UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LESLIE BROWN, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CARLOS CHAPPELLE, Defendant - Appellee. No. 15-5117 (D.C. No. 4:14-CV -00757-GKF-FHM) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before GORSUCH , BALDOCK , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges. **

________________ _________________ Plaintiff Leslie Brown, Jr. is a party to a civil action pe nding in Oklahoma state court. The initial state-court judge assigned to his case recused. Afterward, Defendant Carlos Chappelle—at the time th e Presiding Judge of the county in which Plaintiff brought his state case—reassigned Plaintiff’s case to a new state-court judge. Plaintiff now contends that Defendant lacked the authority to reassign his case

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collatera l estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 3, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 because Defendant was “disqualified by la w from participating in any case which Plaintiff might be involved in because of a previous di squalification by [Defendant] in civil cases involving Plaintiff.” He fu rther laments that (1) Defendant transferred the case to the new state-court judge “knowi ng that at the time said case was assigned to [the new judge] there were disqualific ation proceedings pending against [the new judge] in another civil case involving Plaintiff,” and (2) Defendant “refused . . . to conduct a hearing on” Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the transfer of his case to the new judge. Plaintiff consequently brings claims under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 against Defendant in his individual capacity for “[d]enial of due process of law and access to the courts” and “[c]onspiracy to violate civil rights.” He seeks $250 ,000 worth of damages and “any appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief . . . necessary to prevent undue and improper harassment and retaliat ion against Plaintiff for th e filing of this lawsuit.” Pursuant to Defendant’s motion, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint. 1 In a thorough written or der, the district court first determined that

1 At first glance, Plaintiff’s claims coul d plausibly be seen as jurisdictionally barred under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Although the district court did not address this doctrine or otherw ise consider its jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims, we address Rooker–Feldman ’s applicability to this case to clarify why this doctrine did not prevent the district court from exercising subject ma tter jurisdiction. Put simply, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine “is a jurisdictional prohibition on lower federal courts exercisi ng appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.” Campbell v. City of Spencer , 682 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court has held that this doctrine is narrow: “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases . . . brought by state-cour t losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court procee dings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The astute reader may think3 Defendant enjoyed absolute judicial immunity from damages because his reassignment of the case wa s a “general function[] nor mally performed by a judge, and thus performed in his judicial capacity.” See Dennis v. Sparks , 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980) (“[J]udges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts perfo rmed in their judicial cap acities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, Defendant had passed away while his motion to dismiss

______________ ______________ that Rooker–Feldman should apply in this case: Plain tiff is asserting that he was injured by a state-court order—the transf er of his action to another judge—that occurred before the federal district court pr oceedings commenced. And because he is asking a federal court to determine whether Defendant violated his rights when he ordered the transfer, he is conceivably as king for federal court review and rejection of that transfer. But the Supreme Court has also explained that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies only “after the state proceedings [have] ended .” Id. at 291 (emphasis added); see also Guttman v. Khalsa , 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 ( 10th Cir. 2006) (“Under Exxon Mobil , Rooker–Feldman applies only to suits filed after state proceedings are final.”) Notably, the state proceedings have not ended when (1) the state court issues only an interlocutory order (as opposed to a judgment) and (2) the state-court litigation is still ongoing when a party challenges that in terlocutory order in federal court. Cf. Federacion de Maestros de Pu erto Rico v. Junta de Rela ciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24 n.10 (1st Cir. 2005) ( holding that the state proceedings have ended for Rooker–Feldman purposes when (1) “the lowe r state court does not issue a judgment but merely an interlocutory order . . . and [(2)] the parties then voluntarily terminate the litigation” before challenging the interlocutory order in federal court (emphasis in original)); see also Guttman , 446 F.3d at 1032 n.2 (citing Federacion de Maestros with approval regarding its treatment of when state proceedings have ended for Rooker–Feldman purposes). This is exactly the si tuation here: the transfer order was a non-appealable, administrative interl ocutory order, and Plaintiff challenged this order while his state-cour t litigation was still pending. See Pierce v. Pierce , 39 P.3d 791, 796 (Okla. 20 01) (holding that parties wishing to appeal transfer orders can only “preserve [that] issue for review on appeal from the subsequent judgment ” (emphasis added)). As such, Rooker–Feldman does not apply as a jurisdictional bar. Cf. Armstrong v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n , 633 F. App’x 909, 911 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (holding that a st ate court’s non-appeal able interlocutory order denying a party’s moti on under Colorado Rule of Ci vil Procedure 120 “was not a judgment that falls within the Rooker–Feldman doctrine”).4 was pending in the district co urt. The district court accordingly determined that “neither a declaratory judgmen t nor injunctive relief woul d serve any purpose in this case because the claims for injunctive and/or declarator y relief are made against [Defendant] in his individual capacity when no future conduct can be anticipated from him.” As such, the dist rict court concluded that a ny declaratory and injunctive relief was moot. Plaintiff moved for the district court to reconsider the dismissal of his complaint, but the district c ourt denied this motion. According to the district court, Plaintiff’s “arguments [did] not warrant reconsideration of the court’s prior order.” Following his motion for reconsideration, Pl aintiff also filed a motion to substitute the late Defendant with the “proper party” (presumably Defendant’s estate, although Plaintiff did not indicate in his motion who the “proper part y” was). But because the district court had already denied Plainti ff’s motion for reconsideration and therefore extinguished all of Plaintiff’s claims, the di strict court denied the motion to substitute as moot. Plaintiff now timely appeals. We need not belabor the point. We ha ve carefully reviewed both parties’ briefs and the appellate record in view of the applicable law and the appropriate standard of review. The district court’s an alysis of Plaintiff’s claims in the first instance was correct. As the district court ably explained, Defe ndant is absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 because hi s transfer of Plaintiff’s state-court case to another judge was an action pe rformed in his judicial capacity. Dennis , 449 U.S. at 27. And while a judge can indeed lose this immunity when he engages in5 judicial conduct “taken in the comp lete absence of all jurisdiction,” Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991), there is no indication that Defendant acted in the absence of jurisdiction in transferring Plai ntiff’s case to another judge, see Smith v. Bogart , 107 P.2d 173, 174 (Okla. 1940) (“The disqualification of a judge to hear and determine a cause does not prevent him from entering su ch orders as are merely formal and necessary to bring the suit to a hearing an d determination before a qualified judge.” (internal quotation marks omitt ed)). Likewise, given th at Defendant passed away after Plaintiff filed his complaint, Plaint iff’s request for inj unctive and declaratory relief against Defendant in his individual capacity is moot because Defendant is no longer able to act. The district court thus properly dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims. And of course, if no claims remain, the dist rict court also corre ctly concluded that Plaintiff’s belated motion to substitute a new party for De fendant is moot. “Where the district court accurately analyzes the issues in a cas e and articulates a cogent rationale based upon the rele vant facts and applicable law, no useful purpose is served by us writing at length. This is such a case.” Lovern v. Dorscheid , 576 F. App’x 869, 870 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublishe d) (internal quotation marks omitted). In conclusion, we affirm s ubstantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s written orders at issue in this appeal. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition is denied as moot.6 AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge