Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-546 | May 3, 2019 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James C. Spencer

Dattilo Law Office

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Mark E. Thevenot,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 3, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-546

Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Darrell M. Auxier, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

39C01-1612-F3-1156

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-546 | May 3, 2019 Page 2 of 16

[1] Mark E. Thevenot appeals his convictions of Level 5 felony domestic battery1

and Level 6 felony criminal confinement.

2

 Thevenot alleges the trial court 

abused its discretion in the admission of evidence and erred by allowing the 

prosecutor to discuss case law in closing argument. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In December 2016, Thevenot lived with M.B. in a two-bedroom house in

Deputy, Indiana. On December 22, 2016, Thevenot and M.B. consumed 

numerous alcoholic beverages, and then Thevenot when to bed to sleep. M.B. 

wanted Thevenot to get up and talk to her, so she pulled the covers from him 

and started “joking around and cutting up.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 51.) Thevenot “got 

madder than a hornet” and jumped up out of the bed. (Id.) M.B. tried to leave 

the room, but Thevenot got into her face and began cursing at her. Thevenot, 

who “had that demon look[,]” (id. at 52), pushed M.B. and she fell down. M.B. 

stood back up and attempted to walk out of the house, but Thevenot pursued 

her, “turned [her] around and slammed [her] into” a glass-topped coffee table. 

(Id.) The coffee table glass shattered and cut M.B.’s back, which felt like it was 

“on fire.” (Id. at 56.) M.B. was crying and begged Thevenot to help her get up 

from the floor. After helping her up, Thevenot went back to bed. M.B. went to 

the bathroom to assess the injury to her back and found she “had two great big 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). 

2 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a).
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old gashes in her back and needed to go to the hospital to get stitches,” (id. at 

58), but Thevenot refused to take her because he would “get 40 years in prison 

for it.” (Id. at 64.) M.B. eventually fell asleep in the bed and, when she woke, 

the sheet was stuck to her back by dried blood. 

[3] On December 23, 2016, Thevenot took M.B. to a Chinese restaurant in North 

Vernon because “he thought if he did something good it would make up for 

what he had [done] to me the night before.” (Id. at 70.) After eating, Thevenot 

went to a store to obtain peroxide, Neosporin, and gauze. The couple drove 

home, and Thevenot cleaned and bandaged the deepest of the two cuts on 

M.B.’s back. 

[4] On December 24, 2016, M.B. cleaned around the house, and then Thevenot 

drove the couple to a liquor store in North Vernon. M.B. remained in the car, 

and Thevenot purchased a 30-pack of beer and a fifth of whiskey. When they 

returned home, the couple drank beer and played Yahtzee. Later in the 

evening, Thevenot was talking on the telephone with family, and M.B. went to 

bed. M.B. was asleep when Thevenot removed her sleep apnea mask to wake 

her up. He told M.B. to get out of bed and drink with him because she had not 

let him sleep the night she pulled the covers off him. 

[5] M.B. got out of bed, and Thevenot instructed her to bring them both a beer. 

She brought the beers to the couch and sat down with Thevenot, who was 

drunk and being very loud. M.B. asked Thevenot why he was yelling when she 

was next to him, and he “just snapped[.]” (Id. at 82.) Thevenot asked M.B. 
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why she had come back into his life, and he started punching M.B. in the head, 

cursing at her, calling her names, and choking her. Thevenot ripped the jacket 

M.B. was wearing into two pieces, tearing out part of her hair in the process. 

M.B. slipped away from Thevenot and ran into the kitchen. Thevenot followed 

her and pushed her down onto a wooden chair with sufficient force to break the 

chair. M.B. landed on the floor, and potted plants fell from a shelf onto M.B. 

and the floor. The impact rendered M.B. unable to feel her legs, and as she 

tried to lift herself off the floor using the cabinet door for support, Thevenot told 

her: “‘You break that cabinet door and I’m going to give you another beating.’” 

(Id. at 91.) M.B. released the cabinet door as Thevenot left the room. 

[6] A few minutes later, M.B. was able to get herself off the floor using the table for 

leverage, and she stood at the sink trying to compose herself and allow her legs 

to recover. Thevenot returned to the kitchen, and M.B. attempted to leave the 

room, but Thevenot “slam[med]” her into another wooden chair, (id. at 92), 

which also broke, causing M.B. to again fall to the floor. As M.B. crawled on 

the floor, Thevenot kicked her repeatedly, grabbed a piece of wood from a 

broken chair, and began beating M.B. with it, telling her he was beating her 

because she “throwed [sic] him in jail for six months, so he was going to beat 

six months[.]” (Id.) Thevenot hit her at least ten times as he was also kicking 

her. M.B.’s pain was “[e]xcruciating. I mean really bad. I mean I couldn’t 

hardly walk by the time he got done.” (Id. at 101.) Thevenot left M.B. on the 

kitchen floor and “went to bed like nothing ever happened.” (Id. at 102.) M.B. 

eventually made it to the bathroom and found she had bruises all over her arms, 
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legs, and back, and the cuts on her back from the glass table had opened again. 

She asked Thevenot to take her to the hospital, but he refused. 

[7] Thevenot slept most of December 25, 2016. While he was asleep, M.B. snuck 

his telephone and called her sister to tell her what had happened. M.B. asked 

her sister to call the police in two days and ask them to do a welfare check on 

M.B. if M.B. had not spoken to her sister again because Thevenot had 

threatened to kill her and throw her body in the cellar.

[8] On December 27, 2016, M.B.’s sister called police and asked them to do a 

welfare check on M.B. Thevenot and M.B. were in the kitchen when police 

knocked on the door, and Thevenot told M.B. to stay in the kitchen. When

Thevenot answered the door, police inquired about M.B. because her sister in 

Kentucky was worried about her. Thevenot reported that M.B. had walked to 

Scottsburg and was not home. M.B. snuck from the kitchen to behind 

Thevenot and began waiving her arms so the police officer would see her. The 

officer asked M.B. who she was, and M.B. gave her name. The officer told 

M.B. that she needed to call her sister and then asked Thevenot to step outside 

for a minute. Thevenot refused, so the officer asked M.B. to step outside. M.B. 

walked toward the door to step outside, but Thevenot grabbed her, pulled her 

away from the door, slammed the door shut, and locked it. 

[9] For the next four hours, while police and SWAT waited outside the house, 

Thevenot would not let M.B. out of his sight, even when she went to the 

bathroom. He accused M.B. of calling the police and hid his cell phone so she 
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could not make any more calls. Thevenot kept the lights off and the blinds 

shut, and he would not respond to police as they called to him with a bullhorn. 

When police called Thevenot’s phone, he offered it to M.B. to talk to the police, 

but M.B. refused the phone

because I was scared you know. He had the door locked. The 

back one was all the way to the back of the house. All I could do 

was imagine him if I got up toward that door he was going to 

grab me by my hair because my hair was a little longer then. 

That’s what he was going to do, and I mean he was going to 

finish what he started.

(Id. at 128.) After over four hours of stand-off, Thevenot left the house and was 

taken into police custody. M.B. walked out of the house, and an officer 

escorted her to a chair, helped her remove her jacket to assess her injuries, and 

immediately called for an ambulance. 

[10] The State charged Thevenot with Level 3 felony criminal confinement,3 Level 5 

felony domestic battery, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery,4 and Level 6 

felony strangulation.

5

 The State also filed an allegation that Thevenot was a 

habitual offender. Before trial, the State moved for, and the court granted, 

dismissal without prejudice of the charge of Level 6 felony strangulation. 

 

3 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(2)(B). 

4 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(c)(4). 

5 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(b)(1). 
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[11] The State filed notice of intent to offer Evidence Rule 404(b) evidence to 

demonstrate motive and relationship. The 404(b) evidence was explanation of 

Thevenot’s prior conviction for battery of M.B., based on Thevenot’s statement

he would beat her six months because she “throwed him in jail for six months.” 

