i 

Study Report 2002-04 

Managing Force XXI Change: 

Insights and Lessons Learned in the Army’s 

First Digital Division

Bruce C. Leibrecht and John C. Johnston 

TRW Inc. 

Barbara A. Black and Kathleen A. Quinkert 

U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

February 2002 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)

March 2002 

2. REPORT TYPE

Final 

3. DATES COVERED (from . . . to)

June 1999 – September 2001 

5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

DASW01-99-D-0013 (DO #4)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Managing Force XXI Change: Insights and Lessons Learned in the

Army’s First Digital Division

5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

0465803D

5c. PROJECT NUMBER

D730

5d. TASK NUMBER

226

6. AUTHOR(S) 

Bruce C. Leibrecht and John C. Johnston (TRW, Inc.); Barbara A. Black

and Kathleen A. Quinkert (U.S. Army Research Institute)

5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

TRW Inc. U.S. Army Research Institute for the 

TRW Systems Behavioral and Social Sciences

One Federal Park Drive Armored Forces Research Unit

Fairfax, VA 22033-4411 2423 Morande Street

 Fort Knox, KY 40121

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

10. MONITOR ACRONYM

ARI

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

ATTN: TAPC-ARI-IK

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Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

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Study Report 2002-04 

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Delivery Order Contracting Officer’s Representative, Barbara A. Black.

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): 

This report is the result of a study that explored techniques for capturing and sharing tacit knowledge gained during Force XXI

transition. The primary goal was to facilitate passing of hard-won information from one leader to the next. The study team

elicited knowledge in structured interviews with senior leaders in the Army’s First Digital Division (FDD). They converted the

knowledge into problem-focused chunks, then derived practical guidelines for facilitating change. The team designed and 

developed a preliminary, computer-based Leader’s Tool to help the target audience define and solve change-management 

problems. They then populated the tool with the project’s knowledge products. The report discusses the team’s lessons learned

for capturing and organizing sharable knowledge and for creating automated tools to support the management of change. It also

illustrates the FDD leaders’ insights and lessons learned regarding the transition process and the impact of Force XXI capabilities. 

Recommendations for leveraging and extending the project’s methodology and the Leader’s Tool technology are offered.

15. SUBJECT TERMS Digitization Force XXI Transition Change Management

First Digital Division 4th Infantry Division Experimental Force Computer-Based Tools

Knowledge Elicitation Knowledge Analysis Advanced Warfighting Experiments

 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 19. LIMITATION OF 20. NUMBER 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

16. REPORT

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Unclassified

ABSTRACT

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(Name and Telephone Number)

Dr. Barbara A. Black

DSN 464-3450

ii 
Study Report 2002-04 

Managing Force XXI Change: 

Insights and Lessons Learned in the Army’s

First Digital Division

Bruce C. Leibrecht and John C. Johnston 

TRW Inc.

Barbara A. Black and Kathleen A. Quinkert 

U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Armored Forces Research Unit 

Barbara A. Black, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

February 2002 

Army Project Number Personnel and Training

2O465803D730 Analysis Activities

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

iii
FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) has long

investigated ways to improve Army training and assessment. The importance of the ongoing

work is highlighted by the Army’s in-progress transformation into a future force fully capable of

responding across a broad spectrum of missions. As units transition to new doctrine, 

organization, and digital equipment, leaders are forced to deal with numerous challenges 

resulting from rapid change. The process spawns critical insights and lessons learned that need

to be passed on from one leader to the next. As part of ARI’s program supporting the future

force, the current effort examined approaches and issues for helping experienced leaders pass 

their hard-won knowledge on to their successors. 

The Fort Knox Armored Forces Research Unit (AFRU) of ARI conducted this study to 

explore methods for capturing and sharing knowledge in the Army’s Force XXI environment. 

The study focused on challenges related to managing change, as encountered by senior leaders in 

the Army’s First Digital Division—the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), or 4ID. This report 

presents the insights and lessons gained from the digital leaders and from study team experts. 

The results will assist Army leaders as they continue to find ways to enhance the Force XXI

transition process. The methodology and findings will help researchers working to push the 

technology for organizational learning and collaborative knowledge exchange. The work was 

supported through a Memorandum for Record between the Chief, ARI AFRU, and the Chief of 

Staff, U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division. The subject of the Memorandum is Commanders’ 

Insights and Assessments Leading and Managing at the Speed of Change in Force XXI: 

Techniques and Tools for Documenting and Sharing Lessons Learned, dated 9 August 1999. 

The results of this study have been briefed to key personnel in the 4ID, and a computerbased Leader’s Tool built around a relational database has been provided for the division’s use. 

 MICHAEL G. RUMSEY 

 Acting Technical Director 

v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Without the support of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), this project would not 

have cleared the launch pad. LTG W. Scott Wallace sparked the study and instrumentally

contributed both knowledge and inspiration. The authors thank MG Ben Griffin, COL Ted 

Kostich, COL Oscar “Randy” Anderson, and COL Robert Cone. They gave generously of their 

time to share their knowledge in interviews, review analytical products, and participate in a user 

trial of the Preliminary Leader’s Tool. In addition, MG Richard Cody participated in an early

interview. 

We thank Mr. Peyton Randolph and Mr. Ron Mast of TRW for their unstinting efforts to 

make the Preliminary Leader’s Tool a reality, and Dr. Beverly Winsch of TRW for her

invaluable contributions to planning, managing, and executing the project. We are grateful to

Ms. Wilma Sanders of TRW for transcribing interviews and editing/producing the Study Report. 

We also thank Mr. Ward Critz, LTG (Ret) Don Holder, LTG (Ret) Robert Coffey, Mr. Randy

Hill, Mr. Darrel Charlton, and Ms. Karen Longoria, all of TRW, and MAJ Kent Cook and MAJ

William Rademacher. 

vi
MANAGING FORCE XXI CHANGE: INSIGHTS AND LESSONS LEARNED IN THE 

ARMY’S FIRST DIGITAL DIVISION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Study Requirement: 

As the Army continues its push to exploit information age technology, rapid and dynamic 

change has become a hallmark of the Force XXI environment. Leading units through complex

transition demands change management skills not taught in Army schools. It also highlights the 

critical need for experienced warfighters to pass on their unique knowledge so their successors 

do not have to relearn critical lessons. The digital leaders of today and tomorrow need tools 

enabling them to harness and build upon the growing body of Force XXI knowledge. To meet 

these needs, the Fort Knox Armored Forces Research Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences embarked on an investigative study. The practical goal

was to facilitate collaborative knowledge exchange and organizational learning to enable future 

leaders to benefit from the hard-won lessons of their predecessors. 

Procedure: 

The study team began by developing categories of change-related problems (Focal

Areas), along with second-level Focal Topics, to organize the capture and analysis of knowledge. 

They then elicited knowledge in structured interviews with senior leaders in the Army’s First 

Digital Division. Next they converted the interview transcripts to Nuggets (discrete chunks of 

knowledge), classified the Nuggets against the Focal Topics, and derived practical guidelines 

(Rules and Principles) for facilitating change. In parallel, the team designed and developed a

preliminary, computer-based Leader’s Tool to help the limited target audience define and solve

change-management problems. They populated the tool with the cumulative Nuggets, Rules, 

and transcripts. A key feature of the Leader’s Tool was the ability for users to add their own 

insights and lessons learned, creating a self-sustaining environment for keeping the knowledge 

base current.

Findings: 

The report discusses the team’s lessons learned for capturing knowledge and organizing it 

in a form convenient for others to use. The report then presents insights regarding the study’s 

methodology for designing, developing, and testing digital tools for collaborative knowledge 

exchange. Recommendations for leveraging and extending the project’s methods, including the 

Leader’s Tool technology, are offered. 

To illustrate the knowledge that can be assembled using the specialized methodology, the 

report documents digital leaders’ insights regarding Force XXI transition. The leaders’ insights 

address the process of managing Force XXI transition as well as the transition’s impact on tactics 

and doctrine. 

vii
Utilization of Findings: 

The findings will assist Army leaders as they continue to find ways to enhance the Force

XXI transition process. They will also help researchers working to advance the technology for 

capturing and sharing transition-driven knowledge, especially as it pertains to managing change. 

viii
MANAGING FORCE XXI CHANGE: INSIGHTS AND LESSONS LEARNED IN THE 

ARMY’S FIRST DIGITAL DIVISION

CONTENTS 

Page

Introduction—The Journey .............................................................................................................1 

Purpose and Scope of the Study ................................................................................................1 

Background ...............................................................................................................................2 

Organization of the Report ........................................................................................................4 

Capturing and Organizing Sharable Knowledge ............................................................................4 

Understanding What Others Need .............................................................................................6 

Eliciting Knowledge ..................................................................................................................7 

Sorting Knowledge ....................................................................................................................9 

Translating Knowledge for Use ...............................................................................................11 

Protecting the Innocent ............................................................................................................13 

Creating Tools for Managing Change............................................................................................14 

Developing the Blueprint.........................................................................................................17 

Understanding the Target Audience ........................................................................................19 

Building the Tool .....................................................................................................................20 

Putting the Tool to Work .........................................................................................................23 

Leaders’ Insights on Force XXI Transition ...................................................................................24 

The Process of Managing Force XXI Transition.....................................................................24 

Force XXI Transition’s Impact on Tactics and Doctrine.........................................................39 

To the Future..................................................................................................................................44 

Issues........................................................................................................................................44 

Value of Sharing Knowledge...................................................................................................46

Recommendations....................................................................................................................46 

Summary of Lessons Learned........................................................................................................48 

References......................................................................................................................................49 

ix
CONTENTS (continued) 

Page

Appendix A. Focal Areas and Topics........................................................................................ A-1 

B. Interview Guides....................................................................................................B-1 

C. Principles of Managing Change in Force XXI ......................................................C-1 

D. Overview of Senior Leader Transition Book ...................................................... D-1 

E. Overview of Preliminary Leader’s Tool................................................................E-1 

F. Sample Nuggets and Rules.....................................................................................F-1 

G. Candidate Enhancements for the Leader’s Tool .................................................. G-1 

H. Suggested Reading ............................................................................................... H-1 

I. Acronyms and Abbreviations...................................................................................I-1 

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1. Summary of Knowledge Elicitation and Analysis Procedures.......................................5 

2. Summary of Preliminary Leader’s Tool Development.................................................15 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1. Diagram of the relationships between Nuggets, Focal Topics, and Principles............10 

2. Large-screen displays in a digital TOC .......................................................................29 

3. Headset use in a digital TOC ...................................................................................... 31 

4. FBCB2 in a combat vehicle. ........................................................................................34 

5. Summary of Lessons Learned......................................................................................48 

x
MANAGING FORCE XXI CHANGE: 

INSIGHTS AND LESSONS LEARNED IN THE ARMY’S FIRST DIGITAL DIVISION 

Introduction—The Journey 

The only real failure is the failure to learn.

Sullivan & Harper, 1996, p. 193

Imagine a tool that would enable Force XXI transition leaders to “pick the brains” of 

pioneers who blazed the trail before them. Imagine, too, a living tool that would grow as Army

leaders add their own insights to the expanding knowledge base. The tool would inform a user 

of approaches that have helped others to solve change-related problems. And it would provide a 

gateway to useful information available via the Internet. In short, the tool would be a one-stop 

source of assistance for leaders who confront the rigors of managing change every day.

The journey to that tool—a Leader’s Tool for managing change—is chronicled in this

report. More importantly, the report distills the insights and lessons learned during the

development phase of the journey. The lessons will help warfighters on the cutting edge of

information warfare as well as researchers advancing tools for managing change. 

Purpose and Scope of the Study 

In the Spring of 1999, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 

Sciences (ARI) launched a study known as “Managing at the Speed of Change in Force XXI”

(MASC-XXI). The study responded to the Commanding General of the Army’s First Digital 

Division (FDD), who was concerned that the “how” of digitization at the operational level was 

not being adequately documented. He described “getting from point A to point C” without a 

clear record of how he got there. A key implication was a concern that leaders in the midst of 

rapid change often were forced to make critical decisions based on an incomplete understanding

of root causes and ramifications. 

Under the leadership of investigators in ARI’s Fort Knox Armored Forces Research Unit 

(AFRU), the MASC-XXI study set a course to help leaders in a Force XXI division pass critical

knowledge on to their successors and to facilitate organizational learning. The ARI team 

established the following technical objectives: 

Develop a scheme to efficiently represent leaders’ concerns about managing change

in their digital units. 

Gather knowledge from selected FDD leaders, focusing on their process for managing

change. 

Develop a transition book as an interim product to assist unit leaders. 

Design and develop an easily accessible Leader’s Tool in preliminary form, using

relational database technology. 

Populate the Leader’s Tool with knowledge organized around problem-focused 

topics. 

1
The ARI team targeted the senior leadership of the FDD—the 4th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), or 4ID, at Fort Hood, Texas—as the primary audience for the Leader’s Tool. 

Accordingly, knowledge gathering centered on the same leaders. The project’s duration allowed 

the team to gather knowledge both early and late in a leader’s tour of duty. The Leader’s Tool 

concept called for a preliminary product with room to enhance and expand the tool, depending

on the needs and desires of the users. 

Background 

A diverse mix of trends and developments shaped the journey to the Leader’s Tool. 

Chief among them were: 

The challenge of exploiting new digital warfighting systems. 

The spiral development environment of Army modernization efforts. 

The increasing importance of change management skills among tactical leaders. 

Research techniques for eliciting and analyzing knowledge from domain experts. 

Relational database technologies for powerful information storage and retrieval. 

The Army faces significant challenges in indoctrinating and training soldiers to exploit 

the full potential of new digital combat systems. Digital command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence (C4I) technologies such as the Army Battle Command System 

(ABCS) offer substantially improved capabilities on the battlefield. Success in battle will hinge

on the full exploitation of complex systems such as the ABCS, which is really a “system of

systems.” The ABCS and similar advancements point to how the battlefields of the 21st Century

will rely increasingly on information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ timely

digital information throughout the battlespace (U.S. Department of the Army, 2000). However, 

the introduction of new systems for digital operations necessitates new doctrine and force 

structure, which in turn will drive new approaches for training and leader development. 

The Army has for several years relied on a “spiral development” process to bring about 

rapid, multi-dimensional modernization advances. This complex process for bringing new 

warfighting concepts and technologies online is well illustrated in the Army’s Transformation 

Campaign Plan (Shinseki, 2000). In simple terms, the 

process involves simultaneous changes in combat systems, 

force structure, combat doctrine, and training strategies—all 

interacting in a progressive spiral (Dierksmeier et al., 1999). 

In tactical units, warfighters must develop new tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as they learn to use new 

equipment. They must also leverage new organizational 

structures and maintain proficiency on legacy systems that 

are not yet phased out. In the meantime, new training products arrive which warfighters must fit 

into their unit training program as they prepare for the next event in the digitization process. As 

the new systems are being updated, altered functionality means the TTPs must evolve to keep 

pace. Hence, the spiral development process imposes a requirement to maintain currency on 

evolving TTPs and systems (e.g., updated hardware and software), and to incorporate training

program and technology improvements into the unit’s training in incremental phases. This vastly

complicates the digital leader’s challenge to implement change and maintain combat readiness. 

If you walk away from this for a

month, it progresses so rapidly 

that you hardly recognize it

when you return.

MG Ben Griffin, 3 May 00

2
Leading units immersed in modernization demands management skills not typically

required of conventional unit leaders. Constantly evolving systems and doctrine require

commanders and staff members to stay technically and tactically current in an extremely

dynamic environment. Managing change is now an important skill for both the commander and 

his staff. Change management has been recognized by corporate America as an important

dimension for some time (e.g., Conner, 1992; Smith, 1996), along with the concept of the 

learning organization (Senge, 1990). Many of the lessons learned from industry apply to and 

may benefit the Army as it transitions to the future force. Sullivan and Harper (1996) provide an 

institutional perspective, suggesting that a key aspect of change management for Army leaders is 

developing the skills associated with learning to anticipate the unexpected. Lessons regarding

the skills needed by commanders and staffs to win the information war come from the Advanced

Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) conducted since 1997. These and other efforts have produced 

leaders and staffs in the 4ID who are now experienced digital warriors. Their lessons learned are 

crucial to the success of transitioning to the future. However, the press of getting ready for the

next major event often overshadows documenting such lessons. 

The digital leaders of today and tomorrow need tools that enable them to harness and 

build upon the growing body of Force XXI lessons learned. A key need is to track the process 

and progress of transitioning to digital operations with new organizational structures. The spiral 

development environment only heightens the need to capture, document, and disseminate 

transition-critical knowledge. The training environment is significantly complicated by the 

complexity of new technologies and the speed at which they are being introduced or modified. 

In the Army’s FDD, commanders and staffs possess unique knowledge about “getting from point 

A to point C” along the Force XXI path. That hard-won knowledge needs to be captured and 

passed on to their successors to avoid relearning the lessons that previous experience has taught. 

Capturing insights and lessons learned from tactical leaders depends on suitable methods 

for gathering knowledge. Much of the knowledge is tacit—gained through practical experience 

and previously undocumented, calling for specialized techniques (Horvath et al., 1994). Recent 

research has generated knowledge elicitation methods (e.g., Klein, 1997; Horvath et al., 1996) 

that could be useful for capturing tacit knowledge about leading and managing change during

Force XXI transition. For analyzing elicited knowledge, techniques such as category grouping

(Horvath et al., 1994) and concept mapping (Novak & Gowan, 1984) have been used. The 

knowledge elicitation and analysis techniques available from the research literature provide a 

foundation for capturing and organizing leaders’ insights and lessons learned. 

Developing a tool to give digital leaders easy, user-friendly access to knowledge hard 

won by their predecessors demands information storage and retrieval technology suitable for

today’s digital environment. The traditional Army “transition book” is an established tool for 

disseminating information to new officers, but it has not taken advantage of information-age 

capabilities. Relational database technology offers powerful capabilities to store knowledge and 

empower users to search for information with flexibility and precision (Hernandez, 1997). One 

of the advantages of database technology is its ability to support self-growth with minimal 

technical support. When coupled with browser technology, a relational database approach can 

provide job-aid assistance to digital leaders in flexible, user-friendly fashion. Commercial-offthe-shelf software is readily available to build browser and database applications in an integrated

3
environment. The concept of a computer-based tool that addresses the unique issues of a digital 

division holds promise for facilitating collaborative knowledge exchange and organizational 

learning in the transition to information warfare.

The MASC-XXI project focused on eliciting, documenting, and sharing the knowledge 

held by the experienced commanders and their staffs. The principal product—the Leader’s 

Tool—harnessed the change-driven insights and lessons learned by commanders and staffs as 

they transitioned to digital operations. 

Organization of the Report 

The remainder of the report, describing the MASC-XXI study’s methods and findings, is 

organized in the following sections: 

Capturing and Organizing Sharable Knowledge narrates the research team’s insights

and conclusions on the process for gathering, organizing, and protecting knowledge 

for others to use. 

Creating Tools for Managing Change details the research team’s lessons regarding

the design, development, and implementation of user-friendly systems to disseminate 

knowledge to leaders managing change in a Force XXI environment. 

Leaders’ Insights on Force XXI Transition illustrates the information resulting from 

the knowledge gathering and organization methods developed during the project. The 

insights and lessons learned address both the process of managing change and the 

impact of Force XXI on tactics and doctrine. 

To the Future outlines considerations for downstream research and development, to 

include technical and management issues, the value of sharing knowledge on Force 

XXI change, and recommendations for future steps. 

Golden Nuggets distills the themes and findings of the study in capsule fashion. 

Capturing and Organizing Sharable Knowledge

The road to the Leader’s Tool began with developing and implementing a methodology

for capturing the hard-won knowledge of 4ID leaders. A problem-focused schema was created 

to structure the capture of change-related knowledge, and it also served to shape the analysis of 

the knowledge. A method was established to organize the knowledge for others to use, cast in a 

problem-solving and action-oriented framework. The resulting methodology provided the 

engine for documenting a unit’s progress while “getting from point A to point C” on the way to 

Force XXI operations. 

The MASC-XXI project focused on tacit knowledge—previously undocumented 

knowledge that is acquired through practical experience (Horvath et al., 1994). To capture Force 

XXI leaders’ insights and lessons learned, the team used a basic knowledge elicitation technique 

in the form of structured interviews. This followed the tacit-knowledge acquisition method 

reported by Horvath et al. To process and organize the knowledge gained in the interviews, the 

team developed and implemented a special knowledge analysis method. The “chunk-classifytranslate” method entailed several steps to create discrete chunks (Nuggets) of knowledge from 

interview transcripts, classify the chunks into problem-focused categories (Focal Areas and Focal 

4
Topics), and then translate them into procedural guidelines (Rules and Principles). Table 1 

outlines the knowledge elicitation and analysis procedures. 

Table 1 

Summary of Knowledge Elicitation and Analysis Procedures 

Phase Activity Steps / Outcomes

Analytical Framework 

Structuring 

Establish basic 

categories of knowledge

Review frameworks from open literature 

Characterize contents of preliminary transcripts

Develop and refine list of Focal Areas

Verify utility of Focal Areas for knowledge sorting

Outcome: Focal Areas (basic categories of knowledge) 

Expansion 

Enhance precision of

basic knowledge

categories

Characterize contents of early transcripts

Develop and refine topics under each Focal Area 

Verify utility of topics for knowledge sorting

Outcome: Focal Topics (sub-categories under Focal Areas)

Knowledge Elicitation* 

Preparation

Develop procedures for 

structured interviews

Determine questions of interest, based on Focal Areas

Develop and refine interview protocol (guide) 

Rehearse procedures with interview team

Outcome: Interview Guide, ready team (facilitator, recorder) 

Execution Conduct one-on-one

interview sessions

Provide read-ahead package to participant 

Discuss questions of interest, per SME (peer) facilitator 

Tape record entire session

Outcome: Interview tapes 

Documentation 

Prepare transcripts of

interviews

Draft verbatim transcript for each interview session

Refine transcript (facilitator and recorder) 

Obtain participant’s review and approval of transcript

Outcome: Participant-approved transcripts 

Knowledge Analysis 

Chunking 

Break transcript contents

into discrete units of

knowledge

Establish criteria for suitable Nuggets

Create Nuggets, add tag lines, edit for clarity and brevity

Reach consensus among analysts, adjust as needed 

Outcome: Nuggets with focal meaning

Classification Classify units of

knowledge

Determine Focal Topics for which Nugget has significance 

Verify goodness and strength of fit

Reach consensus among analysts, adjust as needed 

Outcome: Nuggets organized in classification scheme

Translation Generate and organize 

practical guidelines

Develop Principles from open literature frameworks

Translate a Nugget’s contents into action-oriented Rules

Link each Rule to one Principle (best fit) 

Reach consensus among analysts, adjust as needed 

Outcome: Rules organized in classification scheme

* Three rounds of interviews were conducted: Preliminary (departing leaders), Round 1 (9-10 months into the job),

and Round 2 (20-21 months into the job). 

5
Four terms are critical for understanding the discussion in this section. Because they are 

not standard terms, they are defined below: 

1. A Focal Area is a category of problems or issues related to change. It is part of a 

systematic scheme for organizing knowledge. It is subdivided into several Focal 

Topics. 

2. A Nugget is a chunk (discrete, focused unit) of knowledge expressing a leader’s 

perspective on a problem or issue. It is a piece of an interview transcript

selected/edited to meet criteria for unity, stand-alone character, etc. 

3. A Principle is a generalized truth about leading units during transition. It provides a 

basis for organizing solutions to change management problems. 

4. A Rule is a how-to guideline for handling change-related problems. It is a form of 

practical advice offered for consideration. It is specific to an operational context. 

Appendix A presents the final list of Focal Areas and Topics. Appendix B contains the 

protocols used to conduct the interviews. Appendix C lists the Principles with descriptors. 

Appendix F provides sample Nuggets and Rules to illustrate the knowledge analysis products. 

In the course of the project, the team captured its lessons regarding knowledge elicitation 

and analysis. The remainder of this section discusses the integrated insights and themes, along

with methodological points that may be of value to future teams. The following subsections 

organize the discussion: 

Understanding what others need 

Eliciting knowledge 

Sorting knowledge 

Translating knowledge for use 

Protecting the innocent 

Understanding What Others Need 

The emphasis on tacit knowledge was a cornerstone from the start. The team felt

strongly that 4ID leaders would attach great credibility to knowledge coming from their 

colleagues, especially if it provided new insights. The emphasis on new, undocumented 

knowledge led to the need for data collection techniques suitable for uncovering what leaders 

knew based on their practical experience. 

Because the goal was to gather tacit knowledge in a highly dynamic environment, asking

the target audience to articulate their information needs was of limited value. How would 

leaders know what they don’t know? Instead, the team relied heavily on the change management 

literature to point the way. The resulting estimate of information needs was later subjected to 

target audience confirmation during external testing of the Leader’s Tool. 

Substantial energy went into developing a scheme suitable for organizing knowledge 

related to managing change in a digital division. The team began with a simplistic concept of 

“Focal Areas,” defined as categories of change management problems and challenges. Fourteen 

Focal Areas emerged (Appendix A), based on the topics that arose during early interviews with 

4ID leaders and augmented by themes identified by change management authors (especially

6
Sullivan & Harper, 1996; Smith, 1996; Conner, 1992). Both sources provided essential input, 

with the literature inputs helping to ensure a comprehensive set of categories. Later the team 

decided that subcategories within each Focal Area were needed to provide a finer level of sorting

capability. Under each Focal Area the analysts developed Focal Topics (numbering between 

three and eleven), using again the early interview results. Most Focal Areas had from four to 

seven Focal Topics. This yielded 75 working topics to be used for structuring both knowledge 

elicitation and knowledge analysis (see Appendix A). 

As development of Focal Areas began, the team assembled a set of criteria to guide the

selection of candidate topics. These were driven largely by expectations of the target audience’s 

interests, habits, and preferences. All criteria were approximately equal in weight. 

Sensibility—each Focal Area should be easily recognizable to 4ID leaders.

Face validity—it should be readily apparent that a Focal Area encompasses a family

of change management problems/issues. 

Clarity—a Focal Area should have an unambiguous meaning.

Uniqueness—a given Focal Area should minimally overlap others. 

Critical mass—a Focal Area should be parent to a significant quantity of knowledge. 

Resolution—no Focal Area should be parent to an excessive quantity of knowledge. 

Completeness—the set of Focal Areas should accommodate the full spectrum of 

change management knowledge. 

Multi-domain applicability—the set should accommodate garrison, experimentation, 

training, unit administration, and deployment domains. 

Quantity—the number of Focal Areas should be reasonable (12-16 maximum). 

Consensus—agreement among team members should be unanimous. 

In general, participating 4ID leaders indicated that the interview sessions helped them

document lessons they realized needed to be captured. Because the team structured the 

interviews primarily around project objectives, the immediate benefit to the leaders was largely

coincidental. Future teams might consider involving the target audience in developing the data 

collection instrument(s) so the participants realize greater benefit. 

As transition leaders progress through their tour of duty, their information needs as 

change managers can be expected to evolve. Such evolution would largely reflect growing

experience, but also could reflect changing personal attitudes, expectations of others, external

influences, and shifts (perhaps subtle) in unit culture. The MASC-XXI project did not directly

probe the changing information needs of new versus experienced leaders. Although the team 

acknowledged the role of experience as a design consideration, it was not deemed feasible to 

implement an experience-sensitive Leader’s Tool in this project. It remains an important 

dimension that merits attention in future efforts. 

Eliciting Knowledge

After weighing various knowledge elicitation techniques, including verbal reconstruction 

and problem-solving probes, the team selected a simple structured interview technique. The 

decision resulted from a desire to cover the broadest possible range of topics in a forum familiar

to the target audience. The expectation of as few as two knowledge elicitation sessions with 

7
each participant was a key consideration. The team also reasoned that using a consistent 

technique for all sessions would simplify the knowledge analysis process and come closer to 

standardizing the form of the resulting knowledge destined to populate the Leader’s Tool. 

Past the preliminary interviews, the Focal Areas and Focal Topics established early in the

project guided the development of interview questions. For the first round, the team crafted a 

procedure for the participants to informally prioritize the Focal Areas in terms of the magnitude

of the 4ID transition challenges encountered. They then asked the participants to discuss specific 

challenges and solutions for the higher priority items. Also addressed were the leaders’ thoughts 

on the lower priority items. For the second round, the team prioritized the Focal Areas based on 

the relative density of knowledge already obtained. Additionally, the input received earlier from

Alpha testers helped determine where more knowledge was needed. 

In developing both of the primary interview instruments (see Appendix B), the team

found it challenging to limit the questions to a number that could feasibly be discussed in 1-2 

hours. The purpose and objectives for each knowledge elicitation session were defined to focus 

the query process, and then refined to sharpen the vision. In the end, the team prioritized the 

questions, in case time limits prevented getting through all of them. 

As an adjunct to knowledge elicitation, the team originally planned to observe key events 

by using a “shadowing” technique. In this method, the team’s subject matter experts (SMEs) 

followed leaders as they participated in meetings and training events. However, shadowing

activities were discontinued after only a few sessions due to negligible payoff. The snapshot 

nature of the shadowing technique largely missed the stream-of-history context that threads 

through transition issues and problems. It appears that observing unit events in isolated fashion 

offers marginal value for illuminating change management in a tactical unit, especially without 

follow-up clarification of the observations. In today’s electronic world, email trails might well 

reveal more about how a unit handles change management challenges. 

Initially the team planned to elicit knowledge from the target audience at three successive 

points—early, midway, and late in an individual’s tour of duty. The intent was to follow the 

maturation of transition knowledge. Due to the leaders’ crowded calendars and project resource

constraints, only two points on the tour-of-duty learning curve were sampled. The first occurred 

at the 9-10 month mark and the second took place at 20-21 months of an approximately 24-

month tour. While the resulting data were sufficient for the Leader’s Tool, future efforts should 

consider charting the maturation of knowledge by sampling multiple points in the course of the 

leaders’ tours. Command emphasis would be critical to ensure availability of participants. 

To assure full readiness of the interview team, every member participated in a train-up 

and rehearsal session prior to the start of each round of interviews. This enabled the team to 

pretest the interview protocol, discuss issues and problems, and clarify responsibilities. In the

case of the first round of interviews, the rehearsal led to refinements in the interview guide. 

As a routine step, the team delivered a read-ahead copy of the interview guide to the 

participant a few days in advance of the scheduled interview. To accommodate this, the

interview guide contained a section of instructions for the participant. The read-ahead package,

8
along with the personal interaction that accompanied its delivery, was valuable in setting the

stage for an optimal interview session. 

The desire for quotable leaders’ comments led to an exacting process for preparing

interview transcripts. The process started with transcription from a tape recording, then was 

followed by at least two members of the interview team reviewing the draft transcript. 

Reconstructing unintelligible passages, smoothing awkward wording, translating acronyms, and 

identifying unfamiliar personal names proved to be frequent challenges. The team asked the

interview participant to review the near-final transcript, identify changes needed, then approve

the final document for posting in the Leader’s Tool. The multi-step process was time

consuming, manpower intensive, and dependent on strict quality assurance (QA) standards. 

Sorting Knowledge 

The team emphasized the importance of transforming the interview transcripts into 

Nuggets with rigor and consistency. The analysts established a set of criteria to ensure the 

creation of stand-alone “chunks” of information and to enhance the utility of the Nuggets in the 

hands of the users. The characteristics of the target audience heavily influenced the criteria and 

their application. The criteria for the Nuggets were: 

Substance—containing knowledge of significant value. 

Brevity—short enough to read and digest quickly (one-third page maximum). 

Unity—preferably containing one central theme (two at the most). 

Completeness—capable of painting a complete picture.

Durability—preferably free of elements likely to become dated within a year. 

Independence—understandable without external information. 

Conciseness—free of redundant verbiage. 

The team desired short Nuggets that a user could digest quickly. The knowledge analysts 

targeted an upper limit of one-third page and rarely violated that ceiling. Most Nuggets 

consisted of one to three short paragraphs occupying less than a quarter-page. An occasional 

Nugget extended to a half-page in order to tell a complete story or to keep a laundry list intact. 

Where possible, the analysts edited out redundant verbiage to produce a more compact Nugget. 

Sample Nuggets can be found in Appendix F.

The analytical process produced several types of Nuggets. Anecdotes took the form of 

“We tried this on that occasion.” Imperative “truths” frequently emerged regarding logistics 

management, budgeting, experimentation, personnel stabilization, etc. Often Nuggets reflected 

an intellectual process of integrating and distilling information to form general conclusions. 

Sometimes a leader provided a mini-tutorial in the form of a seriated list of ingredients or steps, 

leading to a procedural nugget. Others offered recommendations for improving tactical 

procedures, unit organization, personnel management, professional development, etc. Yet others 

provided warnings about the dangers of high-risk conditions, usually related to the budget. A 

few Nuggets conveyed individual convictions or biases on topics such as tactics or Army culture. 

The process of creating Nuggets necessarily removed information from its original 

context. To ensure each Nugget possessed true stand-alone quality, the analysts inserted 

9
explanatory verbiage where needed. This included spelling out uncommon acronyms. The

analysts discovered a separate editorial step worked best to accomplish such finishing touches. 

To provide at-a-glance identity for each Nugget, the team developed a “tag line.” This

element was designed to convey the primary theme of the Nugget in abbreviated fashion. The 

analysts chose a declarative noun form (e.g., “Absolute requirement for synchronization”) as the 

most straightforward representation (see additional examples in Appendix F). The typical tag

line ranged from four to seven words in length, only rarely extending to a dozen words or more. 

The tag line served to represent the Nugget when shorthand presentation was in order. 

The classification process called for placing a given Nugget in as many Focal Topics (see

Appendix A) as were reasonably applicable. If a Nugget spoke clearly to some aspect of a Focal 

Topic, the analyst noted the relationship accordingly. To avoid later redundancy during a user’s 

search process, the analysts tried to limit the number of Focal Topics per Nugget to three (see 

Appendix F). If more appeared justified, the analyst considered breaking off part of the Nugget 

to form another Nugget. Typically two or three Focal Topics captured a Nugget’s problemrelated connections. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between Nuggets and Focal Topics. 

Focal

Topic2c

Focal

Topic2b

Focal

Topic2a

Focal

Topic1d

Focal

Topic1c

Focal

Topic1b

Focal Topic1a

A more specific

category of problem

Foca Focal Area2 l Area1

A general category of change management problems

Focal

Topic2c

Focal

Topic2b

Focal

Topic2a

Focal

Topic1d

Focal

Topic1c

Focal

Topic1b

Focal Topic1a

A more specific

category of problem

Foca Focal Area2 l Area1

A general category of change management problems

Principle Pr C inciple Pr B incipleA

A change management or leadership method

for dealing with problems

Principle Pr C inciple Pr B incipleA

A change management or leadership method

for dealing with problems

Nugget

A pertinent piece of information;

an interview extract, an 

observation, or an insight

Nugget

A pertinent piece of information;

an interview extract, an 

observation, or an insight

Rule

RuleRule

Rule

Nuggets are categorized by

Focal Areas and Topics.

Nuggets are related to a Principle

by specific Rules.

A Rule is a how-to guideline 

for dealing with transformation 

problems.

Figure 1. Diagram of the relationships between Nuggets, Focal Topics, and Principles. 

The additional granularity provided by Focal Topics was intended, in part, to make it 

easier for the Leader’s Tool user to manage his search activities. The scheme would enable the

user to find desired information by searching under a Focal Topic, permitting greater precision 

10
and speed than searching under the broader Focal Area. Unfortunately, it increased the workload 

during analysis of transcripts—with 75 Focal Topics versus 14 Focal Areas (see Appendix A). 

The process of creating Nuggets, balancing simplicity of theme against completeness of 

thought, crafting tag lines, and classifying the contents against Focal Topics proved to be very

demanding. To ensure consistency, the team restricted knowledge analysis activities to two 

analysts, with each reviewing the work of the other. Where differences of opinion occurred, the 

two analysts conferred until agreement was reached. 

Translating Knowledge for Use 

Contributing to the professional development of the target audience was an important 

Leader’s Tool objective. Beyond the new insights inherent in the tacit knowledge obtained from 

the leaders, the team felt that practical advice on solving transition problems would be essential. 

The quest for practical advice led to a decision to derive “how to” guidelines from the interviewbased Nuggets. In terms of time and effort, this decision set in motion a mushrooming

component of the knowledge analysis process that grew by leaps and bounds. 

The concept for “how to” guidelines began as a vague notion of “evident heuristics” but 

soon evolved into a literature-based collage of “convictions, principles, and rules.” In the final 

analysis, the team adopted a two-tiered framework with Principles serving as higher-level 

generalizations (or truths) and Rules conveying procedural (try this) or declarative (essential 

ingredients) heuristics. 

The value of the Principles lay in their ability to set a high-level framework for leaders to 

think about solving transition problems. By ordering the domain of approaches and techniques 

for resolving problems, the Principles (see Appendix C) provided a systematic schema for

addressing the division’s change management challenges. Whereas the Focal Areas were

designed to order the identification and understanding of problems, the Principles took on the 

role of ordering solutions to those problems. In the end, the Principles furnished the structure for 

organizing the Rules. 

The team developed the Principles by first examining the high-level constructs found in 

the open literature (especially Sullivan & Harper, 1996; Smith, 1996; Conner, 1992). The 

analysts adapted the basic constructs, merging some and reshaping the wording to fit the Army

transition environment. A special challenge lay in ensuring that each Principle was intuitively

meaningful while maintaining a broad, general scope. The team explored a bottom-up approach 

of building Principles from early Rules, but discarded it when it became clear it would be 

difficult to reach a sufficient level of generality using a manageable number of Principles. 

The team began development of the Principles in accordance with a loose set of criteria. 

As knowledge analysis progressed, clarification and refinement of the criteria occurred hand-inhand with the derivation of Rules, likely reflecting a symbiosis between Principles and Rules. 

The final set of criteria for Principles included: 

Insightful—offering a fresh perspective for facilitating change. 

Recognizable—intuitively meaningful. 

11
Generic—applicable across a variety of transition settings. 

Unique—free of distracting overlap with other Principles. 

Effective—capturing a valuable number of Rules. 

Comprehensive—accommodating the full spectrum of approaches/solutions. 

Manageable—not exceeding 12-16 in number. 

Economical—enabling efficient sorting of Rules. 

Initial efforts to adapt Rules from open literature sources produced unsatisfactory results, 

because the resulting context was too generic. This may have stemmed from the fact that open 

literature Rules were anchored to no particular environment, whereas the Leader’s Tool targeted

the Army tactical environment. As a result, the team decided to generate Rules by translating

Nugget statements into action-oriented guidelines (see Appendix F for sample Rules with their 

associated Nuggets). The knowledge analysts then codified each Rule under a single Principle. 

This procedure was time consuming and it produced a relatively large number of Rules. See

Figure 1 for an illustration of the working relationship between Nuggets, Rules, and Principles. 

As the team developed the Rules, ad hoc criteria evolved. Most of the criteria were

apparent at the start, but a few (e.g., practicality) emerged in the course of knowledge analysis. 

It would be unfair to say that the analysts explicitly applied all the criteria from the beginning. 

In truth, some of them operated implicitly, as unstated guidelines. By the end of knowledge 

analysis, the following set of criteria for Rules was apparent: 

Action—identifying a specific step to take.

Value—offering advice of significant value for a specific challenge. 

Simplicity—focusing on a single approach or consideration. 

Meaning—easy for warfighters to understand and place in context.

Durability—offering suggestions with lasting utility.

Brevity—concisely worded without sacrificing clarity of meaning.

Fidelity—reflecting the scope and context of the parent Nugget. 

Uniqueness—avoiding duplication of or overlap with related Rules. 

Practicality—implementable at the user’s level. 

Conner (1992) cautions that hard and fast rules (rigid laws) can be counterproductive in 

effectively managing change. Given the complex and dynamic nature of change, he argues for 

relying on patterns and principles instead of rules. His patterns describe how people typically

behave as they respond to change. For Conner, principles flow from patterns and hinge on verbs 

such as recognize, know, and understand. He also identifies action-oriented skills, using verbs 

like establish, facilitate, and encourage. In crafting Rules, the MASC-XXI team used verbs such 

as understand, know, realize, consider, expect, monitor, establish, build, use, ensure, and help. 

Semantically it thus appears that the Rules in the Leader’s Tool are closer to what Conner calls 

principles and skills. The team designed the MASC-XXI Rules as guidelines for addressing

transition problems in flexible fashion, not rigid laws. It might be instructive in future efforts to 

explore basing guidelines on change-related patterns as opposed to problems. 

One challenge was to capture all of the significant “advice” inherent in interview 

comments without overwhelming the Leader’s Tool user with a large number of Rules. Most 

Nuggets spawned more than one Rule (see Appendix F). The analysts set no hard limit on the 

12
number of Rules per Nugget, but they tried to observe a general limit of no more than three. A 

typical Nugget generated two or three Rules, but an occasional Nugget yielded up to seven 

Rules. Not surprisingly, more complex Nuggets yielded a greater number of Rules. 

To meet the criterion for uniqueness of Rules, the team first identified those that partially

or largely overlapped. Compiling the cumulative rules in a single file organized by Principles, 

with tags indicating the source of each Rule, facilitated this. Next the analysts merged closely

related/overlapping Rules to produce a common version fitting several Nuggets. This created a

retrofit situation requiring the team to replace original Rules with the merged Rules. This 

imposed a special burden in the case of Rules that had already been entered into the Leader’s 

Tool database. In the future, project managers may want to sequence the knowledge analysis 

and database population steps for economy of execution, taking care to freeze the criteria for 

finalizing Rules as early as possible. 

Analysis of a relatively small number of interviews (seven) led to Rules numbering in the

hundreds. This created a situation where a user looking for “simple” advice could end up 

inundated with Rules, all with some measure of relevance to a specific problem. In future efforts 

it would be valuable for SMEs to integrate and synthesize the cumulative Rules to produce a 

more compact collection. Doing so would require substantial resources and would sacrifice to 

some degree the close fit with original problems. 

Codifying each Rule under a single Principle sometimes boiled down to a judgment call. 

A Rule might appear to fit equally well under two different Principles, depending on the relative 

emphasis chosen. The team adopted conventions to specify the appropriate Principle for certain 

types of Rules. For example, learning environment rules were placed under the Principle Only 

people can make transformation happen. And rules encouraging new leaders to learn from the 

experience of predecessors or others fell under the Principle Soldiers learn by doing. Sometimes 

the lack of any good fit forced a somewhat arbitrary decision, which was deemed preferable to 

creating new Principles for outlying Rules. As a matter of routine, the knowledge analysis 

procedures required the two analysts to agree on the codification of every Rule. 

Protecting the Innocent 

Because the knowledge gathered from the 4ID leaders was intended to be shared in the 

Leader’s Tool, sensitivity issues arose early. The issues revolved around the delicate balance of 

being willing to share information about personal experiences, even mistakes, within the 

organization so that others could learn with the possible repercussions of having one’s mistakes 

made public. Taken out of context, statements could be misused or misinterpreted. Early on the 

leaders themselves were nearly unanimous in dismissing serious concerns about unintended 

consequences. Nevertheless, the team invested substantial effort in avoiding embarrassment to 

individuals and organizations. As the time to start up the Leader’s Tool approached, some of the

leaders began to agree with the team’s concerns. 

During knowledge elicitation and analysis the team took deliberate steps to protect the 

participating leaders. First, the facilitator obtained the interview participant’s verbal consent at

the start of each session. Then the team took great pains to transcribe the session with accuracy

while guarding against wording that might be misinterpreted. The team routinely filtered out 

13
potentially offensive language during the transcription process, without changing the meaning or

the emphasis. Next the transcript was reviewed and edited by the leader himself to ensure that he 

was comfortable with the contents. The process climaxed with the leader’s approval to release 

the transcript. At all points access to the transcript files and printouts was tightly controlled. 

From the start the interview participants were willing to have their personal names 

associated with their transcripts. However, the team debated whether to identify the contributors 

by duty position instead of by name. That would make it somewhat difficult to determine the

exact source of the comments, although the small target audience certainly narrowed the field of 

candidates. Ultimately the team decided on personal attribution, on the grounds that doing so 

would significantly enhance the credibility of the knowledge in the eyes of other warfighters. 

Whether that decision will stand the test of time remains to be seen. 

The emphasis on protecting individuals and organizations from embarrassment contrasted 

with the leaders’ avowed commitment to sharing their knowledge. The leaders were willing to 

stand by their statements in the interest of contributing to the Army’s transition efforts. The

creation of tools that disseminate individual knowledge to a potentially broad audience is 

relatively new to the Army. Fundamental issues regarding the balance between sharing

knowledge and safeguarding its contributors will initially be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 

The following section discusses the last stage of the road to the Leader’s Tool, with 

emphasis on lessons learned. The design and development of the tool was a key step in 

establishing the capability for leaders to pass on their hard-won knowledge to their successors. 

Illuminating the process of “getting from point A to point C” along the Force XXI pathway was 

the overarching goal. 

Creating Tools for Managing Change

The most tangible objective of the project was to create a user-friendly, computer-based 

tool—the Leader’s Tool—capable of helping digitization leaders manage change. By design, the 

automated tool was the key to passing critical knowledge from one generation of leaders to the 

next. In practice, the Leader’s Tool provided a means of sharing the change-driven knowledge 

acquired during the project. The team organized the creation of the tool into three stages: (a)

exploration of basic parameters, (b) design based on users’ needs, and (c) development and 

testing. The exploration took place in the context of producing a Senior Leader Transition Book 

as an interim product. The key to the design stage was a front-end analysis (FEA) conducted to 

determine what users needed in terms of functionality and contents. The development and 

testing stage revolved around internal and external review cycles. The explore-design-developtest-revise method is outlined in Table 2. 

A “design big, implement small” framework guided the design and development 

activities. This meant designing to the full potential of the concept, but developing an

immediately supportable subset of functions and contents during the MASC-XXI project. It

meant building the Leader’s Tool with robust capabilities for expansion and improvement in the 

future. Throughout the project there was a tendency to expand the “implement small” 

boundaries. 

14
Table 2 

Summary of Preliminary Leader’s Tool Development 

Phase Activity Steps / Outcomes

Interim Change Management Tool (Transition Book)

Exploration*

Develop interim tool

around traditional 

Army concept 

Select delivery medium (CD ROM) 

Outline and develop HTML** pages and contents

Conduct internal and customer review, then revise

Outcome: Senior Leader Transition Book (computer-based)

Try-out 

Conduct informal trial 

with actual and 

surrogate users 

Conduct try-out with senior leaders (4ID and others)

Compile participants’ comments and suggestions

Document issues for design of Preliminary Leader’s Tool 

Outcome: Input for Preliminary Leader’s Tool FEA

Design of Preliminary Leader’s Tool

Requirements 

Perform FEA of user

functional needs 

Gather data on user needs and operating environment

Identify required functions and contents

Prepare description of primary and transparent functions

Outcome: User Functional Description document 

Approach Establish technical 

approach

Define operating and development environments

Specify tools for database and interface development 

Prepare user interface guidelines (approaches, features) 

Prepare integrated description of technical approach

Outcome: Technical Approach document

Design Develop technical 

design of database

Develop database architecture (tables, relationships) 

Outline pre-defined queries (search functions)

Document technical design parameters

Outcome: Logical Design document

Development and Testing of Preliminary Leader’s Tool

Development Establish database 

and user interface 

Implement database in Microsoft Access 2000®

Develop user interface using Microsoft FrontPage 2000®

Perform internal QA review, followed by revision

Outcome: Draft Preliminary Leader’s Tool (unpopulated) 

Population 

Populate data tables 

with knowledge

analysis products

Load Focal Areas/Topics and Principles

Format knowledge analysis products for database entry

Load Nuggets and Rules (copy/paste), enter relationships

Load intact transcripts and directory pointers 

Conduct internal QA review, followed by revision

Outcome: Draft Preliminary Leader’s Tool (populated) 

Testing &

Revision 

Conduct internal and

external testing

Conduct informal customer review, then revise

Conduct formal trial using contractor SMEs, then revise 

Conduct user trial (demonstration), then finalize 

Prepare user and system administrator documentation

Outcome: Preliminary Leader’s Tool 

* No design phase was programmed for the Transition Book, given the availability of the traditional Army model. 

** HTML = Hyper-Text Markup Language

15
Four concepts are critical for understanding the discussion in this section: 

1. The target audience for the MASC-XXI products consisted of a small set of senior 

leaders in the 4ID—Commanding General (CG), Chief of Staff (CofS), and maneuver 

brigade commanders. The narrow composition required no assumptions about 

applicability of the contents (given the source of the MASC-XXI knowledge base) 

and it permitted the team to work through security issues with minimal risk. 

2. The Senior Leader Transition Book was a computer-based reference tool modeled 

after the traditional Army transition practice. It mainly contained a small set of FDD 

leaders’ interviews broken into Nuggets, classified by Focal Areas, and viewed in

Web browser fashion (see Appendix D). It served as a stepping-stone to the Leader’s 

Tool. 

3. The Leader’s Tool was a Web-server software package (see Appendix E) intended as 

a professional development venue, a personal coach, and a knowledge capture tool. 

Designed for easy use and near-zero overhead, it combined a Web browser interface

with a relational database to provide quick access to Nuggets, Rules, and Principles. 

It enabled users to add contents (self-growth) within limits. The Leader’s Tool was 

considered preliminary because of the constraints of the exploratory project.

4. A relational database is a computer-based system for storing and retrieving various 

types of data. It represents state-of-the-art technology that offers excellent flexibility

in searching for data. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) relational database software

packages are readily available. 

The Leader’s Tool was designed mainly to enable 4ID leaders to tap their unit’s previous 

experience with digitization and pass their knowledge on to their successors. The preliminary

version developed in the MASC-XXI project helped leaders to (a) search for useful insights and 

advice from their predecessors, (b) connect with Force XXI-related Web sites, and (c) document 

their own transition knowledge for use by their successors. The tool’s primary functions are 

listed in Appendix E. A user could employ the Leader’s Tool as a problem-solving coach for 

Force XXI challenges. For example, a new brigade commander could start by familiarizing

himself with previously encountered training problems, searching for Nuggets under the Focal 

Area Training. He could next pursue a specific question, such as “How can we get the greatest 

training value out of our scheduled system test?” To that question he could seek an answer by

searching for Nuggets under the Focal Topic Mixing training and testing, extending his search to 

view Rules (action-oriented guidelines) linked to the Nuggets. He could also review all the 

Rules linked to the Principle Soldiers learn by doing, to get a broader picture of training

practices in the Force XXI environment. As he develops his own observations and insights about 

digital training, he could add them to the database so they would be available to others. 

As an exploratory effort, the work on the Leader’s Tool yielded lessons regarding the 

design, development, and testing of tools for sharing practical knowledge. The remainder of this 

section discusses the lessons learned, including methodological points that may be of value to 

future teams. The reader will find the following subsections: 

Developing the blueprint

Understanding the target audience 

Building the tool 

Putting the tool to work

16
Developing the Blueprint

The “design big, implement small” concept enabled the team to think beyond the 

resource limits of the MASC-XXI project and envision a futuristic Leader’s Tool. In reality this 

led to a two-stage design process—far-term and near-term. The “design big” credo placed a 

large premium on design options for expanding the tool at a later time. The “implement small”

maxim required the team to make early judgments about potential value and affordability in the 

context of the MASC-XXI project. 

Before design of the Leader’s Tool began the team, including customer representatives, 

made early decisions regarding target audience, purpose, and scope of contents. The initial 

definition of the target audience eventually changed to reflect the priorities of the 4ID CG; 

fortunately, the change had no serious impact on the tool’s design. The purpose—to assist, 

advise, and document—remained stable throughout the project. The scope of contents—digital 

leaders’ insights and practical guidelines—also remained stable, although the concept of

practical guidelines grew substantially as knowledge analysis proceeded. Stable foundation 

decisions provide the backbone for the development of change management tools. 

At the start, the team agreed on a relational database approach as the core for the 

Leader’s Tool application system. The decision was based largely on a desire to enable the user 

to locate critical information much faster than by reading documents. A relational database

approach supported systematic searching for information, with the interface serving as the 

“search agent” responding to the user’s input. The relational database would also facilitate the 

tool’s self-growth by making it easy for users to add new contents. However, the decision was 

made prior to systematic analysis of functional requirements and alternative approaches (e.g., 

document management system searchable by hypertext means). The resource environment

precluded testing of alternative approaches, and verification of the suitability of the relational 

database approach remained beyond the team’s grasp. Future efforts should seriously consider 

formal analysis of feasible technical approaches following establishment of functional 

requirements. 

The customer’s designation of a widely used COTS suite (Microsoft Office 2000®) for 

developing and implementing the Leader’s Tool conferred the advantage of ready availability in 

Army circles. Based on prerelease claims from the software manufacturer, the team planned to 

use the suite’s native features, especially the Data Access Pages (DAPs) supported by Microsoft 

Access 2000®, as the primary programming tool for Web-based access. As it turned out, the

software imposed some serious restrictions on supportable capabilities for conducting searches 

and entering data (discussed later). That led the team to expand the programming environment 

in order to achieve the desired functionality. Future teams should consider contingencies in 

weighing the pros and cons of alternative software suites during the bid development process. 

The target operating environment evolved during the course of the project. The initial 

concept of a stand-alone system residing on a user’s personal computer gave way to a serverbased approach. The latter approach eventually developed into the final Web interface providing

network client access, with serious implications for the level of effort during development. An 

early notion for a mobile (stand-alone) version of the tool was discarded because of security

17
concerns and the difficulty of standardizing the contents of the database. A more definitive

analysis of functional requirements and the target operating environment during the FEA might 

have avoided the “moving train” phenomenon. 

The team achieved only limited success in estimating the resource impact of evolving

design parameters, especially changes in the programming and operating environments. 

Consideration of risk management as part of the deliberate planning process becomes especially

important in the research and development environment. Future teams should expect to analyze 

risk factors, contingencies, alternative approaches, ramifications, and flexibility. They should 

also plan to update the risk analysis when needed, and reevaluate the technical and resource

implications. 

In the MASC-XXI study environment, characterized by exploration and innovation, one 

of the challenges was to design the Leader’s Tool with no legacy system or existing product as a 

point of departure. The most difficult component to design was the user interface. Beyond a 

start-up decision to use a common browser (Microsoft Internet Explorer®) as the framework, the 

vision of the interface was nebulous. The team established the following interface guidelines: 

Full compatibility with the target audience’s office computer environment 

Consistent look and feel (formatting, iconology, terminology, and labeling) 

Display features (font, color, etc.) consistent with user’s software experience

User-friendly organization and functionality

No requirements for special input and output devices 

User-controlled pathway and pace, with predominance of on-demand menus 

Situational awareness features to avoid getting “lost”

Data entry features that encourage user additions to the database 

Reliance on basic computer features for email, file exchange, printing, etc. 

Flexibility to accommodate user preferences and differences

Minimal time required for user orientation and spin-up 

Capability for user operation without written instructions or technical assistance 

The User Functional Description (UFD) was prepared from an operator’s perspective, 

with no delineation of the interface linkage to the database contents. A limited usage scenario 

was constructed as an adjunct to the UFD, but it incompletely portrayed data requirements and 

criteria for satisfactory query responses. A more operational framework for specifying

functional requirements, with complete threading of user “challenges,” would be worth 

considering in future efforts. 

The Leader’s Tool design combined resident information unique to the database with 

hyperlink access to pertinent World Wide Web information, effectively making the tool a 

networked collection of resources. This approach capitalized on a diverse array of existing

information and extended the tool’s reach. However, it made the tool subject to content and 

availability changes beyond the control of the developers or users. A design option would be to 

incorporate information from external sources, with necessary approvals, so it becomes resident 

information. Such an option should be carefully analyzed for impact on system maintenance 

requirements. 

18
Search options were limited to a set of predefined queries, to accommodate the limited 

scope of the tool. Simple versus detailed options were included. There was a certain amount of 

redundancy among the various options, with alternative paths for reaching the same information. 

The user trial participants exhibited different preferences for search techniques (e.g., problemdriven hierarchical approach vs. Focal Area browsing), reinforcing the provision of flexible 

search methods. 

An important design goal called for a user-sustained system. Accordingly, the team

designed the Leader’s Tool to minimize requirements for administrative support and system 

maintenance. Still, a few important functions were assigned to a system administrator—system 

installation, user registration, adding new Focal Areas and Principles, and at-large editing of 

contents. This rendered use of the tool dependent on the unit’s willingness to commit qualified 

personnel to part-time support roles. 

The team’s initial notion of user documentation in printed form eventually evolved into a

digital approach, in recognition of the target audience’s digital operating environment. Both user 

and system administrator documentation was prepared in read-me file form, suitable for 

distributing electronically and printable if desired. In today’s advanced technology environment, 

system documentation should be digital. Any apparent need for paper documentation should be 

scrutinized closely.

Understanding the Target Audience 

Designating the members of the target audience proved to be more complicated than 

expected. The team began with the three most senior leaders in the 4ID—CG, Assistant Division 

Commander – Maneuver (ADC-M), and Assistant Division Commander – Support (ADC-S). 

Subsequent input from the new CG led to replacing the two ADCs with the division’s Chief of 

Staff and the 2nd Brigade Commander (because of the brigade’s pivotal role in the Division 

Capstone Exercise, or DCX). Shortly thereafter the team added the 1st Brigade Commander, 

bringing the target users to four. The target audience membership defined not only intended user

status, but also knowledge elicitation participation. If knowledge elicitation resources had not 

been at stake, the approach to defining the target audience might have been more expansive. The 

team’s experience during knowledge analysis suggested that insights gathered from one position 

could apply to other positions, but there was no opportunity to verify that empirically. It would 

be worthwhile to investigate the applicability or generality of elicited knowledge. 

Involving the target audience in the design of the Leader’s Tool proved very difficult, 

because of time and scheduling constraints on the part of the users. The team developed an FEA 

survey which included potential contents (e.g., leader interviews, information papers, audio and 

video materials, references) for the leader to rate. However, only one member of the target 

audience was available to complete the survey. In the end, the team relied mainly on Transition 

Book feedback obtained from senior leaders and on the judgment of surrogate users (SMEs on 

the study team). Future teams should include SMEs who can serve as user surrogates, and their 

input should be weighted heavily.

19
Early in the project, the team became aware that unit personnel outside the primary target 

audience might become users of the Leader’s Tool. This realization acknowledged the potential 

for the target audience to expand beyond the design boundaries, as users might recommend the 

tool to their colleagues and subordinates. It set the stage for a concern that different positions 

and echelons require different knowledge. From a design perspective, the team reserved 

expansion of the target audience to the “design big” realm (i.e., future work). From a practical

perspective, the team reasoned that no great harm would come from unplanned users gaining

access to the tool, so long as all were aware of sensitivity issues. 

The prospect of providing the Leader’s Tool to other units engaged in transition arose 

from time to time. Candidates included the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) and the Interim Brigade 

Combat Team (IBCT). The MASC-XXI investigators became convinced that secondary target 

audiences would most likely have different information needs, user preferences, and operating

environments. Such differences would result in large part from each unit being at a unique point 

or stage along the transition path. Accommodating such challenges was beyond the scope of the 

MASC-XXI project. As Army transition efforts proceed, future development teams can expect 

to deal with issues of divergent target audiences. 

The division’s office computing environment obviously influenced the target audience

needs, especially in terms of the system operating environment and the user interface. 

Information on the expected automation and networking environment was obtained from the 

office of the installation’s Directorate of Information Management (DOIM). Through no fault of 

DOIM personnel, some of the projected capabilities did not materialize fully (e.g., user display

capabilities, availability of web servers, and server operating systems). Future teams should be 

prepared to build sufficient flexibility into the system design and the implementation plans to 

accommodate unforeseen contingencies. 

Security considerations are important to protect the target audience and their units from

unintended consequences. Candid information and opinions could be misinterpreted or

misrepresented if taken out of context. Security provisions should consider the complete target 

audience, including unintended users. It can be hard for prospective users to articulate their 

security desires in early, abstract stages. As a result, a conservative security approach is

generally desirable as a starting position. Security concerns can become a limiting factor in 

defining the target audience (i.e., restricted access). 

Building the Tool 

The team began with a paper-based concept of the Senior Leader Transition Book, in 

keeping with Army practice. However, the delivery medium evolved relatively quickly into a 

computer-based mode. The key consideration was the digital environment of the 4ID. The end 

product for the Transition Book (Appendix D) was a compact disc (CD) containing HTML pages 

viewable with the user’s browser software. In the information age environment of today, the role 

of printed products meant to serve as job aids should be analyzed carefully.

As originally envisioned, Web-based access to the Leader’s Tool database was to rely on 

DAPs, a native feature of Microsoft Access 2000®. In practice, the DAPs proved inadequate. 

20
Contrary to prerelease claims from the software manufacturer, DAPs could not support selecting

query variables from drop-down lists, they could not support more than one query variable at a 

time, and they could not support data entry, a key feature of the Leader’s Tool. The shift from 

DAPs to Active Server Pages (ASPs) required Structured Query Language (SQL) scripting,

which consumed much more effort than had been estimated for DAPs. Further, initial decisions 

about project staffing did not call for ASP expertise, which led to an unexpected learning curve 

for the programmers supporting development. The likely need for future teams to weigh the pros 

and cons of alternative software suites was noted earlier. 

In developing the Leader’s Tool interface to meet the requirements specified in the UFD, 

conflicting expectations arose between customer representatives and the team’s SMEs and 

programmers. Differences in definitions, global concepts, individual preferences, etc. became 

apparent. The team attempted to use storyboards to explore a suitable theme—a division 

Tactical Operations Center (TOC)—for the interface, with limited success. Flowcharts and 

outlines may have been more appropriate for visualizing the database-driven tool, rather than

storyboards best suited for linear or branching computer-based products (e.g., courseware). In

future efforts, suitable interface visualization aids should be specified early in the design phase. 

After exploring two themes (a division TOC and a library-like knowledge center), the 

team settled on a “flat” Web-site approach similar to the interface layout and color scheme of

common ABCS systems. Two primary considerations led to that decision: the team’s SMEs felt 

that the familiar layout would appeal to the users, and a review of acclaimed Web sites revealed 

a strong preference for simple menus and site maps instead of theme-based frameworks. 

Developing a sophisticated, colorful, and animated user interface is much more labor-intensive 

and time-consuming than developing the underlying database. However, without an attractive 

interface even the best functions may go unused. When resources are limited, as in the MASCXXI project, an early decision should be made on how to balance the development effort 

between function and interface. Both function and interface should receive detailed attention 

during the FEA, particularly when no legacy or “model” system exists. 

The initial version of the Leader’s Tool included a text search feature as a way of

narrowing a user’s search for desired information. However, the text search feature was 

eliminated because of negative feedback from Alpha testers and actual users. The problem 

centered on the literal match required to “find” desired information. Exact matches occurred 

infrequently, leading to “No records found” in most cases. This proved frustrating to the user. 

Without an intelligent search capability, text searches in systems such as the Leader’s Tool 

appear to be impractical. 

When developing a knowledge-focused database lacking inherent structure, there is a 

strong interdependence between database development and knowledge analysis. In practice, 

search capabilities were limited by constraints in the knowledge analysis method. For example, 

by design the set of Focal Areas and Focal Topics defined (and limited) the primary dimensions 

for structuring searches for Nuggets. In a different vein, alphabetic sorting of Nuggets and Rules 

in search returns was necessary because judging Nugget or Rule “value” was not programmed. 

Expansion of search capabilities would have required a dramatic increase in knowledge analysis 

effort. 

21
Development of the Leader’s Tool required the team to resolve several security issues 

that arose along the way. Chief among these issues were attribution of Nuggets and transcripts 

(by name or position), cautionary measures, and the potential to copy contents for outside 

(uncontrolled) dissemination. After considerable debate, the team decided to attribute Nuggets 

and interview transcripts by personal name in order to maximize their credibility in the eyes of

the users. For cautionary measures, the team chose to place explanatory statements about 

unintended consequences in the tool’s Orientation and the user documentation. Beyond the 

cautionary statements, no steps were taken to limit copying of contents. 

Using the tool’s native data entry and editing features to populate the database bypassed 

the need to create special data entry capabilities for the developers. However, the manual, multistep population process placed considerable demands on the person entering knowledge analysis 

products into the database. The process was susceptible to human error, and the mechanism for 

verifying entries by using the resident search function was laborious. An automated process for

entering the knowledge analysts’ products directly into the database would be a major advantage 

where the volume of materials to be entered is large. Future teams might conduct a cost/benefit 

analysis to determine if developing an automated population process would be worth the 

investment of time and resources. 

Internal QA was a continuous, hand-in-glove component of the development process. 

The team membership included SMEs (surrogate users) and behavioral scientists who could 

participate routinely in internal QA. The presence of SMEs capable of serving as surrogate users 

would be very beneficial in future development efforts, as would human factors experts capable 

of evaluating interface and functionality characteristics. 

The conventional software testing model (Alpha and Beta testing) may not be appropriate 

for a research-oriented project with a small target audience. A formative evaluation approach 

(internal review, internal trial, user trial/jury) was used with reasonable success for the Leader’s

Tool, and should be considered for similar projects in the future (see, e.g., Tessmer, 1993). 

The principal programmer maintained the in-progress Leader’s Tool on a Local Area

Network (LAN) accessible via a corporate Intranet, with password-protected access for members 

of the team. This led to the need to establish a dial-in capability to enable customer

representatives to review the tool. A corporate Web site accessible to customer representatives 

would have been helpful, with acceptable security provisions. Password-protected Web space 

outside the corporate firewall may be worth considering in the future. 

User testing of the Leader’s Tool occurred in the actual implementation environment, an

imperative from the team’s perspective. This not only exercised the ultimate operating

environment, it also reduced the burden on the user-participants. In some cases the convenient 

access made the difference between a user being able to participate or not. 

In the SME try-out of the Senior Leader Transition Book and the internal SME trial of the 

Leader’s Tool, evaluation of interface and contents was structured in the same session(s). The 

participants showed a strong tendency to focus on interface features (look and feel) at the 

22
expense of contents. It may be desirable in the future to organize trials in two phases addressing

interface and contents separately. 

Putting the Tool to Work

The handover of the system to the target audience should include steps to (a) secure 

command emphasis, (b) resolve implementation issues (e.g., security), (c) provide follow-up 

technical support, (d) ensure resident system administration support, and (e) institutionalize the 

tool’s role in the unit. A transition plan should be developed in advance of handover and 

coordinated closely with the unit. 

Establishing ownership among the target audience is a key step to promote use of a tool. 

In the MASC-XXI project the team briefed the unit leaders at the outset, then provided update 

information as the project unfolded. Creating the Leader’s Tool contents from target audience

interviews and involving the users in external evaluation helped foster a sense of ownership. The 

team also worked to enlist the support of key personnel (e.g., the division’s Information 

Management Officer) as proponents for the tool. 

Maintaining the currency of the contents will be a major factor in determining the success 

of the Leader’s Tool. The database depends on users to update and expand the contents. The 

team counted on the premise that an easy-to-use system and a leader’s sense of dedication would 

be sufficient to keep the database growing. However, that premise was not tested or verified. In

self-growth tools, understanding and then verifying the user’s motivational framework is crucial. 

As with C4I systems the users must be convinced quickly that the tools bring value-added to 

their jobs. Future efforts might consider embedding change management (lessons learned) tools 

in the digital systems that the users employ routinely.

One member of the target audience noted the need for an evaluation to determine the 

benefits realized by using the Leader’s Tool. Such an evaluation was beyond the scope of the 

MASC-XXI project due to resource constraints. Future project managers would be wise to 

program post-implementation evaluation as a means for ensuring success of the new system. 

Such an evaluation should focus, in part, on how well the self-growth features (user additions) 

are working.

Promoting continued use of the Leader’s Tool as new leaders take the reins is expected to 

be a challenge. Means should be pursued to institutionalize the tool as an ingrained, routine 

asset. This would make the tool a programmed, integral part of the new leaders’ transition 

process. 

Hyperlinks to Web sites will become non-functional as time passes. Provisions for 

updating, replacing, and deleting the links should be created to ensure currency. This should be 

one of the system maintenance functions, with implications for the qualifications of system

administrators (i.e., knowledge of Web page editing). 

The “design big” maxim of the MASC-XXI project created provisions for expanding and 

enhancing the Leader’s Tool. The conditions for realizing the full potential of the tool can be

23
substantially improved by progressively upgrading its scope and functional capabilities. Ideas 

that emerged during the course of the project for enhancing the tool appear in Appendix G. 

The methodology discussed in the two preceding sections resulted in the preliminary

Leader’s Tool populated with the products of the MASC-XXI knowledge elicitation and analysis 

methods. The initial database contained insights from 4ID leaders regarding transitioning to 

Force XXI operations. The following section illustrates the type of knowledge produced by the 

methodology developed and implemented in the project. 

Leaders’ Insights on Force XXI Transition

The study team interviewed senior leaders who held four key positions in the 4ID during

the project: CG, CofS, 1st Brigade Commander, and 2nd Brigade Commander. All of them were

interviewed 9-10 months into their jobs, and all except the CG were interviewed again at 20-21 

months. In addition, the team interviewed two departing leaders at the start of the project—CG 

and ADC-M, who had been in their jobs for two years and one year, respectively.

The interviews produced a total of nine transcripts. Through knowledge analysis, each 

transcript yielded Nuggets representing a mix of anecdotes, insights, tutorials, convictions, 

cautions, and recommendations. The team’s analysts integrated and synthesized the Nuggets to 

derive generalizations offering value in the broad context of Force XXI transition. When 

appropriate, they injected their own knowledge to amplify a basic theme or crystallize the 

implications of leaders’ comments. The results of this analytical step clearly reflected the

Leader’s Tool contents, but in a distilled form with implications added. 

Force XXI transition has produced significant insights and lessons regarding the process 

and impact of change. The results illustrate the value of capturing leaders’ hard-won knowledge 

so it can be shared with others. This section presents the noteworthy insights and lessons, 

organized according to Focal Areas (with minor modifications). Actual quotes of participating

leaders are included in text boxes. The first subsection groups Focal Areas dealing with the 

management of Force XXI transition, while the second subsection deals with the Force XXI

program’s warfighting impact as captured under the Tactics and Doctrine Focal Area. 

The Process of Managing Force XXI Transition

Command Climate—Setting the Unit Tone 

The greatest challenge ... any unit coming to digitization faces 

is not the TTPs, but the culture change that must take place.

COL Bob Cone, 15 May 00

Transition leaders must reshape the unit’s warfighting culture. Old ways—of seeing

things, thinking about things, doing things—must yield to new. Bringing about cultural change

in leaders and soldiers is probably the greatest challenge. It’s not likely to get easier for future

24
units, but creating a learning organization where discovery and new ideas are prized is an 

important first step. 

Accepting the reality that digital performance standards do not exist is one of the hardest

cultural adjustments early in digitization. At the outset, leaders can only estimate what “digital 

right” looks like. Digital tasks, conditions, and standards are under construction. To a 

warfighter who is used to standards, this can be a radical change. 

A key to a learning organization is the 

acceptance of risk as a positive factor. Soldiers

and leaders who know the commander expects 

mistakes are more likely to find creative solutions 

that make digitization work. Mistakes can play an

important role in learning, feeding the unit’s 

lessons learned. A risk-tolerant climate also encourages people to think differently. When no 

one really knows what “right” looks like, there is no wrong answer. 

When you tell people that they are 

supposed to learn, you take away the 

zero defect mentality.

BG(P) Richard Cody, 21 Jun 99

A unit has finite energy, so accomplishing the transition’s extra activities forces leaders 

and soldiers to achieve efficiencies. That means thinking differently, working smarter, and 

setting priorities. It means thinking through every aspect of change—doctrine, training, 

leadership, organization, materiel, soldiers, budget, etc. Successful transition leadership 

demands true systems thinking. 

A transitional leader can get more out of the unit by stretching the organization vertically

and horizontally. Vertical stretching means pushing responsibilities down to the lowest feasible 

echelon. Horizontal stretching means having like units (e.g., a company’s four platoons) doing

different things simultaneously. Empowering and motivating subordinates is a key in both. 

Command Climate—Motivating Leaders and Soldiers 

Leading change from within encourages initiative and builds momentum quickly. This 

involves leaders sharing their vision of where the unit 

is going. It involves mentoring key people, putting

them in the right places, and empowering them. It

involves motivating soldiers and leaders by showing

them how digitization is helping them do their jobs

and how it improves combat effectiveness. 

You have to communicate what the

end state is and what you want [it] 

to look like.

COL Bob Cone, 15 May 00

Empowerment takes on a special meaning in the transitional environment. Soldiers and 

leaders at all echelons become agents of change, helping to discover new ways of doing things. 

Empowerment challenges the digital warfighter to embrace change, think differently, and create 

solutions—all in an environment with much greater uncertainty than is normally encountered. 

Involving soldiers and leaders at all levels is a great transition catalyst. Letting people 

know that their input is valued and their feedback is being used leverages the talents residing

within the division. With empowerment comes a personal sense of ownership and responsibility. 

25
An ADC-M provided a good example of streamlining the division’s TOC, where gathering

inputs from all staff officers and soldiers led, through several iterations, to a dramatically smaller 

command post. Everyone played a part. 

Soldiers judge things against their expectations, and good leaders manage their soldiers’ 

expectations. Letting soldiers know that early versions of new systems are forerunners of bigger 

and better things reduces frustration. Staying focused on the ultimate destination and where the 

unit is on the roadmap keeps things in perspective.

Discipline plays a big part in successful digitization. Turning a digital system on must 

occur before it can be used. But discipline is by no means enough. Soldiers must want to use 

their digital systems because they believe it makes a difference. A conviction that digital 

systems enhance the warfighting process is a powerful motivator. 

Forcing functions are important for focusing the transition. Any major event—National 

Training Center (NTC) rotation, test, or experiment—can and should serve as a forcing function. 

Such events give the entire unit anchor points 

for concentrating the organization’s energies. 

They motivate soldiers and leaders to make the

critical pieces come together. They discipline 

external organizations to deliver their inputs 

on time. 

The whole organization must have some

main effort upon which [to] focus.

MG Scott Wallace, 22 Jun 99

In motivating his leaders and soldiers to embrace digitization, one brigade commander 

found himself concentrating his energies on his combat and combat support elements. Because

of time and energy constraints, the combat service support (CSS) elements received less 

attention. This may become a common pattern in tactical units. Getting CSS company

commanders excited about digitization remains a challenge.

The distinction between testing and implementing can be significant for soldiers’

expectations. Testing implies the Army has yet to make a commitment. On the other hand, 

telling soldiers that the Army has 

invested a lot of money in new 

systems and the soldiers’ job is to 

make them work can be very

motivating.

I can’t afford to have $7 million tanks fail because

people refuse to use the commander’s independent

viewer.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

Command Climate—Setting and Protecting Unit Priorities 

Because transition involves multiple agencies, the division must consider the needs of 

system developers, experimentation proponents, and others. A key to protecting the unit’s 

interests is establishing axes, both main and supporting, and using them to shape the playing

field. The relative priorities of the axes may change, but the synchronization process remains the 

same. Synchronization and flexibility become more important with multiple axes. Balancing

unit priorities with those of others may necessitate compromises, but the main axis provides the

fulcrum.

26
The 4ID shepherded four major axes—readiness, modernization, reorganization, and 

experimentation—during the unit’s transition. The leaders steadfastly maintained readiness as 

the main axis, sometimes contending with pressures to downplay training and deployment in the

face of high-priority fielding, turn-in, testing, and other requirements. To maintain the unit’s 

warfighting skills, they forged creative approaches to integrate training and readiness into every

transition event. Readiness-driven training contributed to the success of transition. 

Setting “trained and ready” as the enduring priority for the unit can positively impact the

modernization process. It counters the “make or break” atmosphere that can surround tests and 

experiments, replacing it with a practical learning environment. It helps motivate soldiers to 

make new systems and concepts work toward combat effectiveness, regardless of immediate

expectations or biases. It emphasizes the constructive aspects of after action reviews (AARs) 

and lessons learned, enhancing the feedback process. Knowing there is no right or wrong answer 

fosters objective, high-value results. 

A unit frequently responds to the stress of high workload by skipping organizational 

management functions. Soldiers and leaders may be working so hard at getting the basic work

done that accountability and assessment activities go untended. For example, after the 

reorganization downsized the brigade’s CSS structure, nobody was checking the maintenance

work or the record keeping. Neglecting such functions can turn into a major problem. 

Command Climate—Working with Others 

The transition process vastly expands the cast of players with whom the division is 

expected to do business. Senior Army leaders, project and product managers, U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) system managers, doctrinal proponents, force 

developers, training proponents, test and evaluation agencies, consultants, and contractors of

every hue will frequent the division’s stage. Traditional lines of authority often vanish. 

Knowing the players, their roles, their authority, and who is in charge demands a questioning

mind and a king-size Rolodex®. 

A strong outside teamwork focus is needed at all echelons of the transitional division, in 

contrast with conventional divisions. Critical teaming may link to experimentation proponents, 

system developers, or maintenance contractors. When it does, lack of control and diffusion of 

responsibility become routine factors to deal with. 

One simple truth reigns—the commander is 

responsible for his people and his unit. He is 

responsible for knowing whether his soldiers have

the knowledge and proficiency they need. That 

becomes especially important when external

personnel conduct operator training. 

The individuals you are trying to hold to

their timelines do not work for you, are

not assigned to you, and have different 

constraints and restrictions.

COL Ted Kostich, 13 Mar 01

The division’s priorities are likely to conflict with those of external organizations. 

Project Managers (PMs), TRADOC System Managers (TSMs), testers, and others typically

believe their programs are highest priority. Leaders in the division, starting with the CG, must 

be very firm in protecting the unit’s training and readiness priorities. External players should be 

27
expected to align their plans with the division’s priorities. It is imperative that outside

organizations provide the resources and products needed by the division to accomplish externally

generated missions. 

Frequently, finding one person in charge of a system of systems has proven impossible. 

In the case of the new TOC, one team did the upgrades, another group provided the 

infrastructure, and a third team did the integration. Such circumstances can make resolving

problems and issues especially difficult. 

Test and experimentation events impose rigor and evaluation requirements not found in 

normal training events. The unit’s training objectives may conflict with the test objectives. The

need to control train-up and test conditions and implement elaborate data collection procedures 

may be foreign to soldiers and leaders. The potential impact of departing from the test plan is 

typically not apparent within the unit. This can lead to friction and misunderstanding. 

Support organizations such as the Digital Force Coordination Cell (DFCC) and the 

Central Technical Support Facility (CTSF) need guidance from division leaders on what they can 

do to help the units. It may be feasible to involve support personnel in division meetings and 

reviews to promote exchange of information. Routine collaboration can facilitate transition. 

Leveraging contractor capabilities hinges on holding system technicians and engineers 

accountable. Commanders must let contractors know what is expected of them and set the rules 

for working together. Maintaining an audit trail (e.g., sign-in log, linking up with the operator

reporting the problem) can be very helpful. When one brigade instituted such procedures, the

frequency of “operator-training problems” dropped dramatically, while the frequency of 

diagnosed software problems climbed accordingly. Ultimately, operators worked hand-in-hand 

with contractors to make the most of the new systems. 

Exploiting Digital Technologies 

The mystery of digitization can be intimidating to leaders coming from a non-digital 

background. The initial learning curve can be very steep. However, sound tactical skills and 

leadership talents are a digital leader’s greatest assets. A digital leader is first a warfighter, who 

has inherited special tools to enhance combat capabilities. The primary challenge is not to 

master digitization, but to harness it creatively for the business of warfighting.

To realize the end state vision, leaders must push for the system functionality they need. 

Accepting “Can’t be done” may shortchange the 

unit and the Army. In talking with the right 

people, too-hard-to-do judgments have often 

turned into relatively easy fixes. Persistence

frequently pays off. 

You get exactly what you are willing to

tolerate in this business.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

The 4ID’s framework for driving the technology envelope was a series of steps. Their 

process for identifying desired system enhancements proceeded incrementally, suggesting an 

evolution based on discovery learning. As a new capability was tried, it led to follow-up ideas

28
that weren’t apparent before. It thus appeared that the front-end design stage was primarily

useful to define a start point for complex C4I systems. An iterative develop-test-revise cycle

yielded a living, growing design. 

Thinking positively leads to thinking differently. Committing to successful change

causes leaders and soldiers to find ways to make new doctrine and systems work. Unexpected, 

novel uses for new systems may materialize. A good example occurred when the division was 

executing a deep attack as part of a field exercise. The warfighters linked the division’s Sentinel

radars (air surveillance systems designed primarily for warning purposes) to monitor and control 

aircraft across a range exceeding 100 km. This departed from established doctrine for employing

the Sentinel, but the novel solution worked quite well. 

In the absence of recognized tasks, conditions, and standards for digital operations, 

transition leaders must intensively mentor and coach subordinates and soldiers. The discovery

environment provides ideal conditions to involve 

subordinates in deciding what the new tasks, 

conditions, and standards should be. This helps 

establish ownership of the transition unit-wide. 

We were at the forefront and no one

really knew what “right” looked like.

BG(P) Richard Cody, 21 Jun 99

Leaders must redefine success in the transition environment. The old rule of “mission 

accomplishment means success” can work against new equipment when it fails at first to meet

soldiers’ expectations. Advising soldiers to expect new systems not to work can help protect 

them from disappointment and frustration. Successful transition depends on opportunities for 

new technologies to grow and improve. 

Forceful steps may be needed to

jump-start digitization. For example, a 

brigade commander in the 4ID banned the 

use of paper maps in command posts to 

force leaders and soldiers to use the new 

digital systems. The commander later

credited that step for much of his unit’s 

digitization success. 

Figure 2. Large-screen displays in a digital TOC.

The state of digital technology has 

passed a critical threshold for selling

itself. Early TV monitors with unfa

displays have evolved into large-screen 

devices (see Figure 2) that warfighters can 

recognize immediately as maps with valueadded functions. And systems are 

becoming more and more reliable. This facilitates acceptance of the new technology. 

miliar

The various systems in the ABCS family have different stages of maturity. The All 

Source Analysis System (ASAS) and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)

are quite mature, while the Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) is relatively

29
young. In the world of digitization, system youth can mean greater difficulties in using and 

managing the system. That poses a challenge for getting users to accept the system. 

To discipline the impact of system evolution, forceful control of software changes is 

imperative. A senior division leader must personally take charge of all decisions to implement 

new software versions. The centralized decision authority considers the impact on the unit, 

especially the requirement for individual and collective training. The unit cannot expect 

developers to understand how their software changes impact unit training, scheduling, and 

competing requirements. 

Infrastructure for Change—Army Culture 

The pace of change in Force XXI is so rapid that information typically has a surprisingly

short half-life. Equipment, doctrine, and 

organizational structure are all on an 

evolutionary fast track. Because of the 

nature of information age technology, the 

rapid change can be expected to continue 

into the foreseeable future. 

Right now the Army is about "change.” There 

isn’t anything that is staying static, not even 

Table VIII.

BG(P) Richard Cody, 21 Jun 99

As a rule, groups that have little history with complex systems are slower to accept 

digitization and they experience more frustration. The M2A3 with its complex turret poses a big

culture change for the infantry community. Infantrymen now have to get used to complex

equipment—temperamental components, complicated troubleshooting, intermittent electrical 

problems, etc.—that tankers accepted years ago with the M1. The process of adjustment takes 

time, but the tankers can accelerate things for their infantry colleagues by sharing their

understanding of advanced systems. 

Digital techniques and procedures are changing the tactical unit’s culture. A good 

example comes from one brigade’s TOC innovations. The use of a networked headphone 

environment has enabled digital collaboration, to include electronic conferencing (digital staff 

huddles). The reduction in face-to-face interaction increases efficiency but changes dramatically

the social environment for the deployed staff. The TOC is no longer a place where warfighters 

gather and chat over a cup of coffee. 

The symbolic aspect of transition is important for highlighting key milestones. 

Ceremonies can help change the way soldiers think about themselves and their unit. They can 

build pride and excitement in soldiers, which in turn creates positive energy. The excitement 

becomes magnetic because it attracts people to join the unit. Celebrating a significant milestone

can also pave the way for soldiers to embrace the next step on the transition path. 

Even after we field [the 4ID], I think 

we're going to have to learn for the next 

ten years on where we need to go.

BG(P) Richard Cody, 21 Jun 99

As the Army proceeds to field new systems 

and doctrine, the establishment of digital 

performance standards may degrade the discovery

environment. Performance standards tend to 

dampen risk-taking and discovery learning—

30
behaviors that are vital to successful transition. When warfighters are being graded against 

standards, they want to deliver the right answer. Preserving the discovery environment will 

become a significant challenge as the transition matures. 

Infrastructure for Change—Enablers 

In one brigade commander’s view, leading units in transition requires “transformational” 

leaders, as opposed to “custodial” leaders. Transformational leaders reinvent units to become 

something completely different. They take the initiative, look to the end state and ask how the 

unit can get there. On the other hand, custodial leaders tend to concentrate on the way the unit 

already does business. Custodial leaders may be able to adapt to Force XXI change, but those 

who cannot may have to be reassigned.

Managing and implementing transition demands full-time dedicated personnel, not just 

“additional duties.” A force integration cell within the division is indispensable for

synchronization and coordination. Corps-level assets such as the DFCC and CTSF have proven 

their worth many times over.

Ideally, as units transition to new organizations, staffing, doctrine and equipment, they

would be able to change one factor (e.g., personnel or equipment) at a time. This would enable 

isolation of problems and determination of a specific cause. The advantages of this approach are 

significant. However, more often units encounter multiple changes at one time. The result can 

be confusion, misinterpretation, and frustration. 

Institutional trainers may lag behind 

the cutting edge units in their digital skills and 

knowledge. For instance, when one brigade 

staff transitioned to digital collaboration, 

observer/controllers (O/Cs) at the NTC noted 

with concern the lack of face-to-face 

interaction. It was difficult for the O/Cs to see 

the collaboration that was taking place via 

linked headsets (see Figure 3). 

Figure 3. Headset use in a digital TOC. 

In the rapidly changing high-tech 

Force XXI environment, innovative options 

for training and professional development 

have become necessary. Establishing digital 

expertise and equipment in the Army’s

training institutions will take substantial time. 

For now, the primary responsibility for digital 

training falls on the unit and the installation. In the Army’s Fort Hood digitization arena, III

Corps leaders are working to establish a digital training facility and build educational alliances

with universities and colleges. 

31
Personnel 

Digital leaders and soldiers must be

warfighters first. They need to master warfighting

basics before they can harness digital tools. And 

they need to cultivate their leadership skills through 

progressive assignments that happen to give them 

practice with digital tools. 

We need to be careful that we don't

make our ABCS operators 

technicians instead of warfighters.

COL Ted Kostich, 13 Mar 01

Sustaining momentum during high personnel turnover rests heavily on mentoring staff 

officers (especially Captains) early in their tenure with the unit. After they have bought into the

vision, they are placed in command positions as vacancies occur. The staff officers carry their 

vision and excitement into their new jobs as commanders. 

While senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) should play an important role in leading

Force XXI transition, they may defer digital matters to junior NCOs who are more comfortable 

with the technology. The NCOs at all levels need digital leadership skills. This will become the 

norm as digitally smart soldiers work their way up through the ranks. 

Young officers and soldiers are crucial to the success of digitization. Their comfort level 

with the digital technology enables them to solve technical problems and discover new ways of 

doing things. Smart leaders encourage and leverage their inventiveness. At the same time, 

young warfighters with limited experience may be most threatened by change. They have seen

only one way of doing things, so they have not encountered major changes. This may seem 

paradoxical but probably relates to the individual’s expectations based on his/her personal 

experience in the Army. A soldier’s values, expectations, personal biases, and limitations 

influence his/her attitudes toward change. 

Personnel issues loom large in the early stages of transition, when soldiers with 

specialized skills are scarce. Working those issues becomes a critical activity for the CG and his 

staff. By-name assignments, personnel stabilization, shifting experienced leaders to critical 

vacancies, battle rostering digital operators, and “grow our own Sergeant” programs have proved 

to be valuable means for ensuring that personnel assets fully support division readiness. As more

of the Army becomes digitized, the need for stabilization and other special personnel provisions 

can be expected to fade. 

Because of the critical nature of transition events such as the DCX, the 4ID used 

personnel stabilization much more extensively than normal. To be effective, stabilizing

personnel means a one-year commitment. That’s necessary to make sure individual and 

collective training can occur before the target event, and to ensure an orderly transition 

afterward. 

The Army’s personnel management system has an especially serious impact on a 

transitional division. This is because the mechanisms that normally compensate for personnel 

turnover (e.g., standard equipment, stable standing operating procedures [SOPs]) are 

compromised when systems and TTPs keep changing. In addition, the expense of training up 

32
digital soldiers is great. As a result, new personnel generate a much greater training burden in 

the digital division. 

Because NCOs typically focus on performance standards, proactive steps may be needed 

to facilitate their participation in digitization. Leaders can describe desired end states in terms of 

performance expectations for their soldiers. Digital operating guides can describe the basic

parameters of C4I usage. Such measures establish a start point for the digitization journey.

In a streamlined division that is 2,500 soldiers smaller, 100 percent fill is indispensable. 

That’s a tall order for the Army’s personnel community, but the division cannot go to war with 

personnel vacancies. This axiom will not change as progress toward the future force continues. 

Training—Fundamentals 

Training is a powerful instrument for leveraging new technologies. Training events can 

stress soldiers and leaders in a way that forces them to get the most out of their new systems. 

For instance, when the M2A3s replaced the M2A2s, 

techniques were developed to get soldiers to use the 

system’s design capabilities. During lane training a

company commander might give his M2A3 platoon a 

wider engagement area (compared to the M2A2) 

requiring the crews to use all of the M2A3’s target

acquisition capabilities. The AAR process then

reinforced desired behaviors. When challenged by such training, crews will not only measure up 

to the systems’ potential, they will also invent new ways of getting the job done. 

We created a training event that 

forces them to use the system if

they are going to pass.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

Digital training for a newly assigned leader or soldier begins with ABCS familiarization, 

which should commence immediately upon arriving in the unit. Immersion in the everyday

world of ABCS launches the journey to digital proficiency.

Training in a transitional unit must address basic tactical (analog) tasks, tasks involving

advanced platforms like the M1A2 SEP and M2A3, and digital tasks. While some have 

described the process as sequential, in reality the three domains overlap and sometimes play out 

in incomplete sequences. Iteration of sequences is driven by ABCS evolution and major events 

such as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Limited Users Test (LUT). 

No single training model is likely to be applicable.

Senior leaders in the 4ID recognized four key factors that determine the rate of a unit’s 

learning: the frequency of repetitions, the amount of enabling learning between repetitions, 

stability of personnel, and consistency of focus. Changing any or all of those variables was said 

to make the learning curve steeper or shallower. While this may not be unique to a digital unit, 

the “model” becomes especially important in the multi-axis environment of transition. 

In the early stages of transition, the train-assess-train cycle must be repeated multiple 

times to identify what needs to be learned—especially with new equipment and organizational 

33
structures. Thus discovering what soldiers, leaders, staffs and units need to learn enters the 

training picture for transitional units. 

Major transition events must be used to advance training. Tests and experiments are no 

exception. Transition leaders can work training and readiness into every event. Major events 

drive a preparation schedule, including all-important training. They motivate soldiers and 

leaders to sharpen their skills and achieve collective proficiency.

Personnel stability is a major factor in achieving high quality training. Personnel 

turnover causes the unit to retrain the same tasks with new people. The established personnel 

management system led the 4ID to orchestrate atypical personnel stability for major events. This 

enabled the units to get the most out of their training efforts and build team confidence. 

Training—Special Groups 

Because the commander is 

responsible, he must take ownership of all 

training—including ABCS instruction 

conducted by contractors. He must 

determine whether his soldiers have the

right skills and knowledge. In part, this means integrating external operator training and unit 

collective training. 

Where we have [taken] ownership of programs

conducted at CTSF we’ve had the best learning 

outcomes. 

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

During the early stages of digitization, special efforts to train NCOs on digitization and 

digital leadership are needed because many senior NCOs are not comfortable with the 

technology. An NCO who does not understand about atrophy of digital skills, e.g., can hinder 

the unit’s transition efforts. This issue will disappear as digital expertise spreads through the

NCO ranks. 

One brigade commander commented that

the one-size-fits-all concept underlying individual

operator training for ABCS systems is flawed. 

Operator training on FBCB2 (see Figure 4), for 

example, is the same regardless of an individual’s

role in the unit. This approach ignores the fact 

that echelon and duty position heavily shape the 

way an operator or leader uses the system. For 

example, platoon leaders do different things than 

company commanders and this gets reflected in

their respective use of FBCB2. System training

should take such usage differences into account. 

Figure 4. FBCB2 in a combat vehicle. 

Training of ABCS operators must occur in a system-of-systems context. An ASAS 

operator, for example, must learn how his system interacts with the Maneuver Control System

34
(MCS) and other systems, what can and cannot be transferred freely. Thus each operator will 

become part of a horizontal team that collaborates through system interchange. 

Differing levels of user-friendliness among the various ABCS platforms impact the 

operator training requirements in the division. The least user-friendly system (CSSCS) requires 

much more training than needed for other systems. Thus the time required to reach a standard 

level of operator proficiency varies across systems. 

Training—Digital Training Methods 

In keeping pace with digitization, training programs become very fluid. Individual and 

collective training requirements change as the equipment and software evolve. New training

methods and techniques are needed to support emergent training requirements. Digital tasks and 

skills call for special performance measurement and feedback tools. 

Individual system operator skills need to be expanded into operational, teamworkcentered skills. One technique for doing that is integration exercises where operators practice in 

a unit collective setting what they learned earlier in the day. The reinforcement of basic skills 

and the common understanding that result are invaluable. The timely reinforcement is especially

important for the procedural knowledge required to operate ABCS components. 

Digital tools can change the way soldiers and leaders interact, and this should be reflected 

in digital training programs. Collaborating through networked computers is different from 

interacting face-to-face. Conferencing on a multi-station headphone network is not the same, 

either. Digital training programs need to address the basic techniques that digital teams can use 

for collaborating electronically. 

Balancing digital training with field craft and tactical training is a challenge unique to the 

digital division. Because information management skills atrophy more quickly than other skills, 

units are likely to devote more time to digital 

training. Maintaining both types of skills is 

essential. Fortunately collective events can train 

both types of skills. Further, the growing digital 

infrastructure is embedding the practice of digital 

skills in routine daily activities. 

You cannot forget those staff and

warfighter fundamentals. We practiced

small unit training repetitively.

COL Randy Anderson, 6 Mar 01

A “training audience plus one” approach has been used to smooth the progression of 

collective training from one echelon to the next. The technique entails introducing a level of 

digitization one echelon higher than required to achieve the event’s training objectives. For

example, the brigade TOC would participate in company lanes training to establish digital 

connectivity and functionality. The objective is to introduce technology early enough that the 

unit can resolve uncertainties before the technology becomes essential to the training process. In

the long run, this approach reduces risk and increases the value of the training at each echelon. 

One commanding general felt that traditional means of pre-command training are

inadequate for digital leaders. Digital pre-command modules need to give new leaders actual 

35
experience with digital equipment and doctrine. Digital operations are so divergent from analog

operations that immersion in the digital environment is a prerequisite for true learning. The

Army is currently developing digital pre-command programs for newly assigned leaders. 

Digitization creates a special need for low-overhead simulations to enable easy-access, 

low-cost training. Existing constructive simulations are too large and too expensive to support 

multiple repetitions of digital training. Low-overhead simulations must enable units to link their

TOCs and vehicles for a challenging training environment. A battlestaff trainer must enable the

integration of battlestaffs in various combinations of live and simulation environments. 

Budget 

Digitization has spawned a spiraling concern about funding. Every new requirement 

sports a price tag, and deciding who will pay becomes a constant challenge. The high driver is 

logistics support of expensive new systems, especially repairing them. 

Today’s budget process invokes a new paradigm. New rules are in, and old assumptions 

are out. Budgeting for equipment turn-in, estimating credits for depot repairables, controlling the

requisition of parts, paying for repair of non-standard items, mastering the single stock fund, and 

a host of other challenges greatly complicate the budget process. 

The unit in transition must quickly master the new budgeting rules or become their 

victim. Every transition-driven change can impact budgeting. For example, the CSS redesign

transferred many repair functions, reducing the division’s options for low-cost repair. The new 

logistics rules invalidated the old cost models, and there were no historical figures for 

establishing new cost factors. This left the division struggling to come to grips with the new 

rules—with an adverse impact on the budget. Transition leaders are likely to be challenged to

find creative ways to assess budget impacts of significant changes. 

Mastering the budget is too crucial for senior leaders to learn the process on the job. 

With the complexity in the transition environment and the new logistics management procedures, 

budget mistakes can be very unforgiving. 

Transition leaders spend an inordinate 

amount of time and energy on the budget. 

Some of this results from the large number of

funding sources and some from new logistics 

management procedures. Leaders appear to accept this as part of reality.

Today’s budget and accounting procedures

require someone to manage them daily.

COL Ted Kostich, 12 Apr 00

The Army’s cost factors are not keeping pace with modernization. A prime example 

comes from the training resources model, which specifies costing factors for each vehicle. The 

cost factors for the newly fielded M1A2 SEP and M2A3, based on historical figures for 

predecessor vehicles, have proven to be significantly conservative. This forced the 4ID to 

document actual costs and obtain relief from III Corps. 

36
Transition is likely to bring unfunded requirements (UFRs). Consider the 4ID’s UFR 

package submitted to cover the costs of equipment turn-in. Once the division’s painstaking

preparation of the package was complete, the submission and approval process had to be tracked 

closely. Future leaders must be prepared to defend their UFRs vigorously. 

Training associated with force modernization and experimentation is frequently underfunded or unfunded. The transitional unit must turn to PMs, TSMs, testers, and others to fund 

transition-driven training. Failure to do so can produce serious shortages in the training budget. 

External funding sources typically require formal 

budget requests at least a year in advance. It takes

hard work to project the unit’s costs for digital events, 

submit the budget package, and then track the funding

process. 

If what you need is a $20 training 

program, you can’t make do with a 

$1.98 training program.

MG Scott Wallace, 22 Jun 99

Funds provided by modernization, reorganization, and experimentation agencies come 

with special accountability rules. Also, they usually come with strings attached. Different 

funding lines are not interchangeable. 

Unit Organization—Reorganization Process 

Reorganization is a high-risk enterprise for the initial units because they have to 

determine how well the new structure works. Unit leaders are forced to accept uncertainties and 

realize that perfection cannot be achieved on the first try. Evaluation is intertwined with 

implementation to produce sound feedback, which in turn leads to updating the new Modified 

Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E). For the first unit(s) reorganized, it means 

additional challenges. 

Planning and implementing reorganization 

takes much more energy than most leaders 

anticipate. That’s partly because it is so hard to

visualize the unit’s end state in a hypothetical

framework. Creating new organizations around 

capabilities that don’t yet exist is also very difficult. 

Even with hard work and painful attention to detail, 

oversights and glitches will occur.

I don’t think anybody understood when 

we said we are going to a new 

MTO&E, all the work that would be 

required.

COL Bob Cone, 15 May 00

The 4ID attempted to accomplish reorganization before tackling experimentation and 

modernization. The logic called for establishing a new structural baseline as a foundation for 

subsequent changes. But the spiral development process made that impractical. Reorganization 

ended up overlapping the other axes so that a complex interaction resulted. Future units 

undergoing transition can almost certainly expect the same circumstances. 

Reorganization is likely to create a period when new responsibilities are not yet fully

resolved. A reorganized unit needs to invest energy in establishing new SOPs, especially in the 

maintenance arena. Then someone needs to check to see how the new procedures are working.

37
Unit Organization—Impact of Reorganization 

People-oriented leaders find ways to implement reorganization without creating a 

negative impact on individual warfighters. For instance, the transition of companies can be 

sequenced so each commander has enough command time when his unit is inactivated. Soldiers

can be kept informed of pending actions so the physical move to new units (the duffel bag drag) 

goes smoothly. The dividends in terms of unit morale are well worth it. 

Reorganization can have

an unwanted impact on units’ 

readiness status. The division’s 

transition plan must carefully

sequence and synchronize the process for all subordinate units, to avoid status-reporting

problems. “Trial” unit status reports can help determine when a subordinate unit is ready to 

begin reporting under a new MTO&E. 

In a 10-division Army, we can’t afford to have one 

division C5 for three, four, five, or six months. 

MG Scott Wallace, 22 Jun 99

Unanticipated impacts of reorganization are common. Two examples from the CSS 

redesign are instructive. First, placing all of the division’s mechanics in a central organization 

ended a long-standing practice of exempting mechanics from Charge of Quarters (CQ) duties, 

headcount, etc. That led to the maneuver battalions frequently ending up short on mechanics, 

with no options available. Second, moving the clerks who order repair parts to the central 

organization meant that outside personnel were spending most of the brigades’ money. In turn, 

that increased the burden on brigade and battalion commanders to coordinate with the clerks and 

monitor their budget status. Such occurrences illustrate that it is easy beforehand to overlook 

some of the operational impacts of reorganization. 

Fielding New Systems 

The experimentation process brings non-standard equipment that evolves into MTO&E 

property. The support model for such equipment starts off non-standard, and then transitions to 

the conventional model. For example, repairing non-standard equipment usually means going to 

a contractor for systems under warranty. When the unit takes full ownership, support becomes a 

unit responsibility. The transition has to be carefully monitored. 

“Out with the old, in with the new” does not work for digital equipment. Old equipment 

stayed in the 4ID after new equipment was fielded. Owning two sets of equipment complicates

budgeting, training, and logistics. And the overlap tends to obscure the eventual requirement to 

turn in the old equipment. 

Transition generates a huge equipment displacement burden. Careful planning and 

tracking of displacement is imperative to avoid siphoning off training dollars. If the only funds 

available are training funds, they can get diverted to pay for turn-in costs. 

38
Documenting Critical Knowledge 

Sharing information is an absolute must in the transition environment. When discovery

learning is the rule of the day, the only way for others to know what someone else has learned is 

by prompt exchange of information. Soldiers should be encouraged and reinforced for reporting

problems as well as positive insights. Both formal and informal mechanisms can be useful. 

Ultimately the unit must share its feedback with those who can improve the systems—PMs, 

TSMs, and contractors. 

Force XXI transition has changed the way the Army develops TTPs and doctrine. Units 

undergoing transition now play the pivotal role in generating how-to-fight guidelines. This 

means empowering subordinates to determine what works digitally. The unit-generated TTPs 

become a prime driver for doctrine. This bottom-up process runs counter to the traditional Army

model for doctrine development. 

Obtaining valid assessment data and lessons learned demands a reasonable level of 

individual and collective proficiency on C4I and weapon systems. This enabling condition 

(similar to a “gate”) applies to tests, experiments, and training events. Achieving proficiency

requires adequate time to train on the equipment before the event begins. Wise transition leaders 

insist on a cut-off date for system changes to protect the training time needed. This often means 

fending off system developers who come with a last-minute fix for some problem. 

An audit trail of unit transition—issues, decisions, things tried and not tried, etc.—is 

indispensable if new leaders are to fully benefit from the experience of their predecessors. It is

especially important for the division’s general officers to know what has been tried, who made 

what decisions, what worked, and what was discarded. Otherwise, the unit may end up 

reinventing solutions and rediscovering lessons learned in the past. 

Transitional units tend to invest their lessons-learned energy in SOPs, with a natural 

connection to the AAR process. Capturing lessons about managing change and measuring

digitization progress often falls in the “too hard to do” box. Thus a transitional unit may

inadvertently limit its effectiveness as a learning organization. The unit may benefit by

obtaining outside help from Army research agencies, TRADOC proponents, contractors, etc. 

Frequent changes in equipment functionality can make system-specific lessons learned 

obsolete in a short time. Transitional units can avoid short-lived lessons-learned by

concentrating on generalities and warfighting functions. 

Force XXI Transition’s Impact on Tactics and Doctrine

Impact of Technology 

The future has arrived. Digitization’s goal of enhancing the command and control 

process is becoming a reality. Leaders are enthusiastic about the visualization and planning

advantages gained by using the new tools. In the hands of skilled warfighters, the tools are

proving their worth on the battlefield. 

39
Digital systems are not a magic panacea. They are tools to help warfighters plan, 

prepare, and execute military operations. Digitization will not make up for lack of basic

warfighting skills. 

The digital tools’ precision for visualizing

enemy elements has boosted our ability to recognize 

patterns on the battlefield. This enables the brigade

to set the conditions desired for destroying the 

enemy. For example, an enemy’s assailable flank 

or the most favorable point for penetration can be 

determined with precision and confidence. 

There is tremendous precision in what

we do now. A major factor [is] our 

ability to recognize patterns ... the

exact circumstances that we wanted.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

Enhanced situational understanding is enabling remarkably bold and aggressive 

maneuver. The precision of the common operating picture gives leaders the confidence to move 

quickly and decisively. In effect the digital tools and battlefield sensors reduce the risk of

maneuvering against the enemy.

Modernization gives the brigade greater capabilities to shape the fight and fight deep. 

That results mainly from the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), engineer reconnaissance 

assets, artillery, and close air support (CAS). Engineer assets can be used as far forward as the 

BRT to shape the fight with pinpoint obstacles. 

Digitization opens up possibilities for doing things that were not feasible before. A good 

example occurred when the division faced a challenge tracking aviation assets during a deep 

attack. They used the division’s Sentinel radars to form an ad hoc airspace command and control 

network reaching 118 km. The non-doctrinal approach worked remarkably well. 

The signal battalion has become the Achilles heel of digital operations. Maintaining

digital networks and connectivity depends absolutely on signal capabilities. The impact of

digital failures during distributed combat operations could be harsh. Experience will tell whether

redundant companies are needed in the signal battalion to prevent catastrophic failures. 

The division is not manned to 

conduct operations using both digital and 

analog (map-and-grease-pencil) systems. 

However, it is likely unfeasible to make the

leap to digital operations quickly and 

cleanly. Mixed operations place a special

burden on tactical units. 

I don’t have enough people to be inside the

TOC working ASAS and then running outside 

the track and changing the analog stuff on the

maps and wingboards.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

Digital Operating Procedures

Shared visualization of the battlefield is the key to digitization’s impact on command and 

control. The digital tools enable the commander to share his vision of the fight with his 

subordinate commanders in a way that was not possible before. He then can monitor patterns 

during execution and share his updated vision. 

40
Situational dominance results from situational awareness (SA) and situational 

understanding (SU), layered on a foundation of basic tactical skills. The SA delivered by

digitization pictures the basic elements of the battlespace, but it does not project what’s going to 

be or what the unit can do about it. The SU exists in the mind of the warfighter, who weighs 

various courses of action to reach a decision. Situational dominance requires both SA and SU. 

The need for digital staffs to perform at a higher level than before has spawned the 

concept of the “lethal staff.” Developing SU from the mass of digital information arriving in the

TOC is very demanding. Realistic standards for the trained and ready battlestaff are needed. 

The strong push to streamline the TOCs is creating new ways of doing business. As 

leaders and soldiers learn how to leverage digital systems, they are transforming the approach to 

command and staff functions. One brigade commander had shrunk his TOC from 14 SICPS 

(Standardized Integrated Command Post System) shelters to 8 and was targeting only 4 shelters. 

This took substantial energy, but the payoff was high. 

New TOC capabilities are transforming the way staff members interact. Collaborative

headphone systems coupled with touch-control computers have reduced the need for face-to-face 

interaction. Staff huddles have morphed into electronic conferences. This improves the 

efficiency and speed of accomplishing staff functions. 

Digital capabilities have significantly facilitated the planning process. They enable the

commander and his staff to develop and rehearse a plan with several courses of action, 

something rarely done without digital tools. The shared analysis and wargaming of enemy

options becomes much more comprehensive. The understanding that emerges among the 

subordinate commanders is a huge advantage. 

During digital operations, the brigade and battalion leaders have begun to analyze what 

the enemy is doing in real time, rather than focus strictly on friendly force activities. Precise

visualization appears to encourage analytical thinking—determining what the enemy is going to 

do—in place of simple declarative exchanges. The interaction on the command net reflects 

higher levels of analysis as events unfold. 

Digital communications enable the integration of

all scout assets, to include the maneuver battalions’ scout 

platoons, in a brigade-wide reconnaissance/surveillance 

network. This expands exchange of enemy information 

and synergizes scout elements across echelons. 

Any scout who enters a spot

report shares that information 

across the entire system.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

Graphic control measures such as boundaries and phase lines remain essential in the 

digital environment. Experience at the NTC backs this up. Their greatest value lies in 

supporting the integration of maneuver and fires to achieve true synergy.

Powerful C4I and weapons capabilities at all echelons can create competition between

echelons. For example, the division can see and strike deep targets, much as the corps can. 

41
Leaders at multiple echelons should collaboratively develop SOPs that fully realize the potential 

of advanced systems without tying the hands of subordinate units. 

Digitization is changing how the brigade manages indirect fires. Laser range finders on 

tanks and Bradleys give each vehicle the capability to initiate accurate FBCB2 calls for fire. The 

role of the Fire Support Team (FIST) is shifting to a focus on managing calls for fire against the 

commander’s priorities. 

Combat Engineer functions are benefiting from the power and precision of digital tools. 

For example, the terrain analysis and line-of-sight

functions in FBCB2 help locate engagement areas. 

Information for placement of obstacles is then 

shared with the engineer, resulting in superior

engagement areas with almost perfectly placed 

obstacles. Obstacle locations are then circulated via 

digital tools. The same principle works for

reporting enemy obstacles. 

You have scouts forward, limited

visibility, heavy fog and you see them 

coming about 30 mph just zigzagging 

right through the obstacles.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

Battlespace Factors 

Successful operations in the expanded battlespace depend critically on new C4I and 

weapon systems. Advanced sensors and C4I systems—both organic and external—enable the 

division to disperse forces, while highly precise and lethal weapons enable massing of effects. 

Electronic sensors are the prime enablers for 

managing the expanded battlespace. Sensors within 

the division (e.g., the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

[UAV]) and outside (e.g., the Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System[JSTARS]) give the 

commander confidence in the unit’s coverage of the 

battlefield. Gaps between brigades become

acceptable when electronic sensors provide a robust

picture of the battlespace. 

It did not bother me to have gaps 

between brigades, as long as I had

electronic sensors to keep looking at 

those gaps.

MG Scott Wallace, 22 Jun 99

Operating with dispersed forces in the expanded battlespace increases the importance of 

intelligence, aviation, and fire support assets. Intelligence assets enable the commander to track 

the enemy and identify dangerous gaps. Aviation provides the flexibility to deal with tactical

and logistical contingencies when ground systems cannot cover large distances quickly enough. 

Fires can also be shifted quickly from one area to another. 

Digital systems can transform the commander’s approach to positioning himself on the 

battlefield. Mobile C4I capabilities enable him to direct the fight from any location. This 

enhances the commander’s ability to see the battlefield without degrading his decision making

process. 

42
Logistics 

Digital tools have enhanced casualty evacuation procedures on several counts. The unit 

can send precise locations of casualties. The medic knows where evacuation assets and available 

treatment facilities are located. The digital systems feed the medical supply network. These 

capabilities lead to faster evacuation, faster treatment, and better allocation of medical resources. 

Because the digital systems make their jobs easier, medical personnel use them. 

When a unit is the only organization to possess a new system (e.g., M1A2 SEP), it cannot 

rely on regular supply channels for repair parts nor on organic assets for skilled technicians. The 

first unit equipped with advanced systems has relied on contractors for maintenance and repair 

services. The gateway for that service typically resides with a PM. In high-visibility field 

exercises contractor technicians have been flown directly to the site of the inoperative system. 

The high cost of turning in an expensive item for depot-level repair has led the division to 

emphasize unit-level diagnostics. The 4ID has invested heavily in diagnostic equipment and 

training of their own mechanics. Courtesy of pinpoint diagnostics, only the defective 

component(s) are repaired or replaced. This is a case of financial incentives shaping unit 

behavior. 

Having maintenance assets organic to the maneuver battalions is a time-tested principle. 

In the aftermath of the CSS reorganization, the division returned to attaching Forward Support 

Companies (FSCs) to the maneuver battalions. The feedback from the units has been singularly

positive. An important consideration is budget accountability, which suffers when clerks in the 

Forward Support Battalion are spending the maneuver unit’s money.

The maintenance infrastructure to 

support digital units requires constant 

attention. For example, leaders working

with the new infrastructure must find outof-the-box maintenance solutions for NTC 

training. Key issues include prepositioned (depot) versus take-along repair parts, reduced stockage levels, 24-hour availability of 

parts, and source of funding. The problems are not unique to digital units, but they are more

severe. 

Today commanders and leaders have to be 

much more visionary in terms of [maintenance]

requirements.

COL Ted Kostich, 13 Mar 01

Digitization has also transformed deployment logistics for digital rotations to the NTC. 

The NTC cannot provide the digital equipment required by the division. Units have to take their 

own. This impacts railhead, funding, and logistics requirements. 

Degraded Operations 

Early concerns about reliability of the C4I systems are fading. One brigade commander 

described the ABCS capabilities in the TOC as “self-healing.” When a system such as MCS 

goes down, another system such as AFATDS is used to follow the battle while the primary

system is recovered. The redundancy across systems has enabled the brigade and its battalions to 

43
sustain digital operations in the field for weeks on end. The current state of the technology

requires humans to decide which backup system to use. 

In vehicles where alternative digital systems are not available, the paper map provides 

backup. The unit SOP may call for each vehicle crew to update a paper map every 30 minutes. 

If the FBCB2 goes down, the unit fights off the map until the FBCB2 is restored. 

Exceeding the capacity limitations of a digital platform can crash the system. Thus 

technology constraints can clash with operational needs. To the enthusiastic operator, the 

limitations may seem intangible until it’s too late. The risk of a crash places a premium on 

simpler graphics, proactive filtering, housekeeping (e.g., removing old graphics), etc. The units 

end up addressing these issues in their SOPs. The long-term solution entails greater bandwidth. 

Unit Tasking Reorganization functions have 

yet to reach a desirable level of maturity. If the 

process is not coordinated carefully, subordinate 

units can be caught by surprise. The operational 

impact of losing digital connectivity can be severe, 

especially in the middle of a fight. The current

functional limitations can cause commanders to avoid changing their task organization. 

Some guy at DTAC hits “reorganize”

and all of a sudden in the middle of a

fight we begin to drop out of FBCB2.

COL Bob Cone, 2 Mar 01

The following section looks to the future by examining how the MASC-XXI methods 

and products could be leveraged to support the emerging force of the future. 

To the Future

The MASC-XXI road to the Leader’s Tool has paved the way for future efforts to capture 

and share knowledge about managing transition. The project’s methodology for documenting

the process of “getting from point A to point C” holds promise for aiding the Army’s highvisibility efforts that are bringing about widespread change. This section discusses key aspects 

of leveraging the lessons learned and facilitating the Army’s transition process. Discussion 

topics include issues and concepts for building on the MASC-XXI methodology, expected value 

of sharing knowledge, and recommendations for follow-on efforts. 

Issues 

The methodology and results of the MASC-XXI project form a start-point rather than an 

end-point. The project revealed only a small amount of the transition knowledge that is 

emerging, with a vast quantity remaining to be documented. The Leader’s Tool technology

represents only a preliminary demonstration of what is achievable in terms of tools for sharing

knowledge. Operational feedback on utility and self-growth of the tool is pending. 

The change management knowledge base to date encompasses only three positions at the 

division level (CG, ADC-M, and CofS) and one position at the brigade level (commander). The

capture of tacit knowledge should no doubt include at least division through platoon echelons, 

with reasonable representation of positions at each echelon. 

44
The validity of generalizing tacit knowledge from one position/echelon to others is 

unknown. Likewise, the applicability of knowledge to other units is uncharted. Understanding

these issues could become a key to defining how broadly change-driven knowledge can be 

shared credibly. 

The MASC-XXI project has examined the change management process in only one Army

transition arena—the Force XXI axis at Fort Hood, Texas. The newer arena of the IBCT at Fort

Lewis, Washington remains virgin territory. The Army’s transition arenas will continue to 

expand with time. The number of units across the force that could benefit from capturing and 

sharing hard-won lessons learned will continue to grow. 

In its preliminary form, the Leader’s Tool technology exhibits deliberate limitations 

resulting from the “implement small” strategy. The tool’s interactive features—especially

searching, entering or editing data, and obtaining help—are relatively simplistic, leaving

significant room for upgrading to dynamic wizards or intelligent agents. The search functions 

include no capability for intelligent, user-created queries. The contents focus on written (verbal)

information, with substantial room for adding graphic, video, and audio materials. And the onestyle-fits-all interface accommodates different user preferences and needs to a relatively small 

degree. 

As an automated professional development forum, the initial Leader’s Tool technology is 

relatively passive—providing simple prompts and responding with stored insights and rules. 

Digital leaders, especially those new to the job, could benefit from more active, collaborative 

assistance in solving problems and making decisions. Exploration of a more active role for 

change management tools (e.g., interactive problem solving aided by an intelligent agent) may be

in order. Collaboration could be extended to direct interaction among the tool’s users, by means 

of message boards, user groups, etc. 

The initial Leader’s Tool approach uses an operational model where the medium for

documenting and sharing insights and lessons learned (independent database) is separate from 

the medium generating many of those insights and lessons learned (C4I systems). Perhaps it 

would be desirable to explore linking or merging the two media. 

Security of contents is an issue whenever individual knowledge and opinions are placed 

in a sharable forum. Sensitivity concerns take on added importance when individual users make

decisions about the acceptability, suitability, and/or validity of contents being added. As more 

units participate in transition, the risks of sharing information will grow. 

The potential lack of post-implementation evaluation would leave a void in terms of 

feedback on utility, benefits, and sustainability of the Leader’s Tool. It would also neglect an

important source of ideas and suggestions for improving the technology and its utilization. 

During the course of developing and testing the preliminary Leader’s Tool, the study

team identified numerous targets for enhancing and expanding the technology for sharing

change-driven knowledge. The candidate enhancements are listed in Appendix G. 

45
Value of Sharing Knowledge 

The MASC-XXI methodology offers benefits to any unit transitioning to new doctrine,

organization, and equipment (e.g., 1CD, IBCT, follow-on units). The practical experience and 

insights of leaders who’ve gone before can accelerate the learning curve for those faced with 

managing change. Defining and solving problems in the unique digital environment can benefit 

from the collective wisdom of previous digital leaders. The MASC-XXI methodology can be 

applied in various arenas, and unit-specific products can be developed as needed. 

Experience-based insights and guidelines can rapidly enhance the change management 

skills of transition leaders, especially those new to the job. The typical Army leader is a de facto 

change manager with no specific preparation for managing change. The availability of an

automated coach such as the Leader’s Tool should promote proactive transitional leadership. It

should help leaders identify potential change-related problems and deal with them effectively.

As a result of proactive leadership based on proven techniques, subordinates and soldiers 

in transitional units can be expected to experience less frustration in a spiral development 

environment. Knowing what to expect and how to anticipate problems can create learning

opportunities instead of disappointment and hostility. In turn, this can foster creative forces for 

turning transition goals into reality.

The Leader’s Tool technology can provide a lever for the learning organization. By

facilitating the capture and dissemination of hard-won lessons learned, the tool can become a

central agent for passing key knowledge from one generation of warfighters to the next. The 

resulting efficiencies in terms of harnessing previous solutions and avoiding earlier mistakes can

pay high-yield dividends in units over-committed to high-priority requirements. In an important 

sense, the Leader’s Tool technology can offer new leaders a personal head-start program. 

Verification of the value of the Leader’s Tool technology in the hands of the users is 

pending, but the leaders who participated in the user trial were enthusiastic about the tool, 

especially its search capabilities. One participant commented, “New leaders should spend 30 

minutes a day just reading nuggets.” 

Recommendations

To realize the potential value of the MASC-XXI approaches and methodology, follow-on 

efforts are needed. Two types of recommendations are offered—systematic research to extend 

the methodology and implementation steps to leverage the Leader’s Tool technology. 

Knowledge-Centric Research 

1. Investigate the extent to which change-driven knowledge gathered from one position 

in a particular unit can apply to other positions and other units. 

2. Fully map the knowledge requirements of change managers in various positions, 

echelons, and units. 

46
3. Compare alternative techniques for eliciting knowledge, and develop a refined 

methodology suitable for diverse transition settings. 

4. Apply the knowledge elicitation methodology to establish comprehensive, multiechelon knowledge bases for the 4ID, IBCT, 1CD and other transition arenas. 

5. Validate the knowledge analysis methodology, to include its suitability for organizing

change-related knowledge across echelons and units 

6. Compare the knowledge analysis products from various transition arenas to assess 

similarities/differences and their practical impact.

7. Analyze the implications and risks of disseminating individual knowledge and 

opinions. 

8. Develop and validate a comprehensive model of knowledge acquisition, capture, 

organization and sharing for the Army transition environment. 

Implementation of Leader’s Tool Technology 

1. Institutionalize the MASC-XXI Leader’s Tool as a routinely used tool in the 4ID, 

under the auspices of a designated proponent. 

2. Conduct post-implementation evaluation of the value and sustainability of the 

MASC-XXI Leader’s Tool. 

3. Evaluate the issues for potential use of the Leader’s Tool by other units. 

4. Expand and enhance the functional capabilities of the Leader’s Tool to optimize its 

characteristics as a user-friendly, high-value asset.

5. Develop policy for disseminating individual knowledge and opinions, with risk 

management guidelines. 

By building on the MASC-XXI methodology and technology, the Army can fully

leverage the hard-won knowledge of transition leaders. The benefits can facilitate the critical

transition to a future force capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st Century.

47
48

Summary of Lessons Learned 

The futurehas arrived. Digitization’s

potential is becoming reality.

The state of digital technology has 

passed a critical threshold for selling

itself.

The greatest challenge of Force XXI

transition iscultural change.

Digital systemsare merely tools to help

warfightersaccomplish their mission.

Digitizationis changing the business of

warfightingin significant ways.

Multiple axes are the rulein transitional

units.

Force XXI transition vastlyexpands the

unit’s teaming network.

Leaders must redefine success in the 

transition environment.

Creating a learning organizationhinges

on accepting risk as a positive factor.

ForceXXI transition todate has not

revolutionized training or career

development.

Today’sbudgeting process revolves

around a new paradigm.

Reorganization canhave unwanted

effects on a unit’s reported readiness.

Vigorous sharing of informationis an

absolute must intransitional units.

Individual knowledge and insights are

especially valuable intransition.

Securityis aspecial challenge for 

formally sharing personal knowledge

and opinions.

Deferring the capture of knowledgeand 

lessons learned meanslost

opportunities.

Without changemanagement tools,

transition issub-optimized.

Self-sustaining tools depend critically

on user commitment and motivation.

The only real failure is the failure to

learn.

Sullivan & Harper, 1996, p. 193

The collective insights and lessons learned in the MASC-XXI project boil down to a 

manageable handful. Figure 5 captures the essence of these lessons. 

Figure 5. Summary of Lessons Learned. 
References 

Conner, D. R. (1992). Managing at the speed of change. New York: Villard Books. 

Dierksmeier, F. E., Johnston, J. C., Winsch, B. J., Leibrecht, B. C., Sawyer, A. R., Quinkert, K. 

A., & Wilkinson, J. G. (1999). Structured simulation-based training program for a digitized 

force: Approach, design, and functional requirements (ARI Research Report 1737). 

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

Hernandez, M. J. (1997). Database design for mere mortals: A hands-on guide to relational 

database design. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Horvath, J. A., Forsythe, G. B., Sweeney, P. J., McNally, J. A., Wattendorf, J., Williams, W. M., 

& Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Tacit knowledge in military leadership: Evidence from officer 

interviews (Technical Report 1018). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the 

Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

Horvath, J. A., Sternberg, R. J., Forsythe, G. B., Sweeney, P. J., Bullis, R. C., Williams, W. M., 

& Dennis, M. (1996). Tacit knowledge in military leadership: Supporting instrument

development (Technical Report 1042). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for 

the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

Klein, G. (1997). Making decisions in natural environments (Special Report 31). Alexandria, 

VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Novak, J. D., & Gowan, D. B. (1984). Learning how to learn. New York: Cambridge 

University Press. 

Senge, P. M. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. 

New York: Doubleday. 

Shinseki, E. K. (2000, October). The Army transformation: A historic opportunity. Army, 

50(10), 21-30. 

Smith, D. K. (1996). Taking charge of change. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 

Sullivan, G. R., & Harper, M. V. (1996). Hope is not a method. New York: Random House. 

Tessmer, M. (1993). Planning and conducting formative evaluations. London: Kogan Page. 

