 

was valid and in place. But it is not. U.S. Ambassador 

to Sweden Mark Brzezinski, in a 2014 briefing to the 

Swedish parliamentary defense commission, declared 
36

clearly that there are no such security guarantees between Sweden and the United States or between Sweden and NATO. Brzezinski also voiced skepticism 

over the commission’s conclusion that Sweden would 

build security together with other countries. Without 

NATO membership, he noted, there are no such security guarantees.80 Thus, the U.S. attitude regarding 

Nordic defense cooperation appears to have remained 

unchanged during the last 5 to 6 years. One may, 

however, ask if this attitude is more a sign of militarydiplomatic inertia than the result of a thorough reassessment of the demands of the new situation in Europe. A relevant question is therefore to try to find out 

if there is any way other than NATO membership to 

generate a Nordic solution for the short- and mediumterm, which would improve the security position of 

all western actors involving the region, including the 

United States.

It is clear to European partners that U.S. patience 

with some leading NATO member states has worn 

thin over the last two administrations. Occasional lack 

of solidarity, but especially the persistent unwillingness of some major NATO members to share burdens 

with the United States, have had a negative impact. 

Many NATO members, on the other hand, have been 

reluctant to increase their defense budgets or assume 

larger responsibilities. For friendly outside observers, 

this raises serious concerns about the extent of mutual 

loyalty within the Alliance. Political cohesion within 

NATO also seems to be in doubt as a number of former 

Warsaw Pact countries seem to be “bowing to Putin’s 

power,” as a senior U.S. observer put in a Washington 

Post editorial in mid-October 2014.81
37

Norway and Denmark, however, are among 

those members of NATO that stand out favorably 

in terms of commitment. Both countries contributed 

significantly to the combined effort in Afghanistan, 

and former U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates commented favorably on both countries’ performance 

in operations in Libya. Denmark’s assumed burden 

and contributions have been particularly outstanding. At the same time, Finland and Sweden also deployed forces to Afghanistan and have contributed to 

building stability there. Swedish air force combat aircraft also participated in a combat role with Alliance 

members in Libya.

With this in mind, one could perhaps try to explore 

the possibilities of a coalition of the willing between 

the United States and the Nordic countries, based 

on the fundamental principle that all Nordic countries need each other and the United States for their 

security. As noted earlier, the United States needs to 

have friends and allies in place in order to secure its 

interests and the stability in the High North and the 

Baltic Sea area. In a time of both increasing tension 

and declining military strength and capabilities, the 

need to cooperate constructively together ought to be 

self-evident. 

Four Nordic prime ministers and the president of 

Finland met with President Obama in Stockholm in 

September 2013. Previously, the three presidents of 

the Baltic States had met with Obama in Washington 

at the end of August 2013. On both occasions, observers reported that the U.S. side saw the regional 

leaders as a team, rather than representatives of individual states.82 The meeting produced a joint declaration, and a new forum, The Nordic Security Dialogue, 

was launched.83 It was agreed that this dialogue will 
38

be conducted on an annual basis. It has yet to be 

seen whether it will be conducted on a high enough 

political level to have real impact.

Yet as the deterrent and war-preventing value of 

the Nordic defense forces—especially Finnish and 

Swedish—is increasingly challenged, building common capabilities cannot wait, but should be pursued 

vigorously despite national political obstacles. Bearing in mind the need to synchronize Nordic defense, 

waiting for all Nordic countries to join NATO is not an 

option. Unless some extremely dramatic turn for the 

worse happens in the Nordic neighborhood, the wait 

will probably be too long. In the meantime, national 

defense capabilities in Finland and Sweden are likely 

to deteriorate further to skeleton levels.

In theory, the political building blocks for cooperation should be largely in place. Norway’s and 

Denmark’s commitment to transatlantic security is 

rock solid, and Finland’s is unambiguous, as stated by 

Haglund in a speech in Washington in January 2014:

I begin my remarks by highlighting the two key security partnerships that Finland has: (1) the strong bilateral relationship with the United States, and (2) the active partnership we have with the Atlantic Alliance.84

Haglund’s speech was approved by the Finnish 

president and senior cabinet ministers. For a notionally non-aligned country, his statement on security partnerships is extraordinarily strong and clearly worded. 

It also differs essentially from the wordings of earlier 

Finnish administrations, where the UN, other international organizations, and soft power had a prominent 

role. Surprisingly enough, despite the strong factions 

of centrists and leftists with neutralist leanings in the 
39

Finnish parliament, this important clarification of the 

Finnish government’s political-security position has 

not yet been debated in Finland at all. Niinistö reiterated in August 2014 the need for Finland to explore 

all possible security partnerships, their benefits, and 

limits, including partnership with the United States.85

For outside observers, the Swedish position is baffling. The new organization of the Swedish defense 

forces, tailored for crisis management and international operations, is severely underfunded and will 

not be fully in place before 2023. But the old organization, built for territorial defense, has already been 

dismantled altogether. Norway and Denmark are 

better off, but their forces, too, are primarily designed 

for crisis management and international operations. 

