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THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN RUSSIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 30, 2015

Serial No. 114–98

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Leon Aron, Ph.D., resident scholar and director of Russian studies, The American Enterprise Institute ..................................................................................... 3

Mr. Simon Saradzhyan, assistant director, U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent 

Nuclear Terrorism, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 

Harvard University .............................................................................................. 12

Mark N. Katz, Ph.D., professor of government and politics, School of Policy, 

Government, and International Affairs, George Mason University ................. 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Leon Aron, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................................. 6

Mr. Simon Saradzhyan: Prepared statement ........................................................ 15

Mark N. Katz, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 40

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 41

(1)

THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN 

RUSSIA 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We call to order this hearing of the Europe, 

Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee. 

This afternoon we will hear testimony, expert testimony, on the 

topic not thought to be, but in reality of great concern and importance, the threat of Islamic extremism inside Russia and what that 

might mean to the United States and global security. 

The fight against violent, radical Islam is one of the major challenges of our time. Islamic terrorists have targeted numerous countries for attack, including the United States and Russia. They have 

declared war on the modern civilized world. Their barbaric actions 

in Syria remind us daily of their depravity. They must be stopped 

and they must be defeated. The future of America, Russia, and, 

yes, of Western civilization, depends on that. The lives of millions 

will be in jeopardy if we don’t do what is right today. 

Given the global nature of this fight, it is in the interests of our 

national interests to understand the growth of extremism in other 

parts of the world and in other countries, such as Russia. It is 

alarming to read reports of Muslims living in peaceful and in free 

democratic countries being attracted or recruited into radical Islamic terrorism. This frightening reality is happening in Europe 

and elsewhere. Media reports indicate that over 2,000 Russian-born 

fighters may have traveled to the Middle East to join ISIL. Our collective inability to stem this tide is both shocking and unnerving. 

This afternoon, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses. I know Dr. Aron we are pleased to welcome back as a witness, has some unique insights regarding the spread of extremism 

into Muslim populations inside Russia. We don’t normally associate 

this behavior with such Russian ethnic groups, like the Tatars or 

others, but we need to know what those details are. We will learn 

more about this and other things in your testimony. 

And also, in the aftermath of the Boston bombing in May 2013, 

I led a congressional delegation to Russia where we met with Russian Government and intelligence officials and discussed the threat 

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of terrorism and how our governments could potentially cooperate. 

I have been disappointed that, due to the upheaval in Ukraine, 

more has not been achieved in implementing cooperation in this 

area. 

Of course, extremist forces continue to plot attacks against both 

the United States and Russia. It seems plain to me that if we work 

together we will be better able to protect our people, stop attacks, 

and kill violent terrorists—something I am personally in favor of 

as a matter of policy. 

Please let me note our discussion today about Russia and the 

question of finding possible areas of cooperation in no way 

downplays or overlooks the disappointing situation in Ukraine. As 

a result, our government has imposed sanctions on Russian officials and institutions. Even with that millstone around our necks, 

our two governments still manage to achieve an admirable level of 

cooperation in other areas, like the International Space Station, for 

example. Perhaps our governments might also make a joint effort 

to stop the spread of Islamic extremism and the terrorism that 

flows from it. 

Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit written questions or extraneous materials for the record. 

And I will introduce the witnesses after opening statements from 

Mr. Sires and our colleagues. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s timely 

hearing on Russia and the Islamic extremists. 

Since coming into power 15 years ago, Vladimir Putin has been 

committed to restoring Russia as a great power, shaping his policy 

to position Russia as a counterweight to the United States. We saw 

Putin flex his muscles in the annexation of Crimea last year and 

the subsequent fighting in Ukraine. Now Russia has shifted its attention to increased support for the Assad regime and an increased 

role in the Syrian conflict. 

At the U.N. this week, Putin continued his talk of the importance 

of mounting a broad effort to support Assad as the only way to 

fight against the spread of the Islamic State. Russia’s plan to combat Islamic extremists through the support of Assad and to 

strengthen its military presence in Syria directly contradicts with 

the U.S. diplomatic goals to have Assad transition out of power. 

It is unclear whether Putin’s motives in Syria and the Middle 

East are self-serving or stem from the growing concern over a large 

number of jihadist fighters from the North Caucasus fighting in 

Syria who could pose a serious problem for Moscow should they return to Russia. 

Given that the U.S. and Russia are at a critical crossroads in 

conversations on how to best combat Islamic extremists, I look forward to hearing from our esteemed panel of witnesses on the possible outcomes and solutions to the current challenges. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Brooks has no opening statement, but how about Mr. Weber? 

Do you have a short opening statement? 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah. Welcome. Let’s go. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He is great. All right. 

3

With that said, I will ask the witnesses to summarize your prepared statements. Hopefully, they are 5-minute summaries, and 

then we can have a dialogue and have some questions and answers. First, I am going to introduce all of the witnesses, and then 

we will proceed. 

Dr. Leon Aron is a resident scholar and director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Starting this year, he 

joined the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the organization which 

oversees operations of international broadcasting, such as Voice of 

America. He is a widely published author and has earned his Ph.D. 

at Columbia University. 

Simon Saradzhyan is a research fellow at the Kennedy School, 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He is also the assistant director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism. Prior, he worked as a journalist 

in Russia for 15 years, where he covered several major events, including the terrorist attack at Beslan. 

Next, we have Dr. Mark Katz, who is a professor of government 

and politics at George Mason University. He has authored many 

books and articles, for example, ‘‘Leaving Without Losing: The War 

on Terror After Iraq and Afghanistan.’’ Very fascinating. Thank 

you. He earned his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

So we have a very esteemed group of witnesses today, and we appreciate you being with us. And, again, if you could summarize in 

5 minutes, we will have a good dialogue on this. 

Dr. Aron, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF LEON ARON, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR AND 

DIRECTOR OF RUSSIAN STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. ARON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee. 

On the morning of July 19, 2012, gunshots and car bombs explosion woke up Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, Russia’s largest autonomous republic and the home of its largest Muslim ethnicity, 

the Tatars. The shots hit Valiulla Yakupov, Deputy Mufti of 

Tatarstan, in charge of education in Islamic studies. The bomb 

went off under the car of the Chief Mufti of Tatarstan, Ildus 

Fayzov. Fayzov was badly injured. Yakupov was killed. 