U.S. Department of the Army (2000, September). Objective Force capability (TRADOC Pam. 

525-66, Draft). Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 

49
Appendix A

Focal Areas and Topics 

Command Climate: The unit environment for fostering the achievement and acceptance of 

change; reflected in policies, procedures, guidelines, and practices; shaped by Army values, 

leaders’ vision, and leadership style. 

1. Setting the unit tone (risk tolerance, learning environment, commander’s philosophy, etc.)

2. Setting and protecting unit priorities (vision, unit axes, priorities, enforcement, etc.) 

3. Motivating leaders and soldiers (e.g., guidance, empowerment, involvement, feedback) 

4. Working with force modernizers, developers and testers (rules of engagement) 

5. Taming the tyrannical schedule (key events, timing, integration, workload, etc.) 

Tactics/Doctrine: Impact of change (digitization, reorganization, weapon platforms, new 

doctrine, etc.) on warfighting principles and practices; may involve doctrinal manuals, TTPs, 

SOPs, and related materials. 

1. Warfighting principles (basic principles for planning, preparing and executing missions) 

2. Battlespace factors (e.g., extended battlespace, dispersion, mobility, agility)

3. Seeing the battlefield (sensors, common picture, shared visualization, etc.)

4. Impact of technology (warfighting effects of individual or combined systems) 

5. Logistics (CSS structure, responsibilities and duties, operations, constraints, etc.) 

6. Digital SOP (e.g., ABCS utilization, information flow, staff operations) 

7. Degraded operations (system failure, backup procedures, half-analog mode, safeguards, etc.) 

Budget: Acquiring, controlling, conserving, and accounting for funds for all aspects of unit 

operations; emphasis on the pace and impact of change. 

1. Budget requirements (e.g., training, reorganization, experimentation, deployment) 

2. Budget and accounting process (responsibilities, decision authority, control of expenditures, 

cost factors, automated ordering, etc.) 

3. Leader skills (required knowledge, training needs, special considerations)

4. Funding constraints (realities, unfunded requirements, cautions, how to cope, etc.) 

5. Impact of modernization (displacement of equipment, reorganization costs, etc.) 

6. Logistics aspects of budget (e.g., equipment repair, turn-in costs, credits) 

7. Outside sources of funds (specific agencies, request process, constraints, etc.) 

Training: Planning and accomplishing unit training (home-station, CTC), new equipment 

training, institutional training, and self-development. 

1. Training fundamentals (essential ingredients such as focus, time, stable personnel, iteration) 

2. Training calendar/schedule (e.g., challenges, integration, sequencing, coordination) 

3. Assessing performance (measurement, feedback, observer/controllers, AARs, etc.) 

4. Training specific groups (e.g., battlestaffs, NCOs, logisticians, equipment operators) 

5. Training RC personnel (unique requirements, AC support, planning, scheduling, etc.) 

6. Institutional vs. unit training (e.g., allocation of responsibilities, near-term realities) 

7. Self-development (courses, self-study, professional development) 

A-1
8. Balancing digital and analog training (relative emphasis, trade-offs)

9. TADSS (limitations of current systems, leaders’ vision, future needs) 

10. Training support packages (currently available packages, future requirements, etc.) 

11. Mixing training and testing (priorities, rules of engagement, challenges) 

Logistics: Supporting the unit’s Army and non-Army systems and equipment; encompasses 

sustainment, transportation, evacuation, replacement, contractor support, etc. 

1. CSS organization (redesign, unit structure, suitability, limitations, etc.)

2. CSS fundamentals (e.g., new realities, responsibilities, impact of transition) 

3. CSS enablers (essential ingredients such as digital tools, trained personnel, diagnostics) 

4. Budget aspects of logistics (resourcing, depot-level repairables, avoiding crises, etc.) 

Personnel: Acquiring, assigning, qualifying, utilizing, and retaining military personnel assigned 

to and supporting the unit; includes career management considerations. 

1. Staffing requirements (type and quantity of specialists, shortfalls, etc.)

2. Personnel qualifications (e.g., capabilities, skills, experience, standards)

3. Assignment practices (Army policy, career management, unit procedures, utilization)

4. Personnel stability (turnover, turbulence, stabilization) 

5. Role of specific personnel (e.g., NCOs, mechanics, Fire Support Officer) 

Fielding New Systems: Receiving, inventorying, distributing, and readying new systems; also 

displacing old systems; includes hardware and software, systems of systems, sub-systems, and 

components. 

1. Staying in control (knowing players and their authority, enforcing unit priorities, etc.) 

2. Impact of modernization (systems of systems, non-Army equipment, iterative software

versions) 

3. Displacing equipment (sequencing, scheduling, controlling, etc.)

4. Scheduling (synchronization, lead-time, resolving conflicts, etc.) 

5. Avoiding pitfalls (e.g., do’s and don’ts, cautions, obstacles) 

Unit Organization: Basic TO&E structure and task organization; reflects Reserve Component 

and split-base elements; emphasis on dynamics of change, to include the process and impact of

reorganization. 

1. Organization requirements (operational needs, both met and unmet) 

2. Unit structure (type and number of units, span of control, shortcomings, etc.) 

3. Task organization (e.g., mission considerations, unit roles, location of key assets) 

4. Reserve Component integration (e.g., integration process, challenges, hurdles, impact of 

transition)

5. Split-base issues (e.g., planning, coordination, integration, hurdles) 

6. Reorganization process (controlling the transition, protecting individuals, etc.) 

7. Reorganization impact (roles and functions, operational issues, resource aspects, etc.) 

A-2
Exploiting Digital Technologies: The process of optimizing the operational benefits of new 

systems, both hardware and software; includes soldier dimensions such as proficiency and 

“ownership.” 

1. Battlefield requirements (needs of commanders and staffs, battlespace factors, etc.)

2. Operational impact of new systems (warfighting functions such as information sharing)

3. Digital proficiency (basic requirements, characteristics, skill maintenance, etc.)

4. Involving warfighters (leveraging the special talents available within the unit) 

5. Support requirements (e.g., technicians, diagnostic capabilities) 

Infrastructure for Change: Organizations, facilities, equipment, systems, networks, etc. for

planning, coordinating, controlling, and supporting change; includes training infrastructure. 

1. Change-focused organizations (specific elements, roles and missions, etc.) 

2. Training infrastructure (special facilities, systems, networking, simulation capabilities, etc.)

3. Enablers (digital platforms, connectivity, personnel, resources, etc.) 

4. Army culture (e.g., global culture, local culture, values, traditions, practices) 

Documenting Critical Knowledge: The process for documenting new insights and ideas about 

change management, doctrine and TTP, operational requirements, etc.; encompasses capture, 

dissemination, and institutionalization. 

1. Information requirements (change management, doctrine and TTP, operational needs, etc.) 

2. Capture process (who, where, what, how, when) 

3. Dissemination process (who, where, what, how, when) 

4. Institutionalization of new procedures (updating of unit and Army documents)

Readiness: The impact of change on unit readiness, deployability, and status reporting.

1. Operational status (factors contributing to or characterizing operational effectiveness) 

2. Status reporting (unit status reporting process, unwanted consequences, etc.) 

3. Impact of transformation (operational indicators of combat effectiveness) 

4. Training deficiencies (shortfalls in individual or collective proficiencies)

Measuring Progress: The process of measuring the progress and impact of change;

mechanisms for tracking and documenting changes. 

1. Roadmap for change (goals, objectives, milestones, timetable)

2. Definition of success (concepts, expectations, criteria, standards) 

3. Evaluation process (framework, methods, techniques, procedures, conditions, timing)

Sources of Additional Support: Sources of information and assistance, actual or desired; 

includes resources internal and external to the unit. 

1. Pre-assignment options (e.g., pre-command modules, self-study)

2. Leveraging internal experts (experienced leaders, staff officers, and operators within the unit) 

3. External sources of help (DFCC, CTSF, TSMs, PMs, contractors, etc.) 

4. References (e.g., books, information papers, AWE reports, transcripts) 

A-3
Appendix B 

Interview Guides 

Contents: 

1. Structured Interview Guide for Early Sessions 

2. Knowledge Elicitation Guide (Round 1) 

3. Knowledge Elicitation Guide (Round 2) 

B-1
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE 

for 

EARLY SESSIONS 

(PT No. 60-26A) 

PURPOSE

This guide provides instructions for Team members when they conduct interviews with 

leaders of the 4ID regarding management of change in the EXFOR environment. 

INSTRUCTIONS

A. The purpose of the interview is to capture the leader’s insights and recommendations on the process of managing change in the Army’s cutting-edge digitization 

arena. We are focusing on how the commander and key staff members dealt with 

critical requirements and issues during a period of dramatic change.

B. The interview team will include the facilitator and at least one member to take careful 

notes of the discussion. One member will operate the tape recorder. 

C. Review the separate list of topics/issues before the interview starts. The interviewee 

will have an advance copy of the list. 

D. Verify the total time available as the interview starts. We have to assume we won’t 

be able to run over. 

E. After introductory comments, ask the interviewee what items he wants to discuss.

The Team should follow the lead of the interviewee, until he looks to the facilitator for 

the next question. 

F. All Team members should be unbiased participants. Avoid leading the interviewee 

with our own expectations. 

G. Give the interviewee plenty of time to digest the questions, think things through, and 

ponder the issues before he answers. This may mean some silent periods. 

H. Be sure we understand what the interviewee is saying. Ask for clarification when 

needed. Avoid opening up new areas of discussion. 

I. The note-taker(s) should capture sufficient detail so we will only have to use the

recording for backup purposes. One note-taker should keep track of which issues 

have been deferred, in case a “what’s left?” point arises. 

J. After the interview, organize your notes and enter them into a file as soon as you 

can. One person may integrate all the notes into a unified set. 

B-2
Interview Questions

Early Sessions

Purpose: The purpose of the ARI interview is to capture the lessons you 

have learned and recommendations you have for those that follow you as 

to how to successfully lead and manage at the speed of change in Force

XXI. We are interested in your insights and assessments from the last one/ 

two years and especially any tools and techniques you have developed. 

Our intent is to document and share the lessons you have learned. As we

execute this effort, we will expand our information gathering. 

1. Preparing for the Job (What did you have? What did you need?) 

Pre-Command Course? 

Orientation tour? 

Mentor/access to previous commanders? 

Focus of preparation? 

2. Learning the Job (What did you face? How did you deal with it?) 

External influences – TRADOC (AWEs), Test Community (FDTE, 

IOTE), III Corps (Red Cycle), ADO (Software Drops), FORSCOM 

(Operational Missions).

Internal influences – Training calendar nearly locked, mostly new and 

inexperienced personnel, fixed budget 

Climbing the learning curve 

Transition programs 

OPDs -- formal and informal 

What were the glass balls that you had to keep in the air and how did 

you juggle them? 

3. Creating the Environment that Supports Change 

Continuous change

Risk takers

Team building 

Spiral development (DTLOMS) 

Infrastructure 

B-3
4. Training 

Maintenance of digital skills 

Integration of new personnel 

Step 1, Step 2, Step 3 Methodology

Simulation vs. live training 

Digital education/training 

NCO involvement in digitization 

Integration of analog assets into Division (personnel (RC) and units) 

5. Transitioning to New Division Structure 

Organizational changes (e.g., CSS)

Fielding of materiel and software 

Enablers 

Readiness 

Resource management 

6. Summary

What would you do different? 

What did we miss?

B-4
KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION GUIDE (Round 1) 

(PT No. 60-26B)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FACILITATOR

Explain the purpose of this initial session (see below).

Get permission to tape record the entire session. Have a team member take notes. 

Lead the participant thru the questions that begin on the next page, in dialog mode. 

Follow the questions in sequence, working thru as many as possible.

Adjust to the participant’s interests and strengths: speed ahead if appropriate, 

pursue detail if something’s especially important to him. 

Keep an eye on the clock, using the benchmark times on the next page as a guide.

Afterwards, prepare a transcript ASAP, then give it to the participant to review. 

Put your own notes and insights in a Word file within 24 hours.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANT

During this interview we want to gather knowledge about managing change in digital

units that is not written in manuals or taught in courses. The kind of knowledge we are 

interested in is sometimes referred to as tacit. Tacit knowledge is more likely to be 

learned from practical experience, rather than in a classroom or other formal setting. 

Our goal in this session is to gather lessons you’ve learned about managing change in

your current job. We are especially interested in problems you’ve run into and solutions 

you’ve tried. What you share with us today should be useful to future leaders who will

someday fill your shoes. 

During our work on this project, we’ve identified 14 focal areas that were voiced by

previous leaders. Let’s take a few minutes now to look at those focal areas and their

definitions (attached). We’ll be referring to them as we discuss our questions of

interest. 

With your permission, we’ll tape record the session. Within a few days you’ll receive a 

copy of the transcript for your approval. 

Do you have any questions before we start? Let’s begin. 

B-5
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (Round 1) 

**************************************** 

1a. What are the 3 most important lessons you’ve learned since you started this job? 

(5 minutes) 

1b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Follow-up each lesson with a specific question that asks 

the participant to craft specific guidance for his successor. Ask clarifying questions. 

 (5 minutes)

**************************************** 

2. Rank order the focal areas (attached) in terms of the difficulty of challenges 

presented by each one. (1 is highest, 14 is lowest) (5 minutes) 

**************************************** 

3a. For each of your top five focal areas, please describe at least one specific

challenge and the lesson you learned from it. (10 minutes) 

3b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Follow-up each example with a question that asks the 

participant to craft specific guidance for his successor in dealing with the challenge. 

Ask clarifying questions. (10 minutes)

**************************************** 

4a. Based on our past interviews, we’re particularly interested in a few focal areas 

where previous leaders didn’t have much to say. Would you care to comment on the 

following areas, if not already discussed above? (10 minutes):

Budget Getting Help 

Fielding New Systems Capturing New Knowledge 

Readiness Measuring Progress 

4b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Ask clarifying questions. Follow-up each comment with 

a question asking the participant to craft specific guidance for his successor.

 (10 minutes)

**************************************** 

B-6
5a. Lots of books give broad guidelines on managing change in large organizations. 

From some of those books we’ve culled the following categories: 

Coping with the challenges unique to the 4 ID



















Approach to training

Empowering and motivating subordinates 

Values and culture of the Army and 4 ID

Vision of the Army and 4 ID

Leadership style in the 4 ID

During your tenure in this assignment, you may have made some adjustments because 

of the unique nature of the digital division. For the above six categories, please give

examples of adjustments you’ve made. (10 minutes) 

5b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Try to restate the answer in terms of a lesson learned. 

Ask the participant to craft specific guidance for his successor for each example given. 

 (10 minutes)

**************************************** 

6a. Please comment and share lessons learned on the following as they relate to

managing change within the 4 ID. (10 minutes)

Split-base operations 

Reserve Component integration

Using Army test events as forcing functions to meet training requirements 

Use of civilian contractors to provide support 

6b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Remember to get (or restate) the answer in terms of a 

lesson learned. Ask the participant to craft specific guidance for his successor for each

lesson learned. Have him place each lesson learned in one or more focal areas.

 (10 minutes)

**************************************** 

B-7
FOCAL AREAS OF CHANGE 

A. Command Climate 

Setting unit tone and priorities, 

accommodating the pace of change, 

fostering acceptance of change, learning to 

think differently, motivating leaders and

soldiers

B. Tactics/Doctrine 

Impact of change (digitization, new

weapons, reorganization, etc.) on

doctrine, TTPs, SOPs, and related 

materials

C. Budget 

Acquiring, managing, and conserving funds 

for all aspects of unit

requirements/operations

D. Training 

Unit training (home-station and NTC), 

new equipment training, institutional

training

E. Logistics 

Supporting the unit’s combat systems and 

equipment, post-fielding; may include 

transportation, evacuation, replacement, etc.

F. Personnel 

Acquiring, assigning, qualifying, utilizing, 

and supporting military personnel 

assigned to and supporting the unit

G. Fielding New Systems 

Receiving, inventorying, distributing,

readying, and troubleshooting type-classified

systems 

H. Unit Organization

TO&E structure, to include 

reorganization, split-base elements, RC

components, etc. 

I. Exploiting Digital Technologies

The process of optimizing the operational

benefits of new systems, both type-classified

and experimental

J. Infrastructure for Change 

Organizations and facilities for

supporting change/transition; 

mechanisms for tracking and 

documenting changes; Army culture 

K. Documenting Critical Knowledge 

The process for capturing new insights and 

advice about change management, doctrine 

and TTP, operational requirements, etc. 

L. Readiness 

The impact of change on unit readiness,

deployability, and status reporting

M. Measuring Progress 

The desirability and process of measuring

achievement of unit goals and objectives 

N. Sources of Additional Support 

Sources of information and assistance,

actual or desired; may include 

institutional training, self-development, 

and leveraging previous experience

B-8
KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION GUIDE (Round 2) 

(PT No. 60-26C)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FACILITATOR

Explain the purpose of this KE2 session (see below).

Get permission to tape record the entire session. Have a team member take notes. 

Lead the participant thru the questions that begin on the next page, in dialog mode. 

Follow the questions in sequence, working thru as many as possible.

Adjust to the participant’s interests and strengths: speed ahead if appropriate, 

pursue detail if something’s especially important to him. 

Keep an eye on the clock, using the benchmark times on the next page as a guide.

Afterwards, prepare a transcript within 2 working days, then give it to the participant. 

Put your own notes and insights in a Word file within 24 hours.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANT

During our first interview we explained that we were gathering knowledge about 

managing change in digital units. We want to continue to capture your insights on 

managing change. 

Our goal during this session is to gather lessons you’ve learned about managing

change since last summer. We are especially interested in problems you’ve run into 

and solutions you’ve tried. What you share with us today will extend the knowledge 

base we are assembling.

Inside this guide you’ll find questions to structure this session. At the same time, we

want to be sure to cover things that are especially important to you.

With your permission, we’ll tape record the session. Within a few days you’ll receive a 

copy of the transcript for your approval. 

Do you have any questions before we start?

B-9
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (Round 2) 

1a. What are the 3 most important lessons you learned during the past 6-8 months? Consider 

your experiences from one or more of the following, as appropriate: 

FBCB2 Customer Test 

NTC Rotation 

Division Warfighter

DCX ramp-up (15 minutes) 

1b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Help identify guidance for his successor. Ask about solutions. 

Remember to focus this and following on how change was managed as the unit transitioned to 

the digital force.

2a. How has digitization changed doctrine and TTP? Consider: 

Battlespace factors 

Maneuver 

CS

CSS (15 minutes) 

2b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: How are digital operations different from analog operations? 

For CSS, facilitate discussion on garrison operations as well as tactical operations. 

3a. Based on your recent experience (Customer Test, NTC Rotation, Division Warfighter, DCX 

ramp-up, as appropriate), how has digitization impacted training for combat operations? 

Consider: 

Digital leader skills 

Battle staff proficiencies

Sustainment tasks (15 minutes) 

3b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Try to identify the 3 most important skills/ proficiencies/tasks. 

4a. What advice would you give your successor about fielding new systems, beyond displacing

old equipment? (10 minutes)

4b. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Focus on equipment fielded in unit during last 9 months and 

how it has impacted tactics, battlespace, training, and maintenance. Some may want to start with 

their experience with TOC delivery. Others may want to start with fielding of M1A2 SEP and 

M2A3. 

B-10
5a. What have you done to define and measure the progress your unit has made along its 

digitization path? (5 minutes)

5b. How did you determine that your unit was ready to execute the Customer Test, NTC 

Rotation, Warfighter, DCX (as appropriate)? (5 minutes) 

5c. What would you do differently if you had it to do over? (5 minutes) 

5d. NOTE TO FACILITATOR: Be prepared to explain the importance of measuring progress 

that comes from Sullivan & Harper and other literature.

6a. How did you capture lessons learned during training?

(10 minutes)

6b. How did you disseminate the lessons learned and implement changes within your unit?

(10 minutes)

7. What other topics would you like to discuss?

B-11
Appendix C

Principles of Managing Change in Force XXI 

1. Transformation is hard work

Effort and discomfort of change

Overcoming human resistance 

Facilitating behavior change

2. Values and culture anchor

transformation 

Protecting culture and values 

Values as stability factors 

3. Everyone needs to understand the 

destination and how to get there 

Clear vision of the future 

Creating, focusing, harmonizing energy

Stakes for organizations, individuals 

4. Only people can make transformation 

happen 

Leaders and soldiers as keys

Empowerment 

5. Transformation is a team sport inside

and outside the division

Alliances, teams, cohesive groups 

Distributing leadership 

Expanding responsible players 

6. Surprise should be no surprise 

Unexpected events and processes 

Flexibility and resilience

Exploiting opportunities 

Working through setbacks 

7. Balancing today’s requirements against 

tomorrow’s is key

Today vs. tomorrow

Future resource requirements 

8. Better means becoming a more

effective fighting force

Doing different things

Establishing an edge, winning

9. Forcing functions are essential to focus 

transformation 

Unit events and activities as focusers 

Testing new paradigms 

10.Soldiers learn by doing

Experiencing the future

Sharing new knowledge 

11.Synchronization meshes the gears of

transformation 

Coordinating vertically, horizontally

Integrating and sequencing efforts

12.Leaders must continuously assess 

progress and process 

Measuring progress against goals 

Communicating status and progress 

13.Transformation costs, usually more

than expected 

High expense of transformation 

Surprise as a cost accelerator 

Sources: Sullivan & Harper, 1996; Conner, 1992; Smith, 1996 

C-1
Appendix D

Overview of Senior Leader Transition Book 

Purpose: To provide new 4ID leaders (a) lessons learned by previous leaders and (b) links to 

resources provided by other organizations. 

Target Audience (4ID): Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and Brigade Commanders 

Technical Characteristics: 

Web browser interface optimized for Microsoft Internet Explorer

® 

Contents stored as standard HTML pages 

Internet links implemented as standard HTML hyperlinks 

Delivery medium = compact disc (installation and operation) 

No support infrastructure required 

Major Functions: 

Select major functions via homepage menu buttons 

Review Nuggets from interviews with 4ID leaders

Review complete interview transcripts 

Learn about Force XXI-related organizations (including hyperlink) 

Learn about and reach digitization POCs (via link to DFCC) 

Get how-to-use instructions by reading Orientation 

Contents: 

Transcripts from 4 interviews with 4ID leaders 

Nuggets from 4 interview transcripts, indexed by Focal Areas 

Descriptions of Focal Areas and their origins 

Descriptions of key organizations involved in Force XXI

Library of hyperlinks to external resources 

Transition Book Orientation 

D-1
Appendix E 

Overview of Preliminary Leader’s Tool 

Purpose: 

Facilitate a learning organization environment in tactical units 

Assist 4ID senior leaders in defining and solving change-related problems 

Provide professional development, personal coach, and reference functions 

Enable users to enter their own insights and lessons learned 

Target Audience (4ID): Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and Brigade Commanders 

Technical Characteristics: 

Web browser interface optimized for Microsoft Internet Explorer

® 5.0 

Primary contents stored in relational database (Microsoft Access 2000®) 

Interface-database interaction via Active Server Pages 

Supplemental contents stored as HTML documents 

Internet links implemented as standard HTML hyperlinks 

Operating environment = Web server running Microsoft Internet Information 

Services®

Client environment = PC connected to Intranet (no user installation) 

Restricted access (user authorization table, password protection) 

Development Tools: 

Microsoft FrontPage 2000® 

Microsoft Access 2000®, Microsoft Database Engine® (database environment)

Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML)

Structured Query Language scripting (Active Server Pages) 

Major Functions: 

Navigate via always-present menu bar 

Get how-to-use instructions by reading Orientation 

Learn about Focal Areas, Focal Topics, and Principles 

Search for Nuggets by Focal Area or Focal Topic

Search for Rules by Nugget or Principle 

Review complete interview transcripts 

Learn about and reach Force XXI-related organizations (including hyperlink) 

Translate acronyms on commercial Web site (via hyperlink)

Enter/edit Nuggets, Rules, and Focal Topics (with “private” option) 

Enter/edit Focal Areas and Principles (system administrator only)

Find out who entered (and when) Focal Areas, Focal Topics, Principles, and Rules 

Edit contents at large (system administrator only)

Obtain help on using Leader’s Tool functions 

E-1
Contents: 

Leader’s Tool Orientation 

Nuggets and Rules (user-expandable), indexed by Focal Topics or Principles

Transcripts from 16 interviews with 4ID leaders 

Descriptions of Focal Areas, Focal Topics, and Principles 

Library of hyperlinks to external resources 

Descriptions of key organizations involved in Force XXI

Help file

Read-me files (user documentation, system administrator documentation) 

Support Environment: 

No routine operating support required 

Unit-furnished system administrator (part-time) for maintenance functions 

User documentation and system administrator documentation (read-me files) 

Pre-Planned Enhancements: 

Expanded target audience (vertically and horizontally) 

Interactive wizard for intelligent search of database contents 

Audio/video library for orientation, familiarization, and professional development 

Army and unit-specific reference documents (e.g., SOPs, MTPs) 

Interactive wizard(s) to support solving change-related problems 

Interactive wizard(s) to support change-related decision making

Remote access (on-the-road or in-the-field)

Interactive help wizard, with frequently asked questions 

Text-to-speech and speech-to-text conversion capabilities 

Job aids in the form of checklists, templates, guides, etc.

Collaborative interaction via chat rooms, message boards and/or user groups 

Interactive wizard for system administration and maintenance functions 

Manual, cued, and automated customization of the interface

E-2
Appendix F

Sample Nuggets and Rules 

This appendix contains sample products of the MASC-XXI project’s knowledge analysis 

method: 

Nuggets (pieces of interview transcripts) with tag lines 

Focal Topics into which each Nugget was classified, grouped under Focal Areas 

Rules derived from each Nugget, grouped under Principles 

Sample #1 

TAG LINE: Pushing for digital capabilities 

NUGGET: 

You get exactly what you are willing to tolerate in this business. If you are willing to 

accept no red icons on an MCS screen, that you are not getting a red feed, then that’s what

you’re going to get. But if you say, “No, that’s unsatisfactory,” then you can get red icons on 

the screen. A classic example happened with the 6.1.1 software. I did a Janus exercise in 

October. The 1st BCT had just finished an NTC rotation. The ADC-M came back and said, 

“No, you can’t do that.” I didn’t know we couldn’t. I said to [the technical manager in the 

CTSF], “Terry, we have to get this thing fixed.” He sent people to look at the problem. They

said, “Oh, that’s just a patch.” 

Talk to the right people, get the right things. It’s unsatisfactory to accept that a UAV 

can’t pass that information, it’s got to be written on a piece of paper and carried across the 

TOC. Time out, get the right guy and get the thing fixed. In this case, within hours the 

problem was fixed. 

What you can and cannot do is not as hard and fast as some people would lead us to 

believe. The biggest thing you have to do as a commander is be wary of people who tell you 

the stuff can’t work. You have to believe in the stuff. 

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Command Climate Setting the Unit Tone

Exploiting Digital 

Technologies Battlefield Requirements

Fielding New Systems Avoiding Pitfalls 

PRINCIPLES RULES

Only people can make 

transformation happen 

Push to get the digital capabilities you need—find the right 

people to make it happen

Transformation is hard work When people tell you something can’t be done, challenge 

the right person to find a way

F-1
Sample #2 

TAG LINE: Reinforcing procedural knowledge for digital warfighting

NUGGET: 

Unit leaders have to be involved. We were under great pressure to get the 6.2 drop 

implemented. It was estimated that would take 3 weeks and we had only one week to do it. 

We looked at the POI in terms of what tasks the soldiers had to learn in the classroom. Then 

we set up TOCs in the CTOC. The soldiers operated out of the BN TOCs set up in the CTOC 

at night. We would have 2-8 Infantry pass information to 1-67 Armor and vice versa. What 

the soldiers learned during the day, they executed at night with repetition between one another

to reinforce the work, under their chain of command supervision so we all had a common 

understanding of what they learned each day.

This is not how we typically conceptualize training. It is not really individual to 

collective. It is more a series of individual training events. I am an individual operator and 

I’m going to build a common operating picture with another individual operator and I’m going

to send message traffic, etc. etc. It’s an additive group of individual tasks. We tried to identify

what they could do as a result of the individual training in CCTT and then rehearsed in the 

CTOC. For that kind of procedural knowledge you really have to reinforce it. 

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Training Training Fundamentals 

Training Specific Groups 

PRINCIPLES RULES

Soldiers learn by doing

Immediately put new system-specific skills to work in 

practical unit exercises 

Deliberately link individual training with collective

training exercises, to reinforce the progression of digital 

skills 

F-2
Sample #3 

TAG LINE: “Out-of-the-box” logistic solutions for NTC training

NUGGET: 

We are making progress at solving some of these [logistics] issues, especially with

regard to things that we are doing now for DCX. The logistics community is working with 

DLA [Defense Logistics Agency], AMC [Army Materiel Command], and others to preposition some parts in depots very close to the NTC (or whatever training site you may have). 

We have identified the requirements. At issue is the funding to support those requirements. I

believe funding is an issue in everything we do. 

One of the reasons we wanted the parts pre-positioned in the depots as opposed to the 

ASL is that as soon as they are pre-positioned in your ASL you buy the parts. This is out-ofthe-box type logistics support that we have not had to deal with in the past. Before, the cost of 

maintaining our systems and parts was considerably less and we could afford to maintain our 

systems. We no longer have that luxury. 

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Logistics 

Budget Aspects of Logistics 

CSS Fundamentals 

PRINCIPLES RULES

Transformation costs, 

usually more than expected 

Consider pre-positioning repair parts in depots close to 

remote training sites such as the NTC, as a means of

reducing the impact maintenance has on the budget 

F-3
Sample #4 

TAG LINE: Incremental process for improving ATCCS

NUGGET: 

We [consider] what capabilities we want that we don't have and what capabilities the 

system is supposed to provide that it does not. That drives us back to ... making the fixes 

required incrementally. For example, we find that MCS light and MCS heavy can exchange 

graphics. That's fairly significant because the majority of our MCS systems are the lights and 

the majority of the planning is done with the lights. The plans are then passed to the heavy

systems, because multiple folks can work on them simultaneously. We now have books that 

describe what the system should be able to do. DFCC can provide copies of those. 

The challenge is that this is incremental. If one of the things you wanted to be able to 

do is share graphics, you never know what you want beyond that until you are able to share 

graphics. Now I know that I can share graphics. Now what do I want to be able to do? You 

attack this incrementally because until you know what one thing will do, you often don't know 

what to ask for next. 

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Exploiting Digital 

Technologies Battlefield Requirements

Fielding New Systems Impact of Modernization 

PRINCIPLES RULES

Leaders must continuously

assess progress and process 

Identify system improvements that will enhance

warfighting capabilities, then push to get the improvements 

implemented

Only people can make 

transformation happen 

Push to get the digital capabilities you need—find the right 

people to make it happen

Balancing today’s 

requirements against 

tomorrow’s is key

Plan on an iterative process for improving new systems 

because you will be identifying requirements 

incrementally, in progressive fashion 

F-4
Sample #5 

TAG LINE: Combining training and testing in the same event 

NUGGET: 

Well, we had to go back and look at the battle tasks and the METLs. We had to ask 

ourselves, Which ones can we master and which ones do we not have time for? Time was the

problem more than anything else was. 

We recognized we had to do a LUT with the 1st Brigade. All right, while we are doing

the LUT, we also have a combat mission that we may have to perform. Can we in the 

construct of that LUT—above and beyond the gathering of data for that LUT, which is very

important to the Army for FBCB2—build a scenario that actually trains the battle staffs and 

companies for their combat mission at the same time? Where do they differ? And in some

cases in doing these tests, you take risks. And you say, “Well, we should do it this way

because this is how we would prepare for combat, but they can't gather the data to do it”. ... 

We will have to do it this way no matter what, just so the data can be gathered. That is where

you have to balance. You say, “Okay, not an optimum solution, but are we getting something

out of it?” I think that was the biggest challenge with 1st Brigade in particular. Every time we

put them [units] out there with FBCB2, we have to ask, “Are we getting something from it?”

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Command Climate Setting and Protecting Unit Priorities 

Training Mixing Training and Testing

PRINCIPLES RULES

Synchronization meshes the 

gears of transformation 

Work multiple purposes, or axes, into the same event. For

example, build a scenario that gives battlestaffs combatrelevant training during a system test. 

Leaders must continuously

assess progress and process 

Assess training calendar events in terms of their 

contribution to unit axes/priorities. What is the unit getting

out of each event?

Balancing today’s 

requirements against 

tomorrow’s is key

Whenever possible, plan events so they support more than 

one axis. Normally this will contribute to both today’s and 

tomorrow’s requirements.

Realize that the data collection environment may limit 

what the unit gets out of a test in terms of preparing for 

combat

F-5
Sample #6 

TAG LINE: Overcoming the zero-defect mentality

NUGGET: 

When you tell people that they are supposed to learn, you take away the zero defect 

mentality. Also, the AAR process became very healthy because it became learning, rather

than stump the chump. ... When the division commander says, "I’ve learned something

today," and he relays that to the soldiers, you have a healthy environment. 

Let me use an example. Specialist so-and-so showed us that when we pushed this 

button and sent that report back, it would clog up the system. We didn't know that was going

to happen. That doesn't mean that the unit messed up by clogging up the system with 

somebody's Spot reports. It meant that we discovered something. That was a trained and 

ready soldier who was at the tip of the spear and said, “Here is what I see.” Then he put it in

the report and sent it back. Oh, by the way, everybody else sent it back and it clogged up the 

system. That is a hardware and software problem, not a soldier problem. 

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Command Climate Setting the Unit Tone

Exploiting Digital 

Technologies Involving Warfighters 

Documenting Critical

Knowledge 

Capture Process 

PRINCIPLES RULES

Only people can make 

transformation happen 

Create a learning environment by communicating that one 

of the unit’s jobs is to learn how to fight digitally—there is 

no right or wrong way

Create a non-threatening environment by communicating

that learning is the key, not placing blame 

Use learning-focused AARs to maintain a healthy,

constructive environment

Soldiers learn by doing Encourage soldiers to share what they’ve learned about 

systems and procedures—both positive and negative 

F-6
Sample #7 

TAG LINE: Critical role of sensors for surveillance

NUGGET: 

As the Division Commander in the Division AWE and subsequently in the Corps 

Warfighter and the exercises in between, it did not bother me to have gaps between brigades, 

as long as I had electronic sensors to keep looking at those gaps and tell me if there's anything

there that I needed to worry about. It didn't bother me that I didn't have ground forces sitting

there to report to me. It caused me some concern, but it wasn't sufficient to cause the Division 

to do something like locking arms and become more linear in our thinking. 

Of course, there certainly are some great dangers in what I just said. We aren't going to

have JSTARS flying overhead all the time. Maybe we will have sufficient time, if theater

commanders recognize the fragility of this Division and the necessity to have the Division 

spread out on the battlefield. They must recognize that there has to be some priority given to 

the Division ... to give us JSTARS downlinks to make sure we can see, perhaps at the expense 

of what the theater commander wants to do with JSTARS. There is going to be a lot of push 

and tug and pull and stretch and all that. 

In the Division, both at the division and brigade level, we are constantly conducting

deep and close fights and are very dependent on the UAV to give us critical information that 

we would not get otherwise. 

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Tactics/Doctrine Impact of Technology

Exploiting Digital Technologies Battlefield Requirements

PRINCIPLES RULES

Better means becoming a more

effective fighting force 

Rely on electronic sensors (JSTARS, UAV) to 

cover gaps between ground forces 

Carefully coordinate the division’s JSTARS 

requirements with higher echelons 

F-7
Sample #8 

TAG LINE: Imperative to have focus-events and personnel stability for effective training

NUGGET: 

If you want good, solid training, understanding of change, and results in the exercise 

that you've got down the road a couple of months, then there are a couple of things that you 

have to have. The first thing is focus. You have to have something that you're looking

forward to, something that you're focused on. Once upon a time we called it forcing functions. 

The ... [Division AWE] forced the Division and the entire community to focus exclusively on 

that event. All the different pieces and parts ... would come together, because everybody was 

looking forward to it. Be it an experiment, training event or whatever ... the whole 

organization must have some main effort upon which ... [to] focus. 

The second thing you have to have is some degree of stability in people. ... To get the 

most out of an organization, you must have the same people around when you go through 

preparatory exercises—1, 2, 3 and 4—for all the learning that takes place in each and all the 

corrections that take place in between them. In the absence of that, you ... are going to have to 

reteach people over and over again. 

FOCAL AREAS FOCAL TOPICS 

Training Training Fundamentals 

Command Climate Setting and Protecting Unit Priorities 

Personnel Personnel Stability

PRINCIPLES RULES

Forcing functions are essential 

to focus transformation 

Focus unit activities by anchoring to a major event such

as the DCX or an NTC rotation 

Only people can make 

transformation happen 

Take steps to ensure a high degree of personnel stability

for major events

Recognize that poor personnel stability will force you to 

retrain the same tasks over and over 

F-8
Appendix G

Candidate Enhancements for the Leader’s Tool

The following targets for enhancing and expanding the Leader’s Tool technology were 

identified during the course of the MASC-XXI project. They are listed without regard to priority

or resource requirements.

Expand the target audience, both vertically and horizontally, through additional 

knowledge elicitation and analysis 

Convert data entry functions to an interactive wizard 

Develop an interactive wizard for intelligent search capabilities 

Add user-desired reference materials (e.g., unit SOPs, tactical task lists)

Develop a graphics library illustrating digital equipment and operations 

Add a multi-media library (video files with sound, etc.) for digital familiarization and 

professional development 

Synthesize Rules to produce a more compact library

Expand the Help file to an interactive wizard

Add Frequently Asked Questions based on early implementation experience

Establish intranet chat rooms, message boards, and user groups for collaborative 

interaction and knowledge exchange

Develop interactive wizard(s) to support change-related problem solving and 

decision-making

Develop capabilities to tailor the tool’s features based on user-entered preferences, 

unit/echelon/experience, and/or usage history

Add speech-to-text and text-to-speech conversion capabilities to accommodate 

sensory preferences of users 

Develop interactive wizard(s) to support system administration and maintenance 

functions 

G-1
Appendix H 

Suggested Reading 

In addition to the sources listed in the References section, the following materials are 

suggested for learning more about managing change and transformation. 

Alberts, D. (1996). The unintended consequences of information. Washington, DC: National 

Defense University. 

Berry, F. C. (1993). Inventing the future: How science and technology transform our world. 

Washington, DC: Brassey’s. 

Collins, J. C., & Porras, J. I. (1994). Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies. 

New York: Harper Business. 

Drucker, P. F. (1995). Managing in a time of great change. New York: Truman Talley/Dutton. 

Dunnigan, J. F. (1996). Digital soldiers. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 

Gouillart, F. J., & Kelly, J. N. (1995). Transforming the organization. New York: McGrawHill. 

Heifetz, R. A. (1994). Leadership without easy answers. Cambridge: Belknap Press. 

Katzenbach, J. R. (1995). Real change leaders. New York: Times Business. 

Negroponte, N. (1995). Being digital. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 

Senge, P. M., Kleiner, A., Roberts, C., Ross, R. B., & Smith, B. J. (1994). The fifth discipline

fieldbook: Strategies and tools for building a learning organization. New York: Doubleday. 

Sullivan, G. R., & Coroalles, A. M. (1995). The Army in the information age. Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. 

Wheatley, M. J. (1992). Leadership and the new science. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. 

H-1
Appendix I 

Acronyms and Abbreviations 

1CD 1st Cavalry Division 

4ID 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

AAR After Action Review 

ABCS Army Battle Command System

AC Active Component 

ADC-M Assistant Division Commander — Maneuver 

ADC-S Assistant Division Commander — Support 

ADO Army Digitization Office

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AFRU Armored Forces Research Unit 

AMC United States Army Materiel Command 

ARI US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

ASAS All Source Analysis System 

ASL Authorized Stockage List

ASP Active Server Page

ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System 

AWE Advanced Warfighting Experiment 

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BRT Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (now Brigade Cavalry Troop) 

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 

CAS Close Air Support 

CCTT Close Combat Tactical Trainer 

CD Compact Disc

CG Commanding General 

CofS Chief of Staff 

COTS Commercial Off the Shelf

CQ Charge of Quarters 

CS Combat Support 

CSS Combat Service Support 

CSSCS Combat Service Support Control System 

CTC Combat Training Center

CTOC Configurable Tactical Operations Center 

CTSF Central Technical Support Facility

DAP Data Access Page

DCX Division Capstone Exercise 

DFCC Digital Force Coordination Cell 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

I-1
DOIM Directorate of Information Management 

DTAC Division Tactical Command Post 

DTLOMS Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers 

EXFOR Experimental Force 

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 

FDD First Digital Division 

FEA Front-end Analysis 

FDTE Force Development Test and Evaluation 

FIST Fire Support Team 

FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command 

FSC Forward Support Company

HTML Hyper-Text Markup Language 

IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team

IOTE Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

KE Knowledge Elicitation 

LAN Local Area Network

LUT Limited Users Test 

MASC-XXI Managing at the Speed of Change in Force XXI

MCS Maneuver Control System

METL Mission Essential Task List 

MTO&E Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 

MTP Mission Training Plan

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

NTC National Training Center

O/C Observer/Controller 

OPD Officer Professional Development 

POC Point of Contact 

POI Program of Instruction 

PM Project Manager 

QA Quality Assurance 

RC Reserve Component 

I-2
SA Situational Awareness 

SICPS Standardized Integrated Command Post System

SME Subject Matter Expert 

SOP Standing Operating Procedures 

SQL Structured Query Language

SU Situational Understanding

TADSS Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations 

TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment 

TOC Tactical Operations Center 

TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TSM TRADOC System Manager 

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

TV Television 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

UFD User Functional Description 

UFR Unfunded Requirement 

I-3