Now that territorial defense has returned strongly to 

the scene, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark all lack sufficient boots on the ground, not to mention reserves 

to sustain prolonged regional military presence or 

large-scale combat. Finland is the only Nordic country 

that still can generate substantial amounts of trained 

combat troops, but the downside is that the bulk of 

the Finnish mobilization army sorely lacks modern 

equipment. Only a small fraction of the planned 11 

wartime brigade equivalents are adequately equipped 

at present.

Figuring out what to do to make defense work on a 

Nordic regional scale is tricky, but essential in order to 

maintain stability in the region and avoid the frightening prospects which inaction would eventually trigger. One of the conclusions made by Danish defense 

researchers in their analysis of the Ukraine crisis is 

worth noting: Military power is the basis for peace in 

Europe. “Credible deterrence is the key to secure that 

the Putin regime does not escalate the conflict with the 
40

west to a point, where the west chooses to intervene 

militarily.”86

FUTURE MILITARY-POLITICAL CHALLENGES

If asked how to organize Nordic defense, given the 

material at hand, a senior soldier from outside the region with a good professional perspective and vision 

could easily formulate a militarily sensible framework 

solution. One such template was already provided 

20 years ago, when General John J. Sheehan, Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Command and NATO’s 

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, presented his 

view. Dwindling defense budgets “may force the militaries of separate nations to fight as one, with the army 

coming from Finland, the air force from Sweden and 

the Navy from Norway,” he wrote at the time.87

For Northern Europe, where the allied nations have 

made substantial defense cuts since the end of the 

Cold War, the concept [of Combined Joint Task Forces] holds promise. . . . It is entirely possible that [eventually] you will see a kind of regional approach in 

the north that will have a CJTF [Combined Joint Task 

Force] capability.88

Sheehan was of the opinion that the prospects for 

this sort of arrangement were far better in the north 

than in NATO’s southern areas. Sheehan presented 

these radical ideas in Norway in spring 1995, but 

did not find a receptive audience among the senior 

Norwegian military brass.89 All the same, several of 

Sheehan’s arguments may even be more valid today 

than 2 decades ago. The diminution of defense budgets that he predicted, at a time when downsizing and 

restructuring defense forces and cashing in the peace 
41

dividend was only about to begin, has continued unchecked throughout the period. The once formidable 

Swedish air force no longer stands out as before, but 

is more or less on par with the three other Nordic 

air forces. But this is balanced by another significant 

change: the rise of the Finnish air force to a truly 

capable regional air force.

Geography, however, is a constant. In a conflict 

in the Nordic region, Finland’s fate is to fight on the 

ground, alone or with outside help. But as long as Finland lacks binding security guarantees, it is unwilling 

to take on the responsibilities of others. Finnish State 

Secretary for Defense Lieutenant General Arto Räty 

said in mid-June 2014: “It cannot be, that we would 

make commitments which relate to NATO’s Article 

Five, i.e., common defense, without ourselves being a 

NATO member.”90

SWEDISH AND FINNISH VULNERABILITIES

Within the long-standing Finnish and Swedish 

defense exchange program, defense researchers were 

free to explore more far reaching cooperation possibilities “outside the politically mandated box.” The first 

small project started at the Finnish National Defence 

University in 2010 and resulted in a working paper.91

The starting point was to identify weaknesses and 

strengths of the radically different defense concepts of 

Finland and Sweden and to discover what gains and 

drawbacks pooling resources together could generate 

from an operational standpoint. The peacetime readiness of the Finnish defense forces was found to be 

insufficient and the mobilization process itself vulnerable, especially in the light of developments in Russia 

toward radically increased surprise attack capabilities. 
42

Deployment of new dual-use precision strike systems 

like the operational-tactical Iskander ballistic missile 

and cruise missile systems well within striking distance of Finland was a particular cause for concern.92

Contributing to the Finnish problem is the recognition that a decision to mobilize the army is perhaps the 

most difficult that the Finnish Supreme Commander 

and the political leadership would ever have to take. 

Serious gaming results indicate that timing the decision correctly is most difficult, and the risks are high 

that it will be taken too late. Needless to say, the game 

is over if mobilization fails. Successful Finnish mobilization would, however, be a key Nordic interest, 

and therefore it was deemed necessary to explore how 

Sweden and perhaps other Nordic countries could 

give support.

The peacetime readiness of Sweden, however, 

will be high after the defense reform is concluded. A 

Swedish battle group could perhaps be available to 

strengthen the Finnish peacetime readiness in a time 

of crisis preceding mobilization. The main drawback 

from the Finnish perspective is that Sweden’s own 

critical needs in a crisis situation, such as the defense 

of the capital Stockholm and critically important Gotland, and possible other solidarity commitments are 

likely to rapidly exhaust her resources. 

Lack of reserves is a very significant Swedish problem in a drawn-out crisis and that is likely to apply to 

Norway, too. Finland is the only country in the region 

that could, at least in theory, deploy trained reserves 

in prolonged low-tension situations requiring some 

military presence, for instance in the Arctic area. This 

could involve mobilization of Finnish reserves on a 

voluntary basis to assist Nordic neighbors and would 

evidently require planning, multinational agreements 
43

and probably also domestic legislation. The Finnish 

strategic reserve is perhaps her most valuable asset in 

promoting deeper Nordic cooperation aiming at joint 

performance. Nevertheless, such arrangements have 

not been discussed yet, even informally.

SITUATION ASSESSMENT AND 

PRACTICAL PROPOSALS

Historical experiences and an 800-mile long common border with Russia evidently influence Finnish decisionmaking and armed forces profoundly. A 

thorough knowledge and understanding of Russian 

military thinking and capabilities are prerequisites for 

making correct decisions. Continuously updated and 

detailed classified assessments are naturally among 

the core tasks of the Finnish defense forces. But some 

of these assessments are also available in the unclassified domain. A major effort to produce an unclassified 

report on Russian military developments based on 

open sources was initiated in 2010 at the Department 

of Strategic and Defence Studies (DSDS) of the Finnish National Defence University. An interim report in 

Finnish was published in September 2011, and an updated and expanded report in English in April 2013.93

Similar but broader assessments, entitled Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective, are regularly 

published by the FOI.94 Most recently, Russian operations in Crimea and Ukraine have given rise to a substantial new wave of analysis assessing to what extent 

the military performance seen in major Russian exercises translates into actual warfighting capability.95

One of the main conclusions in the DSDS report 

concerning the developing Russian military capability was that capabilities are tailored to meet different demands against various opponents in different 
44

theaters. Swift surprise operations with elite forces 

from their normal peacetime readiness may work well 

against unprepared opponents with neglected defense 

capabilities, but Russia also wants to maintain the capability to mobilize large conventional forces operating in more traditional manners. This is especially relevant when considering the potential for main force 

operations, and countering the currently fashionable 

assumption that all future Russian military ventures 

will resemble actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, 

where the main force has not (to date) been relevant 

other than as a distraction.

The Russian military’s performance has improved 

significantly since the short war in Georgia in 2008. 

The unexpected and rapidly executed annexation of 

Crimea is proof enough. This was followed by the 

slightly more covert attempt to secure parts of eastern 

Ukraine, with the apparent aim to destabilize Ukraine 

entirely. Western defense communities are now attempting to understand the implications of Russia’s 

unorthodox asymmetric way of warfare, in this case 

using SOF personnel, “volunteers” as well as ethnic 

Russian separatists, on a more general scale. It is, however, most important not to dismiss the impressive 

and greatly expanded Russian training and exercise 

program for conventional forces. A recent example is 

Russia’s counterexercise in the Kaliningrad area June 

9-20, 2014, as a response to NATO’s BALTOPS ’14 

and Saber Strike ’14 exercises in the Baltic Sea area. 

The Russian exercise in Kaliningrad Oblast included 

joint operations involving all three main services, 

with a total strength on par with the corresponding 

NATO exercises. 

When the Kaliningrad exercise was over, yet another week-long snap combat readiness inspection ex-
45

ercise immediately commenced in the Central Military 

District, involving 65,000 troops, 5,500 military vehicles, 180 aircraft, and 60 helicopters.96 Subsequently, 

the Vostok 2014 (East 2014) major strategic command 

and staff exercise took place in the Eastern Military 

District in September 2014. It was preceded by another unannounced snap inspection and involved about 

100,000 servicemen transported by airlift or rail from 

various regions, impressive amounts of equipment, 

and units from different arms of service.97 In October 

2014, a comprehensive civilian defense exercise was 

held, involving 300,000 people. Interestingly enough, 

the Russian air force also participated, as well as the 

Strategic Rocket Forces, indicating a possible nuclear 

dimension of this large exercise.98 The absence of any 

similar exercise patterns of this scale in the west—despite Moscow’s claims of NATO and U.S. provocative 

exercises near Russian borders—gives the Russians 

great advantages in preparation for waging largescale war.

The Russian exercises have developed in quality 

as well as quantity, according to assessments by respected military observers and analysts including in 

Sweden.99 The Russian armed forces are now able to 

perform increasingly complex joint operations, and 

all three services appear to have done well. Remarkable improvements have also been achieved in command and control, and the beginning of widespread 

use of a digital operational-tactical command system 

has made it possible to conduct operations in a significantly higher tempo. The internal features of the command system, including data and intelligence fusion, 

contribute to easier and more reliable decisionmaking.

A careful western response is warranted. As the 

Afghanistan operation winds down, there is reason 
46

to contemplate what is prudent to do. Back to basics 

is a good starting point. There is a renewed need to 

develop tactics and operational art suitable for largescale combat against militarily well organized and 

equipped opponents. Winter warfare is a specific area 

where the Nordic states more generally could contribute. Finland, in particular, can contribute not only 

substantial Arctic warfare experience, but also significant training facilities, as detailed further in the policy 

recommendations on the succeeding pages.

