ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL MILITARY

STRATEGIES

FOR THE UNITED STATES

Conrad C. Crane

Reporting Author

December 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-040-0

ii
Although the close results of the recent election may 

weakened administration and a split Congress, some 

decisions will need to be made about the future cou

American national security strategy. Everyone agree

there is a mismatch between current military mission

resources, but opinions about how to fix it vary widel

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have to a

all the relevant issues and provide useful recommendat

the new administration as it develops a new security stra

The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Arm

College and the Georgetown University Center for Pea

Security Studies convened a conference on “Alter

Military Strategies for the United States” to highlight t

issues that will have to be analyzed by the QDR and th

administration’s security planning. This report summ

the presentations from a distinguished group of panelis

included many prominent American commentato

national security issues.

The report closes with an analysis of the most imp

issues that must be resolved to produce a viable na

security strategy for the new millennium. This strate

require some combination of new mission priorities, add

force structure, and Department of Defense economizin

report provides a useful overview of the various posit

those areas, and is a good starting point for those try

grasp the intricacies of future QDR debates.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Ins

in September 2000 after 26 years of military servic

concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at th

Military Academy. He has written or edited books 

Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea

published articles on military issues in such journals 

Journal of Strategic Studies, The Journal of M

History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian, as w

in a number of collections and reference books. He h

B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy along with an 

and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a gradu

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College a

U.S. Army War College.

iv
STRATEGIES

FOR THE UNITED STATES

Introduction.

The U.S. Army War College and the Georg

University Center for Peace and Security Studies, 

with its National Security Studies Program, cospons

conference in Washington, DC on September 21, 20

examine the issues that will shape future American d

policy. Discussion panels were structured to identi

questions, issues, and schisms likely to shape the upc

Quadrennial Defense Review. Among the 160 atte

registered for the conference were representatives fro

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) offices for a

Services and the Joint Staff, as well as defense expert

other government agencies, private industry, and acad

The conference was divided into four panels. Th

session discussed what the focus should be for U.S. d

planners for the next 10 to 20 years. The second loo

the issues involved in transforming the militar

Department of Defense (DoD) for that future. The 

panel debated how the near-term U.S. defense b

should be allocated for force structure, manpowe

modernization. The last analyzed what the next Na

Military Strategy should be. This report summariz

presentations of the main speakers and highligh

myriad issues they illuminated about formulating a 

American national security strategy.

Planning Focus.

Alan Goldman opened the first panel w

presentation entitled “Peer Level Threats to U.S. 

Interests.” He lamented the incoherence in cu

1
resulting primarily from an inability to develop 

forecasts of long-range threats. The world appear

threatening, but is also more uncertain. The spectr

possible threats ranges from terrorism to weapons o

destruction, but specifics are hard to discern.

Goldman argued that force planners should in

focus on being able to fight major wars to defend U.S

national interests. He listed five, derived from work 

Commission on America’s National Interests in 1996

are:

• Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of NBC a

on the United States;

• Prevent the emergence of a hostile hegem

Europe or Asia;

• Prevent the emergence of a hostile power o

borders or in control of the seas;

• Prevent the catastrophic collapse of major 

systems; and,

• Ensure the survival of U.S. allies.

A force designed to safeguard these interests shoul

deter major threats.

Goldman argued that Americans too easily dism

chance of the emergence of a peer competitor, wh

defined as a nation or rival coalition capable of domi

Europe or Asia. Also, history is filled with examp

weaker nations dissatisfied with the status qu

attacked stronger ones when it appeared that waiting 

only make the strategic imbalance worse. Underestim

of these possibilities increases the potential to be surp

and traditional American reluctance to bear the co

superpower status means initial phases of the nation’

usually involve building up forces recovering 

2
available in the future, so there is a clear need to h

force always ready to fight major wars to protec

interests.

Timothy Hoyt agreed that strategic planning ne

remain focused on winning major theater wars (M

Expensive and difficult wars in Asia or the Middle Ea

still possible, and the most serious threat we face

asserted that an American heavy corps remains the 

significant military force on the planet, and such 

influence other actors on the international scene th

deterrence, conflict limitation, and speedy war termi

when they are committed. These capabilities will b

more important if China or Russia emerges as a 

competitor. Maintaining the capability to fight MT

critical for broader international stability.

