alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Second District.

#### Howard Gaddie, appellee, v. William R. Whittaker, appellant.

Gen. No. 8,029.

Opinion filed October 10, 1929.

Rehearing denied February 4, 1930.

H. D. Morgan and John W. Fling, Jr., for appellant. Floid B. Brian and Clarence W. Heile, for appellee; Brian *&*McManus and Heyl & Heyl, of counsel.

Mr. Justice Jones

delivered the opinion of the court.
#### § 1.418 Procedure upon no request for hearing.

If no hearing is requested by a party of record, the Judge shall issue an initial decision based on the written record and without further procedure or hearing. If no hearing is requested, the written record consists of papers and documents submitted during the 30-day comment period, the 10-day review period, and includes motions submitted before the Judge issues an initial decision. For purposes of a formal review of a sourcing area, the written record also consists of the papers and documents submitted during the informal review. Copies of the decision shall be served by the Hearing Clerk upon each of the parties of record.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. (Duke Energy Ohio) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30,
2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Steven K. Young, Chief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President and Controller of Duke Energy Ohio, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Duke Energy Ohio.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                               
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                               
|/s/    STEVEN K.
YOUNG                                                         
|Steven K. Young                                                                
|Chief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President and Controller November 12, 2009
932.402 General. ( e ) ( 1 ) The Head of the Contracting Activity or designee shall have the responsibility and authority for making findings and determinations, and for approval of contract terms concerning advance payments.
( 2 ) Before authorizing any advance payment arrangements, the approving official shall obtain the advice, and other inputs of the servicing finance office.
Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                RULE 15d-14(b)
                                      and
                              18 U.S.C. Sec.1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the Annual Report of Sequiam Corporation (the "Company") on
Form  10-KSB/A  for  the  period  ended  December  31,  2003  as  filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mark L.
Mroczkowski,  Senior  Vice  President,  Secretary,  Chief  Financial  Officer  &
Principal  Financial  Officer  of  the  Company,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Sec.1350,  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     (1)     The  Report  fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or  15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     (2)     The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company  as  of  and  for  the  periods  covered  therein.

                                  /s/Mark L. Mroczkowski
                                  -------------------------
                                  Mark L. Mroczkowski
                                  Senior Vice President, Secretary, Chief
                                  Financial Officer & Principal
                                  Financial Officer
                                  November 5, 2004


<PAGE>
#### In the Matter of William Young, Petitioner, v. Supreme Court, Kings County, et al., Respondents.

Application by petitioner under article 78 of the CPLR to direct the dismissal of the indictment against him and his release from custody on the ground that his constitutional rights have been violated. Petition dismissed, without prejudice to such further proceedings by petitioner in the trial court, as he may be advised. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.
#### 970.1504-1-1 Fees for management and operating contracts.

This subsection sets forth the Department's policies on fees for management and operating contracts and may be applied to other contracts as determined by the Senior Procurement Executive, or designee.

[65 FR 81009, Dec. 22, 2000, as amended at 74 FR 36378, July 22, 2009]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-7272

JOHN L. WHITE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

MARK A. HENRY, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CA99-1752-CCB)

Submitted: November 18, 1999 Decided: November 24, 1999

Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John L. White, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

September 1, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on September 2, 1999. Pursuant to

Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is

the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we

take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See

Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

John L. White appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the

record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. See White v. Henry, No. CA-99-1752-CCB (D. Md. Sept. 2,

1999).* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
§ 1000.14 Other source milk. *Other source milk* means all skim milk and butterfat contained in or represented by: ( a ) Receipts of fluid milk products and bulk fluid cream products from any source other than producers, handlers described in § 1000.9(c) and § 1135.11, or pool plants;
( b ) Products (other than fluid milk products, fluid cream products, and products produced at the plant during the same month) from any source which are reprocessed, converted into, or combined with another product in the plant during the month; and
( c ) Receipts of any milk product (other than a fluid milk product or a fluid cream product) for which the handler fails to establish a disposition.
# CI2020070EN.01000101.xml

| 4.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CI 70/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CI 70/1

---

Corrigendum to Recruitment Notice PE/242/S – Director (F/M) (Function group AD, grade 14) – Directorate-General for Innovation and Technological Support – Directorate for Publishing, Innovation and Data Management

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 65 A of 28 February 2020
  )

(2020/C 70 I/01)

On page 57, point 2, ‘Place of employment’:

for:

‘Luxembourg.’,

read:

‘Brussels.’.

---
Exhibit 32.2

Certification pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) or 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange
                         Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. 1350

                                   ----------

In connection with the annual report on Form 10-KSB of ELECTRONIC SENSOR
TECHNOLOGY, INC. (the "Company") for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005
(the "Report"), I, Francis Chang, Vice President of Finance and Administration
of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


/s/ Francis Chang
-----------------------------
Francis Chang
Vice President of Finance and
Administration

March 24, 2006
#### Richard J. Laffey, appellee, v. City of Chicago, appellant.

Gen. No. 34,607.

Opinion filed March 24, 1931.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, and William D. Saltiel, City Attorney, for appellant; Samuel L. Golan, Assistant City Attorney, and Roy S. Gaskill, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel.

Murphy O. Tate and Lloyd T. Bailey, for appellee.

Mr. Presiding Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report of Twin Lakes, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-KSB/A for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on March [], 2004 (the "Report"), I, Kirk M. Warshaw,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



                                    /s/ Kirk M. Warshaw
                                    ----------------------
                                    Kirk M. Warshaw
                                    Chief Financial Officer
                                    February 25, 2005



A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 1160.211 Assessments. ( a ) ( 1 ) Each fluid milk processor shall pay to the Board or its designated agent an assessment of $.20 per hundredweight of fluid milk products processed and marketed commercially in consumer-type packages in the United States by such fluid milk processor. Any fluid milk processor who markets milk of its own production directly to consumers as prescribed under section 113(g) of the Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983 (7 U.S.C. 4504(g)), and not exempt under § 1160.108 or § 1160.215, shall also pay the assessment under this subpart. The Secretary shall have the authority to receive assessments on behalf of the Board.
( 2 ) The Secretary shall announce the establishment of the assessment each month in the Class I price announcement in each milk marketing area by adding it to the Class I price for the following month. In the event the assessment is suspended for a given month, the Secretary shall inform all fluid milk processors of the suspension in the Class I price announcement for that month. The Secretary shall also inform fluid milk processors marketing fluid milk in areas not subject to milk marketing orders administered by the Secretary of the establishment or suspension of the assessment.
( 3 ) Each processor responsible for remitting an assessment shall remit it to the Board not later than the last day of the month following the month that the assessed milk was marketed.
( b ) Such assessments shall not: ( 1 ) Reduce the prices paid under the Federal milk marketing orders issued under section 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (7 U.S.C. 608c), reenacted with amendments by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937;
( 2 ) Otherwise be deducted from the amounts that handlers must pay to producers for fluid milk products sold to a processor; or
( 3 ) Otherwise be deducted from the price of milk paid to a producer by a handler, as determined by the Secretary.
( c ) Money remitted to the Board or the Board's designated agent shall be in the form of a negotiable instrument made payable to the Board or its agent, as the case may be. Processors must mail remittances and reports specified in §§ 1160.108, 1160.211(a)(1), 1160.213, 1160.214, and 1160.401 to the location designated by the Board or its agent.
[58 FR 62503, Nov. 29, 1993, as amended at 62 FR 3983, Jan. 28, 1997; 70 FR 2753, Jan. 14, 2005]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Salvatore Pennise, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered February 1, 1963 after a hearing, which resenteneed him as a first felony offender to serve a term of 10 to 20 years for manslaughter in the first degree, commencing *nunc pro tunc*as of February 1, 1952, the date of the original judgment convicting defendant and sentencing him as a second felony offender after a jury trial in the former County Court, Kings County. (See 281 App. Div. 839, affd. 305 N. Y. 862.) Said original judgment was vacated 'by order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated January 30, 1963, pursuant to an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which sustained defendant’s writ of habeas corpus and remanded him for resentence on the ground that a prior 1941 felony conviction in the State of Idaho, on the basis of which he had been sentenced in New York as a second felony offender, was void *(United States ex rel. Pennise*v. *Fay,*210 F. Supp. 277). Defendant’s sole contention on this appeal is that the resentence was excessive. Judgment of February 1,1963 resentencing defendant, affirmed. No opinion. (For a related appeal, see 278 App. Div. 713.) Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Christ, Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### 817.7000 Scope.

This subpart prescribes policies and procedures for use of undefinitized contract actions.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel Griffin, Appellant.

[776 NYS2d 797]

*442Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bruce Allen, J.), rendered December 19, 2001, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and attempted assault in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 41⁄2 to 9 years and 2 to 4 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490 [1987]). Issues of credibility and identification were properly considered by the court and there is no basis for disturbing its determinations. The credible evidence established that defendant sold drugs to an undercover officer and then threw a bottle at another officer, who clearly identified himself as such, and who was attempting to arrest defendant for the drug sale.

Defendant’s argument concerning the court’s discharge of a sworn juror during an uncompleted jury selection became moot when defendant waived a jury trial. We find defendant’s argument to be unavailing in any event. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Andrias, Ellerin and Friedman, JJ.
#### § 1205.306 Bale.

Except as used in § 1205.322, *Bale* means the package of lint cotton produced at a cotton gin or the amount of processed cotton in a manufactured product that is equivalent to a 500 pound bale of lint cotton.

[56 FR 64472, Dec. 10, 1991]
§ 11.15 Participation of third parties and interested parties in Division proceedings. In two situations, parties other than the appellant or the agency may be interested in participating in Division proceedings. In the first situation, a Division proceeding may in fact result in the adjudication of the rights of a third party, e.g., an appeal of a tenant involving a payment shared with a landlord, an appeal by one recipient of a portion of a payment shared by multiple parties, an appeal by one heir of an estate. In the second situation, a party may desire to receive notice of and perhaps participate in an appeal because of the derivative impact the appeal determination will have on that party, e.g., guaranteed lenders and reinsurance companies. The provisions in this section set forth rules for the participation of such third and interested parties. ( a ) *Third parties.* When an appeal is filed, the Division shall notify any potential third party whose rights may be adjudicated of its right to participate as an appellant in the appeal. This includes the right to seek Director review of the Hearing Officer determination. Such third parties may be identified by the Division itself, by an agency, or by the original appellant. The Division shall issue one notice to the third party of its right to participate, and if such party declines to participate, the Division determination will be binding as to that third party as if it had participated. For purposes of this part, a third party includes any party for which a determination of the Division could lead to an agency action on implementation that would be adverse to the party thus giving such party a right to a Division appeal.
( b ) *Interested parties.* With respect to a participant who is a borrower under a guaranteed loan or an insured under a crop insurance program, the respective guaranteed lender or reinsurance company having an interest in a participant's appeal under this part may participate in the appeal as an interested party, but such participation does not confer the status of an appellant upon the guaranteed lender or reinsurance company such that it may request Director review of a final determination of the Division.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1136 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to remove the statue to the memory 

and in honor of Albert Pike erected near Judiciary Square in the District 

of Columbia, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 21, 2023 

Ms. NORTON (for herself, Mr. CARSON, Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin, Mr. 

MOULTON, Ms. CLARKE of New York, Mr. BLUMENAUER, and Mr. 

MCGOVERN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to remove the statue 

to the memory and in honor of Albert Pike erected 

near Judiciary Square in the District of Columbia, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Albert Pike Statue 

5 Removal Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1136 IH

1 SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF STATUE OF ALBERT PIKE. 

2 (a) REMOVAL.—The Secretary of the Interior, acting 

3 through the Director of the National Park Service, shall 

4 remove the statue to the memory and in honor of Albert 

5 Pike erected near Judiciary Square in the District of Co6 lumbia under the ‘‘Joint Resolution Granting permission 

7 for the erection of a monument or statue in Washington 

8 City, District of Columbia, in honor of the late Albert 

9 Pike.’’, approved April 9, 1898 (30 Stat. 737). 

10 (b) RELOCATION.—The Secretary of the Interior may 

11 donate the statue to a museum or other similar entity, 

12 as determined appropriate by the Secretary, to ensure its 

13 preservation and interpretation in an indoor setting. The 

14 recipient of the statue may not store, display, or exhibit 

15 the statue outside. If the statue is stored, displayed, or 

16 exhibited outside, ownership of the statue will revert back 

17 to the Federal Government. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### 908.7108 [Reserved]
# FILED
July 10, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COU RT OF CR IMINA L A PPEA LS OF TENN ESSEE AT JAC KSON APR IL SESSION, 199 7

RICKY TUCKER, ) ) No. 02C01-9606 -CR-00196 Appellant ) ) SHELBY COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. W. FRED AXLEY, Judge STA TE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) (Post-Conviction) Ap pellee )
For the Appell ant : For the Appell ee : RICKY T UCKER , Pro Se CHA RLES W. BUR SON Register Number 99302 Attorney Gen eral and Repor ter Rt. 1, Box 330 Tiptonvill e, TN 38079-9775 CL IN TO N J . M OR GAN Assistant Att orney Gener al Criminal J ustice Div ision 450 James Roberts on Parkway Nashvil le, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM GIBBONS Distric t Attorney General ALA NDA HORN E Asst. Dist rict Attor ney General Criminal J ustice Complex Suite 301 201 Poplar Street Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILE D: AFFIRMED

David G . Hayes Judge2 OPINION
The appellant, Ricky Tucker, app eals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his peti tion for post-conviction relief. The appell ant asserts t hat the trial court’s jur

y instr uction on reaso nable doubt wa s unconstituti onal.

After a revi ew of the recor d, we affirm the t rial court ’s judgment.
The appellant contends that the reasonabl e doubt instruc tion provi ded by the trial court is constitutionally invalid due to the use of the t erm “moral certainty” combined with the “mind rest easy” language. He argues that these phrases toget her could have allowed a reasonable ju ror to find him g uilty bas ed on a lower standard of proof than that required for guilt beyond a reasona ble doubt. Although the Te nnessee Supreme Cou rt has recently held such jury charges to be constitutio nal, the appella nt argues that those decisi ons do not apply to his case because the court did no t specifically address the “mind rest easy” phr

ase. See State v. Nichols , 877 S.W.2d 722, 734 (Tenn. 1994) and Pettyjohn v . State , 885 S.W .2d 364, 365 (Tenn . Crim. App. 1994). This argument, however, is

erroneous. I n Nichols , the Tennessee Su preme Court held constitut ionally valid an i nstruction w hich allowed “moral cer tainty” to be considered in conjunction w ith an instr uction that “[ r]easonable doubt is that dou bt en gend ered by an in vesti gatio n of all th e pro of in the c ase a nd an inab ility, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the certai nty of your verdict,” Id. (emp hasi s add ed). The a ppe llat e cou rts of this s tate have repeatedly found this jury instructi on constitutio nally valid. See State v. Sex ton , 917 S.W.2d 263, 265-266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) and Coving ton v. State , No. 01C01-9606-CC-00250 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 30, 199 6). This claim is w ithout merit.3 Therefore, we affirm t he trial cour t’s decisi on.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HA YES, Judge

CONCUR:

_____________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTO N, Judge

_____________________________ W ILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge