AUSTIN. TEXAS 78711 

June23., 1977 

Honorable Henry Wade 

District Attorney 

Opinion No. H-1019 

Dallas County Government Center Re: Whether a county may 

Dallas, Texas 75202 pave a city parking lot. 

Dear Mr. Wade: 

You have requested our opinion regarding whether Dallas 

County may, pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, article 

4413(32c), V.T.C.S., enter into a contract to pave a parking 

lot owned by a municipality or an independent school district. 

That statute, after defining "local government" to include, 

inter *, any county, municipality or school district, authorizes any local government to 

contract or agree with one or more local 

governments to perform governmental 

functions and services under terms of this 

Act. 

V.T.C.S. art. 4413(32c), S 4(a). Section 4(b) of article 

4413(32c) requires that any governmental function or service 

performed be one 

which all parties to the contract are 

legally authorized to perform. . . . 

In our opinion, this provision means that Dallas County is 

authorized to pave a school district or a municipal parking 

lot if Dallas County possesses any authority to pave parking 

lots. See Attorney General Opinion H-28 (1973). 

Counties of 150,000 or more are empowered to construct, 

equip and operate "a parking station adjacent to or near the 

courthouse of the county." V.T.C.S. art. 2372s-2, 9 2. See 

also articles 2372s, 2372s-1, V.T.C.S. Counties of 500,000 

or more may construct, equip and operate "parking stations 

in the vicinity of . . . coliseums and auditoriums." V.T.C.S. 

art. 2372d-4. 
Honorable Henry Wade - page 2 (H-1019) 

More significantly, the authority to construct, maintain 

and operate parking lots may be inferred as an incident to 

other, more specific county powers. In County of Cameron v. 

Wilson, 326 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1959), the Supreme Court 

construed article 6079c, V.T.C.S., by which certain counties 

were authorized to establish and maintain public parks. The 

Court held that 

[als an incident thereto . . . [the county1 

may . . . provide parking space for motor 

vehicles. . . . 

326 S.W.Zd at 167. In our opinion, therefore, there is ample 

authority by which to conclude that Dallas County possesses 

the authority to pave a parking lot, either by virtue of a 

particular statute, such as article 2372s-2, or as an incident to another county power, as in County of Cameron v. 

Wilson. See also Attorney General Opinion H-45 (1973). If -- 

a county may pave a parking lot for itself, we believe it 

may do so for another governmental entity under the Interlocal 

Cooperation Act, so long as such governmental entity could itself perform that function. 

In Hayden v. City of Houston, 305 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. 

App. -- Fort Worth 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held 

that, even without statutory or other authority, a municipality 

may operate a parking facility whose purpose "is to provide 

a convenience for that portion of the public desiring to 

visit a municipal establishment. . . ." 305 S.W.2d at 802.. 

The trustees of an independent school district are authorized 

to "acquire and hold real and personal property" and "to 

manage and govern the public free schools of the district." 

Education Code 9 23.26. We believe that these statutory 

provisions, together with the principle established in 

Hayden, supra, empower an independent school district to 

construct and maintain parking lots for itself. Thus, it 

is our opinion that Dallas County may pave a parking lot for 

either a municipality or for an independent school district. 

Of course, the county must receive adequate consideration in 

return for performing such work, in order to avoid any 

violation of article 3, section 52 of the Texas Constitution. 

You also ask whether competitive bidding would be required on such a contract. In Attorney General Opinion H-93 

(1973), we held that a school district need not accept competitive bids on a contract with a city for the transfer of 

park land to the city and the construction of recreational 

p. 4209 
Honorable Henry Wade - Page 3 (H-1019) 

improvements thereon. We characterized the contract,"as an 

agreement reached between two political subdivisions, each 

having the power of eminent domain and condemnation, respecting 

the paramount public use of land owned by one of them." 

Attorney General Opinion H-93 (197;) at 4. Likewise, in the 

present instance, we have held that governmental entities 

may contract under the Interlocal Cooperation Act to do only 

such acts as both are legally authorized to perform. Since 

competitive bidding would not be necessary in order for a 

municipality to pave its own parking lot, we do not believe 

it is required when the county performs the work on behalf 

of the city. In our opinion, therefore, a contract between 

Dallas County and an independent school district or a 

municipality pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act does 

not require competitive bidding. 

SUMMARY 

Dallas County may contract to pave a 

parking lot for either a municipality or 

an independent school district, pursuant 

to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, article 4413(32c), V.T.C.S., so long as Dallas 

County receives adequate compensation for 

performing such work. Competitive bidding 

is not required on such a contract. 

Attorney General of Texas 

APPROVED: w 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Firs Assistant 

C. ROBERT HEATH. Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 4210