Hoyt pointed out that in the past America has rel

sea barriers, mobilization, technology, and its indu

base to win wars. New weapons take a long time to d

and produce, however, and the industrial base has dec

There will be no time to mobilize and train forces for 

conflicts in the 21st century. He admitted that maint

MTW capability is expensive, but it is cheaper than th

of war, and the United States might not be able to re

the ability to fight MTWs if it is allowed to disappea

British Army never recovered the capability it sac

during the period between the World Wars, with disa

consequences.

Despite these strong arguments for maintaining 

focus and capability, that is not the most probable t

conflict the nation will face. In his presentation, “The 

Military Power in Crisis, Conflict and Stability Opera

Ambassador Robert Oakley asserted that future cris

evolve from the rising number of failed states alon

developing nations disgruntled that the 20 percent 

world’s population in advanced countries uses 86 per

the planet’s resources. Traditional concepts of na

3
and challenges to public order. Seriously troubled 

threaten access to vital resources, create troubl

refugee flows, serve as sanctuaries for criminal

terrorists, and become catalysts for regional confli

instability. Oakley noted that the United States cur

expends many billion dollars a year on such countrie

Oakley explained that this changed environment 

questions of when, where, and how to intervene 

complex. It requires much more civil-military plannin

cooperation, and might necessitate a change in 

military organization. Although the potential for unil

action exists, the consensus is that future Am

military operations will be expeditionary, joint

combined. Oakley argued that the Army needs to foll

lead of the Navy and Air Force to organize into sm

modular formations. DoD must link better with 

governmental and nongovernmental agencies to e

unity of effort. Military power employed without 

well-defined, and attainable political objectives will f

the long run, the best strategy may be to emphasi

diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian actions nec

to prevent the creation of failed states requiring m

intervention. 

Robert Steele continued this emphasis on a dif

approach to force planning with a briefing that cons

“Non-traditional Threats.” He predicted a future 

high intensity conflicts level off, low intensity co

increase, and internal political and ethnic violence 

through the roof.” Genocides, water shortages, and 

will wrack the world. He described four threat types

tech brutes fighting conventional wars, low tech 

engaged in low intensity conflict, high tech seers focu

information warfare, and low tech seers engaged in a 

In his opinion, those transformers who think these t

can all be met with a single “Army After Next” bas

revolution in military affairs (RMA) technology are 

touch with the future strategic environment. Steele a

4
capable of handling regional conflicts, crime, home de

and intrastate problems. He believes that the nature 

has fundamentally changed, requiring a focus on th

people more than complicated technology and a reali

that national security begins with “day-to-day good 

from governmental agencies other than DoD. $100 m

will buy an aircraft carrier, 1000 potential str

thinkers, 10,000 Peace Corps volunteers, or a million 

meters of desalinated water. Force planners in th

administration will have to make appropriate trade

design the right security instruments to implemen

strategy, and Steele believes expensive high tech

military forces should not be the highest priority.

Defense Transformation Issues.

The second panel concentrated on how the m

services should change to respond to the new t

mentioned in the earlier session, and to take advant

the technological advances that are affecting the w

fight. James Blaker began by pointing out that th

widespread agreement that warfare is changing. Th

debate is over the speed, depth, and drivers of that ch

and whether we need to alter our military organizat

embrace a “Revolution in Military Affairs.” Blaker be

that we do. He described the key ways he though

warfare was evolving. In his view, mass armies that f

close range in sequential phases are being replaced by 

agile forces that engage from a distance in conc

operations. Joint requirements are replacing those 

services, and civilian decisionmakers are increa

dominant over their military counterparts. He argue

debate and experimentation must be encouraged to 

sure that the services have the right type of personn

organizations by 2010 or 2020 to meet the challenge

take advantage of the opportunities resulting fro

RMA. 

5
adding that transformation will also be essential to c

future adversaries applying asymmetric stra

designed to counter or avoid our strengths. For examp

noted, “Access problems are coming to a theater nea

Fiscal pressures will also force DoD to be more efficien

process of radical change must begin now, since it t

long time and there is no guarantee that the initial pa

be the right one. The goal should be to preserve con

U.S. military superiority against all threats and to e

American military power can achieve national intere

an acceptable level of risk.

