U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Research Report 1798

Vertical Teams in the Objective Force:

Insights for Training and Leader Development 

 

James A. Cox 

 Leonard D. Holder

 Bruce C. Leibrecht 

 Larry DeRoche 

TRW, Inc. 

OCTOBER 2002

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

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ZITA M. SIMUTIS

 Acting Director

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Theodore M. Shlechter, ARI

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Vertical Teams in the Objective Force: Insights for Training and Leader

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James A. Cox, Leonard D. Holder, Bruce C. Leibrecht, and Larry

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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): 

This report addresses the selection and training challenges expected for vertical teams—commanders and staff leaders of multiple 

echelons—in the Army’s planned Objective Force. Researchers interviewed experienced warfighters and trainers operating in the 

Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) environment. They also observed collective training events conducted by the Army’s first 

IBCT, and reviewed Army documents relating directly to the Objective Force and Future Combat Systems. The findings

document the selection considerations (knowledge, skills, and aptitudes), training issues (problems and challenges), and training

methods expected to shape vertical teams in the future force. Recommendations are offered for steps to expand the database

related to training, leadership, and soldier factors. The results forge a foundation for creating and sustaining high-performing 

teams that can fight and win on the battlefields of the future.

15. SUBJECT TERMS 

Objective Force Transformation Training Issues Interim Brigade Combat Team

Training Methods Leader Traits Vertical Teams Vignette-Based Training

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 i
Research Report 1798 

VERTICAL TEAMS IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE: 

INSIGHTS FOR TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT 

James A. Cox 

Leonard D. Holder 

Bruce C. Leibrecht 

and Larry DeRoche 

TRW Inc. 

Armored Forces Research Unit

Barbara A. Black, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600 

October 2002 

Army Project Number Personnel Performance and 

2O262785A790 Training Technology

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

 iii
FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts 

research to enhance personnel selection and training. As the Army continues its transformation 

to a future force capable of responding across a full spectrum of missions, more effective 

selection and training methods become increasingly important. The transformed capabilities and 

high-tech environment of the future force must be reflected in future selection and training

programs. As part of ARI’s research supporting the future force, this report examines key

dimensions that will be critical for building and maintaining vertical teams in the 21st Century

Army. 

The research described in this report investigated the selection considerations, training

issues, and training approaches expected to shape vertical command and staff teams in the 

Objective Force. Through interviews and observations conducted in the environment of the 

Interim Brigade Combat Team, the investigators sampled the experience and insights resulting

from the Army’s initial transformation efforts. The results establish a preliminary knowledge

base regarding the selection and training needs of the future force. More importantly, they forge 

a foundation for creating and sustaining high-performing teams that can fight and win on the 

battlefields of the future.

This research was part of ARI’s Future Battlefield Conditions (FBC) team efforts to 

enhance soldier preparedness through development of training and evaluation methods to meet 

future battlefield conditions. This report represents efforts for Work Package 211, Techniques 

and Tools for C4

ISR Training of Future Brigade Combat Team Commanders and Staffs 

(FUTURETRAIN) and the ARI Science and Technology Objective, Methods and Measures of 

Commander-Centric Training. 

The contents of this report have been provided to the Commander of the Army’s first 

Interim Brigade Combat Team (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division) at Fort Lewis, Washington. 

 STEPHEN L. GOLDBERG 

 Acting Technical Director 

 v 
VERTICAL TEAMS IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE: INSIGHTS FOR TRAINING AND 

LEADER DEVELOPMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Research Requirements: 

Within a decade, military operations will be transformed by the new technologies, 

doctrine, and organizations of the Objective Force. Based on the Future Combat Systems 

(FCSs), a semi-autonomous suite of air and ground platforms directed by a smaller number of 

soldiers, this radically different fighting force will constitute a significant departure from current 

organizations, weapons, and soldier systems. Its doctrine, fighting techniques, and human 

requirements will differ substantially from the current force. Future commanders will rely more

heavily on the active cooperation of subordinate leaders who can act decisively and in concert 

with the common plan and commander's intent. This points to a need for more effective, more 

cohesive vertical leader-teams to exploit the full potential of Objective Force capabilities. The

current research investigated the training and leader development challenges the Army is likely

to face in the tactical environment of the future. 

Procedure: 

The research team combined interview and observation methods to sample the experience 

and to capture insights emerging from the Army’s initial transformation efforts. Researchers 

selected the Army's first Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, today’s newest

transformational organization, for this study. The interview audience included leaders and 

supervisors in the IBCT as well as leaders and trainers in elements supporting the IBCT. The 

interviews and observations focused on critical leader and leader team tasks, essential warfighter

traits, leader training and development requirements, and training support considerations with 

emphasis on differences from past practices. The team also reviewed Army documents and 

publications relating to the Objective Force. The team’s subject matter experts integrated and 

elaborated the data to produce insights and lessons learned for leader development and for 

building and sustaining effective vertically aligned teams in conceptually new organizations. 

Findings: 

Leader training and development emerged as the dominant theme in this research effort. 

The issues and challenges identified call for the development of a structured, standards-based 

approach for both self-development and unit administered professional development programs. 

Strong commitment by senior leaders to protect training time and resources is also necessary. 

The ability to communicate effectively will emerge as an increasingly important skill in 

Objective Force leaders. The tactical and technical competencies required of Objective Force 

leaders and leader teams seem likely to expand. This change stems from wholly new combat 

formations, equipment capabilities, tactics and doctrine. In the IBCT, they foretell disciplines

and operations more typical of today's division and corps echelons. These include participation 

vii 
in joint operations as the chief Army element, direct coordination with foreign partners in 

international coalition, and close cooperative relationships with civil agencies and nongovernmental organizations. 

Better communications and situational understanding will make dynamic teaming and 

“plug and play” task organization possible. Command of a task-specialized, widely distributed 

fighting element that is capable of changing its content without ceasing operations will impose 

special requirements. Leaders of such forces will have to be adept at integrating the efforts of a

changing set of actors in functioning vertical teams. Beyond the necessary technical and tactical 

competence characteristic of effective vertical teams, team performance and effectiveness were 

also observed to be largely dependent on mutually shared confidence, trust, and commitment. 

These characteristics can be either enhanced or inhibited by the influence of the senior leader and 

the leader's ability to communicate effectively.

The vertical team competencies required to ensure dominance in future military

operations need to be articulated in doctrine. Vertical leader team tasks, conditions, and 

standards need to be developed and written into Mission Training Plans (MTPs) to assure

attention to leader team performance in after action reviews (AARs) and other training

assessments. 

In the hands of well-prepared leaders-facilitators, the experimental vignette-based leader

training technique employed in the IBCT appeared to be a powerful training tool. It offers easily

executable alternatives to achieve leader and team training objectives. The technique holds great 

promise as a means of leader development training and vertical team integration in future forces. 

The research findings indicated that the introduction of new technologies, doctrine, and 

structure will not outmode traditional concepts of leadership. Even in boldly new units such as

the IBCT, the defining characteristics of military leadership are not significantly affected. The

only wholly distinctive trait anticipated for future leaders is digital competence.

Utilization of Findings: 

Creating and maintaining effective vertical teams in future fighting forces will depend on 

the development of new training requirements and methods. The results of this research effort 

establish a preliminary base of knowledge for understanding the leader development and vertical 

team training requirements of the Objective Force. Used imaginatively, that base may serve as a 

foundation for training high-performing leader teams that can leverage the technology, agility,

and lethality of FCS to win on future battlefields. 

viii 
VERTICAL TEAMS IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE: INSIGHTS FOR TRAINING AND 

LEADER DEVELOPMENT 

CONTENTS 

Page

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 

Purpose.........................................................................................................................................1 

Organization of the Report...........................................................................................................1 

Background..................................................................................................................................1 

Problem Statement.......................................................................................................................4 

Project Objectives........................................................................................................................5 

CHAPTER 2. METHODS.............................................................................................................5 

Data Collection Procedures..........................................................................................................5 

Data Analysis...............................................................................................................................8 

CHAPTER 3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION ...........................................................................8 

Future Forces Leadership Environment.......................................................................................8 

Fundamentals of Future Force Leadership ................................................................................ 16 

Expected Challenges.................................................................................................................. 17 

Training Issues for Leaders in the Objective Force ................................................................... 18 

Training Techniques for Future Force Vertical Teams.............................................................. 28 

Vignette-Based Training for Vertical Leader Teams................................................................. 32 

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................... 46 

Conclusions................................................................................................................................ 46 

Recommendations...................................................................................................................... 49 

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 51 

Appendix A. The Army Program for Leader Development .......................................................A-1 

B. Interview Protocol—IBCT Warfighters................................................................B-1 

C. Observation Guide: Vertical Team Training ........................................................C-1 

D. List of Documents Reviewed ................................................................................D-1 

E. Sample Vignettes from the Leader Sustainment Training Program ......................E-1 

F. Acronyms...............................................................................................................F-1 

ix
CONTENTS (Continued) 

 Page

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1. List of Interviews Conducted by the Team.......................................................................6 

 2. List of Unit Training Events Observed by the Team........................................................7 

 3. Characteristics of the Leadership Environment, Current versus Future Force...............16 

 4. Candidate Knowledge, Skills, Aptitudes, and Attitudes for Future Force Leaders........21 

 5. Advantages of Vignette-Based Training.........................................................................34 

 6. Observed Training Audience Groupings........................................................................36 

x 
VERTICAL TEAMS IN THE OBJECTIVE FORCE:

INSIGHTS FOR TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 

Purpose

This report explores the training and leader development challenges the Army is likely to

face in the tactical environment of the near future. Within a decade, military operations will be 

transformed by dramatically new technologies, doctrine, and organizations of the Objective 

Force. High performing vertical teams—commanders and staff leaders of two or more 

cooperating echelons—will play a critical role in successful operations. Creating and 

maintaining effective vertical teams in future fighting forces will depend on developing new 

training requirements and methods and purpose-built personnel selection procedures. 

This report is the result of interviews and observation of training conducted in the Army's 

first Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and derived from the preliminary concepts for the

Objective Force. The research was initiated to produce insights that speak to the selection and 

training of leaders and the development and training of high-performing vertical teams. The 

knowledge of current training practices in the dynamic environment of the IBCT and Objective 

Force concepts enabled extrapolation from the experience of the present to shed light on 

selection and training needs of the future. 

Organization of the Report 

This report is organized in four chapters: 

Chapter 1. Introduction, describes the background, defines the problem and states the 

project's technical objectives. 

Chapter 2. Method, presents the procedures followed to collect, reduce, and analyze 

the data. 

Chapter 3. Findings and Discussion, presents the findings pertinent to selection and 

training of leaders and training of vertical teams. 

Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations, distills the report’s major themes and 

offers recommendations for future research. 

Background 

The Army is systematically transforming itself into a fast-deploying, highly adaptable

force that can respond to a wide variety of threats in any operational environment (Shinseki, 

2000). As an intermediate step in the transformation process, the emerging IBCTs are moving

toward the targeted capabilities of 2010. In the coming years, IBCTs will give way to 

dramatically new organizations equipped with the Future Combat Systems (FCSs). For the

immediate future, they will serve as a bridge between old and new force designs (Mehaffey,

1 
2000). Their experience in integrating advanced technology into leader teams may point to a 

changed approach to leading military operations. 

Embedded in the Objective Force vision is the requirement for the Army to achieve 

significant improvements in strategic responsiveness, lethality, and flexibility. These will allow 

it to arrive in any theater of operation with combat power sufficient to dominate at every point on 

the operational spectrum. The spectrum ranges from dealing effectively with asymmetric threats 

in low-intensity peacekeeping, nation-building, and small-scale contingencies (SSC) to winning

battles and engagements in regional conflicts and major-theater wars (MTW). Thus, prime goals 

of the Objective Force campaign are to improve strategic mobility, enhance lethality, and 

leverage technology to generate greater combat power from smaller forces. The IBCTs represent 

the first step in this direction. 

On the future battlefield of the Objective Force, FCS-equipped units will dominate and 

win the close fight through (a) rapid deployment, (b) agile and dispersed operational maneuver, 

(c) devastating lethality, (d) quick-reaction versatility, and (e) improved survivability. Force

developers expect the Objective Force to fight in dispersed, semi-autonomous formations of 

manned and unmanned platforms (Mehaffey, 2000). Future leaders will exploit these

capabilities as well as advanced (now unknown) technologies to achieve superior situational 

understanding and dominance of the battlespace. These capabilities will enable them to destroy

key opposition forces and facilities and to neutralize enemy counteractions with unprecedented 

speed and efficiency. Adaptive leaders will be crucial in fighting through unexpected events and 

rapidly changing battlefield conditions (Ervin & Decker, 2000). Soldiers and leaders alike will 

fill new positions, interact with intelligent automated systems, and perform critical functions that

differ from those of the present. 

Compared to the past, leaders and soldiers of the Objective Force may need substantially

different knowledge, skills, and aptitudes (KSAs). Anticipating those differences and preparing

to recruit, train, educate, and develop warfighters for future operations are important challenges 

for today’s Army leaders. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

(ARI) investigators are examining these challenges to identify the emerging training and 

professional development needs of the Objective Force. The research documented in this report 

explored vertical (inter-echelon) functions in the digitized elements of the first IBCT (3rd

Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division) to illuminate important dimensions for the Objective Force.

For the purposes of this report, “vertical team” refers to any grouping of commanders and 

staff members (linked by common functions) who must collaborate across contiguous or noncontiguous echelons to integrate and synchronize the elements of combat power. For example, 

commanders of widespread formations with and without past relationships will have to closely

coordinate their actions to get full benefit of FCS capabilities. Likewise, their supporting staff 

leaders (e.g., the intelligence specialists at multiple levels) will have to act in concert to support

them. 

The vertical leader teams of the IBCT closely resemble those of present day infantry

brigades. They differ from other brigade leader teams—and therefore represent a step toward the 

Objective Force—in their digitized command and control means, some of their tactics and their 

2 
orientation on rapid reaction missions. However, their established echelons of command (platoon, 

company, battalion, brigade), their rank structure, and the command relationships between levels of 

organization are identical to those of today’s standard combat brigades. 

Vertical teaming in the Objective Force will rely on advanced command, control, 

communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) tools descended from today’s Army Battle

Command System (ABCS). These future systems may be as revolutionary then as ABCS is today. 

Using them in the dynamic tactical environment of the future may require new warfighter KSAs

honed through focused professional development. New training methods and tools may be needed 

to ensure high-performing vertical leader teams that can meet demanding performance 

requirements. In working with new doctrine, organizations and equipment, leaders and soldiers in 

the first IBCT can shed light on selection, training, and leader development issues that the Objective 

Force will likely encounter. 

The reader will find leadership, leader training, and leader development as dominant themes 

in this report. Leadership will remain central in building and coordinating vertical leader teams and

in sustaining their effectiveness under the strain of combat. Commanders will retain their role as the

principal leaders and the overarching purpose of vertical teams will be to support and implement

their commanders’ shared vision. Staff officers and non-commissioned officers play important 

leadership roles as well. Accordingly, the authors use a broad definition of “leaders” to ensure that

the complete needs of vertical teams in the Objective Force are considered. 

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) has recently advanced the support of vertical team

training by developing the Leader Sustainment Training Program (LSTP). Specifically designed for 

IBCT leader teams, the LSTP consists of a library of “vignettes” designed to develop adaptive 

leaders at brigade, battalion, company, and platoon levels. Each vignette is a self-contained exercise 

that challenges the participants to apply initiative, adaptability, and creative problem solving. The

vignettes are designed to train technical, tactical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills. Minimal 

resources are required to plan and conduct the exercises. The IBCT is using vignette-based training

for leader and vertical leader team development and has experimented with the methodology to 

simultaneously conduct horizontal battle staff training. 

The vignettes were the brainchild of MG James Dubik, the first TRADOC Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Transformation and Chief, Brigade Coordination Cell (BCC). He conceived the idea of 

developing special multi-echelon training exercises to prepare IBCT leaders and leader teams for

the challenges of their newly formed units. To obtain full involvement of TRADOC proponents

and to assure conceptual consistency, MG Dubik insisted on full participation of the Army branches 

concerned with the IBCT and on CAL’s overall supervision of the developmental work. 

The vignettes’ chief features are their emphasis on out-of-the-ordinary situations and their 

sequential involvement of overlapping leader teams. Each vignette-based training session calls for

innovative problem solving and initiative in the absence of clearly defined doctrinal solutions. Each 

brings together three levels of command—the directing commander, his immediate subordinates 

and the next level of leaders (the subordinates’ subordinates). This grouping changes and overlaps 

as the training progresses from higher to lower levels of organization. Chapter 3 provides greater 

3 
detail on this contemporary training technique (see the Vignette Based Training for Vertical Leader 

Teams section). Appendix E contains two representative vignette training guides. 

MG Dubik’s original design called for each level of command in the IBCT to train 

sequentially over a five-day period, beginning with a brigade exercise and ending with platoon level 

events across the whole brigade. This design stressed continuity along the vertical axis of Army

organization and cultivation of mutual understanding between levels of command. As it turned out,

the training took place after MG Dubik’s departure from the BCC, and the implementation differed 

from the initial plan. Nonetheless, the IBCT maintained the fundamental focus on multi-level

vertical leader team training with participation of three levels of organization.

This project explored the selection, training, and professional development requirements for 

IBCT vertical leader teams. Researchers concentrated on vignette-based training, but also observed 

other training and included a wide variety of past experiences in their interviews with IBCT leaders 

and trainers. 

Problem Statement

The Army must prepare now for the leader training and leader development challenges that

will accompany the transition to the Objective Force. As transformation progresses, significant

changes are occurring in each of the six readiness domains—doctrine, training, leader development,

organization, materiel, and soldier issues (DTLOMS). Much has already changed in the form of 

new doctrine, combat organizations, and advanced tactical equipment now embedded in the IBCT. 

There is a need to ensure that advances in doctrine, organization, and materiel are matched by

similar gains in training, leader development, and soldier issues. 

The Army’s capstone document for the Objective Force (U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, 2000) sets the tone for the challenges that lie ahead: 

The demands of operating in the future distributed and non-linear battlespace will 

place greater responsibility on leaders and soldiers at all levels. Success will 

demand leaders with mature judgment who can operate in an environment of

uncertainty with courage, initiative, and aggressive resolve. Requirements for

soldier proficiency will increase in many areas. The Objective Force soldier will 

perform many more varied and complex tasks, and units will function more

autonomously, necessitating individuals who are not only multi-skilled but also 

multifunctional thus providing operational redundancy across the Force. Leaders 

and soldiers at all levels must become highly adaptive, mastering change rapidly,

while competently employing a wide range of new technologies, particularly in 

the arena of Information Operations (IO). Comprehensive training requirements 

for a full spectrum Objective Force will be greater than the already heavy burden

that exists today. The Objective Force requires training capabilities, resources, 

and effective management that will ensure dominance across the full spectrum of

conflict. (p. 37) 

4 
Vertical leader teams in the Objective Force must exploit the capabilities of advanced

doctrine, technology, and improved organization to achieve full combat potential. Because 

success will depend on the abilities of leaders to think creatively, decide promptly, exploit 

technology, adapt readily, and act as a team, the Army needs effective methods of ensuring that 

future leaders and vertical leader teams possess these qualities. Selecting warfighters with the

right qualities, training them for multifunctional performance requirements, and continuously

developing their professional competencies will all demand reconsideration of leader training

and doctrine. The current project was initiated to begin gathering the information essential to 

that assessment. 

Project Objectives 

The goal of the work reported here was to establish an initial knowledge base regarding

selection and training of future leaders and the development and training of effective vertical

teams. The project's technical objectives were to:

Determine training issues for leaders and vertical teams relevant to the FCS and 

Objective Force. 

Identify training techniques, methods, and problems in training leaders and vertical 

teams. 

Identify the KSAs future leaders should possess to perform effectively.

CHAPTER 2. METHODS

Researchers established a knowledge base for this report in two stages. First, they

captured insights from warfighters and support personnel working in the IBCT environment by

using structured interview and observation techniques, and studied Army documents describing

the organization, capabilities, and operational environment envisioned for the Objective Force. 

The focus was on identifying leader and vertical team training issues, training methods and 

techniques, and KSAs necessary for successful operations. In the second stage, subject matter 

experts (SMEs) analyzed the IBCT data to project current dimensions into the future force

environment. Non-quantitative methods were employed for reducing and analyzing the 

information gathered in the interviews, observation sessions, and document reviews. 

Data Collection Procedures 

Interview Procedures 

The team’s on-site SMEs interviewed selected leaders, soldiers, and training support 

personnel at Fort Lewis from May 2001 through September 2001. Table 1 shows the personnel 

from each category who participated in the interviews. 

The on-site SMEs served as interview facilitators. They used a standard interview guide

that was pilot tested during preliminary interview sessions and revised to produce the final guide 

(Appendix B). Individual sessions were conducted one-on-one while group interviews were 

5 
conducted by one or both SMEs. Interviews were tape recorded for preparation of written 

summaries. Each session lasted approximately two hours. 

Table 1 

List of Interviews Conducted by the Team 

Participants Comments

IBCT Warfighters 

Brigade Commander Informal session (loosely structured) 

Battalion Commanders (4 ea) IN, FA, RSTA*, formal and informal sessions 

Battalion Executive Officer (3 ea) Infantry, Support 

Company/Battery/Troop Commanders (4 ea) Infantry, RSTA, and Support 

Platoon Leaders (2 ea) Infantry, Support 

Digital System Operators (4 sessions) Group Sessions, 4 operators in each session 

Transformation SMEs 

I Corps Leaders (2 ea) Deputy CG for Training & Readiness; G3

U.S. Army TRADOC Principal Deputy CG for Transformation 

Brigade Coordination Cell (2 ea) Dir, Battlespace Integr; Dir, Battlespace Trng

Mission Support Training Facility Ldrs (2 ea) Chief; Operations Officer 

IBCT Trainers

Battalion Assistant S3-Training Officers (2 ea) Infantry, RSTA

Brigade Coordination Cell Training NCO 

Mission Support Training Facility Staff (2 ea) Training Officer; Training NCO 

Digital Battle Staff Trainer Training NCO 

* RSTA = Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 

The interviews probed the operational experience of IBCT warfighters and trainers with 

emphasis on critical tasks and how they differ from those in an analog unit. Interview questions 

were designed to capture opinions and insights regarding leader team training, selection factors, 

and professional development. A summary of each interview session was prepared, reviewed, 

and edited to produce an accurate record. The interviews concentrated on: 

1. Critical tasks and their relation to unit missions. 

2. Activities (e.g., steps) essential for performing tasks effectively.

3. Leader and soldier enablers (knowledge, skills, aptitudes, attitudes). 

4. Training requirements to support individual and team proficiencies. 

5. Specific training techniques, procedures, and methods for effective team 

performance. 

6. Training support (e.g., simulations, after action review [AAR] capabilities) required 

for the Objective Force. 

7. IBCT lessons learned for training methods and warfighter selection/utilization. 

6 
Observation Procedures 

Two SMEs served as the principal observers at Fort Lewis. The senior observer was a 

retired artillery colonel with over 20 years of active duty experience, including involvement in the 

Army’s earliest efforts to digitize command and control. The second observer was a retired Infantry

Sergeant Major who had worked closely with the IBCT collecting lessons for the Center for Army

Lessons Learned (CALL) before beginning work on this project. Project-specific training included 

reviewing past ARI studies, collaborating in the development and pilot testing of the data collection

instruments, and receiving informal instruction from the project senior scientist. 

