Report of the 

Defense Science Board 

Task Force

on

 Patriot System Performance 

Report Summary

 

January 2005 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
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This report summary is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a 

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of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report 

summary do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

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1 

Introduction 

 The Defense Science Board Task Force on Patriot System Performance began 

in August 2003 and concluded in June 2004. The Terms of Reference for the Task 

Force are given in Appendix A, the Task Force Membership is in Appendix B, and the 

briefings given to the Task Force are listed in Appendix C. This is the Report Summary. 

The complete Final Report is classified. 

 The Task Force investigated the lessons learned from the Patriot system 

performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and assessed if these lessons could be 

incorporated into the continuing development of Patriot and its follow-on system, the 

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The Task Force concluded that the 

lessons can be incorporated into Patriot-MEADS. Two of the main shortfalls seen in OIF 

performance transcend just the Patriot system; they involve combat identification and 

situational awareness. 

Patriot Missile Defense 

 The Patriot role in OIF was defense against tactical ballistic missiles; it had no 

assigned air defense role, but it did have a self-defense role against anti-radiation 

missiles. The Patriot deployment was substantial, involving up to 40 U.S. fire units and 

22 fire units from four coalition nations. Two types of Patriot interceptor missiles were 

used: the improved PAC-2 missile, which is the traditional Patriot interceptor; and a new 

hit-to-kill missile, the PAC-3. Both were used with success in OIF, with the bulk of the 

engagements falling to the PAC-2. All nine enemy tactical ballistic missiles that 

threatened areas designated for Patriot defense were engaged. Eight of these 

engagements were observed by enough other sensors to conservatively declare them 

successes; the ninth engagement is judged to be a probable success. None of the 

attacking tactical ballistic missiles caused any damage or loss of life to the coalition 

forces. 

 The Patriot battalions operated reliably, and the two variants of the interceptor 

missile worked well against these Iraqi tactical ballistic missiles. One can argue that 

these relatively slow missiles which did not break up in flight like the Scuds of Desert 

Storm, were not stressing targets; however, their short range and the coalition’s goal of 

large defended footprints and high-altitude intercepts due to chemical warhead concerns 

made them somewhat stressing targets for the Patriot and their crews. 

 In an overall sense, the Task Force assessed the Patriot missile defense in OIF 

to be a substantial success. 
2 

Fratricide Incidents 

 The Patriot system was involved in three regrettable fratricide incidents. Two of 

these incidents involved Patriot firings at coalition aircraft that in one case was classified 

as an attacking anti-radiation missile and an attacking tactical ballistic missile. Three 

aircraft crew members were lost in these two incidents. The third incident involved a 

U.S. aircraft firing on a Patriot battery believed to be an enemy surface-to-air missile 

system. 

 These incidents generally involved a complex chain of events and failures, and 

there is often insufficient data to pin down the exact causes of failure. However, a 

number of shortfalls can be identified. 

 First, our combat identification capability embodied in the Mode IV IFF system 

performed very poorly. This is not exactly a surprise; this poor performance has been 

seen in many training exercises. The Task Force remains puzzled as to why this 

deficiency never garners enough resolve and support to result in a robust fix. The 

number of coalition aircraft flights in OIF was enormous, 41,000, and the Patriot 

deployment was large, 60 fire units, so the possible Patriot-friendly aircraft observations 

were in the millions and even very-low-probability failures could result in regrettable 

fratricide incidents. We have to fix Mode IV and institute additional protection measures 

such as safe return corridors for our aircraft. 

 A second shortfall was the lack of significant situational awareness in our 

combined air defense system, which involved major systems such as Patriot, AWACS, 

and AEGIS. We tend to assume that data are routinely communicated from one system 

to the other, that targets are correlated, and target information is shared and assimilated 

by all. The Task Force believes that we are a long way from that vision. The 

communication links, the ability to correlate target tracks by disparate sensors, and the 

overall information architecture are simply not there. Thus, a Patriot battery on the 

battlefield can be very much alone. Its closest connection is its Patriot battalion 

headquarters unit, and in some cases in OIF even that connection was weak. 

 The third shortfall was the Patriot system operating philosophy, protocols, 

displays, and software, which seemed to be a poor match to the conditions of OIF. The 

operating protocol was largely automatic, and the operators were trained to trust the 

system’s software; a design that would be needed for heavy missile attacks. The 30 

days of OIF involved 9 engagements of tactical ballistic missiles which were immersed in 

an environment of some 41,000 coalition aircraft sorties; a 4,000-to-1 friendly-to-enemy 

ratio. 

 The solution here will be more operator involvement and control in the 

functioning of a Patriot battery, which will necessitate changes in software, displays, and 

training. 
3 

Patriot-MEADS Development 

 The Task Force was asked to comment on the ongoing Patriot and MEADS 

programs, which recently were combined into a single program. The main question was 

– could the planned program assimilate the lessons learned in OIF? 

 The basic architecture of MEADS calls for a high degree of connectivity to other 

air and missile defense systems. This, plus the MEADS battery design with three radars 

with 360 degree coverage capability, should provide a high degree of situational 

awareness. 

 The recently combined Patriot-MEADS program plans a gradual infusion of 

MEADS software and components, so that in the 2015 era the Patriot system will have 

fully migrated to MEADS. The interceptor missile will be an improved version of the 

PAC-3. The Task Force believes this multi-year migration from Patriot to MEADS will be 

a challenging task. Adding to the challenge will be the relatively unique acquisition 

program that involves several European firms developing and producing major 

components of the MEADS system, in addition to U.S. firms. 

 During this long development-acquisition period, we need to upgrade and 

maintain our Patriot batteries, since they will be our main air and missile defense well 

into the future. 

Recommendations 

 The Task Force had recommendations in three areas. With regard to the 

fratricide incidents, we must find and fix the Mode IV IFF problem(s) and we must 

improve the situational awareness of our air defense systems. With regard to the Patriot 

system itself, we need to shift its operation and control philosophy to deal with the 

complex environments of today’s and future conflicts. These future conflicts will likely be 

more stressing than OIF and involve Patriot in simultaneous missile and air defense 

engagements. A protocol that allows more operator oversight and control of major 

system actions will be needed. 

 With regard to the Patriot migration to become MEADS, the Task Force 

recommends a conservative course where we maintain a robust Patriot system as 

MEADS components are developed, proven, and integrated into Patriot battalions. 
4 

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A-1 

Appendix A 

Terms of Reference 
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Appendix A 

Terms of Reference 
A-4 

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Appendix B 

Task Force Membership 
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Appendix B 

Task Force Membership 

Task Force Co-Chairs

GEN Michael Williams, USMC (Ret.)

Logistics Management Institute

Mr. William Delaney

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Government Advisor

Mr. Mike Eison

Army PEO-ASMD

Mr. Julian Davidson

Davidson Technology Inc

Dr. David Ebel

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Mr. Robert Everett

Consultant

Mr. Charles Fowler

Consultant

LTG David Heebner, USA (Ret.)

General Dynamics Corp.

Mr. Cliff McLain

ARES Corp.

Dr. Dennis Murray

SAIC

Dr. George Schneiter

Consultant

Task Force Members

Executive Secretary

Dr. Kent Stansberry

OSD-ATL

DSB Secretariat

CDR David Waugh

United States Navy

Task Force Support

Mr. Mike Osborn

SAIC

Mr. Chester Kurys

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Mr. Julian Davidson

Davidson Technology Inc

Dr. David Ebel

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Mr. Robert Everett

Consultant

Mr. Charles Fowler

Consultant

LTG David Heebner, USA (Ret.)

General Dynamics Corp.

Mr. Cliff McLain

ARES Corp.

Dr. Dennis Murray

SAIC

Dr. George Schneiter

Consultant

Mr. Julian Davidson

Davidson Technology Inc

Dr. David Ebel

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Mr. Robert Everett

Consultant

Mr. Charles Fowler

Consultant

LTG David Heebner, USA (Ret.)

General Dynamics Corp.

Mr. Cliff McLain

ARES Corp.

Dr. Dennis Murray

SAIC

Dr. George Schneiter

Consultant

Task Force Members

Executive Secretary

Dr. Kent Stansberry

OSD-ATL

DSB Secretariat

CDR David Waugh

United States Navy

Task Force Support

Mr. Mike Osborn

SAIC

Mr. Chester Kurys

MIT Lincoln Laboratory
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Appendix C 

 

List of Briefings 
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Appendix C 

List of Briefings 

August 26-27, 2003 

Overview of Use of Patriot in Operation Iraqi Freedom – Mr. Michael Eison, Army Air, Space & 

Missile Defense Program Executive Office 

Data Sources from OIF to Assess Patriot Performance (against threat targets and in friendly fire 

incidents) – Mr. Michael Eison, Army ASMD PE 

Overview of DoD Plans for Integrated Air and Missile Defense – Mr. David Crim, OSD/AT&L 

Army Development Plans for Combined Patriot/MEADS Program – Mr. Stan Sherrod, Army 

PEO ASMD 

Patriot Performance in OIF Against Threat Targets – Mr. Michael Eison, Army PEO ASMD 

Status of Investigation of Patriot Friendly Fire Incidents – Mr. Michael Eison, Army PEO ASMD 

Patriot “Lessons Learned” to Date – Mr. Michael Eison, Army PEO ASMD 

October 2-3, 2003 

Iraqi TBM threat review – Mr. Scott Stanfield 

Performance of Patriot and Patriot Development Program Plan to Include Response to OIF 

Lessons Learned – COL Newberry 

Overview of Patriot Volleys 2-15 – Mr. Don Adams, PEO ASMD Consultant 

Friendly Fire Brief and Patriot Operational LessonsLearned – COL Jassey 

Patriot logistics during OIF – Gifford Lee, LPTO 

Detailed Comparison of MEADS and Patriot Requirements – MAJ Robertson and Bob Clune, 

LTPO 

MEADS Risk Reduction Effort to include MEADS Architecture – MAJ Robertson, LTPO 
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October 29-30, 2003 

Army Inspector General Investigation – COL Michael Rhoden 

Air Force Friendly Fire Investigation – LtCol Bob Schwarze 

Perspective of U.S. Central Command – LtCol John Miller 

Work of Joint Air and Missile Defense Organization – JTAMDO 

Perspective of 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command – LTC David Mantiply 

Work of Single Integrated Air Picture System Engineer (SIAP SE) – CAPT Jeff Wilson 

Work of Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team – Dr. Jeff Lutz 

December 11-12, 2003 

DoD Integrated Architectures – Dr. V. Garber, OSD/AT&L 

SIAP/FIOP Industry Blue Ribbon Panel – Mr. George Smith 

Patriot Performance in OIF – Raytheon 

MEADS System Design – Lockheed Martin 

OIF Major Combat Operations – Joint Forces Command 

Patriot Performance in OIF – Mr. Larry Lewis, Center for Naval Analysis 

February 11, 2004 

Introduction and agenda for IFF discussion – CAPT Peter Riester, Naval Air Systems Command 

Mode 4 Security – Mr. Don Crossman, National Security Agency 

IFF Tutorial – Mr. Mark Cianflone, Naval Air Warfare Center 

Center for Naval Analyses Briefing – Mr. Larry Lewis, CAN 

Mode 5 Development & Performance – Mr. Mark Cianflone, Naval Air Warfare Center 
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March 3-4, 2004 

JTAMDO on Near Term Possible Improvements in SIAP/Combat Identification – Dr. Barry 

Fridling, JTAMDO 

Ban on Data In and Out of Theater & Limits in DoD Regulations on Track Correlation – Mr. Larry 

Lewis, CNA 

Additional Assessment of F/A-18 Friendly Fire Incident – Mr. Don Adams, PEO ASMD 

Training Issues for Evolution from Patriot to MEADS – COL Rob Jassey, TRADOC System 

Manager, Lower Tier 

Joint SIAP System Engineering Organization on Near Term Possible Improvements in 

SIAP/Combat Identification – CAPT Jeff Wilson, USN 

April 7, 2004 

Patriot/MEADS Program Overview – Army 

Discussion of Patriot Battle Management (software tabs, etc.) – Cliff McLain 

Review of Lessons Learned by Others (JFCOM report on OIF, JCIET brief to Task Force, Army 

Center for Lessons Learned briefing on OIF) – OSD/AT&L 
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