September and October 2014 saw a range of initiatives and developments as each Nordic state responded in its own way to the new perceived challenge from 

Russia. Sweden’s new fragile minority government 

under Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stated clearly that 

Sweden does not intend to apply for NATO membership during this government’s term.100 At the same 

time, both Löfven and his Minister of Defence Peter 

Hultqvist further stressed the commitment to Nordic 

defense cooperation, particularly with Finland. According to Hultqvist, “deepening of defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland is one of the most 

important projects during the next few years.”101 There 

has even been discussion of the partial reinstatement 

of conscription in Sweden. But mention of defense cooperation, or even alignment, with the United States is 

conspicuous by its absence. 

Finland, meanwhile, has announced specific measures to enhance readiness in response to updated assessments of the threat from Russia and the entirely 

new security environment in Europe. Finnish Chief 

of Defence General Jarmo Lindberg has laid out plans 

for a Finnish “spearhead force” mirroring NATO’s enhanced reaction force, with particular reference to the 

need to match the newly-demonstrated speed of Rus-
47

sian decisionmaking.102 Elsewhere, Lindberg made 

an explicit statement of the challenge that front-line 

states now face: 

Crisis situations have changed and become more diffuse, without a clear beginning or a clear finish. War 

is not advertised as such, it begins and ends in its own 

time. Typical of this period is that the boundaries of 

peace, crisis and war come together to form a sort of 

grey area of instability. The line between traditional 

and unconventional warfare have been wiped out - or 

rather, they are mixed in a new way with each other by 

adding new elements of warfare employed. Contemporary warfare, now also known as hybrid warfare, 

is exactly what this is all about, as events in eastern 

Ukraine show us.103

Finally, in Norway, radical steps have been called 

for to re-adapt the armed forces back to a defensive 

capability. As noted earlier, Norwegian defense had 

over decades changed from a mobilization force of 

several hundred thousand soldiers, who would be 

able to repel a full-scale invasion, to a different type of 

defense effort where small but highly qualified units 

would deploy in international missions or meet limited attacks on Norway. The result, according to one 

analysis, is that: 

The Army today is so small that it is pointless. The 

manpower strength is hopelessly small, and there 

are major shortcomings in core assets such as air defense, artillery and combat vehicles. . . . The Navy 

is struggling with manning problems, to fill vessels 

with people, and similarly the Air Force has difficulty 

obtaining enough technicians for maintenance.104
48

Similar analyses highlighted Norway’s reliance on 

adequate warning of threats in order to prepare and 

retrain to meet them, contrasted with Russia’s demonstrated new ability to move large forces rapidly 

and—importantly—with little visible sign of preparation. In early October 2014, Norwegian Minister of 

Defense Ine Eriksen Søreide publicly tasked Chief of 

Defense Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen to provide 

a military assessment and advice on how to address 

these new challenges.105

FUTURE WAR FOR THE NORDIC STATES

Former Norwegian Chief of Defense General 

Sverre Diesen has presented interesting ideas for further cooperation with the aim of developing functioning defense forces for the future.106 Diesen notes that 

the concept of maneuver warfare is still prevailing in 

most western countries. The aim is to defeat the will 

and belief of the opponent in his own operation and 

to seize from him the initiative and capacity to influence the situation. The method to accomplish this is 

to have faster decisionmaking in the command chain 

and a higher operational tempo than the opponent. 

Fully mechanized ground troops with full air support 

have been the preferred tool.

The first two points are still valid, Diesen says. But 

tank warfare along the basic principles that the Germans developed 80 years ago will have to yield. The 

core of future ground forces will consist of small units, 

which rely on technology and mobility—Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 

(ISTAR) units—that engage enemy troop concentrations, military convoys, command posts, and air defense systems. Diesen mentions small ISTAR patrols 
49

with light vehicles or other platforms, but adequately 

equipped to spot and designate targets and transmit 

target data to decisionmakers or directly to shooters. 

Target data can then be distributed for engagement 

to the most suitable platforms of the services at hand, 

such as multirole air force platforms or sea-based platforms delivering long-range precision weapons. 

In sum, the core of the new system consists of 

distributed sensors and centralized weapons delivery systems. The maneuvering takes place with these 

numerous light units, while engagement takes place 

with stand-off weapons over long distances. Effect on 

target can be achieved in a small fraction of the time it 

would take to move mechanized units over such distances. ISTAR patrols need no armored protection, but 

rather mobility, low signature and ability to disperse. 

In addition to personal weapons, they also need manportable air defense systems to handle threats from 

enemy aircraft and helicopters.

This new concept offers many advantages for 

countries with small populations but large territories. 

The number of fighting units remaining in the Nordic countries is so low that it has become impossible 

to cover all of the territories with traditional forces, 

or to respond to border infringements within reasonable time frames. The paradigm shift before us is that 

technology will replace the need to transport heavy 

units. Fire control tasks will be performed by light 

and relatively cheaper small units that can be deployed to many critical defensive positions, while a 

limited number of heavy weapon platforms cover the 

territory as a whole.

Diesen underlines that it is imperative to understand the potential of information technology and 

comprehend its impact on organizational and concep-
50

tual matters. He suggests that Nordic nations should 

during the coming years explore the possibilities, 

conduct theoretical studies, move on to gaming and 

simulations and practical trials, and in the end train 

and exercise with full-scale troop units to test the concept. We understand Diesen’s thinking as related specifically to defense against classical invasion, and his 

ideas are thought provoking and certainly need to be 

explored. It should be mentioned, however, that his 

ideas are not entirely novel. The Finnish doctrine of 

regional defense and regional combat developed in 

the 1960s included such elements. Unfortunately, they 

were forgotten in the 1990s, only to return in the recently adopted new Finnish army doctrine.107

At the same time, it is evident that more is needed, 

and it is questionable if this format alone addresses 

other types of military threats, such as subversion and 

sabotage activities aimed at paralyzing society even 

before large scale attacks have begun—along the lines 

of the Russian asymmetric warfare ideas currently 

being applied in eastern Ukraine. Vital infrastructure 

has to be protected and back-up systems built, e.g., 

for electricity and water supply, in order to increase 

societal resilience. Local troops, reminiscent of home 

guard units in the other Nordic countries, play a crucial role. The classical way to defeat SOF detachments 

holding strategically important positions is firepower. 

Local forces supported by main battle tanks are still a 

useful tool even in urban combat.

Another serious question related to Diesen’s thinking is how small countries can afford sufficient quantities of stand-off precision weapons if the opponent 

reverts to his traditional method of fighting, where 

quantity is a quality of its own. The new Finnish army 

fighting doctrine can be considered a step in the di-
51

rection Diesen proposes. The aim is to cause the opponent maximum losses, stop him in his tracks, but 

holding ground is no longer a key priority. There is, 

however, an important exception. The Finnish capital 

in Helsinki and other vital locations are to be defended at all cost, in order to secure political and military 

leadership and decisionmaking. Although this Finnish approach may in some respects be considered 

“old-fashioned,” with Finland’s inevitable role as the 

“front line” of any future Nordic clash with Russia, it 

will form an essential element of defense of the region 

as a whole in precisely the same manner as it did in 

1939 and 1944. 

CONCLUSION

The present prolonged security crisis in Europe, 

signaled by the war in Georgia in 2008 and then underlined by the armed intervention and land grab in 

Ukraine, has fatally undermined the European security regime and exposed the vulnerabilities of Russia’s neighbors for all to see.108 The primary lesson 

to be drawn from the crisis is that cooperation and 

solidarity in resisting Russia is essential. Researchers from Denmark’s Center for Military Studies have 

provided a sober assessment of why Russia continues to keep the initiative: It has not been a western 

priority to formulate a coherent common policy to 

control the situation.109 Because of different national 

preferences, Russia’s actions have not been met with 

a resolute response. Paradoxically, countries like 

France and Germany have had no problems selling high-tech weapon systems to Russia at the same 

time as they contemplate how to support Kyiv and 

sanction Russia. 
52

The west has itself created space and freedom of 

action for Russia. The way out, according to the Danish view, is to close ranks as to thwart Russia’s divide 

and rule policy. It should be recognized that Europe 

can have influence in security policy only by cooperating closely with the United States. Different European 

positions will have to be reconciled. Consensus has to 

be built, e.g., in the form of a new Strategic Concept 

for NATO. Given the disparate views within Europe 

and NATO, this is indeed a tall order to achieve.

With Europe divided and reluctant to share burdens, a Nordic regional coalition of the willing, supported by the United States, would be easier to achieve. 

These countries share both interests and values. Norway is a good example of a NATO member that, despite being a neighbor to Russia, has nevertheless succeeded in maintaining good and relaxed relations to 

Russia. A Nordic coalition within or outside NATO 

would be no military threat to Russia, but would severely curtail Russia’s possibilities to threaten, coerce, 

and extort.

Defense cooperation can be discussed by all sides, 

including the United States, within the Nordic Security 

Dialogue. This would contribute to the security and 

stability of Europe’s North, while remaining a much 

less politically sensitive approach than attempting the 

same dialogue within the context of potential NATO 

membership for Finland and Sweden. Nevertheless, 

Finland’s present position as a nonaligned country 

is untenable in the long run. As the doyen of Finnish 

diplomats, Ambassador Jaakko Iloniemi has observed 

that at present Finland carries the same risks as NATO 

member states, but without credible assurances of 

help or the benefit of NATO security guarantees.110
53

Sweden is in many respects a question mark. On 

the one hand, Swedish political culture relies heavily 

on old traditions regardless of which political coalition is in power. This means continuity, predictability, and reluctance to deviate from past behavior. As a 

result, the gap between the views and assessments of 

leading politicians and those of the Swedish military 

community about defense needs is increasing, to the 

extent that they often seem to live in different worlds. 

Swedish former senior defense official and researcher Krister Andrén asks if maintaining a warpreventing threshold capability has become forgotten 

as a core task of the Swedish defense forces. His logical argument is that the Swedish threshold ambition 

needs to be sufficiently high, so that there is no gap 

between threats that are too big for Sweden alone and 

too small for the Nordic countries as a whole. The 

Nordic collective threshold capability, in turn, needs 

to be sufficient that there is no gap between threats 

that are too big for the Nordic countries combined and 

too small for the surrounding transatlantic world, i.e., 

NATO and especially its most important member, the 

United States.111

Nevertheless, the downward trend of Swedish military capability is not likely to change any time soon, 

and at times Swedish defense policy appears to serve 

only Swedish defense industrial policy, which limits 

the potential for cooperation with other Nordic states. 

For Sweden’s neighbors, this is far from reassuring. If 

policy issues are complicated and difficult to tackle, 

assessing military capabilities is easier. The results are 

well known, although not always recognized. Overall, more than one of the defense forces under scrutiny 

is in a lamentable condition. Any offensively minded 

great power needs to consider the credibility of its 
54

neighbor’s defenses within its own offensive planning. Mathematical methods to evaluate such risks are 

employed in contingency planning, and one Western 

starting point is that the probability of success must 

be greater than roughly 80 percent in order to contemplate even using military means to achieve a desired 

political goal.112 The Russian army uses its own methods to assess these risks, but, given the harsh austerity measures that have hollowed out the Finnish and 

Swedish defense forces, it goes without saying that, 

from a Russian viewpoint, the operational risks of offensive action have diminished sharply. 

Leading strategic thinker Professor Thomas C. 

Schelling gave the following explanation in the 1960s 

of why credible defense is so profoundly important: 

The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force. . . . The power to 

hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—

vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. . . . it is not the pain 

and damage itself, but its influence on somebody’s behavior 

that matters.113

At present, maintaining the credibility of the defense of the Nordic states depends heavily on finding 

a way to enhance defense cooperation both within the 

region, and by extension with the United States. 

IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Drawing from historical experiences and current trends, a short list of baseline assessments and 

recommendations for U.S. policymakers can readily 

be made:
55

• The Nordic countries all need support from

the United States for their security, and the 

United States needs reliable allies and partners 

if it wishes to secure peace and stability in the 

Nordic and Baltic Sea area, including the Arctic, where competition for natural resources is 

bound to increase in coming decades.

• Russia’s actions have re-established military

power as the basis for peace in Europe. It follows that a credible defense posture is essential. But the lack of Nordic military resources to 

fulfill nationally stated defense tasks in a time 

of increased uncertainty is commonly acknowledged. As no Nordic country can manage 

alone, cooperation offers the only sustainable 

solution. The alternative—inaction—is entirely 

unsatisfactory for any country in the region. 

Norway and Denmark would not be reassured, 

thanks to continued downsizing (including the 

U.S. rebalancing to Asia) and the alarming potential for a split in NATO. Sweden has already 

explicitly rejected territorial defense as a policy 

for the foreseeable future, and Finland, despite 

recent increased willingness to publicly state 

the threat, remains exposed and unable to manage alone.

• The time-consuming task of creating common

military capabilities should be pursued vigorously within the region in parallel with political efforts to align goals and objectives and improve cooperation. Informed encouragement 

from the United States, with clear communication of the extent and limits of U.S. support, can 

help foster this aim.

• The “NORDEFCO” and “Joint Procurement”

sections highlight areas where the national pol-
56

icies and interests of individual Nordic states 

have so far limited the effectiveness of cooperation programs. Nevertheless, any enhancement 

of defense cooperation in any area complicates 

the operational calculations of the potential 

adversary. It follows that all opportunities to 

work together should be pursued at the earliest stage possible given political constraints. 

This applies in particular to building common 

ground among leadership figures, including 

sharing of situational awareness, assessments 

and interpretations, the consequences of action, 

and especially the consequences of inaction.

• The long-term goal for the Nordic countries

must be the ability to fight as one entity in cooperation with the United States and NATO. 

Meanwhile, a way should be found to allow 

a politically acceptable coalition of the willing between the United States and the Nordic 

countries to underwrite regional security.

• But antagonizing Russia by singling out NATO

membership and endorsing it to Finland and 

Sweden as the only possible path to achieve 

Nordic security guarantees is at present bad 

policy, given the political sensitivity of NATO 

accession. More subtle policies, which could 

use the Nordic Security Dialogue with the United 

States as a forum for discussion and planning, 

can work toward the same future goal without 

precluding NATO membership in the future. 

The long Norwegian experience of dealing with 

Russia in a relaxed and nonadversarial manner 

is a valuable asset in this respect.

• Similarly, extensive analytical expertise on Russia throughout the Nordic states can be lever-
57

aged to enhance U.S. understanding of Russian 

intentions and capabilities. As noted by a UK 

parliamentary committee in July 2014, Russia’s 

neighbors have a powerful incentive to properly resource study and analysis in this area, 

and these resources can be tapped into by the 

U.S. Department of State and Department of 

Defense (DoD) among others, given an appropriate framework for enhanced cooperation.114

• There is an acknowledged need for armed forces within NATO and partner nations to change 

focus from insurgency-related operations back 

to more classic forms of state-on-state warfare. 