Observations of vertical team training occurred during two different types of events: 

vignette-based training conducted as part of the IBCT’s LSTP and progressive battle staff 

training culminating in the IBCT’s Warfighter Exercise (WFX). The vignette-based training

focused on vertical leader teams. Training objectives for Warfighter preparation extended 

beyond vertical team proficiency to include, for example, ABCS system operator proficiency and 

horizontal teaming. Table 2 lists the training events that were observed between June and 

September 2001. The team’s two on-site SMEs observed the events on a sampling basis aiming

for high-payoff opportunities. During each event, SMEs spent time unobtrusively with the entire 

training audience, typically requiring that they rotate among several nodes. 

A standard observation guide was developed to structure the SMEs’ monitoring activities 

and to facilitate the capture of notes and insights. The guide included background and 

procedural information as well as dimensions of interest to focus the observers’ attention. The 

focusing dimensions were built around the primary aspects (explicit and implicit) of the project’s 

technical objectives—training requirements, training techniques/methods, and KSAs—as they

might be observable in IBCT training events. The observers pilot tested the guide during early

observation sessions and revised it to produce the final instrument (Appendix C). 

Table 2 

List of Unit Training Events Observed by the Team

Events Observed

Brigade Level Vignettes On-hand training audience (2 sessions) 

Battalion Level Vignettes On-hand training audience (5 sessions) 

Company Level Vignettes On-hand training audience (4 sessions) 

Platoon Level Vignettes On-hand training audience (3 sessions) 

Battle Staff Training Brigade focus; 3 of 8 days of training in MSTF* 

Focused Multi-Echelon Training Brigade and battalion; 3 of 5 days of training

Brigade CPX (Command Post Exercise) Brigade training audience; 3 of 5 days of exercise

Warfighter Preparation (Mini-Exercise) Brigade and battalion; all 4 days of exercise 

Warfighter Exercise Brigade and battalion; all 4 days of exercise 

* MSTF = Mission Support Training Facility

7 
Document Review

The team reviewed Army literature relevant to the Objective Force. The selected

documents (see References and Appendix D) dealt with Force XXI operations and training, 

future force concepts, Army transformation, adaptive leadership training and innovative 

approaches to staff training. The SMEs reviewed the references to determine future leader and 

vertical team tasks and skills, and to identify concepts and common threads pointing to leader

selection and training requirements. The intent was to integrate the document-based information 

with the data gained during the interview and observation sessions. 

Data Analysis 

The SMEs used non-quantitative methods to analyze the assembled data. They translated 

and integrated statements, insights, and conclusions drawn from interviews, training

observations, and document review having specific relevance to the project's questions of 

interest. Judgment and interpretation by the SMEs was key throughout data analysis to resolve 

inconsistencies and to determine what was important and germane to the project. The resulting

collection of insights and conclusions was reviewed, discussed, and analyzed by the project team 

(the on-site investigators, a senior military analyst, and a behavioral scientist) to arrive at

consensus. 

CHAPTER 3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 

Great leaders produce great subordinates, who, in turn, become great 

leaders in their own time... The single most important contribution we

make is in developing our subordinates. Our enduring legacy to the 

Army and the nation is the training of tomorrow's leaders. 

Sullivan, 1995, p. 71

Future Forces Leadership Environment

General

Strong leadership has historically differentiated armies. The U.S. Army has long recognized 

leadership as the leading factor in a very short list of the elements of combat power. Leadership 

will remain vital even under radically changed circumstances of the future. 

Army leadership doctrine has rightly stressed the role of the commander. Capable leader 

teams, however, have also been essential to successful fighting forces. Cohesive and effective 

combination of command and staff talents at several coordinated levels of organization—vertical 

leader teams—has given the U.S. Army the edge in many of its operations. High performing units

like the 4th Armored Division and VII Corps of World War II and the 1st Cavalry Division of the 

Vietnam War were characterized by excellence of internal cooperation, originating with

commanders but embraced by the entire vertical team. The cooperation and needs of this broader 

8 
group of leaders consisting of commanders and staff leaders at multiple echelons remain central 

facets of vertical teams.

 

As the modes of combat change, specific vertical team qualities and traits have become 

more or less important. Generally the trend line of the past two centuries has headed toward

decentralization of leadership as tactics dictated more dispersion. Commanders at all levels have 

had to visualize events over longer times and greater spaces and have had to judge transient

conditions and act decisively on incomplete information. Their cooperation, based on broad, shared 

understanding of goals and tactics and on necessary distribution of authority to act independently

within the context of a common plan, has been essential to winning.

Under the influence of more effective weapons, the massed brigade formations of the 

American Civil War gave way to smaller and smaller combat groupings over the years. Improving

communications allowed for better coordination of action. Small unit leaders have had to act with 

greater and greater independence with each expansion of tactical areas and with each technical 

advance. Larger unit leaders responded to these conditions by providing a unifying concept to their

forces, by leading from the front where they could consult with and direct subordinate leaders most

effectively, and by providing increasingly well coordinated applications of combined arms. 

Better situational awareness, precision weapons, and improved communications began to

offset the wide dispersion of combat power and to change the nature of vertical cooperation in the 

20th Century’s last decades. Greater understanding of conditions and unit location increasingly

enabled commanders to confer more easily, to coordinate their actions with greater effect and to 

integrate fast, accurate point and wide area weapons into the close combat operation. Today’s 

battlefield conditions are stimulating reconsideration of the balance of centralized and decentralized

actions within the vertical team. The need remains to understand causes and effects, to analyze 

complex situations and to make timely, effective decisions if future commanders are to meet the

Objective Force’s vision to “see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively” (U.S. 

Department of the Army, 2001a). 

During Army transition, vertical leader teams will contend with both continuity and change. 

Some basic team tasks will remain while others will shift dramatically. 

Continuity

Some of the conditions of the future will resemble those of today. Army leaders will face a 

broad range of threats and missions. These will range from short notice missions to long foreseen, 

deliberately planned operations. Vertical leader teams of the future will have to anticipate conflicts 

across the full spectrum of possibilities—everything from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency to 

general war. Training leaders and leader teams for these conditions will have to aim for general 

proficiency in basic operations while providing for focused and intensive training as specific crises 

develop. 

The U.S. strategic position will subject vertical teams to worldwide operations. With a 

handful of other powers, American forces will have to train, organize, and equip themselves for 

operations in any conceivable geographical setting under any possible set of climatic and

9 
environmental conditions. Understanding the setting will be better than in the 20th Century when a

series of unexpected events forced the Army into unfamiliar surroundings, but the realm of 

possibilities will be as broad as it is now. 

As in current operations, Army vertical leader teams of the future will consist of members of

both the Active Components (AC) and Reserve Components (RC). These teams will commonly be 

augmented with uniquely qualified personnel. Specialists in languages, cultures, environmental

conditions, civil affairs, and technical matters will join units on short notice or in the midst of

operations and will have to be made productive without delay. This will create new dynamics 

between echelons of organization and new functions that require coordination within the overall

operation. Leader training will have to develop strong, flexible organizational skills and the ability

to integrate new members into functioning leader teams before and during operations. This also

suggests the need for a comprehensive integration protocol for new team members to ensure their

rapid assimilation. 

Experience in recent operations (e.g., Haiti, DESERT STORM, Kosovo and Bosnian 

peacekeeping) shows that AC and RC elements can cooperate well if they are given time to 

prepare and to train together. In future operations these associations may be formed on shorter 

notice, last for shorter periods, and require more frequent reorganization. If that is the case, 

leaders will enter and exit vertical teams more quickly and more often than they have in the past. 

In such circumstances the elements of cooperation, coordination of efforts, mutual 

understanding, and professional confidence will be affected. Uniform leader training and 

understanding of doctrine will help counteract turbulence in leader teams, but some loss of 

coordination and mutual understanding must be expected. Training that accustoms AC and RC 

leaders to this turbulence will be important and should take place in both components regularly.

Replicating this condition would add cost and complexity to training. It would, for 

example, cause AC leaders to appear in greater numbers for RC Inactive Duty Training (IDT, in

the form of monthly drills) and Annual Training (AT, typically for two weeks) for the purpose of 

intermittent participation in their training. On the RC side, this would require leaders to use

scarce training days to take part in Combat Training Center (CTC) and home station training of 

AC units in greater numbers. Distributed training—leaders participating via telecommunications 

only—may simplify this sort of teaming and reflect the reality of future C4I.

Army operations will continue to be part of fully integrated joint operations. Future joint 

action, however, is apt to involve more junior leaders in direct cooperation with elements of other 

services than is now the case. Also, joint doctrine will almost certainly have progressed from its 

present general and non-prescriptive condition and will impose more specific tasks and limits on

elements of the Army or ground component. Army commanders and staff leaders will be expected

to function smoothly in joint teams. It is desirable, therefore, that future leader training include 

elements of joint operations at a lower level of organization than is now common. Leader teams 

from colonel level (current brigade or regiment) may be expected to participate directly in joint 

organizations and must therefore be exposed to that experience in their training and education. 

United States forces will probably retain the ability to dominate aerospace, sea space, and 

much of the infosphere. They will be able to deploy significant fighting formations relatively

10 
quickly and to commence combat before deployment is complete. However, all combatants—

enemy as well as friendly—will employ wide-area and precision weapons that can rapidly

incapacitate ports, urban areas, command and signal nodes, and units. In these circumstances, 

the Army’s vertical leadership teams will have to manage and direct forces that expand quickly, 

bringing new leaders into the team as operations progress. 

To meet this need, leader training will have to represent this expanding/contracting

reality early and consistently in order to supplant the existing bias toward stable force structure 

by Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) with a mentality more akin to the German

“Kampfgruppe” of World War II or the U.S. “battle group” orientation of the late 1950’s. Field 

training and school exercises will have to stress evolving organizations and the ability to employ

a force that changes in structure from day to day. The object of this training would be to 

accustom leaders to functioning in changing vertical leader teams. Specifically, it would 

concentrate their attention on building the technical and human skills (e.g., orienting new 

members, transferring responsibilities when participants depart, modifying databases to maintain 

currency) involved in altering leader teams with minimal loss of combat potential. 

Conventional and irregular indigenous forces will also continue to be present in many

operations and may have already begun fighting, thus setting some of the operational terms 

before U.S. Army commanders can influence events. 

Future leaders will still enjoy the advantage of reliable global communications. Today’s 

military signal structure is evolving into a dependable, flexible, high capacity communications

system. Already under construction, that system will support command and control 

communications and staff information needs without interruption from mission alert through 

deployment and into fully developed combat. The system will facilitate teamwork but will also

allow individual commanders and staff leaders to obtain information independently. 

Despite the goal of continuous global connectivity, the system will remain subject to attack 

for as long as the enemy retains fighting capability, and future vertical teams will have to be able to 

switch quickly between fully-supported and temporarily impaired battle command operations. 

Training for synchronized action and close cooperation within the vertical team with and without 

full use of these means will require attention. Leaders will need the trained capacity to function 

effectively in close coordination with teammates and separately in periods of isolation. 

Combined operations are likely to remain the norm. While the U.S. will occasionally act

independently, it will more commonly fight with foreign partners. These contingents will include 

both familiar teammates and new ones. Their troops will present a widely varying level of technical

sophistication but will augment U.S. Army abilities with their unique strengths. Integrating foreign 

military leaders into the vertical leadership team from component command down to small unit 

level will complicate coordination. Foreign military leader preparation, practices, and values can be 

expected to differ from ours and will require U.S. Army leaders capable of understanding the 

differences and rationalizing them to generate the greatest possible combat effectiveness in the force

as a whole. This implies frequent training contacts with other armies, a characteristic of North

Atlantic Treaty Organization days that has, since the Cold War’s end, atrophied to some extent. 

11 
High level national and coalition authorities will have better knowledge of military events 

and greater capacity to coordinate them with other elements of national power. Like the 

commander in the fight, political leaders will be subject to continuous public scrutiny and to daily

pressures from other nations’ leaders. For the Army commanders this means that future strategic 

direction will have the potential to alter operations quickly and fundamentally. Committed 

commanders will have to operate with the understanding that time available and strategic objectives

may change suddenly. As a consequence, their vertical teams will have to be ready to conclude or 

extend operations on very short notice. 

This means that commanders and their leader teams will have to approach their missions 

and their training very flexibly. Characteristically, unit training ends neatly on the objective at 

about the time expected. If training is to prepare leader teams for the possibilities of suddenly

truncated operations (e.g., DESERT STORM) and unexpected extensions (e.g., Kosovo), then it 

should feature unforeseen changes. Requiring leaders to bring their operations to a rapid halt on 

the best terms obtainable or to extend their efforts beyond the initial assumptions of their plans 

will help prepare leader teams for these complicated tasks. 

Such training would force leaders and leader teams to confront issues of rapid termination. 

Such issues could include choosing realistic and supportable final dispositions, accelerating the

movement of parts of the force and defeating stubborn opposition in detail within tough time 

constraints. Similarly, training for unforeseen extensions to operations would raise difficult 

questions of sustaining logistical support, maintaining tactical momentum, and continuing to fight a 

tired and partially depleted force. The leader tasks related to these conditions would include

communicating in time to act, maintaining coordination in spite of curtailed or extended missions, 

re-positioning command nodes, and planning dynamically with the aid of advanced tools.

Finally, future vertical leadership teams can expect the same close coordination with nonmilitary participants that has characterized recent operations. They will have to be prepared to adapt 

their activities to take advantage of cooperation with civilian authorities and private entities that play

a role in the conflict. Training vertical teams to incorporate non-governmental and private

voluntary organization (NGO/PVO) elements—permanently or temporarily—will be part of the 

training challenge. 

Change 

Leaders of the future will confront substantial change that may force adoption of wholly

new forms of command and methods of control. Better information support and more rapid data 

collection may make the dominant battlespace awareness–precision engagement goals of system-ofsystems advocates obtainable (Owens & Offley, 2000). The complete effect of this change is

difficult to foresee in detail, but a few features seem certain. Future forces will operate across the 

full spectrum of operations. This will involve emphasizing tactical agility and shifting from stability

and support operations (SASO) to combat missions as necessary. Conventional combat operations 

will take place in non-contiguous and distributed theaters. Units will possess radically different 

fighting capabilities. Robotics and artificial intelligence will be regular components of the fighting

force. Directed energy weapons, nanotechnology-based systems (e.g., advanced air and ground 

sensors), and biotechnical soldier aids (e.g., sensory amplifiers, pharmaceuticals) are all likely to

12 
appear. So are new area denial weapons (such as “intelligent” mines), antimaterial agents

(compounds that attack metals, plastics, etc.), and novel toxins. 

Future leader teams will plan and coordinate their operations with substantially different 

battle command means. These may differ from the present ABCS automated tools as much as the

ABCS tools differ from their analog predecessors. Information collection, distribution, and decision

cycles will increase in speed, supporting faster decision cycles, inter-echelon collaborative planning, 

and broader participation in decision-making by all commanders. Automated data and information 

sorting tools will simplify dealing with this deluge of information but the idea of a stable, lasting

estimate of the situation will surely disappear. Roles within the command and staff elements of the

vertical team are likely to change in this environment with some positions becoming more important

as others become redundant. 

Where vertical leader team development is concerned, changes in information distribution

and access to new processors and global communications are likely to call for broad reorganization. 

The basics of command—building blocks like command responsibilities, span of control, mission 

and directive orders, decision support tools, codified staff responsibilities, and the roles of leaders at

differing echelons—may change fundamentally. Virtual rehearsals, execution-centric (vs. planscentric) operations, and true battle command/situational awareness on the move are goals for the

Objective Force. 

Virtual rehearsals will allow leaders to prepare actions in detail without confronting the 

time-distance difficulties in holding commanders’ meetings or consolidated staff huddles where 

participants’ physical presence is required. Multi-party video teleconferencing supported by

advanced staff aids, computer graphics and tactical simulations will support better preparation 

than voice-only conferences of analog leader teams. Virtual rehearsals will allow leaders to

consult freely at any time and to game competing courses of action using accurate strength data

and images of areas of concern. This rehearsal-based understanding of friendly and enemy

options will create an intermediate level of planning between today’s deliberate and hasty “fragorder” processes. Virtual rehearsals create the potential for better coordination of extended 

operations without pausing for extensive planning. Coupled with improved decision speed, this 

capability represents a considerable tactical advantage for Objective Force vertical leader teams. 

Execution-centric operations differ from plans-centric operations in a similar way. They

stress greater freedom of action by subordinate leaders within the context of the commander’s 

basic plan and greater use of mutually understood variations from that plan. If leaders 

throughout the vertical chain understand the commander’s overall intent and preferences as the 

operation unfolds, they will, as a group, anticipate and react to changes in the tactical situation 

without the need to resort to a new cycle of planning. 

Staff support will remain important in execution-centric operations. Rather than 

preparing plans for a distinct subsequent phase of the operation, staff leaders will use their C4I

means to provide a continuous estimate of the situation within their specialty areas. Cooperating

between echelons, staff leaders will support a series of maturing options by positioning force 

assets (command nodes, combat multipliers, supplies and services) to anticipate needs and 

sustain the continuity of operations. 

13 
Full situational awareness for commanders on the move should eliminate leader dependence 

on command posts. Objective Force commanders will be able to see any aspect of their situation 

while moving or while operating well away from their headquarters. New communication devices,

improved staff tools and simulations, and greater signal bandwidth underlie this capability and will

help staffs keep their commanders fully informed from a distance. The net effect of this will be to

give leaders full freedom of movement without loss of situational awareness.

Command of a task-specialized, widely distributed fighting element that is interdependent 

with others and capable of changing its content without ceasing operations will be different. 

Leaders will need to be multifunctional—capable of performing competently in several functional

areas. “Command” itself may not be as appropriate as local authority with license to task a broad

set of joint force capabilities. The established idea of a unit staff may disappear in favor of a 

generalized information and decision support apparatus. 

If so, then leaders and leader teams of the near future will have to be adept at orchestrating

the efforts of a changing set of actors and of integrating supporting capabilities quickly for short and 

long duration. This calls for broader knowledge and skills than are now prevalent. It also suggests 

that more experienced leaders (e.g., majors in place of captains) may be necessary in future 

organizations. Leader development and training would be strongly affected by such adjustments. 

More fundamentally, basic combat relationships may also change. Advanced weapons may

generate new fighting combinations requiring altered organizations, novel crewing, new leadership 

and training techniques, and perhaps changes in the Army’s branch organization. Just as armored 

fighting vehicles, aircraft, and radios eventually coalesced into a new and dominant tactical

combination, so too the emergent intelligent weapons, computerized decision aids, information 

tools, and global intelligence collectors are likely to fuse into something quite different from the

20th Century’s combined arms warfare. The IBCT experience is too new to justify broad 

generalization. Still, the inappropriate use of the RSTA squadron by other units suggests that a 

large part of the leadership will have to be trained to assure full exploitation of future capabilities 

even if those are only present in a few units. 

Better communications and situational understanding will also make dynamic teaming

and “plug and play” task organization possible across the whole fighting element. Improved 

situational understanding and communications may even support the elimination of some of the 

traditional Army fighting structure. If the corps, brigade, or battalion level of organization were 

to prove unnecessary, for instance, the redistribution of command and staff responsibilities and 

new techniques for cooperation and coordination would require considerable change to leader 

development, battle command doctrine, and training. For example, if corps directed the actions 

of brigades without the intermediary supervision of divisions, staff leaders would have to 

supervise a greater number and variety of actions and would be expected to understand a larger 

range of tactical details. 

Innovative and adaptive enemy opposition will also prompt force designers and doctrine 

writers to re-evaluate leader development and training requirements. Future vertical teams will 

face enemies who avoid direct confrontation and take on forms that are hard to discern and hit. 

Operating on the boundaries between military action and criminal activity, these enemies will 

14 
compel the Army to select, prepare, and employ commanders and staff leaders differently. The 

vertical leadership team of the future may incorporate civilian agency chiefs and subordinate 

military leaders to civil organizations. Training and leader selection will both have to reflect

those conditions. 

Training leaders to defeat adaptive enemies will mean preparing them for a broader range

of enemy actions in multiple geographic and demographic arenas. Automated staff aids, terrain 

modeling, historical data, artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted analytical tools, and pattern analysis 

capabilities may assist leaders in meeting this challenge, but preparing leaders to defeat enemies 

as different as terrorists, guerrillas, and conventional forces will be difficult in any case. 

Extended, immersive leader training is one approach to this problem. Army leaders have

long considered dedicating more leader time to tactical proficiency through intensive

professional education, more unit-based training and new self-development programs supported 

with sophisticated instruction and training aids. Observation of the IBCT, however, suggests that 

gains made in this way will be modest because of demands on leader time by other activities. In

practice, leader training does not compete favorably with other requirements. New and 

innovative support to unit leader training and leader self-development would certainly enhance 

leader skills, but they promise change on the margin, not fundamental improvement. 

The Army has generally resisted another approach called “tiered readiness”—the staged 

preparation of some units for full readiness at the cost of maintaining most of the force at lower

levels. Colonel Douglas MacGregor’s book, Breaking the Phalanx (MacGregor, 1997), argued 

for that system and was implicitly rejected by the Army. Nonetheless, tiered readiness is used in 

the Ranger Regiment and the U.S. Marine Corps and offers some advantages in leader training. 

Deliberate preparation of leaders for a limited period of full readiness would allow the Army to 

concentrate efforts on preparing those junior leaders for a more complex opposition in a few 

specific theaters. 

In the future the problem may become more acute. It is likely that Objective Force 

leaders—faced by innovative enemies and responsible for exceptionally powerful systems, large 

areas, substantial missions—will have to be more senior than present company grade leaders. 

Objective Force entities, though they may not be much larger than companies, may require field 

grade leadership and a larger proportion of senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) than 

traditional companies. If that were the case, then professional development for junior officers 

and NCOs would have to change substantially. This would mean developing junior officers and 

junior NCOs through repeated small unit assignments within the Objective Force or, less 

attractively, preparing them academically for years before assigning them to those forces. 

Table 3 distills the foregoing discussion to profile the leadership environment of the current

versus future force. The eventual characteristics of the Objective Force will heavily shape the roles 

that leaders and leader teams will play on the future battlefield. It will be important to update this 

profile as the Army’s transformation efforts lead to revision of operational and organizational 

concepts for the Objective Force. 

15 
In summary, future Army leaders will operate in an environment similar in many ways to 

today’s turbulent conditions. New conditions and opportunities will also exist, however, and to

assure continuing battle dominance the service will need to train leaders who can combine new and 

traditional weapons, tactics, techniques, and C4I means effectively. Concepts for the Objective 

Force suggest that leaders will provide the intellectual component of a more agile force (U.S.

Department of the Army, 2001a). Anticipating and providing for tomorrow’s training requirements 

is key to realizing the vision of the future force.