While all the services have accepted the need for c

and are pursuing and testing new ideas, Flournoy 

number of barriers to transformation. There is 

complacency about the effort because of the perceive

of major threats or a challenge to current American m

superiority. Today’s high operational tempo also de

from the effort and energy necessary for innov

Services tend to underestimate the requiremen

transformation since there is no good way to me

progress. Additionally, the process is hampered 

zero-defects military culture that discourages e

mentation, along with the divisive suspicion of inters

rivalry. And real world threats and operations are alw

distraction from any future planning.

Despite these obstacles, Flournoy is convinced 

meaningful military transformation should and c

accomplished. She argued that the keys to achievin

goal will be the development of new operational co

and a rationalization of DoD organizations. She adv

some increased funding for the process, but argued th

more important to accelerate the pace with com

emphasis and cultural changes. After develop

well-defined vision for changing DoD and its compo

senior leaders should create a clear roadmap to 

transformation efforts and create a sense of ur

Service cultures need to be altered to encourage exper

6
them must catalyze and integrate transformation e

Flournoy admitted that to make the process work

leaders must also be willing to accept additional r

meeting near term threats. They will have to perf

complicated balancing act between near, mid, and 

term demands.

The last speaker on the panel, Michael O’Hanlo

much less sanguine about the chances to achieve sign

transformation with the resource constraints that wil

He noted that the next administration will not be incli

spend as much on defense as the current strategy dem

Campaign promises of a five or ten billion dollar a

increase for DoD fall far short of the estimated 50 

dollars required to match capabilities to missions 

pursuing modernization and research. Yet ove

commitments will be hard to reduce, since most 

regions of considerable strategic interest and 

bipartisan support. Therefore, any transformation 

will have to be very economical, and compete 

procurement, recapitalization and a high tempo of n

operations for defense funds. He also believes that w

current state of technology and doctrinal innov

wholesale transformation of the services in the next d

does not make sense anyway. He recommended a 

modest approach focusing research and developmen

selective modernization on those electronic, senso

munition technologies that have the potential fo

revolutionary change. In his view, the services n

invest more in research, while cutting back extensive 

for modernization.

Keynote Address.

One of the highlights of the gathering was the ke

speech by General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), f

Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. Central Comma

provided his own views on the direction national se

7
of his involvement in the readiness and transform

debates, “Ready for what?” and “What needs to chang

perceives that there has been a lack of American fo

engagement planning during a period he described a

third reordering of the world in the twentieth centur

argued that the regional CINCs have not been g

enough resources to adequately shape their the

General Zinni also pointed out that with the cu

complex international political situation comes a rise 

threats like organized crime and failed states that de

new approaches. The United States may need two ki

military forces, one large and at a high level of rea

prepared to fight two MTWs, and another more flex

handle less traditional missions. The nation needs to e

its own asymmetrical advantages in technology

response, the ability to expand the battlefield

information gathering, while at the same time reva

the interagency process and carefully identifyin

capabilities each service really needs. He fu

emphasized that the services need to involve the Am

people in this process and maintain their confidence i

military competence, so parents will continue to send 

sons and daughters to serve the nation in uniform.

Force Structure, Manpower, and Modernizatio

Carl Conetta opened the third panel by arguing th

United States could spend significantly less on d

without endangering its security priorities. He state

DoD could be reduced to 1.2 million uniformed per

and a budget of $250 billion in today’s dollars by 20

thinks the nation’s policies for the use of military forc

become detached from threats and are too amb

probably unworkable, and possibly counterprodu

Additionally, DoD has not taken advantage of chan

warfare or new management practices to inc

efficiency. He pointed out that 20 percent of the se

base structure is excess, and maintenance depots, t

8
extra capacity.

Conetta believes that military forces need to retu

focus on the “respond” element of our current “

respond, prepare” strategy. In his view shapin

preparing were overemphasized on the last QDR; th

belongs to the State Department, and the United 

doesn’t need a large active force for the latter. Fo

presence could be reduced in favor of strong deter

Money could also be saved by admitting that th

advances from a military-technical revolution are 

future, and by avoiding big investments in in

technology, like the F-22, today. He also argued 

planners overestimate the requirements for a major t

war against declining rogue states, and could save f

resources by dropping the goal of quick victories in m

wars and adopting a “win-hold-win” approach. But 

are far less likely to occur than a host of sm

contingencies. He warned that current American 

forces are in danger of becoming strategically irreleva

future warfare, and need to adopt modern informatio

business practices that favor smaller but more f

tactical units. Additionally, the services need to bette

the needs of operational deployment, unit training

personnel development by gearing these needs away 

global protracted wars and toward the smaller 

contingencies that they are actually doing.

The next presenter, Daniel Gouré, disagreed st

with Conetta. Gouré opened by asking three questio

the United States going to remain engaged in the w

Does it need a spectrum of military capabilities? D

want to retain its qualitative military edge? He then p

out that although an affirmative consensus has 

reached on all these issues, there is still a $50 billion 

billion budget shortfall to pay for the forces required 

maintain the industrial base to support them. Wh

fiscal constraints necessitate a cutback in force struct

missions, the current strategic approach cannot be 

9
reduce operations and support costs, and older equipm

increasingly expensive to maintain. He argued th

biggest problem is in the procurement of new system

that modernizing the entire force will cost $164 bi

year for the next decade. He fears that American m

forces are entering a new period of vulnerability, and 

transformation is needed, it will not be possible w

more money. He advocated a return to spending 4 per

the U.S. gross domestic product on defense. The count

afford that, and historically has paid even a higher a

to guarantee its security.

The last speaker on this panel, Steven Kosiak, a

that the budget is insufficient to support the imp

missions that the military must perform, but he 

bipartisan agreement on a ceiling of about $300 bill

defense. A key part of his solution to this problem, sim

one of Conetta’s ideas, is to cut back on current mo

zation in favor of research and development that wil

transform the force in 20 years. Rogue states are not b

advanced systems. Kosiak argued that some force str

will have to be cut today to economize funds, but the 

must invest for an uncertain and dangerous future. H

this process as part of an historical trend toward s

and more capital-intensive militaries.

The Big Picture: What Military Strategy Shoul

Cindy Williams led off the last panel by disc

approaches that she believes should be used to sha

next national military strategy. First, she explaine

she disagrees with senior military leaders who want a 

that is “strategy based, not resource based.” They wan

able to list all the missions they have been asked or w

do, and then let DoD identify the forces and program

will be necessary to meet those requirements 

acceptable risk and calculate the cost to prese

Congress. Williams argued that “the essence of 

10
competing interests and missions, precisely when res

are constrained.” She doubts that military budget

grow much in the coming years, anyway, and asserte

force structure and modernization cutbacks are far 

likely than large funding increases for defense. The 

needs to decide what missions are most importan

affordable within current spending realities.

Next, Williams attacked the use of two MTWs 

force-sizing principle that has become the centerp

declared U.S. military strategy. However, the mis

between this declaratory strategy and actual oper

involving peace operations and shaping mission

caused considerable friction. The forces structured f

MTWs are really not configured for the actual operat

the past decade, causing considerable strain on 

demand, low density” units and personnel types th

used repeatedly, and Cold War-based readiness repo

skewed so that a unit may be declared unready to figh

MTW, but might be perfectly able to carry out the s

scale contingency (SSC) it has been assigned b

President. She argued that future military strateg

force structure should be modified to meet the rea

current operations. First priority should be given to a 

MTW, with second priority assigned to a force for SSC

agreed with Carl Conetta that the military’s role in sh

could be done at lower cost and with less risk by c

institutions and resources, and this would also leave a 

peaceful impression of the United States abroad.

Seth Cropsey followed with a presentation that fo

on what he perceives as threats to the sense of purpo

direction of the American military. Most of what the U

States has worked to accomplish within the last cen

within its grasp, and Cropsey credits much of that suc

the ability of its armed services to win wars, 

protecting the nation and its allies. However, 

concerned because the idea that a military is maintain

combat is being gradually replaced by “vague notion

11
armed forces about their purpose.”

Cropsey mentioned a series of policies that have 

this trend. After properly cutting force strength aft

Cold War, Congress and the Executive Branch 

changed the stated purpose of the armed forces by ad

plethora of noncombat roles. Though there are many 

right about these missions, he wonders whethe

military will be able to maintain its central values w

concentrated on competing ones. There are already s

erosion. In a recent survey of service members, o

percent said they were willing to risk their liv

necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission

decline has also been furthered by the military’s incr

emphasis on force protection resulting from terrorist 

and the executive branch’s insistence on zero casual

practice that often reduces the effectiveness of the way 

fight. Cropsey asked, “Is our military’s mission to p

itself or defeat an enemy?”

He also perceives the RMA as another “uninten

source of diversion from traditional military values.” 

it promises great benefits, he sees no one pointing 

negative effects. Precise, standoff weapons enco

leaders to expect that objectives can be achieved w

risking military lives, and the armed forces have be

embrace that idea as well. Junior leaders are bec

frustrated when their judgments are overridden by 

commanders who believe they have the same informa

their on-scene subordinates.

Cropsey expressed great concern about the dec

American nuclear deterrence of rogue states. If they l

one or two weapons of mass destruction at the U

States, he doubts the nation will retaliate with a 

strike. Instead American leaders would probably 

respond proportionately, but that would still only kill 

innocent civilians without harming the dic

responsible. The best alternative would be to have a 

12
whole armed force at risk, a real threat to a small t

But that will require having warriors willing and a

perform that mission. Cropsey closed by stating th

American military should remain focused on fieldin

best motivated combat force in the world, and “forg

other stuff.”

The last panelist at the conference, Colonel W

Anderson, agreed that the primary focus for the m

should be winning wars, but argued that all the elem

“shape, respond, and prepare” could be accomplishe

proper resources. The three elements have synergy th

help mitigate risk, and he predicted that the next na

security strategy would not be much different. But w

proper funding, the nation is on a glide path to unacce

levels of risk in meeting American security objective

so-called “Peace Dividend” was an illusion, and the U

States now finds itself with a “deterrence gap” that 

decisionmakers into a consequence management rol

a crisis occurs instead of allowing them to prevent 

described Army efforts to maintain the “legacy force” 

developing interim and objective follow-ons, but also 

that the multidimensional challenges facing the 

services will require more capable joint forces as wel

Anderson explained that the “2 MTW” appro

necessary to avoid self-deterrence (“If you have one 

when do you fire it?”) but pointed out that there 

written into the current national security strateg

requires those wars to be fought from a postu

engagement. He wondered what the process and imp

pulling out of Bosnia would be. Homeland defe

another area that will require some forces, and 

undergoing transformation will not be availab

deployment during their period of transition. Despite 

requirements, American military forces must st

capable of reassuring allies and deterring threats.

13
Concerning the focus of future planning, there app

to be general agreement at the conference tha

possibility of two MTWs has decreased, that there w

more small scale contingencies in the future, and th

United States will retain its advantage in technolog

emphasis on minimal casualties for quite a while. The

much less consensus on the next step. Some sup

retaining the ability to fight two MTWs despite 

reduced probability of occurrence, simply becaus

represents the most dangerous threat or would cau

worst consequences. Others argued for a restructur

meet more likely missions, or advocated reducing 

because there is no viable threat to U.S. interests.

Similarly, almost all attendees concurred that the

need for the American military to change and adap

many supported a broad transformation. There wa

agreement that even with modest budget incr

continuing fiscal constraints will demand hard cho

establish priorities for defense spending. The closen

the recent election and precarious balance in Co

portend that there will be no major increases in d

spending during the next administration. Attendee

generally believed the future military strategy will pr

remain some form of the current “shape, respond, pr

construct. But opinions varied widely as to the directio

pace transformation should take, exactly how the d

budget should be spent, and what the proper empha

each of the three elements of the new security st

should be.