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 92.) The State also filed notice of intent to offer Evidence Rule 

702 expert opinion evidence regarding domestic violence. Thevenot filed a 

motion in limine to exclude those two kinds of evidence. The court ruled the 

State could admit the 404(b) evidence of Thevenot’s prior conviction as relevant 

to motive and could admit the 702 evidence only if Thevenot asserted M.B.’s

behavior was “unexpected” for someone who was being confined. (App. Vol. 4 

at 45.) As we will discuss in more detail below, both of those forms of evidence 

were admitted at trial. 

[12] The jury found Thevenot guilty of Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Level 5 

felony domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Thevenot 

admitted the prior convictions that demonstrated his being a habitual offender. 

Prior to sentencing, the trial court merged the misdemeanor and felony findings 

of domestic battery, to avoid a double jeopardy violation. The court imposed a 

five-year sentence for Level 5 felony domestic battery and enhanced that 

sentence by five years for the habitual offender adjudication. The court 

imposed a two-year sentence for Level 6 felony criminal confinement and 

ordered it served concurrent to the sentence for domestic battery. 
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Discussion and Decision

Admission of Evidence

[13] If an evidentiary ruling does not raise any issues of law, “we review for an 

abuse of discretion.” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 567 (Ind. 2019). We 

reverse for an abuse of discretion “only when the admission is clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before the trial court. Id. at 

568.

Prior Battery Evidence

[14] Thevenot first challenges the admission of evidence that he had a prior 

conviction of battering M.B. He asserts the evidence was inadmissible under 

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). 

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) serves to safeguard the 

presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants. The 

Rule’s mandate is clear: a court may not admit evidence of 

another crime, wrong, or act “to prove a person’s character in 

order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). 

This restriction prevents the jury from indulging in the 

“forbidden inference” that a criminal defendant’s “prior wrongful 

conduct suggests present guilt.”

But Rule 404(b) does not totally proscribe other-bad-acts 

evidence—only its use as character evidence. Indeed, the Rule 

plainly states that other-bad-acts evidence may be admissible for 

other purposes, and it provides an illustrative list—to show 

“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 
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404(b)(2). So when the State claims that other-bad-acts evidence 

is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court is tasked with 

deciding whether that evidence “is relevant to a matter at issue 

other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged 

act.”

If the evidence passes that relevance test, it has to clear a second 

hurdle: Indiana Evidence Rule 403’s balancing test. In applying 

Rule 403, the trial court must conclude that the evidence’s 

probative value is not “substantially outweighed” by the danger 

of unfair prejudice, Evid. R. 403—otherwise, the evidence is not 

admissible.

Id. (internal case citations omitted). 

[15] In this case, the State’s need to produce evidence of Thevenot’s past conviction 

for battery of M.B. arose because Thevenot, as he was beating M.B. with a 

piece of wood from a broken chair, announced M.B. was getting the beating 

because she “throwed [sic] him in jail for six months, so he was going to beat 

six months[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 92.) This was the motive that Thevenot himself 

provided as he committed the crime. Because motive is an exception to Rule 

404(b)’s prohibition of admitting evidence of prior crimes, we cannot say the 

trial court abused its discretion in determining this evidence was admissible for 

a proper purpose. See, e.g., Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004) (defendant need not advance contrary claim of motive before evidence of 

prior bad acts become relevant, and thus meet first hurdle for admission, as to 

motive for alleged crime). 
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[16] Nor can we say the trial court abused its discretion in determining the evidence

also cleared the Evidence Rule 403 hurdle, despite the five years that passed 

between the first and second trials, in light of the fact that Thevenot referenced 

the prior conviction as he was beating M.B. The admission of the prior 

conviction is being used by the State to shed light on what motivated Thevenot 

to commit the current crime. It is not being used to shine a negative light on 

Thevenot’s character. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting this evidence. See id. at 409. 

Domestic Violence Expert

[17] Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to offer expert opinion to educate 

the jury on domestic violence. Thevenot filed a motion in limine to prevent the 

introduction of such testimony. The trial court ruled:

1. The State of Indiana requests the right to introduce 

syndrome evidence as to the victims of domestic violence.

2. Such evidence may be used to show unexpected 

behavior patterns if the defense discusses or presents evidence of 

such unexpected behavior. In such case evidence of the 

prevalence of the specific unexpected behavior within the general 

class of reported domestic violence victims may be introduced.

3. Such evidence shall be admissible in rebuttal if the 

Defendant opens the door as set forth in Paragraph 2. The State 

shall notify the Court in the event it intends to introduce such 

evidence in rebuttal.
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(App. Vol. 4 at 45.) In his opening statement at trial, Thevenot noted “many 

aspects of [M.B.]’s conduct were inconsistent with the charges of confinement.” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 18.)6

 The State called a domestic violence expert, Laura 

Berry of the Indiana Coalition Against Domestic Violence, and the trial court 

permitted her to testify over Thevenot’s objection. 

[18] Thevenot argues on appeal that the admission of Berry’s testimony was an 

abuse of discretion because M.B. had already testified to why she behaved in 

the way she did. For example, on direct examination, M.B was asked to 

explain why she did not leave the house after the coffee table incident on 

December 22. She explained:

Well, for one thing my vehicle was not running. And uh –

Another thing, where was I going? It was cold outside. It was 

nighttime. I mean I had no family here, nobody to run to, so I 

mean I was pretty much trapped there – pretty much. 

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 67.) In addition, the prosecutor asked M.B. why she did not 

request help when Thevenot left her alone in the Chinese restaurant, and she 

explained:

I wasn’t in the right state of mind for one thing. I think I was still 

initially in shock, of course, between what had happened, the 

pain that was in my back because it wasn’t lightly – believe me. 

 

6 We cite the Appellant’s Brief, rather than the Transcript, because Thevenot has not provided a record 

citation for that assertion. We will not search the record to find material for the parties. Thomas v. State, 965 

N.E.2d 70, 77 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Nevertheless, as Thevenot makes this admission against 

his interest in his brief, we presume it is correct. 
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If I would have had – I thought if I would have went to 

somebody in a situation of that nature some people did not want 

to get involved. . . . I was just so scared. I know that. And I was 

afraid the cops would come and they would – he would come 

back and seen them and then it would have been worse for me 

when I got home or he would have dragged me in the car or – I 

had a thousand things running through my mind. I really did, 

and I mean I was scared you know to ask anybody for help.

(Id. at 76-77.) 

[19] Under our evidence rules, a witness can be qualified as an expert based on 

“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Ind. Evid. Rule 702(a). 

Once so qualified, the expert “may testify in the form of an opinion or 

otherwise . . . if the expert’s scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge 

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue.” Id. To be admissible, an expert’s testimony must meet that standard, 

must rest upon reliable scientific principles, and must not be more prejudicial 

than probative. Iqbal, 805 N.E.2d at 409. 

[20] Expert testimony about “battered woman’s syndrome” is admissible at trial if it 

is relevant to a question at issue. Id. For example, in Iqbal, the State offered 

expert testimony on domestic violence to explain why the victim would have 

allowed the defendant into her home even though he had already assaulted her 

and she had already gotten a protective order. Id. That expert “merely 

educated the jury on the complexity of behavior of domestic violence victims.” 

Id. at 410. Moreover, because the expert had not counseled the victim and had 

no knowledge of the facts of the case, the expert could not cross the line into 
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“impermissible vouching.” Id. Based thereon, we held the trial court had not 

abused its discretion in permitting the expert testimony. Id. 

[21] Herein, the State’s expert testified she knew nothing about the facts of 

Thevenot’s case, she did not know M.B. or Thevenot, and she was not offering 

an opinion about the facts of the case. She then testified generally about the 

dynamics of domestic violence, including economic abuse, emotional abuse, 

psychological abuse, denying, minimizing, and blaming. She discussed why 

victims frequently return to relationships with an abuser, and she testified that 

nearly all of the 300 victims she had assisted returned to their abuser. As in 

Iqbal, under these circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion 

when there was no chance the expert could be seen as vouching for the victim. 

See id. (finding no abuse of discretion in expert’s testimony). 

State’s Closing Argument

[22] Finally, Thevenot argues prejudicial error occurred during the State’s closing 

argument because “the deputy prosecutor quoted from Brown v. State, 497 

N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. 1986) on the issue of the meaning of ‘substantially 

interfere.’” (Appellant’s Br. at 21) (formatting in original). In support of his 

argument, Thevenot sets out the standard of review for prosecutorial 

misconduct and alleges it “is prosecutor misconduct to instruct the jury in 

closing argument on a legal issue that has not been tendered as a prospective 

instruction or previously considered by the Court to give to the jury.” (Id. at 

22.) 
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[23] However, during closing argument, Thevenot objected to the prosecutor 

quoting from case law. (See Tr. Vol. 3 at 116-120.) All counsel approached the 

bench to discuss the issue. The State provided sources supporting its ability to 

read case law to the jury. After reviewing the law provided by the State, the 

trial court ruled the prosecutor could discuss the case and entered a continuing 

objection for Thevenot. In this circumstance, when the prosecutor presented 

case law during closing argument with the trial court’s permission, we review 

whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to so 

argue. 

[24] “The proper scope of closing argument is within the trial court’s sound 

discretion.” Walls v. State, 993 N.E.2d 262, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. 

denied. An abuse of discretion will not be found unless the trial court’s decision 

was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before 

it.” Id. To obtain reversal of a conviction, an appellant must demonstrate trial 

court error and “resulting prejudice to his or her rights.” Id. 

[25] In closing argument, a “prosecutor may argue both law and facts and propound 

conclusions based upon his or her analysis of the evidence.” Lambert v. State, 

743 N.E.2d 719, 734 (Ind. 2001), reh’g denied, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1136 (2002). 

“[T]he reading of ‘law’ to a jury is permissible.” Lax v. State, 275 Ind. 34, 38, 

414 N.E.2d 555, 557 (1981). Moreover, “reading from decisions to the jury is 

proper in final argument so long as it is clear that the prosecutor is reading from 

or referring to a separate case, so as to not mislead or confuse the jury.” 

Hernandez v. State, 439 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ind. 1982). 
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[26] Here, the prosecutor provided citation to the jury of Brown v. State, 497 N.E.2d 

1049 (Ind. 1986), and told the jury: “the Court stated that the fact that the 

victim later freed herself does not negate the fact that the jury could find beyond 

a reasonable doubt that a confinement took place.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 118.) 

Thevenot does not assert that statement is incorrect law or a misstatement of 

Brown. The prosecutor made it clear she was reading from Brown, and then she 

discussed M.B.’s testimony about the times she wanted to escape the situation 

with Thevenot, but she was unable to leave.7

 We cannot say the trial court 

abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to read that sentence from 

caselaw during its closing argument. See Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 256 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 

prosecutor to read from caselaw during closing argument), trans. denied. 

Conclusion

[27] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence or by 

permitting the prosecutor to quote caselaw during closing argument. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

[28] Affirmed.

 

7 For example, M.B. testified she was headed for the front door on December 22 and wanted to leave, when 

Thevenot grabbed her and threw her onto the glass top table, and she was headed out the front door on 

December 27 when Thevenot pulled her back in the house and slammed the door shut. M.B. also testified 

that, during the three hours that police were outside the house on December 27, Thevenot did not let her out 

of his sight and she was terrified what he would do to her if she tried to leave the house. Thus, we reject 

Thevenot’s argument that there was a “lack of evidence of confinement[.]” (Br. of Appellant at 22.) 
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Baker, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.