Table 3 

Characteristics of the Leadership Environment, Current versus Future Force 

Characteristics

Dimension Current Force Objective Force 

Mission Cycle Predictable, criterion-based Unpredictable–truncated or extended 

Overlap of Operations Deployment, then combat Overlapping deployment and combat 

Task Organization Limited flexibility Reconfigurable (plug-and-play) 

Unit Dispersion Proximate, contiguous Widely dispersed, non-contiguous 

Equipment Mix Predictable, relatively uniform Unpredictable, diverse 

Use of Unmanned Systems Limited mainly to UAVs* Extensive intelligent/robotic systems

Chain of Command Traditional, linear Non-traditional, skip-echelon 

Leader Team Membership Single-service focus Joint, coalition, diverse 

Leader Team Stability Relatively stable Variable, reconfigurable 

Battle Command Limited-mobility command posts Command and control on the move

Decision Framework Plans-centric, centralized Execution-centric, decentralized 

Planning Process Hierarchical, sequential Collaborative, concurrent 

Preparation Tools Physical rehearsals Virtual rehearsals 

Estimate of the Situation Phased, discontinuous Continuous 

Information Access Controlled, gated Continuous, global 

Interpersonal Interaction Face-to-face, voice Routine interaction via tele-media 

* Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Fundamentals of Future Force Leadership 

The fundamental values and characteristics that the Army now requires of its leaders will 

remain after transformation. Technological advances will affect leadership techniques and must 

be optimized for best effect, but they will not change the essence of leadership. This study

concludes that, while the collaborative decision-making process enabled by digital C4I systems 

is highly advantageous, it does not diminish the need for strong leaders and capable chains of

command. High-performing vertical leader teams directed by competent commanders will 

remain vital to battlefield dominance.

Interviews with IBCT warfighters, technical experts, and senior commanders produced 

the following key insights: 

16 
“The new technologies are tools. They don't produce knowledge. That comes as a 

result of the interaction of intellect, experience, insight, and the flash of brilliance that

comes from an able commander.” (General Officer) 

“What we require of leaders hasn't changed. Even with perfect, real-time

intelligence, the Common Operational Picture can only show what is, not what should 

be. It still takes a big, tough, smart person to be in charge and lead from the cutting

edge. It still takes human intellect to make the leap from situational awareness to 

understanding.” (Digital Systems Trainer) 

“The complexity of this business has dramatically changed but the basic skills of

leadership have not. An officer must first be tactically and technically proficient... 

able to think critically and rationally under pressure and be able to motivate and 

inspire his subordinates. He needs to be an excellent trainer. These things have not 

changed, nor will they.” (Battalion Commander)

“Make no mistake—the products and speed gained through technology are truly

powerful. Our ability to see the battlefield and make faster decisions with far greater

precision is coming. All that makes a good leader better, but it doesn't make a good 

leader.” (Battalion Commander)

“The traits, characteristics, and skills needed in a digital environment are exactly the

same as needed in an analog environment... Maintain the leadership culture and 

warrior ethos in the Army and do not substitute technical knowledge for leadership. 

If the leader comes with both, fine, but of the two, leadership carries the far greater 

weight. The Army is about leading people and it is leadership that creates the

conditions for soldiers and units to be successful.” (Company Commander)

“The infusion of new technology and its impact on tactics, techniques, and procedures 

and doctrine is nothing new. Its been going on for centuries with the discovery of the 

crossbow, the advent of gunpowder, the development of tanks, aircraft, and the 

atomic bomb. Every new technology brings change to fighting unit formations, 

equipment, doctrine, and tactics. But through it all the qualities of effective combat

leadership have not changed. What changes are the words we use to describe it. 

Adaptiveness and flexibility are in vogue these days. I can’t think of a single winning

commander anywhere in history where those terms would not apply. Is this latest 

technology likely to result in a paradigm shift for leadership? No way.” (Sergeant 

Major) 

Expected Challenges 

New operational challenges are emerging. In the operational environment of the 

Objective Force, vertical leader teams will face relatively new or unique challenges. The IBCT 

is now encountering some of these challenges for the first time. Others have emerged in the 

operational environment within the past few years. Major factors likely to shape the operations 

of the future include: 

1. Short notice mission assignments and quick transitions from peace to combat. 

2. Rapid deployments that pass very quickly from in-theater staging to actual combat. 

3. Non-contiguous, widely distributed operations that separate leaders from their 

subordinates and superiors by considerable distances. 

17 
4. Novel and changing task organization that places commanders under unfamiliar 

leaders and puts them in charge of new subordinates. 

5. Direct subordination of smaller Army units (brigades) to joint or combined 

headquarters, either temporarily or for extended periods. 

6. Voluminous information flow into the theater and the unit. 

7. Periodic interventions into lower level command nets by higher-level commanders

who will have the ability to track the movements and status of companies and 

battalions. 

Existing leadership challenges will persist. Some of today’s common leader challenges 

will confront vertical teams in the Objective Force. These challenges stem from force

configuration and staffing practices as well as realities of the modern battlefield. Chief among

them are:

1. Short-notice replacement of familiar leaders with new ones because of casualties or

other unanticipated conditions (e.g., non-deployability, reassignment, non-battle 

injury, and other causes).

2. Attachment of new units to the formation or detachment of some units. 

3. Alteration (and potential disruption) of trained leader teams by the addition of new 

members (e.g., area or topical specialists; representatives of other services, nations or 

civilian agencies).

4. Integration with differently equipped units (especially less capable battle command 

capabilities). 

5. Locality factors including adaptation to terrain, weather, the population, unfamiliar 

friendly forces and new enemies. 

6. Soldier access to external information that will require commanders to counteract 

false reports and misconceptions with active internal “command information” efforts. 

7. Obstacles to leader training in the form of competing priorities, scheduled training

interruptions and lack of clear standards. 

Training Issues for Leaders in the Objective Force 

This project examined IBCT training in light of concepts for the Objective Force to

determine training issues relevant to future leaders and vertical leader teams. This section 

presents the findings derived from the team’s understanding of Objective Force concepts and the 

IBCT training it observed. 

During the project researchers gathered a considerable amount of information that relates 

to the Army's program for leader development described in DA Pam 350-58 (U.S. Department of

the Army, 1994) and pertinent to the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development 

Panel (ATLDP) report (U.S. Department of the Army, 2001b). Some of those findings are 

presented in this section, but more have been recorded in Appendix A in order to maintain the 

Objective Force focus of this report. 

18 
Structured leader development programs should be standards-based. This finding

supports the development of structured programs with specific learning objectives for unitadministered leader development and for individual leader self-development.

Structured leader development programs in the Army are those taught at the institutional 

training facilities where learning objectives are clearly defined and training is standards-based. 

Otherwise, leader development is unstructured and there are no uniform terminal learning

objectives. This lack of structure and clear learning objectives results in widely dissimilar leader

development programs from unit to unit. Lacking structure, neither the unit commander nor 

individual leaders have the necessary “road map” to guide the development process. Without 

learning objectives and standards, neither has the mechanism to determine whether a leader

development event or program achieved its purpose. 

The paragraph that follows suggests how structure and learning objectives might be 

implemented in an existing professional self-development program. It also illustrates that

structure allows the creation of performance requirements and standards that can be adjusted to 

learner needs. The Army Chief of Staff's recommended professional reading list provides the

example. 

The Chief of Staff's recommended professional reading list is available on-line. The 

books are not. For each title a brief description is provided that contains information about the 

book's content and why reading it is worthwhile. The latter could easily be expanded and 

restated as learning objectives. To a degree, structure for the reading program is provided 

because it is broken down by grade. The titles could be further organized in a progressive order 

where one reading expands upon the previous one, presenting an opposing view or reinforcing

important concepts. Organized in this fashion, the individual (and his commander) would have a 

“road map” that describes a sequential professional reading program against which progress can 

be measured. Structure in the form of study guides might further increase the value of this leader 

development tool. These, along with the books themselves, could also be made available online. Specific performance requirements might be added by making the professional reading

program mandatory instead of recommended and by providing feedback to the soldier and his 

commander. 

Transitioning to more structured leader training may encounter resistance. Long-held 

attitudes and beliefs about the unit-specific and individualized approaches to leader training

could work against efforts to build greater structure into leader/leader team training programs in

units. In particular, efforts to develop a more structured approach and/or establish standards for 

leader training might encounter reluctance and even hostility in some quarters. Adding structure 

and standards would help remove leader training from the “discretionary” column of things to do 

and put it solidly into the “required” column. If this were done, the Army would have to provide 

clear performance standards. This would entail accountable instruction, external program 

evaluations, and, perhaps, the use of performance data in assignments to leadership positions. 

All these run counter to the Army culture and could only be implemented by determined high

level leadership. 

19 
The ability to communicate effectively will emerge as an increasingly important leader 

skill. Future force commanders will enjoy the benefit of better and faster means of

communication, with expanded options. The family of increasingly reliable, easy to use digital 

C4I systems will provide nearly instantaneous communication of data, text, and graphics. Nearterm adoption of video telecommunication and teleconferencing technologies promises to make 

remote, dynamic interaction routine for multiple echelons of command or dispersed elements of

the same command. These technologies enable the emergence of a parallel and collaborative 

decision-making process as the likely successor to the traditional hierarchical, sequential model 

(Dudley, Johnston, Jones, Strauss & Meliza, 2001). 

New telecommunications facilitate the dispersion of units across extended battlespace 

called for in both IBCT and Objective Force concepts. Paralleling this trend is a new emphasis 

on trained, mutually confident vertical leader teams that plan, rehearse, and control their 

operations electronically to a far greater extent than is now the case. The common thread in all

of this—the exploitation of new technologies, the application of new doctrine, the increased 

reliance on high performing vertical leader teams—is that each places new demands and 

importance on the leader's ability to communicate effectively with a distributed vertical leader

team. The advantages and techniques of in-person interactions will be absent. Commanders will 

need deliberate training in the art of effective distant or symbolic communication if they are to

gain the full advantage of future communications capabilities. 

In articulating vision, purpose, and intent, commanders must achieve both understanding

and commitment in the leader team. Both are essential. As danger increases, those who assume

the greatest risks must fully comprehend the task at hand and commit to its accomplishment. 

Training that promotes this kind of understanding and commitment will be very important to 

developing strong vertical leader teams in future forces. 

Dispersion of units across an extended battlespace or urban battlefield will amplify the

difficulties while increasing the reliance on vertical team performance. While technological 

advances will help maintain contact between dispersed forces, that better communication 

capability will not automatically lead to better understanding. Reliance on mutual understanding

of tactical concepts, doctrinal terms, and the commander’s intent to ensure cooperation will 

increase just as Objective Force operations call for more complex, higher tempo operations. 

Essential characteristics of future force leaders will persist. The leaders and SMEs 

interviewed during the project expressed definite ideas about the traits needed by leaders of units 

undergoing transformation. It is reasonable to project that the traits they identified will be 

appropriate for the future force (Table 4). The only distinctive trait that emerged was the

requirement for digital literacy and competence. Otherwise, the traits are fully consistent with 

the traditional wisdom regarding what makes a good leader. While multi-cultural characteristics 

driven by international coalitions are not new, they will certainly play a more prominent role in 

the Objective Force. 

20 
Table 4 

Candidate Knowledge, Skills, Aptitudes, and Attitudes for Future Force Leaders 

Attribute Description

Knowledge

Tactical Literacy Understanding of basic language and principles of military operations 

Digital Literacy Understanding of digital technologies and their operating principles 

C4I Systems Savvy Understanding of C4I and network capabilities and limitations 

Multi-Cultural Awareness Understanding of different value systems and communication barriers

Skills

Tactical Competence Mastery of the basic principles of military operations 

Digital Competence Ability to leverage the capabilities and architecture of C4I systems 

Multifunctionality Competence in multiple functional areas and/or domains 

Communication Skills Ability to express ideas clearly and convincingly by speaking and writing

Cognitive Integration Ability to process and integrate diverse, multi-source information 

Interpersonal Skills Ability to collaborate with others by direct and mediated means 

Teambuilding Skills Ability to establish and maintain effective collaborative teams 

Mentoring Skills Ability to teach, coach, and mentor subordinates and peers 

Multi-Cultural Teamwork Ability to work with team members from diverse cultures 

Aptitudes

Self-Awareness Understanding of own strengths and limitations; monitoring of own behavior

Multi-Sensory Facility Capability to process visual, spoken, tactile, and composite data streams 

Cognitive Flexibility Capability to conceptualize problems and solutions adaptively

Time-Space Concepts Capability to relate time and space dimensions in a dynamic tactical context 

Temporal Flexibility Capability to adjust or rescale operational timeframe rapidly

General Adaptability Flexibility of intellect and temperament to adapt quickly to change

Interpersonal Adaptability Flexibility to adapt to changes in superiors, peers, and subordinates 

Mental Reflection Capability to learn from own and others’ successes and mistakes 

Attitudes

Forcefulness Routine display of decisiveness, initiative, and energy

Confidence Projection of confidence and positive spirit, even in crisis 

Commitment Obvious evidence of dedication, persistence, and determination 

Open-Mindedness Willingness to accept change in any aspect of the operational environment 

Role Flexibility Acceptance of variable duties and novel organizational structures

Risk Tolerance Willingness to make mistakes and accept others’ mistakes 

Multi-Cultural Respect Constructive regard for foreign values, beliefs, religions, etc. 

The set of leader traits summarized in Table 4 is not all-inclusive. The list omits many

factors generally assumed important for leaders, such as general intelligence, diligence, honesty,

integrity, loyalty, and resourcefulness. 

The factors listed in Table 4 were derived without regard to their relative importance. 

Establishing their comparative weight would require development of new assessment techniques 

and procedures. Therefore additional steps are required to establish valid criteria for selecting

and qualifying future force leaders. The path leading from candidate factors to sanctioned 

selection/qualification procedures will involve systematic research and validation, geared to the 

evolving doctrine, organization, and materiel of the Objective Force. 

21 
The scope and methods of this project did not disclose how leader traits might relate to 

performance of vertical leader teams. Future research will be required to investigate the

interplay between leader traits, tactical factors, and performance dimensions. 

Leader responsibilities will differ from past models. Typically, new concepts require leaders

to perform tasks different from those of the older model. Leaders of the IBCT have had to learn to 

employ wholly new systems and capabilities (Mobile Gun System [MGS] and Anti-Tank Guided

Missiles [ATGM] companies, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), civil affairs soldiers). They are 

also expected to understand small-scale contingencies as well as conventional operations. Increased 

requirements for knowledge of tactics and techniques, weapons and system effects, communications

capabilities, and other details add to the basic leader tasks of all members of the chain of command. 

Additionally, customary relationships may change between troop leaders and staff leaders. 

Defining leadership roles with precision for future forces is impossible at this stage. 

Extrapolating from the Experimental Force (EXFOR) and even from the IBCT will not yield clear 

insights to Objective Force issues of leader roles since the Objective Force will differ so markedly

from current units. 

It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the automation, robotics, and improved situational 

understanding of the Objective Force will permit greater spans of control (more subordinates 

grouped under single commanders and thus, perhaps, fewer levels of organization). Advanced 

command and control tools in the future force will also support faster decision-making and therefore 

potentially more decisions in a period of time. It is also logical to expect that leader roles and unit 

staffing will change as information becomes more accessible to all and the need for staff 

information handlers/collectors diminishes. Future staffs may serve multiple vertical levels of

organization in a dynamic environment. 

Qualitative changes may also occur. It may become desirable to raise the experience levels

and seniority of small unit leaders as the effectiveness, dispersion, and responsibilities of small 

forces grows. That is, where lieutenants and captains lead today’s platoons and companies, captains 

and majors may provide the parallel leaders in tomorrow’s minor units of action. It may also be 

useful to include in vertical leader teams mentors, technical specialists, and advisors who have no 

tactical responsibilities and who are only “virtually” present with the fighting unit. Issues of 

teamwork, mutual trust, and unequal sharing of risks and rewards all accompany such developments

and will challenge trainers and commanders. 

The need for back-up training will confront the future force leaders. Vertical teams will

need to be able to continue functioning when high technology capabilities become degraded or 

unavailable. Digital system and network failures are to be expected on future battlefields. Further, 

joint and combined operations may well entail mixed forces where some elements are not equipped

with digital tools. The need for back-up skills (utilizing non-digital procedures or alternative digital 

capabilities) has been identified in previous work (e.g., Campbell, Ford, Shaler, & Cobb, 1998; 

Salter & Black, 1998). Back-up training to maintain analog skills was very much evident in the

IBCT as the unit prepared for their Warfighter exercise. The emphasis on analog skills was driven 

mostly by chronic technical problems with digital systems. Because of competing priorities and 

finite training resources, future units can expect difficulties in maintaining non-digital proficiency.

22 
Developing multifunctional leaders poses notable challenges for leader training. Future 

force leaders will be expected to understand disciplines and operations common to larger

formations than battalions and brigades. Leading in a larger range of missions, cooperating with 

joint forces and civilian agencies, and operating directly under joint or combined headquarters 

are all possibilities that will stretch the capabilities of future leaders. What level of knowledge 

and proficiency do leaders require in “secondary” functional areas? How much additional time 

must be added to an Officer Advanced Course, for example, to expand functional competencies? 

How should unit training programs change to accommodate the performance requirements and 

environment of multifunctional leaders? How does the career path for a multifunctional leader

differ from a traditional career path? How does the multifunctional leadership model impact the

mentoring process? Might a leader in the future force require a network of mentors? At the very

least, these questions point to an increased burden on institutional and unit training programs. 

Providing standards for vertical leader teams in the IBCT or Objective Force environment 

will raise new training issues. The Army has developed standards for staff actions and for the 

estimates and orders process, but it has yet to publish complete tasks, conditions, and standards for

today’s vertical leader teams. Army studies on Objective Force leadership requirements are 

addressing the missions and roles of future leader teams but are far from specifying precise 

standards for them. 

The IBCT vignette-based training technique observed in this study deliberately avoided 

applying standards to vertical leader teams. Its stress on innovation and mutual understanding made 

those issues paramount and, while the training material offered trainers broad guides to possible 

solutions, the program avoided standards-based assessments. 

As Army transformation matures, collective leader training standards will become 

necessary. The changeable nature of future organizations, the requirements for future organizations 

to function under different types of headquarters (brigades subordinated directly to corps, joint task 

forces, or foreign/multi-national formations and so on) and the variety of missions pose special 

problems. Solving them calls for clear yet flexible standards for leader teams.

For instance, an IBCT arriving early in a new theater of operations could find itself assigned 

to a U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Force or a combined (multi-national) joint task force before

being transferred to an Army corps or division. In those circumstances its leaders and vertical

leader teams must be prepared to function within an organization with standards different from the 

Army’s. They will also have to be capable of accepting additions to their own organization—new 

units and new leaders—who have not trained with them and do not understand their methods or 

expectations. If the IBCT (or Objective Force) vertical leader team loses coherence or efficiency in

those cases, it will simultaneously lose combat power. Army standards for collective vertical leader 

team training should therefore provide for realistic performance levels under a range of conditions 

from “pure” unit composition to mixed leader team content. 

If, for example, standards call for the unmodified IBCT vertical leader team to distribute

information internally with a 90 percent accuracy rate within an hour, then deliberate thought should 

be given to what standard is realistic and acceptable when the brigade becomes the nucleus of a 

mixed nationalities formation under joint direction. Similarly, if an Objective Force leader team is 

23 
trained to recognize significant (e.g., mission-changing) conditions and alter its concept of 

operations within twenty minutes during an attack, then conditions that invalidate that standard

should be identified and accounted for in doctrine. 

Part of this definition of standards should focus on establishing leader team performance 

thresholds that mark unacceptable losses of capability. Defining this kind of limit would assist

future commanders not only in training their leader teams but also in understanding the risks of

disrupting established command relationships. 

Maintaining up-to-date standing operating procedures (SOPs) will tax transformational 

units. The transformation process involves frequent changes in equipment, doctrine, and training

technology. In addition, reorganization will bring wrenching realignments of personnel and 

functions. The dynamic nature of the transformation environment will create a need to update

unit SOPs frequently, perhaps several times a year. Capturing new tactical and procedural

knowledge as it emerges demands substantial effort and vigilance, as does incorporating the new 

knowledge into procedural documents. The spectrum of full-dimensional operations, including

joint and coalition operations, will further increase the cost and effort required to maintain unit 

SOPs. The 4th Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) (4ID) experience as it transitioned to Force XXI

operations highlighted the difficulty of keeping SOPs up to date (Dudley et al., 2001). This 

concern also offers opportunities for vertical leader team development. By making SOP 

adjustment and correction part of leader development through post-exercise critiques or other 

means, leaders of vertical teams can promote greater mutual understanding among teammates 

and may uncover problems and solutions missed in other activities. 

Leader training must be guarded in spite of competing requirements. As a matter of 

training priorities, leaders at every echelon acknowledged the importance of training subordinate

leaders. In practice, however, the daily routine of operational requirements takes precedence 

over leader training. (Indeed, the practice of labeling leader training as “professional

development” contributes to the tendency to relegate it to a lower priority.) With a single

exception, the time set aside for leader development in the units observed was minimal and 

subject to cancellation or postponement in the event of any conflicting requirement. The 

experience of the research team and remarks made during interviews confirmed that leader

training ranked low in the priority of unit activities. In the words of a Sergeant Major whose

sentiments were echoed by many, “Leadership development programs are personality driven. 

Most commanders don't do them at all. Those who do them fall into two camps. There are those

that just go through the motions and there are those who are really interested in teaching their 

subordinates. The teachers are rare. We expect subordinates to work hard to learn their 

profession. We should expect the leaders to work equally hard to teach their profession. [Italics 

added] The leader owes it to his subordinates ... to be technically and tactically competent and 

he owes them the opportunity to grow professionally... [And yet] it's the first thing cut from the 

training schedule every time.” 

This situation must be remedied if the Army is to transition successfully to truly different 

organizations, tactics, and techniques in the future. Changing it may call for a more structured

approach to leader training or for making leader training accountable and fully assessed. Mainly, 

though, it seems to demand the focused attention of senior leaders. 

24 
Leadership practices need to be amended as experience accumulates. The first units of a 

new design typically operate under draft or provisional rules. Their experience forms the basis 

for changes to early assumptions and the roles of leaders and leader teams change as training or 

tactical experience grows. As the Army forms its future forces under new TO&Es and with new 

doctrine and equipment, leaders of those units should expect to change their techniques and 

methods as soldiers and the leader team learn more about how the new organization actually

functions. The first digitized division, for example, has had to take an incremental approach to 

installing the leader practices related to its new combat service support (CSS) organization. 

Assuming the presence of a number of reporting and force tracking enablers, the division’s CSS

system re-assigns direct support maintenance personnel and re-subordinates forward support 

company commanders and battalion commanders. Without a fully capable ABCS architecture, 

however, reporting and directing support operations had to be done differently than the design

specified. 

Likewise, the IBCT is modifying its leadership techniques as it fields elements of the 

ABCS and as its sub-units convert from old TO&Es to new ones. Further changes are likely to 

occur when the brigade receives its new combat vehicles. Units of the Objective Force will 

likely undergo an even more radical departure from their past experience. Studied approaches to 

leader methods and techniques and to leader team building akin to the vignette-based leader

training of the IBCT will be useful at that time. Similarly, frequent internal and external

assessments of leader training practices will probably be useful. In any case, leader practices, 

methods, and techniques will have to be studied deliberately and will have to keep pace with 

significant changes in unit capabilities, especially those pertaining to C4I capabilities. 

