If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee, UNPUBLISHED May 21, 2019

v No. 342545 Gogebic Circuit Court CHADD MATHIAS ANDERT, LC No. 2017

- 000009

- FC

Defendant

- Appellant.

Before: S HAPIRO

, P .J., and B ORRELLO and B ECKERING , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

F ollowing a jury trial , defendant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82(1). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.1 2

, to serve 3 to 15 years in prison. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm defendant’s

convictions and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2016, d efendant entered a gas stati on in Ironwood, Michigan a nd told the attendant to call 911 because he was being robbed. The attendant then activated a silent

alarm

. Shortly before the attendant telephoned 911, d efendant removed two knives from his

sweatshirt that were folded closed. Defendant placed the knives on the counter, then opened both knives and pointed them at the attendant from four or five feet away. The attendant

believed that defendant wanted to rob the store and called 911 , stating that he was being robbed by an armed man

. While the attendant believed defendant was going to rob the store, he also testified that defendant never attempted to take anything. The attendant also testified that defendant told him he was not going to take anyt hing, but defendant did not say that he would not hurt the attendant. The attendant testified that he felt threatened and nervous by the knives, and stood a distance away from defendant, hoping that defendant could not reach him.

Police arrived at the s tore approximately three minutes after the attendant made the 911 call. They arrested defendant without incident. Defendant later told police that he had lost his job and was trying to get arrested so that he could get shelter.- 2

- Following the close of t estimony, the trial court instructed the jury as to the elements of assault with intent to rob while armed. The trial court also instructed the jury that it could convict defendant of the lessor crimes of attempted assault with intent to rob while armed o r assault with a dangerous weapon. As previously indicated, the jury convicted defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon, and defendant was sentenced as stated above. This appeal then

ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

In his appeal, d efendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him

. This Court reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Ericksen

, 288 Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010)

. Due process 1 requires that evidence of every element of a crime be pr oved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a criminal

conviction. People v Hampton , 407 Mich 354, 366; 285 NW2d 284 (1979), citing In re Winship

, 397 US 358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). To determine if the prosecutor produced eviden ce sufficient to support a conviction, this Court considers “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor” to ascertain “whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Tennyson , 487 Mich 730, 735; 790 NW2d 354 (2010), quoting People v Hardiman , 466 Mich 417, 429; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).

Direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn are

considered to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustai n the defendant’s

conviction. Hardiman , 466 Mich at 429.

The elements of assault with a dangerous weapon ( felonious assault ) are : “ (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehen sion of an immediate battery.” People v Chambers , 277 Mich App 1, 8 ; 742 NW2d 610 (2007) ; MCL 750.82(1). A defendant commits an assault when there is “an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 453

- 454; 812 NW2d 37 (2011) (citation a nd quotation marks omitted). A battery is “an intentional, unconsented and harmful or offensive touching of the person of another. . . .” Id. at 454 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here

, t he attendant was “concerned” when defendant instructed him to call 911 before defendant told him that he was being robbed and pulled out the knives. The attendant recalled that defendant then opened both knives and pointed the open blades at him from four or five feet

away. He said he took defendant “serious ly” and thought that defendant wanted to rob him. He described being “a little nervous” when defendant pulled out the knives, and did not run because

he did not want to encourage defendant’s retaliation or cause panic for those around. He said

that he di d not know what would happen, or what defendant would do.

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he committed an

assault. He asserts that this evidence did not establish that he made the attendant fear an

1 US Const, Am XIV.- 3

- immediate batt ery. Defendant claims that the attendant only felt intimidated, or concerned, rather than fearful, and that defendant did not make a threat. T his Court “ is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury ver dict. ” People v

Gonzalez , 468 Mich 636, 640

- 641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003), citing People v Nowack

, 462 Mich 392, 399

- 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). It is r easonable to infer that the attendant , who had knives drawn on him and then pointed at him, was placed in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery

. From the attendant’s testimony it can reasonably be infer red that the attendant did not know what defendant was going to do and did not want to alarm defendant by trying to flee, and

that he compl ied with the demand to call 911 out of re asonable fear that he could be assaulted with the knives that defendant was pointing at him. Thus, examination of the evidence and in a light most favorable to the prosecution, support s the jury’s determinatio n that defendant’s actions placed the attendant in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery

.

Defendant similarly argues that he did not intend to place the attendant in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery

. “ [B]ecause it can be diffic ult to prove a defendant ’ s state of mind on issues such as knowledge and intent, minimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to

establish the defendant ’ s state of mind, which can be inferred from all the evidence presented. ” People v Kanaan

, 278 Mich App 594, 6 22; 751 NW2d 57 (2008)

. To support his argument,

d efendant notes that he was several feet away from the attendant a t the time he drew and pointed

the knives at the attendant. However, from the evidence that defendant was pointing knives at

and tel ling the attendant that he was going to rob the store , and that d efendant told the police that he wanted to be incarcerated, a reasonable inference arises that he intended to instill fear in the

attendant so that he would be compelled to call 911. Despite the distance, the att e n dant did not

know what defendant would do and he could have feared that defendant would lunge at him with

the knives or cha se him. The situation was sufficiently compelling for the attendant to call the police an d activate a silent alarm, as defendant intended. Because the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s due process rights were not violated. Hampton , 407 Mich at 366

.

Next, def endant argues that offense variable 1 (OV 1) was improperly assessed at 15 points. This Court reviews the trial court’s factual determinations at sentencing for clear error. People v Hardy , 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Id

. See also People v Calloway , 500 Mich 180 , 184; 895 NW2d 165, 167 (2017)

.

“ A defendant is entitled to be sentenced by a trial court on the basis of accurate

information. ” People v Francisco , 474 Mich 82, 88 ; 711 NW2d 44 (2006) . A trial court relies

on inaccurate information when it sentences a defendant by consulting an inaccurate advisory guidelines range

. Id . at 89 n 7. The trial court’s factual determinations regarding offense

variables must be supported by a p reponderance of the evidence. People v Osantowski

, 481 Mich 103, 111; 748 NW2d 799 (2008)

.

Offense variable 1 assesses the “ aggravated use of a weapon. ” MCL 777.31(1) . OV 1 is assessed at 15 points where “ the victim had a reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery

when threatened with a knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon .” MCL 777.31(1)(c). T o “threaten” means “to be a menace or source of danger to” or “to indicate impending evil,- 4

- mischief, or difficulty.” People v Brooks , 304 Mich App 318, 32 1; 848 NW2d 161 (2014) (quotation marks omit ted).

A n assessment of 15 points is warranted where there was “ some reason, however slight, for the victim to reasonably perceive that the weapon will actually be used, and moreover, will actually be used against the victim .” Brooks , 304 Mich App at 32 2. The attendant tes tified that

he felt concerned when defendant told hi m to call 911, and then nervous when defendant pointed knives at him from a few feet away and told him to call 911 and report th at he was being robbed.

The attendant did not know wha t defendant might do, and strategize d to act unthreatening,

activate a silent alarm

, and c all 911. That the situation did not esc alate and that defendant did not lunge at the attendant with the knives does not mitigate that defendant threatened him w ith

knives and caused reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery , as evidenced by the expressed fear and defensive behavior. Hence, OV 1 was correctly assessed.

Next, defendant argues that he was denied the counsel of his choice and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Defendant did not move for a new trial or seek a

Ginther 2 hearing. Hence, t hese claims are not preserved. Generally, u npreserved cla ims are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights

. People v Carines

, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999)

. Reversal is warranted only if the plain error resulted in the conviction of an

innocent defendant or if “ the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence. ” Id. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are unpreserved are limited to review for errors apparent on the record. People v Unge r ( On Remand ), 278 Mich App 210, 253; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). The constitutional question of whether an attorney’s ineffective assistance deprived a defendant of his

Sixth Amendment 3 right to counsel is reviewed de novo. Id . at 242.

Defendant argues that his case was transferred from his initial appointed attorney, whom he trusted, to his trial attorney without his consent, and in violation of his right to the cou nsel of

his choice 4 . However, this Court has held: “ As an indigent receiving counsel at publ ic expense, defendant was not entitled to choose his attorney. ” People v Ackerman

, 257 Mich App 434, 456 ; 669 NW2d 818 (2003) , citing People v Ginther

, 390 Mich 436, 441; 212 NW2d 922 (1973) . Th e cases that defendant cites for the proposition that he had a right to choose his counsel involved

non

- indigent defendants w ith retained counsel. D efendant did not have the r ight to choose his

trial counsel.

Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, a defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963 art 1, § 20. This “right to counsel encompasses the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” People v

2 People v Ginther , 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

3 US Const, Am VI.

4 Although the record is unclear as to the precise reason for defendant’s prior counsel to have stopped representing defendant, there was some indication from defendant’s trial counsel that prior co unsel had retired.- 5

- Cline , 276 Mich App 634, 637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). In order t o demonstrate an ine ffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” People v Taylor , 275 Mich App 177, 186; 737 NW2d 790 (2007). The “effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Rodgers

, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001)

.

In his ineffective assistance claims, d efendant begins by arguing that his trial counsel

fail ed to object to venue as defendant suggested. V enue is the location, or forum, at which a trial

is held. People v Webbs

, 263 Mich App 531, 533 ; 689 NW2d 163 (2004) . Venue is generally proper “ in the county where the crime was committed .” People v Houthoofd , 487 Mich 568,

579 ; 790 NW2d 315 (2010)

. Where there are “special circumstances where justice demands or statute provides ,” a trial court may move venue to another county. Unger , 278 Mich App at 25 4. Defendant does not articulate why venue wou ld have been improper in Gogebic County. T here

was no appare nt reason for defendant’s counsel to object to venue and no argument regarding why a motion to change venue would have been meritorious. Consequently, d efendant has failed

to establish that coun sel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of p rofessional reasonableness, ” People v Jordan , 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007)

, and he is

not entitled to relief.

Defendant also claims that counsel ignore d his request to object to cert ain questions posed by the prosecutor on grounds that the answers called for speculation . Defendant specifically cites a page in the record w here the prosecutor asked the attendant whether he knew what would happen if he did not call 911 as defendant requ ested, and whether he called 911 because of defendant’s words and actions. The first question did potentially call for a speculative response; however, the attendant responded that he did not know what would have happened. The second q uestion was factual in nature. Simply stated, there were no speculative

responses from which the jury could have be en misled . As a consequence, defendant is not

entitled to relief.

Defendant also takes issue with the fact that his trial counsel mentioned three times that defendant had previous ly been to jail. This occurred during voir dire, and in trial counsel’s opening statement and closing argument. Dur ing voir dire, trial counsel asked whether defendant’s previous in carceration would cause any potential juro r to be biased. Otherwise, counsel was explaining that defendant’s intent was not to rob the gas station, but to obtain housing he was familiar with (jail) rather than live homeless after losing his employment.

C oun sel was arguing that defendant’s actions in the current case were therefore not criminal. Given the facts presented to trial counsel in this case, such an argument should be viewed in the context of whether the argument presented to the jury constitute d sound trial strategy. This Court has, on numerous occasions, stated that we “will not substitute [our] judgment for that of

counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will [it] use the benefit of hindsight when assessing

counsel’ s competence. ” Unger , 27 8 Mich App at 242

- 243. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that trial counsel’s arguments to the jury constituted sound trial strategy. Our conclusion is based, at least in part, on our understanding that trial counsel’s strategy contributed

to the jury ’s acquittal of defendant on the charge of assault with intent to rob while armed. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.- 6

- Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was biased based on an overheard

conversation betwe en his counsel and the prosecutor discussing a social club and carpooling to a rotary club meeting. Because the function of defendant’s trial counsel is to assist the defendant,

“ counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of inte rest. ” Pubrat , 451

Mich at 603 , quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 6 88 ; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984)

. The Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct provide that an attorney “shall not represent a client” if “ the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client ”

or “ if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer ’ s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer ’ s own interests ,” except in certain

circumstance s. MRPC 1.7. T o establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance due

to a conflict of interest, defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest negatively impacted his attorney ’ s performance. People v Smith

, 456 Mich 543, 556; 581 NW2d 654 (1998) , quoting Cuyler v Sullivan

, 446 US 335, 3 50; 100 S Ct 1708; 64 L Ed 2d 333 (1980)

. D efendant has not demonstrated that the social activities of his trial counsel , which may have overlapped with those of the prosecutor, were compet ing interests. Presumably, defendant’s trial counsel could fulfill his respon sibilities to defendant and continue s ocial pursuits that the prosecutor might also be involved in. Additionally, defendant has not demonstrated that the performance of his tria l counsel was adversely affected.

Even if defendant could have established deficient performance, it would be deemed to have prejudiced the defense only if it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s error, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Jordan , 275 Mich App at 667

. Here, it is highly unlikely that any alleged deficiency would have impacted the outcome of the trial. Ther e were onl y two witnesses and video recordings of defendant’s interactions with both witnesses were played for the jury, including the entirety of defendant’s interactions in the gas station. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Next, defendant argues that he was denied his right to an impartial jury. He did not preserve this issue. Unpreserved claims are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights

. Carines

, 460 Mich at 763

. A defendant has a “ right to a fair and impartial jury ” with jurors who only deliberate about “ the evidence that is presented to them in open court. ” People v Budzyn

, 456 Mich 77, 88 ; 566 NW2d 229 (1997) . An important function of voir dire is to allow the court and the parties to discover hid den bias that would render a potential juror incompetent. People v Jendrzejewski

, 455 Mich 495, 509 ; 566 NW2d 530 (1997) , citing People v Tyburski

, 445 Mich 606, 619; 518 NW2d 441 (1994).

D efendant argues that several jurors should have been dismissed for cause under MCR 2.511(D ) because they were biased against him

. Where it is demonstrated that a prospective juror “ comes within one of the categories enumerated ” in MCR 2.511(D)

, the “ trial court is

without discretion ” and “ must ” excuse the juror for cause. People v Walker , 162 Mich App 60,

64 ; 412 NW2d 244 (1987) . “ Otherwise, the decision to excuse for cause is within the discretion

of the trial court. ” Id

.

Defendant ident ified five p otential jurors who had familiarity with the prosecutor (Nicholas Jacobs), or John Colassaco, an Ironwood Public Safety Officer who was a possible

witness. However, a lthough severa l jurors noted recognition of or past interactions with the prosecutor and C olassaco , none of the relationships described between any potential juror and- 7

- Jacobs or Colassaco were among those relationships that would disqualify a juror as described in MCR 2.511(D) . Each of the prospective jurors denied any bias based on past inte ractions with

Jacobs or Colassaco. Thus, defendant has not established that they should have been removed

for cause. We also note that Cola ssaco did not testify, so even if there was bias it would have been inconsequential

.

Defendant also states that the knowledge of two jurors about the case denied him an impartia l jury. One had heard “what the case was going to be” after he told others that he was called to be a juror, but he “didn’t know [the case]” and claimed that he could be fair and set

aside w hat he had heard. Another had read of the crime in the newspaper, and informed the trial court that he understood that the newspaper article was not evidence he could consider and that

he could set aside the information and fairly decide the case. MCR 2. 511(D)( 3) allows for the dismissal of a prospective juror who “ shows a state of mind that will prevent the person from rendering a just verdict, or has formed a positive opinion on the facts of the case or on what the

outcome should be .” Here, neither of the prospective jurors described having sufficient

infor mation about the case to cause them to decide the case in advance, and both stated that they could fairly decide the case.

Defendant also states that the jurors’ community ties and familiarity with the prosecuting parties produced a jury that was not impartial. However, the contacts that three jurors had with the prosecutor and that two had with sources of information do not demonstrate tha t a juror was biased or could not fairly contemplate the evidence. Jurors are “presumed to be impartial until” shown otherwise, and the “burden is on the defendant to establish that a juror was not impartial or that a juror’s impartiality is in reasonable doubt.” People v Miller , 482 Mich 540, 550; 759 NW2d 850 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Walker , 162 Mich App at 63. Here, defendant has not identified any factor that would place the impartiality of a juror in reasonable

doubt.

Furthe r, “a juror ’ s expressed lack of prejudice and ability to render an impartial verdict are all that is required to uphold selection of the juror. ” People v Hughes , 85 Mich App 8, 18 ; 270 NW2d 692 (1978) . Here, the trial court asked each potential juror ide ntified by defendant whether they could judge the evidence fairly and was reassured to the extent that the trial court did not dismiss any of them for cause. “ This Court defers to the trial court ’ s superior ability to

assess from a venireman ’ s demeanor wh ether the person would be impartial. ” People v

Williams , 241 Mich App 519, 522; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). Defendant has not demonstrated that the jury was biased. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Next, defendant argues that there was an error when the trial court was instructing the jury. Jury instructions are reviewed “in their entirety to determine if there is error requiring

reversal.” People v McFall , 224 Mich App 403, 412; 569 NW2d 828 (1997)

. A defendant has the rig ht to “a properly instructed jury.” People v Mills , 450 Mich 61, 80; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). “The trial court is required to instruct the jury with the law applicable to the case and fully and fairly present the case to the jury in an understandable manner. ” Id . There is no error where the instructions “fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights.” McFall , 224 Mich App at 412

- 413.- 8

- Here, the trial court initially instructed the jury to consider four crimes: assault with intent to rob while armed, attempted assault with intent to rob while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and attempted assault with a dangerous weapon. The trial court instructed the jury regarding the elements of assault with a dangerou s weapon, and assault with intent to commit armed robbery. The trial court defined for the jury what constituted an attempt. After it instructed the jury and the jury was discharged to deliberate, the prosecutor noted that the written jury instructions d id not include an instruction that the jury could convict defendant of attempted offenses. Thus, the trial court collect ed the jury’ s written instructions and replace d the p age that

dealt with the option to convict of attempted crimes . T he jury was not told of the mistake. The trial court did not want to call attention to the mistake by informing the jury.

Defendant argues that the jury was not able to consider whether it should convict defendant of an attempted crime because it had incorrect instructions. However, the trial court had verbally instructed the jury that it should consider whether the crimes were merely
attemp ted, and defined “attempt.” Immediately after dismissing the jury to deliberate, the trial

court was informed of the err or, and issued a corrected written instruction by instructing a clerk, less than five minutes after the jury was dismissed, to “collect the instructions and we’ll get them fixed and then they can start their deliberations.” Thus, the jury’s deliberations included the possibility of convicting defendant of attempt crimes.

Defendant cites People v Clark , 453 Mich 572, 5 90

- 591; 556 NW2d 820 (1996)

, which is inapposite. In Clark

, the parties agreed before closing arguments that the prosecutor was required to prove that the defendant “ kn [ew] her actions would cause death .” After the defendant’s closing argument, t he trial court changed the jury instructions to include an instruction that the p rosecutor had to prove that the defendant acted with “ know [ledge] that her actions would result in serious injury

. ” In reversing, t he Supreme Court reasoned that “defense counsel was inadvertently misled by the court and argued the wrong theory to the jury ,” impairing counsel’s ability to represent the defendant and th e defendant’s right to a fair hearing

. Id . a t 589

- 590. Here, the parties had discussed the final jury instructions with the trial court in chambers during a recess, and the parties received a copy of the proposed instructions prior to closing arguments. Defendant’s argument in closing was that he did not attempt a crime, either to rob the gas station, or to assault the complainant, and that he acted only out of desperation for housing. Defendant’s trial counsel specifically argued that he was not guilty of an attempted crime because he was not committing a crime. Then the trial court verbally instructed the jury that they could consider “attempt” crimes, and submitted corrected written instructions to the jury shortly after they were dismissed, includin g the possibility of convicting defendant of “attempt” crimes. Thus, defense counsel ’s argument was n ot compromised by the corrected

written instructions

. Defendant’s right to a fair trial was not i mpaired

. Accordingly, defendant is

not entitled to relief on this issue.

Lastly, defendant argues that he was denied access to legal resources. Defendant failed to preserve this issue and review is therefore for plain error affecting substantial rights

. Cari nes , 460 Mich at 763

. Inmates have a “ constitutional right of access to the courts. ” People v Mack

, 190 Mich App 7, 20 ; 475 NW2d 830 (1991)

. “[P] risoners possess a due process right of reasonable access to the courts that guarantees them ‘ adequate, effe ctive, and meaningful ’ opportunities to present their claims. ” Proctor v White Lake Twp Police Dep ’ t , 248 Mich App 457, 463 ; 639 NW2d 332 (2001) , quoting Bounds v Smith

, 430 US 817, 822 ; 97 S Ct 1491 ; 52 L- 9

- Ed 2d 72 (1977 ). “[I] n the absence of other form s of adequate legal assistance, this right of access to the courts requires providing prisoners with adequate assistance from persons trained in

the law or adequate law libraries to assist prisoners in the filing of legal papers. ” Mack , 190 Mich App at 20 , citing Bounds

, 430 US at 8 28

.

Defendant has not identified any ways in which he was denied access to the courts by a lack of legal resources while incarcerated. He was represented by counsel who prepare d and

present ed legal arguments in his defense. Defendant’s constitutional right to access the courts

was satisfied when the trial court “offe red defendant the assistance of counsel .” Mack , 190 Mich App at 2 4 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “A state is not required under the law to offer

a de fendant law library access once it has fulfilled its constitutional obligation to provide him with competent legal assistance .” Id . (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Affirmed.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro /s/ Stephen L. Borrello /s/ Jane M. Beckering