Appointed only a year before, both men were moderate clerics, 

determined to oppose what they saw as the encroachment of fundamentalism, Salafism in Tatarstan, and to strengthen the traditional moderate Hanafi madhab, which is one of the five major 

branches of Sunni Islam. Lest anyone miss the terrorists’ point, a 

cavalcade of cars, under the black-and-white banners of global 

jihadists, raced through downtown Kazan shortly after the attack. 

I think the July 19 attack, in retrospect, could be viewed as a 

watershed. Two decades after the first Chechen war, the Russian 

jihad may be reaching a tipping point at which the center of gravity of militant Islamic fundamentalism is shifting from North 

Caucasus to the more urban and densely populated European Russian heartland, the home of 13 million Muslims, especially Tatars 

and Bashkirs, Russia’s second-largest Muslim group, that are very 

4

close to Tatars both ethnically and geographically. If this trend 

continues, the consequences for the largest Muslim country in Europe, and Russia has an estimated Muslim population of 20 million, 

could be ominous. 

Let me mention five underlying factors, all of which continue to 

operate today as risk factors that increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks in Russia and heighten Russia’s vulnerability to such 

attack. 

Number one, Russia has not been able to evade the pan-European phenomenon. That is the turn to radical Islam of a fraction 

of seemingly assimilated and integrated European Muslim population, especially its young people. 

Two, the exposure after the fall of the Soviet Union of an estimated tens of thousands of Russian Muslims to Salafism and 

Wahhabism in the course of theological studies in the Middle East. 

In their return to Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, some of the newly 

minted imams have increasingly turned away from the traditional, 

moderate Hanafi madhab and toward Salafism and Wahhabism. 

According to Russian experts, imams that share Wahhabi views 

preach at dozens of the over 1,000 mosques in Tatarstan. 

Three, Russia is now home to millions of guest workers, Muslims 

from Central Asia: An estimated 2 million Uzbeks, between 1 and 

2 million Tajiks, and around 1 million Kyrgyz. There are an estimated 21⁄2 million of only registered migrants from Central Asian 

Moscow alone, making the Russian capital the largest Muslim city 

in Europe. 

Often without work permits, marginalized culturally and ethically, and often subjected to abuse, extortion, and not infrequently 

to racist violence, many of the men, understandably, turn to their 

faith and the faith of their grandparents as a means to sustain 

their dignity. Unfortunately, as reported in the Russian media, at 

least some fall under the influence of radical clerics and, more importantly and recently, recruiters from ISIS. 

According to the reports in the Russian media, most, if not all 

ISIS fighters from Central Asia have been recruited at the construction sites in Russia, especially Moscow, including an estimated 

400 ethnic Uzbeks fighting with ISIS in Syria. All of them were recruited outside of Uzbekistan, including their reported leader, 

Nusrat Nazarov. 

Number four, given the permeability of borders, the recruitment, 

and the proselytizing effort that has been doubled and tripled by 

ISIS in Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan, given the flow of people, such efforts are likely to result 

in the increasing radicalization of the elements of the Central 

Asian diaspora in Russia. If you add to this the fact that, with Russia on the ground now in Syria, adding to other risks of Putin’s decision is also the fact that the probability of retaliatory terrorist 

strikes inside Russia are increasing. 

The final point, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, 

Nikolai Patrushev, said that, at the moment, Russian authorities 

do not have the means to stem the flow of volunteers to ISIS. The 

Russian Foreign Ministry estimates that there are around 2,400 

Russian speakers among the jihadists in Syria, while the total Russian nationals and those from the former Soviet Union in the ranks 

5

of ISIS could be as high as 5,000. Today, Russian is the third-most 

popular ISIS language after Arabic and English. 

How long will it be before the veterans of ISIS, coming back to 

Russia, decide to join a fight for a Russian caliphate inside Russia? 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude on this. Like overwhelming majorities of Muslims everywhere, most Russian Muslims and the migrants from Central Asia practice their religion peacefully, abhor 

violence, and are good citizens and patriots of their countries. Yet, 

as we have learned only too well in the 14 years since 9/11, the 

radicalization of even a small minority, not registered by any public 

opinion polls, can inflict incalculable damage and cost thousands of 

lives. 

If the evidence that I outlined today does not amount to a significant increase in national and international terrorism, I will be the 

first to acknowledge and celebrate my error. But having largely 

missed the rise of Chechen terrorism, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, we 

would be far better off wrong than sorry. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aron follows:]

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STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON SARADZHYAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, U.S.–RUSSIA INITIATIVE TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of 

the committee, thank you for inviting me to participate in what I 

believe is a very important event. 

I will present my view on prospects for U.S.-Russian cooperation 

in countering terrorism, and I will start with an observation made 

by Winston Churchill, who is often quoted saying that Russia is a 

riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. Fewer, though, remember the remainder of that saying, which is that perhaps there 

is a key, and that key is Russia’s national interest when it comes 

to discerning Russian actions. 

There is no strategic document, Russian strategic document or 

statement that would offer a hierarchy of vital national interests, 

but I have taken liberty to distill some of the statements to build 

such a hierarchy in the statement that you have. Of these interests, at least three of seven vital national interests to Russia, at 

least three are affected by the political violence in the Middle East. 

And of these three interests, which are prevent insurgencies in 

Russia, in areas adjacent to Russia; prevent large-scale terrorist attacks on Russia and its allies; and prevent the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, to 

countries and also nonstate actors, at least two of those interests 

converge with U.S. vital national interests as formulated by the 

Commission on America’s National Interests in 2000 and subsequent projects. 

So, therefore, both countries share an interest in ensuring that 

the dual threat that emanates from the Middle East insurgency 

there is contained, and that comes to countering the rise of ISIS, 

continuing to dismantle or keep al-Qaeda on the run, as well as denying these and other terrorist organizations any access to weapons of mass destruction, and particularly to nuclear weapons. 

I should note that, even though there are 30,000 recruits, reportedly, from foreign countries in ISIL and at least 4,500 of them are 

estimated to have come from the West, Russia and its allies are 

more exposed to the threat posed by ISIS, if only because of the 

proximity. And, as Dr. Aron has pointed out, there are various estimates. 

The latest estimates have come from the Federal Security Service, and it is that 2,400 Russian nationals are in ISIS, and about 

3,000 nationals of Central Asian republics are also in ISIS. That 

is a potent force. 

We shouldn’t also discount al-Qaeda’s al-Nusrah Front, which 

has its own unit that consists of natives of Russia’s North 

Caucasus, but also the republics of Central Asia, and that unit 

counts about 1,500. 

So imagine what would happen if all these individuals come 

home, whether because ISIL prevails or whether because ISIL is 

defeated, but these individuals are not apprehended or eliminated. 

I should note that both organizations, ISIL and al-Qaeda, have 

maintained ties with the insurgents and terrorist networks in the 

North Caucasus. This summer saw ISIS establish a vilayat, a sort 

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of province in the North Caucasus; and the Emirate Caucasus, the 

umbrella terrorist organization, operates in the North Caucasus, 

has had longstanding ties with al-Qaeda, and its leaders have 

praised Ayman al-Zawahiri as their leader. 

So no surprise that Russian officials, including Foreign Minister 

Lavrov and Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev, have described ISIS as the main threat to Russia and the main threat to 

global security, respectively. On the U.S. side, there is less agreement on whether ISIS represents a top threat, but I think the FBI 

Director has been quoted as saying that it is a top threat to U.S. 

national security. 

So since neither the United States nor Russia can tolerate the 

further existence of a quasi-state in the form of ISIS in the Middle 

East, and both countries need to counter al-Qaeda and keep it on 

the run and reduce its possibilities, I would argue there is definitely ground for potential cooperation. 

Now, that is impeded by different approaches toward Syria, although I believe—and Russian officials have said officially—that 

Russia is not married to Assad. So I think in the longer term there 

is an opportunity for a transition to a coalition government that 

would represent Assad’s key constituencies—Alawites, Kurds, and 

also moderate sections of the Syrian opposition. 

For now, the U.S.-Russian cooperation can be, though, limited to 

fighting ISIL in Iraq, and that could include joint operations, which 

is something U.S. and Russian special forces have done on a very 

low scale in Afghanistan. It could include providing more arms and 

more training to the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Kurds fighting 

ISIL, and it could, of course, include disrupting financing, which is 

not a counterterrorism tactic per se, but is an important element 

of countering such organizations. 

But even looking beyond that, countering terrorism with force 

alone would not suffice. So there are certain root causes and contributing factors that I am not going to list, but are in the statement, that both Russia and the United States need to address as 

they think how to defeat terrorists not only in the Middle East, or 

containment, but also in their own countries. 

Of the deep-rooted and structural causes, I would point out relative socioeconomic deprivation, historical grievances, poor quality 

of governance, and political instability are factors that facilitate 

this violence. I would point out the spread of violent ideologies and, 

primarily, the militant form of Salafia, or so-called ‘‘Wahhabism,’’ 

as Dagestani officials call it. 

And finally, the third group of causes, motivational causes I 

would point out are the abuses of the population. If there is anything that creates grievances, it is the abuses of the population at 

the hands of authorities. 

So let me conclude by saying that cooperation between the 

United States and Russia against terrorism in general, and ISIS 

and al-Qaeda in particular, will not only significantly advance 

international efforts to contain these organizations’ expansion within and without Iraq and adjacent countries, but it can also help to 

stop the slide toward a new Cold War between the West and Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, although these factors are not 

exactly—there is no avoiding it. I mean, the Ukrainian crisis will 

14

have to be resolved regardless, but that cooperation—let me repeat—will help to stop the slide toward a new Cold War. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saradzhyan follows:]

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STATEMENT OF MARK N. KATZ, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, SCHOOL OF POLICY, GOVERNMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. KATZ. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, thank you so 

much for the invitation to speak to you today. I would like to address the Syrian aspect of this issue. 

Unlike in Ukraine, where Moscow has openly declared that its 

motive for intervention and support for separatist forces is being 

undertaken to counter the West, Russian officials have characterized their support for the Assad regime in Syria as actually being 

in Western interests—even if Western governments do not quite 

seem to understand this—since it serves the common goal of combating the Islamic State. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently described the Assad 

regime as an important ally in the fight against the Islamic State. 

‘‘It is evident,’’ he stated recently, ‘‘that without an active participation of the Syrian authorities and military, without participation of 

the Syrian army inside the territory, as the military say, in the 

fight against Islamic State, terrorists cannot be expelled from that 

country and from the region on the whole.’’

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described the Assad regime as a crucial ally against Islamic State. He declared that, ‘‘The 

Syrian President is the commander in chief of probably the most 

capable ground force fighting terrorism. To give up such an opportunity, ignore the capabilities of the Syrian army as a partner and 

ally in the fight against the Islamic State, means to sacrifice the 

entire region’s security to some geopolitical moods and calculations.’’

Now, while the West may not like Assad, Russian officials and 

commentators are saying his authoritarian regime is preferable to 

an even worse one that Islamic State would establish that would 

pose a real threat to Western, as well as Russian interests. Furthermore, Assad regime forces are needed in order to stop Islamic 

State from taking over more or even the rest of Syria. Western insistence that Assad must step down, then, is foolish since this 

would gravely weaken the forces fighting against Islamic State. 

The West, then, should work with Moscow and the Assad regime 

against the common threat and not against them. 

This argument is based on the premise that the Assad regime is 

actively fighting against Islamic State. There have been numerous 

reports, though, that the Assad regime and the Islamic State have 

actually not been fighting with each other or not doing so very 

much. A widely quoted study by IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center at the end of last year noted that the Assad regime’s 

‘‘counterterrorism operations . . . skew heavily toward groups 

whose names aren’t ISIS. Of 982 counterterrorism operations for 

the year, up through November 21, 2014, just 6 percent directly 

targeted ISIS.’’

In February of this year, TIME magazine reported on a Sunni 

businessman with close ties to the Assad regime describing various 

forms of actual cooperation between the Assad regime and the Islamic State, including how the Assad regime buys oil from Islamic 

State-controlled oil facilities, how Syria’s two main mobile phone 

22

operators provide service and send repair teams to IS-controlled 

areas, and how Damascus allows food shipment to the IS capital, 

Raqqa. 

At the beginning of June 2015, U.S. Embassy Damascus accused 

the Syrian Government of providing air support to an advance by 

Islamic State militants against other opposition groups north of 

Aleppo. 

In July, Turkish intelligence sources claimed that ‘‘an agreement 

was made between the Assad regime and Islamic State to destroy 

the Free Syrian Army in the country’s north.’’

Now, why would the Assad regime not fight against the Islamic 

State and even cooperate with it? Both of them have an interest 

in weakening their common foes—other Syrian opposition groups 

being supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others. 

Moscow and Damascus, of course, vehemently deny that the 

Assad regime and the Islamic State are not fighting each other and 

are even cooperating against their common foes. The numerous reports that this is what is happening, as well as the compelling nature of the ‘‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’’ logic at work here, 

though, point to their credibility. And if these reports are true, 

then certain implications follow. 

If Assad and the Islamic State are not really fighting each other, 

but the Assad regime is losing ground, then its weakening is due 

primarily to the non-Islamic State forces backed by Turkey and the 

Gulf Arabs. 

Russian military support to the Assad regime is likely to be used 

primarily against those forces that are most threatening to Damascus—i.e., the Free Syrian Army, the al-Nusrah Front, and all of the 

others—and not against the Islamic State, which is less threatening to it. 

Russian calls for the West to work with Moscow and Damascus 

in the fight against the Islamic State, then, are really intended to 

elicit Western acquiescence to increased Russian support for Assad 

regime efforts to combat its more threatening non-Islamic State opponents as well as to divide Western governments that fear the Islamic State more than the Assad regime, on the one hand, from 

Turkey and the Gulf Arab states, which are more focused on supporting the downfall of the Assad regime through supporting its 

non-Islamic State opponents on the other. 

What all this suggests is that the recent increase in Russian 

military involvement in Syria is motivated much less by a desire 

to combat the Islamic State than by the desire to protect the Assad 

regime against its more active non-Islamic State opponents as well 

as to blunt the actions of Western and Middle Eastern actors aimed 

at supporting them. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katz follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you all for this actually quite diverse view of what is going on and what we should do. I hope 

maybe by the end of this hearing we can actually come to some 

conclusions, but you are all so much wiser than I am, I assure you. 

All right, Dr. Aron, Dr. Katz just basically called into question 

whether Assad is actually as anti-ISIL as we have been led to believe. Could you give us your assessment of that, please? 

Mr. ARON. Well, I am sure Mark looked deep into that. I was 

concentrating largely on the spread of fundamentalism—militancy—inside Russia from the North Caucasus. But intuitively, you 

know, gangsters usually find common language—Stalin did with 

Hitler, for example—so I would not be surprised if that is the case. 

And in any case, they do come to blows, but first they take care 

of the pro-Western liberals. And, again, you know, that may not 

just apply directly to the Free Syrian Army, but, historically, I 

would think that that is probably quite accurate. 

As somebody who has been dealing—you know, studying Putin 

and his ideology and his goals, I agree that, you know, even regardless of what Putin’s plans are with respect to Assad, per se, I think 

they are secondary. I think the most important thing to Putin in 

Syria is what I call the implementation of the Putin doctrine, as 

I articulated a few years back, which is the recovery of geopolitical 

assets lost by the Soviet Union in the fall of the Soviet state. He 

wants to establish the presence of Russia in the Middle East as 

probably the dominant outside player. That is the first thing. 

The second thing, let’s not forget that, Assad or no Assad, the 

only thing, as a Russian analyst, top Russian pollster told me a 

couple years ago, the only thing that is going for this regime—I am 

talking about the Putin regime—is Putin’s personal popularity, if 

you look at the public opinion polls. How does he get this popularity? He gets this popularity by embodying the thirst and the 

hunger for reestablishing Russia as a great power. This is what 

happened with Crimea, this is what happened with Ukraine, and 

now this is what is happening in Syria. I think this is the key motivational force, the key motivation for Putin to be present in Syria. 

And one last thing, again, which has nothing to do with his support for Assad. There is a very serious concern, and both of the 

speakers touched on this, there is a very serious concern for what—

you mentioned Churchill before, let me apply Churchill’s definition 

of the Balkans—for the soft underbelly of Russia, which is the Central Asia. It consists of very unstable regimes, and the ISIS penetration and the Taliban subversion of those states brings ISIS and 

brings the Taliban to Russia’s borders. This is another issue for, I 

think, motivated Putin. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have how many minutes before we vote? 

About 7 minutes. 

I am going to yield several minutes to you now, and we will come 

back immediately after the two votes. 

Mr. SIRES. I will wait until we get back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. We are in recess until immediately 

after the second vote. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The hearing is called to order. I will finish 

my questions after Mr. Sires has his chance. 

27

Mr. SIRES. After you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Look, again, there is a wonderful diversity of opinion here and 

a whole new concept, which I had not heard, and let me just ask 

then, from your testimony, you are suggesting that Assad is not 

someone who is as antiradical as we have been led to believe and 

that he would, and with Mr. Putin’s involvement with Assad, is not 

going to direct them toward ISIL but direct them toward his own—

or the nonaligned movement? 

Mr. KATZ. I think that Assad, obviously, he is opposed to the 

jihadists, and they are opposed to him. I just think that the way 

in which they look at the question is one of, you know, a highly 

Machiavellian manner, and that is that, who is threatening Assad 

most now? It is not ISIS so much. It is these other opponents. And 

who threatens ISIS in many respects? In other words, it is a competition among the other Syrian opposition movements, so that 

they have a common interest at present that both would like to see 

the other opposition movements weakened. Now, that doesn’t mean 

that they are going to be friends later on—in other words, they are 

preparing for the day that they will probably turn on each other—

but at the moment, it seems that they are not so interested in 

fighting each other, that they both prefer to weaken the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So those two groups are not interested in 

fighting each other, and at least one of them is interested in fighting Assad, and Assad will then focus on, if we help him, only on 

that group and ISIL? So you are saying the ISIL forces are not at 

this point attacking Assad’s military bases and things such as that 

and it is the group that we—by the way, just to note, I voted 

against arming that third force. I thought that was going to turn 

out the way things did in Iraq. 

And so you are suggesting that that group now is, indeed, leading the fight against Assad and that ISIL is not? 

Mr. KATZ. Well, obviously, it is many, many groups, in other 

words. It is not even as complicated as a three-cornered conflict. In 

other words, there are loads of actors involved here. But what it 

does seem is that at the moment, it is the opposition groups that 

are not ISIS that are most threatening to Assad; therefore, it is not 

surprising that Assad is concentrating his efforts on these particular forces. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But we have seen reports that—and one of 

the reasons why we voted against doing this is that there have 

been defections by that third force, supposedly, to ISIL. In fact, one 

of the major leaders of that group defected, and the report that I 

read is he now commands a force half of which is made up of people from Chechnya. 

Mr. KATZ. My memory of the report is that the moderates whom 

we supported defected to the al-Nusrah Front, which, of course, is 

hardly better, but it is not ISIS, that is for sure. But we are not 

a major actor in terms of, I think, external actors supporting the 

Syrian opposition. Obviously, it is the Saudis, the Turks, the 

Qataris, and others. And I think that they have their own agenda. 

I am not sure if it was ever possible to create this moderate third 

force. I don’t think it necessarily was. 

28

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you tell me what group, was it the 

third group that you are thinking about or was it ISIL that just 

captured the—I have trouble pronouncing it—I–D–L–I–B, the Idlib 

airbase, which was—I think it was 2 weeks ago? It was a major—

it was a huge victory for—I assumed it was ISIL at the time, but 

it was a major defeat for Assad’s forces. 

Mr. KATZ. I am not positive which one it was actually who captured it. I just remember the very——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So if it was ISIL and not this third force, the 

basis of your—that would go totally contrary to the basic which you 

are testifying today? 

Mr. KATZ. I would just like to refer to the U.S. Embassy Damascus statement from earlier in June indicating that the U.S. accused 

the Syrian Government of providing air support to an advance by 

Islamic State militants against opposition groups north of Aleppo. 

In other words, that there seems to be sort of a—not an actual 

alliance, but sort of an alliance of convenience, in many respects, 

between Assad and ISIS. If he has to give anything up, he would 

rather see it go to ISIS at present than his other opponents in 

order to bolster the argument that——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But if that airbase, which was one of the 

major battles in the last 6 months, because they have been defending this with their lives and this was a major part of their strategy, 

if indeed that was an ISIL attack, that does basically contradict 

your theory. 

Mr. KATZ. If it was an ISIL attack. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. So we will find out. I will 

look into it. The group that did it was al-Nusrah. 

Mr. KATZ. Okay. Then that makes sense, yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And al-Nusrah, to you, is a radical Islamic 

group? 

Mr. KATZ. Of course, it is a radical Islamic group. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Yeah. Okay. 

Mr. KATZ. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So doesn’t that go a little bit contrary 

to what you were testifying? 

Mr. KATZ. Well, if the focus is on ISIS per se, I think one thing 

that we know is that they are more radical even than al-Nusrah. 

In other words, there has been competition between the al-Nusrah 

Front and ISIS. I am not saying that it is better that al-Nusrah 

Front has made these advances, but what I think is that what we 

are seeing is that, as the Assad regime weakens, then eventually 

we are going to see a conflict between al-Nusrah and ISIS. In other 

words, they are not going to kiss and make up because they are 

both radicals. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Okay. 

Mr. KATZ. That there is going to be a conflict between them. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, with that, and Mr. Sires, and then I 

will have some other questions later. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, as I listened to your statements, I couldn’t help but 

be a little bit confused in everything that was said here. 

First, let me make an observation. You know, for the last few 

weeks we have been hearing about how the Syrian army has been 

29

weakened and how it looked like there was going to be defections 

and everything else. I really think that was a setup so that the 

Russians should come in and step in there in Syria. And now, 

today, I understand that the Russians bombed the Free—I wrote 

it down here—the Free Syrian Army post, but that wasn’t ISIL. 

So what does all of that mean? I mean, I assume that they were 

there to fight ISIL. Anybody? I guess I will get all three of your 

opinions since they were so diverse when you first gave your statements. 

We will start with you. 

Mr. KATZ. Okay. Yes. I think that in today’s Washington Post, 

we have seen reports in which the Russians have claimed that they 

have made an attack on ISIS, but that opposition leader Hisham 

Marwah claimed that the Russian air strikes targeted civilians, not 

ISIS, killing 37 people in Homs. ‘‘ ‘The people of this area are opposed to ISIS,’ said Marwah, vice president of the Syrian National 

Coalition, speaking by telephone from the U.S.’’ His accounts, of 

course, couldn’t be independently verified. 

And so I think that this is the heart of the matter, that Putin 

claims he is there to fight ISIS, but what he is really there to do 

is to protect the Assad regime—protect the Assad regime against 

both the forces that oppose him most strongly, and this isn’t ISIS. 

In other words, he is going to hit whoever is threatening Assad. He 

is not going to punctiliously avoid those forces that are not ISIS 

but which are threatening Assad. No. He wants to get rid of all the 

opposition to Assad. 

Mr. SIRES. Dr. Aron. 

Mr. ARON. As I said before in answer to Mr. Chairman’s question, Putin is there to show that Russia does not abandon its allies. 

Mr. SIRES. So in complete contrast to what people are claiming 

about us? 

Mr. ARON. Make your own conclusions. 

Mr. SIRES. No, I am just saying. 

Mr. ARON. Yeah. And I think Putin—well, and I think Putin—

you know, that point does not escape Putin, definitely. Well, you 

notice that immediately, you know, almost coincidental, Iraq now 

is cooperating with Russia on intelligence matters, and we are now 

worried what secrets is our Iraqi, I guess, allies are going to give 

Russia. It was a headline today. 

So Putin is there to show that Russia does not abandon its allies. 

On a more strategic level, if I may reiterate, it is for Putin to regain a very important geopolitical asset. Russia is back in the Middle East after Sadat threw the Soviet Union out in 1972. Russia 

is back. 

And, finally, it is an extremely important domestic political imperative for him to show that, whatever economic difficulties they 

have, Russia is a great power again, whether it is in Ukraine, 

whether it is in the Middle East, and God knows what is going to 

be next. 

So these, to me, I think, is how Putin calculates it. Frankly, you 

know, so long as the regime that he supports is in power, I think 

that is Putin’s strategic goal. Who he has to bomb along the way 

is, you know, I think is a secondary matter to him. He leaves it 

to the people on the ground. 

30

Mr. SIRES. What do you think? 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. Well, I haven’t seen reports of what Russian 

warplanes have bombed what. My understanding is that Russia’s 

interests in Syria require that Russia has a say in the future of 

this country. But the notion that Russia would bomb any of Assad’s 

opponents, I think, is mistaken. Russia has hosted negotiations between some members of the Syrian opposition and Syrian officials. 

Russia has discussed, according to those opposition members, as 

cited in the press, potential participation of these opponents in the 

future government. 

So, therefore, I think, as long as Russia’s interest in Syria are 

honored, which is the presence of the Russian Navy in the Tartus, 

at the Tartus facility, continuing military industrial cooperation 

with Syria, and ensuring that there’s no failed state in Syria, 

which is the largest concern of Russia, it would be open to accommodating a potential transition to a coalition government in the 

long run. Again, I haven’t seen what they have bombed. 

Mr. SIRES. But a coalition government, though, that would be in 

favor of Russia? 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. That would take into account—it is not black 

and white—that would take into account Russia’s interests, which 

include ensuring stability of Syria so that it doesn’t become a failed 

state and, therefore, does not become a haven for terrorist groups 

that would then attack Russia and its allies, ensuring that Russia’s 

naval presence remains in Syria, as it has been, and ensuring that 

Russia continues to trade with Syria in goods that let Russia diversify its economy, which is mostly about oil and gas. Syria is a 

major buyer of Russian machinery, including arms. 

So as long as those interests are honored, Russia will remain 

open to the real dialogue, and the notion that it would bomb any 

of Assad’s opponents, I think, is mistaken. If you read what the 

spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry said, Maria Zakharova, she 

said openly what has been said privately by Russian officials for a 

long time, that Russia is not married to the idea of keeping Assad 

necessarily in power. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Somebody talk a little bit about the challenges 

that the Russians’ military presence in Syria poses to the United 

States in terms of its conflict in Syria. What challenges do you see 

for us there? 

Mr. KATZ. Well, clearly, if, in fact, the U.S. has its own bombing 

campaign against ISIS—and, certainly, Russia has its bombing 

campaign too—then I think the main question is deconfliction. We 

want to make sure that the two air forces don’t run into each other. 

And so this is a serious issue, it seems to me. 

On the other hand, other than that, I am not sure that the Russian military presence can really be seen as a threat to the United 

States. You know, Russia has fewer troops in Syria than we now 

have in Iraq. And so it strikes me that with our presence in Iraq, 

we are not exactly able to defeat ISIS with that. I don’t think that 

what Russian presence we have seen in Syria is going to enable 

Russia to defeat ISIS if, in fact, that is what it wants to do. I think 

that, at best, what they are there to do is to bolster the Assad regime. 

31

I have to disagree with my colleague about who Russia is or is 

not willing to bomb. I think that Russia is there to help the Assad 

regime. The Assad regime has certain very urgent opponents, and 

therefore I think that if that is what is necessary to attack, then 

that is what they will attack. I don’t think Russia wants to get 

deeply involved in Syria, and in that caseI think thatPutin may 

have bitten off a little more than he can chew. 

I have heard certain people from the Pentagon indicate that the 

U.S. can live with a Russian naval facility on the coast of Syria. 

It doesn’t really threaten us very much. SoI don’t think that we are 

necessarily opposed to Russia having normal relations, even favored relations with Syria. 

And I think that at the beginning of the Syrian conflict our 

thought was that, well,just as Moscow complained that after Assad 

Russia wouldn’t have any influence in Iraq because the Iraqi Government would be pro-American, and what we have seen is increasing cooperation between Iraq and Russia. I think what we expected 

was that with the change of regime in Syria, which of course didn’t 

happen, was that the new Syrian Government would eventually, 

after a certain pause, restore relations with Russia as well. But, of 

course, this is not what has happened. 

Mr. SIRES. Dr. Aron, what challenges do you think it poses to——

Mr. ARON. No comment on that. You know, I thought that the 

actual topic, the threat of Islamic extremism in Russia, I think 

Syria does enter this simply because Syria has become a training 

ground for the jihadists from Central Asia, North Caucasus. But 

my point was that I think we may be seeing something much more 

threatening, and that is the Russian Muslim minorities inside Russia are beginning to go that route. They have very significant presence already in the troops of the jihadists in Syria. 

And, frankly, if we thought that the Chechenswere a problem, 

there are 1 million of them, and there are 61⁄2 million of Tatars and 

Bashkirs, and there are another 5 to 6 million inside Russia, including 21⁄2 million migrants from Central Asia, who are constantly 

going back and forth, and Central Asia is completely now penetrated by ISIS recruiters and ISIS propaganda. 

So talking of danger to the United States, those things are very 

rarely contained within national borders. So this, to me, is one of 

the offshoots. Regardless of what Putin does and what we do, I 

think that train is already in motion. 

Mr. SIRES. And do you agree or disagree? 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. Well, I agree. And as I said in my recent statement, the primary threat that emanates from that area is not 

whether Assad stays for a bit longer or is ousted now. It is whether 

this threat of violent jihadists can be contained and eliminated. 

Mr. SIRES. So you don’t think it poses any challenges to our efforts in Syria? 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. I think whoever does anything, if it focuses on 

violent extremists and violent Islamists in Syria and Iraq, whoever 

goes after them, it is in the interests of the United States and it 

doesn’t pose a threat, just like it is in the interests of Russia. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. 

32

We are going to have another series, which gives me an excuse 

to be able to ask some questions as well. And if you would like to 

ask some more, we will get that in as well. 

I would like to place in the record a letter from John Quincy 

Adams to his fellows about his observations about Russia even as 

far back as John Quincy Adams, who, I believe, was our first Ambassador to Russia. 

And he pointed out in his letter and lengthy analysis that the 

Russian character had been developed in great part due to its constant fight with Islam on its borders, that the Russia character of 

actually—and their national spirit—had been brought about by this 

fact that Islam was in a time of expansion, and Russia and the 

Russian people bore the brunt of that. 

Thus, the idea that something could happen in the Islamic world 

that would be a great threat to Russians is something that is not 

just what Putin believes, but something that is engrained in Russian people, who over the years have had tragic incidences with, for 

example, a school in Beslan. And I went to that area to see that 

school and to talk to the local people. And they end up with hundreds of their children being murdered, basically. But that is not 

only. But you go through the years, this has been part of Russia’s 

psyche. 

I don’t think—look, is there something—I don’t think there is 

anything wrong with a country being led by a ruler who wants 

their country to be a great country. And I heard Mr. Putin’s remarks to the United Nations, and he readily admitted that Russia 

had discarded the Soviet Union, and this was a new situation, and 

they are back to what normal countries should be judged by, not 

by standards that were established during the Cold War when Russia, itself, was being directed by an ideological, zealous clique in 

the Communist Party, the same way radical Islam is having such 

a major impact on Islam. The radical Islamists have that type of 

ability to impact on policies and large numbers of people through 

their violence. 

So I really reject the idea that, well, Putin is only down there 

and the Russians are only down there to help Assad, their friend, 

although part of being a great country is making sure that when 

you make a deal with somebody that you keep the deal even when 

it gets tough and you don’t leave your friends in the lurch after 

they have risked everything for you. And it seems that in the last 

few years the United States, as my colleague accidentally indicated, the United States——

Mr. SIRES. Some people. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, well, we have left a lot of people behind here. And also, the United States policy was what? We had 

to get rid of Saddam Hussein. We felt compelled to go in and get 

Saddam Hussein. And now we feel compelled to make sure that 

Assad in some way doesn’t hold power. 

I don’t get that. I think it was a mistake on our part. And I voted 

for that to support President Bush when he went into Iraq. That 

was a horrible mistake. And Saddam Hussein was not our enemy. 

And guess what, I don’t think Assad is our enemy. 

And if Russia is indeed there simply to help Assad—and what 

might happen to Syria, even if Assad is overthrown with non-ISIL 

33

forces—I don’t think that it was the radicals that necessarily overthrew Qadhafi, but when the moderates overthrew Qadhafi with 

our help, we ended up with half of Libya now being controlled by 

radical Islam and a threat to the stability of the whole region. 

Maybe Assad is like that. Maybe, no matter who overthrows him, 

as Mr. Putin was mentioning in his remarks at the U.N., that 

maybe this will create an unintended consequence of total catastrophe, not just Assad being overthrown by someone who isn’t radical, but by the fact that you have a power vacuum then and chaos 

that will be exploited by these radical forces that are clearly 

present in that region. 

So I personally, number one, think that we ought to start analyzing Russia, which is one of the reasons why you have this hearing, make sure that we understand what motives are going on 

here. And I don’t think it is the motive that we had the same motive that when Khrushchev put the missiles into Cuba. I don’t 

think that is the type of attitude that we are facing in the world 

today. And that is a lot different and that deserved the outrage 

that we had at that time. 

But Assad being helped by Russia in the face of this type of turmoil, I don’t see that this should be on our list of things to thwart, 

and it seems that our government is. 

Back to the actual nature of Russia and radical Islam. Do you 

think, with all of the testimony we have heard today, I mean, it 

seems to me that wouldn’t a government of Russia be justified in 

being concerned to hear that there are 5,000 Russian people who 

might at the end of this come back home and start committing the 

types of terrorism that is being experienced in different parts of the 

world? Isn’t that a justified fear? Okay, please feel free to comment. 

Whatever. 

Mr. ARON. Of course it is. And the fact that the Russian language is now the third most popular and that, you know, I have 

all kinds of stuff that you cannot fit in 5 minutes, but, you know, 

there have been reports that there were graffiti in Russian in Syria 

which read, ‘‘Putin, we will pray in your palace,’’ or through 

‘‘Tajikistan to Russia,’’ which was one of the slogans of several 

groups. There is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. I mean, this 

is a very vulnerable area. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, a Tajik city was just taken over by the 

Taliban. Now, by the way, it is not that somebody is worried about 

that Russia will fall to these radicals. The issue is whether or not, 

because these radicals feel that they are now motivated and backed 

and have experience, that they might go into that country and 

start killing people in large numbers, whether it is herding a bunch 

of kids into a school and surrounding them with explosives, or 

whether it is setting off the type of explosions and things that we 

have seen in railroad cars in Western Europe. 

There are fewer Muslims in Western Europe than what we have 

in Russia, and they are suffering from attacks, terrorist attacks 

there. 

So, again, I think that the threat to Western civilization, to the 

non-Muslim world from radical Islam, Islamic terrorists, is real, 

and it makes sense if someone is also a target for that, that we 

don’t try to do everything we can to undermine their efforts, but 

34

instead at least try to find ways to cooperate. That is what this 

hearing is all about. 

And my colleague will now have his questions. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Are you going to put that letter for the record? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is for the record. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. 

I am trying to associate the Ukraine with what is going on in 

Syria. And do you think it has anything to do with Putin’s decision 

to go into Syria, the fact that now there is like a stalemate there? 

Mr. ARON. Well, one of the most interesting reactions that I 

heard from the—or read in the Russian media immediately after, 

because it was a surprise to everybody, part of the issue with Russia is that Putin literally is his own defense council, which is very 

difficult. It is a very dangerous situation. Crimea was a surprise 

to his ministers, to his closest aides, and so was Syria. 

So the reaction from the Russian analysts was—one of the reactions—and remember I mentioned to you that there is a domestic 

political dimension to this, that is that Putin is popular not because of the Russian economy anymore. He used to be popular because they grew 7, 8 percent every year between 2000–2008. He is 

popular because he embodies this dream of Russia becoming a superpower like the Soviet Union used to be. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is called patriotism, right? 

Mr. ARON. Well, we all want our countries to be great. The question is how we achieve it. That is a separate issue. 

Mr. SIRES. We call it something else. 

Mr. ARON. But the bottom line is, some of the analysts, some of 

the most respected Russian analysts, independent Russian analysts, said one of the reasons, not the whole reason, but one of the 

reasons to go to Syria is that Ukraine no longer generates enough 

of this patriotic heat that makes not all Russians, but quite a few 

to forget about the economic hardships, the 15 percent inflation, 

that the economy is probably going to shrink 5 to 6 percent this 

year, that there is unemployment, that the pensions are growing 

smaller and smaller due to inflation, that food products are now 15, 

20, 30 percent more than they used to be because of the ban on 

the imports, and because there is no import substitution anymore. 

So all of those——

Mr. SIRES. The price of oil has gone down. 

Mr. ARON. The price of oil is down. The ruble lost half of its 

value. But you see the headlines. We are in Syria now. We are 

present. They listen to us. They are afraid of us. They respect us. 

This is all very important. 

And this is, you know, answering your question, this could have 

been one of the motivations. And you said, what is the connection 

to Ukraine? And I could talk to Ukraine for a long time. It is a very 

interesting subject. But for whatever reason, Putin now put 

Ukraine on hold. I don’t think it is forever. I think he is going to 

return to that issue. 

But there is something else now. He is like that man on the bicycle. I mean, that thing that, you know, when you put all your eggs 

in this what I call patriotic mobilization, you have got to give people, you know, fresh meat. You know, you are riding the tiger 

which is great, but the tiger requires fresh meat and bloody meat 

35

every now and then. So Ukraine is on hold, but Syria is in the 

headlines. 

Mr. SIRES. Anybody else want to take a crack at that? 

Mr. KATZ. Thank you. 

Yes, I think in addition to what Dr. Aron had to say about the 

domestic political aspect of this and the link between Ukraine and 

Syria, I think there is also an important aspect in terms of relations with the West. In other words, the sanctions that the West 

has imposed on Russia as a result of actions in Ukraine are hurting the Russian economy, hurting it pretty badly. And I think that 

for Putin in particular, by making this argument that we can work 

together in Syria against ISIS, that this is a way sort of to restore 

relations with the West. 

And to some extent I think we have seen it starting to work. 

President Francois Hollande actually came out and said maybe we 

should reduce the sanctions on Russia now that we have to deal 

with Syria together. Obviously, this is what he wants, although I 

did notice that most recently Francois Hollande indicated that 

what he wants to see is Russian actions against ISIS, not just 

words about it. 

And of course Putin is taking advantage of the migration crisis. 

In other words, I think for a lot of Europeans in the European public, when it comes down to it, which is more important to them? 

Is it the migration crisis or what is happening in Ukraine? It is the 

migration crisis and if Putin is going to provide a way out of this, 

but the question is can he. 

I would like to just also get back to an important point that Congressman Rohrabacher indicated, in other words, that in addition 

to the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and Russia, there 

is a basic philosophical difference about how to deal with Syria. 

The Russian argument is that Assad, as bad as he is, is less worse 

than ISIS, therefore we should support Assad. The Obama administration’s argument is that ISIS is so awful that he has contributed to the rise of ISIS. 

And the real trouble, I think, is that both might be right. In 

other words, that both arguments have a degree of validity. And 

what that implies is that, whether Assad goes or stays, ISIS is 

going to be a problem. And that is the situation, I think, that we 

are really stuck in, that we can argue about how to deal with the 

Syrian situation, but the real bottom line is that neither we nor the 

Russians really have an adequate response to this, that it has gotten out of hand, and whatever which way we go, it is going to remain a problem. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s give our panelists each 1 minute to 

summarize what they would like to summarize on the issue, but 1 

minute. And then the chairman, with his prerogative, will have a 

final statement as well. Then you can go. 

Dr. Aron, do you want to give us 1 minute? 

Mr. ARON. Yes, 1 minute is enough. I think, if indeed—and of 

course I gave you the tip of the iceberg on the evidence—if indeed 

we are witnessing a tipping point at which fundamentalist militant 

Islam is migrating from North Caucasus into Russia itself, I think 

this is a huge threat to Russia and the world. 

36

In addition to that, these types of things usually are enhanced 

by domestic political crises and pressures. And Russia is in a very 

precarious state economically, politically, even though Putin would 

not admit it. There are all kinds of strains. And I think, while we 

are worried about the failed state in Syria, I think we should also 

worry about how the terrorism could become an issue for Russia 

and us. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. I would like to reiterate that U.S. and Russia 

share common interests in countering terrorism and proliferation 

threats that emanate from Syria and Iraq, meaning terrorist 

groups based there. And I think regardless of disagreements on the 

future of Assad, both countries can and should work together to 

counter that threat, which is much more threatening, much more 

superior than intricacies of transition in Syria. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Katz. 

Mr. KATZ. The rise of jihadism in Russia is obviously not in Moscow’s interest and it is not in the interest of America and the West 

either. But this rise of jihadism in Russia just isn’t occurring in a 

void. The real tragic situation is that Russia’s Muslims are not 

treated very well by the Russian Government, by Russian society. 

And I think part of the problem that we face in dealing with this 

issue is that we can’t either force or convince Vladimir Putin to 

treat his Muslims nicely. And that, I think, is the heart of the 

problem: That the Muslim issue in Russia is not one that America 

is in a position to address. Only Moscow can do that, and at the 

moment it doesn’t want to do so very effectively. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you all for joining us today. Just 

a few short thoughts, and that is, let us remember that when Saddam Hussein was eliminated it brought chaos. When Qadhafi was 

eliminated it brought chaos. There were alternatives there, you 

know, Qadhafi in particular, but also with Saddam Hussein. 

And we were told that this third force was our alternative to 

Assad. And I think the Russians are very concerned that even if 

Assad is eliminated by this third force, even if that is the case, you 

are going to have just what happened in these other countries—

chaos, which is then exploited by the most radical Islamic forces 

within those societies. 

And what would that impact on Russia, which we described 

today? This is a greater concern than actually is in Western Europe. And we can see what is going on, the frantic way Western 

Europe is dealing with radical Islam and the impact of it. 

President Putin just gave—not just, several months ago, I think 

it must have been 6 months to a year ago now—went down and 

provided President el-Sisi of Egypt $2 billion worth of credit—$2 

billion—even at a time in which we have had testimony of a weakness in the economy of Russia. Now, why did that happen? Is that 

just because he wants Russia to dominate Egypt? 

Listen, Russia is a—like England and other great countries in 

the world, in China, in Japan, in India, and these countries—these 

are great countries of the world that their leaders calculate what 

is good for their country. And in the long run, I believe the reason 

why that $2 billion and that help to General el-Sisi was coming forVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:26 Oct 27, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\093015\96819 SHIRL
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ward was because Putin acknowledges that if radical Islam were 

to take over in Egypt, that these other countries would be swept 

away in the Gulf and you would have radical Islam pouring into 

Central Asia, and that would dramatically impact the security of 

his country and the future of the world. 

And I think that there is some strategic thinking going on rather 

than simply he is a tough guy showing his muscles to the world 

and he is a gangster thug, which is usually the answers you get 

when you are trying to come up with a real analysis of what the 

hell is going on with Russia and these various parts of the world. 

So with that said, I think we need, I think the United States 

needs to cooperate with people who are going to help us defeat radical Islamic terrorism, whether it is Putin, or whether it is Assad, 

or whether who that is, because those people, especially, have the 

United States in target for their terrorism. 

If a nuclear bomb goes off from a terrorist group in the United 

States, it won’t be from Russia, it won’t be from Assad, it won’t be 

probably from Japan or any of these other countries. It will be from 

radical Islamic terrorists. And if we are going to protect our people, 

we have got to be rational and we have got to reach out to those 

people who are the enemy of our enemy. And I buy that formula, 

and I think it will make us safer. 

And with that said, I appreciate the insights that this panel has 

given us today in understanding the world and having some good 

thoughts about what strategies we can use. 

So this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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