No. 87-272 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

CHARLOTTE JOHNSON; ROBERT E. JOHNSON; 

0. PRISCILLA JOHNSON; T. OTTO JOHNSON; 

KARLA D. JOHNSON; JACQUELENE J.LAMBERT; 

and EVERETT E. LAMBERT, 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

THE ESTATE OF WM. A. SHELTON, Deceased; 

THE ESTATE OF LAURA E. SHELTON, Deceased; 

ALLEN B. SHELTON; ALLEN B. SHELTON, Trustee; 

THE ESTATE OF ALLEN B. SHELTON, Deceased; 

RUTH 0. SHELTON; ROBERT M. GRAVES; VERA 

SHELTON GRAVES, a/k/a VERA L. SCHNASE; COUNTY 

OF LEWIS AND CLARK, a political subdivision 

of the State of Montana; COUNTY TREASURER OF 

LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY; DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 

an administrative agency of the State of 

Montana, and its Director, JOHN LaFAVER, et al, 

Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District 

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark 

The Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

J. Brian Tierney, Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Michael J. Rieley; Luxan and Murfitt, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 24, 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

The plaintiff, Mrs. Charlotte Johnson, has brought an 

action in equity to quiet title to 320 acres of land located 

in Lewis and Clark County, near East Helena, Montana. The 

only defendant contesting the quiet title action is Mrs. Vera 

Shelton Graves, Mrs. Johnson's first cousin, who asserts that 

the property is rightfully hers under the wills of William 

and Laura Shelton, the grandparents of both women as well as 

the adoptive parents of Mrs. Graves. 

The Sheltons died in 1926 and 1927. This present 

dispute centers on their wills, which devise an undivided 

one-half interest in 320 acres of property in Lewis and Clark 

County, Montana, and 23 acres of property in Walla Walla 

County, Washington, to Allen B. Shelton, the son of the 

testators and uncle to the parties here. Allen B. Shelton 

was qualified and served as trustee under the will. The will 

directed that if Allen B. Shelton died without issue of his 

body, as he did in 1967, and Mrs. Graves survived him, the 

property of the trust would pass to Mrs. Graves. 

Subsequently, if Mrs. Graves also died without issue of her 

body, the will directed that the property of the trust would 

pass to the children of Alma Shelton Foster and C.U. Foster. 

Mrs. Johnson is the sole surviving child of Alma and C.U. 

Foster. The record reveals that Mrs. Graves is 71 years old, 

widowed, and has no living natural children, thus making it 

unlikely that she would have issue of her body at the time of 

her death. It is noted, however, that she adopted a 

65-year-old man as her son in 1986. 

Mrs. Graves argues to this Court that the second 

contingent limitation on the trust property, which would pass 

the property to Mrs. Johnson if Mrs. Graves dies without 

issue, is void under 70-15-205, MCA, vesting the trust 
property in Mrs. Graves. Mrs. Johnson, the plaintiff, argues 

that a contest over the construction of the Shelton wills is 

inappropriate 60 years after the Shelton deaths and also that 

Mrs. Graves' rendering of a quitclaim deed on the Montana 

property is conclusive. 

In 1976, Mrs. Graves decided to sell a piece of 

property called the "Snake River Property," which Allen 

Shelton had acquired during his lifetime. However, before 

she could sell the property for $235,000 her attorney advised 

her to get the signatures of Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson's 

brother, Allen Foster, since deceased, because they had a 

contingent interest in the Shelton estate. Mrs. Graves 

pocketed $150,000 from the sale, Mrs. Johnson and her brother 

received $42,500 each. 

Mrs. Graves and Mrs. Johnson decided in 1977 to divide 

up the Shelton estate. Mrs. Johnson, who had been living 

near the Montana property, offered to Mrs. Graves a quitclaim 

deed on the 23 acres in Washington in consideration of "clear 

title." Likewise, Mrs. Graves gave Mrs. Johnson a quitclaim 

deed on the 320 acres in Montana. Mrs. Johnson recorded that 

deed and has since considered the Montana property to be hers 

even though tax notices identify the property as belonging to 

the William Shelton estate. Mrs. Johnson has paid all taxes 

on the property and deeded portions of it to her children. 

The District Court of the First Judicial District, 

having considered these factors, entered summary judgment in 

favor of Mrs. Johnson. Mrs. Graves appeals and argues that 

the District Court erred: 

-by disregarding Mrs. Graves' alleged full fee simple 

absolute in the Montana property; 

-by ruling there had been no mistake of fact or of law 

in the exchange of quitclaim deeds; 

-by ruling that there was valid consideration for the 

exchange of quitclaim deeds; and 
-by dismissing Mrs. Graves' counterclaim as barred by 

laches. 

We affirm the District Court's judgment. 

We note first that in actions in equity, this Court 

will accept the findings of the District Court unless there 

is a "decided preponderance of the evidence against them," 

and that where issues of fact are close, we defer to the 

District Court because it is in a better position to 

determine the facts. Peterson v. Taylor (Mont. 1987), 735 

P.2d 1120, 1122, 44 St.Rep. 754, 756, citing Dahlberg v. 

Lannen (1929), 84 Mont. 68, 77, 274 P. 151, 153; and Rase v. 

Castle Mountain Ranch, Inc. (Mont. 1981), 631 P.2d 680, 684, 

38 St.Rep. 992, 996. The basis underlying summary judgment 

in a quiet title action is similar to that elsewhere: 

summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues 

of material fact. Benson v. Diehl (Mont. 1987), 745 P.2d 

315, 316, 44 St.Rep. 1455, 1456, citing Rule 56 M.R.Civ.P. 

Mrs. Graves has argued throughout this case that the 

wills of her grandparents/adoptive parents devised the trust 

property unto her. The District Court, however, was correct 

when it ruled that Montana courts need not give a 

construction to those wills at this late date. The simple 

fact is that subsequent to receiving by devise what she now 

calls a full fee simple absolute in 320 acres of land in 

Montana and 23 acres in Washington, Mrs. Graves offered a 

quitclaim deed on the Montana property to Mrs. Johnson in 

exchange for Mrs. Johnson's quitclaim deed on the Washington 

property. Thus, this dispute does not concern whether Mrs. 

Graves had a fee simple absolute in all of the property of 

the Shelton estate. If indeed she had a fee simple absolute 

in the entire estate, she exercised one of the rights of 

ownership by dividing and alienating the Montana property. 

If her interest was less than a fee simple absolute, the 

exchange of quitclaim deeds indicates that she was 
contracting for a fee simple in the Washington property from 

the person who held a contingent interest. Instead, this 

dispute focuses on whether the exchange of quitclaim deeds 

was valid. 

Section 70-20-103, MCA, provides sample wording for a 

quitclaim deed. The contested quitclaim deed, although using 

different wording, remains substantially similar since it 

names the grantor and grantee, locates by legal description 

the property involved, notes the consideration and is signed 

and dated by the grantor. As such, it represents a valid 

quitclaim deed, and Mrs. Johnson enjoys conclusive rights in 

the property as against anyone other than a purchaser in good 

faith for valuable consideration previously recorded. See 

$ 70-20-303, MCA. Mrs. Johnson gave up valid consideration 

for this quitclaim deed since she relinquished a quitclaim 

deed on the Washington property, in which she had a 

contingent interest, in order to clear all titles. Section 

28-2-801, MCA, defines good consideration, inter alia, as 

"[alny prejudice suffered or agreed to be suffered by [a] 

person, other than such as he [or she] is at the time of 

consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the 

promisor . . . " The relinquishment of a legal right is 

sufficient consideration for a contract. Rickett v. Doze 

(1979), 184 Mont. 456, 459, 603 P.2d 679, 680. In short, 

Mrs. Johnson gave consideration for this exchange when she 

surrendered her contingent interest in the Washington 

property, which afforded Mrs. Graves a fee simple absolute in 

the Washington property. 

Mrs. Graves' assertion that she acted under mistaken 

belief or due to mistaken legal advice does not overcome the 

fact that she chose to surrender a quitclaim deed on the 

property. Mrs. Graves was charged with the responsibility of 

acquainting herself with the effects of the quitclaim deed 

before she signed it since her husband's consultant made out 
the deeds. One who executes a written contract is presumed 

to know its contents and assent to them; ignorance of the 

contents is not grounds for relief from liability. Quinn v. 

Briggs (1977), 172 Mont. 468, 476, 565 P.2d 297, 301. 

Neither does Mrs. Graves' reliance on her attorney's advice 

in a previous land transaction and the advice of her husband 

and his consultant on the exchange of quitclaim deeds 

represent mistake of law. Mrs. Graves cannot obtain relief 

unless she proves ambiguity in the deed, misrepresentation, 

bad faith action by Mrs. Johnson, or knowledge on Mrs. 

Johnson's part that the transaction was something more than a 

mutual exchange of quitclaim deeds. Quinn, 565 P.2d at 301. 

She has proven none of these elements. 

Finally, we sustain the District Court's decision that 

it would be inequitable to allow Mrs. Graves to repudiate 

this exchange of quitclaim deeds nine years after the 

transaction. The doctrine of laches applies "where there has 

been an unexplained delay of such duration or character as to 

render the enforcement of an asserted right inequitable." 

Clayton v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (Mont. 1986), 717 P.2d 558, 

561, 43 St.Rep. 717, 720, quoting Brabender v. it 

Manufacturing Co. (1977), 174 Mont. 63, 67-68, 568 P.2d 547, 

549. In the present dispute, more than nine years elapsed 

from the time of the exchange of quitclaim deeds to I4rs. 

Graves' pronouncement in her counterclaim that she still 

owned the Montana property by virtue of the Shelton wills. 

In that interval Mrs. Johnson had improved on the land and 

Mrs. Johnson's grandson had built a home on a portion of the 

property she deeded to him. 

Where a party is actually or presumptively aware of her 

rights but fails to act, laches is appropriate. Clayton, 717 

P. 2d at 561. A party is held to be presumptively aware of 

his or her rights "where the circumstances of which he [or 

she] is cognizant are such as to put a [person] of ordinary 
prudence on inquiry." Hereford v. Hereford (1979), 183 Mont. 

104, 108-09, 598 P.2d 600, 602. The mutual transfer of 

quitclaim deeds in property between two parties is a most 

serious matter; Mrs. Graves testified at her deposition that 

the exchange was made to facilitate her sale of five acres of 

the Washington property. She further testified that at the 

time of the transaction she trusted her husband would obtain 

the proper legal advice even though the wills named her as 

devisee. Mrs. Graves demonstrated by such testimony that she 

had presumptive knowledge of the effect of the transaction, 

but did not advise a lawyer of her concerns until October, 

1983. Mrs. Graves' counterclaim is properly barred by 

laches. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: .fl