Land warfare tactics and operational art against 

modern but more traditional large-scale troop 

formations need to be developed and trained in 

Nordic environments and on sufficiently large 

manpower scales. Winter and Arctic warfare 

are fields where Finland and the Nordic states 

more generally can contribute significant expertise and training resources for the benefit 

of U.S. and allied forces. In particular, Finland 

would be able to complement and cooperate 

with NATO’s Cold Weather Operations (CWO) 

Center of Excellence (COE) in Bodø, Norway. 

The ranges at Sodankylä in northern Finland 

have ample facilities for training and exercising defensive warfare together in at least battalion size formations, including support from 

air assets, with the Rovajärvi live-firing range 

and others nearby. This is a significant asset as 

similar ranges are in short supply elsewhere, 

especially in Western Europe. Finnish senior 

officers unofficially advocate an additional 

COE based on the Sodankylä assets, and focus-
58

ing on Arctic land warfare in close coordination 

with CWO COE.

• It is important to bear in mind that the Norwegian-Russian border, although geographically 

short, is strategically of profound importance 

for Russia; the vastly longer Finnish-Russian 

border does not carry the same relative strategic weight. This adds to the importance of the 

Arctic as an area of strategic focus.

• Finland is the only country in the region that

could, at least in theory, mobilize and deploy 

trained reserves for prolonged low-tension 

situations. The U.S. Army should consider options for cooperation with the Finnish military 

for situations of this kind, requiring a military 

presence to maintain security in the Arctic and 

potentially other regions.

• Enhanced cooperation with both Finland and

Sweden would self-evidently play a major role 

in security assurance for the Baltic States, drastically reducing their current isolation in the 

face of Russian intimidation. Both states are notably less resistant to defense burden sharing 

than many established NATO allies in Western 

Europe.

• U.S. policymakers should be alert to shifts in

the domestic debates on NATO membership 

in Sweden and Finland. In the case of Finland 

in particular, already close integration with 

NATO structures and compliance with membership criteria would facilitate a potentially 

rapid accession process. This would imply a 

sharp increase in potential for military and security cooperation with the United States, and 

preparation for this eventuality by the U.S. 

Army and DoD would be prudent.
59

ENDNOTES

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60

6. Tarja Cronberg, then chairman of the Finnish Green Party, 

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NATO-förbindelser (The Hidden Alliance: Sweden’s Secret Links with 

NATO), Stockholm, Sweden: Atlantis, 2011.
61

17. Robert Dalsjö, “DYSFUNCTIONS, Sweden’s Squandered 

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24. Ibid., p. 84.

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Northern Security and Global Politics, London, UK: Routledge, 

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och det kalla kriget (FoKK) Publication 37, Stockholm, Sweden, 2013.
62

28. Holmström, Den dolda alliansen, p. 202.

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33. Ibid., p. 411.

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niin, niin vieras” (“In Every Country There Is Intelligence—If Not 

Your Own, There Are Others”), Kanava, No. 5, 2014, p. 14. 

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late Colonel Paasonen.

36. Tuunainen, p. 272.

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the Finnish Ground Forces), Maavoimien muutos ja paikallisjoukot

(Changes in Ground Forces and Local Forces), Media Briefing, April 

28, 2014, Mikkeli, Finland.

38. Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden), Defence Commission Presents Its Defence Policy Report, May 15, 2014.
63

39. Cf. Försvar och Säkerhet (Defense and Security) Blog, Johan Wiktorin, ed., Stockholm, Sweden: Royal Swedish Academy 

of War Sciences, 2014. 

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2012, p. 48. See also White Paper, March 1, 2013, p. 11.

44. Ibid., p. 86.

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lagres I Norge” (“American Battle Tanks Will Be Stored in 

Norway,” August 5, 2014, available from www.dn.no/nyheter/

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Strong Contribution”), Hufvudstadsbladet, August 28, 2009.
64

50. Sverre Diesen, Juhani Kaskeala, and Håkan Syrén, “Nytt 

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and Security Policy,” Proposals presented to the extraordinary 

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53. Ibid.

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58. NORDEFCO Annual Report 2013, p. 6, available from www.

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59. Järvenpää, pp. 140-142.

60. NORDEFCO Annual Report 2013, p. 28.
65

61. Lieutenant General Mika Peltonen, “The MCC Chairman 

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62. Ibid.

63. Järvenpää, p. 148.

64. Karin Enström and Carl Haglund, “Action Plan for 

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COOPERATION_BETWEEN_SWEDEN_AND_FINLAND.pdf.

65. Ibid.

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Malminen and Gudrun Persson, eds., The Swedish National Defence 

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71. Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, 

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73. Authors’ personal experiences and private discussions 

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67

79. Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE), “Niinistö Lavrovin 

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68

87. Jack Dorsey, “NATO May Combine Its Forces to Trim 

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88. Ibid.

89. Claes Arvidsson, private email communication, April 9 

and May 13, 2014. Mr. Arvidsson interviewed Lieutenant General (Ret.) Per Bøthun, who met General Sheehan several times 

and held several high-ranking positions in the Norwegian Armed 

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ei ole vastuuta Baltiasta’” (“State Secretary Arto Räty: ‘Finland 

carries no responsibility for the Baltic States’”), Talouselämä, June 

13, 2014.

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Hult, “The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland,” 

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29, 2015.
69

94. Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin, eds., Russian 

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95. See, for example, Andrzej Wilk, “Is Russia Making Preparations for a Great War?” OSW, September 24, 2014, available 

from www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-09-24/russiamaking-preparations-a-great-war; and Roger McDermott, “Vostok 

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98. “Entire Russian Air Force Participates in Russian Civil 

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2014, available from en.ria.ru/military_news/20141007/193759625/

Entire-Russian-Air-Force-Participates-in-Civil-Defense-Drills.html; 

“Drills Involving Topol Missile Systems Held in Russia’s Volga 

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com/russia/753065.

99. Jägarchefen, “Midsommardans” (“Midsummer Dance”), 

June 23, 2014, available from jagarchefen.blogspot.fi/2014/06/midsommardans.html; and “Åskvarning” (“Thunder Warning”), July 

1, 2014, available from jagarchefen.blogspot.fi/2014/07/askvarning.

html; and “Konsten att förbereda ett land” (The Art of Preparing 

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fi/2014/10/konsten-att-forbereda-ett-land.html. 

100. “Regeringsförklaringen den 3 oktober 2014” (“Statement 

of Government Policy, October 3, 2014”), Stockholm, Sweden: 

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regeringen.se/sb/d/3039/a/247180.
70

101. “Stubb: Sveriges Natolinje påverkar inte Finlands beslut” 

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(“The Army Wants Elite Forces Rapidly”), Helsingin Sanomat, 

September 27, 2014, p. A18.

103. Speech by Finnish Chief of Defense General Jarmo 

Lindberg at the Opening of National Defense Courses, September 15, 2014, available from www.puolustusvoimat.fi/portal/

puolustusvoimat.fi/!ut/p/c5/vdDLkqJAEAXQb_EDtAp5FCwFiuJVoLxhY6DSgI2C2ILy9WNEb2YW7arHvMsbmSciQQaeOedDXeZfdXvOG5CATNiSpSDqJmQk1zExNDiiWEvHWEKJAzFIILf1j4_OmD4n7wjvpj-lD7pLR6pqFu1jSPF8cvCNCVQ6UVxROqVLJ8Aj3EtMpG3wyumWVSfOnreyfzWLytBwbRghe80oBL7uIfPdCyy2sEM4hqwVDhq-GkpBiFgSCi_3XQ999_CHWUGQggz99A1d4EHwi994adE3Whi9zwq591n6f7DkTRQQzLqQbBwNGjoSXUwtI5TYX7VMkNW702LcnxZwwSNGkhjE8gLiWVZkQJyld1m9GiXG8bCpismO10_WSQ9M1fpjS8kmy3fL7fFxO974opD6J9DXNi-XNYfYYTgj8mGtjILmG-Vkfl5bNap5Mzxw2DMT2ZbmdFXNS2RERWS1Xt51GVl7Q5-d5-ePri-V6eo3xEfezt0Hhpro91hUbhqhdtPUjeR1l0gKAm0F-_0lrw6lIFfTuG8S7Wt70dz6fpDGvA6

GSASO3p4K0J2GDnv6lPyVYjWb_QE4cpIc/dl3/d3/L2dBISEvZ0FBI

S9nQSEh/?pcid=dfc2438042b5987f96e9f600af335404.

104. Bentzrød.

105. Ibid.

106. Sverre Diesen, “Manøverkrigføring for det 21. århundre” 

(“Maneuver Warfare for the 21st Century”), Vårt Försvar, No. 1, 

2014, pp. 9-11.

107. Lieutenant General Raimo Jyväsjärvi, “Maavoimat: 

Maavoimien muutos ja paikallisjoukot” (“The Army: Change 

in the Army and Local Forces”), Helsinki, Finland: The Finnish 

Defence Forces, April 28, 2014. 
71

108. Forss et al., “The Development of Russian Military Policy 

and Finland,” p. 45.

109. Ukrainekrisen, Copenhagen, Denmark: Center for Militære Studier, p. 35.

110. Jaakko Iloniemi, Intervention at the presidential security 

political seminar, Kultaranta, Finland, June 9, 2014.

111. Krister Andrén, “Krigsavhållande tröskelförmåga—Det 

svenska försvarets glömda huvuduppgift?” (“War-Preventing 

Threshold Capability—The Forgotten Core Task of the Swedish 

Defence Forces?”), FOI-R--3852—SE, Stockholm, Sweden: February 2014, p. 16, available from www.foi.se/rapport?rNo=FOI-R--

3852--SE, accessed June 27, 2014

112. Lieutenant General Matti Ahola, personal communication, June 26, 2014.

113. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Chap. 1, New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.

114. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Towards the 

Next Defence and Security Review: Part Two—NATO,” London, 

UK: House of Commons, July 31, 2014, pp. 32-33. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Professor Stefan Forss

Colonel (Ret.) Pekka Holopainen

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil