Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

SEPTEMBER 2015

Special Study 7

Walter S. Poole

Series Editors Jeffrey A. Larsen • Erin R. Mahan

Cold War Foreign Policy Series

Elliot richardson, James Schlesinger,

and Donald Rumsfeld

1973-1977

The Decline of Détente
Cover Photo: Secretaries of Defense Elliot Richardson, James Schlesinger, and 

Donald Rumsfeld.

Source: Official DoD Photo Library.

Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

September 2015

Series Editors

Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D.

Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D.

President, Larsen Consulting Group

Special Study 7

Walter S. Poole

Elliot richardson, James Schlesinger,

and Donald Rumsfeld

1973-1977

The Decline of Détente
This study is cleared for public release. The views expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent 

the views of the Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, or any other agency of the Federal Government.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, 

provided that a standard source credit line is included. The Historical 

Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would appreciate a 

courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Organizational and Personality Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Bolstering NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Reacting to Defeat in Indochina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

SALT under Schlesinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Rumsfeld and SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The Debate over Détente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
v

Foreword

This is the seventh special study by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Historical Office on the secretary’s role in the U.S. foreign 

policymaking process. It examines the role of three secretaries of defense 

during the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford: 

Elliot Richardson, James Schlesinger, and Donald Rumsfeld. Richardson 

left after only a few months in office to become the attorney general, and 

Schlesinger’s increasingly poor relations with the Ford White House led 

to his replacement by Rumsfeld in November 1975. Despite an overall 

thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations during Nixon’s first term, tensions with the 

Soviet Union marked the tenures of these three secretaries. In particular, 

Schlesinger’s management of U.S. military aid to Israel in October 1973 

to counter Soviet aid to Arab states and Rumsfeld’s efforts to undermine 

strategic arms limitation talks illustrated the limitations of détente.

The Historical Office views this series as part of an ongoing effort to 

highlight the secretary’s myriad roles and accomplishments. The series 

had its origins in a draft manuscript by Dr. Steven Rearden, author of 

The Formative Years, 1947–1950, the first volume in the Secretaries of 

Defense Historical Series. We anticipate that future series will cover other 

defense topics as they relate to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

My thanks go to Dr. Ryan Peeks and Corbin Williamson of the OSD 

Historical Office for redrafting portions of the study and to our editors, 

Sandra Doyle and Allen Mikaelian. I continue to be indebted to Kathleen 

Jones in OSD Graphics for her expertise and design. 

The series titles printed to date as well as other publications are available 

on the OSD Historical Office website. We invite you to peruse our 

selections at <http://history.defense.gov/>.

Erin R. Mahan

Chief Historian

Office of the Secretary of Defense
vii

Executive Summary

By the beginning of Richard Nixon’s second term, Henry Kissinger 

had become the public face of American foreign policy, serving 

as both national security adviser and secretary of state. As Nixon 

devoted more and more of his time to the Watergate scandal, 

Kissinger became increasingly responsible for articulating and 

conducting foreign policy, a role he maintained as President Gerald 

Ford’s secretary of state. Against this background, the three secretaries 

of defense who served between 1973 and 1977—Elliot Richardson, 

James Schlesinger, and Donald Rumsfeld— achieved mixed success 

in their attempts to influence the nation’s foreign policy. 

Elliott Richardson came into office in January 1973 after serving as 

secretary of health, education, and welfare (1970–1973). He entered 

the Pentagon intending to increase DoD’s capacity for geopolitical 

and geostrategic analysis by strengthening the Office of International 

Security Affairs (ISA). Within months, however, Nixon convinced 

Richardson to take up the position of attorney general. 

Nixon then turned to Director of Central Intelligence James 

Schlesinger to replace Richardson. An economist, Schlesinger had 

a great deal of experience with foreign and defense policy and took 

a broad view of his foreign policy responsibilities. Like Richardson, 

Schlesinger attempted to boost the profile of ISA, increasing its 

capacity to evaluate the national security implications of global 

economic changes and creating a task force in ISA to deal with 

arms control negotiations. These efforts, however, were somewhat 

undermined by successful congressional pressure to cut staff in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Schlesinger’s main foreign policy goal during his term was to bolster 

the conventional military strength of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization). His approach was two-pronged. First, he attempted 
Executive Summary Executive Summary

viii ix

Rumsfeld was bolstered by shifting domestic politics. Events in 

Southeast Asia and criticism of the Helsinki Conference robbed 

détente of much of its luster within the United States by late 1975, 

weakening Kissinger’s position in policymaking. Rumsfeld was 

able to leverage this domestic dissatisfaction to argue successfully 

against substantive new strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), a 

stance that put him at odds with both Ford and Kissinger. 

The tumultuous mid-1970s saw three secretaries managing the 

Pentagon under two different presidents. These changes at the 

highest levels of DoD leadership, as well as Henry Kissinger’s 

inordinate influence on both Nixon and Ford, limited the 

secretary of defense’s role in U.S. foreign policy. No matter 

how worthwhile their intentions and goals, Richardson’s tenure 

was too short for him to claim any major accomplishment, and 

Schlesinger’s differences with the secretary of state led him first to 

marginalization in policy discussions and then to dismissal from 

office. Rumsfeld, too, found himself in conflict with the secretary 

of state, particularly in regard to arms control. Yet with domestic 

circumstances favoring a turn away from accommodation with the 

Soviet Union, Rumsfeld undermined Kissinger’s progress toward a 

comprehensive strategic arms treaty and cast doubt on the viability 

of détente as a national policy.

to convince NATO ministers that conventional defense of Western 

Europe was possible, and that doing so was worth increased military 

spending. Second, he pressed for rationalization of NATO policy—

having each ally concentrate on specialized military functions—and 

standardization of parts and equipment across the Alliance. Schlesinger 

only partially succeeded; European governments remained wedded to 

the less expensive nuclear deterrent, while the standardization drive 

partially foundered on protectionist impulses in member states. 

Outside of Alliance politics, Schlesinger’s tenure was plagued by 

disputes with Kissinger. Poor personal relations intensified their 

many policy clashes. From August 1974, the two men also fought 

for influence with the new president, Gerald Ford, who came to trust 

Kissinger’s judgment over Schlesinger’s. Ford also resented Schlesinger’s 

supercilious manner and his brusque comments at National Security 

Council meetings. Partially because of this lack of rapport, Kissinger 

nearly always prevailed when he and Schlesinger disagreed on policy. 

Schlesinger’s failure to manage these two relationships came to define 

his tenure and led to his dismissal in late 1975. 

Ford replaced Schlesinger with a close ally, Donald Rumsfeld, 

who had been White House chief of staff and who previously 

served as Ford’s ambassador to NATO. Like Schlesinger, Rumsfeld 

clashed with Kissinger; Rumsfeld thought that Kissinger was too 

complacent about growing Soviet strength. Although Rumsfeld 

agreed with the secretary of state’s assessment that the United 

States led the Soviet Union in defense capabilities, he argued that 

Kissinger’s public optimism would prevent Congress from giving 

the Department of Defense (DoD) the funds it needed to maintain 

that lead. In response, Rumsfeld regularly presented DoD’s more 

pessimistic view of the Soviet threat, which he credited with 

convincing Congress to increase investment in the military. 

Rumsfeld’s primary foreign policy interest was in arms control 

negotiations, where he surpassed his predecessors. Like Schlesinger, 

Rumsfeld was skeptical of détente. Unlike Schlesinger, however, 
1

Introduction

In January 1969, President Richard M. Nixon entered office seeking 

to replace the Cold War rivalry with superpower détente, laying 

the groundwork for a “generation of peace.” Yet, in dealings with 

his Cabinet officials, the president displayed little tolerance for the 

type of compromise and comity he sought with international rivals. 

The president and Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the president 

for national security affairs, concentrated decision making in 

the White House to an unprecedented degree. They regularly 

bypassed established leadership channels to work through their 

own backchannels, negotiating with North Vietnam, orchestrating 

an opening to Communist China, and shaping strategic arms 

limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. By January 1973 they 

had recorded important successes: the Paris Peace Accords ending 

the U.S. combat role in the Vietnam War; a dramatic presidential 

visit to the People’s Republic of China; an antiballistic missile 

(ABM) treaty; and an interim agreement on offensive strategic 

weapons (SALT I) with the Soviet Union. Melvin R. Laird, Nixon’s 

first secretary of defense, made several important contributions to 

foreign policy, particularly in the areas of arms control and the 

drawdown from Vietnam, but distrust and conflict pervaded his 

relations with the White House. Like Laird, who stepped down 

after the 1972 presidential election, the three secretaries of defense 

who served Presidents Nixon and Ford from 1973 to 1977—Elliott 

L. Richardson, James R. Schlesinger, and Donald H. Rumsfeld— 

often found themselves battling to shape policy in an administration 

that concentrated the policymaking process and decision making 

in the White House to an unusual degree. 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

2 3

Organizational and Personality Issues

For his second term, Nixon selected Elliot Richardson, a Harvardeducated lawyer who publicly expressed agreement with the 

president’s national security policies and was known for his excellent 

managerial skills. Richardson stood out as an embodiment of the 

Eastern establishment, heir to the tradition that had produced 

Dean G. Acheson, Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy, and James V. 

Forrestal. As undersecretary of state and then as secretary of health, 

education, and welfare, Richardson had gained a wide familiarity 

with governmental policy processes. He later remembered Nixon 

saying that one reason he wanted him in the Pentagon was to act as 

“an effective counterweight to Kissinger.”1

Upon taking office on 29 January 1973, Richardson reasoned that, 

at a time of diminished military budgets, it was more important than 

ever for the Defense Department to possess a clear appreciation of 

problems abroad in order to make the most effective use of available 

resources. Accordingly, he intended to bolster what he termed the 

department’s capacity for “geostrategic” and “geopolitical” analysis, 

starting with the rejuvenation of the Office of International Security 

Affairs, or ISA. He also favored more military participation in 

diplomacy, such as warships “showing the flag,” to “help stabilize 

critical situations and keep them from becoming shooting wars.”2 Yet 

four months after becoming secretary of defense, as the Watergate 

scandal widened, Nixon persuaded him to accept the post of attorney 

general. Richardson left the Pentagon on 24 May 1973.

To fill the now vacant position of secretary, Nixon turned to 44-yearold James Schlesinger, who held a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard 

and had engaged in strategic studies at the RAND Corporation, 

where he criticized Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara for his 

cost-effectiveness comparisons and his conviction that the ability to 

assure destruction of an enemy, statistically measured, would deter 

nuclear attack. After leaving RAND in 1969, he became assistant 

director of the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management 

Nixon had only begun his second term when the Watergate scandal 

engulfed the presidency and sapped his authority. Between March 

1973 and August 1974, with Nixon increasingly besieged, Kissinger 

publicly assumed a more visible role of articulating and conducting 

foreign policy. He became secretary of state in September 1973 

while remaining national security adviser. After Nixon resigned on 

9 August 1974 and was succeeded by Vice President Gerald R. 

Ford, Kissinger’s influence over foreign policy continued.

Ford sought to heal bitter domestic divisions wrought by the Vietnam 

War and the Watergate scandal. His efforts to preserve a bipartisan 

foreign policy consensus around détente became increasingly difficult 

in the face of a series of crises in the mid-1970s, including war in 

the Middle East and an oil embargo by Arab states that exposed 

the vulnerability of Western economies; double-digit inflation and 

recession at home; the total defeat of anticommunist regimes in 

Cambodia and South Vietnam; and the apparent failure of détente 

to bring about lasting improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations. 

Moreover, Washington also had to adjust to strategic nuclear parity 

with the Soviets, increased economic competition from abroad, 

and diminished stature in the eyes of traditional allies. Schlesinger 

challenged Kissinger’s control over policymaking and détente but 

found himself increasingly marginalized by the powerful secretary 

of state and a president alienated by the secretary’s condescending 

manner. By 1975, however, the growing public perception that 

Kissinger controlled Ford and advocated a policy that accepted 

American decline exposed the president to attack from conservative 

Republican primary challenger Ronald Reagan. In November 1975, 

Ford stripped Kissinger of his national security adviser position, 

fired Schlesinger in favor of his White House chief of staff, Donald 

Rumsfeld, and replaced William E. Colby with George H.W. Bush 

as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

4 5

and Budget), where he devoted much of his time to the Defense 

budget. He acquired an influential ally in Senator Henry M. Jackson, 

a key member of both the Senate Armed Services Committee and 

the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In 1971 Schlesinger 

moved to the chairmanship of the Atomic Energy Commission, 

and in February 1973 he became director of central intelligence. 

While Schlesinger’s intellectual reputation stood high and his grasp 

of national security issues was impressive, many found his manner 

alienating. According to William G. Hyland, a Kissinger protégé, 

Schlesinger “seemed in a perpetual state of condescension.”3

Schlesinger entered office convinced that the secretary must work 

through the National Security Council (NSC) system to relate broad 

policy objectives to the development, sustainment, and deployment 

of forces. At the start of his tenure, he viewed State and Defense as 

coequal and even urged the adoption of procedures whereby State 

and Pentagon officials could operate interchangeably, perhaps by 

trading representation on NATO’s planning bodies.4 He defined 

foreign affairs as an “operational responsibility” that frequently 

required him, in the interest of longstanding commitments (e.g., 

forces in Western Europe), to play an even larger and more active 

role than the secretary of state.5 “The interplay between foreign 

policy and military forces and between foreign policy and military 

strategy,” he recalled, “was my area of interest.”6

Schlesinger’s effort to expand his role in foreign affairs suffered from 

the absence of a strong, well-managed support staff. Working to 

restore ISA to something approaching its 1960s stature, Schlesinger 

upgraded ISA’s capacity for economic analysis by creating an office 

of international economic affairs to evaluate the national security 

implications of global economic changes, particularly those related 

to fluctuations in energy supplies. He improved the coordination 

of arms control policy by establishing a SALT task force under 

ISA’s supervision and restructured the security assistance program 

in response to a White House directive calling for reductions in the 

scale and scope of military advisory and assistance missions.7

Robert C. Hill, a former ambassador and Republican stalwart, 

served as assistant secretary of defense (ISA) from May 1973 until 

January 1974. Upon Hill’s departure, Schlesinger offered the ISA 

position to Paul H. Nitze, who had run ISA from 1961 to 1963, 

had been deputy secretary of defense from 1967 to 1969, and 

was then serving on the SALT delegation. Before the nomination 

could move forward, however, Nitze withdrew in the face of strong 

objections from conservative Republicans led by Senator Barry M. 

Goldwater.8 The position was then filled by Robert F. Ellsworth, 

a former congressman from Kansas and NATO ambassador from 

1969 to 1971. 

Schlesinger’s desire to strengthen ISA conflicted with congressional 

pressure to reduce headquarters staffs worldwide. In March 1974, 

the secretary directed the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to cut personnel by 

15 percent, which ultimately resulted in the elimination of 32 

civilian and military positions within ISA.9 He also had to scale 

back restructuring of the security assistance organization and 

shelve plans to consolidate all four of the regional deputy assistant 

secretaries under one principal deputy assistant secretary.10

More than any organizational problems, what particularly 

hindered Schlesinger, and adversely impacted foreign policy, 

were his poor relationships with top officials, particularly Deputy 

Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr. The secretary and 

his deputy arranged a regional division of their responsibilities 

for international affairs. During his highly successful career in 

the oil drilling business, Clements had cultivated a wide range 

of acquaintances in the Middle East. Accordingly, he dealt with 

leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, and the Persian Gulf states. 

Clements’ portfolio also included the Far East (except Vietnam and 

Cambodia). Schlesinger focused on Western Europe, rating as his top 

priority the strengthening of NATO’s conventional capabilities.11

This allocation of responsibilities appeared sensible, but it worked 

poorly because the two men could not get along. Schlesinger 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

6 7

later characterized his subordinate as deficient in judgment, while 

Clements concluded that his superior lacked integrity.12 One senior 

official recalled a running joke in the Pentagon: “If you didn’t like 

the answer you got from Clements you could go to Schlesinger, 

and he would overturn it every time. If you thought you’d get a ‘no’ 

from Schlesinger, you could wait until he was out of town and then 

ask Clements.”13

More detrimental to foreign policy was the relationship between 

Schlesinger and Kissinger. How much of their falling-out stemmed 

from conflict between two strong-willed personalities, competition 

over influence with the president, or substantive policy differences is 

difficult to determine. Nonetheless, their often-fractious relationship 

made the secretary’s involvement in foreign policy frequently at 

cross-purposes with the State Department and the White House. 

An episode in June 1974 illustrates their poor chemistry: Kissinger 

called Schlesinger to say that he was “reading on the ticker tape 

all about how you were not consulted on commitments made to 

[Israeli Prime Minister] Golda Meir.” Kissinger declared that he 

wanted to talk not about the “substance” but rather the “ethics” 

of the situation. Schlesinger replied, “Henry, I doubt you are able 

to instruct anyone on ethics”—and hung up. The next morning, 

Schlesinger told his staff that Kissinger’s “technique is to deceive 

each group in a different way.” He directed subordinates to “accept 

no guidance ‘under the sun’ from State on any subject. Anyone 

receiving guidance will report it to me and we will develop our own 

policy here in this building.”14

Gerald Ford’s accession to the presidency did little to ameliorate 

the friction between senior officials. From the start, the FordSchlesinger relationship was tainted by rumors of the secretary of 

defense’s behavior in the final months of the Nixon administration. 

According to press reports, Schlesinger, worried that Nixon might 

resort to a coup to remain in power, took steps to ensure that he 

could not issue orders to the military without the defense secretary’s 

assent. Ford, who had been assured that no such measures were 

taken, considered the possibility that military commanders would 

take part in any sort of illegal action troubling on constitutional 

grounds, and judged the allegation to be a slur on the military’s 

honor.15 Ford later claimed that he contemplated removing 

Schlesinger at that point but refrained to preserve continuity at the 

Pentagon.16 The president’s attitude towards his secretary remained 

sour. According to Kissinger, “Ford resented not only Schlesinger’s 

brusque comments at NSC meetings but also his tendency to arrive 

at the Oval Office with his tie loosened and to drop into an easy 

chair, draping one leg over an arm rest.” The president confided to 

Kissinger that “Jim . . . thinks I am stupid, and he believes you are 

running me, which he resents. This will not end until I either fire Jim 

or make him believe he is running me.”17 As the months wore on, the 

Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship also deteriorated, resulting in the 

marginalization of the defense secretary in foreign policy. 

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Schlesinger’s first test in managing foreign crises came after he had 

been in office only three months. On 6 October 1973, Egyptian and 

Syrian forces launched surprise attacks against Israelis occupying 

Arab lands—Syria’s Golan Heights and Egypt’s east bank of the 

Suez Canal. When Israeli counterattacks failed, Israel presented 

urgent and sizable requests for U.S. arms. Schlesinger worried that 

openly supporting Israel would cause U.S. interests in the Middle 

East to “go down the drain,” turning the Arabs toward Moscow 

and endangering Western access to oil. Containing Soviet influence 

was his overriding objective.18

Schlesinger had serious doubts whether the approach pursued by 

Nixon and Kissinger, positioning the United States to act as honest 

broker between Arabs and Israelis, could succeed. Convinced that 

diplomacy would not work unless Israel first won tactical victories, 

Kissinger complained to Nixon’s chief of staff, Alexander M. Haig 

Jr., that Schlesinger “panics easily” and that Pentagon officials were 

“dragging their feet” about making materiel available to Israel.19
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

8 9

Schlesinger met almost daily with the Israeli ambassador, Simcha 

Dinitz, to discuss Israel’s ever-increasing arms requests. The defense 

secretary thought they were deliberately inflated. Kissinger, who also 

was conferring regularly with Dinitz, disagreed.20 Matters reached 

a point where Kissinger complained about “massive sabotage” by 

the Pentagon to delay arms transfers, which Schlesinger denied. 

Finally, Kissinger opened a high-level interagency meeting with 

words aimed at the Defense Department: “The president said if 

there are any further delays in carrying out orders, he wants the 

resignation of the officials involved.”21

Starting on 10 October, a Soviet airlift of arms to Syria changed 

the complexion of the conflict. Nixon and Kissinger decided that 

Moscow’s clients must not gain the upper hand. On 13 October, 

with Schlesinger’s agreement, American C–141s and C–5As began 

flying equipment directly to Israel.22 These deliveries contributed 

to Israel’s battlefield successes in the Golan Heights and then in 

crossing the Suez Canal. On 25 October, after cease-fire violations 

briefly threatened to precipitate a direct Soviet intervention to 

support Egypt, the fighting ended.

In the war’s immediate aftermath, Kissinger assured senior U.S. 

officials that “we have come out in the catbird’s seat. Everyone 

has to come to us since we are the only ones who can deliver.”23

He undertook “shuttle diplomacy,” flying back and forth between 

Cairo, Jerusalem, and Damascus. Israel presented the administration 

with a series of large requests for arms, for which the Defense 

Department could find no real military justification. In theory, 

the ability to grant or withhold arms would give Washington 

considerable diplomatic leverage. But in practice, linking supply 

for Israel to withdrawals by Israel from occupied territory enjoyed 

only limited success. Over a two-year period, Schlesinger held 

frequent conversations with a range of Israeli officials about the 

merits of various weapon systems. In September 1975, he advised 

President Ford that meeting Israel’s requests, without substantially 

diminishing inventories and diverting production schedules, was 

beyond DoD’s capacities. Schlesinger warned, also, that meeting 

these requests would “exacerbate Arab perceptions of Israel as a 

kind of Western spearhead and would be seen as giving Israel a 

kind of lien on our own Middle Eastern policy.”24 Nonetheless, 

Israel received regular, large-scale aid unrelated to diplomatic 

progress. Schlesinger’s achievement, such as it was, lay in making 

certain that weapons would be supplied from future production 

rather than taken from U.S. inventories, as had occurred during 

and immediately after the war.25

Bolstering NATO

Despite preoccupation with turmoil in the Middle East, Schlesinger 

later observed, “My central concern as secretary of defense was to 

protect Western Europe.” He believed that the allies made only 

the minimum effort they thought was needed to deter a Warsaw 

Pact attack and to keep the Americans from withdrawing from 

Europe in disgust. His concern was not new. With limited success, 

his predecessors, dating to Robert McNamara, had cajoled NATO 

allies into increasing their contributions for conventional defense. 

As Schlesinger saw it, the advent of nuclear parity between the 

superpowers meant that what constituted a minimum effort 

kept increasing.26 He made his top priority the strengthening of 

conventional capabilities in Allied Command Europe. Knowing 

how slowly the Alliance’s decision-making process moved, he told 

his staff in September 1973 that “we cannot afford a NATO-typical, 

three-year dillydally.”27 Through dozens of meetings with fellow 

defense ministers, he argued that creating a viable nonnuclear 

defense was well within their means. The most receptive European 

leader was West German Defense Minister Georg Leber, with whom 

Schlesinger held frequent, productive conversations. As part of his 

campaign to persuade allies that the conventional threat was not 

overwhelming, Schlesinger became personally involved in revising 

what he considered unduly pessimistic intelligence estimates. A 

byproduct of that exercise was closer collaboration between U.S. 

and West German military intelligence agencies.28
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

10 11

Convinced that NATO’s array of weapon systems wasted money 

and adversely affected military efficiency, Schlesinger pressed 

for rationalization—having each ally concentrate on specialized 

functions—and for standardizing armaments. Europeans should 

purchase U.S. weapons in those areas where American technology 

was superior, and vice versa. After intense lobbying by U.S. 

personnel, including Schlesinger, four of the smaller European 

allies—Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark—agreed 

to buy F–16s. The United States agreed to purchase Roland II, 

a Franco-German short-range air defense system. Had all such 

proposals been carried to completion, the improvement for Allied 

Command Europe’s weapons arsenal could have been dramatic. 

Instead, the pace was ragged and the results were mixed. National 

pride and politics, guided by a desire to protect jobs and industries, 

inevitably affected decision making on both sides of the Atlantic. 

The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), housed in 

a modified Boeing 707, promised to provide low-altitude radar 

surveillance over an area at least 20 times greater than any surfacebased system. Europeans, however, balked at U.S. pressure to 

share the costs of AWACS production and deployment. Similarly, 

a decision about commonality among tank components, such as 

whether to place a West German or a British gun on the U.S. M–1, 

had not been reached by January 1977.29 

Schlesinger devoted considerable effort to winning Alliance approval 

of the Long-Range Defense Concept that called for creating a 

capability to defend Western Europe without rapidly resorting to 

nuclear weapons. What emerged was a compromise document, 

fulfilling his objective only in part. Approved by NATO’s Defense 

Planning Committee in May 1975, it placed a “major emphasis” 

on conventional capabilities that would require “some modest 

annual increase in real terms in defense expenditure.” However, the 

call for an increase was followed by a qualifying clause declaring 

that “NATO has already achieved a large measure of success in this 

regard.”30 Ultimately, therefore, Schlesinger could count on only 

modest conventional improvements for Allied Command Europe. 

He fell short not because his approaches were flawed but because 

nothing could shake the Europeans’ conviction, West Germans 

included, that a threat of swift nuclear escalation constituted 

the best deterrent, while prolonged conventional combat would 

devastate their homelands.

The 1973 war in the Middle East had unpleasant repercussions for 

NATO. Many Europeans blamed the United States for acquiescing 

to Israel’s refusal to withdraw from any of the occupied territories, 

which they viewed as the chief cause of renewed conflict in the 

Middle East and the subsequent oil embargo imposed by Arab 

oil states. In November 1973, Schlesinger told NATO Secretary 

General Joseph Luns that, once the Soviets became involved, “a 

strategic defeat for the U.S. in the Middle East would have had 

incalculable consequences for NATO, and NATO nations should 

have realized that.”31 His argument changed no minds, and Middle 

East policy remained a point of contention between the allies.

An area in which Schlesinger did exercise influence was in the field 

of arms control negotiations with the Soviets. For example, in 

the long-lasting East-West negotiation over mutual and balanced 

force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, he worked in 

complete harmony with Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger.32 From the 

administration’s standpoint, MBFR’s main value lay in deflecting the 

growing demands from Congress for unilateral U.S. withdrawals.33

Since an approximate balance existed in Central Europe between 

the immediately available forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 

Schlesinger told the Senate Appropriations Committee, he could 

not “in good conscience recommend that we take out units short 

of an agreement with the Pact on mutual and balanced force 

reductions.”34 That argument helped defeat legislative proposals for 

unilateral reductions. 

Schlesinger oversaw the preparation of a proposal for the MBFR 

talks, dubbed Option III, to trade the pullback of a Soviet tank army 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

12 13

for the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear elements. The Soviets, he 

reasoned, had built up their conventional forces to compensate for 

their nuclear inferiority. Thus, as strategic forces came into balance, 

the United States was entitled to call for cuts in Soviet conventional 

strength.35 Even though Soviet acceptance of Option III would have 

worked to NATO’s advantage, given that the U.S. tactical nuclear 

arsenal was so large that the reductions on the table would have 

little effect, Schlesinger felt no disappointment when the MBFR 

talks stalled. In fact, he characterized Soviet obstinacy as “the 

best incentive the U.S. can have to improve its own conventional 

capabilities in Europe.”36 During 1974–1976, NATO prepared to 

increase the strength of U.S. Amy Europe by stationing two more 

U.S. Army brigades in West Germany. Thus the failure of MBFR 

served the administration’s purpose—avoiding force reductions.37

During Schlesinger’s tenure, NATO’s gravest crisis was internal; 

in 1974, NATO members Greece and Turkey came close to war 

over Cyprus. The island nation’s population was 80 percent ethnic 

Greek and 20 percent ethnic Turk, and many of the former group 

favored union with Greece. In mid-July, guided by the ruling 

military junta in Athens, extremist Greek Cypriots seized control 

of the government. In response, Turkish troops promptly landed on 

the island’s north coast. Debate in the Washington Special Actions 

Group (an operational subgroup of the NSC that coordinated and 

managed actions in carrying out presidential decisions) revealed 

mounting tension between Schlesinger and Kissinger. Schlesinger 

wanted to “move subtly” to oust the Athens junta, arguing that “the 

future status of NATO” was at stake. Describing members of the 

junta as “unsophisticated, irresponsible . . . increasingly desperate,” 

Schlesinger feared they might launch an attack against Turkey 

unless a cease-fire could be arranged. Expecting that the junta would 

collapse without any U.S. machinations, Kissinger complained to 

the president’s chief of staff afterward, “We are having a massive 

problem with Defense. Schlesinger is taking an all-out position on 

the overthrow of the Greeks . . . Schlesinger will crucify us.”38

Although the Athens junta and the regime in Cyprus did resign, 

Turkish forces in mid-August launched a swift offensive that overran 

one-third of the island. The new democratic government in Greece, 

angered by Washington’s inaction during what amounted to ethnic 

cleansing of Greek Cypriots, withdrew for a time from NATO’s 

integrated command. Many in Congress concluded that Turkey had 

violated provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act that restricted the 

use of U.S. equipment to national self-defense. However, Turkey 

hosted crucial U.S. intelligence collection facilities valuable to the 

Defense Department. In February 1975, after Congress suspended 

all military aid, Schlesinger asked his Turkish counterpart to 

preserve “an open channel of military-to-military communication.” 

Working with President Ford and Kissinger, Schlesinger lobbied 

members of Congress to reverse the ban, arguing that otherwise 

“Turkey will go down the irrevocable path of forcing us out.”39 In 

October 1975, Congress eased the arms ban and Turkey once again 

began cooperating.40

Reacting to Defeat in Indochina

In the spring of 1975, the U.S. witnessed complete victories by 

Communist forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam. In March, 

South Vietnamese defenses in the Central Highlands and Northern 

provinces collapsed. At NSC meetings early in April, when some 

still spoke of trying to sustain South Vietnam as a rump state into 

1976, Schlesinger stated bluntly that the situation had become 

“hopeless” and that Saigon likely would fall within a few weeks. 

Kissinger presented three options: do nothing or next to nothing; 

ask Congress for $300 million worth of military aid, with perhaps 

more to follow; or seek $722 million that might strengthen South 

Vietnam for negotiations with Hanoi. Schlesinger recommended 

asking Congress for only $300 million, but he exhorted President 

Ford to give a fighting speech along the lines of Winston Churchill’s 

“blood, sweat and tears” summons of 1940: “The important thing 

is for you to establish leadership. . . . You could say that U.S. foreign 

policy is in the most difficult period since 1939.” The president 
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14 15

rejected and perhaps resented his advice. How, Ford replied, could 

he deliver a blood, sweat, and tears oration and then ask for only 

$300 million? The president opted for $722 million, saying that he 

would deliver “a strong speech in my own way.”41 Ford appealed to 

a joint session of Congress for prompt aid to help Saigon stabilize 

the situation and create the opportunity for a political solution. 

However, Congress refused. On 12 April, Cambodia’s capital of 

Phnom Penh fell to the Communist Khmer Rouge. In Saigon, 

South Vietnamese President Duong Van Minh unconditionally 

surrendered to the North Vietnamese on 30 April.

Barely two weeks after the fall of Saigon, Cambodian forces seized 

the U.S. merchant vessel Mayaguez steaming in international 

waters. A successful rescue that cost the lives of 18 U.S. service 

members provides another example of the incompatibility between 

Schlesinger and Ford. The president was deeply dissatisfied with 

Schlesinger’s supervision of the operation, concluding that he had 

been inept at best and perhaps deliberately disobeyed presidential 

orders by calling off a final wave of airstrikes. Ford ordered a detailed 

report on the rescue, and although it exonerated Schlesinger, 

the president continued to blame the secretary for “high-level 

bumbling.” Schlesinger also provided the president with a set of 

“observations” that placed blame for any mishaps on the White 

House rather than the Pentagon: “Washington’s role should be 

to define the larger goal . . . while attempting to avoid too many 

and too frequent interventions.” The president and his White 

House advisers, Schlesinger asserted, “are concerned that nothing 

go awry—and are searching for apparent mistakes.” By contrast, 

people in DoD “have far more information and are in the position 

of having to execute any decisions in a fast-moving situation.”42

Schlesinger reacted to defeat in Southeast Asia by calling for a hardline elsewhere. Debate over the future of the Panama Canal gave 

him an opportunity. In the spring of 1975, negotiations over a 

new treaty that would cede U.S. control over the canal to Panama 

but retain U.S. defense rights seemed near success. But at an NSC 

meeting on 15 May, just after the Mayaguez rescue, Schlesinger 

declared himself a treaty opponent, arguing that “one of the biggest 

mistakes the United States has made since 1945 was not to acquire 

sovereign base rights in a number of places around the world.” 

He criticized the U.S. approach to canal negotiations as reducing 

requirements to what the administration thought the Panamanians 

would accept: “When the U.S. shows strength and determination, 

it receives respect. When it recedes from its position, it whets 

appetites.” Oddly, his contrary position clashed with that of his 

principal subordinates—Deputy Secretary Clements and JCS 

Chairman General George S. Brown—who judged the proposed 

treaty acceptable.43 Early in 1976, when the presidential primary 

campaign began, conservative Republicans portrayed Ford as giving 

the canal away, causing him to postpone further action.

SALT under Schlesinger

Despite the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia, arms control 

talks with the Soviet Union remained paramount in American 

foreign policy, and Schlesinger played a major role in these 

negotiations. By 1973, arms control had become the centerpiece 

and symbol of superpower détente. Thanks to his work at RAND, 

OMB, and the CIA, Schlesinger came to the Pentagon with a 

deep knowledge of arms control issues. While director of central 

intelligence, he had discerned a pattern in strategic arms limitation 

talks with the Soviets that he believed could lead to U.S. inferiority 

over the long term.44 What worried him was not so much the risk 

of nuclear war as the danger of a Cuban missile crisis in reverse, 

with the Soviets enjoying such a large advantage that U.S. leaders 

could be forced to back down during a crisis. The 1972 Interim 

Agreement on Offensive Weapons and the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty had put numerical caps on the nuclear arms race. As things 

stood, a U.S. lead in numbers of warheads offset a Soviet lead in 

numbers of missile launchers. The United States was first to equip 

its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple independently 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

16 17

targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which allowed for the targeting 

of several geographically distinct sites with a single missile. But in 

mid-1973 the Soviets began flight tests of MIRV missiles. Since 

Soviet launchers were larger than their U.S. counterparts, MIRV 

versions could threaten many more targets—potentially enough to 

render all U.S. silo-based missiles vulnerable. Schlesinger therefore 

insisted that SALT II establish essential equivalence through “equal 

aggregates,” meaning that the combined numerical totals of each 

side’s ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers be equal. But, in his view, 

parity must also be established by including the total throw-weight 

(maximum weight of the warheads and MIRVs that can be lifted) 

of each side’s MIRV missiles.45

As the Watergate scandal deepened, Schlesinger worried that Nixon 

might offer the Soviets dangerous concessions to score a diplomatic 

success and bolster his public standing. At an NSC meeting in 

March 1974, Schlesinger said the worst possible approach would 

be to push for a permanent agreement that simply continued the 

current programs of both sides—which was what Nixon appeared 

to be seeking. In June, as a U.S.-Soviet summit drew near, 

Schlesinger urged the president to insist that an agreement preserve 

the U.S. advantage in numbers of MIRV launchers. He brushed 

aside the Soviets’ rejection of a similar proposal with an argument 

that Nixon found insulting: “You can be very persuasive—you have 

great forensic skills.” In Kissinger’s opinion, “Only a conviction 

that Nixon was finished could have produced so condescending 

a presentation by a Cabinet officer to his president.” In Moscow, 

when the president put forward a variation of Schlesinger’s proposal, 

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev rejected it.46 

Nixon’s resignation on 9 August 1974 dissipated the atmosphere of 

tension and suspicion that had surrounded internal U.S. discussions 

about SALT. At Vladivostok in late November 1974, Ford and 

Kissinger reached an understanding with Brezhnev that limited 

each side to 2,400 central weapon systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and 

bombers—and 1,320 MIRV launchers, an accord made possible 

by Soviet concessions. Afterwards, Schlesinger assured Ford of his 

support, telling him that “you’ve got the high ground” against any 

criticism from Congress.47

Both sides intended for Vladivostok to point the way toward 

a comprehensive treaty that would be concluded by 1976. 

Negotiations revolved around two issues: range limits to place 

on cruise missiles, a category where the United States held a wide 

lead, and constraints on the new Soviet Backfire bomber. At the 

NSC meeting on 25 July 1975, Schlesinger told the president 

that Brezhnev was anxious to reach an agreement. Therefore, he 

recommended, “Give only a little ground, showing a considerable 

degree of firmness, responding to their tactics in kind.” But the 

Soviets also stood their ground, believing that they had made 

significant concessions at Vladivostok and it was the Americans’ 

turn to reciprocate. In mid-September 1975, Schlesinger and 

Kissinger settled on a complicated negotiating proposal. Otherwise, 

however, their relationship remained frigid. Kissinger bluntly told 

Deputy Secretary Clements that he held “a grievance against DoD. 

We haven’t had a working relationship for two years.” The Defense 

Department, Kissinger claimed, had “become a political party—

positioning itself both to the right and left of the administration.”48

Their disagreements escalated to the point where one of the two 

secretaries had to leave, and the president’s preference was clear. 

Rumsfeld and SALT 

In October 1975, Donald Rumsfeld, the president’s special assistant 

who functioned as a chief of staff, and his deputy, Richard B. Cheney, 

offered Ford their resignations, claiming his administration had 

become increasingly dysfunctional and urging an overhaul in order 

to better confront Ronald Reagan, the likely Republican primary 

challenger. On 25 October, Ford met with Kissinger and Rumsfeld 

in the Oval Office and told them that he would begin a major 

Cabinet shakeup, which the press would dub the “Halloween 

Massacre.” Among other changes, Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger as 
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18 19

secretary of defense; Kissinger lost his position as national security 

adviser but remained secretary of state. Ford concluded that 

Kissinger’s prominence had become a political liability for him. 

Despite the memo he had drafted urging radical changes, Rumsfeld 

later asserted that he had no intention of replacing Schlesinger at 

the Pentagon. He recalled, “I told the President I thought that 

Schlesinger was a darn good secretary of defense and I didn’t know 

of a national security issue about which I disagreed with him.”49

Nevertheless, on 2 November 1975, in what Ford remembered as 

“one of the most disagreeable conversations I have ever had,” the 

president asked for Schlesinger’s resignation.50 According to Ford, 

Schlesinger responded, “I haven’t resigned, sir. You’re firing me.” 

While the president grew angrier, the secretary of defense argued 

for nearly an hour against his dismissal before leaving the Oval 

Office.51 Although Rumsfeld shared many of his predecessor’s 

views, the changeover marked a shift in the Ford administration’s 

approach to foreign policy, as the new defense secretary would 

prove to be a more formidable opponent for Kissinger.52

With Ford in command, NSC meetings began functioning as 

deliberative forums rather than as pro forma sessions to approve 

predetermined decisions, as so often had been the case in Nixon’s 

second term. Ford promoted Kissinger’s deputy, Lt. Gen. Brent 

Scowcroft, USAF, to national security adviser. Unobtrusive, yet 

effective, Scowcroft played an expediter’s role in policy formulation. 

Although Ford moved toward a more corporate approach to policy 

and decision making, Kissinger remained his principal adviser.

Rumsfeld, an adept bureaucratic operator, had several advantages 

over his predecessor in contesting Kissinger. He was far closer to Ford 

personally and, when serving as a representative from Illinois, had 

helped propel Ford to House minority leader in 1965. Rumsfeld’s 

protégé and friend, Richard Cheney, replaced him as White House 

chief of staff, ensuring that the White House staff would not seek 

to come between the defense secretary and the president. Moreover, 

Rumsfeld’s hawkish arguments resonated more deeply now that 

Ford was facing reelection in a political climate that had become 

less favorable to détente.53

Rumsfeld found that the volume of sensitive cable traffic from 

the State Department to the Pentagon had dropped precipitously 

during Schlesinger’s last months. The defense secretary suspected 

Kissinger of cutting off the flow of information as a means of 

protecting his power. Remembering the importance of sensitive 

embassy cables from his time as Nixon’s ambassador to NATO, 

Rumsfeld presented a graph of DoD’s receipt of State cable traffic 

to Kissinger. The secretary of defense thereafter received a higher 

volume of State Department communications.54

Rumsfeld did not have sufficient time to devise and implement 

organizational changes that might have strengthened the OSD’s 

role. Like Schlesinger, Rumsfeld did not get along well with Deputy 

Secretary Clements, but he was reluctant to remove him with Ford’s 

reelection campaign fast approaching.55 When Rumsfeld needed 

help, he tended to look first to his immediate staff or to Robert 

Ellsworth, whom he had promptly moved from ISA to be the 

second deputy secretary, a position created by Congress in 1972 but 

left vacant by Laird and Schlesinger. Rumsfeld also gave Ellsworth 

responsibility for overseeing the Pentagon’s large intelligence 

portfolio, which included the services’ intelligence organizations, the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the 

National Reconnaissance Office and accounted for more than twothirds of the federal government’s intelligence funds and personnel. 

By taking over that portfolio, in Rumsfeld’s view, Ellsworth spared 

the secretary from having to spend “almost full time on it.”56

Rumsfeld differed with Kissinger on arms control issues carried 

over from Schlesinger’s time. At the heart of the matter lay what 

Rumsfeld later characterized as Kissinger’s overly complacent 

assessment of growing Soviet strategic power and his confidence 

in the ameliorating effect of arms control accords. “It was not that 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

20 21

we were in an inferior position,” Rumsfeld recalled, “but rather 

that the trends were taking us toward a position of inferiority.”57

Instead of tempering Soviet behavior, Rumsfeld feared that an 

overly conciliatory SALT II treaty would embolden the Soviets to 

confront the United States and threaten American interests.58

President Ford, very much wanting to conclude a comprehensive 

arms control agreement, directed his advisers to prepare fresh 

approaches.59 By then, however, the U.S. political climate had 

changed considerably. Détente in general and SALT in particular 

came under attack from domestic critics, including former Secretary 

of Defense Melvin Laird, who charged that the Soviets had violated 

aspects of SALT I without being challenged by the administration.60

Rumsfeld never openly joined the critics, but in Kissinger’s view 

he “permitted and indeed encouraged the bureaucratic process to 

run into the sand.”61 Thus, early in December 1975, Rumsfeld 

cited Kissinger’s absences from Washington as reasons for delaying 

NSC discussions about SALT positions, which in turn caused the 

postponement of negotiations with the Soviets. When the NSC did 

convene on 13 January 1976, instead of opening up a discussion 

of all the options, Rumsfeld tabled an option he disfavored and 

then, only hours after the meeting, sent Ford what amounted to a 

revision of his own proposal.62

On 19 January 1976, Kissinger took to Moscow several negotiating 

options that he believed Rumsfeld and JCS Chairman General 

Brown had endorsed. After Brezhnev rejected some, Kissinger 

cabled Washington for permission to present “Option Three,” 

which U.S. officials viewed as the one most likely to win Soviet 

acceptance. Essentially, it would allow the Soviets to deploy 300 

Backfire bombers while the United States would be allowed to 

deploy 250 or more sea-launched cruise missiles on 25 surface 

ships. But at an NSC meeting on 21 January, while Rumsfeld and 

Brown were in Europe, the acting JCS chairman, Admiral James 

L. Holloway, said he opposed Option Three on grounds that the 

Navy did not plan to build that many cruise missile ships, if any. 

Subsequently, as Scowcroft cabled Kissinger, a stunned and furious 

president “ranted” that “Rumsfeld and Brown could damn well try 

themselves to get the extra money [for a buildup] if we failed to get 

a SALT agreement.” Almost simultaneously, Rumsfeld and Brown 

cabled Scowcroft their recommendation that Kissinger “politely 

say that he wishes to discuss . . . new ideas personally with the 

President and come home.” The secretary of state returned from 

Moscow empty-handed.63

Continuing to face opposition within his own administration, 

Ford, at the next NSC meeting on 11 February 1976, emphasized 

that a SALT agreement would serve the country’s interests. While 

discussing Ford’s primary election campaign in a contentious Oval 

Office meeting the following month, Kissinger exclaimed, “It is 

inevitable that our margin since ’60 has slipped. Are we trying 

to maintain the same margin as we had in 1960 or to maintain 

adequate forces?” Rumsfeld responded, “We have been slipping 

since the ’60s from superiority to equivalence, and if we don’t stop, 

we’ll be behind.”64 Rumsfeld urged the president to postpone any 

substantive negotiations with the Soviet Union until January 1977. 

During an NSC discussion on 30 July, Ford made his final effort 

to move SALT forward. Rumsfeld reacted by arguing against new 

initiatives, because “as we look at the charts [comparing U.S. and 

Soviet force postures], we see that pieces of our leverage are moving 

away. . . . Incrementally, not any one piece is significant, but the 

cumulative effect is.”65 No further movement on SALT negotiations 

occurred during Ford’s tenure. Rumsfeld had first delayed and then 

quashed Kissinger’s SALT II efforts; the president would later blame 

Soviet Premier Brezhnev and Rumsfeld for his administration’s 

failure to achieve a strategic arms limitation breakthrough.66

The Debate over Détente

Between 1973 and 1976, public attitudes toward foreign 

commitments and defense spending underwent an unexpected 

change. In March 1973, President Nixon warned the secretaries 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

22 23

of state and defense that he foresaw a “massive” problem: members 

of Congress would likely want to transfer money from defense to 

domestic programs. Yet, in his judgment, maintaining a robust military 

posture involved “the possible success or failure of our entire foreign 

policy and of our initiatives toward peace.”67 Late in September 1973, 

the Senate supported maintaining funding for a new ballistic missile 

submarine by the narrow margin of 49–47. Two weeks later, however, 

a new Arab-Israeli war changed the climate on Capitol Hill. The Soviet 

reaction—rushing arms to the Arabs—struck many as contrary to the 

spirit of détente. Consequently, the FY 1974 DoD budget emerged 

from Congress with only modest cuts, and it was promptly augmented 

by a readiness supplemental. The following year the administration’s 

budget request encountered no major opposition.

In January 1975, with the House and Senate now containing lopsided 

Democratic majorities, administration leaders again worried 

about how their defense requests would fare. Three months later, 

Communist victory in Southeast Asia persuaded many members of 

Congress—including some who had been strongly antiwar—that 

this was not the time to make sizable budget cuts or reduce overseas 

deployments. But developments abroad could work against the 

administration as well. The Helsinki Conference on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in August 1975, sparked 

criticism in the United States because it appeared to ratify Soviet 

control over Eastern Europe. The provisions addressing respect for 

human rights and fundamental freedoms, which came to acquire 

great significance later, were viewed dismissively at the time. By 

autumn 1975, therefore, détente had lost a good deal of its luster. 

For a number of observers, Kissinger represented the continued 

pursuit of détente while Schlesinger stood for a more combative 

approach. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., chief of naval operations 

from 1970 to 1974, published a memoir early in 1976 that 

portrayed the conduct of foreign policy as having pitted Kissinger’s 

pessimistic outlook, accommodating to the notion of U.S. decline, 

against Schlesinger’s determination to resist Communist inroads.68

Rumsfeld later described his basic difference with Kissinger in 

subtler terms. Kissinger, he concluded, wanted to maintain publicly 

that the United States was, and would remain, the world’s most 

powerful nation because this perception would strengthen his hand 

in negotiations. Rumsfeld, however, believed that the trends in 

relative military capabilities were adverse, and that Congress would 

not vote the funds needed to reverse those trends unless it could be 

persuaded that there were compelling reasons for doing so. Therefore, 

he arranged numerous briefings for senators, representatives, and 

public interest groups detailing the Soviet buildup. Rumsfeld’s 

carefully orchestrated briefings painted a dire picture. To add 

credibility, Rumsfeld held the sessions in the Roosevelt Room of 

the White House, and Ford often briefly entered the room.69 The 

payoff, he claimed, could be seen in congressional willingness to 

vote more funds for investment in defense programs.70

Conclusion

In hindsight, Kissinger characterized Gerald Ford’s presidency as 

years of renewal. Purely from the standpoint of foreign affairs, this 

judgment appears open to question. Notwithstanding Kissinger’s 

successful shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, a train of events 

seemed to show that, in the words of one Soviet official, “the 

world was going our way.”71 These events included victories in 

South Vietnam and Cambodia. Moreover, the sharp rise in oil 

prices disrupted U.S. and West European economies, making real 

increases in their defense budgets difficult to achieve. Conversely, 

the spike in prices enriched oil exporters like the Soviet Union, 

providing Moscow with the means to finance foreign adventures. 

Kissinger believed that, while his policy differences with Schlesinger 

had been mostly intellectual or technical, many of his disagreements 

with Rumsfeld derived from domestic politics.72 Essentially, this 

domestic political factor flowed from the discrediting of détente 
25

Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7

24

among conservative Republicans and influential Democrats like 

Senator Henry Jackson. In 1976, Rumsfeld could block any 

movement on SALT because he spoke for a powerful constituency.

In his farewell speech, on 10 November 1975, Schlesinger said 

that détente should be pursued vigorously but without illusion. 

Détente, by his definition, “rests upon an underlying equilibrium 

of force, the maintenance of a military balance.” Yet, he insisted, 

the adverse trend in military power “is not a matter of theory; it 

is a matter of simple arithmetic.” The Soviets were lengthening 

their leads in some categories of armaments and narrowing their 

disadvantages in others. Recalling the lethargy of democracies 

during the 1930s, Schlesinger appealed for a rekindling of national 

values and purposes.73 Basically, he was warning against the danger 

of negotiating with the Soviets from a position of weakness. How 

imminent that danger might become would remain a topic of 

debate well into the 1980s.

The tumultuous mid-1970s saw three secretaries managing the 

Pentagon under two different presidents. These changes at the 

highest levels of DoD leadership, as well as Henry Kissinger’s 

substantial influence on both Nixon and Ford, limited the secretary 

of defense’s role in U.S. foreign policy. No matter how worthwhile 

their intentions and goals, Richardson’s tenure was too short for 

him to implement major changes, and Schlesinger’s differences 

with the secretary of state led him first to marginalization in policy 

discussions and then to dismissal from office. Rumsfeld, too, found 

himself in conflict with the secretary of state, particularly in regard 

to arms control. Yet, with domestic circumstances favoring a turn 

away from accommodation with the Soviet Union, Rumsfeld 

undermined progress toward a comprehensive strategic arms treaty 

and cast doubt on the viability of détente as a national policy.

Notes

1 Elliot Richardson, interview by Stuart Rochester and Maurice 

Matloff, 31 Aug 1989, 11–12 (quote), Oral History Collection, OSD 

Historical Office (hereafter OSD/HO).

2 Ibid., 5–6 (quotes); Richardson, interview by Stuart Rochester and 

Maurice Matloff, 14 Dec 1989, 8, 16 (quote), Oral History Collection, 

OSD/HO.

3 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1992), 623 (quote).

4 Ltr, Schlesinger to Rogers, 2 Jul 1973, folder SD-Schlesinger 

Signers (Jul 1973), box 48, Biographical Files, OSD/HO.

5 James R. Schlesinger, “The Office of the Secretary of Defense,” in 

Reorganizing America’s Defense: Leadership in War and Peace, eds. Robert 

J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington, DC: 

Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1985), 255 (quote), 

256–274. 

6 James R. Schlesinger, interview by Maurice Matloff and Alfred 

Goldberg, 7 Feb 1991, 4 (quote), Oral History Collection, OSD/HO.

7 Memo, SecDef to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) 

(Comptroller) et al., subj: Establishment of Deputy ASD (Economic 

Affairs) in ISA, 13 Jul 1973, folder 020, box 7, Acc 330-78-0001, Records 

of the Secretary of Defense, Record Group (RG) 330, National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA) II, College Park, MD; memos, 

SecDef to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., subj: Director 

of DoD SALT Task Force, 15 Sep 1973, folder SD-Schlesigner Signers 

(Sep 1973), box 48; SecDef to Secretaries of the Military Departments 

et al., subj: Director of DoD SALT Task Force, 17 Sep 1974, folder SDSchlesinger Signers (Sep–Oct 1974), box 49: both in Biographical Files, 

OSD/HO; memos, Kissinger to Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee, 

subj: U.S. Government Presence Abroad, 6 Jan 1973; Director, Defense 

Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) to Director Security Assistance Plans 

et al., subj: Organization for Security Assistance, 11 Sep 1974: both in 

folder 020, box 6, Acc 330-78-0011. 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

26 27

8 “Nitze Out as Appointee for Pentagon,” Washington Post, 27 Mar 

1974; Schlesinger, interview by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg, 

1 Aug 1991, 19, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO.

9 “Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Announces Further Reductions 

in Pentagon, Headquarters Staffs of Military Services,” 5 Mar 1974, 

OSD Historical Office, comp., Public Statements of James R. Schlesinger, 

Secretary of Defense, 1974, 4:1457; memos, Amos Jordan to ISA Staff, 

subj: Personnel Reductions and Reorganization, 7 May 1974; Jordan to 

Clements, subj: ISA Additional Personnel Requirements, 24 Oct 1974: 

both in folder 020, box 6, Acc 330-78-0011.

10 Memo, Latimer to Clements, subj: ISA Reorganization, 16 May 

1974, folder 020, box 6, Acc 330-78-0011.

11 Schlesinger, interviews by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg, 12 

Jul 1990, 7; 28 May 1991, 31–32, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO.

12 Schlesinger interview, 7 Feb 1991, 16; William P. Clements Jr., 

interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 16 May 1996, 10, 24, 

Oral History Collection, OSD/HO. 

13 John L. McLucas, Reflections of a Technocrat: Managing Defense, 

Air, and Space Programs during the Cold War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 

University Press, 2006), 85 (quote). McLucas served as secretary of the 

Air Force from July 1973 to November 1975.

14 Notebook of Brig. Gen. Robert C. Taylor, USAF, Military 

Assistant to SecDef, entries for 5 and 6 Jun 1974 (quote), folder 020 

OSD (31 Dec 1974), box 7, Acc 330-78-0011; memo, Moorer (M-33-

74), subj: Breakfast with SecDef Schlesinger and DepSecDef Clements, 

0720–0840, Thursday, 6 Jun 1974 (quote), Adm. Thomas H. Moorer 

Diaries, box 11, Entry P 05D9, Acc 218-05-006, Records of the U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA II. 

15 Gerard R. Ford, interview by Maurice Matloff and Alfred 

Goldberg, 5 Dec 1990, 6–7, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO.

16 Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. 

Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 136, 322–323.

17 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 

1982), 181–182 (quotes). 

18 Telcon, Kissinger-Schlesinger, 10 Oct 1973 (quote), 8:27 a.m., 

folder 10, box 22, Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Telephone Conversation 

(Telcon) Transcripts, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Richard 

Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA (hereafter 

Nixon Library).

19 Telcons, Kissinger-Schlesinger, 8:22 a.m.; Scowcroft-Kissinger, 

8:59 p.m. (quote); Haig-Kissinger, 9:14 p.m. (quote): all on 10 Oct 1973, 

folder 10, box 22, HAK Telcon Transcripts, NSC Files, Nixon Library.

20 Telcon, Kissinger-Schlesinger, 13 Oct 1973, 12:49 a.m., folder 1, 

box 23, HAK Telcon Transcripts, NSC Files, Nixon Library. 

21 Transcript, Telcon, Kissinger-Schlesinger, 13 Oct 1973, 12:49 

a.m.; memcon, subj: Special WSAG [Washington Special Action Group]–

Principals Only, 13 Oct 1973: both in Foreign Relations of the United States 

[FRUS], 1969–1976, 25:467 (quote), 482 (quote). 

22 Memo, Deputy ASD(PA) William Beecher to SecDef, subj: The 

October Airlift, 21 Jun 1974, 5–6, folder Israel 091.3 (Jun-Sep) 1974, 

box 65, Acc 330-78-0011.

23 Minutes, WSAG Meeting, 24 Oct 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, 

25:714 (quote). 

24 Memo, SecDef to President, subj: Military Co-operation with 

Israel, 2 Sep 1975 (quote), folder Israel 091.3 1975, box 3, Acc 330-78-

0059.

25 Study prepared by the National Security Council Ad Hoc Group, 

NSSM 231, n.d., FRUS 1969–1976, 26:858.

26 Schlesinger interview, 1 Aug 1991, 16 and 12 Jul 1990, 7 (quote).

27 Memo, subj: Meeting of NATO Task Force with Secretary of 

Defense on 6 Sep 1973, 10 Sep 1973, folder NATO 092 (Jun–Dec 1973), 

box 74, Acc 330-78-0001.

28 Chapter 3 in “Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld,” MS for 

future volume 8 in Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, OSD/HO.

29 Ibid.

30 The concept is printed in NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: 

NATO Information Services, January 1976), 344–349 (quotes).

31 Memcon, subj: Bilateral Between SecDef and NATO Secretary 

General Joseph Luns, 6 Nov 1973 (quote), folder NATO 123 1973, box 

74, Acc. 330-78-0001.
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

28 29

32 The MBFR talks began in 1973 as an effort to limit conventional 

military forces in Central Europe that were deployed by both NATO and 

the Warsaw Pact. The negotiations continued until 1989, and while no 

treaty was ever signed, the experience did prove valuable in leading to the 

successful conclusion of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty of 

1989. Jeffrey A. Larsen and James M. Smith, Historical Dictionary of Arms 

Control and Disarmament (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 140.

33 Memcon, 12 Apr 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, 39:415–418. The 

Soviets participated in MBFR because the U.S. joined the Conference on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe, which in 1975 ratified the territorial 

status quo—an important Soviet objective.

34 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense 

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975: Hearings, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 5 

Mar 1974, pt. 1, 124–125 (quote).

35 Memcon, subj: Meeting Between SecDef and US MBFR 

Ambassador [Stanley] Resor, 29 Jul 1974, FRUS 1969–1976, 39:1014–

1018. 

36 Ibid., 1017 (quote).

37 Memcon, subj: US Briefing on Vladivostok Meeting, 5 Dec 1974, 

FRUS 1969–1976, 39:769–770.

38 Minutes of WSAG Meeting, subj: Cyprus, 21 Jul 1974, FRUS 

1969–1976, 30:360–361 (quote); Conversation between Secretary 

Kissinger and General Haig, 21 Jul 1974, 10:50 a.m., Item 25B (quote), 

folder 8, box 26, HAK Telcon Transcripts, NSC Files, Nixon Library.

39 Ltr, SecDef to DefMin Sancar, 13 Feb 75, folder Turkey 091.3 1975, 

box 80, Acc 330-78-0058; memcon, President’s Meeting with Republican 

Leadership, 21 Jul 1975, FRUS 1969–1976, 30:766–767 (quote), 768.

40 Memcon, subj: Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister 

Caglayangil, 24 Mar 1976, FRUS 1969–1976, 30:800–814.

41 Minutes of WSAG Meeting, subj: Indochina, 2 Apr 1975, FRUS 

1969–1976, 10: 731–732 (quote), 733–739; Minutes of National 

Security Council (NSC) Meeting, subj: Indochina, 9 Apr 1075, FRUS 

1969–1976, 10:762–776, 777–779 (quotes).

42 Ford, A Time to Heal, 275–284; Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal 

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 570–573; memo, subj: Some 

Observations on the Decision Process in the Mayaguez Incident, 20 May 

1975 (quote), attached to memo, SecDef to President, subj: Rescue of the 

SS Mayaguez and Its Crew, 22 May 1975, folder Cambodia 385.3 1975, 

box 3, Acc. 330-78-0059.

43 Minutes of NSC Meeting, 15 May 1975, pt. 2, 8–9, 12–13 

(quotes), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Grand 

Rapids, MI (hereafter Ford Library), <www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/

library/guides/findingaid/nscmeetings.asp>, accessed 23 Oct 2014.

44 Telcon, Schlesinger-Kissinger, 7 Feb 1973, 9:25, folder 7, box 18, 

HAK Telcon Transcripts, NSC Files, Nixon Library.

45 Notebooks of BG Taylor, entries for 29 Aug and 3 Dec 1973, 

folder 020 SD (31 Dec 1973), box 7, Acc. 330-78-0001; entries for 7 Jan, 

8 Jan, 23 Feb, and 20 Mar 1974, folder 020 SD (31 Dec 1974), box 7, 

Acc 330-78-0011.

46 Notes of NSC Meeting by DepSecDef, 20 Jun 1974, folder USSR 

388.3 (Jun-Aug) 1974, box 4, Acc. 330-78-0010; Kissinger, Years of 

Upheaval, 1157–1159 (quote), 1170. 

47 Minutes of NSC Meetings, subj: SALT, 14 Sep, 7 Oct, and 2 Dec 

1974, 4, 9 (quotes), Ford Library, <www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/

guides/findingaid/nscmeetings.asp>, accessed 23 Oct 2014. 

48 Minutes of NSC Meetings, subj: The Soviet Union and SALT, 25 

Jul 1975; and subj: The Middle East, SALT, 9 Aug 1975, Ford Library, 

<www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/nscmeetings.

asp>, accessed 23 Oct 2014; memo, Maj. Gen. John Wickham to 

SecDef, subj: SALT Meeting between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger 

on 19 September 1975, 29 Nov 1975, folder USSR 388.3 (Jan–Feb 

76), box 3, Acc 330-79-0059; memcon, 27 Sep 1975 (quote), 11:50 

a.m.–1:25 p.m., Ford Library, <www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/

document/0314/1553248.pdf>, accessed 23 Oct 2014.

49 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New 

York: Sentinel, 2011), 196 (quote). Ford also recalled Rumsfeld’s initial 

reluctance to replace Schlesinger at the Pentagon.

50 Memcon, 3 Nov 1975, 9:20 a.m.–10:13 a.m., 2, Ford Library, 

<www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553284.pdf>, 

accessed 23 Oct 2014; Ford, A Time to Heal, 329–330 (quote).

51 Ford, A Time to Heal, 329–330.

52 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 197. 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7 The Decline of Détente

30 31

53 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet

(New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 66. Mann conducted an interview 

with Morton Abramowitz, a senior foreign policy official at the time, on 

12 December 2001.

54 Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and 

Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009),

127; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 233. 

55 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 218. Clements later told OSD 

historians, “As far as I know, Rumsfeld and I never agreed on anything. It 

was a very unpleasant period for me.” William P. Clements, interview by 

Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 16 May 1996, 28 (quote), Oral History 

Collection, OSD/HO.

56 Donald Rumsfeld, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 

12 Jul 1994, 25 (quote), Oral History Collection, OSD/HO.

57 Ibid., 35; Rumsfeld, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger 

Trask, 2 Aug 1994, 1 (quote), Oral History Collection, OSD/HO.

58 Rumsfeld interview, 12 Jul 1994, 53–54. 

59 Minutes of NSC Meeting, subj: SALT, Israeli Arms Request, 17 

Sep 1975, Ford Library, <www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/

findingaid/nscmeetings.asp>, accessed 23 Oct 2014.

60 Melvin Laird, “Is This Détente?” Reader’s Digest, Jun 1975, 54–57.

61 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 850 (quote).

62 Msgs, Scowcroft to Rumsfeld, SCOTOs 11 and 20, 4–5 Dec 

1975; Rumsfeld to Scowcroft, TOSCOs 66, 79, and 97, 4–5 Dec 1975; 

Kissinger to Rumsfeld, 082318Z Dec 1975: all in folder USSR 388.3 

(Dec) 1975, box 82, Acc 330-78-0058; Minutes of NSC Meeting, 

subj: SALT, 8 Jan 1976; Minutes of NSC Meeting, subj: Israeli Military 

Requirements and SALT, 13 Jan 1976, pt. 2: both in Ford Library, <www.

fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/nscmeetings.asp>, 

accessed 23 Oct 2014.

63 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 853–860 (quote); Minutes of NSC 

Meeting, subj: SALT, 21 Jan 1976, Ford Library, <www.fordlibrarymuseum.

gov/library/guides/findingaid/nscmeetings.asp>, accessed 23 Oct 2014; 

msg, Rumsfeld to Scowcroft, 220350Z Jan1976 (quote), folder USSR 

388.3 (Jan-Feb) 1976, box 3, Acc. 330-79-0059.

64 Memcon, 29 Mar 1976 (quote), 9:20 a.m.–10:25 a.m., Ford Library, 

<www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553410.pdf>, 

accessed 23 Oct 2014. To see the guidance to Rumsfeld, see memo, 

Marshall to Rumsfeld, subj: Key Military Balances, 6 Dec 1975, <http://

library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/195/1975-12-06%20From%20A.%20

W.%20Marshall%20re%20Key%20Military%20Balances%20.pdf>, 

accessed 23 Oct 2014.

65 Minutes of NSC Meeting, subj: SALT, 11 Feb 1976; Minutes of 

NSC Meeting, subj: SALT, 30 Jul 1976 (quote): both in Ford Library, 

<www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/nscmeetings.

asp>, accessed 23 Oct 2014.

66 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 233; Ford, A Time to Heal, 357–358.

67 Memo, President to SecDef et al., 10 Mar 1973 (quote), folder 

110.01 (Mar–) 1973, box 20, Acc. 330-78-0001. 

68 Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle 

Books, 1976).

69 Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 224–226. 

70 Rumsfeld interviews, 12 Jul 1994, 19, 20, 23; and 2 Aug 1994, 

2. While Schlesinger and Rumsfeld claimed to have achieved real growth 

in U.S. defense spending, the distortions imposed by high inflation 

make such claims hard to assess. From FY 1974 to FY 1977, DoD total 

obligational authority in constant dollars rose, while outlays in constant 

dollars decreased. See DoD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller), “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2014,” May 

2013, 91, 179, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/

defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf>, accessed 23 Oct 2014.

71 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going 

Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic 

Books, 2005), 24.

72 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 175–177.

73 Remarks by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, 10 Nov 

1975, Schlesinger Public Statements 1975, 7:2476 (quote).
33

About the Author

Walter S. Poole received a baccalaureate from Princeton University in 

1964 and a doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania in 1968. After 

a brief time with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Historical Division, he 

served in the Army during 1968–1970. Dr. Poole returned to the JCS 

Historical Division, which became the Joint History Office in 1993, 

remaining there until his retirement as chief of the Histories Branch 

in 2000. During his 30 years as a JCS historian, Dr. Poole wrote five 

volumes in the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff series, including The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961–1964, and The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and National Policy, 1965–1968, and coauthored two additional 

volumes in the series. He also coauthored The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

War in Vietnam, 1971–1973; The Effort to Save Somalia, 1992–1994;

and The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a key member of 

the Defense Acquisition History Project in the Historical Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, he wrote Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960–1968 

(2013). His full-length history of the secretaries of defense during the 

presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford is in manuscript phase.

About the Editors

Erin R. Mahan has been Chief Historian for the Secretary of Defense since 

2010. Previously, she worked in the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction at National Defense University and in the Historian’s 

Office at the U.S. Department of State, where she was an editor of the 

Foreign Relations of the United States series. Dr. Mahan holds a Ph.D. in 

history from the University of Virginia.

Jeffrey A. Larsen is Director of the Research Division at the NATO 

Defense College in Rome. He previously served as president of Larsen 

Consulting Group and as a senior scientist with Science Applications 

International Corporation. He has been an adjunct graduate professor at 

the universities of Denver, Northwestern, and Texas A&M and served on 

the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy. Widely published, Dr. Larsen 

holds an M.A. in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate 

School and an M.A. and Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University. 

Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 7

36

Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Washington, DC