Sustaining effectiveness and cohesion of vertical leader teams in the midst of change is a 

challenge. The Objective Force concept stresses tactical agility and continuous operations as 

force multipliers. Implementing this may mean that stable organization for combat becomes the

exception rather than the rule. Leaders of an established force will therefore have to contend 

with frequent additions and deletions from their task organizations with potential consequences 

for sustaining combat power, mutual understanding, and cooperative action. Turbulence in 

organization for combat will also affect leader team cohesion and effectiveness as membership 

changes. The training challenge will be to reproduce these effects often enough to accustom 

leaders to dealing with them and to exercise doctrinal solutions to the problem. Technical means 

of familiarizing members of the leader team with the commander’s and others’ preferences, 

styles, and personalities (operations summaries, commanders’ profiles, technical data) could also 

be useful in facilitating the addition of new members to a vertical leader team. 

Teaming with less technically advanced elements can dilute a transformed unit’s 

capabilities. Objective Force concepts plus experience with the IBCT and the EXFOR indicate 

that units incorporating advanced technology will frequently work with and for units that have 

not been converted to the new model. The IBCT experienced this during the Division Capstone 

Exercise II as subordinates of the 4ID. Leaders in the IBCT and 4ID encountered difficulties in 

understanding new capabilities and employing the brigade in consonance with its operational 

concept. The 4ID itself has dealt with similar misunderstandings more or less continuously as it 

assumed control of analog units or was subordinated to headquarters whose capabilities did not 

match its own. 

25 
Specific measures will be needed to integrate different capabilities and new subordinate 

leaders who do not fully understand the modernized unit’s technology. Otherwise the core 

leader team’s effectiveness may suffer. Useful measures may include automated transfer of 

SOPs to the new unit, summaries of past operations and future plans, computer monitoring of 

messages and activities to flag departures from norms, and other technical aids to command. 

Training must replicate teaming with unfamiliar civilian entities. Army operations have 

increasingly involved cooperation with civilian agencies and authorities. Army training

incorporates “civilians on the battlefield” in some instances and occasionally requires unit 

leaders and staffs to cooperate with civilian authorities. The Objective Force concept and recent 

field experience suggest that future forces will only gain their full potential by coordinating their

actions with those of civilians in fully integrated actions. Since the goals and preferences of civil 

organizations and authorities do not match those of military forces and because their modes of

communications differ from military means, training for this integration is important to 

Objective Force leader preparation. Because of the wide disparity of civilian concerns, the Army

would be wise to replicate realistic civilian effects in its leader training. Specifically, trainers

should consider employing variations of the CTC's “uncooperative enemy” philosophy as they

train for integrating civilian and military capabilities. That is, they should confront Objective 

Force leaders with diverse and divergent interests among the civilian groups with which they

train. 

Future leader teams will have to maintain effectiveness over very large areas. Team 

dynamics today depend on frequent face-to-face meetings and the knowledge that time-space 

dimensions allow members of the leader team to meet in person from time to time. Objective

Force conditions will extend unit dispersion and may also reduce the number of leaders present 

in a force. Future commanders will choose their positions carefully to assure that their presence

influences operations optimally; in doing so they will knowingly remove themselves from other 

parts of the battlefield. Issues of mutual understanding, private consultation, encouragement, and 

other personal interactions will have to be handled differently. “Huddles” of the entire command 

team and the unit staff will be impractical. With a faster decision cycle in operation, individuals 

who lose communications will be more isolated than is now the case. Obviously, future

communications will determine exactly how leaders deal with this condition, but training in 

general and leader training in particular will have to replicate these conditions. Today’s training

areas are too small for realistic practice of EXFOR tactics above battalion level. Tomorrow’s 

training facilities will have to be even larger if they are to prepare future leader teams to remain 

effective under conditions of extreme dispersion. 

Training must prepare leader teams to maintain their effectiveness over greater time 

spans. The extension of operations in time is related to their extension in space. Today’s units 

adapt to extended operations by resting leaders regularly and maintaining a fresh shift on duty. 

In reality, this rarely amounts to more than three or four days of continuous operation. If

Objective Force technology permits the truly continuous application of force, leader team 

effectiveness will have to be reconsidered. Adding extended time to the large spaces of

Objective Force operations means that leaders and units will move frequently and that the

opportunities to rest and to meet will be limited. Leaders trained to employ periodic conferences 

and personal meetings to assure continuity and coordination of operations will have to adapt to 

26 
changed circumstances. Their planning and conceptualization will also have to extend beyond 

familiar time periods or phases to address actions over weeks instead of days. Training exercises 

will have to reflect that and doing so will have implications for every aspect of exercise planning

from design to control to assessment. 

Fighting and deploying will occur simultaneously. Objective Force units will be

designed to initiate operations early in the deployment cycle. Leading units may begin fighting

while succeeding elements are still arriving. For leaders and vertical leader teams, this implies 

operating with a changing force structure and a growing leader team. Leaders will need the

ability to fight parts of their commands while other elements of the leader team look to the 

arrival and forward movement of incoming units. Dividing leaders’ attention in this way will 

alter basic assumptions about concentration of thought and effort and will change the doctrinal 

applications of synchronization and economy of force. Training for such operations demands 

more complex approaches and raises new issues like replicating conditions of deployment and 

enroute planning and coordination. Future leader training will have to confront the leader team 

with these concerns and create conditions associated with simultaneous deployment and combat. 

Including RC members in vertical leader team training is a challenge. Because of limits 

on their training time, RC leaders face special training challenges in mastering and maintaining

currency on new equipment, weapons, and concepts. Their integration into vertical leader teams 

that mix AC and RC leaders must overcome the same difficulty. Experience in the 4ID indicates 

that differences in AC and RC schedules and availability can pose substantial training

challenges. Training day limitations simply do not allow the same RC leaders to be present for

all exercises and training events of AC units. Weekend training that is routine for RC leaders 

can become onerous for AC leaders who already labor under a heavy workload. 

Objective Force organization will depend on RC participation. Means of condensing the 

initial training for RC leaders in key concepts and equipment, provisions for sustaining their

skills with C4I equipment, and techniques for assuring that AC and RC leaders can cooperate 

well enough to guarantee full exploitation of Objective Force capabilities are all issues. Either

staff leaders and commanders of the components must work together often enough to form 

strong teams or Objective Force organizations must arrange for the RC to staff parts of the force 

that require less complete integration with other parts of the force. Possible training remedies 

include distance learning programs; distributed leader team exercises; assignment of full time

technicians to RC positions requiring constant system training; and block training of units that do 

not have to be as closely integrated with other arms. Embedded training in staff leader (C4I)

tools might be used to keep RC leaders competent in particular tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP) and informed of system changes. Autonomously updating embedded training

modules with materials developed in the AC and with information that clarifies the preferences, 

style, and patterns of action of the RC unit’s AC command team partners might also help 

improve AC-RC cooperation.

The future force must leverage “skip echelon” command and control where higher level 

commanders participate in the unit’s C4I structure. Objective Force C4I will permit higher level 

commanders to intervene in tactical actions anywhere on the battlefield. They will understand 

the risks of this intervention, but will be able to track events in detail and therefore be capable of 

27 
following critical actions very closely. When senior leaders choose to direct specific actions 

several levels below their own, junior commanders whose operations are directly affected and 

intermediate commanders whose direction has been interrupted will have to respond effectively. 

These responses will range from contesting the direction based on factors not revealed through 

tactical communications to re-shaping the surrounding actions to conform to the change. Senior 

leaders will need to be instructed and trained in the risks and advantages of such actions and in 

the parameters affecting them. Teamwork in general will be affected and staffs at all levels will 

have to practice the adjustments to the force as a whole that accompany such changes. 

Participating in joint operations requires training emphasis. Concepts for the future 

foretell relatively small Army units acting as service elements of joint formations. This entails 

direct interaction with a joint (multi-service) staff and participation in operational level planning

and execution, actions generally unfamiliar to leaders of formations below corps level. Leaders 

of Objective Force units will need training in joint doctrine, terminology, organization, and 

practices to participate effectively as service component leaders and staff. Leader education and 

training will have to address these subjects. 

Training Techniques for Future Force Vertical Teams

Training for future leaders and leader teams should be based on anticipated combat 

organization and on a doctrinally accurate vision of leader requirements in the Objective Force. 

Promoting stability in leader teams through deliberate personnel policies will facilitate building

strong teams and offset the disruptions of additions to the task organization and frequent changes 

in supporting unit assignments. Sustainment training against valid standards is also essential, 

although this will necessitate establishment of Army-sanctioned collective standards and 

competencies for vertical leader teams. 

The Army’s practice of assuring understanding “two levels up and down” seems a useful 

guide for training and sustaining the abilities of vertical teams. That is, brigade leader training

should extend to company level, battalion training to platoon level, and so on. This helps assure 

understanding of the commander’s expectations and promotes mutual understanding between 

leaders who must cooperate closely during operations. 

Variable training audiences. Today’s unit-based training exercises involve more or less 

stable organizations. Changes to task organization occur within the limited context of brigades, 

divisions, and corps. Leader team adjustments (orientation, issuing of orders, changes of 

mission, etc.) are similarly limited. To conform to Objective Force concepts, future training will 

have to include much more extensive organizational changes. Training vertical leader teams to

accept, employ and release supporting cells or units from a wider range of sources—reachback to 

national capabilities, use of theater assets, direction of adjacent units, direct control of other

service units—will be complex. Staffs and command groups may evolve into fluid collaborative 

cells in which composition and functions change as a mission progresses. Supporting that kind 

of training means arranging for the periodic participation of a large number of real units or 

highly capable role players during an exercise. Providing the training commander with a 

realistic set of optional supporting cells will also add complexity to training. Finally, providing

28 
observer/controllers or evaluators capable of assessing the quality of the vertical leader teams’ 

use of such resources and of judging its tactical actions will be challenging.

Training for continuous operations with overlapping phases. Objective Force operations 

and those of the IBCT contemplate fighting while deploying and conducting SASO during

combat operations. They also anticipate longer periods of continuous action without pauses. 

Future leaders will therefore employ expandable vertical leader teams that change as operations 

progress. Techniques that facilitate training for these operations include lengthy command post 

exercises supported with simulations complex enough to represent activities from home station 

through ports and operations of all types. Alternatively, non-continuous training events that 

compress time by moving between major decision points may be used to train and assess teams. 

Such exercises have been done manually and with rudimentary simulation support in the past (in 

theater war games, at Battle Command Training Program [BCTP] seminars, in the School for 

Advanced Military Studies, etc.).

Leaders of future forces will require very capable simulations to support their training. 

As a minimum such simulations will have to present detailed data on supporting headquarters 

and units, operations of other component forces, organization, and capabilities of attached U.S. 

and foreign units. Additionally leader teams in such operations will need information on status 

of all deploying forces, the transportation system, port operations, theater supply, national and 

theater intelligence, host nation capabilities, and detailed information on the enemy and the

population. Providing these capabilities at a reasonable cost in exercise overhead will test the 

training support community. 

Coalition operations and joint operations involving specific tasks and limits. Foreign and 

other service elements normally cooperate with U.S. forces under clear limitations concerning

their missions, employment, and uses. Forces as small as brigades are not now required to 

accommodate these limitations in their operations. Future Army forces of brigade size will have 

to do so and their vertical leader teams will need to be trained to function in those circumstances. 

Arranging the participation of foreign and other service units during brigade- and division-level 

training of the future is a good means of acquainting leaders with these dynamics as they affect 

actions between echelons. Some of this information can be conveyed in formal leader training at 

schools and in units. Basics can be taught in computer-based instruction programs designed to 

prepare leaders for assignments to Objective Force units. Command-sponsored exchanges or

U.S. leader travel to observe foreign and other service exercises is a potentially valuable means 

of familiarizing leaders with employing joint and coalition forces. Finally, command post 

exercises and full-scale field training at CTCs seem necessary to promote this understanding in 

leader teams whose cooperation will be affected. In such training, leaders should be made to 

face significant and realistic limitations on the employment of other services’ and other nations’ 

units. 

Including foreign military and civilian personnel as members of vertical leader teams. 

Working directly with foreign staff members, commanders and civilian officials as team

members will be necessary to leader team development. Since Objective Force units will 

frequently serve in coalitions, their leaders need training in cooperating, responding to, and 

directing the activities of foreign leaders and officials. The fact that command authority is 

29 
usually limited in these dealings complicates the matter. Among the techniques for training

leader teams to work effectively with foreigners are area and cultural orientations; instruction in 

human relations; visits to the units, staffs and agencies of other nations; temporary duty on 

alliance or coalition staffs; and multi-national training events. In particular, leaders of units 

reliant on advanced technologies need to be trained in differing classification systems and means 

of including foreign leaders in operations without compromising U.S.-only information. 

Employment of advanced technologies in C4I. It is impossible to foresee the detailed 

development of C4I technologies, but it is reasonable to assume that future command facilities 

will make very sophisticated capabilities available to future vertical leader teams. Fielding

small, mobile command centers that use AI tools to replace some (or most) members the

traditional staff exemplifies the kinds of changes that are possible. Indeed, command centers 

may become outmoded. To date, IBCT efforts to master digitized command tools only hint at

the difficulty of shifts of that nature. Training leaders—especially experienced leaders grounded 

in other systems—for that sort of breakthrough technology will require deliberate study of 

change in the service schools and should be reinforced by identification of individual leaders’ 

abilities to accept fundamental changes. Preparing leaders and leader teams for major technical 

change should involve deliberate, structured efforts by special training teams or in special 

purpose schools. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons to the Army in the 1950’s offers 

an unclassified example of how the service has prepared leaders for radical change in the past. 

In that case, the Army established a special course to teach leaders the fundamentals of 

employing these wholly new weapons. Basic changes in C4I technology may be introduced in a 

parallel fashion. 

Multifunctional performance requirements for many or all team members. Leader team

members may take on new responsibilities temporarily—as part of deployment or detachment—

or permanently. New force designs may change the nature of tactical units and/or of staff

organization. The addition of air platforms to ground maneuver units, for instance, necessitates 

new supervisory tasks for commanders and staff leaders. Similarly, new C4I technologies or 

mission assignments may expand the responsibilities of staff leaders or involve commanders in 

new activities without adding new specialists to the unit. In any case, future leaders may be 

required to supervise more than a single, familiar functional area. Preparing leaders for such

tasks can be done methodically in schools and in leader team training. Where new technologies 

are concerned, embedded tutorials may be useful. Where staff leaders must take on additional 

duties because of new capabilities in the unit or loss of other leaders, reachback access to 

specialty and procedural guides may be of value. 

New techniques for team interaction (e.g., digital staff huddles). The C4I means of the 

near future will permit the kind of distributed interaction that the concepts for the IBCT and the

Objective Force anticipate. Leader collaboration via telecommunications before, during, and 

after operations (distributed collaborative planning, electronic huddles, multi-echelon 

wargaming) will be necessary to support the high tempo of operations and the wide dispersion of 

forces contemplated in both concepts. 

Training leader teams to use these means and learn these processes will require training

design that forces or rewards this kind of distributed interaction. Trainers should therefore 

30 
assure that command posts or commander platforms operate at realistic distances from each 

other, that they move as frequently as the situation demands, and that the pace of events makes 

extended planning sessions, staff huddles, and command conferences impractical and 

counterproductive. Observer/controllers and evaluators should be provided with Mission 

Training Plans (MTPs) that contain clear conditions and standards for team interaction. Training

assessments and AARs should present data on the effectiveness of team interaction, critiques of 

the methods used and recommendations for improvement.

Artificially intelligent C4ISR capabilities, including information tools and decision aids. 

Leader teams in the IBCT are learning to use the advanced capabilities of the ABCS C4I suite. 

Objective Force vertical leader teams will go farther, eventually integrating artificial intelligence

into their operations. When that occurs machines will begin supplanting staff experts and 

changing some of the team interactions between levels of command. 

Extrapolating from ABCS-based leader training to training with artificial intelligence

tools is a far reach. The novelty of each system, however, calls on leaders to have extraordinary

confidence in their C4I systems. Trainers seeking to facilitate adoption of these new aids will 

have to design programs that first teach leader teams the capabilities of the equipment, then 

demonstrate those capabilities as they affect team interaction. In the case of AI, trainers will 

have to convince leaders and leader teams that the software/hardware combinations provide 

better support than the man-in-the-loop systems. This will mean carefully documenting the 

differences in speed, quality of information, accuracy in reporting and efficiency in coordinating

tasks and comparing those to human performance.

Introducing AI-based C4I will involve experimentation and adjustment of original 

assumptions. This has been the case with ABCS training. In order to assure leader confidence

and support, it will be important for senior leaders and trainers to initiate leader training in AI

with a clear understanding that the first solutions are tentative and that leader team input will be 

essential to finalizing system design and operation.

It is possible that the Army might learn useful lessons and approaches by studying Air 

Force experience in training leaders to use “fly by wire” equipment, missile defense routines, and 

space operations computers. 

Robotic systems that require operators/controllers and alter command and staff 

dynamics. Capable combat robots now exist and training with robotic systems will soon occur in 

the IBCT. The Objective Force will field a great number of robotic systems from the outset and 

will use IBCT experience as one basis for training leaders to integrate soldiers and robots. For 

leaders and leader teams, employing robotic systems involves knowing machine capabilities and 

understanding their control mechanisms. Basically, leaders will have to know how to fit robots 

into combined arms teams and how to explain and justify the use of robots to soldiers and 

outsiders (e.g., allies, less sophisticated U.S. units, civilian agencies). 

Leader teams will have numerous robotic subjects to address. These include technical 

reliability, effects on cooperation between echelons, sharing or transferring control from one

level or unit to another, countermeasures, legal limitations, and protection of civilians. Other 

31 
implications concern the pacing of operations, cross-functional capabilities of some robots (e.g., 

direct fire versus intelligence collection) and balancing endurance of human combatants with that 

of machines. 

Unpredictable interruptions in digital capabilities or signal support. All command and 

control systems are subject to interruption or partial failure. Historically, the introduction of new 

means of C4I has required users to retain some capability for “degraded operations.” In the case

of digital capabilities, leader teams must understand vulnerabilities, expedient corrections, and 

degrees of incapacitation so that they can make sound decisions about continuing or changing

their modes of operation. Doctrine should provide general guidance to commanders regarding

acceptable levels of system degradation. Training should replicate likely interruptions and—

unlike current simulation-based training—assure that losses of capability have realistic effects on 

team cooperation and coordination between vertical levels of organization.

Current problems in training fidelity include the inability to represent the effects on 

command and control when command posts and signal nodes are destroyed in simulation. 

Future training tools should provide for loss of range, bandwidth, contact with distant stations, 

impairments caused by enemy actions, interference created by improper systems engineering and 

similar problems. Only by training in such an environment can vertical leader teams be forced to 

deal with C4I problems realistically. Training systems and the control apparatus should be 

designed to note their choices and actions and to provide feedback in terms of alternatives as

well as actual and potential system performance.

Vignette-Based Training for Vertical Leader Teams 

Vignette-based leader team training conducted by a well-prepared, skillful leaderfacilitator was a powerful training tool in the hands of the IBCT. It provided the commander

with clear leader training objectives and easily applied, self-contained exercises that spanned 

several echelons. It facilitated training vertical team integration and exercising initiative within 

the scope of the commander’s intent. At the same time, validation of this new training technique

awaits further investigation. 

The Leader Development Vignettes 

The IBCT Leader Sustainment Training Program vignettes deliberately stimulated original

solutions to novel situations and assisted IBCT leaders in developing leader skills in vertical teams. 

By design, the vignettes presented problems in four categories: interpersonal, conceptual, technical,

and tactical. The geographic settings and tactical missions of the vignettes varied to encourage fresh 

approaches to problem solving.

The vignettes provided no “right” answers and were written to allow for different solutions. 

Each vignette consisted of four to ten pages of printed material intended to minimize preparation

time on the part of the commanders conducting the training (see examples in Appendix E). The 

TRADOC proponents for infantry, field artillery, reconnaissance, logistics, Military Intelligence, 

and Battle Command commented on the draft vignettes prior to their use by the IBCT. 

32 
Under the initial concept, IBCT leaders were to conduct vignette training once per quarter in 

five-day blocks that would proceed from brigade to platoon level. Each echelon of command was 

to conduct one day’s vignette-based training in turn, beginning at the brigade level. Leaders from 

three echelons would participate in each training block in order to involve all leaders “two levels

down.” To promote continuity within the IBCT, the training audience would overlap from day to 

day as echelons changed. The overall goal was to instill superior understanding of unit capabilities,

techniques, procedures, and policies and to create mutual understanding and cooperation within 

vertical leader teams. 

The brigade commander was to lead brigade level training on Day One of the cycle and 

personally train his battalion commanders, company commanders, and brigade staff leaders. On

Day Two battalion commanders would direct training with their own staffs, company commanders,

and platoon leaders as the training audience. On Days Three and Four the level of training would

move to company and platoon levels, using the same formula for leader participation. The fifth day

of the cycle was left open for commanders to use in discretionary fashion (U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, 2000). 

In practice, the IBCT leaders modified the vignette training design. To meet their most 

pressing training needs, they chose to use “tactical” vignettes almost exclusively. They also chose 

not to train for five consecutive days and instead conducted vignette-based leader training sessions

in one- and two-day blocks. Finally, they cancelled a number of scheduled leader training events, 

reducing the number of vignette-based training sessions considerably from the design target. 

These changes reduced the number of opportunities for researchers to witness vignettebased leader training and changed the character of the training. The departure from initial design of 

the training did not, however, prevent the use of vignettes or impair the quality of the sessions that 

the IBCT units conducted.

Findings from Vignette Training 

The results of this project led to the identification of numerous advantages of the vignette 

training technique (Table 5). Researchers concluded that vignette-based training can enhance 

vertical team integration and individual leader skills while also developing essential team 

competencies among primary and supporting staff. The technique can train leaders in using digital

capabilities and in employing the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) tools residing in 

ABCS. Doing so can simultaneously enhance the development of individual digital skills and

system operator horizontal integration. 

33 
Table 5 

Advantages of Vignette-Based Training

Feature Advantage

Training Structure Structures the learning environment to enhance training value 

Adaptive Focus Promotes adaptive behavior, critical reasoning, and creative solutions

Accessibility Affords on-demand access to structured training (no external assets required)

Low Overhead Minimizes resources required to prepare and execute training exercises 

Doctrinal Base Ensures consistency with doctrinal view of future leadership requirements 

Communication Forum Establishes environment where reflective sharing of ideas can be emphasized 

Echelon Spectrum Develops leaders at platoon through brigade levels, using common method 

Library of Options Provides broad selection of exercises to meet specific unit training needs 

Mentoring Forum Creates opportunities for leaders to teach, coach, and mentor subordinates 

Multi-dimensionality Trains tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills 

Acculturation Forum Promotes sharing of unit values, beliefs, expectations, and norms 

Flexibility Can be readily tailored to achieve specific unit teambuilding objectives 

Modularity Accommodates updating and expansion of exercise library

As a measure of their acceptance, departing IBCT leaders have said that they intend to

access the vignettes from the CAL website so they can use them in future assignments. The

authors recommend that vignette-based training methodology be used in Officer Education 

System (OES) and Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) programs of 

instruction. The use of vignette-based training should also be encouraged for leader 

development programs to achieve better vertical leader team integration in units. 

