TRANSFORMATION

PLANNING

GUIDANCE

APRIL

2003
Transformation

Planning

Guidance

April 2003
This page intentionally left blank
CONTENTS

Secretary’s Foreword .......................................................................................................1

I. Introduction...................................................................................................................3

What is Transformation? ..........................................................................................3

Why Transform?........................................................................................................4

II. Scope of Transformation............................................................................................6

Transforming How We Fight...................................................................................6

Transforming How We Do Business......................................................................6

Transforming How We Work With Others...........................................................7

III. Strategy for Transforming........................................................................................8

IV. Implementation of the Transformation Strategy.................................................12

Roles and Responsibilities Overview...................................................................12

Transformation Implementation Overview..........................................................13

Implementing the Four Pillars...............................................................................15

Pillar One: Strengthening Joint Operations.....................................................15

Pillar Two: Exploiting U.S. Intelligence Advantages....................................17

Pillar Three: Concept Development and Experimentation............................17

Pillar Four: Developing Transformational Capabilities................................19

Measuring Transformation Progress....................................................................21

Appendix One: Transformation Roles/Responsibilities............................................23

Appendix Two: TPG Integrated with PPBS Timeline ...............................................27

Appendix Three: Transformation Roadmap Guidance..............................................29

Appendix Four: Joint Concept Guidance ....................................................................31

Appendix Five: Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Guidance .......33
This page intentionally left blank
1

Secretary’s Foreword

Some believe that with the United States in the midst of a dangerous war on

terrorism, now is not the time to transform our armed forces. I believe that the

opposite is true. Now is precisely the time to make changes. The war on terrorism

is a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, and to put

that new thinking into action.

Sept 11th taught us that the future holds many unknown dangers and that we

fail to prepare for them at our own peril. Future threats may come from terrorists,

but they also could be in the form of a cyber-war, a traditional state-on-state

conflict or something entirely different.

As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the

kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to

unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our

disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the

way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces, but also the

Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent

risk-taking. We must promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military

capabilities, one that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and

anticipates threats before they emerge.

This document provides a clear, concise approach for transforming the

Department of Defense. It identifies the critical elements of transformation,

assigns roles and responsibilities for promoting transformation, and describes how

the Department will organize to implement transformational capabilities. It also

depicts the outcome we must achieve: fundamentally joint, network-centric,

distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across

the battlespace. Realizing these capabilities will require transforming our people,

processes, and military forces.

There will be no moment at which the Department is “transformed.”

Rather, we are building a culture of continual transformation, so that our armed

forces are always several steps ahead of any potential adversaries. To do so, we

must envision and invest in the future today, so we can defend our homeland and

our freedoms tomorrow. The Department of Defense is up to the task.

Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense
2

This page intentionally left blank
3

“...a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and

swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more

heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.”

George W. Bush

I. Introduction

The United States is transitioning from an industrial age to an information

age military. This transition requires transformation in warfighting and the way

we organize to support the warfighter. Although the end-state of transformation

cannot be fully defined in advance, we do know some of the necessary

prerequisites for transformation. In particular, we know that early transformation

requires exploiting information technology to reform defense business practices

and to create new combinations of capabilities, operating concepts, organizational

relationships and training regimes.

Successful transformation of U.S. military forces and Department of

Defense (DoD) processes requires a strategy with clear objectives. Effective

implementation of the strategy requires commitment and attention from the

Department’s senior leadership and clearly assigned roles and responsibilities.

This document communicates the Department’s strategy for transformation and

assigns senior leader roles and responsibilities to ensure implementation of the

strategy. Senior leadership commitment to transformation will mobilize the rest of

the Department and stimulate the bottom-up innovation required for successful

transformation.

Effective implementation of the transformation strategy is an essential

prerequisite for strategic management of the Defense program. It will allow the

Department to define transformation investments that address future risk with

enough specificity that they can be balanced against the other three primary risk

areas identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): force management,

operational, and institutional risk.

What is Transformation?

Transformation is “a process that shapes the changing nature of military

competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities,

people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against

our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps

underpin peace and stability in the world.”

Shaping the nature of military competition ultimately means redefining

standards for military success by accomplishing military missions that were
4

previously unimaginable or impossible except at prohibitive risk and cost. The

U.S. military understands current standards for success because it trains to

exacting standards in the most realistic fashion possible. From this baseline, we

can compare and assess new operating concepts that employ new organizational

constructs, capabilities, and doctrine for achieving military objectives and

determine whether they are sufficiently transformational to merit major

investments. Eventually such efforts will render previous ways of warfighting

obsolete and change the measures of success in military operations in our favor.

Why Transform?

Strategic Imperative : Transformation is necessary to ensure U.S. forces

continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage in support

of strategic objectives. We cannot afford to react to threats slowly or have large

forces tied down for lengthy periods. Our strategy requires transformed forces

that can take action from a forward position and, rapidly reinforced from other

areas, defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively while conducting an active defense

of U.S. territory. Transformed forces also are essential for deterring conflict,

dissuading adversaries, and assuring others of our commitment to a peaceful

world. Over the long term, our security and the prospects for peace and stability

for much of the rest of the world depend upon the success of transformation.

Specifically, transformation is a key element of our defense strategy for five

reasons:

• The Difficulty with the Status Quo: Some argue that the United States

should not change what are demonstrably the world’s best military forces.

History and current trends suggest that merely attempting to hold on to

existing advantages is a shortsighted approach and may prove disastrous.

The United States already far outspends its potential rivals on defense, but

cannot count on this spending disparity to produce commensurate military

advantages in the future. As the distribution of economic wealth continues

to flatten, as other countries begin to enjoy the benefits of growing,

educated human resources, and most importantly, as the diffusion of

information age technology and the rate of technological change continue

to accelerate, U.S. military advantages could diminish comparatively.

• Growing Asymmetric Threats: Over the past decade, potential adversaries

sought to compensate for U.S. conventional military superiority by

developing asymmetric approaches and capabilities across the full range of

military operations. Terrorists attacked non-combatants and other

adversaries have used low-end indiscriminate weapons such as unmarked

mines in international waters. Adversaries also invested heavily in

weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,

and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE)) and a wide range of delivery
5

methods in hopes of deterring or frustrating the deployment and

employment of U.S. combat capabilities. Both these trends present

significant challenges, but also reflect the current U.S. advantages in largescale conventional force-on-force combat.

• Rising Force-On-Force Challenges: Over the longer term, some adversaries

hope the United States will become complacent. They hope that they will

be able to better exploit diffusion of knowledge and information technology

as the world moves from the industrial age to the information age, and

thereby negate or leap ahead of current U.S. military advantages. Potential

adversaries are developing the ability to confront U.S. advantages directly.

They are developing new electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, means

to counter or negate distinct U.S. advantages such as our space capabilities,

and anti-access capabilities such as submarines, mines, and cruise and

ballistic missiles. They also are investigating innovative operational and

tactical concepts to better employ advanced asymmetric technologies.

• Historic Opportunity: The evolving threat environment and our strategic

response reflect an underlying trend in technology development.

Throughout history, warfare has assumed the characteristics and used the

technology of its era. Today we are witnessing the transition from the

industrial age, with its emphasis on mass, to the information age where the

power of distributed networked forces and shared situational understanding

will transform warfare. The Department must align itself with the on-going

information revolution, not just by exploiting information technology, but

by developing information-enabled organizational relationships and

operating concepts. Victory in the Cold War opened an historic window of

opportunity to do so, because we are no longer consumed by the

requirement to face down a monolithic global threat to our way of life.

That window remains open as long as U.S. forces are much more capable

of conducting traditional military operations than our most likely regional

adversaries.

• High Stakes: If the United States fails to transform, then our current

military superiority and the relative peace, prosperity and stability it

underwrites will erode. We will see the rapid emergence of regional

competitors and a world prone to major conflict. Operations in such an

environment would be conducted at much greater cost to the nation. At

best, the United States would be forced to invest increasing shares of

national wealth in forces with diminishing capabilities. At worst, we would

eventually face the historic norm: a major battlefield reversal and the rapid

rise of a major competitor. Therefore, the Department of Defense must

move forward on transformation. Success in transforming U.S. military
6

forces will enable us to execute our defense strategy with high confidence

and less risk in critical areas, and to shape the international environment so

that it is less rather than more hostile to U.S. interests.

II. Scope of Transformation

The Department’s transformation efforts will encompass three areas: how

we fight, how we do business inside the Department, and how we work with our

interagency and multinational partners.

Transforming How We Fight 

The strategy for transformation presented in this document includes a

detailed approach to force transformation, or transformation of how we fight. It

hinges on development of future joint warfighting concepts and includes the full

range of supporting military capability areas: doctrine, organization, training,

materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.

Transforming How We Do Business

Forces employing transformational warfighting concepts require

transformed processes that produce the timely results demanded by 21st century

security challenges. The Department currently is pursuing transformational

business and planning practices such as adaptive planning, a more entrepreneurial,

future-oriented capabilities-based resource allocation planning process,

accelerated acquisition cycles built on spiral development, output-based

management, and a reformed analytic support agenda. Senior leadership must

take the lead in fostering innovation and adaptation of information age

technologies and concepts within their organizations, and they must ensure that

processes and practices that are antithetical to these goals are eliminated.

Many initiatives to transform the way the Department does business are

already under way as a result of Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and other

direction. Several of these initiatives demand priority attention and follow-through

from senior leadership. Among the most important is a set of proposed legislative

reforms to eliminate duplicative reporting requirements, transform fiscal

authorities, and enhance the Department’s ability to hire and retain highly skilled

personnel. Pay raises and housing improvements to improve quality of life for

Service personnel and greater flexibility in managing the Department’s human

capital more generally are both critical steps for sustaining transformation

momentum in the Department.

Another priority element of the Department’s corporate transformation

strategy is reform of the acquisition process. The Department is reducing
7

acquisition cycle time and aligning acquisition with a new capabilities-based

resource allocation process built around joint operating concepts. Instead of

building plans, operations and doctrine around individual military systems as often

occurred in the past, henceforth the Department will explicitly link acquisition

strategy to future joint concepts in order to provide the capabilities necessary to

execute future operations.

Finally, as part of the larger effort to streamline processes, the Department

already is moving from deliberate to adaptive war planning. Some reforms that

accelerate the production of contingency plans have been enacted, but a more

fundamental overhaul of the planning system is required. Contingency planning

must become more responsive to rapid changes in planning conditions and

assumptions by exploiting improving training of planners, automating timeintensive activities, and using collaborative environments for parallel rather than

sequential development of component parts of plans.

In short, the Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) supports and is

consistent with a larger process reform effort mandated by the DPG. Some

elements of the strategy for transformation implementation identified in following

sections of the TPG, such as the requirement for joint concepts, will fundamentally

reform the way the Department estimates and adjudicates future risks, but

numerous other equally important process reforms are required and are in fact

under way.

Transforming How We Work With Others

Transforming the way the Department integrates military power with other

instruments of national power will help ensure that when we employ military

power, we do so in the most effective way possible. Integration of national power

is especially critical for overcoming terrorists or other unconventional adversaries

that cannot be defeated by military means alone. Enhanced coordination among

agencies and across all levels of government (federal, state, and local) will

promote increased cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to conduct

seamless operations. Specifically, statutory and regulatory changes must be made

to allow compartmented intelligence related to the war on terrorism and homeland

defense to be shared.

Furthermore, DoD should work with other Departments to share

information on its transformation programs in order to help guarantee

compatibility and encourage other agencies to follow suit as appropriate. Some

guidance on how DoD works with our interagency partners is provided in the

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and more will be forthcoming as a result
8

of experimentation and ongoing policy efforts, including deliberations currently

underway in interagency fora.

The Security Cooperation Guidance provides instruction on implementing

our new defense strategy through regional partnerships, however, more guidance

is required with respect to multinational transformation cooperation (see tasking,

appendix one). As the U.S. military transforms, it is in our interest to make

arrangements for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly

transforming U.S. capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition

capabilities. U.S. transformation objectives should thus be used to shape and

complement foreign military developments and priorities of likely partners, both

in bilateral and multilateral contexts.

III. Strategy for Transforming

The Department’s overall strategy for implementing transformation

consists of three parts:

1. Transformed Culture Through Innovative Leadership: As transformation

gathers pace, the Department must continue to encourage innovation. This will

require a strong commitment from senior leaders, represented most visibly by

the promotion of individuals who lead the way in innovation. History suggests

that this is a decisive characteristic of innovative military organizations.

Senior leaders also must be prepared to execute their responsibilities for

implementing the Department’s transformation strategy, and be equally ready

to eliminate current practices that stifle innovation.

2. Transformed Processes—Risk Adjudication Using Future Operating Concepts:

The Department must balance the requirements of current operations against

the need to invest in capabilities needed to support future operating concepts.

This portion of the strategy has two parts:

• Reformed Capabilities-Identification Process: The Department must reform

the requirements system to better identify and assess specific options for

mitigating future risks. This will be accomplished by investing in

transformational capabilities based on joint operating concepts.

• Transformed Strategic Analysis: In addition to a reformed capabilitiesidentification process, the Department needs a transformed analytic

capability that can identify and assess risks for strategic planning (see

tasking, appendix one). DoD must be able to support a capabilities-based

planning process that accounts for greater uncertainty in threats and

capabilities, and must be capable of comparing risks across time and

between multiple theater-level operations.
9

3. Transformed Capabilities Through Force Transformation: The supporting

strategy for force transformation, as defined in the 2001 QDR, rests on four

pillars, which are further explained in succeeding sections of this document:

1) Strengthening joint operations

2) Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages

3) Experimenting in support of new warfighting concepts

4) Developing transformational capabilities.

This strategy for transformation implementation will permit the Department

to manage better the two major transformation dilemmas that have stymied

transformation progress in the past, both of which arise from the need to invest

scarce resources in transformation.

The first transformation dilemma is the need to balance near-term,

operational risk against future risk in investment decisions. Postponing major

investments in transformation while devoting the bulk of resources to reducing

near term operational needs raises the risk of being overtaken by our adversaries.

Progress in transforming military forces requires significant investments in those

aspects of transformation that we are confident have enduring benefits. Because

of limited resources, this may mean making the difficult decision of foregoing

currently planned systems and investing instead in capabilities that we believe will

reduce future risk.

The second transformation dilemma is the need to invest now in specific

technologies and concepts that are deemed transformational, while remaining open

to other paths towards transformation. To transform the force we must commit

resources, yet remain detached enough from these commitments to continue an

iterative process of innovation and experimentation that permits new insights to

guide future investment decisions.

The Department’s transformation strategy helps manage the tension

between the need to remain open to new ideas and the need to foreclose some

debate and invest in programs deemed critical to progress in transformation. It

also allows the Department to better balance operational and future risk. The

strategy does so through activities that build new capabilities now, permitting

better execution of the new defense strategy, while exploring other capabilities

essential for further transformation.

Implementation of the Department’s force transformation strategy will shift

us from an industrial age to an information age military. Information age military
10

forces will be less platform-centric and more network-centric. They will be able

to distribute forces more widely by increasing information sharing via a secure

network that provides actionable information at all levels of command. This, in

turn, will create conditions for increased speed of command and opportunities for

self-coordination across the battlespace. The first step toward forces with these

attributes is to invest more now in the four transformation pillars. The goal should

be to produce military forces capable of the following type of operations by the

end of the decade:

• Standing joint force headquarters will conduct effects-based, adaptive

planning in response to contingencies, with the objective of defeating

enemy threats using networked, modular forces capable of distributed,

seamlessly joint and combined operations.

• U.S. forces will defeat the most potent of enemy anti-access and area denial

capabilities through a combination of more robust contamination avoidance

measures, mobile basing and priority time critical counterforce targeting.

• U.S. forces will leverage asymmetric advantages to the fullest extent

possible, drawing upon unparalleled Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)

capabilities that provide joint common relevant operational situational

awareness of the battlespace, rapid and robust sensor-to-shooter targeting,

reachback and other necessary prerequisites for network-centric warfare.

• Combined arms forces armed with superior situational awareness will

maneuver more easily around the battlefield and force the enemy to mass

where precision engagement capabilities may be used to maximum effect.

Military forces with the ability to execute these types of operations will be

better able to implement the new defense strategy and accomplish the six

operational goals identified in the 2001 QDR:

1. Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies

and friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and means of delivery will

ensure our ability to generate forces in a timely manner without being

deterred by adversary escalation options.

2. Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial

environments and defeating anti-access threats will enable us to preserve

and utilize the most effective avenues of approach while rapidly engaging

adversary forces.
11

3. Denying enemies sanctuary through persistent surveillance, tracking and

rapid engagement with high-volume precision strikes will permit the United

States to prosecute a rapid campaign that reinforces deterrence by denying

any adversary hope of achieving even limited objectives, preserving

escalation options or maintaining command and control of forces over an

extended period.

4. Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective

and discriminate offensive information operations will deny the adversary

hope of exploiting a new dimension of the battlespace as a low-cost and

powerful asymmetric option while providing us an unwarned strike

capability that contributes to a broad, simultaneous and overwhelming

range of effects that increases the likelihood of rapid collapse of an

adversary’s will to fight.

5. Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting

infrastructure will provide sustained, protected, global C4ISR capabilities

that permit rapid engagement of American power and reinforce deterrence

by promoting earlier warning of adversary intentions while denying the

adversary similar capability.

6. Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop an

interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a

tailorable joint operational picture will guarantee our combat leaders

decision superiority and enable our forces to maneuver effectively to gain

positional advantage, avoid battlefield obstacles and successfully attack the

adversary even in the face of numerically superior forces.

Committing to a set of investment priorities designed to accomplish these

goals will permit us to execute better the new defense strategy and establish a

foundation for further transformation. However, these six QDR goals are just

intermediate objectives. The Department will pursue transformation more

comprehensively with aggressive and wide-ranging science and technology efforts

and, more importantly, with a robust concept development and experimentation

program.

Transformation must be comprehensive, ranging from science and

technology efforts to fielded capabilities, but need not encompass the entire force

simultaneously. The tension between retaining flexibility in transformation and

the need to invest now in prerequisite capabilities is greatly reduced by assuming

that only a small portion of the force will be transformed during the early phase of

transformation. These “vanguard” forces will then be available to exploit new

concepts and capabilities in operational environments and influence the
12

development of the rest of the force. Heavier investments in the larger share of the

force will follow after the smaller portion of the force has demonstrated in realworld operations and field trials that a critical mass of transformational

capabilities can produce disproportionate effects.

IV. Implementation of the Transformation Strategy

Roles and Responsibilities Overview

The Department’s transformation strategy is ambitious and presumes the

success of multiple reform efforts. Its success depends upon innovative senior

leadership executing clearly defined roles and responsibilities. The primary senior

leader roles and responsibilities for executing and implementing the

transformation strategy are as follows:

• The Secretary of Defense is the final approval authority on all major

elements of the transformation strategy. He will set the Department's

transformation policies and objectives, and define the roles and

responsibilities of the Department’s senior leadership in executing the

transformation strategy.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will advise the

Secretary on the best approach to balancing the four QDR risk areas,

especially operational and future risk. The Chairman also is responsible for

overseeing development of joint concepts and validating joint warfighting

requirements.

• The Director, Office of Force Transformation (OFT), will monitor and

evaluate implementation of the Department’s transformation strategy,

advise the Secretary, and manage the transformation roadmap process. He

will help ensure that joint concepts are open to challenge by a wide range of

innovative alternative concepts and ideas.

• The Commander, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and other

Combatant Commanders are responsible for developing joint warfighting

requirements, conducting joint concept development and experimentation

and developing specific joint concepts assigned by CJCS. Commander,

JFCOM, is responsible for coordinating concept development and

experimentation efforts of the Combatant Commands. He is also

responsible for concept development and experimentation on CJCSdirected joint concepts and other joint concepts, integrating the results from

these and other Combatant Commanders’ experiments, and for

recommending to the CJCS modifications to existing joint concepts. The
13

Commander, JFCOM is also responsible for a joint transformation roadmap

to achieve joint capabilities required by joint concepts.

• The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs of

Staff are responsible for developing specific concepts for supporting

operations and core competencies. They will oversee Service

experimentation, modify supporting concepts accordingly, and build

transformation roadmaps to achieve transformational capabilities to enable

those concepts.

The Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman, ultimately rules

on the appropriate balance in apportioning resources to mitigate risks. The

Commander, JFCOM, and the Director, OFT are the advocates for

transformational requirements. Their responsibility is to provide input that will

better balance the existing requirements and resource allocation system in the

Department, which in the past was too heavily oriented toward near-term

operational requirements.

More guidance on the roles and responsibilities is provided below.

Appendix one summarizes the guidance in this document and provides more detail

in the form of a matrix. The matrix identifies the decision authority, activity lead,

participants, mechanism, and timelines.

Transformation Implementation Overview

The Secretary’s Transformation Planning Guidance, updated as necessary,

will provide guidance for transformation strategy, implementation, transformation

roadmaps, and joint experimentation. Validated joint concepts will define how

transformed forces operate. Roadmaps will be prepared to specify the capabilities

required by these concepts. POMs will be developed to incorporate as much of

the roadmaps as possible, and will be evaluated for transformational value in light

of the roadmaps. Recognizing the inevitability of gaps between capabilities,

resources, and needs, rapid and imaginative research, development, test and

evaluation (RDT&E) programs will be proposed to accelerate transformation

efforts, and to stimulate alternative means for achieving the capabilities envisioned

in the roadmaps. Finally, annual strategic appraisals will be conducted to assess

progress and to inform periodic updating of the TPG and other Department

planning documents. To further elaborate:

1. Transformation Guidance: After the issuance of this guidance, the

Secretary’s TPG will be updated as necessary. This guidance includes

transformation strategy and the roles and responsibilities of the parts of the

Department supporting ongoing transformation efforts. It also includes

transformation roadmap guidance to the Services and Commander, JFCOM
14

(see appendix three) and joint experimentation guidance to Commander,

JFCOM (see appendix five).

2. Joint and Service Concepts: New joint concepts will emerge from ongoing,

iterative joint concept development and experimentation. The CJCS is

responsible for recommending how and whether these new concepts merit

inclusion in approved joint operating concepts which he will submit to the

Secretary by June 1, 2003 (and update by September 1 each year

thereafter). The joint operating concepts will include identification of

requisite supporting operations to which the Services, JFCOM, and the

Combatant Commands will develop accompanying concepts.

3. Transformation Roadmaps: The Services and JFCOM will submit

transformation roadmaps for approval no later than November 1 each year.

The Secretary of Defense will approve the initial updated roadmaps in

November 2003; subsequent roadmaps will be approved by the Service

Secretaries. The combat support Defense Agencies will provide JFCOM

with inputs into the joint transformation roadmap upon request. The

roadmaps will demonstrate how the Services and JFCOM intend to build

the capabilities necessary for executing the joint operating concepts. Upon

approval, these roadmaps will be used by the Services to help develop their

POMs. During the annual program/budget review, the transformation

roadmaps will be used by Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

(PA&E) as yardsticks for evaluating the transformational value of the

POMs (see tasking, appendix one).

4. Rapid RDT&E Programs: The roadmaps are implementation plans for

achieving the desired joint operating concepts. To facilitate execution of

the roadmaps, or to stimulate alternative ways to better achieve desired

capabilities, the Department will initiate several RDT&E programs with

substantially greater flexibility and rapidity.

5. Strategic Transformation Appraisals: The transformation process will be

evaluated in an annual appraisal to be written by the Director, OFT and

submitted to the Secretary of Defense no later than January 30 (see tasking,

appendix one). These appraisals will evaluate and interpret progress toward

implementation of all aspects of the transformation strategy, recommending

modifications and revisions where necessary.

A graphic depiction of the transformation implementation process, and its

supporting elements identified below, is available at appendix two. The following

section elaborates on the implementation process organized around the four

transformation pillars identified in the QDR.
15

Implementing the Four Pillars

Pillar One: Strengthening Joint Operations

Joint Concepts and Architectures

The key to the Department’s transformation strategy is future joint

operating concepts. They should be specific enough to permit identification and

prioritization of transformation requirements inside the defense program. In order

to avoid becoming a new orthodoxy that forecloses debate on promising new

approaches to warfighting, the concepts will be updated as required by ongoing

experimentation results and operational lessons learned. The CJCS will be

responsible for oversight of production and annual validation of authoritative joint

concepts in three timeframes:

• Near-term (2-3 years out) Joint Operations: Combatant Commander war

plans, operational and training lessons learned, and joint doctrine, all

designed to achieve new strategy goals and updated in accordance with the

CPG, will promote transformation through enhanced jointness and planning

modifications. Combatant Commanders will devise war plans taking into

account mid-term joint operating concepts, lessons learned from ongoing

operations, joint training and exercises, advanced concept technology

demonstrations and experiments. Current war plans and joint doctrine will

be the authoritative baseline against which joint training and experimental

results will be measured to assess their transformational value.

• Mid-term (Just Beyond the FYDP) Joint Concepts: Future joint concepts

will depict how the joint force of the future is to fight. They will address

specific military operations across the range of military operations. They

will be designed to meet the six operational goals established in the 2001

QDR. The CJCS, in coordination with Commander, JFCOM, will initially

develop one overarching joint concept and direct the development of four

subordinate joint operating concepts (JOC): homeland security, stability

operations, strategic deterrence, and major combat operations (see tasking,

appendix one). More guidance on the development of these concepts is

provided in appendix four. The JOCs will evolve over time to reflect

insights gained from experimentation. The transformation roadmaps will

identify the desired operational capabilities needed to implement the JOCs

and the preferred means of obtaining those capabilities. The Department

will measure progress toward building these capabilities in the

program/budget review.
16

• Linking Integrated Architectures to a Reformed CapabilitiesIdentification Process: Integrated architectures describe in greater detail

the relationship between the tasks and activities that generate effects on

enemy forces and supporting operations. They identify where

operations intersect and overlap and they provide details on

interoperability requirements. The architectures will include not just

material solutions but also doctrine, organization, and training needs.

Using these architectures, the JROC will be responsible for

prioritization of capabilities based on their contribution to realization of

the JOCs.

• Far-term (15-20 years out) Joint Vision: The current Joint Vision document

will be modified and used as a long-range articulation of joint operations

(see tasking, appendix one). It will provide a broad statement of desired

future concepts and capabilities required for future operations. The Joint

Vision also will provide the context for future joint and Service concept

development and experimentation.

Other Jointness Initiatives and Interoperability Goals

The FY04-09 DPG directs the Department to strengthen joint operations

through standing joint force headquarters, improved joint command and control,

joint training transformation, and an expanded joint forces presence policy.

Building on the DPG-directed interoperability study results, Commander, JFCOM

will develop an integrated interoperability plan to address the following

interoperability priorities (see tasking, appendix one):

1. Standard operating procedures and deployable joint command and control

processes, organizations, and systems for the Standing Joint Force

Headquarters;

2. A common relevant operational picture for joint forces;

3. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;

4. Selected sensor-to-shooter linkages prioritized by contribution to the joint

operating concepts;

5. Reachback capabilities that provide global information access; and

6. Adaptive mission planning, rehearsal, and joint training linked with C4ISR.
17

Pillar Two: Exploiting U.S. Intelligence Advantages

The new defense strategy rests on a foundation of transformed intelligence

capabilities. Our ability to defend America in the new security environment

requires unprecedented intelligence capabilities to anticipate where, when, and

how adversaries intend to harm us. Our vision of a smaller, more lethal and

nimble joint force capable of swiftly defeating an adversary throughout the depth

of the global battlespace hinges on intelligence capabilities that:

• Allow us to warn of emerging crises and continuously monitor and thwart

our adversary’s intentions;

• Identify critical targets for, measure and monitor the progress of, and

provide indicators of effectiveness for U.S. effects-based campaigns;

• Persist across all domains and throughout the depth of the global

battlespace, supplying near-continuous access to our most important

intelligence targets; and

• Provide horizontal integration, ensuring all of our systems plug into the

global information grid, shared awareness systems, and transformed

Command, Control, and Communications (C3) systems.

Our transformed intelligence capabilities also must adapt to new strategic

requirements. Increasingly short decision cycles and swift reaction timelines

require the closer integration of intelligence and operations. This trend will

require the Department to create new organizational constructs that closely relate

or merge operational and intelligence functions.

The new security environment also will require closer cooperation between

the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community on how we acquire,

manage, and execute the overall intelligence program. New priorities in

clandestine activities, space intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and

communications are just a few examples where the Department and the

Intelligence Community will have to work as close partners. The FY04 DPG

provides extensive guidance for these initiatives, including several intelligencerelated studies in support of the new defense strategy.

Pillar Three: Concept Development and Experimentation

Concept development and experimentation are inseparable. Experiments

designed to evaluate new concepts provide results that refine those concepts, in

iterative fashion. The Department must have multiple joint and Service concept

development efforts underway to ensure competition of ideas. To accomplish this,
18

the Combatant Commands and the Services must establish and continuously

conduct robust concept development and experimentation programs. Detailed joint

concept development and experimentation guidance is provided in appendix five.

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Criteria

The Director, OFT will promulgate criteria for successful experimentation

programs (see tasking, appendix one). The criteria will address:

• Scientific method and its role in U.S. armed forces achieving competitive

advantage;

• Experimentation in exercises and operations and considerations for design,

data collection, analysis and sharing results;

• Experimentation with virtual capabilities and threats to explore mid and far

term transformational possibilities;

• Experimentation with aggressive threats that include asymmetric

capabilities, the possibility of technological breakthroughs, and that span a

variety of environments;

• Use of red teams supported with fenced funding and operating at the

tactical, operational and strategic levels; and

• Establishment of procedures and repositories for capturing and sharing

lessons learned.

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Progress Assessments

Commander, JFCOM will report annually to the Secretary of Defense on

progress in priority experimentation areas and on the adequacy of dedicated

experimentation infrastructures. In particular, the report should address and make

recommendations on the following infrastructures (see tasking, appendix one):

• War Gaming: War games can help Services and Agencies develop, refine,

and evaluate future concepts. Recommendations in the JFCOM report will

address:

• the use of human-in-the-loop war gaming with both constructive and

live force elements and objective red-teaming; and

• the use of commercial-off-the-shelf gaming technology for development

of war games for use by unit commanders at various echelons.
19

• Modeling and Simulation (M&S): A new generation of M&S is needed to

support concept development. Recommendations in the report will address

M&S options to promote transformation by linking together many types of

simulations, from aggregate and detailed computer models to simulators

and man-in-the-loop hardware components.

• Joint National Training Capability: The Joint National Training Capability

(JNTC) will provide a real-world laboratory with the capability to conduct

experiments that assess new doctrine, tactics, and procedures using live

military forces against professional opposing forces in realistic combat

conditions. Lessons learned from JNTC exercises and experiments will be

a principal source of insight for generating new operating concepts.

• Operational Lessons Learned: Lessons learned from operational missions

should be systematically captured, analyzed, and incorporated into ongoing

experimentation and concept development. The focus should be on results

that have lasting application, and those that transcend timeframes should be

institutionalized.

Pillar Four: Developing Transformational Capabilities

The Department requires strong mechanisms for implementing results from

concept development and experimentation and, more immediately, for developing

the capabilities needed to meet the six operational goals established in the QDR.

To accomplish these operational goals and to develop the capabilities necessary

for achieving future operating concepts, the Department must develop actionable

transformation roadmaps, promote rapid and innovative RDT&E alternatives, and

transform joint training.

Developing Actionable Transformation Roadmaps

The 2003 DPG-directed roadmap efforts established a baseline assessment

across DoD’s transformation activities. The next set of revised roadmaps will

address capabilities and associated metrics to address the six transformational

goals and the joint operating concepts (see tasking, appendix one and guidance,

appendix three). In addition, the Service roadmaps will provide a plan for

building the capabilities necessary to support the JOCs. Similarly, the joint

roadmap will provide a plan for building joint capabilities in support of the JOCs.

Transformational RDT&E

The transformation roadmaps serve as baseline plans for achieving the

desired joint operating concepts. However, it is possible that the roadmaps will

not be fully funded due to competing priorities in the defense program. To
20

facilitate execution of the roadmaps and to stimulate better ways to achieve

desired capabilities, the Department will initiate RDT&E programs with

substantially greater flexibility and rapidity, starting in 2005.

Transformation Initiative Program: The Director, OFT will develop and

manage a Transformation Initiatives Program (TIP) to support Combatant

Commanders’ efforts to implement transformation initiatives and opportunities

(see tasking, appendix one). This program will better support a Combatant

Command’s ability to pursue unforeseen, but potentially high-payoff joint

transformation initiatives during the fiscal year. TIP initiatives are expected to be

time-critical and present themselves as opportunities to co-evolve operating

concepts and technologies in contingencies, joint operations, exercises or

experiments.

Joint Rapid Acquisition Program: Transformation of defense management

includes the reduction of acquisition cycle time. A joint Rapid Acquisition

Program (RAP) can accelerate the implementation and fielding of projects

employing newly matured technologies to meet the immediate needs of the

warfighter (see tasking, appendix one). Such initiatives are expected to present

themselves as a result of the co-evolution of joint operating concepts and

technologies in exercises and formal experimentation and may include the outputs

of advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) or Service Advanced

Technology Demonstrations (ATDs). Joint RAP will accelerate acquisition by

starting development in the current fiscal year with bridge funds that tie the joint

acquisition initiative to the PPBS process. To that end, the FY05-09 DPG will

address implementation procedures and funding for a JFCOM-led joint RAP to

accelerate joint initiatives of Combatant Commands, Services and Defense

Agencies.

Transformation of Test and Evaluation: As the Department transforms to a

joint concept-centric approach to operational planning and capabilities

development, we need integrated architectures that define the specific parameters

of the requisite joint capabilities. A Joint Test and Evaluation Capability

(JointTEC) is needed to test the capabilities in a realistic joint environment (see

tasking, appendix one). Test and evaluation in a joint context will reveal whether

or not the integrated architectures present a viable application of warfighting

capabilities. A JointTEC would focus policies, plans, methodologies, and

resources for evaluation in joint operations environments.

Transformation of Training

The military advantages U.S. forces enjoy are due in large part to the way

they train. The rigorous and realistic training regimen which our military conducts

provides our forces with extraordinary battlefield advantages. This training
21

enables the warfighter to maximize the potential of technologically advanced

platforms, thus widening the gap between the United States and its adversaries.

For this advantage to persist into the future, we must transform our training in the

same way we transform the rest of the force. The FY04-09 DPG provides

guidance on transforming the force by transforming training through development

of a Joint National Training Capability and other new training capabilities.

Transformation of Joint Education

Joint education is fundamental to creating a culture that supports

transformation, founded on leaders who are innately joint and comfortable with

change. This requires a fundamentally revised approach to joint professional

military education (see tasking, appendix one). Joint education must prepare our

leaders both to conduct operations as a coherently joint force and to think their

way through uncertainty.

Measuring Transformation Progress

Senior leadership must constantly review progress toward implementation

of transformation and make appropriate course corrections. To facilitate

development of the TPG and other Department planning documents, annual

reports that employ common metrics for evaluating transformation are required.

Strategic Transformation Appraisals: The Director, OFT will prepare

annual Strategic Transformation Appraisals to assist the Secretary of Defense in

evaluating progress in implementing transformation (see tasking, appendix one).

The strategic appraisals will:

• Evaluate and interpret progress by approved transformational

acquisition programs, and other significant activities such as rapid

acquisition programs;

• Evaluate concept development and experimentation findings for

implications for transformation;

• Report on actions to facilitate concept development and experimentation

and accelerate implementation;

• Identify key barriers to transformation and the means to overcome them,

including changes required in manpower and personnel statute, policy

and systems; and

• Provide recommendations for the next TPG or DPG.
22

Program/Budget Review Output Report: To support the annual Strategic

Transformation Appraisals, the D(PA&E) each year will produce a postprogram/budget review report that summarizes the transformational elements of

the defense program (see tasking, appendix one). This output report will evaluate

the transformational value of the Service programs in light of their transformation

roadmaps and the implementation of transformational initiatives.
23

Appendix One: Transformation Roles/Responsibilities

Transformation

Task

Page Approval

Authority

Lead Coordination Mechanism Timeline

Shaping Transformation Policy

Establish

Transformation

Objectives

- SECDEF USD

(Policy)

D(OFT),

CJCS,

JFCOM

Guidance: Transformation

Planning Guidance

As

necessary

Set

Transformation

Policy

- SECDEF USD

(Policy)

D(OFT),

CJCS,

JFCOM

Guidance: Transformation

Planning Guidance

As

necessary

Coordination of

Interagency

Transformation

Efforts

- DEP

SECDEF

USD

(Policy)

D(OFT),

CJCS,

JFCOM,

ASD(C3I)

As appropriate Ongoing

Develop

Multinational

Transformation

Recommendations

8 SECDEF USD

(Policy)

D(OFT),

CJCS,

JFCOM,

Services,

USD(AT&L),

ASD(C3I)

Document: Develop

recommendations for inclusion

into the Security Cooperation

Guidance to govern bilateral

and multilateral cooperation

on transformation consistent

with the new defense strategy

and the six QDR goals.

May 30,

2003

Transform

Strategic Analysis

8 DEP

SECDEF

USD

(Policy)

D(PA&E) and

CJCS

Briefing: Provide new

approach to analysis of current

and future requirements

synchronized with PPBS and

QDR. Will include an

alternative to DPG IPS, a

broader set of analytic tools,

and a joint scenario data

management approach.

May 1,

2003

Oversee and

Allocate

Resources

- SECDEF/

DEP

SECDEF

SECDEF SEC, DRB,

D(PA&E)

Program/Budget Review Aug-Nov

annually

Concept Development and Experimentation

Publish Joint

Operations

Concepts

15 SECDEF CJCS Combatant

Commands,

Services,

D(OFT)

Document: Develop one

overarching Joint Operations

Concepts that describes joint

warfighting just outside of the

FYDP.

May 1,

2003.

Biennially thereafter.

Develop Joint

Operating

Concepts

15 SECDEF CJCS Services and

Combatant

Commands,

with comment

from D(OFT)

Briefings/Documents: Develop

four cornerstone JOCs to be

updated annually. Will also

keep transformation roadmap

developers in the Services,

Defense Agencies, and

JFCOM informed during JOC

development.

June 1,

2003.

Sept. 1

thereafter
24

Transformation

Task

Page Approval

Authority

Lead Coordination Mechanism Timeline

Define list of

Supporting

Operations

15 SECDEF CJCS Services,

JFCOM,

USD(Policy)

Briefings/Documents: Provide

list of required operations

necessary to support JOCs.

Will update list as

joint/Service roles change and

new JOCs are developed.

May 1,

2003.

Part of

JOCs

thereafter

Develop Joint and

Service Concepts

15 SECDEF Services,

JFCOM,

and

Combatant

Commands

CJCS Briefings/Documents: Service

leads and designated

Combatant Commands will

develop concepts for the

supporting operations. The

Service Transformation

Roadmaps will plot the

development of capabilities

necessary to support these

operations and JOCs. The

Joint Transformation Roadmap

will plot the development of

capabilities to support joint

operations and JOCs.

Ongoing

Develop Integrated

Architectures for

Supporting

Operations

16 CJCS CJCS Services,

JFCOM, and

Combatant

Commands

Briefings/Documents: Develop

integrated architectures for

each supporting operation.

The architectures will describe

in greater detail the

relationship between the tasks

and activities that generate

effects on enemy forces and

also those tasks and activities

that support functional

operations. JFCOM,

consistent with Management

Initiative Decision 912, shall

develop the Battle

Management Command &

Control architecture.

Ongoing

Publish Joint

Vision

16 SECDEF CJCS Combatant

Commands

and Services,

with comment

from D(OFT)

Joint Vision Document April 1,

2003

Issue Joint

Experimentation

Guidance

App.

5

SECDEF CJCS D(OFT),

JFCOM, and

Services

Guidance: The CJCS, in

coordination with D(OFT) and

Commander, JFCOM, will

recommend to the Secretary

modifications to the guidance

in this document.

As

necessary
25

Transformation

Task

Page Approval

Authority

Lead Coordination Mechanism Timeline

Joint

Experimentation

Assessments

18 SECDEF JFCOM CJCS,

Combatant

Commands,

Services,

Agencies,

with comment

from D(OFT)

Report: Report the status of

achieving stated

experimentation/

interoperability priorities,

experimentation infrastructure,

and provide recommendations

for follow-on activities.

June 1

annually

Develop

experimentation

plan

App.

5

SECDEF

(through

CJCS)

JFCOM CJCS,

Combatant

Commands,

Services,

Agencies,

D(OFT)

Plan: Develop Joint Concept

Development and

Experimentation Campaign

Plan based on guidance in

appendix five.

Dec. 1

biennially

Provide

Experimentation

Criteria

18 D(OFT) D(OFT) CJCS Memo: Expand upon

experimentation criteria in

TPG.

May 1,

2003

Interoperability

Achieving

Interoperability

Priorities

16 SECDEF JFCOM CJCS,

ASD(C3I),

USD(AT&L),

Combatant

Commands,

Services,

Agencies

Plan: Develop Integrated

Interoperability plan for

achieving stated priorities

within the decade (to include

DPG 05 recommendations)

July 1,

2003

Transformation Roadmaps

Interim Progress

Report

19 D(OFT) Services

and

JFCOM

Briefing: Present interim

briefing that addresses status

of roadmap revision.

August 1

annually

Revised

Transformation

Roadmaps

19 D(OFT) Services

and

JFCOM

Joint

Roadmap

developed in

coordination

with CJCS

Roadmap: Submit revised

transformation roadmaps to

D(OFT). Combat support

Defense Agencies will provide

input into the Joint

Transformation Roadmap as

requested by Commander,

JFCOM.

Nov. 1

annually

Review of

Roadmaps

19 SECDEF

in Nov.

2003 and

Service

Secretary

thereafter

D(OFT) Services and

JFCOM

Memo: Submit roadmaps to

the approval authority with

comments on adherence to

guidance and recommend

ways to address shortcomings.

No later

than 1

month

after

roadmap

submission to

D(OFT)
26

Transformation

Task

Page Approval

Authority

Lead Coordination Mechanism Timeline

Roadmap/POM

Analysis

14 DEP

SECDEF

D(PA&E) D(OFT) and

Services

Briefing: Evaluate POMs

based on their consistency

with transformation roadmaps

and provide recommendation

for resolution of issues in

program review.

Prior to

program

review

Innovative Processes

Fostering Transformation

Initiatives

20 D(OFT) D(OFT) CJCS,

Combatant

Commands,

and JFCOM

Transformation Initiative

Program: Programs must be

consistent with joint concepts

and interoperability standards.

FY05

DPG

Promote Rapid

Acquisition of

Transformational

Programs

20 JFCOM JFCOM CJCS and

USD(AT&L)

Joint Rapid Acquisition

Program: Programs must be

consistent with joint concepts

and interoperability standards.

FY05

DPG

Testing, Training, and Education

Develop Plan to

Transform

Military Education

21 SECDEF CJCS D(OFT),

Combatant

Commands,

Services,

USD(P&R)

Plan: Conduct an assessment

of the current joint military

professional education system

and present a plan to change it

as necessary to meet the

requirements of the future.

July 1,

2003

Joint Test and

Evaluation

Capability

(JointTEC)

20 DEPSEC

DEF

D(OT&E) USD(AT&L),

USD(P&R),

JFCOM,

Services

Plan/Briefing: Brief options

and implementation plans for a

JointTEC. At least one option

will consider an integrated

approach with the Joint

National Training Capability.

June 1,

2003

Establish Policy

for Transformation

of Training

- USD

(P&R)

USD

(P&R)

USD(Policy),

D(OFT),

Services,

CJCS

Training Transformation

Implementation Plan

Ongoing

Establish Joint

National Training

Capability

- USD

(P&R)

JFCOM CJCS,

USD(Policy),

Combatant

Commands,

Services

Joint National Training

Capability

October

2004

IOC

Measuring Progress

Strategic

Transformation

Appraisals

21 SECDEF D(OFT) USD(AT&L),

ASD(C3I),

JFCOM,

Services,

Agencies,

with comment

by CJCS

Report: Address specific

issues outlined in the TPG.

D(OFT) is responsible for

managing inputs from the

coordinating offices which are

due no later than November 1.

Jan. 30

annually

Program/Budget

Review Output

Report

22 D(OFT) D(PA&E) USD(PA&E) Report: Summarize the status

of the transformational

elements of the program.

Jan. 15

annually
27

Appendix Two: TPG Integrated with PPBS Timeline

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

2003 2004

P

P

B

S

DPG Build

Program/Budget

Review

DPG Build

Program/Budget

Review

Concept Development and Experimentation

T

P

G

TPG

JOC

POM/RM

Analysis

FY05 POM Build

Trans.

Roadmaps

Strategic

Appraisals

JOC

Trans.

Roadmaps

POM/RM

Analysis

FY06 POM Build

Program/

Budget

Reports

Program/

Budget

Reports

GUIDANCE ASSESSMENT/FEEDBACK TRANSFORMING CAPABILITIES Highlighted part

represents one full cycle
28

This page intentionally left blank
29

Appendix Three: Transformation Roadmap Guidance

As described in the body of the TPG, the Services and Joint Forces Command

will build transformation roadmaps to achieve transformational capabilities (as

represented in the six operational goals) in support of joint operating concepts and

supporting operations. The transformation roadmaps will plot the development of

capabilities necessary to support these concepts and will serve as baseline plans for

achieving the desired joint operating concepts. They will outline the concrete steps

organizations must take in order to field capabilities for executing joint and Service

concepts.

To ensure that the transformation roadmaps provide a level of consistency for the

purpose of comparison and analysis, it is important that the roadmaps adhere to certain

fundamental guidelines. The updated transformation roadmaps will:

• Use the definition of transformation presented in this guidance;

• Utilize timelines consistent with the development of joint operating concepts as

explained in the body of this document;

• Describe how the organization plans to implement transformational architectures

for future operating concepts, consistent with the joint operating concepts and

supporting joint and service mission concepts, to include:

• When and how capabilities will be fielded;

• Identify critical capabilities from other Services and Agencies required for

success;

• Identify changes to organizational structure, operating concepts, doctrine

and skill sets of personnel.

• As possible, include programmatic information that includes appropriation

breakouts through the FYDP necessary for the desired capabilities;

• Unclassified or collateral roadmaps will be supplemented with a compartmented

annex when required to expand identification of key capabilities and fully

represent the spectrum of Service and Agency capabilities.

A central element of transforming our force is interoperability--the ability to bring

all relevant information and assets to bear in a timely, coherent manner. All roadmaps

will directly address the interoperability priorities listed on page 16 of this document.

Additionally, Services will explicitly identify initiatives undertaken to improve

interoperability in the following areas: deployment of a secure, robust and wide-band
30

network; adoption of “post before process” intelligence and information concepts;

deployment of dynamic, distributed, collaborative capabilities; achievement of data-level

interoperability; and deployment of “net-ready” nodes of sensors, platforms, weapons and

forces.

Service roadmaps will identify plans for achieving these critical capabilities by

ensuring that:

• Systems are capable of participating in a Joint Technical Architecture

collaborative environment;

• Systems are tested and evaluated to determine actual capabilities, limitations, and

interoperability in realistic Joint Warfare scenarios and in performing realistic

missions;

• New C4ISR, weapons and logistics systems incorporate IP-based protocols;

• Systems are capable of “post before processing” functionality;

• Selected legacy systems are retrofitted with these capabilities.

In addition to adhering to the guidelines above, the joint and Service roadmaps

will address plans to implement other aspects of transformation to include:

• Incentives to foster concept-based experimentation, the use of prototyping

methodologies, and development of training and education programs;

• Information superiority, the identification and employment of all its elements, how

it should be represented in war plans and joint experimentation, and how to

achieve it;

• Seamless integration of operations, intelligence and logistics;

• Support Standing Joint Force Headquarters and joint command and control;

• Metrics to address the six transformational goals and transformational operating

concepts;

• Transformational intelligence capabilities, specifically those mentioned on page

17 of this guidance;

• And how experimentation programs meet the TPG experimentation criteria (on

page 18 of this guidance) and support the priorities for experimentation. 
31

Appendix Four: Joint Concept Guidance

The Joint Operations Concepts and its attendant concepts, architectures,

requirements and capabilities, will encapsulate the vision of a transformed organization

and a capabilities-based defense strategy designed to meet the six operational goals

established in the 2001 QDR. It will also be expressed in terms of the cognitive,

information and physical domains of warfare. The cognitive domain exists in the

warfighters’ minds and encompasses leadership, morale, unit cohesion, experience,

training, situational awareness, strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.

The information domain facilitates communication of data, sharing of knowledge and

conveyance of commander’s intent. The physical domain spans the land, sea, air and

space environments where forces execute the range of military operations. The following

terms of reference serve as principles to guide development of the concept:

• Superior Information Position (Fight First for Information Superiority) –

generate and exploit high quality shared awareness through better timeliness,

accuracy and relevance of information.

• Increase an enemy’s information needs and reduce his ability to access

information.

• Assure our own information access through a well-networked and interoperable

force.

• High Quality Shared Awareness – move to a capability to translate information and

knowledge routinely into the requisite level of common understanding and situational

awareness across the spectrum of participants.

• Requires a collaborative network of networks, populated and refreshed with

quality intelligence and non-intelligence data, both raw and processed to enable

forces to build a shared awareness relevant to their needs.

• Requires information users to become information suppliers, responsible for

posting information before use.

• Requires secure and assured networks and information that can be defended.

• Dynamic Self-Coordination – increase freedom of low-level forces to operate nearautonomously and re-task themselves through exploitation of shared awareness and

commander’s intent.

• Produce a meaningful increase in operational tempo and responsiveness.
32

• Rapidly adapt when important developments occur in the battlespace and

eliminate the step function character of military operations.

• Dispersed Forces – move combat power from a fixed or constant position to noncontiguous operations.

• Retain control of the battlespace and generate effective combat power at the

proper time and place.

• Increase close coupling of intelligence, operations and logistics to achieve precise

effects and gain temporal advantage with dispersed forces.

• De-massed Forces – move from an approach based upon massing of forces to one

based upon massing of effects.

• Substitute information and effects for mass to limit the need to concentrate

physical forces within a specific geographical location.

• Increase the speed of movement throughout the battlespace and complicate an

opponent’s targeting problem.

• Deep Sensor Reach – move to deployable, distributed and networked sensors, both

distant and proximate, that detect actionable information on items of interest at

operationally relevant ranges to achieve decisive effects.

• Leverage increasingly persistent ISR to use sensors as a maneuver element as well

as a deterrent when used as an overt display of intent.

• Compressed Operations and Levels of War – reduce boundaries between Services

and within processes so that joint operations are conducted at the lowest level possible

in order to achieve decisive effects. Increase the convergence in speed of

deployment, speed of employment and speed of sustainment.

• Rapid Speed of Command – reduce the time required to recognize and understand a

situation, and through battlefield innovation and adaptation compress sensor-todecision maker-to-shooter timelines to turn information advantage into decision

superiority and decisive effects. This should include locking out an adversary’s

options and achieving option dominance.

• Alter Initial Conditions at Increased Rates of Change – exploit the principles of

high quality shared awareness, dynamic self-coordination, dispersed and de-massed

forces, deep sensor reach, compressed operations and levels of war, and rapid speed

of command to enable the joint force, across the cognitive, information and physical

domains of warfare, to swiftly identify, adapt to and change an opponent’s operating

context to our advantage.
33

Appendix Five: Joint Concept Development and

Experimentation Guidance

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) plays a critical role as a

major generator of transformational change in the force, and JFCOM is the locus of this

activity. By 1 December biennially, the Commander, JFCOM will submit to the

Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan that

recommends an approach for effectively conducting CDE.

The development of joint operating concepts depicting how our future transformed

force will fight and conduct non-combat operations is critical to long range planning,

particularly for the transformation roadmaps. It is essential that development of these

joint operating concepts and related CDE activities continuously feed back to each other

in an iterative fashion, to ensure a dynamic, aggressive approach to both that

demonstrates progressive refinement and optimization. The CJCS and the Commander,

JFCOM will ensure that this synergy takes place. The Combatant Commanders should

also be engaged in joint concept development and experimentation, providing JFCOM

with favorable findings/concepts so that JFCOM may use its larger pool of

experimentation resources to further experiment with and develop promising concepts.

Commander, JFCOM will use experimentation results to recommend to the CJCS

modifications to existing joint concepts.

A key element of force transformation will be Joint Force Command and Control

at the operational and tactical level. The Commander, JFCOM will work with the CJCS

to develop an operating concept for Joint Force Command and Control, and a means of

implementing it on behalf of the regional combatant commanders during FY05. Since

our military forces will be working closely with other branches of the United States

government and with our friends and allies overseas, JFCOM's Joint Force Command and

Control concept development and experimentation activities will incorporate features that

include interagency and multinational participation, subject to proper security safeguards.

In addition, the Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan should include substantive

activities addressing the following:

• Joint capabilities that enable forward and CONUS-based Joint Forces to rapidly

deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy in austere regions and anti-access and area

denial environments;

• Integration of forward deployed, CONUS based, and coalition forces into the

overall Joint operation, enabling the near-simultaneous synergistic employment

and deployment of air, land, sea, cyber and space warfighting capabilities;

• Fast-deploying, adaptable, and agile joint command and control structures that

optimally exploit shared situational awareness, reach-back to distributed, non-
34

deploying centers of information worldwide and better enable the synchronized

and synergistic employment of forces provided by the Military Departments;

• Tools enabling the timely correlation and dissemination of mission-specific

information tailored to commanders at all levels including mission planning,

rehearsal, joint training, and knowledge management;

• Tools enabling the closer integration of intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance efforts and their connectivity to C2 and targeting elements;

• Resource reallocation recommendations aimed at overcoming Low-Density/HighDemand constraints;

• Improvements to Joint Military Operations in Urban Terrain and jungle

environments, with special emphasis on Limited Objective Experiments in urban

C4ISR in FY2004 and FY2005;

• A compressed CDE cycle whereby the current 6-year period consisting of

workshops, seminars, war games, Limited Objective Experiments, Vision

Simulation Experiments, and Challenge Field Experiments will be accelerated to

no more than 3 years;

• Criteria for successful experiments, provided by the Director, Force

Transformation.