Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 3

Table of Contents

foreward ....................................................................................................5

editor’s Introduction..................................................................................6

russia’s transnational security:

challenges, Policies, and International cooperation

by Rouben Azizian....................................................................................21

the Perfect storm? thailand’s security Predicament

by Miemie Winn Byrd...............................................................................35

transnational security threats to Indonesia

by James R. Campbell..............................................................................48

cambodia’s transnational security challenges

by Jessica H. S. Ear.................................................................................63

us-oceania security cooperation in the Post 9/11 World:

Whose agendas and Priorities?

by Gerard A. Finin...................................................................................77

Japan’s transnational security agenda

by David Fouse ........................................................................................90

republic of Korea: meeting the challenge of

transnational threats in the twenty-first century

by Steven Kim.........................................................................................104

afghanistan at a crossroads: transnational

challenges and the new afghan state

by Kerry Lynn Nankivell ........................................................................117

transnational security challenges in India

by Rollie Lal...........................................................................................128

Perceptions of transnational security threat in malaysia and singapore:

Windows of cooperative opportunities for the united states

by Yoichiro Sato .....................................................................................140

sri lanka: transnational security and Postinsurgency Issues

by Shyam Tekwani..................................................................................154

vietnamese Perspectives on transnational security challenges

by Alexander Vuving ..............................................................................167

Published 2010 by the asia-Pacific center for security studies.

cover photo by soumik Kar

for reprint permissions, contact the editors at the

asia-Pacific center for security studies,

2058 maluhia road, honolulu, hawaii 96815.

all views expressed in the chapters of this book are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the asia-Pacific center for

security studies or those of any governmental agency.

IsBn 978-0-9719416-2-5

2 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 5

Foreward

ed smith

lieutenant general, u. s. army, retired

Director, asia–Pacific center for security studies

at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, various

transnational security challenges appear in much of the world. the

continuing challenge for security officials and others assessing what is

happening is to understand comprehensively not only the facts related to

situations at hand and anticipated ahead, but also various perspectives on

what is occurring as well as opportunities for useful collaboration and

cooperation.

to help in that regard, faculty members at the asia-Pacific center for

security studies (aPcss) have endeavored to gather in this volume a

series of perspectives from the asia-Pacific region. the resulting product

of their efforts, in the form of this collection of essays, entitled Issues for

Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges,

is intended to offer perspectives aPcss faculty have gathered from recent

travels and other intersections with diverse groups dealing with these

challenges regularly.

as you would expect the common thread is the diversity of perspectives,

leading to various strategies, policies and actions to accomplish national

objectives related to prioritized security challenges. If cooperation is to be

realized with results beneficial to all or most, a continuing exchange and

careful study of these evolving perspectives is necessary.

In support of the center’s continuing attempt to contribute to enhanced

cooperation for the common good of all, I am pleased to offer this

publication to help advance our continuing discussion of select complex

security challenges in the asia-Pacific region.

4 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 7

concept of national security to address a wide variety of transnational

security challenges that require multilateral cooperation and coordination

to resolve. concerns about global climate change, environmental

degradation, pandemics, resource scarcity, demographic shifts, terrorism

and organized crime predate the end of the cold War but have received

increasing attention as the probability of a great power nuclear conflict has

receded.

another factor contributing to the rising importance of transnational

security challenges is the increasing pace of globalization. In addition to

bringing opportunities and benefits to many of the world’s people,

globalization also has brought new risks and associated costs. for

example, modern advances in communications, transportation and

commerce that have fostered economic growth, social exchange and

political integration can also be conduits for transnational security threats.

i

sometimes referred to as the “dark side” of globalization, advances in

global integration have made it easier for those involved in illicit

trafficking, money laundering and terrorism to evade the reach of national

governments.

ii further, the global impacts of infectious disease,

environmental degradation, resource scarcity and economic distress all

have been magnified as the barriers between countries have been

lowered.

iii

for those advocating an expanded view of security, the key is not to

focus on any one particular transnational threat but rather to understand

the overlapping and interactive effects that various challenges can pose at

the individual, national and global levels. Jessica matthews, in her muchdebated 1989 Foreign Affairs article “redefining security,” argued that

unresolved issues of resource scarcity and population growth that result in

economic decline could spark domestic unrest or “make countries ripe for

authoritarian government or external subversion.”iv five years later

robert Kaplan’s controversial article, “the coming anarchy,” invoked

West africa as a symbol of “worldwide demographic, environmental and

societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real strategic

danger.” v Kaplan’s message, while certainly not universally accepted, did

help to garner additional attention for the un Development Program’s

attempt to introduce the concept of “human security” in its 1994 human

Development report. the notion that security should be conceived

globally, with the focus on individual human beings, meant “both a

horizontal extension of the parameters of security policy to include an

even larger set of problems, such as poverty, epidemics, political injustice,

Editor’s Introduction

David fouse

this introductory chapter has five specific objectives. first, it

summarizes an ongoing debate within the global security community over

what constitutes security in the world today. the aim of this discussion is

not to settle this debate, but rather to contextualize the views of security

professionals from all over the globe with regard to the emergence and/or

intensification of a wide variety of transnational security challenges.

secondly, this chapter addresses us policy toward the asia-Pacific region.

the emphasis is that regardless of where one places transnational security

issues in terms of us national security priorities, us policy currently

promotes active engagement with the asia-Pacific region, and that to

engage in a manner seen as beneficial to all parties will require careful

scrutiny of the needs and perspectives of those who live in the region. the

third objective is to discuss the unique position of the asia-Pacific center

for security studies (aPcss) as a conduit for regional security dialogue

and a filter through which asia-Pacific security priorities can be

channeled. the goal of this volume, to provide insights from our

assessment of the importance of transnational security challenges in the

national security priorities of a wide range of asia-Pacific nations, is

explained in section three. In the fourth section of this chapter, the results

of an electronic poll of aPcss alumni on the importance of a wide variety

of transnational security challenges are presented, highlighting the

significant differences that can be observed among the priorities of the

various subregions of the asia-Pacific. finally the chapter concludes with

a summary discussion of some of the crosscutting themes that emerged

from the individual country level analyses.

I. The (not so) New Security Debate

the global security community is currently involved in a wide-ranging

debate about the significance of emerging transnational security

challenges. this debate has been ongoing for more than twenty years,

receiving enhanced impetus with the end of the cold War and more

recently with the rise of international terrorism. the debate within security

circles has pitted those who continue to view traditional state-to-state

rivalry and conflict as the preeminent concern of national policymakers

against a growing chorus of voices emphasizing the need to expand the

6 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 9

toward the asia-Pacific region, with most american strategists differing in

terms of degree of emphasis, rather than the outright denial of the

importance of issues on either side.

xii

this volume does not attempt to settle this debate but rather to identify

areas of particular concern for the asia-Pacific region and, where possible,

to offer suggestions on how the united states might engage these

countries to our mutual benefit.

II. Transnational Security Challenges and US Asia Policy

the us government’s interest in transnational security challenges was

evident well before the tragic events of september 11, 2001. soon after

taking office in 1992, the clinton administration signaled its interest in

“new” security issues by creating several new offices in traditional areas

of the government. these included a national intelligence officer for

global and multilateral issues, a deputy undersecretary of defense for

environmental issues and an undersecretary for global affairs at the state

Department. the national security council also added a new Directorate

for global and environmental Issues, which attempted to integrate

environmental considerations throughout the nsc’s decision-making

process.

xiii

the clinton administration’s national security strategy (nss) of 1997

moved the issue of transnational challenges closer to the forefront of us

policy. the 1997 nss named transnational threats, including terrorism, the

illegal drug trade, illegal arms trafficking, international organized crime,

uncontrolled refugee migrations and environmental damage as “threats to

us interests” on par with regional or state-centered threats and threats

from weapons of mass destruction.

xiv however, there was often disparity

between these policy pronouncements and comparable levels of funding

and policy initiatives during a period of declining public and congressional

support for foreign engagement.

xv

clearly, the terrorist attacks on new york and Washington in

september 2001 helped to galvanize us strategic thought and resources to

combat transnational security challenges. these events moved the threat of

terrorism—and the danger of weak states that can become vulnerable to

terrorist networks—to the highest level of priority in us security policy.

xvi

the corollaries of this shift in us security priorities for us asia policy

during the Bush administration led to mixed reviews. the new emphasis

on nonstate actors as primary security concerns provided the united states

natural disasters, crime, social discrimination, and unemployment, as well

as a vertical extension of the traditional referent object of security policy

to above and below the nation-state.” vi as amitav acharya has argued,

the development of the human security concept has strong roots in the

asia-Pacific, though the emphasis in the east has tended toward “freedom

from want” whereas the West has promoted “freedom from fear”.

vii

as more researchers took an interest in a wider view of security,

assessments across the globe were carried out. alan Dupont’s East Asia

Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security, while clearly less

apocalyptic in tone than Kaplan, argued that a failure to reverse the

decline in energy, food and water sufficiency, as well as increases in hIv

transmission, drug addiction and people-smuggling, “will have

overwhelmingly negative outcomes for peace and stability in the

region.” vii

Dupont is among those who have criticized the dominant realist school

in international relations theory for focusing too narrowly on issues related

to interstate warfare. critics such as Dupont argue that because realism

puts too much emphasis on territory and national boundaries, new threats

caused by the cross-border flow of money, information, infectious diseases

and environmental degradation do not receive enough attention. critics

argue that both classical realists and contemporary neorealists view

economic vulnerabilities and strengths primarily in terms of strategic

control and war-fighting potential rather than as fundamental security

issues. Dupont, and others like him, see the need for an “extended

realism” that gives sufficient weight to the combined threat of these

challenges, not only because of the cost to individuals, but also in terms of

weakening states and increasing the tensions of interstate relations.

ix

realists and others who have a skeptical view of broadening the

concept of security often have pointed to the problems of making security

in this sense operational, emphasizing the need for governments to

prioritize among a diverse array of possible threats.

x some would argue

that the end of the cold War has been overrated; great power

confrontations are not obsolete but rather in the “down phase” of a

cyclical pattern that will eventually return. such viewpoints posit that

emerging powers and rogue states continue to challenge the international

order, and that policymakers turn attention away from these threats at

their own peril.

xi

the debate between realists and “the transnational challenges school”

is a significant aspect of current us strategic thinking and us policy

8 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 11

criminals or disease, weak states can become failed states.”xxv

secretary gates’s characterization of the united states as a “resident

power” in the asia-Pacific region during his may 2008 remarks to the

shangri-la Dialogue has been adopted by the obama administration in

symbolizing a reinvigorated us engagement strategy for the region. us

assistant secretary of state for east asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt

campbell, articulated this theme in his recent statement, “Principles of us

engagement in the asia-Pacific” during testimony before the us senate

subcommittee on east asian and Pacific affairs:

the asia-Pacific region is of vital and permanent importance to the

united states and it is clear that countries in the region want the

united states to maintain a strong and active presence. We need to

ensure that the united states is a resident power and not just a visitor,

because what happens in the region has a direct effect on our security

and well-being. over the course of the next few decades climate

change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and widespread

poverty will pose the most significant challenges to the united states

and the rest of the region. these challenges are and will continue to

be the most acute in east asia. this situation not only suggests a need

for the united states to play a leading role in addressing these

challenges, but it also indicates a need to strengthen and broaden

alliances, build new partnerships, and enhance capacity of multilateral

organizations in the region. fundamental to this approach will be

continued encouragement of china’s peaceful rise and integration into

the international system. a forward-looking strategy that builds on

these relationships and us strengths as a democracy and a Pacific

power is essential to manage both regional and increasingly global

challenges.

xxvi

the obama administration’s first year has seen a number of high-level

diplomatic visits to the region, including President obama’s visit to

singapore in november 2009 to convene the first us-asean summit

meeting. secretary of state clinton’s first diplomatic trip was to asia, and

she attended the 14th asean summit in thailand from 28 february to 1

march 2009. very early in his administration President obama appointed a

special representative for afghanistan and Pakistan, emphasizing the need

for diplomatic solutions to the complex problems plaguing this region.

the administration’s decision to sign the treaty of amity and cooperation

in July 2009 has been well received in southeast asia and should allow

and major powers such as china and russia (both having their own

reasons to be concerned with the terrorist threat) with a stabilizing

framework from which to engage each other despite deep differences over

many other strategic concerns.

xvii at the same time, some us allies in the

region grew concerned that us preoccupation with counterterrorism was

resulting in inadequate attention to regional security dynamics, including

the pace of chinese military modernization.

xviii

the designation of southeast asia as a “second front” in what was

then described as the “war on terror,” in conjunction with a new awareness

of china’s growing influence in the region, led to what catherine Dalpino

has described as “a modest renaissance in us bilateral relations with

southeast asia.”xix the focus on increased intelligence cooperation, new

economic and military assistance, and expanded military-to-military ties

between the united states and certain southeast asian countries, while

significant, was not enough to overcome the view in some quarters that

southeast asian concerns and regional developments were being

overshadowed by us preoccupation with the middle east.

xx additionally,

major initiatives developed by the Bush administration to enhance

economic and trade relations with southeast asia, including the

association of southeast asian nations (asean) cooperation Plan, the

enterprise for asean Initiative, the asean-us enhanced Partnership,

and the us-asean trade and Investment framework agreement, were

sometimes viewed as reactions to improvements in china-asean

relations.

xxi the sense of marginalization felt by some in southeast asia

was fostered when secretary of state condoleezza rice decided not to

attend the 2005 and 2007 annual meetings of the asean regional forum

and when a us-asean summit was canceled in 2007.

xxii

In her recent “remarks on regional architecture in asia: Principles

and Priorities,” secretary of state clinton indicated that the failure of the

united states to participate in these annual meetings demonstrated “a lack

of respect and a willingness to engage.”xxiii the obama administration has

indicated that it intends to actively engage the region over a wider variety

of issues, dealing both with traditional interstate rivalries and a “range of

diverse, unconventional threats that transcend national borders.”xxiv

secretary of Defense robert gates articulated the us position at the may

2009 shangri-la Dialogue, stating: “It has become clear in just the last two

decades that “security” encompasses more than just military

considerations. an economic crisis can become a security crisis. a lack of

good governance can undermine order and stability. under pressure from

10 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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may influence the changing security environment of the region and us

relationships (including alliances and strategic partnerships) in the asiaPacific region during coming years, providing us policymakers with upto-date insights for engaging countries on issues of significant concern

across the region.

the first step in the research for this project was carried out in June–

July of 2009. During this period aPcss conducted an online survey of its

alumni regarding their views on the most pressing transnational challenges

in their own countries as well as the best means for addressing these

issues. the results of this survey (discussed below) were then distributed

to aPcss faculty authors as background for writing the individual country

analyses. over the summer of 2009 most of the faculty authors then

traveled to the region to conduct face-to-face interviews with government

officials and subject matter experts in countries covered in this volume,

supplementing the information they have gained through their day-to-day

contact with asia-Pacific security practitioners and analysts here at the

center. the chapters that follow represent the culmination of this process.

IV. Alumni Survey Results

the aPcss electronic survey of its alumni base on “transnational

security challenges” was carried out from June–July 2009. some two

hundred of our alumni, composed primarily of mid-level government

officials, law enforcement and military officers from forty-six nations in

the asia-Pacific region, responded to the survey.

xxix the tables below

provide a look at the survey results across the various subregions,

highlighting the differences and commonalities in the perceived security

priorities of the asia-Pacific.

Table 1 Framing Questions

as table 1 indicates, northeast asia is the only subregion where

interstate security is the top concern. as discussed in chapters by azizian

on russia, fouse on Japan and Kim on south Korea, northeast asian

security priorities still lie in the area of traditional state rivalries, although

transnational challenges have been integrated into security strategy at

varying levels. table one also indicates that internal security is the highest

priority in both south and southeast asia, followed by concerns over

transnational security challenges. chapters by vuving on vietnam and

the united states to attend meetings of the east asia summit.

as for concrete initiatives for engaging the region, the obama

administration hosted the first us-china strategic and economic Dialogue

in July 2009 with follow-up discussions planned for 2010. also in July

2009 the united states launched an initiative that creates a formal

partnership between the mississippi river commission and the mekong

river commission, a cooperative management organization involving

thailand, laos, cambodia and vietnam.

xxvii

one of the central aims of this volume is to point in the direction of

further possibilities “for america to enhance, deepen, and sustain our

engagement to seize opportunities and minimize risk.”xxviii

III. Goals and Methods

the asia-Pacific center for security studies maintains a constant and

continuing dialogue with government officials, security practitioners and

subject matter experts of the asia-Pacific region over a wide range of

security issues through its in-house educational programs, outreach

activities and research. through our research and publications program we

seek to ensure that the insights derived from this dialogue are conveyed to

policymakers in the united states and in the asia-Pacific region.

this volume attempts to bolster our efforts in this regard by

identifying the major transnational security challenges facing ten asiaPacific countries, oceania and afghanistan, a country that has had a large

effect on the region. authors in this volume were asked to answer a

number of questions, including: What are the most significant

transnational security challenges facing this country? how do

transnational security challenges stack up against traditional security

threats for the country’s security planners? What steps has the country

taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally to cope with these

challenges? What are the most important “next steps” for this country to

take? are the transnational security challenges this country faces of any

consequence for the united states? Is the country in question interested in

engaging with the united states to deal with these issues?

each author was asked to discuss the governmental priorities in the

country under study with respect to transnational security challenges and

to assess whether these priorities and the resources applied sufficiently

address the threats posed by these issues today. In this context aPcss

faculty authors explored how emerging transnational security challenges

12 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 15

terrorism remains a significant concern in southern asia.

oceania, not surprisingly, was the subregion most concerned with the

issue of climate change, given that the very existence of some island states

has been called into question by the rise of ocean levels. nevertheless,

strong majorities of the alumni respondents in each subregion view

climate change as at least fairly important.

sharp differences in opinion can be found with regard to the threat

posed by infectious diseases such as acquired immune deficiency

syndrome (aIDs), severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars), the avian

flu and malaria. although majorities in each subregion view this issue as

fairly important, we see that the intensity of this concern is much stronger

in both southeast asia and oceania, where 53.9 and 50 percent,

respectively, saw the issue as very important.

Table 3 Transnational Crime

table 3 demonstrates that the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and

human beings raises the highest level of concern in southeast asia. ear’s

chapter on cambodia illustrates the continuing need for international

support for initiatives that foster local empowerment in these areas.

northeast asian alumni ranked their concerns on these issues significantly

lower, especially with regard to weapons trafficking. the high level of

concern of our oceania alumni with regard to money laundering may

come as a welcome surprise to those involved in countering the financing

Byrd on thailand discuss this tendency among southeast asian countries

to focus on the maintenance of domestic stability, which can sometimes

undermine the ability of these governments to confront other emerging

challenges. our alumni in oceania rated transnational security challenges

as their number one security priority, followed closely by internal security.

table one also indicates that our alumni have diverse views regarding

how to most effectively deal with transnational security challenges,

whether global, regional or subregional. northeast asian alumni do appear

to favor a regional (asia-Pacific) approach, while there is slightly more

emphasis on finding a subregional approach among the south asian

alumni respondents. each of the subregions indicates a strong interest in

working with the united states to deal with transnational security

challenges. oceania, the subregion with the fewest resources of its own,

demonstrates the greatest interest.

Table 2 High-Profile Transnational Issues

alumni rankings of three transnational security challenges that have

received significant media attention in recent years are listed in table two.

this table indicates that there is a great deal of variation across the

subregions in terms of the gravity of concern regarding terrorism, climate

change, and infectious diseases. While strong majorities of our alumni

respondents in south asia, southeast asia and oceania view terrorism as

“very important,” only 17 percent of our northeast asia alumni felt the

same about this issue. tekwani’s chapter on sri lanka demonstrates that

despite the government’s recent victory over the tamil tigers, the threat of

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Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 17

the only asia-Pacific subregion to identify piracy as at least fairly

important is southeast asia, where concerns over the malacca straits have

been prominent. sato’s chapter on singapore and malaysia illustrates that

even within southeast asia, concerns about piracy and other transnational

challenges can vary widely. table three also indicates that a majority of

our alumni view cybercrime as at least fairly important, although south

asian alumni are yet to be completely convinced on this issue.

Table 4 Resource Scarcity

table 4 displays the results with regard to resource scarcity issues

(food, water and energy). here south asian alumni consistently

demonstrate the strongest concerns, although alumni from southeast asia

also place high importance on these issues. energy scarcity is the one

issue majorities in all of the subregions, including northeast asia, see as at

least fairly important, although even here south asians show the strongest

concerns. lal’s chapter on India highlights the manner in which south

asia’s lack of environmental resources is currently fueling tensions

between states in this subregion.

of terrorism. as finin points out in his chapter, the leadership in these

countries has faced difficult tradeoffs between meeting the concerns of the

international community and providing economic sustenance for their

people. oceania alumni also register very high levels of concern on the

issue of illegal fishing, with substantial concern registered from our

alumni in southeast asia as well. campbell’s chapter on Indonesia

discusses how environmental crimes like illegal fishing, illegal logging

and illegal wildlife trade outrank concerns over terrorism.

16 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 19

i

see Paul stares, “Introduction,” in Paul stares ed., The New Security Agenda: A Global

Survey. (tokyo and new york: Japan center for International exchange, 1998):12.

ii

see moisés naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the

Global Economy (new york: Doubleday, 2005).

iii

see, for example, thomas homer-Dixon, “on the threshold: environmental changes as

causes of acute conflict,” International Security vol. 16, no. 2, 1991.

iv

Jessica matthews, “redefining security,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2, 1989: 162–177.

v

robert D. Kaplan, “the coming anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 273, no. 2, 1994:

44–76.

vi

stares, “Introduction,” p. 15.

vii

amitav acharya, “human security: east versus West”, International Journal, vol. lvI,

no. 3 (summer 2001): 442-460.

viii

alan Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security (cambridge:

cambridge university Press, 2001), p. 243.

ix

Ibid., pp. 3–11.

x

stephen Walt, “the renaissance of security studies,” International Studies Quarterly vol.

35, no. 2, 1991: 211–39.

xi

John mearshimer, “Disorder restored,” in graham ellison and gregory t. treverton,

eds., Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, (new york: W.

W. norton, 1992).

xii

see Kurt campbell, nirav Patel, and vikram singh, “the Power of Balance in iasia,”

center for a new american century, 11 June 2008: 60. available online at:

www.cnas.org/files/documents/.../CampbellPatelSingh_iAsia_June08.pdf.

xiii

ann m. florini and P. J. simmons, “north america,” in Paul stares, ed., The New

Security Agenda: A Global Survey (tokyo and new york: Japan center for International

exchange, 1998):62.

xiv

Ibid., p. 61.

xv

Ibid., p. 63.

xvi

see the Bush administration’s national security strategy of 2002, available online at:

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.

xvii

see shirley Kan, “us-china counter-terrorism cooperation: Issues for us Policy,”

CRS Report for Congress, may 12, 2005. available online at:

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/rs21995.pdf.

V. Summary Thoughts on Crosscutting Themes

the chapters in this volume analyze security priorities at the individual

country level and gauge each country’s attempts at bilateral and

multilateral security cooperation on transnational security challenges. our

intention is to provide policymakers and other government officials with a

useful and convenient reference tool to draw upon to engage specific

countries in the asia-Pacific region. as shown in the survey results

discussed above, security priorities across the various subregions can vary

widely, making it hard to pinpoint crosscutting themes that fit the region

as a whole.

xxx

Despite the difficulty in categorizing all of the asia-Pacific under a

single framework, several themes that emerge from these analyses are

noteworthy. northeast asia, as stated above, is an outlier among the other

subregions where internal and transnational security issues receive

paramount importance. nevertheless, in russia, Japan and south Korea,

where traditional interstate security issues predominate, each country has

adopted policies that allow it to play an international role in helping to

resolve transnational security challenges. furthermore, the bilateral

relationships between these economically powerful countries and the

united states influence their willingness to confront cross-border

challenges. more broadly, we see that us security priorities can differ

significantly with those of many asia-Pacific countries (see especially

chapters covering oceania, Indonesia and malaysia), and that the

willingness of the united states to engage these concerns will impact the

response on us concerns.

the research for this book was conducted during a period of deep

financial crisis. many of the chapters depict the additional burden that

economic turmoil has placed upon already beleaguered states to provide

basic services to their people, no less carry out the tasks of securing

porous borders and initiating governmental reforms necessary to bringing

whole-of-government approaches to complex security challenges. several

states covered in this volume, including thailand, sri lanka, and vietnam,

have prioritized domestic or regime stability to such an extent that

transnational challenges are not receiving sufficient attention. us

policymakers are urged to find ways to work with these governments to

prevent negative outcomes that would threaten long-term stability in

the region.

18 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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Russia’s Transnational Security:

Challenges, Policies, and International Cooperation

rouben azizian

Key Findings

• the major innovation of russia’s new security strategy, adopted

in may 2009, is its departure from a narrow interpretation of

national security as a military or geopolitical concept. a wide

variety of factors, including the broad gap between the country’s

rich and poor, the level of unemployment and the state of the

country’s health and education, have now been framed as

fundamental components of russia’s national security.

• russia’s security strategy does not prioritize the country’s

transnational security challenges. It does, however, emphasize the

vital importance of protecting the country and its people against

terrorism, ethnic and religious extremism, and international crime,

especially drug trafficking.

• Demographic decline and international migration are perceived as

high priorities, although these topics are discussed less openly in

view of their diplomatic sensitivity affecting the high-priority

relations with former soviet republics and china.

• russia has shown interest and willingness to advance cooperation

with other countries—first of all its neighbors—on transnational

challenges. however, the level of such cooperation remains

limited. limitations derive from the high levels of corruption

within russia’s security sector, legislative deficiencies in russia,

the weak legal basis for russia’s bilateral cooperation on

transnational issues, as well as a lack of trust and confidence in

her relations with neighboring countries.

• us-russia cooperation on transnational challenges has been

uneven and reflective of disruptive bilateral relations in the past

few years. after a brief period of intensive dialogue and

collaboration on counterterrorism measures following 9-11,

the bilateral cooperation has been sporadic.

xviii

this issue was raised on numerous occasions during author interviews with Japanese

security analysts.

xix

catherine Dalpino, “group think: the challenge of us-asean relations,” in

America’s Role in Asia: Asian and American Views (san francisco: the asia foundation,

2008): 231.

xx

alice Ba, “systemic neglect: a reconsideration of us southeast asia Policy.”

Contemporary Southeast Asia (December 2009): 376.

xxi

Ibid., p. 379.

xxii

Ibid., p. 378.

xxiii

secretary of state hillary rodham clinton, “remarks on regional architecture in asia:

Principles and Priorities,” east-West center, honolulu, January 12, 2010.

xxvi

secretary of Defense robert m. gates’s remarks for the 8th IIss asia security summit

(shangri-la Dialogue), 30 may 2009. xxv

Ibid.

xxvi

Kurt campbell, us assistant secretary of state for east asian and Pacific affairs,

“Principles of us engagement in the asia-Pacific,” testimony before the subcommittee on

east asian and Pacific affairs senate foreign relations committee, Washington Dc, 21

January 2010.

xxvii

Ivan Boekelheide, “engaging asean: us Policy in southeast asia,” stimson

Publications available online at: http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=%20908.

xxviii

Kurt campbell, “Principles of us engagement in the asia-Pacific.”

xxix

for details on survey methodology please contact David fouse at foused@apcss.org.

xxx

Barry Buzan first documented this disparity among what he termed the “security

complexes” of the region in his seminal work People, States and Fear: The National

Security Problem in International Relations (chapel hill, north carolina: university of

north carolina Press, 1983).

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Major Transnational Security Challenges

russia’s security strategy does not prioritize the country’s

transnational security challenges. It does, however, emphasize the vital

importance of protecting the country and its people against terrorism,

ethnic and religious extremism, and international crime, especially drug

trafficking.

the public relations center of russia’s federal security service (fsB)

states in its 2008 annual report that “the possibility of infiltration of the

territory of the russian federation by international terrorists remains the

main destabilizing factor, which creates a direct threat to the national

security and interests of the russian federation in the border area.” there

is, however, little evidence that such infiltration is happening at a

significant scale: the majority of extremist and terrorist acts in russia are

organized and executed by homegrown groups.

at the same time, some well-known and highly disturbing challenges like

demographic decline and international migration did not receive due

prominence in the new security strategy. reticence on these issues has in

part to do with their foreign policy sensitivity, especially relations with the

former soviet republics and china. In closed meetings and private

conversations, however, the demographic situation is portrayed as one of

russia’s greatest challenges.

Demographic Security

according to a recent united nations report (released in april 2008),

russia’s population could drop from about 142 million today to 131

million by 2025, due to alcohol, smoking and poor diet. this demographic

decline has serious economic consequences: there will be as many as eight

million fewer people in the work force by 2015 and possibly nineteen

million fewer by 2025. sergei mironov, speaker of russia’s federation

council (senate), believes that the most serious social problem in russia

today is the demographic crisis, and that if russia does not solve it, russia

will cease to exist as a nation. It is clear from statements by political

leaders that the government is aware of the problem and the serious threat

that it poses to future economic growth and security as the country’s

workforce shrinks. What also is clear, according to demographers and

public health experts, is that the government has not made enough effort to

identify the root of the problem or to measure whether extant policies to

address the demographic crisis are really helping. although some financial

• since President obama took office, the united states and russia

have tried a fresh start. at the July 2009 summit in moscow, the

united states and russia made concrete commitments to deepen

security cooperation, pledging to work together to defeat violent

extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of

piracy and narcotics trafficking. one concrete result of the summit

was russia’s agreement to allow the united states to transport its

military personnel and equipment across russia in support of the

north atlantic treaty organization (nato)-led International

security assistance force and the coalition forces in afghanistan.

Introduction: Russia’s Security Perceptions

on 12 may 2009, russia adopted a new national security strategy

projected until 2020. the key innovation of the third post-soviet iteration

of russia’s security strategy is its departure from a narrow interpretation

of national security as a military or geopolitical concept. russia has

traditionally relied on a “hard-power” vocabulary when constructing its

doctrines and strategies, which led to a much greater emphasis on the

needs of the military-industrial complex than that of civil society.

But in an era of global interdependence, national security is no longer

simply a question of military strength or economic indicators, but also

many other factors such as demographic strength, the quality of human

resources and the quality of life. all of these factors find a prominent spot

in russia’s new national security strategy. the new document

acknowledges that a state’s social, economic and humanitarian conditions

are no less important for providing security than the size of its army.

factors such as the wide gap between the country’s rich and poor, the level

of unemployment and the condition of health and education are included

as fundamental components of russia’s national security.

i

the new russian security strategy, however, continues to distinguish

between external and internal threats and does not specifically use the

term “transnational security.” transnational security threats are considered

within the concepts of state and public security (as opposed to national

defense). they are also often referred to as nontraditional threats. finally,

the russian concept of transboundary threats is quite broad and covers

many transnational security challenges.

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believe the number to be closer to three million when unregistered cases

are considered. eighty percent of infected people in russia are under the

age of thirty. a combination of young people being infected and an aging

population is resulting in a decreasing workforce and population; if left

unchecked, this trend will have a significant economic impact by the

year 2020.

iii

after the breakup of the soviet union and the formation of the

independent soviet states, hIv was a low-priority issue. With the

emphasis on the newly independent russian federation, hIv agencies

commanded little importance and even less funding. Poor networking

among the few hIv organizations that existed resulted in an inadequate

flow of information between the agencies. russian medical professionals

received very little training on how to recognize and treat hIv and

related illnesses.

today in russia, things have not improved much. hIv is a growing

problem for many of the same reasons as when it began twenty years ago.

the russian government has vowed to commit more resources and

attention to the hIv problem. yet, little progress is being made. hIv

education is inadequate, and the societal perception—despite strong

evidence to the contrary—remains that the problem affects only drug

addicts and homosexuals.

Illegal Migration

after the collapse of the soviet union, russia experienced a major

immigration boom. millions of ethnic russians found life in newly

independent post-soviet states politically uncomfortable, while millions of

non-russians experienced major ethnic and economic upheavals

prompting them to move to russia for a better life.

Because of the difficulties of tracking illegal migrants and the complex

registration system for those entering the country legally, it is statistically

not very clear how many people move to russia annually. however,

according to Konstantin romodanovsky, who heads russia’s federal

migration service, more than twenty million migrants enter russia each

year as part of a post-soviet “migration boom.” of these, half are in the

country illegally.

there is only one state program aimed at attracting russian-speaking

people from former soviet republics into the country, but to be eligible for

russian citizenship and financial benefits, potential immigrants have to

incentives have been created to help couples have more children, a much

more comprehensive approach is necessary. the un report cautioned that

the government’s demographic policy would fall far short of its goal of

stabilizing a rapid decrease in the country’s population. the situation in

the russian far east is particularly disturbing, with the already tiny

population of seven to eight million people living on this vast landmass

shrinking by approximately one hundred thousand people every year.

Health Security

russia is one of the few countries in the world where life expectancy

has declined since the 1960s. In 2006, the life expectancy for russian men

was 60.6 years, about fifteen years lower than that of most developed

countries. the number for women is higher, at 73.1, but still almost ten

years below that of most developed countries.

ii

experts agree that a large share of early deaths in russia, particularly

among men, is preventable. cardiovascular diseases account for 55

percent of all deaths, four times the rate in Western europe.

reducing the death rate among the working-age population by 38

percent by 2025 is one of the government’s targets, with the ultimate goal

of raising average life expectancy to seventy-five years—the current

figure for mexico.

over the past two decades, state spending on healthcare has, however,

remained meager, and the population has failed to develop healthier

lifestyles.

most demographers agree that the russian government needs to find

ways to lower alcohol consumption, particularly the abuse of cheap, lowquality alcohol that kills thousands every year. annual alcohol-related

deaths averaged about 426,000 over the past twenty years, representing

almost 30 percent of deaths among men and 17 percent for women.

studies show that mortality rates have risen or fallen in tandem with

alcohol consumption rates in the country, and both rose in the 1990s.

HIV in Russia

russia has the fastest growing human immunodeficiency virus (hIv)

rate in the world, with new cases doubling every twelve months. russia

represents two-thirds of all hIv cases in eastern europe and central asia.

While the number of “registered” cases is three hundred thousand, experts

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Human Trafficking

russia is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women,

and children trafficked for various forms of exploitation.

men and women from the russian far east are trafficked to china,

Japan, the middle east, and south Korea for purposes of sexual

exploitation, debt bondage, and forced labor, including in the agricultural

and fishing industries. moscow and st. Petersburg are destination centers

for children trafficked within russia and from ukraine and moldova for

purposes of sexual exploitation and forced begging. the International

labor organization of the united nations reports that an estimated one

million illegal migrant workers may be victims of labor trafficking in

russia. the government of the russian federation does not fully comply

with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it

is making significant efforts to do so.

v

russian legislation on human trafficking is ill-equipped to tangle with

highly adaptable operators who use the country as a major source, transit

and destination country for the trade in human beings. human trafficking

is seen by russian legislators as primarily transnational and being about

the sexual exploitation of women and children, when in fact trafficking for

both internal and international labor exploitation is the most common form

in russia, according to a report funded by the canadian government and

supported by six united nations agencies and the International

organization of migration (Iom). laborers are moved or migrate to cities

from poorer regions within russia and from former soviet republics now

comprising the commonwealth of Independent states (cIs).

vi russia

needs to develop a comprehensive national strategy that acknowledges the

gravity of russia’s multifaceted human trafficking problem and allocates

adequate resources to address deficiencies in victim assistance.

Transnational Terrorism

along with drug trafficking, smuggling, and mass migration, the threat

of transnational extremist penetration into russia is one of the strongest

arguments for the securitization of russian border policy. In some cases

militants and extremists have been discovered among those trying to enter

russia (both legally and illegally) from neighboring countries. some of

these extremists have cooperated with chechen separatists and even made

preparations for terrorist activities. such activity was registered mostly

across russia’s border with azerbaijan and georgia, where illegal centers

settle in remote and sparsely populated areas, like the far east. the

program, which focuses on these “fellow countrymen” was established by

then-President vladimir Putin in June 2006 and was scheduled to kick into

action in 2007. viktor Ivanov, the Putin aide appointed to oversee the

program, promised in an interview with german newspaper Die Welt in

2006 that the country was ready to welcome the twenty-five million ethnic

russians living in other former soviet republics.

so far, however, the results have been very modest. according to a

source in the federal migration service, in 2007 only 2,100 immigrants

were resettled in russia as part of this program. the challenges are even

more severe for potential immigrants who are not ethnic russians.

Isolation, the lack of social infrastructure, xenophobia and salary

discrimination all make life for immigrants difficult.

The Chinese are Coming ...

If the russian press is to be believed, a massive influx of chinese into

siberia and the russian far east is turning the area “yellow,” and russia is

about to lose its easternmost provinces. russia’s far eastern federal

District—a huge area covering 6,215,900 square kilometers—has only

seven million inhabitants, and that is down from nine million in 1991. the

population is declining rapidly as factories are closing down and military

installations have been withdrawn.

across the border, china’s three northeastern provinces—heilongjiang,

Jilin and liaoning—are home to one hundred million people, and the area

has an unusually high unemployment rate. many chinese cross the border

with russia legally and illegally for work opportunities. officially, forty

thousand chinese live more or less permanently in the russian far east,

but the actual figure is believed to be much higher. russians call it a

“creeping occupation” by the chinese.

iv

moscow has tightened border control. however, due to corruption

among immigration and customs authorities, it has not been very effective.

more importantly, russia does not have a clear immigration policy that

could encourage legal migration to its under populated far east. Ideally,

however, the local russians should be offered enough incentives not to

move to european russia.

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convenient tools for maintaining their own authority. even traditional

Islam has become politicized in the caucasus, and in chechnya the

mosque serves as the center of political indoctrination for the republic’s

youth.

vii

the republics across the north caucasus are experiencing an acute

demodernization. the region is extremely weak. It has few elements of a

modern economy, and the system of middle school and secondary

education has practically collapsed. emigration is growing, which in turn

is causing tensions in neighboring regions of russia. the problems in the

region have definitely become one of moscow’s biggest challenges.

Drug Trafficking

activities related to illegal movement of narcotic substances across

the border and organizing channels of illegal migration by cross-border

criminal groups continue to pose a serious threat to russia’s security.

the russian-Kazakh section of the border presently remains the main

barrier along the drug trafficking route from afghanistan and the central

asian region to russia. During the past two years alone, about 40

percent of the total volume of narcotic substances seized by border

guards was seized on the border with Kazakhstan in close cooperation

with Kazakh border guards.

viii

currently, law enforcement structures are able to intercept only a

paltry share of the drugs coming into russia. Between 1,000 and 1,500

kilograms of heroin is arrested at russia’s borders annually. Based on

conservative expert assessments that russia’s estimated one million heroin

addicts consume on average 0.5 grams daily, the effectiveness of russia’s

border protection system against heroin trafficking may be estimated at no

more than 0.7 percent.

ix

President Dmitry medvedev called a special meeting of the security

council on 8 september 2009 where he declared drug abuse among young

people a threat to national security and ordered the government to craft a

program against illegal drugs that introduced tougher penalties for drugrelated crimes. medvedev said the number of drug users has shot up by

nearly 60 percent over the past decade to an estimated two to two and a

half million, or 2 percent of the population. two-thirds are under the age

of thirty. he said longer prison sentences should be handed down to

people who deal drugs to minors, as well as for organized drug traffickers

and corruption related to trafficking. victor Ivanov, chief of the federal

supporting chechen militants worked, and sometimes in territories near

the russia-Kazakhstan border.

some observers perceive the mere presence of chechen communities

in some Kazakh and russian borderland districts, in conjunction with

russia’s overall illegal migration from traditionally muslim non-cIs

countries—as a phenomenon connected a priori with transborder

extremism.

Violent Extremism in the North Caucasus

the russian government has been caught off guard by a spike in

violence in the north caucasus over the past few months. after canceling

antiterrorist operations in chechnya, the authorities were convinced that

the situation there had stabilized.

It is clear, however, that the picture is far less rosy. It has become

obvious that the number of insurgents in the north caucasus—primarily in

Ingushetia, chechnya and Dagestan—is greater than official figures have

stated and that they have deep reserves and the ability to operate at a fairly

professional level.

What started as the Kremlin’s attempt to “chechenize” the conflict in

the republic—that is, to convert it into a domestic struggle rather than one

between russian troops and local forces—has now turned into a

“Kadyrovization” of the problem, with all of its numerous drawbacks. as

a result, moscow is becoming increasingly annoyed with chechen

President Kadyrov’s absolutism and the way his strong loyalty to the

Kremlin is coupled with attempts to transform chechnya into something

bordering on an independent state. the russian government is facing a

dilemma about what to do next. on one hand, the direct application of

force is no longer effective.

sending federal forces to the region evokes hostility among local

people and only escalates tensions. on the other hand, it is unrealistic and

even dangerous to give full authority to local officials to solve their own

problems, given the widespread lack of trust they have among the people.

In the meantime, the population of the north caucasus continues to

live according to its own laws. Blood feuds are on the rise again, and

Islam is playing an increasingly central role in regulating social relations.

religion has become politicized from two sides. first, jihad remains a

standard rallying cry for the muslim opposition. second, secular

authorities frequently appeal to Islamic leaders, viewing them as

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depends, however, to a considerable degree on the factor of reciprocity.

for example, russia has been urging the united states to give up double

standards when dealing with terrorist movements, implying especially the

lack of Western support for russia’s campaign in chechnya. In the

absence of such support, moscow has demonstrably maintained close

contacts with hamas, which is identified by the united states as terrorist

organization. as a long-term solution to religious extremism and

terrorism, russia emphasizes the need to protect religion and national

cultures from the destructive impact of extremism and forge a “respectful

dialogue” among religions and civilizations.

In regional terms, russia would like the un’s counter-terrorism

committee to build up practical cooperation with regional organizations,

including the cIs, the collective security treaty organization (csto),

and the sco.