The preparation and skill of the leader-facilitator greatly affect the quality of the training 

and learning achieved. Observations of leader-team vignette-based training conducted in the 

IBCT revealed that some leader-facilitators had prepared thoroughly for the training while others

had not. The quality of the training and the benefits derived from the conduct of training were

observed to be in direct proportion to the leader’s preparation, involvement, and training skills. 

Further, the extent to which the commander or leader-facilitator utilized the coordinating staff to 

prepare for, support, and participate in the training process appeared to affect the teambuilding

achieved significantly.

Excellence in the execution of vignette-based training is illustrated in the following

example. The battalion commander provided a brief explanation of what vignette-based training

is, what it is designed to accomplish and what he hoped to achieve as a result of the training

(training objectives). He concluded, “... and have fun with this thing. I expect to see some 

imaginative solutions.” He then introduced the vignette in general terms and provided the higher 

command’s mission statement for the battalion. He gave a carefully crafted statement of the 

brigade commander’s intent that he had prepared for the training. The battalion S2 described the 

background leading to the current situation—the road to war—much of which was also 

fabricated in cooperation with the battalion commander and S3. The S2 briefed the current 

enemy situation, expanding on the information provided in the vignette materials. The S3 

briefed the friendly situation, also with embellishments, and presented a battalion mission 

statement that omitted any direction about how the mission could or should be accomplished. 

The battalion commander articulated the requirement that each company group was to develop a 

34 
battalion scheme of maneuver with the company commander acting as battalion commander and 

with each of the platoon leaders acting as the company commander responsible for the main 

effort. He advised them that the battalion staff would serve as their staff, but only to provide 

technical advice and answer questions, and that he would move from group to group to answer 

questions as well. The Command Sergeant Major and all of the battalion primary and special 

staff were present. Doctrinal references were available and each group was provided the 

necessary supplies for preparing graphics and briefing aids. 

During the preparation for the briefings, discussions were lively with much professional 

dialog in both tactical and technical areas. References were in high demand and some groups 

dispatched runners to get more. As each group briefed their solution, the battalion commander 

frequently asked “what if” questions to stimulate discussion of related factors. He also called 

upon platoon leaders to describe their plan for maneuver as the main effort, and called upon 

members of other groups and/or the staff to comment on the course of action being briefed. The 

event was concluded with a short AAR. During the AAR, the commander tasked each of the 

participants to provide him with a list of three tactical or technical areas addressed in the training

in which they felt they were weak. In the following three weeks, they were to look up and read 

about each of the things they identified, informing him when they had accomplished that task. 

Researchers observed both meaningful teambuilding and rich professional dialog without 

threat during this training. This training simultaneously contributed to individual professional 

development, vertical leader-team integration and horizontal teambuilding for the battalion staff. 

Thought, effort, and preparation by the battalion commander and the battalion staff were 

required, but the results indicated that their effort was an excellent investment. 

Even in marginally effective vignette-based training sessions, some development of 

technical, tactical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills occurred as a result of subordinates’ 

initiative and spontaneity. At the conclusion of one particularly disappointing event an observer 

remarked, “It wasn't exactly a waste of time, though that was certainly the attitude of [the

leader]. This reminds me of when I was in school and a substitute teacher was sent in at the last 

minute. Unprepared, he/she simply read from the lesson plan and handed out a worksheet to 

keep us occupied for the prescribed period of time.” Soldiers are always learning and a great

deal of learning comes from observation. For motivated participants, the vignette in question 

yielded some benefits. 

Communicating intent is critical to the demonstration of initiative. In training leaders 

and vertical leader teams to take the initiative, the commander's clear, unambiguous intent 

establishes the conditions necessary to train. The commander’s intent needs to be carefully

crafted, clearly stated, and carry in it the conviction to inspire confident exercise of initiative by

leaders at lower echelons. Most importantly, the commander's intent must be understood. This 

study found that many commanders do not articulate their intent well enough to ensure 

understanding. As a result, subordinates’ training in the use of initiative was inhibited. Further, 

the language used to articulate intent—the professional language taught in our institutions and 

shown as examples in doctrinal publications—is frequently not understood by young officers 

who lack experience and higher-level professional education. In several instances of vignette 

35 
leader team training, the failure to clearly articulate intent was the major factor that inhibited the

behavior the training was designed to promote. 

The project team concluded that each vignette should include a pertinent, carefully

crafted sample statement of commander's intent for the leader-facilitator’s use. This expression 

of intent must also use and teach proper application of doctrinal terms and concepts. Even 

greater problems of clarity may accompany early training of Objective Force leader teams 

because the number of new concepts, terms, techniques, and methods may be very large. 

The grouping of the training audience affects the type of teambuilding accomplished. 

During the vignette-based leader training conducted in March 2001, the IBCT followed the 

vignette model that instructs the leader-facilitator to divide the audience of training participants 

into small groups of equal rank or position. During the training conducted in June, they elected 

to organize the training audience by maintaining the integrity of the existing chain of command. 

Other groupings of the training audience were also observed on other occasions. While the 

opportunities to observe training were limited, the results achieved in teambuilding—horizontal, 

vertical, or both—appear to be linked to the manner in which the groups were formed. In each 

variant of participant grouping a different set of advantages and disadvantages was observed. 

The advantages, disadvantages, and type of teambuilding to be achieved should be considered 

when planning to conduct vignette-based leader development training. The different training

audience groupings that were observed are summarized in Table 6. In the cases of organizing by

functional area and by task organization, only a single iteration was observed. The following

paragraphs discuss each type of grouping in detail.

Table 6 

Observed Training Audience Groupings 

Ordered by ... Primary Characteristics 

Rank or Position Groups of peers similar in grade, education, and experience (recommended) 

Chain of Command Hierarchical, multi-echelon groups reflecting diversity of membership

Task Organization Mission-specific groups driven by organization for combat 

Functional Area Multi-echelon, same-specialty groups (e.g., intelligence officers, staff, and 

operators) 

Order by rank or position (peer groups). This method, recommended by the designers of 

vignette training materials, supports vertical teambuilding. The groups consist of individuals of 

similar grade, education, and experience who are currently serving in similar positions. Two 

variants on this theme were observed. In one case, each group consisted of all company

commanders of a single battalion. In another case, one company commander from each battalion 

came together with peers from the other battalions to form the groups. 

The peer group method minimizes the tendency for one participant to dominate the 

discussion and avoids potential intimidation by the presence of more senior officers. While

conducive to the learning of tactical and technical skills, ordering by peer group appears to 

support the development of interpersonal and conceptual skills more effectively than other 

36 
methods of organizing training participants. It was observed that peer groups were less bound by

convention, more creative in their thought processes, and more innovative in their creation of 

viable solutions. Organizing by peer group also creates greater opportunities for mentoring

because of the relative inexperience of the group's members at lower echelons. 

This method appears to be particularly well suited to learning the skills needed to quickly

coalesce into teams. However, when the groups are formed from a cross-section of peers from 

different battalions, the teambuilding achieved offers little immediate value because the group 

members disperse back to their units of assignment when the training is concluded. Organizing

by peer group encourages a non-threatening, non-competitive learning environment. The project 

team recommends this ordering method as being particularly well suited for brigade-level 

vignette-based leader development training. 

Order by unit (chain of command). This method takes advantage of the existing

organizational structure, and it strongly supports vertical teambuilding as well as simultaneous 

horizontal teambuilding and integration. It was demonstrated to be an excellent vehicle to 

promote vertical leader-team integration with lasting residual effects when training was 

conducted at battalion, company, and platoon levels. 

This method appeared to be particularly effective for leader-team integration and the 

development of important team competencies at the platoon level. These team competencies 

include technical and tactical proficiency, confidence, and trust. At the platoon level the unique 

circumstance exists where the least experienced member, typically a second lieutenant fresh out

of Officer's Basic Course (OBC), is in charge of the leader development training for the 

considerably more experienced NCO leaders of his platoon. In every case, the lieutenant 

benefited from the tactical and technical competencies displayed by his subordinates and his 

confidence in their skills was increased while the trust and confidence of the NCOs for “their”

lieutenant was enhanced as well.

Ordering the audience by unit chain of command also appeared to be particularly

effective when leaders who exhibited participatory and collaborative leadership styles conducted 

the training. A directive leadership style significantly inhibited participation, development of

critical reasoning skills, display of adaptive behavior, and initiative. At the brigade level, 

ordering by unit fostered a competitive environment with clear winners and losers when the

focus shifted from training subordinates to producing doctrinally correct maneuver schemes and 

attractive briefing aids. When battalion commanders briefed their team's solution, discussion 

was limited and the few questions asked were relatively trivial. It also invited comparisons of

briefing style, TTPs, and quality of presentation that tended to either enhance or detract from 

subordinates' confidence in their leader. The project team's assessment is that this method of 

organizing discussion groups is an effective and recommended method for organizing

participants at battalion level and below, but it is not well suited for use at brigade level. 

Order by task organization. A single iteration of this grouping was observed. In this 

instance, the signal and engineer company commanders and their subordinate leaders were

invited participants in a maneuver battalion's vignette-based training. These commanders 

participated as members of the battalion staff and served as technical and tactical advisers in the 

37 
staff estimate process during concurrent and complementary training using the same vignette, led 

by the battalion executive officer. Their subordinate platoon leaders were integrated into 

company-team groups. This method appears to support teambuilding and integration for both 

vertical and horizontal teams. It appears to be particularly useful to enhance tactical and 

technical skills and most appropriate for battalion level vignette-based training. Although

ordering by task organization was not observed at the brigade level, the assessment is that the 

brigade training audience would be too large. 

Order by functional area. A single iteration was observed—an impromptu adaptation of 

an existing vignette to train vertically aligned intelligence officers, staff, and digital system

operators. This adaptation of vignette-based training appeared to support both horizontal and 

vertical coordinating staff teambuilding and integration while accomplishing the training

objectives to improve functional area communication, information processing, and coordination 

procedures. This training event was similar to traditional vertically aligned logistics, 

communications, fire support, and intelligence exercises commonly conducted in brigade and 

division level organizations throughout the Army.

Training objectives determine vignette selection and influence the method selected for 

organizing the training audience. Commanders should determine training objectives considering

not only the training needs of the organization and subordinate leaders, but also the training

objectives for which a particular vignette was designed. Each vignette is designed to enhance 

one or more of the four leadership skills identified in FM 6-22 (22-100), Army Leadership (U.S. 

Department of the Army, 1999): tactical, technical, interpersonal and conceptual. The 

commander can simply select from the vignettes that are intended to enhance a particular

leadership skill. Collectively the vignettes were designed to develop leaders who: 

1. Understand intent and apply disciplined initiative to accomplish diverse missions. 

2. Understand team-building concepts and can build cohesive teams. 

3. Make appropriate decisions in complex and ambiguous operational environments. 

4. Rapidly filter and prioritize information. 

5. Display the tactical skills necessary for the full spectrum of military operations. 

6. Leverage information technology to create situational awareness and dominance. 

7. Develop organizations that continually improve their operations and systems. 

The project team judged that vignette-based training was more successful in achieving

the first five of the stated objectives than the latter two. Even so, the team’s observers concluded 

that this training methodology accomplishes other important training objectives, as well. It can 

significantly broaden the experience base upon which developing leaders may draw. It enables 

initiative by providing important insights into how more senior commanders think, allowing

deeper understanding and the ability to predict how commanders would be likely to respond to 

changing situations. It develops skill in thinking by illuminating the consequences of decisions, 

including impacts beyond the most obvious or immediate effects. 

Commanders should select from the menu of vignettes and determine the manner by

which to form subordinate discussion groups, based on the unit's needs-based training objectives 

and any supplemental or collateral training objectives. Since the number of vignettes to select 

38 
from is large (80) and anticipated to grow, a decision aid matrix could be developed to assist 

commanders with this process. 

An unexpected change in the tactical situation or operational environment facilitates 

adaptive behavior and initiative within intent. Observers from the research team concluded that

fostering initiative and adaptability during vignette-based training was the exception rather than

the rule. A number of factors contributed to this circumstance. In some cases, a poorly stated 

commander's intent contributed to uncertainty and ambiguity. In others, the design of the 

vignette provided little opportunity. Vignettes designed to train tactical and technical skills were 

criticized by participants as being too simple. The time allotted for completion of the

“deliverables” called for in the vignettes was regarded as too constrained to allow much

consideration of the broader ramifications of decisions. A battalion commander questioned 

whether the vignette training process really gets at the notion of adaptive leaders taking initiative

within the commander's intent. He saw no real opportunity for such initiative. Many echoed his 

thoughts. 

A common thread was identified in the cases where participants did display initiative and 

adaptability. In each case, imaginative solutions were prompted when the leader-facilitator

unexpectedly injected new information that created a change to the operational situation. This 

was accomplished by the leader asking “what if” type questions, or by providing additional 

information that dramatically changed conditions. For example, a battalion commander 

complicated the selected vignette scenario by interjecting that a soldier was missing. This 

caused the participants to decide how to accomplish the mission and deal with the new 

information. It presented a dilemma that potentially voided the course of action they had decided 

upon and to which they had to react quickly. Later, the facilitator introduced more new 

information: the missing soldier's identification card was found along with signs of a struggle—

blood. The conditions were ratcheted up another notch, and another, each time followed by a 

rejoinder akin to, “What now, lieutenant?” After the briefer announced how he would deal with 

the new situation, the leader led an open forum discussion of ideas and options for dealing with 

the new situation. During the next briefing a totally different set of new information was 

interjected that required different solutions. 

These observations led the project team to conclude that interjection of a situational 

change promotes the display of adaptive behavior and initiative. It also suggests that the design

of vignettes can be improved. A list of potential changes to the situation could be added in the 

“instructions for the leader” portion of each vignette. The leader could draw from the list to

promote adaptive behavior and initiative.

For training and teambuilding to be effective, a senior leader must serve as the active 

facilitator of the event. The leader's personality, attitudes, and thought processes, the manner in 

which problem solving is approached and communication is conducted with both subordinates 

and superiors, even body language—all are observable by subordinates. The traits demonstrated 

by leaders in their words, acts, and attitudes are important because they provide much of the 

context in which subordinates and teams operate. Teambuilding occurs within the context of the 

operational environment established by the commander, and it is important to understand that 

environment. Leadership and teambuilding demand the commander’s presence. Subordinates 

39 
and teams require the feedback, reinforcement, and context that are provided by the involvement 

and interaction of the commander. A battalion commander offered that, “Vignette-based training

depends on a confident, competent leader that can effectively mentor a group of junior leaders 

without feeling inadequate or challenged should they pose a solution that falls outside [the 

leader’s] comfort zone.” The effectiveness of vignette-based training, and the teambuilding that

occurred as a result, were judged to be in direct proportion to the level of involvement by the 

leader-facilitator. In cases where the leader was present, actively involved, and willingly

accessible to the training audience, good learning and teambuilding were achieved. In cases 

where leader-facilitators appeared to be disinterested, absented themselves from the training site

during discussion periods, or were involved with their staff handling other matters, the value of 

the training and teambuilding was minimal. 

A directive leadership style inhibits learning. A directive leadership style was found to 

inhibit participation, critical reasoning skills, adaptive behavior, and initiative. It was observed 

that directive leaders frequently dominated the discussion and imposed their own solutions as 

opposed to allowing for a free exchange of ideas. This is aptly demonstrated in the following

example. 

In this example of directive leadership style, the discussion groups were organized by

unit. When the discussion period began, the commander immediately announced, “Okay, guys, 

here's how we're going to accomplish this mission.” He then proceeded to outline his solution 

for the tactical scheme of maneuver. Subordinate members of the group, company commanders, 

were designated to accomplish a number of tasks in preparation for the briefings that were to 

follow. One was set to the task of drawing the scheme of maneuver on butcher paper. Another 

looked up the doctrinal reference for the maneuver to capture the key points and considerations 

for the commander and put them on a slide so that they could be addressed during the briefing. 

Other officers were told to prepare a fire support plan, determine how reach-back capabilities 

could be exploited, plan the locations and employment of signal nodes, etc. During an informal

discussion following the training, one of the company commanders remarked that, “I would have

done it differently, but the colonel was set on his course of action and I didn't want to contradict 

him.” When pressed for his ideas, the captain said, 

“The mission was to destroy the chemical plant, not fight the brigade. They were 

more than 20 kilometers away and in their barracks. If we had cut off

communications and isolated the plant, they'd never have known what was 

happening until it was too late. We could jam their radios, cut the telephone lines, 

take out a few communications nodes and if we'd been monitoring their 

communications, we could even impersonate the local guys at the plant by

sending messages saying that the situation is normal, everything is fine. And 

even if the brigade did react, that doesn't mean we have to fight them. Infiltrate 

some RSTA assets to keep an eye on things and if it looked like they were getting

ready to leave the compound, a few cratering charges where the road goes through 

this defilade would stop them cold. That would force them to go another way and 

they'd be too late to influence the action.” 

40 
The young captain's ideas had merit and demonstrated the kind of thinking that leads to initiative

within intent. But he had no opportunity to express them. 

Leaders who lack the qualities of adaptability and flexibility generally default to tactical 

solutions that focus on opposing forces and the application of combat power. During the 

conduct of several tactical vignette training sessions, the use of force appeared to be the only

choice considered in resolving the issue at hand. Rather than explore a spectrum of potential 

solutions, many leaders defaulted to a recitation of doctrinally based maneuver techniques that 

focus on the destruction of opposing forces and ignored other, potentially better, solutions. For 

example, one vignette assigned the unit the mission of destroying a chemical plant in a crossborder operation into an adjacent neutral country. The focus of nearly every group was on 

attacking to destroy or divert a nearby brigade-size opposing force. This was one of several 

instances where the tendency to focus on application of combat power for the destruction of 

opposing forces was observed to take precedence over the mission and intent articulated in the 

vignette. 

The operational environment of the future will likely involve a wide range of potential 

operations, enemies, and allies. “Friendly forces” will vary from true partners to sometimes 

competing paramilitary, irregular, indigenous forces with diverging political agendas that 

complement our own only part of the time. The presence of international, local governmental, 

non-governmental, or private relief agencies will be common, and every operation will be 

conducted in the glare of public scrutiny. If the only solutions considered to the dilemmas posed 

in tactical vignettes prescribe the application of combat power to defeat opposing forces, then 

trainers will forfeit much of the potential for learning and for broadening experience.

The tendency to default to the application of force is exhibited most by older leaders 

charged with conducting training and less by the young officers being trained. In the judgment 

of the project team, the trainers are not accustomed to an operating environment where noncombat solutions matter much. The project team concluded that over time the subject matter and 

intent of the vignette-based training methodology would cause mid-level leaders to become more 

adaptive and flexible. The team also concluded that the development of these qualities in the

younger leaders will be less than what otherwise might be achieved because mid-level leaders 

are learning, too. 

When the Army addresses the special challenges of the Objective Force, its leaders 

should consider preparatory training in new tactical dynamics and systems, and in group 

dynamics. The development of critical thinking skills in leaders should be an aim of future

training programs. Leader trainers should also guard against the tendency of experienced 

soldiers to favor “safe” or familiar approaches in times of change. Instead they should stress that 

Objective Force team leaders will have to consciously promote free-ranging discussion as they

teach new tactics and forms. 

Command emphasis is imperative to ensure effective implementation. Leader training

only receives equal emphasis with other training activities if the commander insists on it. Given 

their operational pace, most units find it difficult to manage the things mandated by higher 

headquarters. The addition of a weeklong leader training program will not be a high priority in 

41 
the typical unit’s scheme of things. Without command emphasis, vignette-based leader training

falls off the training schedule quickly and quietly. Commanders and unit leaders must be 

encouraged (or required) to schedule this training, and then conduct it vigorously assuring that 

AARs are conducted to maximize potential benefits. 

Recommendations for Improving Vignette-Based Training 

The research team judged that vignette-based training has great merit for training leaders 

and vertical leader teams. Based on the project’s findings, the researchers developed the 

following recommendations for improving vignette-based leader team training. 

Develop a “How to Conduct Vignette-Based Training” video. Technique is largely a 

matter of individual preference and personality, complemented by learned skills acquired by

observation of other trainers and past practice. Since vignette-based training is a relatively new 

technique, there have been few opportunities for leaders to practice it. A train-the-trainer video 

could address practical program-level topics such as:

1. What is vignette-based leader development training and why is it valuable? 

2. What are the training objectives for which this training methodology was designed?

3. How are leader development needs and leader-team training objectives determined at 

the unit level?

4. How should the training audience be approached to best achieve training objectives?

5. How should vignettes be selected and modified to achieve training objectives?

6. How can staff and attached units be included in vignette-based leader training?

7. What resources and advance preparation are required?

8. What best-practice examples most facilitate achieving meaningful training results?

The Army used similar videotaped instruction successfully in the past to improve the

conduct of company training meetings and AARs. Similar improvement in the conduct of 

vignette-based training could be achieved if a “How To Conduct” instructional video on the 

subject were produced and distributed to Army leaders. 

Expand the vignette training materials. Some relatively simple steps could be taken to 

make the leader-facilitator’s job easier.

1. A content matrix would help commanders select appropriate vignettes and determine

the best method for grouping the training audience to achieve training objectives. 

2. It would be beneficial to provide trainers with a description of the advantages and 

disadvantages of the various methods by which the training audience can be

organized. 

3. Each vignette should include a carefully crafted sample statement of commander's 

intent that a leader-facilitator could default to when time-pressed or otherwise unable

to prepare for the conduct of training. 

4. A list of potential changes to the situation should be included in the “instructions for 

the leader” of each vignette from which a leader may draw to prompt audience 

initiative.

42 
5. Multi-media alternatives would enhance the presentation of the tactical situation of

vignettes. These might include selected portions of audio and video news reports or 

movies. 

Produce vignettes that continue the tactical situation and commander’s intent through 

successive events. Providing continuity between the vertical leader teams that sequentially

execute the training events could enhance the utility of vignette-based training and improve

training audience receptivity toward this training technique. The model for vignette-based leader 

development training provides that Day One training is conducted at the brigade level with 

battalion commanders and company commanders comprising the target audience. On Day Two, 

training continues at battalion level with company commanders and platoon leaders making up 

the training audience. On Days Three and Four training proceeds to company and platoon levels, 

respectively and the target audience consists of leaders from the next two lower echelons. The 

program design provides no linkage between the vignettes across the echelons. Consequently, a 

passage of lines vignette that emphasizes tactical skills might be executed at brigade followed the

next day by an unrelated press conference vignette in a different theater of operations at battalion 

training. This pattern continues to lower levels in the current collection of leader team training

vignettes. 

This lack of continuity denies subordinate leaders opportunities to develop a deeper 

appreciation for, and understanding of, the thought processes of higher-level commanders. 

Lacking links between the training events, subordinates cannot observe how the higher-level 

commander’s intent is modified and complemented by the intent statements of subordinate 

leaders. Similarly, without linkage subordinate leader teams cannot see their role in 

accomplishing a larger mission or generate situation-specific issues for the leader teams at higher 

levels. Producing vignettes that build upon preceding training conducted at higher echelons was 

a recurring recommendation by IBCT leaders during AARs. Future editions of vignette-based 

training for vertical leader teams should experiment with linked scenarios common to each set of 

vignettes. 

General Issues in Training Leaders and Vertical Teams 

Collective training in field exercises will remain essential for developing vertical leader 

teams. Effective vertical leader teams display a high level of combined and complementary

competence, both tactical and technical. Typically, well-trained vertical leader teams act

cooperatively with only minimal command intervention to solve problems and to coordinate 

actions between vertical organizational levels. Active maintenance of a shared understanding of

current status and of coming actions initiated by both assigned and natural leaders in the group 

also typifies their operations. They also demonstrate mutual trust and shared confidence among

their members, not only as expressed by confidence in unit combat capability, but also 

confidence in the “rightness” of purpose (mission) and vision (intent). These shared 

competencies and the understanding they encourage enable an effective vertical team to respond 

quickly and appropriately to changing tactical situations. The traditional mechanism used to 

create and sustain these qualities has been multi-echelon field training exercises (FTXs). 

Historically, collective field training has served as the means by which TTPs are validated and 

synchronized and in which new team members are trained to the group’s standards. This will 

43 
remain true in the future. Much of the power of field training events stems from the actual field 

environment in which the effects of physical exertion, equipment breakdowns, human stress, 

weather, geographical dispersion, and logistical challenges combine in ways that cannot be 

replicated by any other means. To train future forces and their leader teams realistically, larger

areas, longer training periods, more complex scenarios, and more capable simulations are likely

to be necessary. 

Computer-based simulation is rapidly increasing in importance for training leader 

teams. Computer-driven tactical simulations—war games and Command Post Exercises 

(CPXs)—offer a means of achieving vertical teambuilding and integration at a fraction of the 

cost associated with FTXs. Simulations also serve to test TTPs at relatively low costs. 

Simulation-assisted CPXs are particularly effective in developing vertical and horizontal team 

proficiency because they can present the same tactical situation repeatedly. The repetition 

enables leader teams to test alternative responses or change key variables, providing the 

intellectual, emotional, and physical stresses that are essential to effective learning. Through 

improved quality and capabilities, training simulations will assume an ever more important role

in developing high performing leader and staff coordinating teams. 

Future forces will be able to leverage simulation technology in FTXs and in actual 

operations as well. Future simulations will allow them to evaluate alternative courses of action 

as part of the parallel and collaborative decision-making process. This capability is already

emerging in digitally equipped units. Future forces will use advanced simulation capabilities 

routinely to rehearse and refine tactical operations with far greater fidelity and accuracy than at

present. Those simulations will also give vertical leader teams the means to train with dissimilar

staffs, units, and civilian agencies either through distributed simulation that allows actual 

collaboration with others or through virtual simulation that represents absent participants. 

While both field training and simulation-based training will remain invaluable methods 

for future forces, leadership will remain the glue that binds teams together. It takes leadership at

each echelon vertically, and at each coordinating node horizontally, to provide the purpose, 

motivation, and inspiration to unlock the drive, desire, passion, and commitment of the people 

within the organization. Leaders must set goals, assess progress, maintain focus for leader teams, 

and guide development of teams and their leaders. 

The roles and capabilities of organizations will change because of the development of 

new weapons and tactics. New capabilities and new roles assigned to traditional echelons will 

prompt the need for training in the peculiar leader team concerns and characteristics related to

each level of command. This will make the need for understanding between echelons as strong

as ever and may change the routine collaboration between teams at different levels by altering

planning horizons or details of execution. (The introduction of remotely piloted aircraft as 

sensors in battalions, for example, will change the way vertical leader teams manage airspace, 

direct fire, control maneuver, and organize intelligence collection and dissemination.) 

Leader and leader team tasks will change with level of command and with the mission at

hand—a subtlety not fully captured in today’s doctrine. Today’s leader team training for 

battalion, brigade, and division levels does not make differences at each echelon explicit and 

44 
does not identify unique internal practices for those levels or for inter-echelon cooperation. 

Future training for leader teams must receive emphasis at least equal to the level of effort defined 

today while addressing changes that will accompany the Objective Force. Simultaneous multiechelon training, a fixture in training doctrine for the past 25 years, is likely to remain important 

if only because available time demands it. 

Frequency of team training needs further examination. Past practice offers a point of 

departure, suggesting that monthly training at each echelon is necessary to sustain basic fighting

and staff skills. Leader team proficiency can be established in dedicated leader training sessions 

and kept current through quarterly exercises. Operator proficiency on C4I systems supports 

leader team training and can be maintained through weekly operator training for individual 

soldiers. 

A variety of training approaches is important. Commanders should vary their training

approaches to accommodate different learning styles, avoid repetition, and provide an 

environment conducive to developing confidence and trust within teams. While simulationsassisted CPXs and FTXs will remain indispensable, the vignette-based training methodology also 

appears to offer a particularly valuable leader team training tool. Other effective techniques for 

developing vertical leader teams may be used to complement vignette-based team training. 

These include historically based staff rides, vignette driven tabletop or sand table exercises, 

terrain reconnaissance, specially qualified guest speakers and tactical exercises without troops 

(TEWTs). All have shown value as leader team training vehicles and an imaginative leader can 

easily adapt these methodologies to accommodate training a variety of tactical and technical 

skills. Even unconventional approaches such as physically challenging “adventure training” in 

new surroundings may have value in assisting a diverse group to coalesce into a cooperative, 

multi-level leader team. One young captain offered this remark: 

“Teambuilding among newly formed teams needs to be conducted off-site, away

from the daily routine and distractions, away from the telephone and the many

demands for time and attention. The normal jobsite where we work every day is 

so demanding that we sometimes can’t see one another. We’re blind to the fact

that the other person is, in fact, another person and not an object to be 

manipulated, or an obstacle to be overcome.” 

In all cases, the goal of vertical leader teambuilding should be to strengthen technical 

proficiency, tactical understanding and functional cooperation among the team members. Some 

techniques can be tailored to simultaneously train leadership skills, enhance cohesion, develop 

trust, establish a basis for confidence, and provide an opportunity for mentorship. Any such 

event that allows individual specialists to inform others of their capabilities and needs, gives the

commander an opportunity to teach his own approaches and preferences, and reveals useful 

information about the group may be of value in vertical teambuilding.

45 
CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This report focuses on developing vertical leader teams for the Objective Force. It is based 

upon interviews and observations of training conducted in the Army’s first IBCT and derived from

concepts describing the operational environment and capabilities projected for the Objective Force. 

The synergistic efforts of vertically aligned leader-and-staff teams, with staff assistants 

functioning as leaders in their own spheres of action, will take on greater importance in the

Objective Force. Because of short decision and reaction times, distributed technical control and

responsibilities, and great physical dispersion, future commanders will rely more heavily on the 

cooperation of subordinate leaders to act decisively and in concert within the context of the common

plan and commander’s intent. These conditions indicate a need for more effective, more cohesive

vertical leader teams to realize the full potential of Objective Force capabilities. Developing such 

teams will depend on a combination of leader selection, leader training, and leader development to

include institutional and organizational training, professional mentoring, and individual and team 

self-development. 

The introduction of new technologies, doctrine, and structure will not alter traditional 

concepts of leadership. Nonetheless, transformation will bring to the future battlefield new 

organizations and equipment, a higher tempo of operations, new information processing tools, 

and novel human challenges. Objective Force leaders and leader teams will have to 

accommodate differently distributed responsibilities, technologically advanced C4I tools, novel 

forms of person-to-person interaction, and unprecedented opportunities for higher level 

commanders and civilian authorities to observe and participate in operations. While basic

leadership qualities will remain essentially unchanged, leaders and leader teams will have to 

adapt to new conditions and training will need to prepare both for these new circumstances. 

Leader and leader team training must be a command priority. In today’s high optempo 

environment, command emphasis on leader and team development can easily shift to other 

things. In the absence of strong command involvement and a structured program, formal training

and self-development can become optional. These are conditions that the Objective Force will 

have to overcome if it is to realize the full combat potential inherent in high-performing vertical

leader teams. In units, leader team development must be treated as high priority training with the 

same command attention as other forms of individual and collective training. 

Unit administered leader team development and training programs in the Objective Force

should be structured and standards-based. In units of action led by company grade officers, 

commanders should focus on basic team capabilities and competencies. At higher levels—units 

of action led by field grade officers—commanders should concentrate on developing high

performing leader-teams of field and company grade officers and NCOs and on preparing

officers and senior NCOs for team responsibilities at the next higher level. 

The ability to communicate effectively will emerge as an increasingly important leader

and team skill. While Objective Force commanders will enjoy better and faster communications, 

46 
they will still depend heavily on non-technical collective and individual communications skills. 

Objective Force leaders must communicate effectively to ensure understanding, cooperation, and 

compliance by subordinate leaders operating with greater autonomy on a dispersed battlefield. 

Their subordinate team leaders and members must communicate with each other with the same 

clarity and ease. Fully conveying both understanding and motivation via new technologies will 

not be possible over sustained operations. Trained cooperation and mutual comprehension 

between team members and teams at different levels will be just as important and will require

deliberate cultivation and concentrated training. 

Training to sustain technical skills—both digital and analog—consumes a large portion 

of the time devoted to leader and vertical team proficiency in today’s digitized units. Moreover,

vertical teams will need to continue functioning when C4I tools are impaired or unavailable. 

Training back-up skills represents some of this load and will continue to confront future force

leaders (though their back-ups are apt to be more sophisticated than the analog techniques used 

today). 

Similarly, operations involving less technically advanced partners, foreign forces and 

civilian agencies—conditions that will be encountered frequently in the Objective Force 

operating environment—will demand that special solutions for external coordination while

advanced C4I capabilities remain in use internally. Back-up training to maintain secondary

system skills will add another training task to Objective Force schedules but those skills will be

critical and vertical leader teams will have to spend time training for them. 

Unlike today’s battalion and brigade leader teams, those of future forces will also be 

expected to understand the practices and operations of higher echelon formations. The 

requirement to respond directly to joint or component headquarters and the license to task 

theater, other service, and even national assets will tax the capabilities of future leader teams. 

The need to cooperate closely with foreign military contingents and civil agencies (both U.S. and 

foreign) without losing team effectiveness will also challenge future vertical team leaders. The 

Army’s training and training support communities will have to prepare Objective Force leader 

teams and individual leaders with the knowledge and experience base needed to perform 

competently under such conditions. 

Objective Force concepts highlight tactical agility and continuous operations as force 

multipliers and imply that a constantly changing task organization will be the norm. Initiating

combat operations before deployment is complete will require leaders to manage dissimilar

concurrent operations (such as deployment, reception, and combat) and to direct forces that 

expand rapidly, creating a continually changing array of participating leader teams. Better

communications and situational understanding will make dynamic teaming and “plug and play”

task organization possible, but training will be necessary to assure that leader teams can really

function effectively in such an environment. 

Command of a fast-moving, widely distributed fighting element that is interdependent 

with others and that changes its content without ceasing operations will require leaders adept at 

orchestrating the efforts of a changing set of teams. New teams must be rapidly assimilated and 

functionally integrated to optimize their contribution to the fight. Leader team training will have

47 
to present this reality early and consistently to accustom future forces to functioning effectively

in the midst of frequent organizational change. Institutional training, field training, and 

simulation-driven exercises should stress changing organizations and the ability to employ a 

force that changes in structure from day to day to meet emerging, continuously evolving tactical 

requirements. 

In the hands of a well-prepared and skillful leader-facilitator, the experimental vignettebased leader training program implemented in the IBCT can be a powerful team training tool. 

The technique provides an easily executable way of achieving both basic and advanced leader 

team training objectives. Its flexibility and ease of implementation make it useful for achieving

vertical leader team integration and for promoting adaptive behavior and initiative. Validation of

the technique awaits further investigation. However, training audience input points to the utility

of vignette-based training for achieving leader development and teambuilding objectives in units 

throughout the Army. 

Based on the observation opportunities of this study, a number of conditions emerged as 

characteristics of sound vignette-based training: 

1. An experienced unit leader must facilitate the training. 

2. The preparation, skill, and active involvement of the leader-facilitator greatly affect 

the quality of the training. 

3. Team-wide understanding of the commander’s intent is critical to the exercise of

group initiative. 

4. An unexpected change in the tactical situation can facilitate adaptive behavior and 

initiative in teams. 

5. Feedback, reinforcement, and coaching are important for training value. 

6. A directive leadership style inhibits learning. 

7. Leaders who routinely opt for tactical solutions that involve applying force often fail 

to discover better solutions. 

A handful of suggestions for improving the vignette library focused on program-level 

tools, training management features, and training support package (TSP) contents. In addition, 

the researchers believe that vignette-based training technique can be adapted to exercise the 

digital communication and MDMP capabilities resident in ABCS. Doing so can simultaneously

enhance the development of individual digital skills and the vertical and horizontal integration of

system operators. 

Multi-echelon FTXs and CPXs will remain important training tools for vertical leader

teams. These exercises incorporate realistic factors such as equipment reliability, weather,

terrain, and a variety of stressors. To get the most out of the opportunity for vertical leader team 

training in such exercises, the Army must develop leader team tasks, conditions and standards in 

its MTPs and direct the systematic treatment of leader team performance in AARs and training

assessments. 

48 
Simulation-based training will increase in importance and utility for the Objective Force. 

An improved family of simulations will be necessary to support training of vertically aligned 

leader teams as well as horizontal staff integration. 

The methodology utilized in this project provides a starting point for investigating the 

personnel selection and vertical leader team training needs of the Objective Force. Extrapolating

from current practice and experience to future issues and needs, guided by the Army’s vision of 

future operations, disclosed a number of practical options in this regard. At the same time, this 

project oriented very narrowly on the IBCT’s use of a few training techniques. More research 

will be necessary to identify the specific leader team dynamics of the future transformation 

environment. 

Recommendations 

Much work lies ahead to expand the insights gathered here in order to fully support the 

Training, Leader Development, and Soldier Issues needs of the Objective Force. Comprehensive 

data and concepts are needed to define realistic selection standards, specify vertical team training

requirements, develop new training methods, and ensure an effective leader development 

program. Specific steps that can be taken are outlined below. 

Continue research to document personnel qualifications, training requirements, and 

training techniques for vertical leader teams of the Objective Force. 

Implement improvements in the vignette-based Leader Sustainment Training Program.

Validate the training effectiveness of the vignette-based technique in terms of effects 

on subsequent performance and learning. 

Assess the potential value of incorporating vignette-based training in institutional 

venues (e.g., OES and NCOES programs of instruction). 

Analyze in detail the vertical leader team competencies required to ensure dominance 

in future military operations. 

Review the literature on team training and performance to identify the most promising

approaches for developing and maintaining leader team proficiency.

Evaluate “best practices” from industry, academia, and other military services for 

applicability to training vertical leader teams. 

Prepare vertical leader team tasks, conditions and standards and assure treatment of 

leader team performance in AARs and training assessments. 

Develop a comprehensive model for building and maintaining high levels of

performance among vertical leader teams in the Objective Force. 

Develop effective techniques for quickly restoring vertical leader team performance 

following personnel turnover. 

Assess the influence of unit type (combat, combat support, combat service support) on 

vertical leader team structure and dynamics. 

Investigate the effectiveness of various types of communication in terms of vertical 

leader team performance.

Using statistically valid methods, study the relationship between leader qualifications 

and vertical leader team performance. 

49 
Integrate the data from multiple research projects that have addressed Training, Leader

Development, and Soldier Issues (TLS) needs of the Objective Force to gain greater

understanding of vertical leader teaming.

Determine the potential barriers (cultural, economic, organizational, etc.) to 

implementing a structured, standards-based leader development program. 

Analyze the simulation capabilities required to support training of vertical leader 

teams. 

The results of this project establish a foundation for creating an effective selection and 

training program that can assure high performing vertical leader teams in the future force. 

Extending the knowledge base will ultimately pay valuable dividends in operational capabilities 

and combat readiness of the Objective Force. 

50 
References 

Campbell, R., Ford, L., Shaler, M., & Cobb, R. (1998). Issues and recommendations: Training 

the digital force (ARI Study Report 98-06). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

Dudley, M. G., Johnston, J. C., Jones, W. S., Strauss, C. P., & Meliza, L. L. (2001). Making the 

transition from analog to digital warfighting: Changes in unit behavior and knowledge (ARI

Research Report 1785). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 

and Social Sciences. 

Ervin, K. E., & Decker, D. A. (2000). Adaptive leaders and the Interim Brigade Combat Team. 

Military Review, 80(5), 24-28. 

MacGregor, D. A. (1997). Breaking the phalanx: A new design for landpower in the 21st 

century. Washington, DC. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Mehaffey, M. (2000). Vanguard of the Objective Force. Military Review, 80(5), 6-16. 

Owens, W., & Offley, E. (2000). Lifting the fog of war. Elizabeth, NJ: Farrar, Straus and 

Giroux. 

Salter, M. S., & Black, B. A. (1998). Back-up training requirements for the digitized battlefield: 

An overview (ARI Study Report 98-05). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

Shinseki, E. K. (2000, October). The Army transformation: A historic opportunity. Army, 

50(10), 21-30. 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (2000). IBCT vignette proposals (Briefing). 

Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (2000). Objective Force capability (TRADOC

Pam 525-66, Draft). Fort Monroe, VA: Author. 

U.S. Department of the Army (1994). Leader development for America’s Army (DA Pam 350-

58). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army. 

U.S. Department of the Army (1999). Army leadership (FM 22-100). Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army. 

U.S. Department of the Army (2001a). Concepts for the objective force (White Paper). 

Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army. 

U.S. Department of the Army (2001b). Officer study: Report to the Army (Army Training and 

Leader Development Panel Report). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the 

Army. 

51 
Appendix A 

The Army Program for Leader Development

During the conduct of this study a considerable amount of information was gathered that 

relates to the Army's program for leader development as described in DA Pam 350-58 (U.S. 

Army, 1994) and pertinent to the recently released findings of the ATLDP report (U.S. Army, 

2001a). The first three findings discussed in this appendix appear also in the main body of the 

report. They address the need for command emphasis to elevate leader development as a priority

training requirement, the need to develop a structured approach to leader training and 

development, and a prediction that such changes will encounter considerable resistance, perhaps 

even hostility. The remainder of the material presented in this appendix expands upon three 

central themes: (1) the importance of mentorship in the development of subordinate leaders, (2) 

the importance of senior leader communication in promoting an environment conducive to 

vertical teambuilding and the promotion of initiative, and (3) reinforcing arguments supporting

the need for structured, standards-based leader training for both unit administered and selfdevelopment programs. 

Leader training does not compete favorably with other requirements. On an intellectual 

level, leaders at every echelon acknowledge the importance of training subordinate leaders. In

practice, the urgency of operational requirements takes precedence over the acknowledged 

importance of leader development. (Indeed, the tendency to label leader training as 

“professional development” contributes to the tendency to relegate it to a lower priority of

activity.) With a single, notable exception, the time set aside for leader development in the units 

observed was minimal and vulnerable to cancellation or postponement in the event of any

conflicting operational or other training requirement. The experience of the research team and 

remarks made during interviews confirm that leader training ranks low in the priority of activities 

performed in units of the IBCT and throughout the Army. In the words of one Sergeant Major 

whose sentiments were echoed by many, “Leadership development programs are personality

driven. Most commanders don't do them at all. Those who do them fall into two camps. There 

are those that just go through the motions and there are those who are really interested in

teaching their subordinates. The teachers are rare. We expect subordinates to work hard to learn 

their profession. We should expect the leaders to work equally hard to teach their profession. 

[Italics added] The leader owes it to his subordinates ... to be technically and tactically

competent and he owes them the opportunity to grow professionally... [And yet] it's the first 

thing cut from the training schedule every time.”

This situation must be deliberately remedied if the Army is to transition successfully to 

truly different organizations, tactics and techniques in the future. Changing it may call for more

structured approach to leader training and for making leader training accountable and fully

assessed. Mainly, though, it seems to demand more serious commitment on the part of senior 

leaders. 

Structured leader development programs should be standards-based. This finding

supports the development of structured programs with specific learning objectives for unit 

administered and individual leader development. That does not mean that this report or its 

 A-1
findings support the development of comprehensive officer performance standards by branch, 

functional area and rank as proposed in the Officer Study (U.S. Department of the Army, 2001). 

Structured leader development programs in the Army are those taught at the institutional 

training facilities where learning objectives are clearly defined and training is standards-based. 

Otherwise, leader development is unstructured and there are no established terminal learning

objectives. In practice, the lack of structure and clearly identified learning objectives results in 

widely dissimilar leader development programs from unit to unit. Leader development is 

perceived as discretionary. Lacking structure, neither the unit commander nor individual have 

the necessary “road map” to guide the development process and against which to track progress. 

Without learning objectives, neither the commander nor the individual have the mechanism to 

determine whether the conduct of the leader development event achieved its intended purpose. 

The paragraph that follows suggests how structure and learning objectives might be 

implemented in a professional self-development program. It is provided to illustrate that

learning objectives and structure can be applied to an existing program. It also illustrates that

structure allows the creation of performance requirements and standards that can be ratcheted-up, 

or down to achieve program objectives. It follows that program objectives need to be clearly

defined to determine the appropriate degree to which structure is implemented and specific

performance requirements are specified. The Army Chief of Staff's recommended professional 

reading list is used as the example. 

The Chief of Staff's recommended professional reading list is available on-line. The 

books are not. For each title a brief description is provided that contains information about the 

book's content and why reading it is a worthwhile endeavor. The latter could easily be expanded 

and restated as learning objectives. To a degree, structure for the reading program is provided 

because it is broken down by grade. The titles could be organized in an ascending, progressive 

order where one reading expands upon, presents an opposing view, or reinforces concepts from a 

previous reading. Organized in this fashion, the individual (and his commander) would be 

provided a “road map” that describes a sequential professional reading program against which 

progress can be measured. Structure can increase the value of this leader development tool by

providing study guides that help the reader identify key concepts that support learning objectives. 

These, too, could be made available on-line as could the books, themselves. Structure can be

provided with specific performance requirements by making the professional reading program 

mandatory versus recommended and by electronically providing feedback to the soldier and his 

commander. If completion of required professional reading were determined to be necessary for

promotion or specific assignment eligibility, then feedback could be provided to U.S. Army

Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to determine promotion and assignment eligibility. Again, 

this is not a recommendation, but merely an illustration of how structure might be added to an 

existing program. 

Transitioning to more structured leader training may encounter resistance. Long-held 

attitudes and beliefs about the unit-specific and individualized approaches to leader training

could work against efforts to build greater structure into such programs in units. In particular, 

efforts to develop a more structured approach and/or establish standards for leader training could 

suffer from reluctance and even hostility. While widely acknowledged as being important, in 

 A-2
practice leader development is viewed as a discretionary activity, something attended to as time

and opportunity permit. Adding structure and standards will help remove leader training from 

the “discretionary” column of things to do and put it solidly into the “required” column. In doing

so, standards must be applied. This would entail accountable instruction, external program 

evaluations, and, perhaps, the use of performance data in assignments to leadership positions. 

All these run counter to the Army culture and could only be implemented by determined 

leadership at the highest level.

Mentorship is critically important in developing subordinate leaders. DA Pam 350-58, 

Leader Development for America's Army (U.S. Department of the Army, 1994) describes 12 

leader development imperatives aligned within a three-pillar leader development model. The

three pillars upon which the model is based are Institutional Training and Education, Operational 

Assignments and Self-Development. A fourth pillar is needed - Mentorship. It is not that

mentorship is absent from the model presented in DA Pam 350-58. Elements pertaining to 

mentorship are included as commander/supervisor responsibilities under the Operational 

Assignments pillar. This study concludes that the process of mentoring, coaching and 

communicating by more senior commanders who serve as both teacher and role model is so 

important to the development of subordinate leaders that it justifies separate distinction and more 

importantly, special emphasis. 

Mentorship by more experienced and knowledgeable leaders is the essence of applied 

leadership in the important business of developing subordinate leaders. Mentorship draws 

heavily on each of the four competencies that a leader must display. These are described in FM

6-22 (22-100), Army Leadership (U.S. Department of the Army, 1999), as interpersonal, 

conceptual, tactical and technical skills. Of these, the effective mentor relies most on 

interpersonal skills. Teaching, coaching and mentoring are all about communication. In the 

words of one senior officer, “Leaders cannot do enough of it (communication). There will 

always be a lack. Subordinates don't hear enough from or interact with their superiors often 

enough to become imbued with an understanding of his priorities, motivation and vision. If they

knew these better, much of the uncertainty in their lives, the vagueness and the self-doubt in 

which they operate would dissipate. They'd be more confident and more likely to demonstrate 

the traits sought for Objective Force leaders—adaptability, flexibility and initiative—because 

they'd know their commander's intent, how he thinks, and why... Whether teaching the 

intricacies of a passage of lines or discussing the menu for a holiday celebration in the dining

facility, it is the communication that is important. It enlightens, provides insight, defines the

operational environment, but most of all, it contributes to understanding.”

The technical aspect of mentoring also merits special consideration for Army transition. 

In introducing information-based systems, Army vertical teams experienced the odd 

phenomenon of younger leaders knowing more about those systems than more experienced 

leaders. Deliberate technical mentorship training for older leaders is likely to pay dividends 

when future technical shifts leap ahead of predictable development expectations. 

Coaching, teaching and mentorship develop trust and teamwork. Army leaders must be 

the advocates who enable superior performance in much the same way that a coach identifies 

talent, develops skill and exploits the strengths of individual team members. Developing skills 

 A-3
and exploiting talent maximizes the individual's contribution and speeds his integration as a

valued member of the team. The coach encourages, cajoles and rewards to establish trust,

increase performance, recognize value and instill confidence. These are necessary to unlock the

drive, desire, passion and commitment of the people within the organization. Communication is 

the mechanism that allows the coach to know his players and the commander to know his 

subordinates. Knowing them enables the commander to assess their strengths and developmental 

needs. It is the means by which the commander can identify talent and discovering those talents, 

develop them. One senior officer offered that, “The degree to which a commander trusts his 

subordinates is directly proportional to how well he knows them, and vice versa. The time spent 

in teaching, coaching and mentoring subordinates is well invested. It allows the insight and 

understanding for both parties [that is] essential to vertical and horizontal team integration.” 

Active coaching and teaching by properly prepared leaders of vertical teams assists in 

establishing common understandings between echelons and helps dispel uncertainty. Young

members of the leadership team in particular need assurances that they know their seniors’ 

priorities and preferences. The “two levels down” approach used in IBCT leader training is a

useful approach for creating this trust, confidence and preparation for participation in team 

actions. 

Initiative, adaptability and decisiveness are enabled by understanding. Initiative and 

decisiveness are traits that are most likely to be exhibited by those who understand the mission, 

the desired end-state and are willing to accept risk. Understanding the commander, his intent, 

and vision enables subordinates to take risk, recognize opportunity and act with initiative. A 

battalion commander advises that, “Without this understanding [of the commander's intent], the 

display of initiative and decisiveness is not so much a question of risk taking as it is a question of

guessing. Understanding the commander's purpose, vision and desired end-state allows 

[subordinates to act with] initiative within intent. The absence of understanding invites 

disaster... The burden of ensuring that his intent is clearly articulated and understood resides 

with the senior commander. He must do everything within his power to clearly communicate his 

vision to subordinates.” Conversely, it follows that subordinates should be able to voice their 

concerns when they are uncertain about intent. Better yet, they should be encouraged to do so. 

Uncertainty is a clear signal that their interpretation or understanding of the commander's intent 

is not sufficient to warrant their confidence. It is a clear signal that the commander must do 

more to ensure understanding. 

Effective communication is the key to avoiding isolation, uncertainty and ambiguity. 

Leaders who recognize the critical importance of communicating with their subordinates work 

hard to ensure understanding. They seek opportunities to open channels of communication. 

Observations of training in the IBCT identified both ends of the spectrum—those that apparently

do understand and those who apparently do not. While discussing vignette-based leader training, 

a senior officer had this to say about leaders who understand the importance of communicating

with subordinates: “I would predict that they'd embrace the vignette-based leader development 

process first as another means to effective communication . . . The sad part is, those who would 

benefit most from a program such as this—those who do not see the criticality of effective 

communication—will decry the time and effort spent as being unproductive or better devoted to 

other things. They are wrong. Leaders would be well advised to communicate with their 

 A-4
subordinates at every opportunity and with all the skill they can muster. Even then, only half 

will hear their message and only half of those who hear will understand. Leaders cannot 

communicate enough or often enough. My advice to battalion and brigade commanders is 

simply this: Engage your subordinates. Speak to them and allow them to speak to you. In the 

absence of engagement there is isolation. In isolation there is uncertainty and ambiguity. By not 

engaging subordinates consistently and often, leaders contribute to an operating environment rife

with uncertainty. By not engaging them, leaders inhibit their development and stifle their 

initiative.”

Professional dialog builds trust. It is probably right that in communicating with 

subordinates for the purpose of leader development, the focus should be on warfighting. But it 

should not be exclusive to that alone. Understanding the Army culture, service ethic and values 

should be important developmental objectives for all leaders, as well. The idea is to develop 

people who believe in and truly care about this institution. A General Officer concludes that, 

“Communication is the means by which shared values, trust, respect and commitment are

nourished and encouraged. These are essential for the conduct of professional dialog without 

threat to person or position.” 

To the young Captain or Lieutenant, battalion and brigade commanders are fonts of 

wisdom, experience and knowledge. These commanders are also defining elements of the 

subordinate leader's operational environment. Subordinates need and want to understand that 

environment and they want to succeed in the environment their commanders define. The 

recently released ATLDP Officer Study: Report to the Army (U.S. Department of the Army, 

2001) finds that, “Officers believe mentoring is important for both personal and professional 

development, yet a majority of officers report not having mentors.” The report recommends that 

the Army “develop doctrine for mentoring in FM 6-22 (22-100), Army Leadership [U.S. 

Department of the Army, 1999]. Teach it throughout OES, so junior officers understand what 

mentoring is and how they should be mentored, and field grade officers understand how they

should be mentoring junior officers. Place emphasis in Pre-Command Courses so future 

battalion and brigade commanders understand Army doctrine, their role in mentoring, and the 

expectations of officers they will mentor.” This research team strongly supports this finding and 

recommendation. 

The focal point for leader development is the battalion commander. Asked what 

assignment they found to be the most rewarding and meaningful of their careers, each of the 

senior officers queried responded in kind, “Battalion Command.” While they gave different 

reasons for their response, the rationale in each case pointed to two central themes. One of these 

is best reflected in a General Officer's remarks that, “Battalion command is at the juncture where

the vectors of authority, power, experience, influence, resources, autonomy, skill sets, time, span 

of control, knowledge and training all converge into focus. The battalion commander ‘owns’ 

them all. Battalion command was a culminating point of all that had transpired and the

privileged duty I had prepared for all my adult life. I was never so well prepared for anything

that came before, or after.” The second theme described battalion command as a gratifying

experience because of the ability to positively influence quality of life, improve training and 

readiness, and attend to the professional development of subordinate leaders. 

 A-5
The practical limitations of span of control also point to the battalion commander as the

necessary focal point for leader development. A former brigade commander lamented, “I had 

five battalions with 27 Captains assigned to company level command positions that I senior 

rated. When it came time to do their efficiency reports, I had to rely heavily on input provided 

by their battalion commanders. Though I tried hard to know each of them better, in fact all I

really had to go on were general impressions formed by infrequent contact. Most of that contact 

was in a group setting that didn't lend itself to any real dialog. For the most part, my contribution 

to their professional development came in the remarks I made during QTB (Quarterly Training

Briefings) and when I visited them during the conduct of training. While visiting various 

training sites kept me busy, from their perspective they saw me very infrequently and for some, 

hardly at all.” The problem of span of control and infrequency of contact is exacerbated when 

subordinate units are widely dispersed, as is the case in many non-TO&E organizations. The 

bottom line is that the span of control for brigade commanders is simply too great, the audience

too large, for individual counseling and mentorship to be a realistic objective. 

Leader development must be structured and top driven. This theme was expanded upon 

by a Lieutenant Colonel, a former battalion commander, who said, “For all the high-sounding

rhetoric about the importance of leader development, there has been precious little in the way of 

demonstrated commitment. I do believe that action speaks louder than words and the lack of 

action and commitment by senior leaders sends the clear message that leader development isn't 

very important, after all. The words are there but without action and commitment, it's only

words and easy to ignore.” Another opined that, “Experience tells me that if you don't put a 

structured program in place, the quality of the [leader development] training becomes suspect 

and it may not happen.” These and similar statements argue for the creation of a more

formalized leader development program that can be executed at the unit level. It is not clear 

whether such a program should be standards-based as advocated in this report and the Officer

Study (U.S. Department of the Army, 2001), take a more generalized approach as in developing a 

series of leader development training support packages (TSPs) from which a commander may

select, or follow the experimental model of vignette-based leader development training practiced 

in the IBCT. One thing, however, is clear: If leader development is not command sponsored and 

left as an unstructured program, it will not happen in the future with any greater degree of

fidelity than it's happening today.

Junior leaders require special assistance in their leader development responsibilities.

Sound vertical team training comes more easily to experienced leaders. Lieutenants and new 

warrant officers and sergeants have the same leader development responsibilities for their 

vertical teams as more experienced leaders do. They lack, however, the experience in training, 

mentoring and teaching older NCO leaders. Additionally, failures in team-building efforts can 

have the opposite of the intended effect, weakening the leader’s position and the team’s 

coherence if leader training is done poorly. Concentrated efforts to prepare lieutenants and new 

warrant officers and sergeants for their leader team development responsibilities are therefore 

justified. 

Command involvement is needed to monitor and guide individual leader self-development 

efforts. Leader Development for America's Army, DA Pam 350-58 (U.S. Department of the 

Army, 1994), strongly emphasizes the importance of self-development and rightfully identifies it 

 A-6
as one of the pillars in its leader development model. It also fixes responsibility for selfdevelopment on more than the just the individual: “Commanders enhance leader development 

by ... helping them prepare and execute developmental action plans to achieve maximum 

growth” (Chapter 1, p. 3). Again with one notable exception observed in the IBCT, in the 

experience of the research team and as confirmed during this study, commanders in the field are 

not helping subordinate leaders prepare and execute professional development action plans. If

they did, then an individual's self-development would not be entirely self-directed, nor would it 

be unnoticed. In the absence of this help from the commander, it is fair to say that selfdevelopment in the Army today is almost entirely self-directed and whether it takes place, or not, 

is unnoticed because nobody's watching. The question becomes: How well is self-directed selfdevelopment working? This study finds that it isn't working except in a few isolated cases. 

There are a few junior and mid-grade officers that actively study the profession of arms, 

leadership, tactics and doctrine, geography, the culture and military-political make-up of

potential adversaries, etc. For the majority, however, the total extent of professional study and 

self-development is limited to reading Army Times and reviewing doctrine and policy pertinent 

only to their immediate, routine operational requirements. In other words, self-directed selfdevelopment is an oxymoron when applied to the large majority of junior and mid-grade officers. 

Self-directed equates to optional and opting for an increased workload does not compete well in

the spectrum of other activities that place demands on time and attention. 

Distance-learning technologies and alternative media could play a significant role in 

leader development. The study of history and successful leaders is important to professional 

development. The traditional means to acquire an appreciation of history’s lessons has been to 

read authoritative accounts—history books and lately, historical novels. Commanders have used 

other media to teach the lessons of history. The format of The Big Picture series highlighting

various campaigns during World War I, World War II and Korea that was produced by the Army

and shown on public television has been followed closely by a more contemporary but similar

series, Unsung Heroes, that currently airs on The History Channel and Discovery. In many

commands, the movies The Longest Day, Patton, Gettysburg, Glory and Saving Private Ryan, 

and television series such as Band of Brothers have been “required viewing.” In some 

commands these became the historical examples and subjects that inspired the professional

discussion and dialog sparking the unit's emerging professional development program. 

Leaders at all levels can benefit from the graphic portrayal and high drama that capture 

attention and elicit emotional response. The media alternatives do not end with the motion 

picture industry. Vignette-based leader development programs might benefit from footage from 

news reports. Books, including doctrinal publications, and important speeches can be reduced to 

audiotapes or digital recordings that can be downloaded off the Internet. Distance learning

technologies enable interactive dialog with acknowledged experts, other leaders or instructors. 

These technologies may one day be so common as to be available in every dayroom and even in 

company command posts while deployed in local training areas. The bottom line to this 

discussion is that professional development does not need to be boring. Exploring alternative

means to promote learning would be a worthy pursuit.

 A-7
Appendix B

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL—IBCT Warfighters

Objective Force Training Research Project

(PT No. 60-34)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FACILITATOR

1. Whenever possible, give the interviewee(s) a read-ahead copy of this protocol a 

couple of days in advance, substituting the “Read-Ahead Package” sheet in place of

the two “Instructions” pages. 

2. As the session starts, request permission to tape record the interview, then have the 

interviewee(s) read and sign the separate Privacy Act form.

3. Explain the purpose of this interview session (see next page). Determine how long

the interviewee(s) can spend in the interview.

4. At the start of the tape recording, state the project name and the date. 

5. Lead the participant(s) thru the interview questions contained in this protocol, in

dialog mode. Work thru as many questions as you have time for.

6. Adjust to the interests and strengths of the individual or group—follow up their

comments, pursue detail if something’s especially important to a participant. 

7. In a group, try to encourage everyone to participate. Use your judgment to draw

every participant into the dialogue. 

8. Keep an eye on the clock so you can end on time. 

9. Within 2 working days after the interview, Fedex the tape to the TRW-Killeen office,

then subsequently review the transcript prepared by Wilma. If you add comments or

annotations of your own, put them in brackets and tag them with your initials. 

10. Put your own insights and thoughts in a Microsoft

® Word file within 48 hours. 

B-1 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS

We are conducting this interview to understand the needs of the future force in terms of

warfighter development, team training, and selection factors. We are looking at ways to 

build more efficient teams—both vertically, as among several echelons of command, 

and horizontally, as among system operators within an echelon. Your experience in the 

IBCT provides an opportunity to capture important insights. 

What you share with us will help pave the way for future units undergoing Army

transformation. 

We’ll try to follow the questions inside this guide to structure the session. At the same

time, we want to be sure to cover things that are especially important to you. 

The results of this interview will be used for training research purposes only, mainly to 

identify selection and training issues for the future force. We will not identify your 

comments by name. 

Do you have any questions before we start?

B-2 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS—IBCT Warfighters 

 ------------ 

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1. Experience with the IBCT: 

a. How long have you been in the Army?

b. How long have you been assigned to the IBCT?

c. What is your current unit and duty position?

d. How long have you been in your current duty position?

2. Knowledge relevant to the Objective Force: 

a. What previous assignments did you have in digitally equipped units (e.g., EXFOR)?

b. What experience do you have with automated C4I systems (FBCB2, ASAS, AFATDS, 

CSSCS, MCS, FAADC2I, or their forerunners)?

[Note to Facilitator: query about sub-systems (e.g., RWS, FED) as appropriate.]

c. How have you gained your knowledge of the Objective Force? (Reading, briefings, etc.) 

d. How have you gained your knowledge of the Future Combat Systems?

 ------------ 

TRAINING ESSENTIALS 

We’re asking you to identify one task that is most critical for your operations in the IBCT,

then consider different aspects of that task in a series of related questions. Please keep in 

mind the new doctrine, equipment, and organization of the IBCT.

As we work through the questions, we’d like you to focus on the group that fits your current

position best:

Leader (member of command group or equivalent).

Staff member (primary or special staff officer or NCO). 

ABCS system operator (primary duty).

B-3 
3. IBCT Tasks:

a. In the IBCT digital command and control environment, what is the most critical task that

leaders (or staff members or system operators) must perform?

b. How does this task relate to the missions an IBCT combat unit (or CS or CSS unit)

performs?

c. How does the task differ from similar tasks performed in conventional units? Consider: 

The impact of new equipment (for example, digital systems). 

Changes in unit organization. 

The impact of new doctrine and tactics. 

Task difficulty, complexity, and workload. 

 ------------ 

4. Performance Factors:

a. In accomplishing the task you identified, what main components (sub-tasks, steps) of the 

task are critical for performing it effectively?

b. Given the reliance on automated C4I, what traits does a leader (or staff member or

system operator) need to perform the task well? Consider: 

Knowledge (concepts, facts, rules, and procedures that the warfighter must know). 

Skills (math skills, communication skills, social skills, motor skills, etc.).

Aptitudes (intellectual capabilities such as spatial visualization, logical 

reasoning). 

Attitudes (motivation, commitment, innovation, flexibility, discipline, etc.).

c. If you had absolute authority to change things, what criteria would you use to select 

IBCT leaders (or staff members or system operators) who will have to perform the task?

d. Considering the essential traits you’ve identified, what’s the best way for the Army to 

develop those traits among its leaders (or staff members or system operators)?

 ------------ 

5. Task-Specific Training Requirements:

a. In the high-tech environment of the IBCT, what are the training requirements that enable

effective performance of the task you identified? Consider: 

Individual leaders (or staff members or system operators). 

Teams, either vertical leader/staff teams or horizontal teams (e.g., Bn staff).

b. In view of the training requirements you just identified, would you rate the task as 

difficult to train or easy to train, and why? Consider: 

Training of individuals.

Training of teams.

 ------------ 

B-4 
6. Task-Specific Training Methods: 

a. For the task and sub-tasks you identified, what are the best training methods to ensure 

effective performance in the digital command and control environment? Consider: 

Training of individuals (leaders or staff members or system operators). 

Training of teams, either leader/staff teams or horizontal teams (e.g., Bn staff). 

b. If you were in charge and had unlimited resources, how would you change the way the

Army trains leaders (or staff members or system operators)?

 ------------ 

7. Training Support Requirements:

a. What new training support does the IBCT need? Consider requirements and challenges 

regarding:

Embedded training. 

Training simulators. 

Computer-based instruction or computer-based training. 

AAR capabilities (including performance measurement). 

Training support packages. 

Training resources (funding, OCs, contractor personnel, etc.). 

 ------------ 

8. Objective Force Training:

a. For the task you identified, how might training change for the Objective Force? 

Consider: 

Mission relevance. 

Sub-tasks. 

Traits and selection factors for leaders/staff/operators. 

Training requirements. 

Training methods. 

Training support. 

 ------------ 

B-5 
IBCT LESSONS LEARNED 

9. Training Methods:

a. In the IBCT, what was the most valuable training you received? Why? How would you 

improve it? Consider: 

Training of horizontal (single-echelon) teams. 

Training of vertical (multi-echelon) teams. 

Training in integrated multi-echelon exercises (e.g., battalion/company). 

b. What was the least effective training you received? Why? If it needs to be continued, 

how would you improve it?

c. What new training techniques or events has your unit developed or adopted? Consider: 

Training of horizontal teams. 

Training of vertical teams. 

Training in integrated brigade/battalion exercises.

10. Leader/Soldier Enablers:

a. For successful IBCT operations, how much knowledge do you need about operations 

and needs of other functional areas? Consider your role in: 

Vertical teams. 

Horizontal teams. 

b. What have you learned about selecting and assigning IBCT warfighters that would be 

important for the Objective Force?

 ------------ 

OTHER COMMENTS 

11. What other comments do you have about IBCT training, leader/soldier development, and 

warfighter traits?

 ------------ 

12. If you could change one thing about how your IBCT training was conducted, what would that 

be?

 ------------ 

B-6 
Appendix C 

OBSERVATION GUIDE: 

VERTICAL TEAM TRAINING

General Instructions: Read this guide thoroughly and carry it with you while

conducting observations of vertical team training. 

Observation of vertical team training will be accomplished during the IBCT

execution of their Leader Sustainment Training Program (LSTP). 

LSTP sessions are scheduled 19-22 June and 17-20 September 2001. 

SMEs will observe all eight days of scheduled vignette-based LSTP training to

obtain the requisite number of observations. 

Observations from a minimum of 12 observer-days are required, equitably

distributed by unit type (Infantry, RSTA, Field Artillery and CSS) and echelon

(brigade, battalion, company and platoon) IAW Table B-1, of the Research Plan. 

In the event of cancellation, or if for any reason SMEs are unable to observe this

training, other vertically aligned training events may be used for data collection 

subject to coordination with and approval of the DO-COR. 

Technical Objectives: (Provided for reference.)

Determine training issues for leaders and soldier/operators relevant to FCS and 

Objective Force.

Identify and analyze effective training techniques, methods and problems in

vignette-based vertical team training and horizontal training. 

Identify the knowledge, skills and aptitudes (KSAs) associated with the 

performance of tasks being trained and with effective training of those tasks. 

Questions of Interest: The answers to certain questions constitute essential items of

information. While observations are of the current training of the IBCT, be mindful and 

alert to activities, statements or behaviors that may provide insight into the training

needs and leader development needs of Objective Force. Never fail to document

information pertaining to the questions that follow: 

What are the future training requirements for the Objective Force? 

What training methods/techniques are required to support the Objective Force? 

What new training support will the Objective Force need? 

What KSAs (for warfighters and trainers) are needed for effective performance of

the Objective Force? 

What IBCT practices and lessons can facilitate training in the Objective Force?

How do training requirements, methods and KSAs vary across different echelons 

and types of units? 

Rules of Engagement: 

Do not interfere with, or become a distraction to the conduct of training. 

Do not attempt to influence, participate in, or assist in the conduct of training. 

 C-1 
Do not volunteer opinion, or offer comment on the training being conducted. 

Do not assume welcome. Coordinate your presence at training in advance. 

Do not use a tape recorder to record observations. Their use (the sound of your

voice) is distracting to trainers and the training audience. Use written notes, 

instead. 

Be discrete in taking notes. Some people are intimidated or irritated by it. 

Be discrete and unobtrusive in manner, speech, presence and appearance. 

Guidelines for Data Collection:

Be observant and sensitive to the information requirements described in the 

questions of interest, above. Ensure that no question of interest is overlooked. 

Take time to take good notes using the data collection sheet provided. Use as 

many sheets as needed to capture observations. 

Capture the observation or insight with sufficient detail to accurately reconstruct 

the essence of the thought/observation later.

Notes should be factual and capture who-what-when-where-why-how

information. 

If possible, obtain copies of pertinent written or graphic materials. 

Do not focus on any one individual or group. Adjust your vantage point to obtain

as broad a base for observation and input as circumstances will allow.

Record your own conclusions and thoughts, clearly marking them as your own. 

It's OK to ask questions of trainers and participants, but minimize interference. 

Do not organize or process observation data in the field. Do it later in the office. 

Privacy Considerations: Attributing quotable material to a person by grade and 

position is generally sufficient; in which case, a privacy statement is not needed. When

it is necessary to attribute comments to a specific individual, have him/her sign a privacy

statement. When in doubt, obtain a signed privacy statement. Keep a quantity on 

hand. 

Documentation:

Collect data in the form of hand written notes, based on the questions of interest. 

Organize and consolidate handwritten notes into Microsoft Word master files 

created for this project. Do it right away, while the information is still fresh. 

Save your notes twice. Keep one set on file, saved under the date-time-group 

that the training occurred. Use the other to cut and paste data into appropriate 

folders. 

"Tag" each data point with a shorthand note that tells when the information was 

obtained and the source. Examples follow:

1. 2206//PLTSGT//INCO The information was obtained on 22 June from a

Platoon Sergeant in an Infantry Company during LSTP training. 

2. 1906//FGO//FA This information came from a Field Artillery Field Grade 

Officer on 19 June, the first day of the LSTP training. 

3. 2106//CDR//CSSCO This annotation says that a CSS Company

Commander is the source of the information. 

 C-2 
4. 2006//TRAINER//CIV This information came from a civilian contract 

trainer. 

5. 1906//SME//COX This information came from TRW SME Jim Cox

Data obtained outside of the context of a training event will be annotated in plain 

text with the source and circumstance under which it was obtained.

Desired Results of Training Observations: Clear, concise SME notes suitable for

entry into a compiled data file for analysis. 

Technical Point of Contact: Dr. Bruce Leibrecht 

Attachment 1: Observed Training Data Collection Sheet 

 C-3 
OBSERVED TRAINING DATA COLLECTION SHEET

Type of Training: Horizontal Vertical Date: 

Unit(s) Involved/Observed: ____ Name of Event: _____________

Observer: ________________________________ Location: ___________________

NOTES:

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

What concepts, tasks, or 

skills are the most difficult

to teach and master?

What are the most effective 

training 

techniques/technologies? 

What are the least effective 

training techniques and/or

technologies? 

What tasks, subtasks, and 

functions are being trained? 

What novel training 

approach, workarounds are 

being used? 

What KSAs are needed for 

effective performance?

What IBCT practices and 

lessons have value for training 

Objective Forces? 

How do training 

requirements, methods and 

KSAs vary across different 

echelons and types of units? 

 C-4 
Appendix D 

List of Documents Reviewed 

Boller, M. (2000, September-October). A common understanding for transformation 

brigades. Military Review, 29-38. 

Brigade Coordination Cell (2001a). Leadership team training vignette development

(Briefing slides, unpublished). Fort Lewis, WA: Battlespace Integration Directorate, 

Brigade Coordination Cell. 

Brigade Coordination Cell (2001b). Parallel and collaborative MDMP (Briefing slides, 

unpublished). Fort Lewis, WA: Battlespace Integration Directorate, Brigade 

Coordination Cell. 

Brown, F. J. (1999). Army learning white paper: Preparation of Leaders. Alexandria, 

VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.

Brown, F. J. (2000). Observations of learning “Best Practices.” Alexandria, VA: 

Institute for Defense Analyses. 

Campbell, C. H, Ford, L.A., Campbell, R. C., & Quinkert, K. A. (1998). A procedure for 

development of structured vignette training exercises for small groups (ARI Research 

Product 98-37). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 

and Social Sciences. 

Campbell, C. H., Quinkert, K. A., & Burnside, B. L. (2000). Training for performance: 

The structured training approach (ARI Special Report 45). Alexandria, VA: U.S. 

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

DeRoche, L. M. (2001). Digital training—What’s the big deal? CALL Newsletter, No. 

01-18, 35-48. 

Dubik, J. (2000, September-October). IBCT at Fort Lewis. Military Review, 17-23. 

Leibrecht, B. C., Johnston, J. C., Black, B. A., & Quinkert, K. A. (In Preparation). 

Managing Force XXI change: Insights and lessons learned in the Army’s first digital 

division (ARI Study Report). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

Leibrecht, B.C., Meade, G. A., Schmidt, J. H., Doherty, W. J., & Lickteig, C. W. (1994). 

Evaluation of the Combat Vehicle Command and Control system: Operational 

effectiveness of an armor battalion (ARI Technical Report 998). Alexandria, VA: 

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 

D-1
Leibrecht, B.C., & Winsch B. J. (1997). Developing a structured training program for 

the Experimental Force (EXFOR): Lessons learned for simulation training and 

Force XXI. Fort Knox, KY: TRADOC Systems Manager for Force XXI.

Lynch, R. (2001). Lessons learned: Commanding a digital brigade combat team (IDA 

Paper P-3616). Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. 

MacDonald, J. (2000). Amended statement of work for Initial Brigade Combat Team 

leader development program. Ft. Lewis, WA: Brigade Coordination Cell. 

Miller, W. (2000). Land Warrior: Work in progress [On-line]. Available: 

http://www.mt2-kmi.com/features/6_5Art2.cfm. Military Training Technology

Online.

Reinwald, B. R. (2000, September-October). Tactical intuition. Military Review, 79-88. 

U.S. Army War College (2001). Army Transformation Wargame 2000: Vigilant 

Warriors 01. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Author. 

D-2
Appendix E 

Sample Vignettes from the Leader Sustainment Training Program 

E-1
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

1. 

Vignette Instructor Guide 

References 

FM 22-100, Army Leadership, Aug ’99, Chapter 4, SUBJ: Direct Leadership Skills, pp. 4-47, Tactical

FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built –Up Areas. 

FM 7-10X, IBCT Infantry Company

ARTEP 7-8-DRILL 

MTP 20-3-3006, Search a Building

IBCT O & O, 30 June, 2000 (Final) 

IBCT SOP(s) 

IBCT Tactical References

2. Purpose. This vignette was designed to exercise the tactical skills required to clear a building. 

3. Instructions For Leader

a. This vignette is designed to assist in the development of sound judgment, understanding decision 

parameters of the higher commander, using creative thinking in problem solving and recognizing the 

underlying short and long term issues that may impact a unit in this scenario. Small and large group

discussions should develop innovative ideas and concepts to address the “non-standard” and/or “nondoctrinal” situations surrounding the situation presented in this vignette.

b. Prior to conducting this training, familiarize yourself with the contents of this vignette and the listed

references. Also, review your platoon’s communications TO&E and ensure you bring an updated listing

of the communications available to your platoon. Compare this to the architectures we have provided. 

As appropriate, provide your training groups copies of excerpts from those references that you feel are 

especially relevant to your particular training objectives. As a minimum, have at least one copy of all 

appropriate references at your training location. You will also need to provide students copies of the 

training support material contained in the annexes accompanying this vignette. 

c. Determine the training support materials you will need for your training, such as butcher paper, 

magic markers, overhead projectors, etc. and ensure that all support materials are available at the 

training location.

d. Explain the purpose of the vignette and provide copies of Annex A (Soldier Support Material), the

reference list and/or appropriate excerpts to your audience. Using an overhead projector, butcher paper, 

or chalkboard, provide the scenario to your audience. Ensure that you provide them copies of

appropriate supporting materials or that those materials are available for them to view. Read the first 

requirement to your audience, clearly stating the expected outcome(s) of their small group discussions. 

Provide the groups with start and end times for the requirement (can be adjusted if required). Issue points

designed to generate discussion on this topic are provided in the requirement paragraph. The instructor

has the option of either assigning selected points to specific groups, pick specific points for each group to

address, or have each group address all discussion points (time available may be a factor). Concluding 

large group discussions should highlight innovative concepts and/or strategies to properly address the 

issues presented by this vignette. This is an excellent opportunity for junior leaders to address leader

issues one to two echelons above their positions.

E-2
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

Vignette Instructor Guide (Con’t) 

e. Divide your training audience into small groups of leaders of equal rank or positions. Each group 

should discuss issues surrounding the situation presented in this vignette. In some cases, identification 

of 2d and 3rd level effects is appropriate. It may be appropriate to appoint an individual within each group 

to be responsible for guiding the group through the discussion points and analysis of the situation 

presented by the vignette. (NOTE: this is a suggestion, NOT a requirement)

f. After an appropriate time, reconvene into one large group and have a representative of each 

small group present its concept or approach for resolving the issue highlighted by the vignette and 

discuss the pros and cons of each group’s concept. Concluding large group discussions should highlight 

the leader challenges embedded in this vignette and the dynamics of developing new and innovative

solutions. The IBCT leader may use these discussions to enhance subordinates’ understanding of his

leadership style and preferences.

g. KEY TALKING POINTS. These talking points are provided to the instructor to supplement ideas

and issues addressed by the small groups in reference to the situation presented in this vignette. 

Considering the current intelligence, what additional precautions or methods could be used to

enter the building? Smoke to obscure, and blasting your way into the building requires

permission from the company commander IAW the ROE. 

What did your squad leaders decide about the sewer? One assumption could be that it is

and exit and entry point that must be covered by fire. 

Did you begin to run out of enough men to accomplish this mission to clear this building? 

Has the platoon used your IAV's to provide additional support to protect your search and 

security elements?

What other ways can you take the enemies advantage of being in a defensive posture 

awaiting your arrival? 

When do you go to the company commander with a request for additional support and 

possibly gain some MGS support to allow you more firepower and men to accomplish your

mission? 

Did your platoon adequately determine how you would employ your squads with the proper

techniques to clear rooms?

What did you decide about the entry and exit into the sewer system? 

What measures should be taken for casualty reporting? 

What roles could non-lethal assets such as a PSYOPS Loudspeaker Team play in this

situation? 

h. For the Urban MOUT mission the IBCT Platoon Leader should consider the following: 

The search element attempts to enter the building IAW ROE and commander's guidance. 

Establish an entry point where subsequent entry after departure will be difficult for locals (for

example, second story window, trap door in roof)

The entry team should emplace signal devices visible to external security and support 

elements to indicate the floor on which search team is working. 

Follow standard search procedures and develop a search pattern. 

An example of individual responsibilities are as follows: 

- Personnel scan their assigned areas during movement. (Scan area is in three 

dimensions).

- Point man checks for trip wires.

- Point man opens doors and pauses behind wall before entry. 

E-3
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

Vignette Instructor Guide (Con’t) 

- Team enters room using a high-man, low-man technique with weapon muzzles

tracking where they look. 

Detainees are brought to civil authority or interpreter to make an initial identification. 

Detainees are kept under surveillance (or guard) until civil-police, military police, or military

Intelligence personnel assume responsibility for them. Detainees are properly tagged with

circumstances or details. 

Prohibited items are initially checked for booby traps. 

Weapons are examined by knowledgeable personnel, cleared or otherwise made safe for

transportation. Properly tagged with location and recorded with serial numbers for future

reports.

Identify key items required when encountering a barricade, booby trap, trip wire, or suspected 

explosives. Some examples are as follows:

- Engineer team or explosive ordnance disposal team (preferred) is brought to site. 

- Search activity on floors above and below are suspended until demolition device is

cleared or deemed safe. 

- Search team vacates floor unless needed to provide security.

- Engineer team disables barricade piece by piece, disarms booby trap, or otherwise 

makes site safe to continue search.

When the building is announced as clear, some of your required actions are as follows:

- Platoon leader reports completion to headquarters element. 

- Building exterior marked to indicate search is complete. 

- If building was vacant, search element secures entry points. 

- Building exterior is kept under surveillance until other local search operations are 

completed.

E-4
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

ANNEX A: SOLDIER SUPPORT MATERIAL

1. Scenario: 

Today is D+ 20 and the IBCT deployed to AO Eagle in Montenegro in June, as part of a NATO

Peace Enforcement Force in response to increasing violence in that country. The leaders of Serbia want

to reunite the nation back into the Yugoslavia that it once was. The tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians

who left Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 still reside in Montenegro and are viewed by many Montenegrins as a 

drain on Montenegro’s potential prosperity. There have been an increasing number of reports of

violence against minorities in the past six months. 

Intelligence reports and interviews with local nationals indicate a major cache of arms located in

Building #41 in the village of Pljevja. Building #41 is a 3-story masonry apartment and storage building. 

There is a possibility that the building has a basement, but drawings are not available. It has working gas

and electricity devices. Original floor plans are provided at Tabs C-E, however, its current precise floor

plan is unknown. The roof is accessible by a hatch-type entry. Gunfire has been heard coming from the 

building and local residents indicate there are 10-15 personnel guarding the cache. Estimates indicate

these personnel are armed with light weapons, at least one machine gun and at least one RPG launcher. 

The Company commander sent your platoon a warning order to prepare for the mission to clear and 

secure building #41. In two hours, you are to report to the company CP and present a back brief on your

concept for this mission. 

2. Requirement: In your small groups, develop a concept plan and schematic on how to clear this

building and identify additional support required completing the mission successfully. Be prepared to reconvene back into the large group to present your solution and/or approach and discuss the pros and 

cons of each group’s approach. Some issues that each discussion group should address include but are

not limited to the following:

a. What additional guidance may you need and how will you approach Building #41? 

b. Does your current ROE enable you to conduct the mission in the “normal” manner outlined in 

FM? What changes need to be requested? What if you don’t get them? What type of search

technique would you use?

c. What platoon command and control issues will have to be resolved? 

d. How will you evacuate casualties? 

e. How did you establish your plan of room clearances? 

f. How will you be able to employ fire support? (mortars, attack helicopters, artillery)

g. How does your search element keep your security and support elements focused on your location 

and search progress?

h. What planning factors are required for detainees and possible barricades? 

i. What actions do you take if you receive fire while inside the building? 

j. How does the size and armament of the threat force impact your plan and ROE?

E-5
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

Appendix 1 to Annex A: Village Schematic 

Village of PLJEVJA

Sewer Line

N

E-6
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

Appendix 2 to Annex A: First Floor Schematic

N 

E-7
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

Appendix 3 to Annex A: Second Floor Schematic 

N

E-8
Vignette Title: Clear a Building (034)

Echelon: Infantry Platoon 

Leader Skill: Tactical

Target Audience: Platoon Level Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

Appendix 4 to Annex A: Third Floor Schematic (Storage Facility)

N

E-9
Vignette Title: Establish a Collection Point For NEO Evacuees and DPRE's (018)

Echelon: Battalion/Squadron 

Leader Skill: Conceptual 

Target Audience: Company/Troop/Battery Commanders and Platoon Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

1. 

Vignette Instructor Guide 

References 

FM 22-100, Army Leadership, Chap. 4, SUBJ: Direct Leadership Skills, pp. 4-18 Conceptual. 

FM 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, January 1996. 

ARTEP 7-94-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion, October 1989. 

FM 41-10, Civilian Affairs Operations.

Reimer Digital Training Library, at URL http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/chap212.htm

IBCT O & O, 30 June, 2000 (Final). 

IBCT SOP(s). 

IBCT Tactical References. 

2. 

3. 

Purpose. The purpose of this vignette is to support leader discussions on conceptual skills required

for creating solutions to providing care for NEO Evacuees and Displaced Persons and Refugees

(DPRE's) and Non Combatant Evacuation (NEO) personnel. 

Instructions For Leader

a. This vignette is designed to assist in the development of sound judgment, understanding decision 

parameters of the higher commander, using creative thinking in problem solving and recognizing the 

underlying short and long term issues that may impact a unit in this scenario. Small and large group

discussions should develop innovative ideas and concepts to address the “non-standard” and/or “nondoctrinal” situations surrounding the situation presented in this vignette.

b. Prior to conducting this training, familiarize yourself with the contents of this vignette and the 

listed references. As appropriate, provide your training groups copies of excerpts from those references

that you feel are especially relevant to your particular training objectives. As a minimum, have at least one 

copy of all appropriate references at your training location. You will also need to provide students copies

of the training support material contained in the annexes accompanying this vignette. 

c. Determine the training support materials you will need for your training, such as butcher paper, 

magic markers, overhead projectors, etc. and ensure that all support materials are available at the 

training location.

d. Explain the purpose of the vignette and provide copies of Annex A (Soldier Support Material), the

reference list and/or appropriate excerpts to your audience. Using an overhead projector, butcher paper, 

or chalkboard, provide the scenario to your audience. Ensure that you provide them copies of

appropriate supporting materials or that those materials are available for them to view. Read the first 

requirement to your audience, clearly stating the expected outcome(s) of their small group discussions. 

Provide the groups with start and end times for the requirement (can be adjusted if required). Issue

points designed to generate discussion on this topic are provided in the requirement paragraph. The 

instructor has the option of either assigning selected points to specific groups, pick specific points for

each group to address, or have each group address all discussion points (time available may be a factor).

Concluding large group discussions should highlight innovative concepts and/or strategies to properly

address the issues presented by this vignette. This is an excellent opportunity for junior leaders to 

address leader issues one to two echelons above their positions.

e. Divide your training audience into small groups of leaders of equal rank or positions. Each group 

should discuss issues surrounding the situation presented in this vignette. In some cases, identification of

2d and 3rd level effects is appropriate. It may be appropriate to appoint an individual within each group to 

be responsible for guiding the group through the discussion points and analysis of the situation presented

by the vignette. (NOTE: this is a suggestion, NOT a requirement)

E-10
Vignette Title: Establish a Collection Point For NEO Evacuees and DPRE's (018)

Echelon: Battalion/Squadron 

Leader Skill: Conceptual 

Target Audience: Company/Troop/Battery Commanders and Platoon Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

Vignette Instructor Guide (Con’t) 

f. After an appropriate time, reconvene into one large group and have a representative of each 

small group present its concept or approach for resolving the issue highlighted by the vignette and 

discuss the pros and cons of each group’s concept. Concluding large group discussions should highlight 

the leader challenges embedded in this vignette and the dynamics of developing new and innovative

solutions. The IBCT leader may use these discussions to enhance subordinates’ understanding of his

leadership style and preferences.

g. KEY TALKING POINTS. These talking points are provided to the instructor to supplement ideas

and discussion points addressed by the small groups related to the issues embedded within this vignette. 

An evacuation site for this type of mission consists of 11 different areas: (See more detail at

the digital training library at URL http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/chap212.htm)

Entry Control Point 

In-processing and interview station 

Security personnel area 

Battalion TOC 

Comfort area 

Medical treatment area 

Search area 

Holding and interrogation area 

Confinement facility

Local civilian authorities area 

Pet holding area 

NEO is conducted in three types of environments: Permissive, Semi-permissive and Non-permissive. 

Given the terrorist and paramilitary threat presented in this vignette, what is the environment in which 

the NEO evacuation will be conducted? 

How did the groups resolve separating the Muslims and Christians because of the current conflicts? 

Did any groups come up with a new and innovative approach in attempting to create a task

organization to support your mission? 

What issues contributed to group’s courses of action? Did groups identify operational planning

concerns which include: 

What additional resources are needed from the theater? 

Is there an Embassy evacuation plan? 

Can a safe haven location be created? 

Distance from the ISB? 

How does this situation cause you to change your SOP or TTPs? 

E-11
Vignette Title: Establish a Collection Point For NEO Evacuees and DPRE's (018)

Echelon: Battalion/Squadron 

Leader Skill: Conceptual 

Target Audience: Company/Troop/Battery Commanders and Platoon Leaders

Methodology: Seminar/Small-Group Discussion

1. 

ANNEX A: SOLDIER SUPPORT MATERIAL

Scenario:

2. 

Today is D+2 and the IBCT, as part of a multi-national force, is deployed to the country of Djibouti, 

strategically located on the northeast coast of Africa along the Red Sea. A paramilitary force has crossed 

the Ethiopian border and invaded Djibouti. This has ignited the Christians and Muslims within the city to

fighting, looting, and disrupting government services. Recent attacks against the government and local 

police forces have increased the animosity between Muslims and Christians in the country.

The IBCT current tactical mission is to conduct Non Combatant Evacuations (NEO’s) of all US

personnel and selected host nation or third-country nationals. The CENTCOM commander's intent is to

quickly secure the collection sites within the city and conduct an immediate evacuation of all personnel to

a central collection point at the airport. The roads heading north and east into the capital city of Djibouti 

are clogged with 35,000 Christian and Muslim DPRE's from the outlying areas fleeing from attacks to the

North and East. 

The IBCT commander has given your battalion the mission of establishing a consolidated collection 

point and evacuation site to provide food, shelter, processing, evacuation and/or relocation for all NEO

and DPRE personnel. The other IBCT Battalions are currently preparing to conduct their NEO evacuation 

missions and collect DPREs. Their orders are to bring the NEO evacuees and DPREs to the 

consolidated collection point at your location. Your battalion is located in an assembly area in the vicinity

of the Djibouti airport. The JTF J1 and J4 require you to coordinate your support efforts with their joint 

logistics center. The IBCT commander has requested a brief back on how you are going to establish the 

collection point to provide initial humanitarian support DPRE and NEO personnel.

Requirement. In your small group, identify and discuss the initial, subsequent and long-term

implications with the DPRE's and NEO requirements. Be prepared to re-convene back into the large 

group to present your solution and/or approach and discuss the pros and cons of each group’s approach. 

Some issues that each discussion group should address include but are not limited to the following:

a. Identify critical issues associated with completing this mission? 

b. How long can the battalion sustain support for this large group of personnel? 

c. What additional support will be required? 

d. Given this mission, what is the initial, subsequent and long-term implications? 

e. What task organization will best support this requirement? What is your recommendation to the 

IBCT commander? 

f. What are your limits and restraints for handling the NEO and DPRE personnel? 

g. How will you resolve separating Muslims and Christians DPRE's at your collection point 

requesting and seeking aid?

h. What Army values issues are raised in this scenario?

i. What ethical issues need to be identified? 

j. What training would be required for the battalion to perform this mission? 

k. How will you address requests for political asylum? How will special categories of people be 

treated (i.e. – US diplomatic personnel, foreign diplomatic personnel?)

l. What are counterintelligence considerations for the evacuation/site? How is the HUMINT cell in 

the MI Co used?

E-12
Appendix F

Acronyms 

4ID 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

AAR after action review 

ABCS Army Battle Command System

AC Active Component 

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AI artificial intelligence

ARI U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

ASAS All Source Analysis System 

AT Annual Training

ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile 

ATLDP Army Training and Leader Development Panel 

BCC Brigade Coordination Cell 

BCTP Battle Command Training Program 

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance 

CAL Center for Army Leadership

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned 

CPX Command Post Exercise 

CSS combat service support 

CSSCS Combat Service Support Control System 

CTC Combat Training Center

DO-COR Delivery Order Contracting Officer’s Representative 

DTLOMS doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier issues 

EXFOR Experimental Force 

FCS Future Combat Systems

FTX field training exercises 

IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team

IDT Inactive Duty Training

IO Information Operations 

KSA knowledge, skills, and aptitudes 

LSTP Leader Sustainment Training Program

MCS Maneuver Control System

F-1
MDMP Military Decision-Making Process 

MGS Mobile Gun System 

MSTF Mission Support Training Facility

MTP Mission Training Plan 

MTW major theater war 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

NCOES Non-Commissioned Officer Education System 

NGO Non-Governmental Organizations 

OBC Officer’s Basic Course 

OES Officer Education System

PERSCOM U.S. Army Personnel Command 

PVO Private Voluntary Organization 

QTB Quarterly Training Briefing

RC Reserve Component 

RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 

SASO stability and support operations 

SME subject matter expert 

SOP standing operating procedure 

SSC smaller-scale contingencies 

TEWT tactical exercises without troops 

TLS Training, Leader Development, and Soldier Issues

TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment 

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TSP training support package

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

WFX Warfighter Exercise 

F-2