While the conference did not achieve anything 

consensus on the future course of American m

strategy, it did effectively highlight key issues that m

resolved to keep it on the right path. General Zinn

questions frame important elements of the debate, lo

at threats and military capabilities in a very unc

future. Concerning “Ready for what?” the proc

14
complex and confrontational, involving sincere propo

of a wide range of views. Once decisionmakers 

determined the goals they want military forc

accomplish, they must be willing to commit the resou

fund the required capabilities and structure, or else 

global priorities that will prevent overcommit

Economizing alone will not be enough. Hard choice

have to be made between a focus on shaping or respo

between major wars or peacekeeping, and betw

commitment to new technology or maintaining c

equipment. As for “What needs to change?” the servic

the challenge of achieving meaningful transformatio

truly increases capabilities for future missions w

raising risk, is within resource constraints, and inve

those technologies that offer the most potenti

revolutionary change. In this quest for a new strateg

costs of failure in either the political or military arena 

be catastrophic, resulting in unacceptable risk to the 

and its interests, and the loss of an opportunity to cr

“New World Order” reflecting liberal-democratic idea

15
PARTICIPANTS

COLONEL WALTER ANDERSON, U.S. Army, is 

Strategic Plans, Concepts, and Doctrine Division, Str

Plans and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy C

Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Depar

of the Army. Colonel Anderson was commissioned 

Armor Officer in 1978 upon his graduation from the U

States Military Academy. He has served in a var

command and staff positions in the United States, Asi

Europe. From June 1995 to June 1997, Colonel And

commanded the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Reg

which deployed to Bosnia for a year as part of N

Implementation Force during Operation Joint End

More recently, he was a Senior Service College Fellow 

Atlantic Council of the United States.

JAMES BLAKER is Vice President, Science Applic

International Corporation (SAIC). Prior to joining SA

held a number of positions in the federal govern

including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (

Analysis), Deputy Under Secretary of the Air 

Personal Representative of the Secretary of Defense 

MBFR Negotiations, and Deputy Director, Congres

Budget Office (National Security and Interna

Affairs). He also served as the senior advisor to Ad

William Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o

(1994-96).

CARL CONETTA has been co-director of the Proj

Defense Alternatives (PDA) at the Commonw

Institute in Cambridge, MA, since January 1991. 

directing PDA, Mr. Conetta has been the principal au

two dozen reports on defense reform, threat assess

and peacekeeping. He has also published widely outsi

Institute, including contributions to seven edited vo

and articles in Defense News, Security Dialogue, Bull

17
the American Sentinel, Boston Review, Nonoff

Defense and Conversion, and The Hawk Journal (bull

the Royal Air Force staff college). In 1997-98 Mr. C

served as a consulting analyst for the Council on F

Relations “Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy” p

He also has served as a consultant for the U.S. House A

Services Committee (1993-95), for the Director of D

Planning of the South African Ministry of Defence (

and for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences w

group on U.N. Military Forces (1995).

SETH CROPSEY is a Visiting Fellow at the Am

Enterprise Institute. Before returning to the United 

in 1998 after 4 years abroad, he served as first departm

chairman and professor at the George C. Ma

European Center for Security Studies in Garm

Partenkirchen, Germany. His previous position had b

director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asia Studies C

Before that he served as Principal Deputy Ass

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in the 

administration. From 1984 to 1990, Mr. Cropsey ser

Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy where h

responsible for efforts to strengthen the Navy’s s

operations capabilities and forces; decentralizin

reducing bureaucracy to improve the effectiven

defense, among other issues.

MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY is a Distinguished Res

Professor at the Institute for National Strategic Stud

the National Defense University (NDU) where she con

research and writes on a range of defense policy i

Prior to joining NDU, she was dual-hatted as Pri

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strateg

Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secreta

Defense for Strategy. In this capacity, she oversaw 

policy offices in the Office of the Secretary of De

Strategy; Requirements, Plans and Counterprolifer

and Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian Affairs. She w

principal author of current U.S. defense strategy a

18
ranging from the drafting of PDD-56 on managing co

contingency operations to various post-QDR assessm

U.S. military capabilities required to carry out the na

security strategy. Prior to joining the Departm

Defense in 1993, Ms. Flournoy was a Research Fellow 

Center for Science and International Affairs at Har

John F. Kennedy School of Government. There she 

two volumes—one on U.S. nuclear weapons policy aft

Cold War and another on managing proliferation

directed the Avoiding Nuclear War Project.

ALAN GOLDMAN is Senior Intelligence Analyst 

Forces Directorate, National Ground Intelligence C

where he oversees and develops methods and techniq

the production of intelligence projections of foreign g

forces’ strategy, doctrine, organization, tactics

equipment. In this capacity he also conducts future 

and global security forecasts in addition to pro

scenarios to the Army and the Office of the Secret

Defense.

DAN GOURÉ is Deputy Director of the Interna

Security Program at the Center for Strategi

International Studies (CSIS). He joined CSIS in Apri

following 2 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defe

director of the Office of Strategic Competitivenes

began his career with the U.S. Arms Contro

Disarmament Agency and specialized in regional 

control issues. He has been a defense analyst with S

Planning Corporation, R&D Associates, Sc

Applications International Corporation, and 

Technologies. Gouré has published widely in such jo

as Orbis, Comparative Strategy, Military Technolog

NATO’s 16 Nations.

TIMOTHY D. HOYT is Visiting Assistant Professor 

National Security Studies Program at Georgetown. 

also Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Nava

College, College of Continuing Education in Washi

19
Newport, RI. Dr. Hoyt has designed and coord

political-military simulations for universities, the 

Department of Defense, and the Emirates Cent

Strategic Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi, United 

Emirates. He has worked for the U.S. Army, the 

Department of State, and as a researcher on defense 

for the Library of Congress. He has written on a var

subjects, including the diffusion of military techno

and practices, the proliferation of conventiona

unconventional weapons, regional security in the M

East and South Asia, and the evolution of strategy and 

production in the developing world.

STEVEN KOSIAK is the Director of Budget Studies 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessmen

independent policy research institute establish

promote innovative thinking about defense plannin

investment strategies for the 21st century. Mr. K

performs research and analysis of defense spending t

force structure and weapons systems costs, an

budgetary consequences of arms control measures, a

other related defense budget issues. He is the aut

CSBA’s annual budget analysis and contri

significantly to other publications on defense and se

issues. His most recent publications include Analysis 

FY 2001 Budget Request, Options for U.S. F

Modernization, and a cost series on the Kosovo confl

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT OAKLEY has b

fellow at the Institute for National Strategic St

National Defense University, since January 1995 an

named Acting Director in August 1999. He retired fro

U.S. Foreign Service in September 1991 after 34 yea

became associated with the U.S. Institute of Pea

December 1992, he was named by President Bush as S

Envoy to Somalia, serving there with Operation RES

HOPE until March 1993. In October 1993, he was 

named Special Envoy for Somalia by President Clinto

served in that capacity until March 1994. He 

20
Restore Hope (1995), and co-editor of a book on 

intervention in peacekeeping, Policing the New 

Disorder (1998).

MICHAEL O’HANLON is a Senior Fellow in the F

Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Instit

specializing in U.S. defense policy issues. Previously, h

a defense and foreign policy analyst in the National Se

Division at the Congressional Budget Office and s

years with the U.S. Peace Corps stationed in the Demo

Republic of the Congo, Central Africa (formerly Z

While at Brookings he has authored numerous studi

books, including How to Be a Cheap Hawk: The 199

2000 Defense Budgets; Technological Change an

Future of Warfare; and is working on a new book on th

QDR.

ROBERT D. STEELE is the author of On Intelligence

and Secrecy in an Open World, and the founder and C

Open Source Solutions, Inc. (OSS). He has been 

named to the Microtimes 100 list of “industry leade

unsung heroes who . . . helped create the future.” Ov

past decade he has written widely in the are

information strategy, open source intelligence

asymmetric warfare including information warfare. 

course of a 25-year national security career, Mr. Stee

served as a Marine Corps infantry officer and servic

plans officer; fulfilled clandestine, covert action

technical collection duties; been responsib

programming funds for overhead reconnais

capabilities; managed an offensive counterintell

program; initiated an advanced information tech

project; and been the senior civilian responsib

founding a new national intelligence production faci

CINDY WILLIAMS is a Senior Research Fellow 

Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Insti

Technology (MIT). Her work at MIT includes a st

future U.S. spending for defense and an examination 

21
concepts. Formerly she was an Assistant Director 

Congressional Budget Office, where she led the Na

Security Division in studies of budgetary and policy c

related to defense and international security. Dr. Wi

has served as a director and in other capacities 

MITRE Corporation in Bedford, Massachusetts

member of the Senior Executive Service in the Office 

Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon; and 

mathematician at RAND in Santa Monica, Californi

GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC (RET.) join

Marine Corps in 1961 and was commissioned an in

second lieutenant in 1965 upon his graduation 

Villanova University. He has held numerous comman

staff assignments that include platoon, company, bat

regimental, Marine expeditionary unit, and M

expeditionary force command. His staff assign

include service on battalion, regimental, division, bas

service staffs in operations, training, special opera

counterterrorism, and manpower billets. General Z

joint assignments include command of a joint task for

a unified command. He has also had several join

combined staff billets at task force and unified com

levels. His operational experience includes du

Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Africa among o

He has also participated in presidential diplomatic mi

to Somalia, Pakistan, and Ethiopia-Eritrea.

22
Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Reporting Author

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler