Report of the Defense

Science Board Task Force

on

Institutionalizing Stability

Operations Within DoD

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Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD

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Dr. Craig Fields

Task Force Chairman

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,

TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force Institutionalizing Stability

Operations within the Department of Defense

I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board task force on

Institutionalizing Stability Operations within the Department of Defense (DoD). This

task force was asked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to consider the institutional

hurdles to effectively constitute and use capabilities for stability operations as called for

in the 2004 Defense Science Board Report on Transition to and from Hostilities and the

subsequent draft Directive to implement the recommendations of the report.

The task force concludes that there is room for improvement in the Department to

embrace stability operations as a core activity. Even though stability operations are as

pervasive as combat operations across the Department, high level leadership and

management is currently needed to accelerate transformation. An important first step, as

recommended in the report, is to sign Draft Directive 3000, with minor modification if

needed

The task force has set forth a number of other recommendations in the areas of

advocacy, readiness, communication, private sector support, and civil affairs, that it sees

as necessary to accelerate transformation to establish stability operations on par with

combat operations as well as to institutionalize stability operations within the

Department.

I endorse the task force's recommendations and encourage you to review the report.

William Schneider, Jr.

Chairman
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force Institutionalizing Stability

Operations within the Department of Defense

Enclosed is the final report of the Defense Science Board task force on

Institutionalizing Stability Operations within the Department of Defense (DoD). This

task force was asked to consider the institutional hurdles to effectively constitute and use

the capabilities for stability operations called for in the 2004 Defense Science Board

Report on Transition to and from Hostilities and the subsequent draft Directive to

implement the recommendations of the report.

In the last year there has been noticeable progress within the Department toward

explicit embrace of stability operations as a core activity of DoD on par with combat

operations; although there is still a long way to go. In that light, our recommendations

should be viewed as accelerants of the process. Unfortunately, during the last year the

progress of other elements of the Government has been less fulsome. Thus, we urge that

the Department act with dispatch to accelerate the transformation of its own capabilities,

while concurrently continuing to give full support to the evolution of capabilities

elsewhere within the Government.

Even though stability operations are as pervasive as combat operations across the

Department, high level leadership and management is currently needed to accelerate

transformation. The most important agent of change is the Secretary of Defense. Ideally

the Secretary, with the Deputy Secretary, should, in effect, act as Executive Agent for

change of the magnitude envisioned. If the Secretary and Deputy Secretary seek

additional support beyond that to be provided by the OSD Staff and the Joint Staff,

appointing an Executive Agent will accelerate change, and the Secretary of the Army is a

possible choice in light of the Army's dominant albeit not exclusive role in stability

operations.

We recommend the following actions as means to accelerate transformation toward

stability operations:

* Sign the Draft Directive 3000, with minor modification if needed.

* Establish high level and properly resourced advocates for stability operations both

within OSD and the Joint Staff.

* Extend and improve our readiness system to realistically encompass stability

operations, provide metrics for management, and provide incentive for change.
We also see three structural improvements as being necessary to institutionalize

stability operations:

"* Establish an organization to effectively exploit our 'fifth force provider'- the

private sector.

"* Strengthen our ability to communicate DoD's intentions and actions to the public

in the foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations.

"* Recruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have requisite skills and

experience for Civil Affairs.

In summary, we urge that the Secretary be forceful and frequent in getting the

message out that stability operations is a core mission for the Department in parallel with

combat operations; continue to focus his attention on our readiness for conducting

stability operations with the same scrutiny as he does for conducting combat operations;

and make a special effort to the support available to him from the high level advocates for

stability operations on his staff and on the Joint Staff. The expressed and perceived

attitude of the Secretary is a key factor in accelerating transformation in this regard.

Dr. Craig Fields

Task Force Chairman
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE ..................................................... 3

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................... 17

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE ................................................... 51

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ............................................. 53

APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS ................................................................... 55
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

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INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE

INTRODUCTION AND BoTroM LINE

We were asked to consider the institutional hurdles, to effectively

constitute and use the capabilities for stability operations called for in

the 2004 Defense Science Board (DSB) Report on Transition to and

from Hostilities and the subsequent draft Directive to implement the

recommendations of the report. As in that report, we are defining "stability operations" broadly to include security, transition,

counterinsurgency, peacemaking and the other operations needed to

deal with irregular security challenges.

We saw no need to revise the 2004 report, despite the passage of a

year since it was submitted to the Department of Defense (DoD).

Further, with one possible minor change detailed below, we believe

the draft Directive is correct, timely and should be signed as soon as

possible.

We have been parsimonious in making recommendations for

organizational change, insofar as reorganization of an institution

typically is fractious and disruptive. Further, we believe our

recommendations must transcend the incumbents, while being

mindful of their capabilities and inclinations. Finally, we have given

priority to recommendations that should, taken together, be

substantially worrisome to our adversaries, extremist militants.

Further, wherever possible we have sought to maintain unity of

our institutional arrangements underpinning combat operations and

stability operations. The line between the two is often not clear and

constantly shifting, and further we cannot afford to maintain two

separate forces, one dedicated to major combat, the other to stability

operations.

In the last year there has been noticeable progress within the

Department toward explicit embrace of stability operations as a core

activity of DoD on par with combat operations; although there is still
DSB TASK FORCE ON ISTITU TIONAL IING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

a long way to go. In that light, our recommendations should be

viewed as accelerants of the process.

Unfortunately, during the last year the progress of other organs of

Government has been less fulsome, and we cannot have confidence

in the speed with which changes in other departments and agencies

outside DoD will take place. Thus we urge that the Department act

with dispatch to accelerate the transformation of its own capabilities,

while concurrently continuing to give full support to the evolution of

capabilities elsewhere within the Government.

4
INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE

STABILITY OPERATIONS:

RESPONSIBILITIES & FLOW

STRATEGIC

" What Policies& -

National ..-- *----------. ---

NSC "-.Countries?.-" "-Strategic Outco0 e;.?- Plans::: "" .. "o0", ..

Do._D

outi Plan

USD A USD (P) trategic Outcome Coco CJCS eadiness

[Country-specific What

Intel Intelligence & Analysis tel Products

OPERATIONAL

USD (P) iLeader ev. s CCS Exercises Plans Capability

JCS Education JFCOM Sets USD (P&R) Training COCOMS COCOMs

USD (AT&L) Technology Services

Services Doctrine

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STASILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 2

This report is, in effect, an addendum to the much more complete

and substantial study 'Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on

Transition To and From Hostilities' that was presented to the

Secretary of Defense on 31 August 2004. The earlier report made

recommendations to not only the Department of Defense, but also to

the Department of State, the National Security Council, and other

organs of the Executive Branch. In the year past the Department of

Defense has made modest progress toward implementing the

recommendations of the 2004 report, although there is much more to

do. The rest of the Executive Branch has made very little progress

toward the development of operational capabilities applicable to

stability operations; and the Congress has not provided Departments

other than Defense with appropriate authorities and resources in

order to develop those capabilities. We are particularly concerned

that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

(S/CRS) in the Department of State is not getting anywhere near the

level of resources and authority needed.

This current report recommends that Defense take an active role

and seek resources for critical areas wherein legislated authorities

5
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

and responsibilities overlap among Departments, e.g. in

communication with the indigenous population of an area, in

applying civil skills, and in mobilizing the commercial sector both in

the United States and the regions in which we might operate. We

believe that DoD should take these steps regardless of the pace of

progress in other agencies. However if they are not complemented by

growth of capabilities in other agencies, the overall U.S. ability to

conduct successful stability operations will be far less that it should

be.

While it is not our intention to summarize and recount all the

elements of the 2004 Defense Science Board study on Transition to

and from Hostilities, it is worth noting the formidable hindrances we

face, other than organization, to achieving effective stabilization

operations -- although advocacy and incentives can make a

significant difference.

Within DoD and the Intelligence Community, to succeed at

stability operations: there will be substantial cost of personnel,

operations, and training; a requirement for a change in culture in

parts of DoD; and in particular with regard to intelligence, we will

need a decade to bolster our intelligence capabilities.

Within the U.S. Government, there will need to be a change in the

culture of cabinet departments, other than DoD, which are largely

focused on policy. Congress will need to overcome reluctance to

authorize and appropriate - with adequate flexibility -- the funds

required, reflecting in part a lack of public acceptance of supporting

large scale standing contingency capabilities other than in DoD.

Incidentally, industry cannot swiftly surge to provide capabilities as a

possible substitute for large scale standing contingency capabilities.

The nature of the inter-agency process has to change to be more than

coordination; to be an orchestration of all the instruments of U.S.

power. Where there is separation of statutory authorities from

capabilities and resources, we will need to reconcile those differences

without undue acrimony.

With regard to foreign governments or the United Nations, there

is a question of alignment of their international policy goals with U.S.

6
INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE

foreign policy goals. Those partners will need to face up to the cost of

maintaining contingency capabilities, of training with the United

States and each other, and of operations. The United States will need

to face up to security issues vis-A-vis sharing sensitive plans and

other information.

With regard to Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) the

challenge is to establish trust and effective working relationships

with organization that are disinclined to work closely with DoD.

These factors are highlighted because while organization changes

within DoD can doubtless facilitate progress within the Department,

from a National perspective there is much else besides.
DS8 TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

S TABIL ITY OPERA TIONS WI THIN DOD_____________________

BRIEFINGS AND MEETINGS * Mr. James Thomasý DASD Policy (Resources and Pans) M Ar. * Task Force meeting September 9, 2005 Joe Benikeit, Deputy Director, Defense Reconstnxm nffcC'e, Mr. Mike Dlonley, CS0 DirectorAdommismila - Hon. Thomas O'Connell ASC(SOC/c) andManagement * ROML Frank Pandolfe JCS J 5Deput Director AFSC Teleconference. CCL Caitva'ight, Deputy Commander, Air. Scott

J- J3 Readiness Dnisi L 

forStrategyandPoklicy Welker -Actin Ceputyto the Commander, Mr. James tLoehd.' - irector of

Fairell tCol Wawrzynski, L tCol Burlingame, Major Contracting, Mr. Mike Hutchinson. Depuly Diector for Contracting, Mr.

* Hon. Thomas O'Connell, ASO (SC/tIC KirkSchulting -Actirg Deputy, G4, Mr Rickey Peer -Chief Pans, & and Mr. RobeitAndrews, POASO (SC/tIC) Iimtitrtves, 01. Mr. Bruce Daasch -Support Operations, G3

C/ SCPO/ryG3, ellAlaane, C AMC Teleconference MOG Stevenson.- Deputy Chief ofStaffor Loistics, Ms. Sue Baker -Pnncipial Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics G3,-Mr. Dr adner a AS oiy(Stabdie1 Operations) Orf Paul Mayberry DUSD(P&R) Greg Kee - Director for Foutur Operations, G3;M. MirNets Biamon.- Directo

J -7, COL Nathan Slate (Exercise for Current Operations, 03; Mir. Jeff Parsons -Comnmand Contractin

Chvislen), CAPTleff Miller 

Don Grant(Cperationat WarfPlans; L TG Walter Sharp Director Joint Staff and COL DourgMonrison (Training Division), HnTmHlAO(eev faisD.CagDern DS 4 LlColfEdward Mclenzie (Joint Concepts and Expetimenatalon) * Task Force menting Saplember2 ADMHon TEdmnd Hall ASO ( nie Affais) tCagCenn.P40(4 2,215 Hon KeM Kredgninasin VCJCAS& Or Hon. Ryano Henr PD olScy (tl~ifyOeain) M Ho RyicardMln Depury PUDirecor. DSC Mr. Ray Dubreis, Special Asnistant, Secretatynofthe Army, Secretary Martin Hoffman, CRS -Afghanistan, Mr. Howard Burns, OSRO - Iraq * Amy toFleur, J-8 War Gaming Division 

*L TO James D.BabrSornU Any rlofnies

Strategy, Plans, 

L ovelace, 

Poicry 

Aony 0-3: MO Keith Dayton, Army 0-35, Director,* Col Clarke tethin, USMC and L fCol Araig Konwonthy, USMCR, WMade

* BO Sandy Davidson Corps Contbat Development Command, Capatifities Development Former Commander 350th, CividAflfais, Command Directorate, Fires, andMalneuver Integration Division * Mr onsltan Dernc So~k, toSec~f Mr MDII cans Bminnndh Mcns Frantlt Sermecf n * PACOM teleconference ColonelfRichard Bloss, J54: tieutenant Coilonel tJmscer NDU RoberttBndgfbor J7t: Lieutenant Colonel John Carnthers, J)72; r Hns ir rankin Bnnedyk rame DrJame ScearCommander JeffGOdlreO J54; Lieutentant Colonel Laurence How, J54, * Amtt. 

DOS 

Carlos Pascual Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabuization Lieutenant Colonel Ke vin Jackson J7ttI: Major John Martin, J77tt,-Mir Lr yoJ1 JFCCMLab, Janet 

J-8, 

Tucker, 

J.-9 AMr 

J-9 Devd 

Strategic 

Ozolek, 

Commonications, J-9 Executive 

Raquegle 

Director Joint 

Hill Futures L t~en Gene Renoart, Director J-5, ROML Frank Pandoolfe, I-S Deputy

Business Operations, Hannah Francis, 

J-g &/rector for Strategy and Policy Col ScotNo~rwonod CDR Mark Metzger J-83 Resources Hon. Enic Edelman, USC (Policy)

OSS TASK FORCE ON 1NSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DlOD 3

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INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE

FOREIGN STABILITY OPERATIONS

ARE A CORE ACTIVITY FOR DOD

"* We have engaged in foreign stability operations for a long time

- 1846: Major General Winfield Scott's forces occupied and administered Mexico CiQt

"* We frequently engage in stability operations

- Every twoyears, on average, since the end of the Cold War

"* We engage in stability operations more frequently than combat operations

- Most combat operations are followed by stability operations

- Some stability operations are not preceded by combat operations, e.g. responding to

the collapse of a failed state

"* Stability operations cost more than combat operations

- Since the end of the Cold War, 80% of our supplemental funds for operations have

been for stability operations and 20% have been for combat operations

"* We have notyet learned to use technology to reduce the cost of stability

operations as we have for combat operations

- But technology has significantly amplified the capabilities of insurgents to disrupt US.

operations

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 4

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9
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

DOMESTIC STABILITY OPERATIONS

ARE A CORE ACTIVITY FOR DOD

Providing support for domestic civil authorities in the face of natural

disaster

- Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, fires

- Industrial accidents

"* Chemical waste

"* Hazardous materials

"* Nuclearpowerplants & materials

"* Electric power outages

* Providing support for civil authorities in the face of malicious, e.g.

terrorist, attacks

- Biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear

DS6 TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 5

There are parallels between the capabilities required for DoD to

succeed at foreign stability operations and domestic stability

operations. Both require anticipation of the likely and important

possibilities, and identification of DoD objectives should those

possibilities arise. Both require careful planning and mission

rehearsal, gaming, and exercises. Both require partnership in the

aforementioned with many other entities. Both require the

availability of trained personnel and equipment that differs from the

requirements for combat operations. Both require a foundation of

information for both planning and execution, information that must

be gathered long in advance and cannot be accessed at the last

moment.

There are differences, of course, the most obvious being with

regard to insurgency in foreign stability operations, which is

oftentimes of greater intensity and duration, and sponsored by

foreign powers; in contrast to looting, riots and general crime of more

modest magnitude sometimes accompanying domestic disasters.

10
INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE

We have yet to compose a sizing concept regarding our

preparation for concurrent domestic stability operations, foreign

stability operations and foreign combat operations; all of which will

call upon some of the same resource base. Further, there may be a

causal link among those kinds of events, e.g. a foreign stability

operation triggering a domestic terrorist attack and accompanying

domestic stability operation. In composing a sizing concept we need

to be careful with our accounting: we must avoid 'double counting'

resources that may be concurrently needed by the Secretary of

Defense abroad and, e.g. a State Governor in the United States.

Considering these questions is beyond the scope of the current study,

and they are raised to underscore the central nature of stability

operations for DoD.

11
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION TOWARD STABILITY

OPERATIONS -BOTTOM LINE (1 OF 2)

Even though stability operations are as pervasive as combat operations across the

Department, high level leadership and management is currently needed to accelerate

transformation

- Relevant elements of the Depaitment already have the statutory authority and responsibility- if

not resources and skills - for stability operations

- However, with the need for massive cultural change and resource allocation, high level advocacy

is required to accelerate transformation

The most important agent of change is the Secretary of Defense

- The perceived attitude of the Secretary vis-b-vis stability operations is the single most important

factor

* Draft Directive 3000 should be signed, with minor modification if needed

* We need high le vel and properly resourced advocates for stability operations both within

OSD and the Joint Staff

We must extend and improve our readiness system to realistically encompass stability

operations, provide metrics for management, and provide incentive for change

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 6

We urge that the Secretary: be forceful and frequent in getting the

message out that stability operations is a core mission for the

Department in parallel with combat operations; continue to focus his

attention on our readiness for conducting stability operations with

the same scrutiny as he does for conducting combat operations; and

make a special effort to make use of the support available to him

from the high level advocates for stability operations on his OSD staff

and on the Joint Staff. The expressed and perceived attitude of the

Secretary is the most important factor in accelerating transformation

in this regard.

The 2004 Defense Science Board study on Transition to and from

Hostilities, with its emphasis on enhancing our capabilities for

stability operations, remains valid today, and the draft Directive

called for by the Secretary largely directs the implementation of the

recommendations thereof. The elements of the Directive have been

discussed and coordinated throughout the Department for a year,

and general consensus has been reached. With possible minor

modification, it should be signed posthaste.

12
INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE

The question of whether the Secretary should appoint an

Executive Agent depends largely on whether he, along with the

Deputy Secretary, want to enlist additional executive support than

would normally be provided by the OSD Staff and the Joint Staff. If

the Secretary and Deputy Secretary seek additional support beyond

that to be provided by the OSD Staff and the Joint Staff, appointing

an Executive Agent will accelerate change, and the Secretary of the

Army is a possible choice in light of the Army's dominant albeit not

exclusive role in stability operations.

At some time in the future the Department will not need high

level advocacy for stability operations in OSD and in the Joint Staff,

in much the same way that there is now no need for any high level

advocate for combat operations per se. We are not there yet.

If our readiness system was extended to fully encompass stability

operations, and was improved so as to realistically demonstrate our

actual capabilities to succeed at stability operations: the Secretary

would have the management information with which to manage; the

Secretary would be able to give supportable advice to the President

when asked about the feasibility of future operations; and, most

importantly, pervasively across all segments of DoD there would be

new and strong incentive to enhance our capability for stability

operations - what is measured is taken seriously.

13
DSB TASK FORCE ON INS TI TUTIONAL MING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS TO

INSTITUTIONALIZE STABILITY OPERATIONSBOTTOM LINE (2 OF 2)

"* We need an organization to effectively exploit our W•fth force

provider'- the private sector.

"• We need to strengthen our ability to communicate DoD's intentions

and actions to the public in the foreign countries wherein we conduct

stability operations.

"* We need to recruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that

have requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs.

0S5 TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 7

There are 60,000 private sector employees taking part in stability

operations in Iraq in a fully integrated fashion. In future stability

operations, the fraction of the 'force' from the private sector may be

greater or lesser, but will inevitably be significant. Employing the

indigenous private sector can be a powerful tool for enhancing

economic wellbeing and bringing about swifter stabilization.

Unfortunately, the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) do not

receive the information they need to realistically factor the private

sector, either U.S. or indigenous, into their stability operations plans.

The COCOMs know what to expect from the four Services and the

traditional aerospace companies; they don't know what they can

count on from civil companies, universities, federally funded

research and development centers, private consultants, NGOs etc.

Further, there is no effective mechanism in place to involve the

private sector in rehearsal or exercises. Finally, during actual

operations, there is no effective and agile institution for bringing the

full power of the private sector to bear on stability operations swiftly

and efficiently.

14
INTRODUCTION AND B07TOM LINE

Nothing is more important than the attitudes of the public we are

trying to help in foreign stability operations. The Department's

capability for communicating to those people in foreign lands the

truth about our past, current and future actions and intentions is not

robust. In this context we are not addressing clandestine or covert

activities, communication with insurgents, communication to the U.S.

or foreign press corps, long term communication in the years before a

stability operation that might make a stability operation unnecessary,

propaganda designed to influence attitudes, nor strengthening the

capabilities of other parts of our Government for communication -

these topics are worthy of consideration, but were deemed outside

the scope of our study.

Finally, Civil Affairs plays a crucial role in stability operations.

Years ago the primary role of Civil Affairs was reducing foreign

civilian interference with U.S. military operations. Nowadays the

primary role of Civil Affairs is accelerating stability: helping to

restore and maintain public order; safeguarding, mobilizing and

using local resources; facilitating the equitable distribution of

humanitarian supplies and services, and other critical functions

involving essential services and governance. We need to better recruit

mid-career senior professionals from the private sector who already

have the skills and experiences we need.

While it does not rise to the same level of importance as the

aforementioned topics, we have urged the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) to

ensure that there is sufficient advocacy within his organization for

the technology and system developments, closely linked to operator

needs, required for stability operations.

In addition, several topics arose that have not led to specific

recommendations, but are worthy of note. First, we believe that there

is nothing more important than improving the effectiveness of our

intelligence apparatus to gather the information needed - much

unclassified - for success at stability operations: the 2004 DSB Report

and subsequent Directive fully cover that topic, and we urge special

attention to monitoring implementation. Second, DoD lacks the legal

15
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

authorities to perform certain activities required for timely closure of

stability operations; other parts of the Government have such

authorities but do not always have the capabilities or resources to

effectively perform those activities. We understand that there is

continuing effort to reconcile the situation, we have no new approach

to suggest for doing so, but we want to emphasize that the

tremendous drain on the Department's resources might be obviated

by solution. Finally, we acknowledge the importance of effective

partnership with NGOs in stability operations, but we have been

unable to uncover an encouraging approach to further improving

that partnership.

16
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDINGS: THE DRAFT DIRECTIVE

The items of discussion

- An Executive Agent for Stability Operations

- An oversight board for an Executive Agent for Stability

Operations

- Chair and composition of an oversight board

* Options

- The Army as Executive Agent

- JFCOM as Executive Agent

- Some other DoD component as Executive Agent

- No Executive Agent

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 9

The major topic of open discussion with respect to the draft

Directive to implement the recommendations of the 2004 Defense

Science Board study on pre- and post-hostilities is in regard to the

appointment of an executive agent to focus on the implementation of

said recommendations. We will not comment on other parts of the

draft Directive except to express support.

Traditionally, an 'executive agent' is assigned responsibilities,

functions and authorities by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to

focus on specific activities involving two or more DoD components in

order to accomplish an objective. In this instance of stability

operations, the responsibilities envisioned include tasks that are akin

to those oftentimes performed by the OSD staff or the Joint Staff -

coordination, reporting to the Secretary on implementation,

17
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

identifying requirements and recommending priorities, developing

processes to facilitate information sharing, monitoring doctrine and

concepts development, ensuring technology support; as well as tasks

oftentimes undertaken by the Joint Staff and JFCOM - developing

operational concepts. However, in addition to these staff function, an

executive agent also has delegated line authority that takes

precedence over other DoD components.

Stability operations cross the full gamut of DoD functions, much

like combat operations. Insofar as there is no executive agent for

combat operations, there might be no executive agent for stability

operations. On the other hand, evolving our capabilities for stability

operations involves such enormous transformative changes in culture

and such significant reallocation of resources that, in reality and on a

temporary basis, additional focused and assigned senior advocacy

and leadership may be necessary to actually accomplish our

objectives vis-A-vis stability operations. In any case, an executive

agent would need to have experience building capabilities,

experience coordinating with outside organizations, and direction

connection to the COCOMs.

With respect to the options, the Army has strong experience

building capabilities and routinely is connected to the COCOMs, but

has lesser experience coordinating in the interagency process and

with the United Nations or foreign governments. If history is a guide,

the Army provides most of the capabilities employed in stability

operations, with critical contributions from the Marine Corps and the

other Services.

JFCOM has experience acting as an executive agent for functions

like joint warfighting experimentation, and already coordinates with

outside agencies, e.g. with State and multi-national organizations; but

may lack the resources required to act as executive agent for stability

operations.

No other DoD component leaps forth as a potential executive

agent for stability operations. A new entity could be created with new

skilled staff drawn from the range of DoD components, e.g. the

Services, Joint Staff, Policy and so on; and could report to the

18
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

Secretary of Defense or elsewhere. Starting a wholly new

organization of major size is a daunting prospect.

Finally, among the options, the Department could proceed to

strengthen its capabilities for stability operations without an

executive agent. To actually succeed, this implies that the Secretary

and Deputy Secretary, supported by the OSD Staff and the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, would effect

transformative change across the full gamut of DoD Components.

The functions required are as broadly based within the Department

as for combat operations. All relevant components within the

Department already have the statutory authority -- with a few

exceptions -- and responsibility for performing stability operations;

although they may not have the resources, skills and perhaps

motivation. There is no executive agent for combat operations.

Finally, we posit that there is no bright line between combat

operations and stability operations. They often happen

simultaneously within the same geographic location (e.g., the three or

even four or five block war).

If the Secretary of Defense chooses to appoint an executive agent,

e.g. the Secretary of the Army, so as to enlist greater executive

management capacity to accelerate transformation, we do not think

that there is any need for a the creation of a new oversight board to

monitor the actions of the executive agent. The OSD Staff and the

Joint Staff both have and exercise oversight responsibilities that

would be more than adequate for the purpose.

19
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STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

RECOMMENDATIONS: THE DRAFT

DIRECTIVE

The Secretary, with the Deputy Secretary, should effect

the transformation of DoD for stability operations

- The transformation is massive and involves most of DoD

- The effort required will be comparably massive and sustained

- The OSD staff willrequire significant strengthening

* If the Secretary wants additional executive capacity, he

should direct the Secretary of the Army to act as Executive

Agent

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 10

All components of DoD already have and oftentimes exercise the

authority with responsibility needed to succeed in stability

operations -- although in some instances resources or skills for

stability operations are deficient. There is already a requirement for

so-called Phase 4 planning within the Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES). Furthermore, a separate line role in the

form of delegated authority to an executive agent for stability

operations might establish an unconstructive division between

stability operations and combat operations that is antithetical to

overall success and furthermore give appearance that stability

operations are only a niche capability instead of a mission of

comparable importance to major combat operations.

In practice, the transformation required in terms of both culture

and resource allocation vis-A-vis stability operations is so significant,

sustained senior executive leadership, management and focus will be

needed to effect the evolution. Change in large corporations always

devolves from the Chief Executive Officer as agent of change; and

20
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

within DoD the Secretary, with the Deputy Secretary, must be the

agent of change with respect to stability operations.

This is a very substantial and time consuming undertaking, and

the Secretary may want to enlist the executive resources of the

Secretary of the Army, while himself remaining engaged in his

leadership role. Most of the resources and capabilities employed in

stability operations are the Army's, with important contributions

from the Marines and other Services.

We could uncover no credible third alternative other than the

Secretary's effecting the major transformation of stability operations;

or the Secretary's assignment of the management task to the Army

while continuing to exercise his leadership. If neither happens,

transformation will not be swift and steady.

In either case the Directive should be signed posthaste. If the

Secretary does not feel that an executive agent is appropriate for

stability operations, a proposed revision deletes the 'line' tasks that

had been envisioned for an executive agent, insofar as they would be

performed in the course of daily leadership and management by the

Secretary; and reallocates the 'staff' tasks that had been envisioned for

an executive agent to the OSD Staff, specifically the Under Secretary

of Defense for Policy, and to JFCOM.

If the Secretary chooses to assign the role of executive agent to the

Secretary of the Army, the current draft of the Directive is ready for

signature, with very slight modification.

21
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FINDINGS: HIGH LEVEL AND PROPERLY RESOURCED

ADVOCATES FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS BOTH

WITHIN OSD AND THE JOINT STAFF

" We do not have high level and properly resourced advocates for stability operations either within OSD or

within the joint staff " Within OS there is a DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations who reports to the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict - The individual's small ofice has been assigned myriad tasks that are not central to stability operations, albeit vaguely

related to stability operations " Certain functions need to be performed within OSD to support the transformation of stability operations - Advocacy, preparation of stability operations elements of SPG and other key guidance documents - Ensure that the Secretary has the information he needs to accelerate the transformation of stability operations - Represent the Secretary in the interagency process. take lead for DoD in helping make interagency partners more capable - Represent the Secretary with the UN, foreign govemments, and NG~s

" Within the Joint Staff there is no correspondent to the aforementioned DASD for Stability Operations - Tasks are apportioned amongJ- 1, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-Z and J-8; and probably elsewhere as well - There is no formal lead, although J-5 has assumed de facto lead

"* Certain functions need to be performed within the Joint Staff to support the transformation of stability

operations

_ Advocacy - Ensure that planning, concept development, doctrine, exercises, training, professional military education encompasses stability operations - Ensure that readiness reporting encompasses stability operations - Work with OSD, the State Department and other organs ofgovernment, as needed

"* Certain functions need to be performed in concert between the OSD staff and the Joint Staff - Our readiness to conduct stability operations should be presented to the Secretary, e.g.jointly by the Deputy Secretary

and the Vice Chairman, supported by their respective staffs

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 11

Staff responsibilities for both combat operations and stability

operations are pervasive across DoD. Those responsibilities have

been distributed across the Joint Staff, unified with staff

responsibilities for combat operations. Those responsibilities have

also been largely distributed across the OSD staff, and cannot and

should not be fully centralized under any single individual; although

within the OSD staff there is a central staff focus and advocate for

stability operations in the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

(DASD) for Stability Operations, while there is no such

corresponding individual on the Joint Staff.

For pervasive activities like combat operations and stability

operations, should there be any central staff focus and advocate?

Several decades ago most large U.S. corporations had corporate

staff offices devoted to quality, to international sales, and to

environmental correctness. Those are in principle pervasive corporate

functions, but at that time they were not pervasively practiced within

corporations, and so forward looking CEOs and Boards accelerated

transformation toward enhanced quality, global operation and

22
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA I TONS

environmental sensitivity with corporate advocacy and focus on the

corporate staff. By now most such offices have been abolished as no

longer needed; or should be.

In much the same way, a transitional, temporary focus and

advocacy by the Secretary's and Chairman's 'corporate' staffs can

serve an important nee essential function in accelerating

transformation; as well as serving traditional staff roles in supporting

their principals. To be effective such staff roles must be of sufficiently

high rank to signal the seriousness of the principal and importance of

the topic - especially insofar as the Government and the Military are

most conscious of rank, both informally and formally - and more

importantly must be properly resourced to actually get work done.

Having a staff focus for stability operations of sufficient rank and

resource on both the OSD staff and the Joint Staff is important

irrespective of the issue of having or not having an executive agent

supporting the Secretary. If there isn't an executive agent, the

Secretary will need even more powerful staff support to effect the

transformation himself, but even if there is an executive agent with

responsibility delegated from the Secretary, there remains a need for

central oversight.

23
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RECOMMENDATIONS: HIGH LEVEL AND PROPERLY

RESOURCED ADVOCATES FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

BOTH WITHIN OSD AND THE JOINT STAFF

We recommend the establishment of a Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy (Stability Operations)

- With functional responsibilities as described above

- With personnel resources increased above the current staffing of 21

individuals, the increase in the range of 20 to 35 more people - either as

government employees, IPAs, FFRDC employees, or contractor employees

* We recommend that stability operations be made an explicit mission

and priority for the J-5 Deputy Director for International Negotiations

and Multilateral Affairs (INMA)

- With personnel resources increased by 3 individuals

- With functional responsibilities as described above

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 12

We believe that a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense is simply

of too low rank to effectively operate in the inter-agency process

within the U.S. government, with the United Nations, and with

foreign governments. In an ideal, world rank would not matter, only

capability and the visible support of the Secretary of Defense, but in

our actual circumstances rank does matter.

In making this recommendation, we considered alternatives to

establishing a Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (Stability

Operations) position. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Stability Operations) could report directly to the Principal Deputy

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which would not solve the

problem. An Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy (Stability

Operations) might approach suitable rank for effectively working on

behalf of the Secretary of Defense with rank-conscious individuals,

but establishing that position would either entail the delay and

negotiation of Congressional legislation, or would require

disestablishing one of the current Assistant Secretary assignments.

Four Assistant Secretaries of Defense are mandated in legislation -

Homeland Defense, SO/LIC, Reserve Affairs and Legislative Affairs;

24
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

five ASDs are currently assigned, namely ISA, ISP, NII, PA and

Health Affairs. We considered the possibility of a Special Assistant to

the Secretary for Stability Operations, but that positioning did not

carry with it the gravitas of the role we recommend.

Establishing a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

(Stability Operations) will underscore our determination to succeed

at stability operations in foreign lands, and to the degree that

comparable capabilities apply, at home.

With regard to resources for the office of the Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy (Stability Operations) which we

recommend, the current office of the DASD for Stability Operations

includes 21 individuals, perhaps half of whom are focused on

stability operations per se. The office of the DASD (Stability

Operations) informally suggested increasing that staffing by 24 more

individuals to a total of 45 individuals to encompass the expanded

role and performance contemplated in this study. In a recent study,

the National Defense University suggested increasing the staffing by

20 to 30 individuals. The ASD (SO/LIC) suggested increasing the

staffing by 30 to 35 individuals. These estimates made independently

and of comparable magnitude, bound the additional staffing needed.

If there is anxiety about OSD bloat, some of those individuals could

be Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPAs) or from an FFRDC or

from a support contractor. As always the quantity of people matters

less than the quality of people; and in addition the additional

resources must be devoted to stability operations and not to 'other

duties as assigned' which, meritorious or not as those duties may be,

consumes about half of the resources of the current office.

Note that we are not recommending that Policy be fully

reorganized to center all activities related to stability operations

under the proposed Deputy Under Secretary. That would be in

opposition to our intention to proceed toward full symmetry and

integration between combat operations and stability operations. We

have tried to strike a balance between centralization and distribution

of staff function.

With regard to a corresponding activity within the Joint Staff, we

considered alternatives to the recommendation. We could continue

25
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with the current arrangement wherein stability operations

responsibilities cross most segments of the Joint Staff without an

explicit advocate and focus, e.g. J-5 has two individuals with stability

operations as collateral duties. We did not believe that would lead to

the accelerated transformation we all seek. We considered the

establishment of an entire new Directorate (J-?) but we felt that was a

bridge too far, again with out intention of long term unity. As with

the OSD Staff recommendation, within the Joint Staff we have tried to

balance centralization and distribution.

26
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

FINDINGS: EXTEND AND IMPROVE OUR

READINESS SYSTEM To REALISTICALLY

ENCOMPASS STABILITY OPERATIONS

" At this time the SecDef is not adequately informed regarding our readiness to succeed at

stability operations

- For different specific places and events

- Among DoD components, e.g. individual Services, individual COCOMs, individual intelligence

agencies

- Among elements of stability operations, e.g peacekeeping, governance, essential services and

infrastructure, economic development . Noting that for some DoD Will lead and for some DoD Will support clvil agencies

"* If the SecDef was adequatelyinformed

- He would have the management information to manage, as well as lead as now

- He could more reliably advise the President with respect to alternatives being considered

- Most importantly, a# components of DoD would be motivated to enhance our capabilities for

succeeding at stability operations

"* Readiness for what?

- Places and events likely and important

- Portfollo of combat operational contingencyplans of the COCOMs

"* Our current readiness system is input and not output oriented, with indicators both objective

and subjective

"* Output indicators devolve from a much deeper understanding of these operations than we have now, from experiments, exercises games, lessons learned, historical studies - Very few exercises andgames involve stability operations

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITIITIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 13

At this time the Secretary is not adequately informed regarding

our readiness for success in stability operations. For different events,

e.g. regime change or stabilization of a failed state, and with different

objectives, e.g. reduce the level of violence to levels typical of crime

vice transform a 15th century society into a 21st century society, he

does not have an adequate indication of our likelihood of success. He

is not fully informed about whether any component of DoD is better

or worse prepared to succeed at stability operations, e.g. any

particular Service, any particular intelligence agency, any of the

regional COCOMs. He is not fully informed about whether we are

better or worse prepared to succeed at any of the essential elements

of stability operations within a region, e.g. peacekeeping, or

restoration of critical services like health care, power, potable water.

Without that knowledge, that management information, he can

lead but he cannot fully manage. He cannot with full confidence

advise the President and the Congress regarding our potency for

stability operations that may be required by various courses of action

under consideration. Further, if that information were visible to the

Secretary there would be powerful motivation across all elements of

27
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD

DoD to get better at stability operations: to quote a lawyerly phrase 'sunlight is the best disinfectant'. This motivation would accelerate

transformation toward stability operations as does the Secretary of

Defense's perceived attitude toward stability operations.

Understandably, our current readiness system is largely geared

toward indicators of combat readiness. The natural question is

'readiness for what?' and the current answer is the successful

execution of the regional COCOMs' portfolio of operational

contingency plans. These plans shape and bound the list of indicators

- both objective, like amount and state of equipment, and subjective,

like level of morale - that in union comprise our readiness reporting.

The Military Essential Task Lists cover availability of personnel and

supplies, condition of equipment, and currency of training. The

indicators contribute to the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review. A few

of the Military Essential Tasks are related to stability operations, but

much more needs to be assessed. The progress planned for

improving the readiness reporting system - the new Defense

Readiness Reporting System - provides an expanded framework for

reporting that could, in principle, be better for monitoring readiness

indicators for both combat operations and stability operations - if

fully and properly employed. The aforementioned system focuses on

military capabilities. Insofar as stability operations involve many

civilians, both from the private sector and public servants, we need

indicators of their readiness as well.

These indicators, however, are 'input' indicators and not 'output'

indicators insofar as they express individual necessary but not

sufficient contributors to overall capability, but not overall capability

per se. It's as if one assessed a player's tennis ability by reporting on

the quality of their racquet and sneakers, the number of hours of

practice each week, their self-assessment of their confidence as a

player, and so on; and not on their actual ability to play.

'Output' indicators devolve, after the fact, from actual experience

in the field and, beforehand, from performance in games and

exercises - not models and simulations wherein computer programs

purport to imitate people - reflecting the aforementioned COCOMs'

operational plans. To be sure, games and exercises are not fully

realistic, are expensive to conduct, and are always open to

28
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA ITONS

interpretation. Nevertheless the combination of the traditional

readiness measures with the results of games and exercises provides

a reasonable sense of our capabilities.

At this time the regional COCOMs' portfolio of plans remains

more focused on combat operations than on stability operations, but

that situation is shifting and will continue to shift in part in

consequence of the Directive that is a subject of this study. That shift

should be accompanied by an expansion of the reported readiness

indicators to encompass those relevant for stability operations, e.g.

language capabilities, cultural training, information operations

training, number of MPs, civil affairs experts and civil engineering

experts. That shift should also be accompanied by a shift in our

exercise agenda to include more exercises on stability operations;

now most exercises are focused on combat operations.

A shift toward performing more exercises and games devoted to

stability operations will have an additional benefit of great

significance. It's all well and good to instruct the COCOMs to

broaden their planning to encompass not only combat operations but

also stability operations; it is another thing entirely to actually do it

and do it well. With regard to combat operations we can draw upon a

couple of millennia of recorded history of warfare, a couple of

centuries of national experience with warfare, extensive personal

experience of many of the incumbents, and extensive training and

education. Many - most - U.S. combat operations have been a success,

and many individuals have written or contributed to plans for

combat operations that have been conducted with success. The

recent experience of many of our Army and Marine Corps officers

with stability operations provides a foundation - not available

several years ago - to begin building equivalent competence for these

types of operations. With a skimpy experiential base, 'trial and error'

is the only way to refine plans to the point of excellence, and it is a lot

better to experience 'trial and error' in exercises and games than in

actual field operations.

The regional COCOMs' portfolio of contingency plans for stability

operations can provide, in effect, management objectives. A good

scheme for readiness measurement can provide, in effect,

management incentives. This is a powerful combination, indeed.

29
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RECOMMENDATIONS: EXTEND AND IMPROVE OUR

READINESS SYSTEM TO REALISTICALLY ENCOMPASS

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Although the number of stability operations related exercises is increasing, and the list of readiness

indicators related to stability operations is enlarging, we recommend that" - The Secretary instruct the Joint Staff and the Regional COCOMs to markedly accelerate the extension of our readiness reporting system to encompass indicators for stability operations; and - The Secretary instruct the Joint Staff, the Regionat COCOMs and JFCOM to markedly accelerate the shift in our exercise and game agenda to more stabtiliy operations related games and exercises.

* Ensuring utility and realism, and developing useful readiness measures is much tougher, a major reason being the immaturity of general understanding of these types of operations.

* Rather than merely assigning someone or some organization to make these happen, we believe this area needs an "intellectualjumpstart"

* Learning about stability operations has been on-the-job in Iraq and, to some extent, Afghanistan. The

people most qualified to provide the "intellectual umpstat" are those who have been practicing stability

operatdons with distinction and those who have been on-scene as lesson learned observers. - E.g. from JFCOM's Joint Center for Operation Analyses, the Center for the Army Lessons Learned, the Peace

Keeping and Stability Operations Institute at the Army War College, the USMC Center for Lessons Leamed

The Secretary should establish a task force with handpicked members from these two groups (perhaps

trainers as well). The task force should be led by either an Army or Marine Corps general officer with

recent experience in Iraq and should. - Develop readiness measures for units from JTF headquarters to Brigade - Establish criteria for realistic exercises including roles of OPFORs, populace, instrumentation, AARs, standards - Work with COCOMs in order to connect to the stability operations plans being developed - Recommend the specific actions needed to incorporate their results into the extant readiness measurement

system of METLs, JQRR, etc. and into the full spectrum of games and exercises conducted under the auspices of the Chairman JFCOM, COCOMs, and the Services - Report to the SecDef within 90 days.

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 14

Without the type of intellectual jumpstart we advocate provided

by a select group of experienced and inventive officers, we fear that:

efforts on mission essential tasks for stability operations will produce

lists of great extent but little value; or that we will conduct more

games and exercises related to stability operations, but not realistic,

relevant and indicative games and exercises.

30
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA ITONS

FINDINGS: A NEW INSTITUTION To

EFFECTIVELY EXPLOIT OUR 'FIFTH FORCE

PROVIDER,' THE PRIVATE SECTOR

* The private sector provides enormous and essential services for stability operations

* 60,000private contractorpersonnelin Iraq; future stability operations, but willinevitable

employ a significant fraction of private sector personnel

* Essential skills lacking within DoD, e.g reconstruction and operation of urban infrastructure

* Private sector'includes companies, non-profits, FFRDCs, university departments,

individual expert consultants

* Employing the indigenous private sector in stability operations provides doubled benefit: the

service itself and local economic wellbeing that promotes stability

"* COCOMs'portfolio of contingency plans for stability operations should take into account the

private sector

"* What is available? What quality? What timescale? What cost?

0 COCOMs know what to expect from the Services, and reasonably know what to expect from aerospace industry, but not from the segments of the private sector unfamiliar to DoD

and necessary for stability operations.

"* In field operations conducting the aforementioned plans, private sector contracting and

management must be efficient, effective and aligned with the planning, tempered by the

need for flexibility and agility as conditions change.

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 15

In effect, the private sector has become a fifth force provider for

stability operations along with the four Services.

In reality that has always been true, i.e. for combat operations,

wherein defense aerospace industry, universities, non-profits,

FFRDCs, and private consultants have always been integral to

national security, in large measure making contributions under the

umbrella of the Services' mandate to 'organize, train and equip'.

What is more or less new for stability operations is the very large

number of private sector personnel in the field, the number of

participating personnel from parts of the private sector unfamiliar to

the military but integral to stability operations, and contracting for

products and services through new means and channels other than

traditional Service procurement.

Effective planning has always required intimate knowledge of the

resources relied upon in the plan. That knowledge is readily available

to COCOMs with respect to the Services' integral capabilities, the

defense industrial base, and the other traditional dual-use providers

of good and services for the military. That knowledge and au courant

31
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intimacy is not available to the COCOMs with respect to the

unfamiliar providers of critical elements of stability operations,

particularly including indigenous private sector capabilities in the

countries, areas and regions in which we might conduct stability

operations. What is available, from whom? Who is reliable and

provides quality and value? What are the de facto industry segment

standards for performance and profit? What are the de facto industry

segment standards for contracting terms and conditions? What delay

must be expected between contracting and provision? What are the

liability and indemnification issues? How 'ready' are the private

sector sources? Is it possible to practice, game, exercise, and rehearse

with the private sector in preparation for operations, and what are

,the security implications of doing so? As long as these kinds of gaps

in knowledge persist, gaps in planning will persist which undermine

our ability to perform successful stability operations.

In addition to effective planning we need effective execution

during stability operations to bring to bear the full power of the U.S.

industrial base and overall private sector, with agility and flexibility;

and to support the indigenous private sector in foreign lands wherein

we are operating to promote economic health. It is within the power

of the Congress and of the Executive Branch to effect such efficiency,

to provide agility and capability for dealing with parts of the private

sector unequipped to work within DoD's traditional and perhaps

cumbersome acquisition structure.

32
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

FINDINGS: A NEW INSTITUTION To EFFECTIVELY

EXPLOIT OUR 'FIFTH FORCE PROVIDER,' THE

PRIVATE SECTOR (CONT'D)

"* A number of existing and ad hoc organizations exist today to provide private sector services to the US.

Government in Iraq "* Requirements Generation - Chief of Mission (COM) - Department of State (DoS) - Multinational Forces - Iraq (MNF-l) - DoD Lead

- Multinational Corps - Iraq (MNC-l) - DoD Lead

- Multliational Security Transition Command- Iraq (MNSTC-I) - DoD Lead "* Oversight. Contracting, and Project Management for Reconstruction and Training & Equipping Iraqi

Security Forces - Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) - DOS project management office in support of COM - US. Agency for International Development (USAID) - Defense Reconstruction and Support Ornice (DRSO) - Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) (ASAAL T) - Army Materiel Command (AMC) - Projects and Contracting Office (PCO) - Joint Contracting Command - Iraq (JCC-I) - Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy & Procurement), (OADASA(P&P)-Iraq) U.S Army Corps of Engineers (USA)

Gulf Region Division (GRO) - Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) - Army Field Support Brigade - Iraq (AFSB-l) -not their primary mission "* Direct support to U.S. Military Forces

-Army Field Support Brigade - Iraq (AFSB-I) - primary mission through Logistics CivilAugmentation Program

(LOGCAP)

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 16

Providing private sector capabilities in support of Iraq

reconstruction and the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces

has been accomplished through a number of existing and ad hoc

organizations. The following discussion describes these

organizations and the origins for those newly established to support

U.S. operations in Iraq (portions of the organizational descriptions

are taken from their official web sites).

The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) was created

by a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, signed May

11, 2004. IRMO was intended as a temporary organization

established under the U.S. Department of State with offices in the U.S.

Mission in Baghdad and was created in the final days of the CPA to

help facilitate the transition in Iraq.

NSPD 36 also directed the creation of another temporary

organization, the Iraq Project and Contracting Office (PCO) within

the Department of Defense. The 22 June memorandum from the

Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the PCO be

organizationally established and placed within the Department of the

Army to provide acquisition and project management support with

33
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respect to activities in Iraq, to the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA) until 30 June 2004. After 30 June 2004, the PCO was directed

to support the close-out of the CPA, and to provide to provide

acquisition and project management support to the Chief of Mission

in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State, and for other activities

in Iraq, as requested by the heads of other Departments and

Agencies. The initial staffing for the PCO came from the Program

Management Office (PMO) previously established under the

Coalition Provisional Authority, with one important difference.

Whereas the PMO had contracting authority, the PCO did not. The

PCO manages the $18.4 billion appropriated by the U.S. Congress to

support the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure. This office is

responsible for all activities associated with program, project, asset,

construction and financial management of that portion of the

reconstruction effort undertaken by the U.S, and manages both

construction and non-construction activities across six sectors:

Electrical, Public Works and Water, Communications and

Transportation, Buildings, Education and Health Care, Security and

Justice, and Oil. The PCO management structure has a "nucleus" of

U.S. government employees, along with some representation from

Iraq and other nations, represent the "owner's" interest in the

enterprise. Contractors are hired to provide the program

management, both on an overall scale, as well as in each of the six

construction sectors.

Because the PCO did not have contracting authority, the

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and

Technology) (ASA(ALT)) was designated by the Deputy Secretary of

Defense to provide the necessary administrative and contracting

support to the Chief of Mission, Project and Contracting Office, and

Multi-National Force and support the humanitarian relief,

reconstruction, and security of Iraq. This was accomplished through

two new organizations: the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq JCCI); and the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy

and Procurement) - (ADASA (P&P).

JCC-I was stood up in January 2005 as a 2-star command

under' the ADCON (Title 10 authority) of ASA (ALT) in direct

support of the Chief of Mission (COM) and the Multinational Force -

Iraq (MNF-I). It has approximately 200 personnel in theater and its

34
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA ITONS

mission is to provide operational contracting support to COM and

MNF-I to acquire vital supplies, services and construction in support

of the Coalition Forces and the relief and reconstruction of Iraq.

Specific responsibilities include: award and administer contracts;

provide contract expertise to PCO, IRMO, GRD, Multi-National

Forces and Chief of Mission; advise Iraqi Ministries on contracting

and acquisition issues; assist in generating contract requirements

packages; and maintain a central list of contracts.

The DASA (P&P) is headed by an SES, and is directly in the

ASA (ALT) chain of command. Focusing on Iraq/Afghanistan is the

Contract Support Office, where the Assistant DASA (P&P) and a 15-

person office in Washington DC provides the oversight of contract

procedures and policies affecting support of the PCO, Congress, and

Army Headquarters; This office recruits and deploys contracting

personnel to Iraq; assists requiring activities in utilization of CONUS

based acquisition organizations - Reach Back; track and validate

contract actions; assists in defining requirements packages; and,

provides coordination and assistance on reconstruction and

equipping actions with OSD, HQDA and Interagency partners.

The Defense Reconstruction Support Office (DRSO) was

established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) in May 2005,

by merging the Defense Support Office - Iraq (established in

September 2004 by DSD) and the Afghan Reachback Office

(established in August 2003 by the Secretary of Defense). DRSO

reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and has

approximately 26 personnel. Its mission is to be the single DoD focus

for the coordination of the Department's operational support of

stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Responsibilities include: serving as the OSD "watchdog" for

reconstruction; providing the primary interface between DoD and

other reconstruction activities; the OSD focal point to other agencies

for reconstruction issues; and, the OSD advocate for economic

development and private sector involvement in reconstruction.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is

responsible for approximately $5 billion of the $18 billion

appropriated for Iraq reconstruction and support. USAID programs

are implemented in coordination with the United Nations, World

35
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

STABILITY OPERA TIONS WITHIN DOD

Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Coalition country

partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector

partners. The USAID Mission in Iraq has offices located throughout

Iraq and a division headquarters office in Baghdad. They carry out

programs in education, health care, food security, infrastructure

reconstruction, airport and seaport management, economic growth,

community development, local governance, and transition initiatives.

The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has over

12,500 personnel to perform worldwide acquisition life cycle contract

management for Department of Defense weapon system programs,

spares, supplies and services for over 325,000 contracts valued at over

$852 billion with over 25,000 domestic and foreign contractors.

DCMA has liaison officers at all of the COCOMs to provide

contingency contract liaison. For years DCMA has used deployable

teams to augment the contract management office (CMO) staffs in

order to conduct missions in a theater of operations. Contingency

Contract Administrative Services (CCAS) teams have supported

nearly every major contingency operation, as well as the present

operations in Iraq, the Philippines and Afghanistan. The DCMA

mission in Iraq includes contract administration, quality assurance

and property accountability for billions of dollars in products and

services. Additionally, DCMA Iraq oversees dozens of "life support"

contracts that provide meals, laundry service, utilities, housing and

security to thousands of American and coalition forces and support

personnel.

The Department of Defense designated the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE) as Executive Agent for implementing plans to

extinguish oil well fires and to assess the damage to oil facilities

during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For the initial phase of this work,

extinguishing nine oil well fires in southern Iraq ignited in the

opening days of the operation, the Corps' prime contractor was

Kellogg, Brown & Root, of Houston, which prepared the contingency

plans for the government under the Army Field Support Command's

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). USACE

continues to contract for services to repair and maintain the Iraqi oil

infrastructure.

36
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA ITONS

The Gulf Region Division (GRD), an element of the USACE, was

activated January 25, 2004. It operates with three district offices

located throughout Iraq and a division headquarters office in

Baghdad. It has been delegated contract administration authority

from the JCC-I, and is planned to take over for the PCO in the future.

The Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) are a field element of

the 2-star Army Field Support Command (AFSC). The AFSBs are

regionally focused and are structured to integrate field support with

acquisition, logistics, and technology. They have organic liaison with

DCMA, USACE, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The primary

mission of the AFSB - Iraq is the support of U.S. military forces in

Iraq. Much of this support is accomplished through the LOGCAP

program, that delivers private sector contractors and services in place

of military force structure to perform military support missions such

as construction, subsistence, maintenance, and supply and

distribution. Although not their primary mission, AFSB-Iraq has also

been called upon to deliver some private sector services for

reconstruction efforts.

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is an Army

program that plans for the use of a private-sector contractor to

support worldwide contingency operations. The Army Materiel

Command is the Executive Agent for LOGCAP. Examples of the

types of support available include laundry and bath, food service,

sanitation, billeting, maintenance, and power generation. LOGCAP

has been used extensively to support U.S. forces in recent operations

in southwest Asia, with more than $15 billion in estimated work as of

January 2005. LOGCAP services are available to all the COCOMs.

37
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

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RECOMMENDATIONS: A NEW INSTITUTION To

EFFECTIVELY EXPLOIT OUR 'FIFTH FORCE

PROVIDER,' THE PRIVATE SECTOR

We recommend that USD (A T&L) and Director, Administration and

Managementjointly conduct a study to design an organizational

arrangement for a new institution to effectively use the private sector

in service of stability operations

- Both US. private sector and indigenousprivate sector

- Both factual and cultural knowledge

- Integration with the regional COCOMS'plans for stability operations

- Private sector rehearsal and readiness assessment as practical

- Efficient, flexible and agile contracting during operations

- Employing, as contributory

"* Elements of cunrent standing organizations

"* Elements of current transitional or ad hoc organizations, e.g. for Iraq

- Report due in 60 days

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 17

Within the time constraints of this study we have not been able to

formulate a design for an institution that would efficiently and

effectively involve the private sector both within the United States

and within foreign countries wherein we may conduct stability

operations. The number of extant organizations, both permanent and

temporary, e.g. for Iraq, is large; their operation, capabilities,

limitations, and relationships are complex and sometimes murky.

It's fairly clear that the weakest element in the current mix is not

efficient and agile contracting during operations -- although there is

vast room for improvement in that respect -- but the 'peacetime'

gathering of both factual and cultural information on the private

sector and the inclusion of that information into the portfolio of

operational contingency plans maintained by the regional COCOMs.

We recommend that two elements of DoD collaborate over the

next 60 days to formulate an institutional design, and report their

findings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of

Defense. Without knowing the details of the findings of said study it

is impossible to predict how swiftly an institution as we envision

38
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA ITONS

could be constituted. However, we urge speed insofar as there are

current pressing needs with regard to the stability operations in

which we are engaged; and if history is a guide there is a possibility

nee probability that further stability operations will be undertaken.

39
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

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FINDINGS: IMPROVING

COMMUNICATION

"* Communicate DoD's actions and intentions regarding stabilty operations to foreign

indigenous populace

- Our soldiers and marines on the ground have a major role to play; they are in most

frequent contact with the populace

"* Ideally, this critical activity would be characterized by

- Full integration, far in advance, into the COCOMs plans

- Engaging contents in support of clear policy

- Complementary activities at tactical, operational and strategic echelons

- No less effective andprofessional than private sector media

- Employing technology that actually reaches people

"* There are at least two parts of DoD positioned for communication

- PSYOPS at SOCOM and Public Affairs in OSD

- Both perspectives are needed

"* There is also a growing cadre of officers with experience in crafting communication

operations

DS0 TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 18

If we do not enlist the local populace in support of the objectives

of our stability operations we will not succeed, particularly if our

extremist adversaries are able to enlist support for disrupting our

activities. A necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for enlisting that

local support is clear, timely and honest communication of our

intentions and actions.

There is room for improvement in our communication. By and

large we do not maintain a portfolio of contingency plans for

communication in parallel with and in support of the COCOMs'

portfolios of operational contingency plans for places ripe and

important. Our communication activities are sometimes successful

and sometimes less successful, but are of a more ad hoc nature.

We don't have clear policies, spelled out in advance, regarding the

identification of the audiences with whom we want to communicate,

nor the kinds of information we want to communicate. This places

undue responsibility on local commanders in the field.

40
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

For communication to be successful it has to be effective, and that

means in part capturing the attention of the selected audiences

wherein there is a media glut facing consumers almost everywhere:

they can listen to us, they can listen to our adversaries, but they may

not choose to listen to both. Our communication has to be interesting

and credible, and not 'just'accurate and complete. It must be tuned to

the local cultural norms, and of course in the languages understood

by the audiences.

Finally, if we are going to destroy or disrupt the local technical

communication infrastructure in the course of combat operations, or

if that infrastructure is lacking in the first place, we need the technical

means to deliver our communication; means tailored to the particular

place in which we are operating, available on short notice, and

devoted to the purpose intended.

While there is a lot of good work underway, we fall short on all of

these dimensions. We can and should expect other parts of the

Government to develop and employ capabilities, as above. However,

that has not happened and we do not know precisely when that will

happen. Furthermore, in any actual operation there is no bright line

between violence and peace, and there will always be a period during

which DoD is the dominant presence in country and needs to ensure

adequate communication, if only to enable the reduction in violence

to a level that is conducive to the activities of other organs of

Government.

Interesting, within the Government there is an organization that

effectively performs the opposite of what we need. The Foreign

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), during its heyday, collected

many kinds of media, e.g. TV, radio, newspapers, periodicals;

translated media in about 120 languages into English; knew and

understood the local cultural norms for media; and employed that

knowledge of local media culture to analytically extract the messages

in the collected and translated media. Is there any reason why DoD

can't have an activity that reverses that conceptual pipeline,

beginning with policy-derived messages, composing media attuned

to local norms, preparing communications in the languages required,

and employing technology tailored for the environment of the

audiences we want to reach? The United Kingdom has a capability

41
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along these lines that is government funded, namely the BBC World

Service.

Two parts of DoD have some of the capabilities that we need.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), reporting to SOCOM, has some

of the capability required vis-A-vis technology and is experienced in

field operations, e.g. in Iraq right now; but it does not prepare media

to the standards of the private sector, nor is it oriented toward the

long term planning we posit. Public Affairs is professional in its

media preparation, but is not a field organization with the technical

capabilities or global capabilities, with respect to languages and local

media cultural norms, that we require.

42
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

RECOMMENDATIONS: IMPROVING

COMMUNICATION

" The Secretary should direct both SOCOM and PA to prepare and submit plans for

extending their capabilities for the purposes of communication to the indigenous populace

in stability operations

- Make use ofprivate sector media capabilities worldwide, don't reproduce them inside government

- Develop long term contingency plans in concert with and support of regional combatant

commanders

- Acquire or have access to technology for dissemination in the places likely and important for future operations - Seeking policy guidance to shape the media or suggesting same as needed

- Learn about and conform to local media norms and local languages in the places likely and

important for future operations

"* Handpick a group of officers with relevant experience in conducting information operations

in Iraq and give them a major role in the preparation of the above plans

"* The plans should include:

- Schedules, metrics and resources required

- Plans for transition of communication to other parts of the government during operations, as stabilization gives way to reconstruction

- Requisite interactions for learning policy intentions, integrating with planning, and integrating with

training

* The plans should be submitted within 60 days

* The Secretary can choose to pursue eitherplan, or an amalgam of both

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 19

We don't think it is necessary or desirable to create an entirely

new organization within DoD for purposes of communication.

Both PSYOPS and Public Affairs currently have some of the

elements required, and both could be extended to encompass all of

the elements required -- although in both instances there would be

cultural hurdles based on history and tradition. Both are effective

organizations for the purposes for which they were intended and

constituted, and our recommendation for extension and change

should be taken as complements and not criticisms.

We urge the Secretary of Defense to direct both of those

organizations to separately prepare and, within 60 days, submit plans

for extensions of the kinds discussed above. The reason for separate

planning is to foster the greatest range of creative thought: the two

entities have very different experiential bases and are likely to

evidence very different approaches to the challenges -- it would be

instructive and valuable to learn the range of possibilities and avoid -

- or at least delay -- the inevitable narrowing oftentimes termed

'groupthink'. This is a topic wherein there is a premium on creativity.

43
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We expect that both plans will be constructive and palatable, and

upon review the Secretary of Defense can decide whether to pursue

one or the other, or an amalgam of the best elements of both.

44
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA ITONS

FINDINGS: CIVIL AFFAIRS

Central role in stability operations

- Tradition: reduce civillan interference with military operations

- Reality stablilty operations

"* Restore and maintain public order

"* Safeguard, mobilize and use local resources

"* Facilitate the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies and services

"* Essential services, infrastructure, governance

* Reports to SOCOM

* Reserves - 5641; active - 351

* Should civil affairs (and PSYOPS, in USA CAPOC) report to

SOCOM?

How can civil affairs recruit even better personnel

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 20

Civil Affairs, an Army activity under SOCOM, plays a central and

sustained role in stability operations.

The active duty component, by and large airborne, is positioned

for early entry and to support the traditional role of Civil Affairs in

reducing civilian interference with military operations. The reserve

component can be an important contributor to the success of longer

term stability operation -- if they have the right people.

We have considered whether Civil Affairs (and PSYOPS, both in

USACAPOC) should be reassigned elsewhere within DoD, e.g. the

Army proper; JFCOM; U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM),

specifically PSYOPS for closer association with the information

operations mission of STRATCOM. Our criterion for assessing the

possible organizational changes has been whether it would

sufficiently enhance field performance in stability operations as to be

worrisome to our adversaries.

Keeping Civil Affairs within SOCOM provides a 'home', a

funding channel for equipment and training, and visibility; but places

45
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Civil Affairs in an organization centered on special operations. Since

Civil Affairs is, in fact, Army it might seem natural to be in the Army,

but given the pressures on the Army there might be an inevitable

drift toward duties other than Civil Affairs. Placement at a different

COCOM might make strategic sense, but SOCOM is special in its

funding stream and ownership of forces.

Perhaps, more important than organizational reporting is proper

sizing, recruitment, retention and motivation of the best people to

actually perform Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs is largely a reserve

activity, and we think that is good insofar as it provides a window on

the private sector where the skills required by the stability operations

mission can be found in abundance. However, the reserve

recruitment process for Civil Affairs is the overall reserve recruitment

process and may not tap into the private sector communities with the

special skills needed by Civil Affairs.

Further issues regarding Civil Affairs involve how they are

fielded, i.e. coupled to maneuver units, and whether that leads to the

best use of the special capabilities of Civil Affairs units. We also need

to consider the rotation policy for Civil Affairs reservists and the

mobilization policy, and tailor same to the special needs for Civil

Affairs. Finally, in light of the likely size of future stability operations,

we have to consider whether the overall size of that reserve capability

is adequate: quantity has a quality all its own.

46
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

RECOMMENDATIONS: CIVIL AFFAIRS

"* We do not recommend moving civil affairs (or PSYOPS) from SOCOM - We have not identified a "destination' wherein a change in reporting chain, in an of itseff, would result in materially

superior field performance "* We do not recommend rebalancing the active/reserve ration within civil affairs at the expense of the

reservist component

In principle, the reservists within civil affairs can be recruited with mid-career skills and experiences critical for stability operations

Skills and experience at, e.g. urban electricpower renovation and operation, cannot be taught in any reasonable time in military schools "* We recommend a different recruitmentiprocess for the reservists within civil affairs - By employing the mainline reservist recruitment machinery we are largely hiring young people without domain

experience - We need older people, e.g., 35 to 45year old professionals, who have domain expertise that cannot be practically replicated in military classrooms . We mayneedinducements, e.g., Warrant Officer status - Recruitment should actively target the skills we need, e.g., those called for in the COCOMs plans, reaching out to,

e.g., trade associations and conferences "* We recommend that the Army and Marine Corps conduct a study to tailor recruitment practices, mobilization

and rotation policies, and training regimes for the special needs and capabilities of civil affairs - The study should propose creative and implemental ideas for recruiting mid-career professionals * Through professionalsocieties?

With Warrant Officer status? - Training what is actually needed for effective civil affairs - Tailored deployment, mobilization and rotation policies - Overall size of the reserve component in light of likely future stability operations - This study should be delivered to the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 60 days

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 21

We do not recommend any organizational reassignment for Civil

Affairs (or for PSYOPS) - we could not identify a parent

organization, different from SOCOM, wherein a change would in and

of itself enable materially superior field performance of those

components.

We approve of the large reserve contingent within Civil Affairs;

unusual for military units, but Civil Affairs has an unusual mission.

That mission relies on skills and experience found largely within the

private sector and difficult to replicate and sustain within the military

proper. The activities that call upon those skills are consistent with 6

to 9 month deployments, with some overlap with successors, which

may be within a reasonable range for reserve duty.

The current recruitment process, however, employs the 'normal'

recruiting means for the reserves, and in consequence recruits

younger individuals without the domain expertise that is actually

needed for Civil Affairs -- classroom training is impractical for these

real-world skills and trial and error in the field is costly and delays

success. We need to recruit engineers familiar with urban

47
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING

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infrastructure, local government officials, professional with financial

expertise and experience, and so on.

While we have tried to make recommendations regarding stability

operations that maintain consistency with combat operations, and

that work within existing organizations wherever possible, in this

instance we believe that something special is required. It will be

difficult or impossible to distort the current reserve recruiting

machinery, which is already stressed, to meet the needs of Civil

Affairs.

We recommend that there be a special recruiting effort targeted at

mid-career, 35-45 year old professionals, with the skills actually

needed for stability operations within Civil Affairs. This effort could

make use of professional societies, professional meetings and trade

shows, professional journals and myriad other local means of

identifying and recruiting professionals needed by Civil Affairs. It

may be that an inducement, like warrant officer status, is needed to

effect recruitment; in World War II the same kind of problem arose,

and professionals were sometimes given General Officer status as an

inducement and to facilitate their performance thereafter.

We recommend that the Army and the Marine Corps conduct a

study, to be delivered within 60 days, that suggests creative but

practical means of recruitment, motivation, retention, training,

deployment, mobilization and rotation tailored to the special

opportunities and needs of Civil Affairs. A 'cookie cutter' 'one size

fits all' approach simply does not work: we are not sufficiently

tapping the capabilities and patriotism of our mid-career professional

population. The study must consider the overall size of the Civil

Affairs reserve component in light of the likely size of future stability

operations. The study should be conducted in coordination with

ASD(RA).

48
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAITONS

THE BOTTOM LINE: REDUX

Accelerating Transformation Towards Stability Operations.

* The perceived attitude of the Secretary vis-a-vis stability operations is the single

most important factor

* Draft Directive 3000 should be signed

* We need high level andproperly resourced advocates for stability operations both

within OSD and the Joint Staff

* We must extend and improve our readiness system to realistically encompass stability operations, provide metrics for management and provide incentive for

change

Structural Improvements to Institutionalize Stability Operations:

"* We need an organization to effectively exploit our 'fifth force provider 'the private

sector

"* We need to strengthen our ability to communicate DoD's actions and intentions to

the public in the foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations

"* We need to recruit more senior professionals with requisite skills and experience

into the Reserves for Civil Affairs

DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD 22

If the recommendations of this study are implemented, and in

effect the recommendations of the 2004 DSB study are implemented,

what will our adversaries face?

I Focus of the full range of DoD's powers in peacetime - from

security assistance to special operations - to head off major

combat operations or the need for stability operations

* Failing that, DoD performance of stability operations with

sufficient personnel properly trained in language and culture

and the other requisite skills, guided by fully rehearsed and

vetted plans, properly resourced and supported by the full

might of the U.S. private sector, in constructive

communication with the vast majority of the public who are

moderate in their views, engaged with the indigenous private

sector to advance economic wellbeing, and with agile

intelligence and response capabilities beyond the speed of

innovation of extremists.

This should be worrisome to our adversaries.

49
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50
APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE

51
TERMS OF REFERENCE

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52
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

AUG 2 3 2005

ACQUISITION,

TECHNOLOGY

AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board Task Force on Organizational

Structures for Stabilization Operations

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has requested you form a Defense Science

Board (DSB) Task Force addressing organizational structures necessary to support or

conduct stability operations.

Although the Department plays a critical role in efforts to promote peace and

stability worldwide, it is not optimally organized for success in those critical missions.

Additionally, the Department must ensure that its efforts at transformation in this area are

coordinated with those of the remainder of the United States government, for which

incipient efforts are underway. Most importantly, the State Department has established a

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with DoD support.

The Department has conducted significant work to improve its understanding of

the requirements for success in stability operations. This understanding is largely a

result of the 2004 Defense Science Board Summer Study, "Transition to and from

Hostilities," and lessons-learned from Iraq, Afghanistan and other stability operations.

This work has resulted in a Draft Department of Defense Capabilities for Stability

Operations Directive, Number 3000.ccE.

"o This Draft Directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to DoD

components within their expertise and authority to develop an array of

stability operations capabilities.

"o It requires that the Department prepare for stability operations as it does for

combat operations and provides a vision of stability operations that requires

civilian and military contributions and seamless integration within the

interagency.

"o It seeks to improve what the Department can within its own organization.

It does not (and cannot by the nature of a Secretary of Defense directive)

direct any non-DoD entities.

W
o It requires Department components to produce measures of effectiveness on

stability operations capabilities.

To enhance organization for stability operations, the Task Force shall focus on the

following issues:

1) What organizational change is needed within OSD Policy, the Joint Staff and

the rest of DoD to manage implementation -- that is, to ensure that the

designated capabilities are created and the interagency and joint vision are

followed at various DoD levels?

a. How can OSD and the Joint Staff best organize to gain the most leverage

for the SecDef in the interagency process to get other departments and

agencies to produce stability operations capabilities and contribute more to

USG missions?

b. Should there be an executive agent for stability operations? (The Secretary

of Defense has expressed grave reservations about a service executive agent

in the past). If so, what powers and limitations should it have? Who

should oversee it?

c. Is a board with a secretariat a viable alternative? (If so, how would the

secretariat be staffed? Where would the billets come from? What expertise

would be required?).

d. Is more fundamental change required, such as an Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Stability Operations (as suggested by the recent Council on

Foreign Relations Report "In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict

Capabilities.")

2) What organization change is needed within DoD to improve our ability to

conduct or support stability operations - including employing and integrating

DoD capabilities with those of other Departments and Agencies, NGOs,

international organizations and the private sector.

a. What organizational changes does DoD need to undergo to more effectively

conduct and support stability operations that involve all national tools of

power?

b. How should it relate to the Defense Reconstruction and Support Office

(formerly the Afghan and Iraq reach-back offices), Policy, the Joint Staff,

and the Combatant Commands)?
3) What should be the timing and sequence of organization change within DoD?

For issues (1) and (2) above, what DoD reorganization:

a. Can be done quickly so the transformation envisioned in this directive can

start without delay?

b. Requires further study or pursuit of legislative authorities (e.g., to facilitate

State-DoD stability operations jointness, economic reconstruction under

combat conditions, or the hiring of personnel to deploy in missions)?

4) What additional staffing is required for any new or reshaped stability

operations entities in DoD?

5) Who are the right people to staff key positions?

This study will be sponsored by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Additional

support will be provided by the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). Dr. Craig Fields

will serve as Chairman. LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Executive Secretary

and Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal

Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force

will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title

18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as

procurement official.
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APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CHAIR

Dr. Craig Fields

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Dr. Ted Gold

GEN Jack Keane, USA (Ret)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARYAND DSB REPRESENTATIVE

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA

GOVERNMENTADVISORS

Mr. Michael Donley Director, Administration and

Management, OSD

Mr. Jerry Jones Special Assistant ,Office of the

Secretary of Defense

STAFF

Mr. Bradford Smith Strategic Analysis Inc.

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis Inc.

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TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

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54
APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS

ADASA (P&P) Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Policy and Procurement)

AFSB Army Field Support Brigades

AFSC Army Field Support Command

ASA (ALT) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,

Logistics and Technology)

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense

AT&L Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CMO Contract Management Office

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

COCOM Combatant Commander

COM Chief of Mission

DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DRSO Defense Reconstruction Support Office

DSB Defense Science Board

DSD Deputy Secretary of Defense

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ACRONYMS

FFRDC Federally Funded Research Development

Center

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPA Intergovernmental Personnel Act

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

JCC-I Joint Contracting Command - Iraq

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

JTF Joint Task Force

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PCO Project and Contracting Office

PMO Program Management Office

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

SO/LIC Special Operations/ Low Intensity Combat

SOCOM Special Operations Command

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USD (P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USD (P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

Readiness

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