Combating Drug Trafficking

the russian federation has been contributing to international antidrug

cooperation. It has signed bilateral agreements with various countries

ranging from south america to thailand. multilaterally, russia has been

particularly active in the cIs and the sco. on 17 June 2004, during the

organization’s summit in tashkent, sco member states signed the

agreement on cooperation in the fight against Illicit Drug trafficking.

the struggle against the threat of drugs occupies one of the central

places in the agenda of the central asian cooperation organization, of

which russia became a full-fledged member on 18 october 2004.

given that moscow considers afghanistan the main source of the

narco-threat for russia, it has suggested the need for an international

strategy—including economic, social and law enforcement measures in

afghanistan and beyond—to fight afghan drug trafficking. In particular,

moscow advocates the creation and strengthening of “antidrug security

belts” round the periphery of afghanistan’s borders and those of the nextdoor states. the chief goal of this initiative is to put a stop to the outward

flow of afghan drugs and the inward stream of chemical substances that

are precursors for the production of heroin. this is perceived not as a

sanitary cordon but rather a collaborative scheme that will operate only

with cooperation between the afghan government, the international

military forces in afghanistan and the neighboring states.

xii

the russian federation has offered assistance to afghan antidrug

Drug control service, posited several ideas on how to fight the drug

problem, such as compulsory testing of school and university students, a

ban on drug abusers from occupying certain jobs and driving cars, and the

compulsory treatment of drug users convicted of minor crimes.

x

Transnational Security Cooperation

russia has shown interest and willingness to advance cooperation

with other countries—first of all its neighbors—on transnational

challenges. however, the level of such cooperation remains limited.

Barriers to this cooperation include the high level of corruption within

russia’s security sector, legislative deficiencies, the weak legal basis for

russia’s bilateral cooperation on transnational issues, as well as a lack of

trust and confidence in her relations with neighboring countries. the cIs

has adopted numerous decisions on transnational security cooperation

between its members, but very few measures are working. for example,

since 2004, when russia approached the cIs countries to conclude

bilateral agreements on countering illegal migration, only ukraine has

agreed to the proposal.

xi

In russia’s relations with china, despite a proclaimed strategic

partnership, the level of trust on demographic issues remains problematic.

russia’s cooperation on transnational security with other northeast asian

countries also is lagging. for example, according to numerous

publications in the russian media, the criminal groups of russia and Japan

have been collaborating much more effectively on illegal fishing than have

law-enforcement agencies from their respective countries.

at the multilateral level, russia has been most active in pursuing a

common agenda on counterterrorism and drug trafficking.

Countering Terrorism

russia’s international strategy on fighting terrorism was most

comprehensively articulated by foreign minister sergey lavrov in his

article “"In the face of a common threat,” Diplomatic yearbook–2004,

russian Diplomatic academy.

this article calls upon members of the international community to

assume collective responsibility for fighting terrorism and act

multilaterally to advance the relevant international norms. russia’s

willingness to genuinely engage in anti-terrorist multilateral cooperation

30 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 33

as well as the coalition forces in afghanistan. this agreement adds

flexibility and further diversifies crucial supply routes, resulting in a

potential savings of up to us$133 million in fuel, maintenance, and other

transportation costs. the significance of this contribution to us efforts to

bring about peace and stability to afghanistan, which also is of strategic

benefit to russia, should not be understated.

xiii

Washington and moscow also agreed to strengthen cooperation in

nonstrategic areas. for example, the united states and russia took steps to

build cooperation in public health, which may include strengthening work

between us and russian scientific research institutions on hIv/aIDs and

tuberculosis and prevention and treatment of cardiovascular disease.

finally, President obama and President medvedev recognized the

need for a more structured foundation for advancing cooperation in key

areas across respective interagencies. the newly formed Bilateral

Presidential commission—to be chaired by the two presidents and led by

secretary clinton and foreign minister lavrov—will provide a

mechanism for sustaining and expanding on the progress achieved in

moscow, while also providing a forum in which the united states and

russia can work together effectively to narrow differences.

i

fyodor lukyanov, “a Positive but confusing security strategy,” Moscow Times, 20 may

2009.

ii

Interfax News Agency, 17 march 2008.

iii

mark cichocki, the cold War Is over, but the War against hIv has yet to Begin, hIv

around the World—the russian federation, about.com health Disease and condition, 3

april 2007.

iv

Bertil lintner, “the chinese are coming ... to russia,” Asia Times Online Ltd, 27 may 2006.

v

trafficking in Persons report – 2008, tier 2 Watch list, released June 04, 2008, office to

monitor and combat trafficking in Persons, country report: russia

vi

“Inventory and analysis of the current situation and responses to trafficking in the

russian federation,” canadian International Development agency (cIDa), 24 June 2009.

vi

alexei malashenko, “the Kremlin’s violent underbelly,” moscow times, 29 July 2009.

vii

ITAR-TASS news agency, 12 february 2009.

ix

sergey golunov, “ethnic migration: a challenge to russian Border security? PONARS

Policy Memo No. 432, march 2007.

x

natalya Krainova, “young Drug users called major threat,” Moscow Times, 9 september

2009.

agencies, including staff training at russia’s specialized education centers.

In 2004 the problem of afghan drug trafficking was examined in the

russia-nato council. the russia-led csto invited nato to consider

the possibility of joining efforts in the fight against drug trafficking in

afghanistan. moscow has urged the coalition forces deployed on afghan

territory to strengthen the afghan section of the border with tajikistan.

US-Russia Transnational Cooperation

us-russia cooperation on transnational challenges has been uneven

and reflective of disruptive bilateral relations in the past few years. after a

brief period of intensive dialogue and collaboration on counterterrorist

measures following 9-11, the bilateral cooperation has been sporadic. the

activity of the bilateral working group on antiterrorism has declined and is

uneventful. russia has been suspicious of the us military presence in

central asia and its rationale of supporting counterterrorist activity in

afghanistan. moscow fears an increased Western political and ideological

presence in what it considers to be russia’s sphere of influence.

the main reason for the lack of us-russia transnational security

cooperation has been the preeminence of geopolitical and ideological

agendas in bilateral relations in contrast with both countries’ pronounced

priority to deal with transnational challenges. Washington has been

suspicious of russia’s resurgence and potential neoimperialism, while

moscow has accused the united states of promoting the “color

revolutions” in former soviet states neighboring russia as well as

unilateralism in international affairs.

after President obama took office, the united states and russia made

some progress in defining common areas of concern and cooperation. at

the moscow summit on 6–8 July 2009, the united states and russia made

concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation. for example, the

countries are to work together to defeat violent extremists and to counter

transnational threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking.

at the summit, chairman of the Joint chiefs of staff admiral mullen and

russian chief of the general staff general makarov agreed to a work plan

for resuming military-to-military cooperation in areas such as

counterterrorism, search and rescue, and counterpiracy.

another tangible result of the summit was russia’s agreement to allow

the united states to transport its military personnel and equipment across

russia in support of the nato-led International security assistance force

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The Perfect Storm?

Thailand’s Security Predicament

miemie Winn Byrd

Key Findings

• Political turmoil in thailand has serious implications for security

and stability in the region. thailand is a major hub for commerce

and transport and a prominent player in the region’s multilateral

forums.

• at present, the abhisit administration’s first order of priority is

regime security. other pressing security challenges, such as the

insurgency in the south, are receiving insufficient attention.

• the global economic downturn is the most significant transnational

threat thailand is currently confronting. the downturn has

exacerbated problems associated with illegal immigration, human

trafficking and substandard healthcare. effective government is

needed to deal with these competing and complex security

challenges within thailand’s own borders and across the region.

• It is imperative that us policymakers continue steady engagement

and open dialog with the thai government, emphasizing the

fundamentals of democracy and effective governance. the united

states should aim to leverage regional forums and to increase

engagement through track II unofficial channels.

• While us-thailand military engagement remains vigorous,

the united states needs to consider extending economic assistance

in rural development, health, family planning, education, science

and technology. expansion of current assistance programs related

to human immunodeficiency virus (hIv)/aIDs prevention and

treatment, refugee assistance and the prevention of human

trafficking should be considered.

xi

Deputy foreign minister alexander yakovenko’s presentation at the conference on labor

migration in russia and cIs: trends, problems and avenues of cooperation, russian

foreign ministry website, 11 may 2007.

xii

Interview of anatoly safonov, the russian President's special representative for

International cooperation in the fight against terrorism and transnational organized

crime, Interfax News Agency, 20 January 2005.

xiii

“obama, medvedev announce new afghan cooperation,” cBs news, 6 July 2009.

34 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 37

Current Political Turmoil

the divisiveness that now exists among the thai is unprecedented.

thailand has cycled through six prime ministers in the three years

following the september 2006 coup d’état, and there seems to be no end in

sight for the continued civil unrest. the current Prime minister, abhisit

vejjajiva, came into power following the occupation of Bangkok’s

international airport in 2008 by the People’s alliance for Democracy

(PaD, also known as the “yellow-shirts”). abhisit called for opposition

participation in efforts to end the civil unrest in may 2009. however, the

opponents (formerly thai rak thai Party and popularly known as the

“red-shirts”) felt cheated and undermined. until the government is willing

to address the underlying reasons for conflict between the different

classes, sectors, and regions within thailand, there is little hope of ending

the civil unrest.

on the surface, this political upheaval appears as a fight between the

traditional urban elite (represented by the urban middle class, the military,

and the bureaucracy) and the poor (represented by thaksin shinawatra and

his supporters). under the surface, it is a clash of two elite classes: the

“old-money” of the traditional plutocracy and the “new money”

accumulated as the result of the country’s economic growth since the

1960s.

i however, the “new-money” elite group, led by thaksin, was able

to gain the support of the poor by exploiting the conditions of economic

inequality through populist policies, which have been dubbed

“thaksinomics”. although thailand has experienced spectacular

economic growth over the past few decades, not all regions have shared

the growth equally. the country’s gini coefficient (measure of inequality

of income distribution) is considered one of the most unfavorable in asia.

ii

this inequality has provided thaksin and his new-money elites the ability

to leverage the rising social discontent against the old-money elites.

thaksin and his party have been able to portray themselves as champions

of the poor, primarily in the north and northeast region of the country,

thereby creating additional rifts between the regions.

the situation is at a deadlock. as the global economic crisis deepens

and the thai economy slows down, the socioeconomic gaps amongst

various factions will become more prominent and discontent will deepen,

which will further fuel political controversy and the power struggle. until

now, the thai people’s unity has been held together primarily by the

citizens’sincere love and reverence for King Bhumibol. the King is now

in his eighty-second year, and there is no obvious political leader who

Introduction

thailand’s position as a major hub for commerce and transport

signifies its strategic importance for the southeast asian region as a

whole. surprisingly, however, many observers of southeast asia have

tended to understate the significance of thailand’s current political turmoil

and the myriad of security challenges confronting thailand today.

although thailand was once considered southeast asia’s economic tiger

and beacon of democracy, its current political turmoil and economic woes

could, if allowed to fester, significantly weaken the foundation for the

region’s future stability and growth.

thailand faces numerous domestic and transnational security

challenges that have been exacerbated by ongoing political and economic

turmoil, creating what might be called a “perfect storm” for the thai

government. among the most pressing security challenges thailand faces

today are the escalating insurgency in the south, the eruption of a border

dispute with neighboring cambodia, increased trafficking of people and

drugs across the country’s borders and problems associated with illegal

migration and refugees fleeing myanmar. effective government is needed

to deal with these competing and complex security challenges within

thailand’s own borders and across the region.

thailand’s efforts to effectively respond to these security challenges

have been hampered by the abhisit administration’s preoccupation with

regime security. although Prime minister abhisit vejjajiva recently

survived the most serious challenge to his rule so far, the risk of an

outbreak of violence remains high. While some have argued that the

strong self-identity and historical unity of the thai people will help them

weather this political storm, recent sociopolitical turmoil has caused

unprecedented fragmentation of thai society by polarizing urban versus

rural, poor against rich, and the north and northeast regions against

Bangkok and the south.

historically, thailand has played a prominent role in supporting the

association of southeast asian nations (asean) and contributing to

cooperation and the prosperity of southeast asia. however, during

thailand’s tenure as the asean chair, thai leaders have faced difficulties

in fulfilling the responsibility of hosting asean summits due to eruptions

of civil protests in the country. the annual summit was postponed four

times before it eventually took place in Phuket during July 2009. the

struggle to host the asean summit tarnished thailand’s reputation on the

world stage and triggered doubts about the region’s stability.

36 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 39

economy. high taxes and cumbersome regulations have stifled

entrepreneurship. Implementation of draconian capital control rules

immediately after the 2006 coup has driven away many foreign investors.

since then, Bangkok has been faced with the difficult task of convincing

foreign investors that thailand is still an excellent destination for

investment. additionally, the “red-shirts” occupation of the thai

International airport severely interrupted the country’s vital tourist

industry, reflected by the 15.7 percent decline in tourist arrivals during the

first quarter of 2009.

iv extensive media exposure of the airport occupation

bred doubts among international investors regarding the future stability of

the country. gross domestic product (gDP) growth went from an

impressive 7.1 percent in 2003 to 4.8 percent in 2007 and 2.6 percent

2008.

vi foreign investment plunged from an annual average of 12 percent

from 2003–05 to 3.8 percent in 2006 and 1.4 percent in 2007. for 2009,

the thai economy is expected to contract by 4.4 percent,

vii the worst

decline since the 1997–98 asian financial crisis.

although the thai government in the first quarter of 2009 pledged

to inject a Bt1.4 trillion (us$40 billion)viii stimulus package into the

domestic economy, such action is unlikely to have an immediate impact

on preventing further economic deterioration. the Bt1.4 trillion is

primarily targeted for building expensive infrastructure over the next

three years. historically, such large infrastructure projects have become

caught up in multiyear political infighting. Bangkok’s new international

airport, which took more than ten years to build, is an example of this

problem. furthermore, the current political instability likely will affect

the government’s ability to secure sufficient financing. the government

is planning to borrow a total of Bt70 billion from a combination of

lenders including the World Bank, the asian Development Bank, and

the Japan International cooperation agency to finance the stimulus

package. this will raise public debt to approximately 45 percent of

gDP, which nearly reaches the 50 percent cap set by the existing

legislation’s fiscal-sustainability framework. the abhisit administration

may seek to amend the existing legislation to remove the cap in the

midst of the political turmoil.

In a shrinking economic environment, financial inequality within

thailand will be exacerbated because those who have large political

influence will be able to subvert institutions, policy, and resource

allocation to maintain and protect their private economic interest at the

expense of the poor.

x meanwhile, unemployment is rising sharply as

matches Bhumibol’s charisma and who commands genuine respect from

the populace. the King has been the one who was able to bring back

thailand’s citizens from the escalating violence in the past. most thais

today still believe that the King will stop the current political turmoil from

reaching the tipping point. overdependence on the King for the country’s

unity and an inability to strengthen the democratic institutions in the post–

1976 era has left the thai very few alternatives to resolve internal

sociopolitical conflicts. Weakened institutions are perpetually vulnerable

to elite exploitation and military interference. many of them have clearly

shown a willingness to use extraconstitutional means to gain and maintain

power. michael connors’ characterization of the thai government as an

“ambivalent state” seems fitting, a state in which “competing modes of

legitimation, forms of leadership and the exercise of power have not

settled into any enduring pattern of dominance.”iii

thailand’s status as an ambivalent state is unlikely to change in the

near future. the opponents of abhisit feel strongly that PaD has

undermined participatory democracy. they believe that abhisit’s

predecessors were removed through unconstitutional means and therefore,

the abhisit administration constantly faces difficulty in garnering

legitimacy, authority, and support from the general populace. to maintain

control over the government bureaucracy, the abhisit administration has

replaced many key government officials with those whom they trust,

regardless of whether they have the necessary qualifications for the

positions. additionally, the ministries and departments are centralizing

authority to tighten control. many of the midlevel career bureaucrats

complain that their operating budgets have been severely slashed and that

they can’t get any work done because they have to seek approval for every

action. at a time when thailand needs efficient and effective governance

to address a myriad of security issues plaguing the country and the region,

the thai government has become paralyzed while the current global

economic crisis continues to worsen.

Impact of Current Global Economic Crisis

the global economic downturn could be considered the most

significant transnational threat thailand currently confronts. Besides

diminishing the government’s ability to respond to other challenges

thailand faces, the downturn magnified the effects of three years of

political instability that had already significantly damaged the thai

38 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 41

this Islamic school system enrolls more than one hundred thousand

students and yields an average of one thousand eight hundred to three

thousand fighters at any given moment.

xvii It is significant to note that

schools—and the education system in general—have been the epicenter

for the clash of cultures, ideologies, and conflict. muslims in the south

view the state schools and education system as the government’s primary

tool of oppression, subjugation, and discrimination. such views also

assert that the instilling of thai nationalism, rituals, and culture in the

students undermines malay-muslim ethnoreligious identity. these

perspectives lead to government schools and teachers being made a

central focus of attacks.

the lack of a stable administration since the 2006 coup d’état has

further hindered the thai government’s promise to devise and implement

consistent policies to address inequitable socioeconomic conditions in the

southern provinces. Despite abhisit’s pledge to empower the southern

Border Provinces administrative centre (sBPac), Bangkok continues to

maintain centralized power and control of policy, which erodes the

development of a regionalized political solution.

xviii the thai

government’s concentration of control has been a consistent theme of

complaint expressed by people in the south. as the decentralization

process continues to stall, the thai central government is losing its

legitimacy and credibility to effectively deal with the issue, which further

feeds mistrust among malay-muslims. as the abhisit government

employs the military to squelch violent mass protests by opposition parties

in the north to cement its power, the resolve to pursue peaceful policies in

the south is diminished.

however, intensifying the military campaign in the south is unlikely to

reduce violence. the government’s continued failure in substantially

addressing a long-standing list of grievances escalates political frustrations

and justifies—in the minds of the southern muslims—the hostilities. the

longer the government fails to settle the conflict, the greater the risk of

involvement of foreign muslim extremists. Jihadi groups in malaysia and

Indonesia, for example, are showing increased interest in southern

thailand’s conflict.

xix the malaysian foreign minister has expressed

concerns about the possible spillover effects impacting his country as well

as the possibility that regional terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya

(JI), may make themselves central to the conflict.

xx

factories shed jobs in response to a collapse in export orders. thailand’s

crucial export sector—merchandise exports—had experienced a year-onyear decrease of 23.1 percent as of march 2009.

x Both general motors

and toyota cut production and laid off workers at their plants in thailand

to cope with falling demand.

xi In march 2009 the national statistic office

reported that five hundred forty thousand workers had lost jobs at the end

of 2008, and the number could rise to at least one million in 2009.

xii as

gDP declines and unemployment rises, resentment in thai society will

become more pronounced, and opposition groups are likely to further

exploit increased economic hardship in efforts to discredit the fragile

abhisit government and its policies. the downturn will be acutely felt in

the Deep south, where economic and political inequalities are already

contributing factors in the political insurgency. Bangkok has continuously

failed to address the key substantive grievances dealing with economic,

social, and political inequities in the south. the Deep south is the poorest

region of thailand, with a population of 1.7 million and a poverty rate of

17 percent.

xiii

Increased Instability in Southern Thailand

While Bangkok is preoccupied with economic and political turmoil,

the violent insurgency in the south continues to escalate. the violence in

the south has sharply increased since January 2009. more than three

thousand seven hundred people have been killed since 2004 in the

southern provinces of narathiwat, yala, and Pattani.

xiv eighty percent of

the population in the southern border region are muslim, who identify

themselves as malay rather than thai. separatists in the south are

fostering the development of a muslim identity and the rise of Islamic

consciousness in an attempt to manipulate the young and lure them into

the separatist movement. the conflict, which originally was based on

ethnonationalism, is now laced with religious rhetoric with a jihadi flavor

as more Islamists join the movement.

xv the allegation of increased human

rights abuses by thailand’s government security forces in recent years has

reinforced a collective sense of injustice that draws young muslim men

toward recruiters. schools have been a fertile ground for recruiting young

members, ensuring multigenerational support for the struggle to separate

from dominantly Buddhist thailand. although precise data are not

available, an estimated 70 to 80 percent of muslim children in the area are

attending panoh, traditional private secondary schools teaching Islam.

xiv

40 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 43

thai official figures estimate there are five hundred thousand to seven

hundred thousand Burmese illegal migrants, some nongovernmental

organizations (ngos) believe the real number may be closer to two

million.

xxv many of the migrants work jobs that are considered dirty,

dangerous, and demeaning. the migrants are forced to reside in crowded

refugee camps, labor camps, and densely populated slums. the plight of

migrant workers in thailand is worsened by their unregistered and illegal

status, making them vulnerable to unscrupulous employers’ exploitation

and enslavement and in some cases the target of crooked police extortion

and brutality. While it is heart wrenching to note the peril of the migrant

workers, their exploiters are also eroding thailand’s stability by

undermining basic human rights and the rule of law. these negative

conditions can breed criminal elements within the thai society and

weaken its social fabric.

Increasing migration and slum living conditions bring added risks of

health insecurity for thailand and the region—spreading infectious

diseases such as hIv/aIDs and avian Influenza. hIv/aIDs outbreaks

are known to occur along the migration and trafficking routes. available

health data on shan ethnic migrants from Burma in thailand indicate

that the migrant population is disproportionately plagued by infectious

diseases, including hIv/aIDs. tuberculosis, lymphatic filariasis, and

some vaccine-preventable illnesses are also prevalent.

xxvi these dismal

conditions in labor and refugee camps are straining the capacity of local

health programs. furthermore, thai public hospitals increasingly bear

the costs of providing charity care for migrants and refugees, who are

unable to pay for their treatment. the additional costs strain healthcare

budgets, which are already stretched thin as a result of insufficient

government funding.

thailand’s inability to tackle healthcare issues of the migrant and

refugee populations could have wider health implications both for

thailand and for the region. many of today’s global pandemics have

originated and spread from impoverished slums where dense numbers of

human live in close proximity with animals and food sources. Pandemics

are thus closely linked to the emergence of “hot zones” in slums and

refugees camps.

xxvii

Increased Migration and Trafficking

according to the asian Development outlook 2009, more than sixty

million people in the region will remain mired in poverty due to the

current economic decline.

xxi a corollary of this is that asia will experience

significant increases in migration as more people search for better

economic opportunities across the region. Increased migration flows will

usher in greater challenges for regional governments as they attempt to

maintain security and stability.

as a country with excellent infrastructure located at the heart of

southeast asia and situated between the south china sea and the Indian

ocean littoral, thailand is a hub for regional commerce and transport.

thailand’s economic prosperity—relative to other countries in the

region—has made it an attractive destination for irregular cross-border

migration—which has created opportunities for traffickers to coerce,

deceive, abduct, threaten, and exploit victims for sex and forced labor.

thailand is considered a source, destination and transit point for human

trafficking globally.

although the thai government has launched several legislative

initiatives and has recently passed laws in efforts to address the human

trafficking problem, the implementation and enforcement of these laws

have been weak. according to the us state Department’s 2004 trafficking

in Persons (tIP) report, only 108 new victims of trafficking were

identified for the entire year.

xxii the 2008 tIP report noted that the

government of thailand does not fully comply with the minimum

standards for the elimination of trafficking. the royal thai Police

reported to have prosecuted only 144 sex trafficking cases for the two-year

period ending in June 2007.

xxiii some observers see considerable evidence

of official complicity in the trafficking, both among lower levels of law

enforcement and senior public officials who have been identified as

having commercial interests in the brothels and factories into which many

victims are trafficked.

xxiv

the combination of pervasive corruption within the government and

the paralysis induced by the current political instability may position

thailand to become a safe haven for traffickers moving illicit goods and

people throughout the region. the resource constraints created by the

economic slump will further hinder the government’s ability to address

the issue.

thailand is already overburdened by refugees and illegal migrants

from the neighboring countries of Burma, cambodia, and laos. While

42 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 45

Recommendations for US Engagement

the united states and thailand share a 175-year history as allies, with

especially close relations since the end of World War II. In December 2003

the united states designated thailand a “major non-nato ally,” further

solidifying this relationship. viewed in this historical perspective, recent

political events in thailand should not be allowed to undermine what

continues to be an important political, economic and military relationship

for the united states. the united states should actively seek out ways of

improving engagement and dialog with the thai government, emphasizing

the fundamentals of democracy and effective governance.

the united states could leverage regional forums to facilitate

confidence building measures to address cross-border issues between

thailand and its neighbors and to address thailand’s southern insurgency.

to further complement formal multilateral efforts, the united states

should facilitate and encourage increased engagement and sharing of best

practices through track II unofficial channels.

as part of mutual defense cooperation over the last three decades,

thailand and the united states have developed a vigorous joint military

exercise program, which has engaged all the services of each nation

(with an average of forty joint exercises per year). current levels of

military engagement with thailand seem appropriate and do not require

any major adjustment.

at the same time, this strong military relationship needs to be

buttressed by stronger assistance to address some of the issues discussed

above. the formal usaID bilateral program for economic assistance to

thailand ended in 1995, and the united states should reconsider

extending economic assistance in the areas of rural development,

education, science and technology. the united states also should consider

expanding current assistance programs in the areas of health and

hIv/aIDs programming, refugee assistance, and trafficking in persons.

the united states and thailand also should reinvigorate free trade

agreement (fta) negotiations (championed by thaksin) that have been

dormant since 2006. a peaceful and prosperous southeast asia is in the

strategic interests of the united states, and thailand lies at the heart of

southeast asia.

i

litner, Bertil, “the real thai crisis: a conflict between old money and new money,”

the Wall street Journal asia, april 15, 2009.

Clashes at the Thai-Cambodian Border

In July 2008 an armed conflict erupted over a long-running border

dispute between thailand and cambodia. the ongoing tension between

the two countries centers on a 1.8 square mile strip of land near the ninehundred-year-old Preah vihear temple, which the united nations declared

a World heritage site in June 2008. the temple sits on top of a cliff and is

accessible only from thailand because most of the surrounding area on the

cambodian side is littered with mines from the earlier cambodia-Khmer

rouge conflict. the International court of Justice awarded the temple to

cambodia in 1962. after long and bitter dispute throughout the 1950s,

cambodia became the owner of the temple building while the surrounding

land and the pathway to the temple are inside thailand’s territory—

creating an untenable situation and fueling a historic rivalry between these

two countries. When the united nations educational, scientific and

cultural organization (unesco) listed the temple as a World heritage

site, the simmering tension boiled over into an armed conflict.

the conflict was localized along a small border area, but the larger

threat lies with unscrupulous politicians willing to manipulate nationalist

sentiment on both sides. the temple issue is symbolic of a long-standing

historical rivalry between the two countries and thus ripe for political

manipulation. In thailand, PaD exploited rising nationalist sentiment

around the Preah vihear case to mobilize mass demonstrations that

contributed to bringing down the thaksin government in 2008.

xxviii

the increased tension along the thai-cambodia border could also have

a wider global impact. In february 2009 the World health organization

(Who) reported the emergence of a drug-resistant strain of malaria along

the thai-cambodia border and has been working in the area to contain the

spread of this new strain.

xxix however, the rising tension and armed

conflict could impede scientists’ ability to continue working in the area.

the disruption of work to contain this deadly disease in a “hot zone” could

undermine the global effort to control infectious diseases.

malaria kills more than a million people every year. the united states

and thailand, through programs developed under the us agency for

International Development (usaID), centers for Disease control and

Prevention (cDc), and the armed forces research Institute of medical

sciences (afrIms), cooperate closely on efforts to fight malaria and a

range of other public health initiatives, including tuberculosis, dengue,

hIv/aIDs, and avian/pandemic influenza.

xxx

44 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 47

xxiv

gallagher, anne, human rights and human trafficking in thailand: a shadow tIP

report, trafficking and the global sex Industry, ed. Karen Beeks & Delila amir, lexingon

Books, lanham, 2006, p. 143.

xxv

Dupont, alan, east asia Imperiled: transnational challenges to security, cambridge

university Press, cambridge, 2001, p. 143.

xxvi

suwanvanichkij, voravit, Displacement and disease: the shan exodus and Infectious

Disease Implications for thailand, center for Public health and human rights, Johns

hopkins Bloomberg school of Public health, Baltimore, maryland, usa, march 14, 2008

http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2324075

xxvii

Davis, mike. Pandemic and the Planet of slums, news Perspective Quarterly, 26:3,

summer 2009, http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2009_summer/16_davis.html

xxviii

Prasirtsuk, Kitti. thailand in 2008: crisis continued, asian survey, XlIX: 1,

January/february 2009, p. 178. head, Jonathan, a long-running Border Dispute between

thailand and cambodia, Khmer voice, october 15, 2008.

http://www.khmervoice.org/?p=1345

xxix

hirshler, Bill, super malaria threat on thai-cambodia Border, reuters, february 25,

2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/healthnews/idustre51o6fJ20090225

xxx

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm, 3 september 2009.

ii

litner, Bertil, “the Battle for thailand: can Democracy survive,” foreign affairs, 88:4.

p. 114.

iii

connors, michael K., liberalism, authoritarianism and the Politics of Decisionism in

thailand, The Pacific Review, 22: 3, July 2009, p. 369-370.

iv

economist.com, may 28, 2009, “thailand in recession”

v

country Profile thailand 2008, economist Intelligence unit, June 3, 2008.

vi

the Wall street Journal asia, “rally calls for thai government’s resignation,”

associated Press, march 26, 2009

vii

country report thailand april 2009, economist Intelligence unit

viii

the Wall street Journal asia, may 13, 2009, “Bangkok Building Boom.”

ix

hicken, allen, “the Politics of economic reform in thailand: crisis and compromise”,

William Davidson Institute Working Paper number 638, January 2004, university of

michigan Business school.

x

country forecast, the economist Intelligence unit, may 26, 2009

xi

Jantraprap, viparat, “gm and toyota to cut Jobs at their Plants in thailand,” new york

times, november 20, 2008.

xii

the Wall street Journal asia, march 23, 2009, “thailand unveils measures to address

economic woes.”

xiii

royal thai consulate-general, Jeddah, saudi arabia, June 2006

xiv

afP, July 8, 2009, “three killed in fresh thai south unrest: police”

xv

International crisis group, asia report no 170, 22 June 2009, “recruiting militants in

southern thailand.”

xvi

Ibid. p.20-21.

xvii

International crisis group, asia report no 170, 22 June 2009, “recruiting militants in

southern thailand.”

xviii

International crisis group, asia report no 170, 22 June 2009, “recruiting militants in

southern thailand.”

xix

International crisis group, asia Briefing no 80, 28 august 2008, “thailand: Political

turmoil and the southern Insurgency,” p.5.

xx

storey, Ian, “malaysia's role in thailand's southern Insurgency,” terrorism monitor, 5:5,

march 15, 2007.

xxi

asian Development Bank, asian Development report 2009.

xxii

Ibid, p. 146.

xxiii

trafficking in Persons report 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/, p. 28.

46 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 49

• It is often expressed by Indonesian security personnel that the

united states should revise its vetting process as it relates to

International military education and training and historical human

rights violations, and focus more on creating a security

environment in which such violations will not occur.

• Indonesia’s rating in combating human trafficking fluctuates

between tier 2 and tier 3, with shifting government interest in

this transnational security threat.

Indonesia has no conventional external threat to its security. national

security priorities therefore tend to focus on the many internal and

transnational security challenges that Indonesia faces today. this paper

characterizes the current vulnerability of Indonesia with respect to such

threats from an Indonesian perspective and analyzes the conditions and

forces within this vast archipelago that predispose the country to domestic

challenges of external origin. mechanisms are discussed through which

Indonesia counters transnational security threats by engaging with regional

neighbors and the united states. this paper further argues that while

many of Indonesia’s transnational security threats are consistent with us

priorities, other threats are ranked differently by the two countries. thus,

this discussion focuses on Indonesian perceptions of key threats, and how

the united states and Indonesia can better coordinate their efforts against

these transnational threats.

high-profile transnational security threats like terrorism and narcotics

trafficking appropriately receive international attention, and these crimes

are repudiated by most countries. other types of transnational crime such

as human trafficking, and environmental crimes like illegal fishing, illegal

logging and illegal wildlife trade are less frequently viewed from a

security standpoint. nonetheless, such environmental crimes outrank

terrorism in terms of transnational challenges in Indonesia. greater us

attention to environmental issues is not necessarily a quid pro quo for

improved cooperation in other areas such as counterterrorism. however,

recognition by the united states that Indonesia considers these issues to be

national priorities would be an influential component of an integrated

strategy for engaging Indonesia in security cooperation.

Transnational Security Threats to Indonesia

James r. campbell

Key Findings

• senior Indonesian military agree that their country has no

imminent conventional external threat; internal and transnational

security threats receive top priority in Indonesian security

planning.

• according to high-level Indonesian authorities, corruption is the

number one domestic security problem for Indonesia. President

yudhoyono’s anticorruption agency has been effective in fighting

corruption.

• along with corruption, other domestic security threats such as

economic issues are prioritized over transnational security threats.

nontraditional threats like illegal fishing and other environmental

crimes are weighted more heavily than terrorism, narcotics or

human trafficking. terrorism, especially international terrorism,

is not viewed as an existential threat to the country.

• as nontraditional threats such as environmental crime often

involve the same networks, actors and elements of corruption as

other transnational security threats, assisting Indonesia in

investigating its priority nontraditional security threats may

represent a less contentious way for the united states to address

its own terrorism concerns in the region. Programs for fighting

terrorism and other security threats need to be seen not as foreign

initiatives but as Indonesian solutions that empower the

government.

• In programs designed to fight terrorism and other transnational

crimes, the military, the police and the national Intelligence

service compete for resources and status, and thus resist

cooperation and intelligence sharing.

• the united states can make its most immediate contribution to

Indonesian security by helping to increase the professionalism of

the national Police.

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the recent bombing attacks on hotels in the capitol city of Jakarta will

change this perception. Indonesia also feels that as a nation it now has

credibility in global finances, and it does not want terrorism to blemish its

standing in world banking and financial markets.

for most Indonesians, the most pressing security threats involve the

economy: putting food on the table, the rising price of gasoline, and

paying for children’s schooling.

iv externally, JI does not appear to be

formally linked to regional extremist groups in the Pattani province of

southern thailand, the rohingyas in Burma, or the abu sayyaf group in

the Philippines, although there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the

exact nature of the relations. the Indonesian government is developing a

database of international terrorist-related websites that may be used for

recruitment within the country by different groups, and one area for us

cooperation may be to provide technological assistance for this effort.

While JI takes inspiration from organizations like al-Qaeda and the

taliban, senior Indonesian security analysts suggest that transnational

terrorist organizations do not appear to have an actual “footprint” in

Indonesia.

v al-Qaeda’s intransigence, indiscriminate brutality, and

dismissal of politics as a perversion of religion banish it to the fringes of

muslim society. Its global brand has suffered a damaging ideological

backlash from repentant violent extremists, prominent religious leaders

and an overwhelming number of muslims who feel horrified by the

movement’s wanton killings.

vi

currently JI is focusing on publishing and appears less interested in

mounting operations, likely reflecting a decision from the top to focus on

religious outreach and recruitment as a way of rebuilding the organization.

JI has developed a profitable consortium in and around the country’s

religious schools (pesantren). the Indonesian government should monitor

these enterprises more closely, but they may be useful in channeling JI

energies into political struggle through the printed page rather than

through acts of violence. the best way to ensure adequate scrutiny would

be for the Indonesian government to enforce its own laws with respect to

publishing, labor, corporate registration and taxation. such enforcement

would not only offer a means of monitoring these enterprises, but it could

also yield valuable information about the size and status of the JI

organization. every publisher is also required by law to provide copies of

every title to the national library.

vii

nonetheless radicalization—the process by which law-abiding

individuals become willing to use violence to achieve their goals—

Terrorism

Probably the most significant terrorist threat to Indonesia is the

domestic, Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). other lesser actors

include laskar Jihad, hizbullah front, laskar mujahidan, and Islamic

Defenders front (fPI), the latter being more in the category of “violent

moralists” rather than terrorists. In the past, there have been international

connections with the abu sayyaf group in the Philippines, which included

training and funding. “afghan veterans,” reported by one senior

Indonesian diplomat to number perhaps as many as six thousand, consist

of Indonesians who trained or participated in military jihad operations in

afghanistan in opposition to the russian occupation of that country.

however, more conservative estimates hold these numbers to be only in

the hundreds.

i regardless of the actual total, many of these afghan

mujahideen returned to Indonesia, bringing destructive elements into the

region, where some perpetrated violence in christian-muslim religious

conflicts in ambon, maluku and Poso, central sulawesi, particularly from

1998 to 2001.

ii

several expert bombmakers remain at large, and access to explosives

and/or small arms is not particularly difficult. these extremists include

taufik Bulaga and tedi, both apprentices of the late malaysian bomb

specialist, Dr. azhari husein. noordin top, a malaysian national and

leader of a violent JI splinter group responsible for several major

bombings in Indonesia, was recently killed by police during an antiterror

investigation, following the July 21, 2009 bombings of the J. W. marriott

hotel and ritz carlton hotel in Jakarta. JI’s leaders are opposed to alQaeda-style bombings on Indonesian soil, not because they are considered

illegitimate, but because they are counterproductive—attacks on Western

targets have killed more Indonesians than infidels, provoked community

outrage, and led to mass arrests.

iii also, international funding for jihadi

operations has largely dried up, with no significant external funding for JI

since 2003. nonetheless, small but persistent domestic terrorist cells

continue to attract global attention to Indonesia, and the potential for

renewal of international terrorist support cannot be dismissed.

the vast majority of Indonesians reject terrorism, but many are

troubled by a possible perception that the us War on terror is also focused

on muslims. Indonesians are aware of “homegrown” terrorist

organizations like JI but do not generally consider them a significant

problem. this is in large part because Indonesia had not suffered a

significant terror attack since 2004. It remains to be seen whether or not

50 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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the strictest salafis in Indonesia are religious—not political—activists.

Ironically, this means that the most “radical” of the salafis are the most

immune to jihadist teachings; salafism in Indonesia is not the security

threat sometimes portrayed. It may come across to outsiders as intolerant

or reactionary, but for the most part it is not prone to terrorism, in part

because it is so inwardly focused on faith.

xii

us counterterrorism assistance in Indonesia, which is focused on

increasing the competence of police and courts to investigate and

prosecute terrorism, has been effective and should be continued. us

assistance to Detachment 88, the elite antiterrorism force of the Indonesian

national Police, should be increased, and the force should be better

integrated with the parent organization. the united states should not just

bring funding and a proposal for Indonesia to implement. us negotiators

should first meet with the national Intelligence service (BIn) and discuss

what the problem is, including the unresolved definition of terrorism, and

a way forward. the reason for the united states to include BIn in these

discussions is because the military (tnI) and the national Police (PolrI)

are often focused too tactically, rather than strategically. one way to

optimize security assistance would be through supporting education to

enhance Indonesian police capacity in surveillance and evidence

gathering, as all antiterrorist actions must be done on Indonesia’s terms,

and not at the insistence of us or other foreign authorities. a challenge for

the united states is that us funding is stovepiped for the different

components of the Indonesian security sector. such an arrangement

inherently reinforces the existing stovepiped structure of the Indonesian

security forces and may exacerbate the lack of interagency communication

and intelligence-sharing.

Corruption and the Security Sector

from the perspective of Indonesian policymakers, the foremost

internal threat to Indonesian national security is corruption. ten years after

the fall of the kleptocratic suharto regime, corruption remains a significant

challenge for Indonesia, which is ranked 126 out of 180 countries in

transparency International’s 2008 corruption Index.

xiii transnational

crime organizations are drawn to operate in Indonesia because of the

perception that the police are corrupt and inept. transnational crime is

more a symptom of weak governmental institutions and corruption, rather

than an externally imposed threat. the Indonesian term oknum refers to

remains a risk in Indonesia, as in the case of the “Palembang group.” this

group demonstrated how easy the transformation can be if the right

ingredients are present: a core group of individuals, a charismatic leader,

motivation and opportunity for targeted killing. access to funding and

weapons may also spur jihadi groups to violence.

viii While very few

religious schools (pesantren) in Indonesia today promote violent extremist

ideologies, the schools serve as a social network where such ideologies

can be discussed. approximately fifty JI-affiliated schools remain active,

mostly on Java. the challenge is to identify individual problem schools

without stigmatizing the entire system.

ix

Police have embarked on a prisoner-focused “deradicalization”

program aimed at persuading jihadists to reject the use of terrorist tactics.

a key element is the provision of economic aid—usually to prisoners’

families and often involving school fees for children—on the assumption

that acceptance of aid from the police entails a rejection of the jihadi

premise that all officials are “thoghut” (anti-Islam).

x While police clearly

hope that deradicalized prisoners will return to their communities and help

discourage recruitment into terrorist cells, there has been little strategic

thinking about how this might actually be accomplished. muhammadiyah,

the nation’s second-largest Islamic organization, had been working with

the government on deradicalization; however, the funding support ran out,

and cooperation has ceased. Discussions with staff at an influential Jakarta

think tank suggest that muhammadiyah is no longer participating in the

government deradicalization, although the organization remains willing to

accept post-radicals (“alumni Bui”) into their own existing programs. the

united states should support prison reform in Indonesia but lacks

credibility in offering assistance, as abu ghraib and guantanamo have

become the “poster children” of prison abuse.

Indonesia’s strategy for dealing with terrorism is based on “soft

power,” because more than 90 percent of the population is muslim, and

thus a hard-power approach to Islamists is deemed unacceptable,

although aggressive interventions by security forces are not “off the

table.”xi sensitivities with regard to battling Islamic extremism mean that

even following the recent terrorist bombings of two Jakarta hotels,

President yudhoyono carefully avoided naming the perpetrators as

Jemaah Islamiyah, as this name literally means “Islamic community,” and

using it would have opened him to criticism by Islamist politicians of

defaming Islam.

conservative Indonesian salafi muslims oppose organizations like JI.

52 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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be funded by a mix of funds estimated to be 30 percent from the

government budget and 70 percent from off-budget private businesses

managed by officers in the KoDams (although the exact proportion from

each source remains unclear). When approval to manage these private

businesses was officially revoked, tnI found itself faced with the prospect

of operating with less than one-third of previous revenues. It is difficult to

assess with certainty whether the extrabudgetary funding stream has

actually stopped or just transformed into a “shadow” budget. as the

“official” operational funds support salaries, training, equipment purchases

and maintenance, tnI’s equipment maintenance strategy has basically

become one of cannibalization. the priority for the government of

Indonesia is the economy and education, not modernization of the military.

economic development and social development programs garner 70

percent of the budget, while defense and security receive 30 percent of the

budget. While tnI is now ostensibly under civilian control, senior military

officers confided that should democracy fail in Indonesia, they believe the

military remains competent to run the country.

the police currently operate under an analogous split-funding

arrangement, although its off-budget private businesses are operated under

private contracts, ostensibly with no oversight by senior police officials.

however, if approval is revoked for the regional police commands

(PolDa) to benefit from private businesses as it was for the military, the

police will be forced to scale back operations significantly. the national

police organization is only ten years old and, while it has made great

progress, there is much work to do in terms of developing professionalism

among its leadership and strengthening basic police investigative skills.

the united states should increase training assistance in investigative skills

to PolrI. Better police work might have detected and arrested the

Palembang group before it was able to carry out its terrorist acts in

2006–07.

xvi

In cooperating with tnI, the us military needs to engage in operations

and activities that make a difference and stay engaged long enough to gain

credibility. the us military participates in nearly 150 joint exercises each

year with tnI, two-thirds of which are us-sponsored. however, a

limitation on us military hardware transfer to Indonesia is the requirement

for a commitment by the government to maintain the equipment in the

future with Indonesian funds. another mechanism is the International

military education and training (Imet) program, which historically has

been an important mechanism for security cooperation. for example,

members of the police or military who abuse their position by engaging in

a range of extralegal economic activities with various degrees of backing

from the state.

xiv President yudhoyono has taken an aggressive approach to

fighting corruption through the creation of the corruption eradication

commission (KPK). this organization has relentlessly pursued corrupt

politicians and businessmen, bringing to justice more than one hundred

high-profile public and corporate officials. Ironically, in may 2009 the

head of KPK, antasari Zahra, was arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to

murder. While his arrest marred the pristine reputation of the KPK, it

apparently did not seriously damage the political platform of good

governance that carried yudhoyono into a second five-year term as

president in July of this same year. Despite the President’s unequivocal

backing of the KPK, International anti-corruption Day on December 9,

2009 saw large rallies in several major Indonesian cities. rally

participants demanded zero tolerance for corruption, and alleged a

systematic government attempt to weaken the KPK and the anticorruption court.

Part of the basis for the corruption problem in the security sector lies

in poorly articulated regulations and inadequate funding levels for the

police and military. after President suharto left office in 1998, the police

(PolrI) were assigned responsibility as lead agency for internal security,

while the military (tnI) was limited to an external security role, including

territorial capacity Building (tcB). law 34 was written to define

security responsibilities of the police and the military; however as of may

2009 the law had not been ratified by the People’s representative council

(DPr) and thus has not been implemented. since Indonesia currently has

no real external adversary, the military basically has no formal mission. as

a result, tnI has not been successful in justifying the budget it deems

necessary for modernization.

xv the police, public prosecutor’s office and

the courts are still weak, yet they have been given the security

responsibilities formerly ascribed to the military. for the next ten to fifteen

years, the military may still have to remain engaged, in the background, to

aid development of the internal security role of the police. currently, only

the military enjoys a modicum of respect as a security force. however, the

successful police operation that resulted in the death of noordin top,

Indonesia’s most dangerous terrorist following the Jakarta hotel bombings

of 2009, resulted in a great deal of positive media coverage regarding the

developing capabilities of the police in counterterrorism.

formerly, the regional military commands (KoDam) were reported to

54 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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in Jakarta has used Department of Defense 1207 counterterrorism fundingxxiv

to enable the Department of state to purchase and install fifteen new radar

stations on northeast sulawesi, near manado and at various locations along

the strategic straits of malacca in support of the “eye in the sky”

program,

xxv jointly operated by Indonesia, malaysia and singapore. this

program enhances regional maritime surveillance capabilities to combat

illicit activities such as smuggling and narcotics trafficking in the waters

bordering these countries. Indonesia previously had to deal with narcotics

primarily as a transshipment point for these drugs. today narcotics are

increasingly becoming an internal threat, with both the domestic production

and use of methamphetamines and ecstasy. It is estimated that there are

approximately one million drug addicts today in Indonesia.

xxvi

Indonesia has been remarkably successful in reducing piracy in its

waters. however, joint efforts are delicate because of sovereignty issues

and extant territorial disputes involving malaysia and singapore. us

support for effective regional responses is critical to reduce pressure on

external maritime powers and to intervene to protect commercial shipping.

Previously, much of the piracy in the northern malacca straits was carried

out by Indonesians from the aceh region of north sumatra. When aceh’s

economic situation improved, piracy in the northern malacca straits

declined. however, Indonesian Bugis sailors still conduct piracy in the

southern malacca straits. for Bugis, capturing a vessel through piracy is

considered a “rite of passage” and earns them the title “lord of the sea.”

the Indonesian government is seeking to replace this act of piracy with

just a ceremonial event.

Indonesia contributes little to the airborne surveillance effort because

most of its helicopters are not operational, and it possesses few c130 and

no P3 aircraft. an additional hindrance is that Indonesia prefers not to

appear “too cooperative” with the united states for domestic political

reasons. Pirates and smugglers understand these “fault lines” in security

cooperation and continue to exploit them for criminal purposes.

the united states is working to set up a Joint operations center for

maritime security in Jakarta to enable increased maritime presence, and

support should be extended to include the Joint maritime Patrols of

Indonesia, malaysia and singapore. In 2008 the us Department of

Justice’s International criminal Investigative training assistance Program

(IcItaP) helped to establish Indonesia’s first marine Police special Boat

unit to provide criminal investigative assistance with maritime

transnational crime (tnc).

reform-minded President yudhoyono is a graduate of us Imet training.

Indonesian, regional and us security would be enhanced by an expansion

of this program. alongside such an expansion, it has also been suggested

by some that the opportunity could be taken to reassess the human rights

vetting process associated with the program, as this is perceived to be in

need of improvement in order to more effectively pursue us goals.

Environmental Crime, Narcotics Trafficking and Piracy

While terrorism remains an ongoing challenge for Indonesia,

environmental crime ranks higher among the government’s set of

transnational security threats. It is estimated that illegal fishing costs

Indonesia us$5 billion per year in lost revenues, with prime offenders

being thailand, malaysia and taiwan.

xvii of all timber produced in

Indonesia, 70 percent is logged illegallyxviii, and much illegal timber moves

between Indonesia and malaysia on its way to overseas markets. the

Indonesian government estimates that illegal logging results in an annual

loss in revenue of about us$3 billion.

xix corruption and collusion by local

elites with illegal logging operations have been exacerbated by the

political decentralization that followed the fall of soeharto’s regime, and

this has created an environment where domestic and transnational

environmental criminals operate with impunity. some local governments

have emphasized development over conservation and in some cases have

urged people to settle and open businesses in protected areas, simply

ignoring national laws.

the convention on International trade in endangered species of Wild

fauna and flora (cItes)xx functions to improve intelligence-sharing,

review weak laws, and coordinate enforcement actions. one hundred and

sixty-seven countries are party to the cItes treaty, and it is one of the few

multilateral environmental agreements to which all ten association of

southeast asian nations (asean) members, including Indonesia, are

party. xxi transnational crime organizations involved in arms, narcotics and

human trafficking also are likely to be involved in the illegal wildlife

trade, and these criminal activities can supply funds to terrorist

organizations.

xxii the illegal wildlife trade is attractive to organized

criminal groups because of their synergistic links with trafficking of other

contrabands, particularly narcotics.

xxiii

one way to address these criminal activities is to strengthen marine and

border surveillance. the office of Defense cooperation at the us embassy

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while at the same time engaging in community-level recruiting of young

women for these networks.

xxx Wherever there is wealth, such as at the

freeport mining corporation, timika, Papua, or at other mining, logging

or energy production camps, there is trafficking. the us embassy has

held discussions with freeport on this issue, but little concrete action has

been taken to resolve the problem. the apparent lack of will by both

governments in addressing this problem inevitably sends a signal to

traffickers and to international businesses that trafficking in humans is

considered less than a priority threat.

to help Indonesia grapple with this problem, the united states should

send more trainers to the Jakarta center for law enforcement cooperation

(Jclec). In 2008, the united states sent nine trainers (the netherlands

sent thirty, the united Kingdom sent thirty-two, and australia sent one

hundred and twenty). In 2007 australia initiated a five-year, a$21 million

partnership with Indonesia to fight the human trade. historically, the

united states has provided a total of us$20 million to assist Indonesia in

the fight against human trafficking, and it needs to continue this support.

to deal effectively with tnc, Indonesia needs to clarify its policies

with respect to international cooperation on surveillance, apprehension

and particularly extradition of transnational criminals. Indonesia is open

and flexible on these issues; however, traditional asean perceptions of

national sovereignty hamper regional progress in this area.

xxxi for

countries with which Indonesia lacks a formal extradition treaty, regional

national chiefs of police have developed an unofficial system of

cooperation through which wanted individuals in one country have on

occasion been “handed over” to the country of origin of the suspect.

xxxii

a more insidious aspect of human smuggling and trafficking involves

the international spread of disease. Illegally trafficked individuals as well

as official foreign guest workers often carry infectious diseases between

Indonesia and other countries where screening for tuberculosis, hepatitis,

and sexually transmitted diseases is inconsistent. Indonesians are more

concerned about domestic health issues (malaria, dengue, tuberculosis)

than transnational health threats such as avian influenza (bird flu), h1n1

(swine flu), severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars), and to a large

extent the human immunodeficiency virus (hIv)/aIDs, which is still

viewed as an “external” problem. Pandemic preparedness is led only by

the Public health sector, within the ministry of health. citing valid

concerns over potential exploitation by the international pharmaceutical

industry, the Indonesian ministry of health has failed to cooperate fully

Human Trafficking and Threat of Pandemic Disease

Indonesia is a major source and transit point for women trafficked to

malaysia, thailand, taiwan and Japan, as well as to the middle east. a

major transit route is through the island of Batam, off of south sumatra, to

malaysia.

xxvii In addition, women from the central asian states, notably

Kazakhstan, are brought into Indonesia for prostitution. Building

international cooperation to control human trafficking has been difficult

for Indonesia because malaysia denies complicity. the malaysian

government sponsors rela, a public security auxiliary force consisting of

five hundred thousand “volunteer civilians” who have been given the

authority to arrest illegals. halfway houses have been set up just across the

border in Indonesia to repatriate these women. however, once detained

inside malaysia, the women are often just re-trafficked for profit by the

volunteers.

xxviii

the regional realpolitik of lack of women’s rights is a root cause of

trafficking of women in Indonesia. exacerbating this, the laws and legal

processes in Indonesia related to human trafficking are not easily

understood by people who lack legal training. rescued human trafficking

victims may fear possible criminal charges, retaliation by traffickers if

they provide information to police, or attacks against family members.

Indonesia was elevated to a tier 2 country rating in the us state

department’s most recent trafficking in Persons report, in part because of

strong efforts to assist victims of trafficking through the funding of basic

services and referral of victims to nongovernmental organizations (ngos)

and international organizations. however, there are few reported efforts to

prosecute, convict or punish Indonesian law enforcement and military

officials complicit in human trafficking.

xxix With little fear of prosecution

by corrupt Indonesian law enforcement authorities, traffickers continue

community recruitment of vulnerable women and children, particularly in

rural areas of central Java. a complicating political factor is that if

Indonesia pressures countries like malaysia or saudi arabia to regulate

trafficking, these countries may retaliate by sending home legal

Indonesian guest workers in their countries, leading to significant losses in

remittances sent to Indonesia.

In central Java, there are regions where institutionalized human

trafficking represents a significant part of the local economy. this is a

sensitive problem for the Indonesian government that was confirmed by

us officials working on these issues in central Java. In these areas, local

citizens cooperate with police in investigating human trafficking networks,

58 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 61

which supports long-term capacity-building in a culturally sensitive

manner, is the best strategy for creating a sustainable security environment

in Indonesia and advancing us national interests.

i

abuza, a. 2002. tentacles of terror: al Qaeda’s southeast asian network. contemporary

se asia 24(3): 427-465.

ii

International crisis group. 22 Jan 2008. Indonesia: tackling radicalism in Poso. asia

Briefing no. 75: 1-11.

iii

Jones, s. July 2008. Briefing for the new President: the terrorist threat in Indonesia and

southeast asia. annals amer. acad. Political and social sciences 618: 69-78.

iv

Public affairs official. 2009. us embassy, Jakarta. Interview by author. Jakarta,

Indonesia, 14 June.

v

sukma, r. 2009. executive Director. centre for strategic and International studies.

Interview by author. Jakarta, Indonesia, June, 2009.

vi

Boukhars, a. 2009. there are many Ways to exploit al-Qaeda’s vulnerabilities.

Brookings Institution, 22 June. available online at:

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0622_al_qaeda_boukhars.aspx.

vii

International crisis group. 28 feb 2008. Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing

Industry. asia report no. 147, p. 1.

viii

International crisis group. 20 may 2009. Indonesia: radicalization of the “Palembang

group.” asia Briefing 92: 1-19.

ix

Della-giacoma, J. 2009. radicalisation: look at the network, not the school. the

Interpreter. 29 June. available online at:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6195&l=1.

x

International crisis group. 19 nov 2007. Deradicalization and Indonesian Prisons. asia

Briefing no. 142: 1-31.

xi

ltg Bambang Darmono. 2009. secretary general of national resiliency council.

Presentation to seminar on east asian security. 7 July. Jakarta, Indonesia.

xii

International crisis group. 13 sept 2004. Why salafism and terrorism mostly Don’t

mix. asia report 83: 1-59.

xiii

transparency International. 2008 global corruption report 2008, p. 191. available

online at:

http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2008.

xiv

scott, J. 1977. Patron-client Politics and Political change in southeast asia. In friends,

followers, and factions: a reader in clientelism. edited by s. schmidt. Berkeley,

university of california Press, 1997. Pp. 123-146.

xv

Bakri, c., Defending Indonesia. gramedia Pustaka utama Pubs. Jakarta, Indonesia. 2009.

p. 128.

with the World health organization in h5n1 avian influenza vaccine

development.

xxxiii this situation does not bode well for the current h1n1

pandemic.

an effective continuity of operations (cooP) plan for pandemics

requires an interagency approach involving other service sectors such as

telecommunications, food and water, sanitation, banking and education.

the united states should encourage asean, via its new ambassador to

the secretariat in Jakarta, to establish regional standards in disaster

preparedness to deal with transnational health threats such as pandemic

influenza preparedness. minimum preparedness standards should apply:

(1) within countries for interagency communication and cooperation; (2)

for information sharing with neighbors; and (3) for communication with

ngos and donors.

Implications for the United States

the biggest challenge to security sector development in Indonesia is

the lack of professionalism among the police and, to a lesser degree, the

military. Improvement in leadership skills, strategic thinking and technical

training of security personnel should be a primary goal of any us

engagement strategy for Indonesia. Increased professionalism among the

national police will help reduce corruption and increase public confidence

in the police as a credible security force. furthermore, a more stable and

secure society in Indonesia supports the strategic goals of both the united

states and Indonesia. the united states recently acceded to the asean

treaty of amity and cooperation. this important confidence-building

measure was a sine qua non, and provided the united states both

credibility and gravitas to engage effectively in negotiations with

Indonesia in a regional context. In this way, programs for fighting

terrorism and nontraditional security threats can be crafted as Indonesian

solutions, not foreign mandates, thereby empowering the Indonesian

government.

for the united states to demonstrate global leadership it must build

partnerships with other nations to share the burden of addressing

transnational security threats.

xxxiv Both countries should look forward and

concentrate on creating a security environment beneficial to the region.

this is best accomplished by continued security sector development and

professionalization of Indonesian security forces at all levels. a

comprehensive partnership between the united states and Indonesia,

60 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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Cambodia’s Transnational Security Challenges

Jessica h. s. ear

Key Findings

• cambodia’s current political stability provides opportunities for

the government to focus on nontraditional security challenges

that continue to plague economic development and effective

governance.

• existing transnational security threats that include trafficking,

terrorism and pandemics highlight a need for government skills

and capacity-building to effectively handle these problems.

• although coordination among multinational organizations, civil

society groups and the government is becoming more effective in

combating cambodia’s transnational security threats, more can

still be done.

• International assistance to cambodia should focus on

empowerment initiatives that promote cambodian self-sufficiency,

sustainability and national confidence in its ability to combat

transnational threats domestically, regionally and globally.

cambodia shares borders with thailand, laos and vietnam and has

limited resources to adequately monitor its overland crossings, maritime

security and coastlines. therefore, it is not surprising that cambodia’s

most significant transnational security challenges can be observed along

its porous border towns and waterways. Potential pandemics, terrorist

threats, and illicit activities such as trafficking of drugs, small arms and

people, are real concerns for the cambodian government as people and

goods continue to move easily across mainland southeast asia.

transnational challenges along the nation’s borders have long been

recognized by cambodia and foreign governments, but recent border flareups between thailand and cambodia over the Preah vihear temple have

refocused cambodia’s attention and intensified the need to protect its

national borders against intrusion and illegal activities. although Preah

vihear is a bilateral dispute between thailand and cambodia and does not

directly relate to regional threats, the issue has heightened attention on

border issues and the capacity of cambodia’s military and police to handle

xvi

senior official, centre for strategic and International studies. Interview by author,

Jakarta, Indonesia, June, 2009.

xvii

sianipar, m. (2006). Deputy chairman, commission Iv, Indonesian house of

representatives. Quoted in media Indonesia, Jakarta. 6 april.

xviii

larsen, J. 2002. Illegal logging threatens ecological and economic stability. available

online at: http://www.westbynorthwest.org/summer02/larsen.vow.summer02/shtml.

xix

Down in the Woods. 2006. the economist. 25 march, p. 74.

xx

cItes, 3 march 1973, 993 united nations treaty service 243.

xxi

lin, J. 2005. tackling southeast asia’s Illegal Wildlife trade. singapore yearbook of Intl

law 9: 191-208.

xxii

vince, g. .17 June 2002. organized gangs target Wildlife trade. new scientist.

available online at: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2413.

xxiii

cook, D., m. roberts, and J. lowther. the international wildlife trade and organized

crime. WWf traffic report, WWf uK. godalming, uK. 2002. xxiv

serafino, n. 2008. DoD section 1207 security and stabilization assistance. crs

report for congress, pp 1-4.

xxv

yusof, m. 2005. eye in the sky over malacca straits. Bernama. available online at:

http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=154485.

xxvi

senior official. 2009. centre for strategic and International studies. Interview by author.

Jakarta, Indonesia 14 June.

xxvii

Political officer. 2009. us embassy. Interview by author. 12 June.

xxviii

senior Protection officer. 2009. united nations high commissioner for refugees.

refugee lecture to seminar on east asia security. Kuala lumpur, malaysia, 9 July.

xxix

us Dos trafficking in Persons report 2009 – Indonesia 16 June 2009. available online

at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a4214a6c.html.

xxx

Political officer. 2009. us embassy. Interview by author. 12 June.

xxxi

Jemadu, a., 2009. associate Dean. national sovereignty lecture to seminar on east

asian security. universitas Pelita harapan. Jakarta, 10 July.

xxxii

senior faculty, Indonesian national Police headquarters, college of Police science.

2009. Interview by author. corroborated by law enforcement officials at us embassy, 10

June.

xxxiii

sedyaningsih, e., s. Isfandari, t. soendoro, and s. supari. 2008. towards mutual trust,

transparency and equity in virus sharing mechanisms: the avian influenza case of

Indonesia,.ann. acad. med. singapore 37: 482-488.

xxxiv

Pascual, c. 2009. american leadership in a global century. Brookings Institution. 12

June 2009. available online at:

http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0612_american_leadership_pascual.aspx

62 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 65

Smuggling of Small Arms

the end of more than three decades of fighting in cambodia left large

surpluses of arms and weapons that quickly find their way into the world’s

illegal arms market. During the 1980s and 1990s, small arms sales

originating in cambodia became one of the country’s most lucrative

activities. the variety of weapons intercepted during that period included

assault rifles, general-purpose machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades,

antitank weapons, pistols and ammunition. at that time, weapons,

ammunition and war supplies in cambodia could be bought and sold in

local markets alongside other basic commodities. small handguns carried

freely in the streets further fueled lawlessness and personal insecurity

among the people.

since then, a joint effort with international partners and organizations

has brought nearly half of cambodia’s supply of surplus weapons under

government control. active weapons collection and destruction

programs have substantially reduced the country’s supply of unused

arms and its potential for proliferation. a small arms survey supported

by the swiss government in 2006 concluded that a considerable

reduction in arms had taken place since the 1990s and estimated that

twenty-two thousand to eighty-five thousand weapons continue to

circulate illegally in cambodia today.

although the reduction in surplus arms since the end of the country’s

civil war is very encouraging, imported arms from china and the middle

east are still finding their way to insurgents and terrorists groups

throughout southeast asia. small arms smuggling remains a transnational

security challenge for cambodia because the country remains a key transit

location among the many covert routes of arms movements in the region.

With insurgencies and terrorist threats in the region, cambodia must

continue to eliminate war remnant weapons to reduce the risk of supplying

these groups with arms and to prevent transnational small arms trafficking

along its borders.

Trafficking of Drugs

cambodia is part of a geographical region that has long been

recognized as one of the world’s major locations for drug production.

located between thailand, laos and vietnam, cambodia’s centralized

location and an under-developed law enforcement structure hindered by

corrupt practices make it an ideal originating and transit point for

potential transnational risks. this point was emphasized in the country’s

national Defense White Paper 2006, as the cambodia recognized a

changed security outlook due to an evolved regional and global situation.

from this new perspective the government acknowledges that major

nontraditional security challenges such as international terrorism and

transnational crimes currently pose serious threats to its national defense,

security and development.

In the early 1990s cambodia’s violent history receded into the past

under the united nations transitional authority in cambodia (untac)

and national focus turned to political stabilization and institutional

reconstruction. after more than a decade of party struggles that included a

1997 coupe ousting the rival national united front for an Independent,

neutral, Peaceful and cooperative cambodia (funcInPec), the

cambodian People’s Party (cPP), headed by Prime minister hun sen,

concluded its claim to strong national support in a 58 percent win,

constitution 90 out of 123 seats in the national assembly election of July

2008. cambodia’s relatively stable political climate over the past ten

years has allowed its leaders to shift focus from national reconstruction to

economic development, bringing about a new era of big business, personal

profit, transnational dealings and potential international investments.

currently, cambodia is undergoing remarkable growth and changes in

national image. While transnational security challenges of trafficking,

terrorism and pandemic threats are not new to cambodia, the ability for

the country to handle these problems has greatly improved. Better

coordination among civil society groups and multinational efforts

combining nongovernmental organizations (ngos), the government and

other regional and international players are helping cambodia become

more effective in combating transnational security concerns. global

initiatives such as cambodia’s contributions to united nations

peacekeeping and demining efforts— as well as strides to reform its

security sector—are increasing government confidence, reshaping

concepts of self-sufficiency and redefining cambodia’s roles in the region.

Despite these positive steps, however, cambodia remains burdened by

endemic corruption and an entrenched system of client patronage that

leaves many of its population impoverished and subject to exploitation by

the country’s rich and powerful. International assistance to cambodia

should strive to support initiatives that empower the country to become

self-sufficient and confident in its ability to contribute to combating

transnational concerns globally and in the region.

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Trafficking in People

as seen in drug trafficking, cambodia is also a source, transit and

destination country for human trafficking. the trafficking is reportedly

organized and managed by crime syndicates. making the problem even

more sinister and harder to deter, however, is the fact that traffickers are

often family and friends profiting from the sale of young men, women

and children.

according to the united nations Inter-agency Project (unIaP),

cambodian men, women and children are trafficked for sexual and labor

exploitation in thailand, malaysia, macau, and taiwan. men are

trafficked for forced labor in the agriculture, fishing, and construction

industries while women are trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced

labor in factories or as domestic servants. a global network of

organizations and individuals working together for the elimination of these

crimes, called end child Prostitution, child Pornography and trafficking

of children for sexual Purposes (ecPat International), reports that as

many as one-third of the victims are children trafficked for sexual

exploitation and forced labor in organized begging rings, soliciting, street

vending, and flower selling.

there are many causes of human trafficking in cambodia. the

ministry of social affairs and youth rehabilitations found that 76 percent

of trafficked persons returned from thailand had come from families who

owned their own land and house. Perplexingly, about 47 percent of those

interviewed stated that their mother was the facilitator of their trafficking.

according to the unIaP, poverty is considered the most significant cause

of trafficking. human trafficking in cambodia has increased because of a

number of other factors, including socioeconomic imbalance between

rural and urban areas, increased tourism, lack of unemployment,

education, and safe migration. ngos working to stop human trafficking in

cambodia attribute the common phenomenon of family-member

trafficking to a lack of education and livelihood skills. Parents or victims

can easily be led to believe that they or their child will be working as

domestic servants only later to find themselves coerced by criminal

elements into sexual exploitation.

other factors, such as client-patron relationship exploitation and

displacement from government land concessions in rural areas, have

fueled a return of cambodian people to the urban areas seeking jobs and

means of livelihood. With well over half the population below the age of

twenty, cambodia faces a growing problem of providing decent work for

trafficking and other illegal activities. clandestine laboratories backed by

organized crime syndicates manufacture illicit drugs in cambodia’s

sparsely populated areas or new urban settings for trafficking to other

countries. cambodia’s porous borders are conducive to trafficking because

the borders span unpopulated areas of jungle that are often poorly

monitored and controlled. as modernization gives rise to more highways

crisscrossing national boundaries, higher volumes of pedestrian, private

and commercial traffic will pass through border checkpoints. Without law

enforcement units trained and equipped to respond to and interdict illegal

substance movements, arresting transnational criminal elements will

remain extremely difficult.

It is known that drugs enter cambodia’s northern entry points from

the golden triangle area along the thailand, laos and Burma borders.

many of the narcotics then transit though cambodia via road or river

networks and move on to thailand and vietnam. the flow of drugs in and

out of cambodia, combined with a large and idle young population

susceptible to drug use, is resulting in a trend of increased drug abuse and

crime in cambodia.

recent discoveries of covert factories extracting sassafras oil from rare

trees in the southwestern provinces link cambodia to the drug network

and syndicates at play in the region. sassafras oil is a key ingredient often

used to manufacture the drug commonly known as “ecstasy.” at the height

of the illegal operations in 2006, it was estimated that there were at least

seventy-five processing factories run by crime syndicates in the

cardamom protected forest. In 2008, the royal cambodian armed forces,

in a joint operation with the australian federal Police and the

environmental nonprofit organization fauna and flora International (ffI),

destroyed factories, made arrests and confiscated about thirty-three tons of

sassafras oil. authorities claimed that amount of oil could have produced

245 million ecstasy tablets with a street value of us$7 billion.

since then the Joint enforcement task force has continued to

confiscate tons of sassafras oil in cambodia and at the thailand border. as

long as there is an international demand and high profitability for drugs,

the emergence of new ecstasy manufacturing facilities and the destruction

of rare trees and forest will continue in cambodia.

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public health facilities are also widespread. It is commonplace for

cambodians who cannot afford healthcare to purchase medicines from

illegitimate sources and turn to unreliable home treatments of diseases.

for wealthier cambodians, travel to thailand or vietnam for serious

medical attention is often preferred to receiving in-country care.

cambodia’s poor healthcare system lacks surveillance and detection

capability to contain potential pandemics such as sars or avian human

Influenza (ahI). as one of the first countries in southeast asia to

experience ahI infection in December 2003, cambodia had its first wave

of alarm from January to may 2004. the outbreak had a severe impact on

small-scale commercial poultry farms and on village farms that raise the

majority of the country’s poultry under subsistence conditions. ahI cases

emerged again in late 2004 and early 2005, with four fatal human cases

reported and about two thousand five hundred birds killed by disease or

culling. additional human deaths were confirmed in 2006 and 2007.

although the outbreaks in cambodia have not been of the scale

experienced in other countries, cambodia remains vulnerable to

pandemics. the repeated outbreaks and associated loss of human life and

livelihoods highlight the country’s inadequate disease surveillance system,

its limited capacity to control disease and the persistence of infection in

the region. Because cambodia is situated between thailand and

vietnam—two major poultry-producing countries that have experienced

far greater ahI human infection—cambodia remains a potential

flashpoint for an expansion of avian influenza and possible emergence of a

human pandemic strain of influenza.

the first case of the new influenza strand a/h1n1 was confirmed on

June 23, 2009. a month later a cambodian health official confirmed

twenty-one new cases. cambodia has consequently tightened its

monitoring and tracking system at two main airports through the use of

thermal detection scanners. the cambodian government is working with

the international community to build capacity for disease surveillance,

investigation and control to integrate preparedness and response planning.

these measures, though helpful, do not fully address the threat that

transnational infectious disease and pandemics present to the majority of

people still unable to afford medical treatment under the poorly sourced

and maintained national health system.

its young population. cambodia’s present shortfall in job stability further

increases the drive toward cross-border migration for employment, which

perpetuates the cycle of vulnerability to human trafficking.

Infectious Disease and Pandemics

the ease with which people and goods move across cambodia’s

national borders also poses the threat of infectious disease becoming a

serious security issue. this threat is exacerbated when taking into account

the fact that cambodia is a country already plagued by a weak health

system that lacks surveillance capability and suffers from widespread

poverty and ill nutrition.

according to the Joint united nations Program on hIv/aIDs

(unaIDs), the human immunodeficiency virus (hIv) is becoming less

prevalent in the cambodia population. In June 2007, hIv prevalence

among adults ages fifteen to forty-nine was 0.9 percent, down from 1.2

percent in 2003. an estimated sixty-seven thousand adults and three

thousand eight hundred children live with hIv in cambodia. While the

decrease in prevalence rate is a positive indication that public campaigns

promoting condom use have had some effect, methods of hIv infection

are changing due to altered sexual networking practices. men in cambodia

are increasingly turning to non-brothel-based sex workers, with whom

they are less likely to use a condom. this has led to circumstances where

almost half of new infections are among married women, and one-third of

new infections occur from mothers transmitting hIv to their newborn

infants. this change in the method of infection is raising new challenges

in the campaign against hIv/aIDs in cambodia.

In addition to new sexual behavioral trends, the lack of adequate

disease detection, treatment and healthcare poses other significant

challenges to transnational disease transmission. at least one-fifth of the

population has no access to health and medical treatments. under sourced

public health services are one of the major contributing causes of

indebtedness and poverty in the country. While the government spent only

us$1 per capita on public health services in 1998, private out-of-pocket

spending was on average about us$30 per person for healthcare needs.

results from an oxford committee for famine relief study on

landlessness indicate that 44 percent of people who had recently lost their

land did so because they had to pay for medical expenses. corruption

plays a role in unofficial charges, and demands for fees to individuals in

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toward its muslim minorities through intensified policy campaigns.

Despite the cambodian government’s increasing concern regarding

terrorist infiltration and domestic risk, its capability to investigate and

respond to transnational terrorist threats remains unsophisticated and

limited. cambodia needs to develop a comprehensive anti-terrorism

approach that incorporates aspects of cham cultural understanding to the

much needed capacities and coordination training among its law

enforcement and intelligence units.

Capacity and Cooperation

cambodia has ratified many international conventions and protocols

addressing transnational security threats, including terrorism suppression

in areas of financing, aviation and hostage taking. however, the

complexity of implementing and enforcing international agreements

through cambodia’s national legislation—under the framework of a weak

cambodian judiciary—leads some observers to question the effectiveness

of the laws.

for example, critics of the law on the suppression of human

trafficking and sexual exploitation argue that the law’s nondifferentiation of sex workers from true victims of the sex industry diverts

attention from the crime of trafficking, which could result in greater health

risks. from the time the law was passed in January 2008, health

campaigns to promote condom use became less effective because police

raided and drove sex workers out of brothels and into other

unconventional establishments. Deficiencies in cambodian laws—either

in drafting or intent—continue to reflect the current limited capacity of

legislators, judiciaries and law enforcement to establish conditions for

effective rule of law.

under the umbrella of international and domestic laws, the

government of cambodia also has established various governmental

bodies to have oversight of specific transnational security concerns. to

address the drug threat, the government established the national authority

for combating Drugs (nacD) to centralize decisions on drug control

policy and to supervise and coordinate the government’s antinarcotics

efforts. the nacD set out and implemented cambodia’s 2005–2010

national plan for narcotics control, focusing on demand reduction, supply

reduction, drug law enforcement, and expansion of international

cooperation.

Terrorism

although cambodia is not threatened by significant organized

domestic terrorist groups currently operating in country, the government is

nevertheless cautious about the regional threat and has classified terrorism

as one of its top transnational security concerns. the government

references cambodia’s vulnerability for terrorism and its potential to be

used as a “safe haven” to its geographic proximity to recent attacks and its

closeness to areas of terrorist operation networks by groups such as

Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

the arrest of hambali, former military leader of Jemaah Islamiyah

(with links to al-Qaeda, in Bangkok, thailand in august 2003)

highlighted cambodia’s susceptibility to terrorists seeking safe haven from

capture. hambali’s whereabouts leading up to his arrest included hiding

out at a guesthouse in the Phnom Penh lake district. a cambodian official

reported further evidence suggesting that hambali also had tried and failed

in attempts to attack the British embassy in Phnom Penh in 2002.

these terrorist activities inside cambodia’s territory spurred the

government to consider the threat stemming from increased radicalization

within the cambodian muslim or cham community. shortly following the

hambali arrest, various religious schools—which were focused on

teaching radical Islam in cambodia and funded by foreign sources—came

under cambodian government scrutiny. In the period leading up to the

association of southeast asian nations (asean) regional forum

meeting in 2003, cambodian authorities, acting on tips from us

government sources (citing links to al-Qaeda and JI), arrested and

expelled the director, associated teachers and their families from a muslim

organization that assisted the cham community through its religious

schools and programs.

although the government relied on credible sources that led to these

arrests, advocates of human rights continue to condemn what they

consider to be drastic government measures that may not be based on

legitimate evidence. these critics view such government actions as

potentially damaging to the cambodian muslim community in a way that

may serve to isolate and give rise to grievances and potential retaliation.

researchers of muslim communities in cambodia suggest that in large

part, the communities are pacifist and unsympathetic to radical Islamic

fundamentalist beliefs. therefore, in cases where the cambodian

government takes proactive measures to deal with terrorism threats, it also

should be cautious of generating ill-treatment and discriminatory attitudes

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Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 73

and sex offenders.

another example of this ngo and government enforcement model is

that of fauna and flora International (ffI), an international ngo working

to protect the cardamom mountains in cambodia. ffI has been

cooperating with the ministry of environment (moe) since 2000 to

protect and monitor sections of the vast forest from illegal activities such

as poaching and illicit extraction of sassafras oil from rare trees. ffI

supplements the income of about fifty moe rangers and provides

extensive training for the rangers while liaising with australian and us

drug enforcement agencies to utilize satellite technology in detecting new

and illegal oil extraction activities in the forest.

much like other ngos assisting the cambodian government, ffI has

to be proactive and involved to bring about success. cambodian

government authorities, as in the case of the moe park rangers, lack

resources, salary incentive and capacity to effectively do their job. the

most common problem in government is the lack of funds and resources.

to help address this shortcoming, ngos and civil society groups have

stepped in to provide services that are traditionally expected of

government. this culture of assistance, however, is not sustainable

because it creates reliance on ngos and dependence on foreign aid.

at the national level, cambodia is utilizing ngos to establish a

comprehensive approach to handling transnational concerns. cambodia

also is partnering with multiple countries on various security concerns,

including australia and the united states, to combat drugs and terrorism.

Japan helps to manage the sihanoukville port, and thailand and vietnam

assist in the training of police and military. cambodia is also a willing

participant in regionally cooperating with other countries, asean and the

united nations.

among the many regional initiatives in which cambodia

participates to address transnational interests, the unIaP on human

trafficking in the greater mekong sub-region is a notable and effective

collaboration between cambodia and five neighboring countries to

report annually on antihuman trafficking initiatives and statistics.

unIaP has deemed the project successful because it harnesses the

political will of individual countries and invites competitive peer

pressure to motivate the establishment of anti-trafficking objectives and

greater accountability among the countries. through such multiparty

initiatives, cambodia is becoming more adept at working with various

entities to maximize organizational strengths and resources to benefit

other government initiatives to address transnational threats include

the creation of the national aIDs authority to provide overall policy

direction and to undertake health sector development to strengthen the

capabilities of the ministry of health, the development of the national

counterterrorism committee in late 2004 and its secretariat in mid-2005,

and the creation of the national task force, which is overseen by the

“high-level Working group” to combat human trafficking. chaired by

the deputy prime minister and minister of interior, the high-level

Working group oversees a task force that includes eleven ministries,

three government agencies and more than two hundred international and

local ngos.

this high-level involvement from government officials in antihuman

trafficking initiatives has strong political backing by the prime minister, a

fact many aid workers attribute to organizational and international

pressures. external pressures for proactive government oversight are also

reflected in the annual us government’s “trafficking in Persons” report.

In 2007, cambodia was listed among countries on the tier 2 Watch list, a

special category for countries that require special scrutiny due to its

trafficking trends. a year later, cambodia was fully upgraded to tier 2,

with “significant efforts to comply with the trafficking and violence

Protection act” due to enhanced government efforts and improved

statistics related to victims of human trafficking. the combination of

integrated collaboration among government agencies, international

pressures and ngos has helped cambodia reduce human trafficking.

comprehensive cooperation models, such as that found in dealing with

human trafficking, coordinate ngo activities with government officials

and agencies. Both civil society and government collaborate in the

prevention and enforcement phases of the public anti-trafficking

campaign. In the context of the large ngo community, this form of

collaboration is considered to be most effective in handling transnational

threats in cambodia. groups such as the cambodia Women’s crisis center

(cWcc) work with government authorities to provide counseling and

training to repatriated victims of human trafficking, assist reintegration

into society and further reduce vulnerabilities of re-trafficking. this model

will not be effective without the efforts of many ngos such as the

cambodian league for the Promotion and Defense of human rights,

(lIcahDo), the cambodian human rights and Development

association (aDhoc), and action Pour les enfants (aPle) working

with authorities to protect the rights of victims and to prosecute traffickers

72 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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government land concession to big businesses. since the early 1990s, the

cambodian government, with its personal ties to wealthy businesses, has

conceded large tracts of land to private companies for investment in

plantations and large-scale agriculture. Instead of promoting rural

development, however, these concessions have compromised the rights

and livelihoods of villagers, displacing the poor and creating more

destitute communities susceptible to human trafficking and other vices.

for cambodia to adequately face threats of drug, human and small-arms

trafficking, the risk of pandemic and infectious disease outbreaks, and

vulnerabilities to terrorism networks, it must rein in corruption, cease land

concession practices and take steps to improve poverty levels in

cambodia.

Opportunities for Engagement

the cambodian military with executive oversight is in the process of

conducting a security sector reform to redefine the roles of the armed

forces and gendarmerie police. this reform process is an opportune time

for the country to better address the law enforcement and protection needs

of the state and its people against a wide variety of transnational threats.

strong political will is needed to carry out security sector reform and

reduce transnational threats. In cambodia this political authority lies in the

centralized power of Prime minister hun sen. very little is likely to

change without the prime minister or his deputies’support and approval.

the concentration of political decision-making power in only a few

leaders in cambodia creates slow and often ineffective governance, as

very little progress can be made without high-level endorsements. to

better meet pressing transnational challenges security sector reform in

cambodia should include wider delegation of power to other government

institutions. In a similar vein, military and police responsibilities should be

more clearly delineated.

It is also in the united states’ interest to support cambodia’s effective

handling of transnational issues. the us government should continue to

fund initiatives and programs that seek to build cambodia’s capacity for

better governance and security, such as training for the counterterrorism

task force, military and law enforcement, supporting educational

initiatives and women’s programs, and strengthening health and

governmental institutions. Donor fatigue, along with large cuts in funding,

exerts positive pressure on the government and ngos to build

from a whole of government approach in combating transnational

security threats.

Challenges

the gradual shift in the attitude of cambodian leadership toward

cooperation is welcome, and there have been noted improvements in the

realm of transnational security. however, cambodia still faces many

challenges that continue to fuel security threats. many aid and foreign

government officials describe corruption as endemic in cambodia.

transparency International, a global coalition against corruption, places

cambodia 166th out of 180 on its corruption perception index in 2008. In

southeast asia, only myanmar, which tied with Iraq in the second-to-last

ranking at 178, ranks lower on this index.

corruption can be found almost everywhere in cambodia.

government wages are roughly us$25 a month. to better retain rangers,

compensate for the dangerous work conditions and deter corrupt behavior,

ffI supplements the moe park ranger’s us$25 monthly salary by raising

it to us$150. Where most low-level cambodian officials turn to corrupt

practices to supplement their income, higher-level government authorities

and politicians have been linked to large national businesses and lucrative

transactions for self-profit. corruption is so widespread in cambodian

society that incidences of kickbacks to public school administrators or

teachers are expected for children to attend schools. Driving in the country

is met by occasional police shakedowns in traffic. even the prolific Khmer

rouge tribunal was subjected to corruption; staff members have

confessed to having paid their superiors to obtain and keep their jobs.

cambodia’s judicial system also is perceived as being corrupt as

judges and police often can be bribed. corruption in law enforcement and

in the court is so prevalent that impunity for extrajudicial killings has

become commonplace. Whistle-blowers and those who get in the way of

powerful figures can become victims of convenient accidents or

unexplained disappearances. Despite receiving a petition—with more than

a million cambodian signatures and thumbprints—supporting a proposed

anticorruption law in may 2009, the national assembly has yet to pass the

law. an ineffective legal system with a weak civilian police force that

lacks capacity poses serious challenges in cambodia’s efforts to counter

transnational crimes and threats.

another major obstacle to countering transnational threats is

74 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 77

US-Oceania Security Cooperation

in the Post 9/11 World:

Whose Agendas and Priorities?

gerard a. finin

aPcss adjunct Professor

Deputy Director, east-West center Pacific Islands Program

Key Findings

• In countering terrorism, even the smallest and most remote

countries can produce large and potentially serious security

problems. this suggests that the us must continue its efforts to

fully engage with Pacific island nations to advance mutual interests

and address security issues.

• unlike other regions of the globe where the us initiated major new

forms of cooperative engagement and coalition building, 9/11 has

not been a redefining or transformative moment in us-Pacific

island relations. although the us has embraced Pacific island

nations as partners in its strategies to address the threats posed by

terrorism, it has not given sufficient attention to the security

priorities of oceania, which frequently differ from those of

western nations.

• september 11 magnified us attentiveness to the security threats

that can emanate from fragile or failed states. the doctrine of

“preemptive action” subsequently changed the calculus of how the

us and its regional allies think about Pacific island nations, with a

new emphasis on military and non-military interventions intended

to prevent fragile states from becoming failed states. Pacific island

governments had little alternative but to cautiously accept this

change, but today appear to be more supportive of the new

collaborative multilateral architecture being advanced by the

obama administration.

• the role of us allies in Pacific islands regional affairs is shifting.

australia and Japan are assuming increasing influence and

responsibility for regional stability in the south Pacific that is in

partnerships and sustainability in their work. the key to enhancing

security cooperation in cambodia—and more broadly in southeast asia—

lies in unifying program efforts and collectively pushing for better

government responses to transnational issues at the national and regional

levels, as is being done to counter terrorism, pandemics, and human and

drug trafficking. other donor initiatives, such as program matching by the

cambodian government, will bolster political will and national ownership

of assistance needs. rigorous monitoring and evaluation requirements in

aid programming will help to reduce the potential for corruption while

promoting stronger governance practices.

us engagement with cambodia on these transnational issues must

continue to incorporate capacity-building, training and education and

confidence-building measures aimed at empowering cambodia to become

more self-sufficient. this was effectively demonstrated through us

support for cambodia to join un peacekeeping missions and demining

operations. cambodia is fast gaining expertise and confidence in its ability

to contribute on a global level by sending peacekeeping troops to sudan

and chad. the sense of empowerment from these missions is helping

cambodia to develop specialized skills in demining and the capacity to

respond to national and regional challenges. Ideal opportunities to build

capacity and channel future us assistance include support for cambodian

peacekeeping missions, regional disaster response development and

multinational cooperation to combat transnational security threats.

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island leaders throughout oceania. at this juncture, however, Pacific

governments were still uncertain about how they could assist the us in

responding to the new security environment.

Overview

this essay explores the changes that have taken place in the usPacific island security environment during the nine years since the attacks

of 9/11 and identifies some of the opportunities and challenges for security

cooperation. few would assert that 9/11 did not significantly alter the way

in which the us viewed the issue of homeland security, or the way in

which foreign policy is conducted. similarly, it is difficult to argue that

the policy environment in which us interests are being defined has not

changed. however, it is important to underscore that many longstanding

us interests have not been transformed, and significant continuities in us

foreign policy must also be taken into account.

Initial US Responses in Asia and the Pacific

If september 11 revealed the vulnerabilities of us homeland security,

the weeks and months that followed highlighted the breadth and depth of

al Qaeda’s organizational reach, including numerous groups in south and

southeast asia that were sympathetic to their objectives. soon countries

such as Indonesia, malaysia, the Philippines and Pakistan were receiving

priority attention from us policymakers and others in government. for

example, on september 19, 2001, President george W. Bush and President

megawati soekarnoputri issued a joint statement at the White house

vowing “to open a new era of bilateral cooperation based on shared

democratic values and a common interest in promoting regional stability

and prosperity” and “pledged to cooperate with the international

community in combating terrorism.”ii the us also reached out to

malaysia and, during a well-publicized meeting at the aPec summit in

shanghai, sought the advice of Prime minister mahathir mohamad on

fighting terrorism. Promises of liberal increases in economic aid and trade

concessions were clearly part of the new post 9/11 agenda in asia.

iii In the

case of the Philippines and Pakistan, the proposals for small numbers of

specialized us ground troops proved extremely sensitive in domestic

political terms, but also allowed both countries to negotiate attractive aid

packages that were beneficial to their national interests. the united states

keeping with their national interests. at the same time, the united

states is increasing its own diplomatic engagement in oceania,

especially with regard to public diplomacy initiatives. china’s and

taiwan’s increasing presence has been welcomed by island

governments as it provides an alternative to the existing regional

architecture, with the potential for both governments to play

constructive roles in the region.

• Promoting us engagement in oceania through the use of soft

power is one of the most effective ways to facilitate robust

collaboration and ensure that there are no “weak links” in our

asia-Pacific security community.

Introduction

In the early morning hours of 12 september 2001, tuvalu’s secretary

to government was awakened at home by a police officer who via radio

had learned of an attack on new york city. What concerned the secretary

most immediately was the welfare of tuvalu’s permanent representative to

the united nations and his family. unable to make telephone contact with

anyone at the u.s. embassy or to gather more information on the crowded

internet lines, he contacted tuvalu’s high commissioner in fiji who was

able to watch cnn television and relay the latest developments via phone.

the personal connection that made the attacks especially real for

tuvalu was mirrored in other Pacific island nations, each of which have

personnel working at the 12 Pacific island un missions. unlike unfolding

world events of previous eras, most Pacific island government officials

had direct access to the vivid images conveyed around the globe by

television. Within the next several days, island governments issued

statements of condolence offering to assist the us in the fight against

terrorism.

cook Islands Prime minister Dr. terepai maoate described the strikes

in new york and Washington as “vicious” and “unthinkable.”i like most

Pacific island nations, the cook Islands’ bilateral relationship with the

united states was not exceptionally vibrant in economic or political terms.

however, based on the reservoir of good will from World War II and

constructive american diplomatic activity during the cold war years, the

relationship was still seen as quite positive. Dr. maoate’s expression of his

nation’s condolences to the people of the united states was echoed by

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offset declining revenues from external donor sources. While there are, to

be sure, differences among countries, the following suggests some of

oceania’s major security concerns and compares them with international

security priorities frequently emphasized by metropolitan powers:

Oceania’s Security Concerns

• climate change/sea level rise

• Disaster Preparedness/management

• eeZ Intrusions and Poaching

• hIv-aIDs, malaria, Dengue

• energy security (fossil fuels)

• human resource capacities

International Security Concerns

• human smuggling/trafficking

• money laundering/offshore Banking

• Passport sales/flags of convenience

• transnational Drug operations

• transportation security (sea & air)

• Weak state Institutions (e.g., ramsI)

• Inadequate Information sharing

most Pacific nations’ economies are structured by large subsistence

sectors and considerably smaller formal monetized activity. as a

consequence, options for raising revenues directly from citizens are quite

limited. however one avenue governments have for raising revenue is

through opportunities afforded by sovereignty. Pacific islands nation states

have in numerous instances turned to such options because they do not

impose hardships on citizens lacking taxable resources. a well known

example is tuvalu’s commercialization of its domain name: .tv, which

brings in considerable revenue from media firms which “rent” this form of

Internet identification. But in the new security environment, a number of

these activities now posed a potentially significant threat to the “war on

terrorism.” some of the practices that could hinder efforts to provide

greater security included:

• sale of passports on demand, which in certain cases allowed entry

into countries such as canada without requiring a visa.

vi

decided that it must not only go after terrorists but take the offensive by

denying terrorists places where they can “hide, plan and conduct their

attacks.”iv

In contrast to the host of anti-terrorism related initiatives launched in

asia, concerted new attention to the Pacific region beyond hawaii and

guam was initially difficult to discern. us embassy staff in fiji, Port

moresby, majuro and other locales made earnest efforts to dialogue with

host country officials about improving security, but were not able to avail

of any significant additional resources or programs. some steps were

made to enhance airport security, and at one point, suspicious activity in

samoa resulted in the temporary closure of us diplomatic offices there.

still, the sense of great urgency and indeed imminent danger that prevailed

during the months immediately after 9/11 gradually appeared to give way

to a sense of tacit complacency. for example, in 2003 us diplomats in fiji

revealed an awareness of certain security weaknesses and expressed

concern about the lack of activity by Pacific island governments to bolster

defenses, but offered little in the way of an action plan toward that end.

Pacific Islands’ Growing Economic and Political

Vulnerabilities

It was not long after 9/11 that newspapers and other media outlets in

the us took notice of the weak security procedures across the Pacific

islands region. op-ed articles and editorials pointed to the need for the

united states to ensure that the Pacific’s ostensible “backwaters” would

not become an open “back door” from which attacks could be launched.

v

from the perspective of Pacific governments it was clear that the us

during the 1990s had quietly disengaged from the region. In the wake of

its successful policy of strategic denial during the cold war years and the

collapse of the soviet union, the us had closed consular offices, cut

development aid and discontinued educational exchange programs.

over time, however, policymakers in Washington gradually realized

that there was a need to reengage. although considerable good will existed

on almost all levels, finding common ground for collective action was

challenging in light of differing national security priorities. the security

concerns of Pacific islands governments are influenced in part by ongoing

economic and political vulnerabilities that predate 9/11. ongoing pressures

from bilateral donors and multilateral lending institutions for economic

restructuring induced Pacific island nations to find means by which to

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Increased US-Pacific Island Engagement

By mid-decade it was apparent that a number of us government

agencies had started to think more about ways to enhance security in the

Pacific. some of this thinking predated the terrorist attacks, but the post

9/11 atmosphere seemingly gave security-related initiatives greater

impetus. for example, in an effort to assist fiji, the state Department in

august 2002 provided modest funding to the east-West center’s Pacific

Islands Development Program to support the “talanoa” dialogue and

reconciliation process. following the may 2000 coup wherein government

leaders were held hostage at gunpoint for 56 days, a series of east-West

center sponsored talanoa convened for the purpose of bringing together

political opponents, religious leaders, former hostages and coup

sympathizers. the talanoa represented an effort to rebuild national unity

as well as address contentious issues related to land tenure and

constitutional reform in what assistant secretary of state for east asian

and the Pacific affairs James Kelly described as a country that “may have

the most complicated politics in the whole asia-Pacific region.”viii

other small signs of emerging us government interest could be

found as well. a Pacific islands specialist from hawaii was invited to

provide a briefing at cIa headquarters. yet, according to the briefer, a

World War II veteran, those present for the session seemed to have little

knowledge of the Pacific region and displayed remarkably mild interest

in pursuing the issues that were raised as points of concern for enhancing

security. the honolulu-based Joint terrorism task force, established to

coordinate efforts among various law enforcement agencies in hawaii

and beyond, also made genuine efforts to better understand the nature of

the weak links in the defense against terrorism in the Pacific. But again,

the extent of the follow-up appears to have been rather limited since

these agencies had little experience or funding to work with peer

agencies in the south Pacific.

In the north Pacific, where direct us involvement has for over 50

years been far more pervasive, 9/11 appears to have reinforced the us

desire to exert a firmer hand on economic and immigration matters. the

compact of free association agreements between the us and the north

Pacific nations of Palau, republic of the marshall Islands (rmI) and

federated states of micronesia (fsm) provide for exclusive us control

over external security matters in exchange for, among other benefits,

liberal no-visa access to the us.

In keeping with the original agreements stipulating reexamination of

• offshore banking operations with the potential to hide huge sums

from scrutiny by financial oversight institutions.

• Weak institutions for preventing human smuggling to locations

from which entry to the us is made easier (e.g., guam and

american samoa)

With remote island nations having porous national maritime borders

extending thousands of miles, maintaining strict enforcement of

immigration procedures also provides major challenges. even in countries

that have good airport screening equipment or port procedures, scrutiny of

arriving and departing visitors and cargo is at best only as reliable as the

motivation and diligence of customs and security personnel.

In light of these vulnerabilities there were calls after 9/11 for the us to

recognize these problems, see the opportunity to renew and reinvigorate

us-Pacific friendships, and work side by side with island governments to

advance collective security. this included proposals for strengthening

relations by reestablishing exchange programs and increasing diplomatic

contacts at multiple levels. rather than attempt to find high cost, high tech

solutions, it envisioned strengthening personal relationships between

public servants in key us agencies and island ministries such as finance,

immigration and customs through more frequent face to face contacts and

a wider sharing of information.

however, as the early us military successes in afghanistan were

witnessed throughout oceania, island governments, having early-on

offered to join the war on terrorism, often felt they were being left on the

sidelines as passive observers. commenting at the east-West center’s

Pacific Islands conference of leaders in early 2002, fiji’s Prime minister

at the time, laisenia Qarase, spoke for many Pacific island leaders in

attendance when he observed, “Just because our region is relatively

peaceful does not mean nothing is happening. I don’t think we should be

complacent. the Pacific island countries will be used to stage activity

elsewhere.” In responding to these and other similar comments admiral

Dennis Blair, then commander in chief of the us Pacific command,

offered no false hope to the assembled Pacific heads of state.

“cooperation with Pacific islands will come in time but it's lower on the

priority list than southeast asia...our hands are full now with the terrorism

we know about.”vii Indeed, of the nine countries admiral Blair visited

after 9/11 to forge a united front against terrorism, none were in the

Pacific.

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package in exchange for action on u.s. concerns.”xii While sympathy for

nauru regarding its economic plight was not widespread in the region, the

way in which us pressure was applied did not go unnoticed.

If us pressure for policy changes in the Pacific caused some quiet

resentment, the us gradually found ways to indicate its desire for positive

long-term engagement based on common interests. In 2004 President

george W. Bush along with his senior staff and national security team

attended a meeting of the Pacific Islands conference of leaders in

honolulu that emphasized a sharing of perspectives about security matters,

at times going into considerable detail about the burdens some island

nations face when international security requirements are imposed

unilaterally. In 2007 the same group of Pacific Island leaders convened for

the first time in Washington, D.c., where they met with the Department of

state’s most senior officials, as well as the congressional leadership.

more recently, regional us diplomatic positions have been created to

promote action on environmental issues and increase educational

exchanges, including a return of the fulbright Program. In another

significant development usaID has announced it is back in the Pacific,

focusing on a broad range of development-related activities region-wide.

Shifting Roles for US Allies in the Region

a key lesson learned from the asia-Pacific region by us officials in

the post 9/11 era is that in the war on terrorism, even the smallest most

remote countries can produce large and potentially serious security

problems. over time, the us came to more fully appreciate that a number

of south Pacific island nations were facing major political, economic and

social challenges. however, in view of pressing challenges in asia, africa

and the middle east, and the proximity of two countries with which the

us maintains strong alliances, the us has to some extent been reliant on

notions of “burden sharing” to address security related matters in the

south Pacific.

more than any nation in the southern hemisphere, australia in recent

years has reaffirmed its close partnership with the us. australia’s vision of

itself as an integral part of the asia-Pacific with close security links to the

us had gained currency in the late 1980s. moreover, australia’s colonial

role in the Pacific islands region and significant economic ties, especially

in melanesia, converge to make prominent its national interests in the

region. this is well reflected in australia’s Pacific aid budget that that is

certain aspects of the compacts after the first fifteen years, amendment

negotiations were already underway well before 9/11. however, the war

on terrorism underscored ongoing us concerns about restricting

naturalization and passport sales to individuals who were not born in these

countries. moreover, spurred by a desire to see better financial

management of us tax dollars being allocated to fsm and rmI, and

certainly aware of the major problems facing a number of Pacific island

states to the south, the us proposed a new financial management

structure. as was the case during the pre-independence era, the proposed

amendments, negotiated in the post 9/11 environment, once again gave the

us a high degree of control over these two nations’ budget expenditures.

and for the first time citizens of countries in free association were

required to have an updated passport when entering the us.

Offshore Banking

one area where the us did in time make a concerted effort in the

Pacific islands region involved offshore banking operations. us

authorities asserted that tax haven operations in the cook Islands,

marshall Islands, nauru and niue were fronts for russian underworld and

south american drug money laundering.

ix Banking operations in vanuatu

and Palau were also the subject of investigation. the financial action

task force of the organization for economic cooperation and

Development (oecD) had been urging a number of countries around the

world to severely tighten their tax haven operations or face sanctions.

nauru was of special concern because of russian reports claiming that

us$70 billion had been laundered through nauru by russian tax dodgers.

x

more ominously, of approximately 450 shell banking companies reported

to be operating from a single post office box in nauru, one-third were said

to be of middle eastern origin. In the face of dire economic conditions

bordering on insolvency, nauru resisted shutting down its revenue

producing banking operations. Intense international pressure including

possible repossession of nauru’s only aircraft, and a letter of concern from

secretary of state colin Powell, finally convinced nauru’s leadership to

meet with officials in Washington, D.c. after years of delay, nauru, in

march 2003, bowed to direct White house pressure and effectively

abolished its offshore banking sector.

xi subsequent claims by nauru that

the us would provide financial relief were denied, the state Department

saying, “the u.s. did not, either directly or indirectly, offer nauru an aid

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declining globally, then Prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s

announcement at the may 2003 Pacific leaders meeting (Palm) in

okinawa that Pacific aid levels would be maintained sent a clear signal of

commitment. this stepping to the fore, supported by subsequent

governments, represents a welcome aspect of Japan’s willingness to assist

with regional security across the asia Pacific. In addressing the war on

terrorism, Japan has funded specialized training for law enforcement

officers and supported the collection of illegal small arms. Interestingly,

Japan has increasingly worked collectively on development assistance

with australia and new Zealand, a position it had for some years

assiduously avoided in the past given australia’s efforts to push politically

difficult economic reform programs throughout the region.

xvi Based on

these recent developments, Japan may be poised to play a larger role in

Pacific island security matters involving political stability and terrorism.

Within oceania six governments recognize the People’s republic of

china (Prc) and six governments recognize taiwan. While some have

raised alarm over this state of affairs, there is an emerging consensus that

the increasing interest in oceania being expressed by the Prc and taiwan

has in general been beneficial for island governments as it provides

alternatives to the existing regional architecture. the Prc’s emphasis on

infrastructure projects such as airport terminals, government buildings and

sports facilities contrasts with taiwan’s emphasis on scholarships and a

range of development projects such as increasing agricultural production.

While the international community has bemoaned the lack of transparency,

there is scope for both governments to play a positive role in the region,

with little evidence that this competition over the past decade, sometimes

characterized as checkbook diplomacy, has actually been destabilizing.

Conclusion

the post-cold War process of us disengagement from the Pacific

region facilitated new and larger roles for other regional powers, most

notably australia and Japan. In the wake of 9/11, the us gained greater

appreciation for the security weaknesses found in the region and, together

with its allies, has incrementally sought new forms of security cooperation

with Pacific island nations. although it has implicitly welcomed the

increasing influence and range of responsibilities for regional security and

stability being assumed by us allies, it has at the same time attempted to

clearly project that message that the us is “back” in the south Pacific.

xvii

second only to Japan’s overseas development expenditures.

a turning point in us recognition of australia’s role in asia Pacific

security was the successful peace keeping operation launched in east

timor. coming in response to us urging and proceeding with the un’s

endorsement, australia’s status was further elevated by its willingness to

take the lead in this multinational endeavor. Indicative of the importance

the us–australia security relationship in the months prior to 9/11 was the

presence of secretary of state colin l. Powell and secretary of Defense

Donald h. rumsfeld at the annual joint meeting on defense and diplomacy

in July 2001. subsequently, us reliance on australia has grown

significantly as evinced by australia’s conspicuous support for the war in

Iraq. most recently, secretary gates and secretary clinton both committed

to attending the 2010 annual meeting ministerial consultations in

australia.

embracing the Bush doctrine that like america, national security may

require pre-emptive military action, australia’s 2003 deployment of troops

and police officers (including personnel from new Zealand and other

Pacific island nations) to restore peace and order in the solomon Islands

suggested that Washington and canberra shared the same outlook. the

announcement to send in australian troops was justified on the grounds

that the solomon Islands was in danger of becoming a “failed state” and, if

canberra did not act, this could in the future lead to use of the solomon

Islands as a location that could be exploited by international terrorists or

criminal syndicates sympathetic to terrorist organizations.

xiii to the extent

that australia is successful over the long term in its efforts at what former

Prime minister John howard called “cooperative intervention” for the

purpose of nation building in the solomon Islands, and more recently

nauru, its standing in the international community, and particularly with

the us, will likely be enhanced.

the other major us ally in the region is Japan. Japan’s more assertive

posture in recent years is increasingly significant. as a former colonial

power in micronesia, and following more than a quarter century of slowly

growing activity in the region, Japan has substantial national interests

centered around access to fisheries, seabed minerals and land-based

natural resources.

xiv greatly concerned with regional stability but hesitant

to be involved in the domestic affairs of island nations, Japan’s position as

the largest de facto aid provider in the Pacific has long been appreciated

by Pacific island governments.

xv

at a time when Japan’s overseas development assistance budget is

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Institute of Pacific studies, university of the south Pacific, 2001...

vii

east-West Wire, march 19, 2002, https://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/events-endetail.asp?news_ID=58.

viii

Pacific Magazine, June 2003.

ix

PIr may 22, 2001 http://166.122.164.43/archive/2001/may/05%2D23%2Dup1.htm

x

PIr http://166.122.164.43/archive/2000/february/02%2D29%2D01.htm

xi

radio australia, mar. 27, 2003. the australian newspaper reported from Washington on

april 16, 2003 that investigators in the united states have released details of six alleged

terrorists, including two alleged al Qaeda operatives, had been arrested in southeast asia

in recent months carrying nauruan passports. nauru has agreed to abolish its investor

passport scheme.

xii

The Australian, april 9, 2003, PIr

http://166.122.164.43/archive/2003/april/04%2D10%2D11.htm

xiii

Particularly revealing of the different perspectives held by australia and new Zealand

was a press conference held on 29 June at adelaide airport. see,

http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030629_philgoff.html

xiv

gerard a. finin and terence Westley-smith, “a new era for Japan in the Pacific Islands:

the tokyo summit.” east-West center asia Pacific Issues Paper no. 32, september, 1997.

xv

see tanaka yoshiaki, “Pacific Island states and Japan in the global context,” in eric

shibuya and Jim rolfe (eds.). Security in Oceania in the 21st Century. honolulu: asia

Pacific center for security studies, 2003.

xvi

“Joint statement on cooperation among australia, Japan and new Zealand on

Development assistance in the Pacific region,” may 17, 2003.

xvii

see steven mcgann, “a strategic vision for the Pacific.” Ambassadors Review fall

2009. available on-line at

>http://www.americanambassadors.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Publications.the%5fambas

sadors%5frevIeW<

xviii

The Washington Post, march 25, 2003. see also,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030320-11.html.

xix

The Hartford Courant, may 22, 2003.

http://www.house.gov/simmons/print/inthenews83.html

Pacific island nations have consistently articulated the willingness and

even a desire to join with Washington in a multinational effort to increase

regional security and combat terrorism. for instance, when symbolic

political backing was urgently needed for the “coalition of the Willing”

assembled by President Bush to support the war in Iraq, us officials

turned to island states. the inclusion of marshall Islands, federated states

of micronesia and Palau and the solomon Islands in the 46 nation

partnership was noted internationally.

xviii

Palau’s assistance in joining the “coalition of the willing” was later

rewarded in the form of an invitation for then President thomas e.

remengesau Jr. to speak at the may 2003 us coast guard academy

graduation in connecticut. remengesau and the first Palauan cadet to

complete his studies at the academy shared the stage with President Bush

and homeland security secretary tom ridge. speaking about the

ramifications of 9/11, ridge told all those in attendance, “suddenly the

oceans got smaller,” he said, “and the challenges to protect them grew

larger.”xix Palau’s recent acceptance of a small number of former

guantanamo detainees as residents has underscored the ways in which

even the smallest island states can at times contribute to global security

concerns.

the years since september 11, 2001 have underscored the fact that

terrorists seek to exploit any available vulnerability to achieve their

objectives. comprehensive global security must include oceania,

strengthening historic ties to advance collective safety and welfare. recent

initiatives to promote renewed engagement through the use of soft power

is one of the most effective ways to facilitate robust collaboration and

ensure that there are no “weak links” in our asia-Pacific security

community. such an approach will be warmly welcomed across oceania.

i

Cook Islands News, september 12, 2001

ii

White house Press release, september 19, 2001

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010919-5.html

iii

Indonesia, for example, received $400 million to promote trade and investment,

especially in the Indonesian oil and gas sector.

iv

Pacific Islands report (PIr), July 25, 2002,

http://166.122.164.43/archive/2002/july/07%2D25%2D10.htm

v

gerard a. finin, “renew ties with Pacific islands to bolster ‘Weak link.’” The Honolulu

Advertiser, october 28, 2001. vi

for evidence of passport sales see, ronald g. crocombe, The South Pacific, suva:

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• Japanese security policy is currently undergoing review following

the victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the august

2009 elections. the new hatoyama administration has already

indicated its desire to see Japan regain leadership in dealing with

climate change. Increased us-Japan cooperation in this and other

nontraditional, transnational security areas is most likely to be

successful, as the DPJ will be unlikely to stretch the limits of the

legal restrictions placed on the Japan’s self-Defense forces.

Policy Background

During the early 1980s Japan adopted a “comprehensive security

policy” that ostensibly placed less emphasis on military than on economic

and diplomatic means for ensuring the country’s security. the

comprehensive security concept developed as a natural outgrowth of

Japan’s successful postwar experience, in which Japan devoted itself to

economic development while relying on its alliance with the united states

to provide external deterrence and limit its military expenditures.

i Within

the alliance structure, Japan’s actual military planning in the postwar

period focused primarily on defense of the homeland through the end of

the cold War.

In the early 1990s Japan confronted a number of challenges that led to

a reconsideration of its overall security strategy. Japan faced strident

international criticism of its so-called “checkbook diplomacy” in the first

gulf War of 1991. shortly thereafter Japan was unprepared to offer

assistance to the united states in contingency planning for the first north

Korean nuclear crisis, causing what some have called a “minicrisis” in the

alliance. as Japan began to grapple with the issue of how to make an

international contribution to security proportionate to its economic clout,

the un Development Programme (unDP) released a report introducing

the new concept of human security and the need to expand security

strategies beyond traditional territorial-based thinking to confront a

plethora of growing transnational security challenges.

ii

the first serious review of Japan’s cold War security strategy was

carried out in 1994 by Japan’s advisory group on Defense Issues

(commonly referred to as the higuchi commission). the report issued by

the higuchi commission indicated that military dangers now differed

considerably from when the first national Defense Program outline

(nDPo) had been issued in 1976, pointing toward nontraditional threats

Japan’s Transnational Security Agenda

David fouse

Key Findings

• Japan’s top national security priorities lie in the area of traditional

security concerns related to north Korea and china. transnational

challenges are visible in Japan’s overall security thinking but are

clearly secondary concerns. Japan views cooperation with the

united states on global or transnational issues in relation to

us support for its top priorities of north Korea and china.

• Japan’s top transnational security priorities have been

nonproliferation and maritime security, because they are so closely

intertwined with concerns related to north Korea and china.

Disaster relief and peace cooperation activities are also deemed

significant government priorities, although Japan’s participation in

peace cooperation activities has actually declined in recent years.

Disaster relief was emphasized as an area for greater us-Japan

cooperation at the recent Defense ministers Joint Defense

conference by Japan’s new defense minister, toshimi Kitazawa.

• Japan has offered support to us operations in afghanistan and

Iraq, cooperated with efforts aimed at undermining financial

support for terrorism, and contributed to capacity-building in

south asia and southeast asia. however, the Japanese public does

not feel that international terrorism strongly affects them, and

many in the Japanese security community do not seem to make a

firm connection between issues such as transnational organized

crime and the illicit networks that can aid terrorists and

undermine states.

• given its available resources, Japan could do more to confront

transnational organized crime both domestically and

internationally. Japan could strengthen these efforts by passing

anti-conspiracy legislation that would allow it to ratify the un

convention against transnational organized crime (unctoc),

fully implement financial action task force (fatf)

recommendations on money laundering, and take more proactive

steps toward dealing with human trafficking.

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Nonproliferation and Maritime Security

not all transnational security challenges can be easily classified as

traditional or nontraditional threats. some of these issues are deeply

intertwined with traditional security concerns, such as nuclear weapons

proliferation, which crosses over these boundaries and garners greater

attention from Japanese security planners focused on north Korea and

china. Japan has for some time been a leader in the area of

nonproliferation, and north Korean nuclear weapons development

programs have brought even greater attention to this issue. Japan has been

an active participant in discussions aimed at promoting better

implementation of the nuclear non-Proliferation treaty (nPt), early

enforcement of the comprehensive nuclear-test-Ban treaty (ctBt), and

strengthening International atomic energy agency (Iaea) safeguards.

the emphasis that Japan places on nonproliferation was highlighted by

former minister of Defense yasukazu hamada at the asian security

summit (shangri-la Dialogue) in may 2009. In his summit speech

hamada identified complex and stratified global security threats such as

piracy, natural disasters, infectious diseases and climate change as one of

three major trends affecting the region (the two other trends were rapid

military modernization and north Korea’s nuclear and missile tests).

hamada’s emphasis in dealing with global challenges focused specifically

on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and he suggested Japan was

ready to play a more significant role in this area, including promoting

greater understanding of the us-led Proliferation security Initiative (PsI).

maritime security is another priority often mentioned by government

officials during interviews and discussed in Japan’s 2009 defense white

paper. here, one can see close linkages with Japanese concerns about

chinese naval expansion as a driving force in policymaking. Incursions

into Japanese territorial waters by chinese survey ships have been an

ongoing source of tension between the two countries for some time. Both

countries share aspirations to play a greater role in the protection of the

sea lines of communication (sloc) as well as a territorial dispute over the

senkaku/Diaoyutai islands that will make cooperation in this area very

difficult to achieve. not surprisingly, the chinese government’s December

2008 announcement that it would be sending naval vessels to support the

antipiracy coalition in the gulf of aden was quickly followed by a similar

decision by the Japanese government to support that operation. tokyo first

sent the Japan maritime self-Defense force (JmsDf) ships that were

limited to the protection of maritime vessels under the Japanese flag and

arising from an “opaque and uncertain situation.” the higuchi report

emphasized that new multilateral approaches to dealing with security

threats would be necessary, and that Japan would need to create

capabilities to aid in preventing unstable situations from developing into

large-scale conflicts. the gist of this report was then incorporated into a

new nDPo that was released in 1995, which included “areas surrounding

Japan” and contributions to international peacekeeping as valid concerns

of Japanese security policy.

iii throughout the latter half of the 1990s,

support for the idea of human security grew within Japan, culminating in

1999 when Prime minister Keizo obuchi indicated that the concept of

human security would be embodied concretely in Japan’s foreign policy.

iv

a 2003 amendment of Japan’s official Development assistance charter

included a stipulation that the concept of human security would underlie

the implementation of Japanese aid programs in the future.

the 2004 national Defense Program guidelines (nDPg) augmented

Japan’s incorporation of transnational and nontraditional security

challenges into its overall security planning. citing “new threats and

diverse situations” in the evolving security environment—such as the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism—

the 2004 nDPg placed international peacekeeping operations on par with

the defense of Japan for the first time. another first in the 2004 nDPg,

however, was the direct listing of north Korea and china as growing

security concerns. thus, while Japan aimed to broaden the scope of its

security policy in the early part of the new century, it also became

increasingly committed to traditional security concerns and whether or not

it could afford to spread its limited resources across a wider array of

international threats while keeping pace with threats perceived closer to

home. Interviews carried out with Japanese government officials and

subject matter experts during July 2009 indicate that present concerns

about china and north Korea far outweigh a desire to confront so-called

“global issues.” likewise, many Japanese security analysts do not see

these issues as priorities in terms of national security.

the rise of the DPJ to power in august 2009 has put renewed

emphasis on some parts of Japan’s transnational security agenda, such as

reviving its leadership on climate change. It remains to be seen, however,

to what extent Japanese priorities will shift under the new administration.

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constitution and the 1992 International Peace cooperation law. the report

also indicates that the 2004 nDPg’s emphasis on Japan utilizing its PKo

involvement to serve Japan’s national interests has, paradoxically, become

something of an impediment to further participation in un PKo activities.

for example, situations in neighboring areas, such as the north Korean

nuclear issue and the rise of china, are clearly recognized as being directly

relevant to national security, while the growing number of un PKos in

distant places, such as africa, is not.

vi

meanwhile, Japan has continued to offer support in the area of

international disaster relief. Because disaster relief and humanitarian

assistance efforts are for the most part noncontroversial topics in Japan,

this is an area where Japan is looking to expand its cooperation. the

limitations on Japan’s military derived from its unique postwar

constitution have led it to develop capabilities that can be of great value in

responding to natural disasters internationally. sDf capabilities in

international disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services

such as first aid and epidemic prevention, (2) transport of goods, patients,

and disaster relief personnel by helicopter, and (3) ensuring water supplies

using water-purifying devices. In addition Japan is a major contributor to

financial assistance packages for disaster relief in countries all over the

world. Japan also supplies twenty-seven member states with disasterrelated information at the asian Disaster reduction center in Kobe city,

hyogo prefecture. Disaster relief was emphasized as an area for greater

us-Japan cooperation at the recent Defense ministers Joint Defense

conference by Japan’s new defense minister toshimi Kitazawa.

In the area of pandemic disease, Japan has been a major contributor to

the global fund to fight aIDs, tuberculosis, and malaria as part of its

focus on human security. Japan also has contributed to the fight against

avian flu in asia, contributing funds to assist asian countries with the

stockpiling of five hundred thousand courses of antiviral drugs and

training personnel from asian countries to respond to outbreaks of this

disease. In 2005 Japan developed its own domestic “Pandemic Influenza

Preparedness action Plan” in compliance with the global plan of the

World health organization (Who) to facilitate countermeasures in the

event of an outbreak. In september 2009 Japan contributed approximately

us$10.8 million of emergency grant aid through the Who to help extend

vaccinations in developing countries in light of the worldwide h1n1

influenza pandemic.

could only use their weapons in self-defense. after the Diet passed a new

antipiracy law in June 2009, the JmsDf was allowed to escort foreign

commercial ships and fire upon pirate ships if they do not respond to

warnings. this meant that, at least in theory, the JmsDf could be involved

in escorting chinese merchant ships while the chinese navy similarly

protected Japanese commercial vessels. the type of loose multilateral

naval cooperation evident in the gulf of aden antipiracy operations will

be much harder to achieve, however, as the focus moves closer to home in

terms of disputed territories, territorial waters and claims regarding

exclusive economic zones. some Japanese analysts have expressed a

desire to see the sino-us maritime military consultative agreement

(mmca) expand to include Japan in a trilateral format to facilitate greater

cooperation and incident prevention in this area.

Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief and Pandemic Disease

In recognition of a new and changing security paradigm, the 2004

nDPg signaled that Japan would look beyond its borders and make efforts

to ensure a stable international environment to prevent security threats

from reaching Japan. the 2004 document stated, “Japan will, on its own

initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities

as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.” under the 2004 nDPg Japan

has created a new central readiness force regiment intended for quick

dispatch to international peace cooperation activities.

v Japan also plans to

establish a new International Peace cooperation center under the Joint

staff college to train Japan self-Defense forces (JsDf) personnel,

officials, and other related staff and to conduct publicity on the behalf of

JsDf international peace cooperation activities.

Despite these positive steps and the new emphasis on proactive

international peace cooperation, Japan’s contributions in this area have

actually been on the decline in recent years. Japan’s national Institute for

Defense studies annual publication, east asian strategic review 2009,

acknowledges this point and attributes this decline to several factors,

including a recent shift to more un peacekeeping operations (PKos)

being carried out as “chapter vII” operations, in which the use of force is

authorized. While Japan’s constitution allows for sDf participation in

chapter vII operations in the areas of humanitarian assistance, airlift

support, and similar duties in noncombat zones, the Japanese government

has had to walk a fine line in adhering to the limitations imposed by the

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been at least partially implemented, Japan still lacks a coherent national

strategy for combating terrorism both domestically and internationally.

xi

In a similar vein, a policy recommendation by a group of Japan’s top

security analysts affiliated with the tokyo foundation recently indicated

that Japan lacks the necessary legal arrangements and crisis management

systems to deal with a terrorist attack on Japanese soil.

xii the policy

recommendation suggests there is a need for Japan to send a clear message

demonstrating that it has the national will to fight against terrorism by all

means. these analysts argue that, “Despite the actual acts of terror in

southeast asia and europe and the conspicuous drug transactions that can

be financial sources for terrorists, citizens of Japan do not regard the

deteriorating situation of afghanistan as a security issue that affects

them.” xiii

Interviews conducted in July 2009 with officials from the Japanese

ministry of Defense and foreign affairs indicate that the above statement

also could be applied to the policymaking level. ministry of Defense

officials clearly do not see transnational issues such as drug and human

trafficking within the parameters of their national security strategy, despite

the often-reported links between these types of transnational crimes and

terrorist financing and support networks. one candid government official

intimated that while the battle against international terrorism is given

rhetorical support, the reality is that the issue does not get high priority

within the Japanese government, and that most Japanese initiatives in this

area are seen internally in terms of alliance management.

Transnational Organized Crime

While contributing to the unDP’s afghan counter narcotics trust

fund and sharing us concerns over north Korea’s reported drug

trafficking, Japan could do significantly more when it comes to dealing

with transnational organized crime, both internationally and domestically.

the Japanese Diet has failed to agree on an anticonspiracy bill for the fifth

consecutive year. as a result, Japan remains unable to ratify the unctoc,

although it has signed the unctoc and its three protocols. Japan is also

not yet a party to the un convention against corruption.

In the area of drug trafficking, where Japanese organized crime groups

(known collectively as the yakuza) play a significant role in asia,

Japanese law enforcement is faced with legal constraints that both prevent

the passing of timely and useful information to foreign nations in

Terrorism

Japan has been one of the united states’ most vocal supporters in

fighting the battle against terrorism since the september 2001 attacks in

new york and Washington. In addition to diplomatic support, Japan has

made precedent-setting contributions through its dispatch of the ground

self-Defense forces (gsDf) and air self-Defense forces (asDf) to Iraq

for humanitarian aid and reconstruction as well as its deployment of the

JmsDf to the Indian ocean for refueling operations in assistance of

operation enduring freedom in afghanistan. Japan also has played an

important role in fundraising activities for reconstruction in afghanistan

and contributed substantial financial resources of its own to this cause.

less publicized contributions include Japan’s support for capacitybuilding in southeast asian countries. Japan’s focus in this area has been

to enhance southeast asian countries’ basic governance capacities in areas

such as law enforcement, export control, money laundering, antipiracy, air

and sea port security, immigration control, and proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction.

vii Japan has ratified the thirteen un counterterrorism

conventions and protocols and has held training seminars for other asian

countries aimed at facilitating their adoption and implementation of the

un conventions and protocols.

Japan has taken on significant risk in supporting us-led operations in

afghanistan and Iraq. In november of 2003 al-Qaeda issued a warning to

Japan not to send troops to Iraq or it would face terrorist attacks. During

the same week, an al-Qaeda operative identified as abu mohamed alablaj sent an email to the arab language weekly Al-Majallah, in which he

claimed that tokyo would be “the easiest place to destroy.”viii the next

event that brought the issue of terrorism closer to home for Japan was the

discovery that lionel Dumont, a frenchman believed to have ties to alQaeda, had made numerous deposits and withdrawals from a postal

savings account after entering Japan on a fake passport several times in

2002 and 2003ix and was suspected of attempting to create a terrorist cell

inside Japan. this revelation contributed to Japan’s adopting the action

Plan for Prevention of terrorism in late 2004. the action plan covers

sixteen items related to border control, prevention of domestic activities

(through identification of foreign guests at hotels and inns), bomb material

control, the suppression of terrorist financing, infrastructure prevention

and intelligence gathering.

x

however, naofumi miyasaka, a counterterrorism expert at Japan’s

national Defense academy, notes that while most of these measures have

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elimination of trafficking, noting that while there was an increase in the

number of sex trafficking prosecutions in 2008, most convicted offenders

were given suspended sentences. the report also noted that the Japanese

government had not yet effectively addressed the problem of trafficking

for labor exploitation. one of the report’s key recommendations was for

the Japanese government to expand collaboration with nongovernmental

organizations (ngos) as “one the most effective tools the government has

available to its efforts to combat trafficking.”xvii

Climate Change

Japan’s stewardship of the development of the Kyoto Protocols in the

1990s was symbolic of its efforts to stake out a leadership position on

newly emerging transnational threats during this period. Japan first

developed its own action Plan to Prevent global Warming in october

1990 and brought these proposals to the earth summit in rio de Janeiro,

where the united nations framework convention on climate change

(unfccc) was adopted in may 1992. Japan’s action plan accepted

separate roles for developed and developing countries, stating that major

developed countries should take common efforts to limit emissions. In the

summer of 1997, Japan domestically formed the Joint conference on

relevant advisory councils to establish its approach toward climate

change. In December 1997 Japan hosted the unfccc’s third conference

of the Parties (coP), playing a key role in attempting to moderate and

facilitate negotiations between the european union and the united states,

which led to the Kyoto Protocol.

xviii

In the years following the development of the Kyoto Protocol, Japan

has continued to attempt to influence the international debate on climate

change, though its own position within that debate has slowly shifted away

from its earlier emphasis on the role of developed nations. Japan’s “cool

earth 50” proposal at the unfccc’s coP-13 meeting held in Bali in

December 2007, which calls for a halving of global greenhouse gas

emissions by 2050, was accompanied by a speech by then Prime minister

shinzo abe, who argued that global warming must be addressed by the

whole world, given the reality that some of the developing countries are

emitting substantial amounts of greenhouse gases.

xix abe’s proposal was

followed by Prime minister fukuda’s “cool earth Promotion Program,”

which emphasized once again that fair and equitable emissions targets

were essential, while adding that Japan could play a greater role in the

international drug investigations and make it very difficult for Japanese

police authorities to proactively investigate members of international drug

cartels that operate inside Japan. most investigations conducted in Japan

only disrupt drug operations at the lower levels of couriers and street

dealers. In 1992 Japan passed the anti-Drug special law to deal with

drug-related money laundering; however, its narrow scope—and the

burden of requiring law enforcement to prove a direct link between money

and assets to specific drug activity—has limited the law’s effectiveness. In

2008 Japan underwent its third comprehensive mutual evaluation by the

fatf on its implementation of the 40 + 9 recommendations for

countering money laundering. the fatf review concluded that Japan was

fully compliant with only four recommendations, with notable deficiencies

in areas specific to financial institutions.

xiv

Proactive measures by Japanese law enforcement also are needed to

address human trafficking, which is another reported source of income for

the Japanese yakuza. While Japan has contributed funds to antitrafficking

projects around the world, it has not yet ratified the un trafficking in

Persons Protocol. Japan is a destination and transit point for men, women

and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial

sexual exploitation. Women and children from east asia, southeast asia,

eastern europe, russia, and south america are trafficked to Japan for

commercial sex exploitation. men and women from china, Indonesia, the

Philippines, vietnam, and other asian countries are sometimes subject to

forced labor.

xv Japanese authorities’ attitudes toward human trafficking,

considering the resources at their disposal, have often been described as

lax. In 2004 the us state Department’s trafficking in Persons (tIP)

report listed Japan on the “tier 2 Watch list” along with countries such

as thailand, vietnam and the Philippines known to have serious human

trafficking problems.

xvi Japan has since taken efforts to demonstrate its

seriousness in dealing with human trafficking, including the adoption in

December 2004 of a comprehensive national action Plan of measures to

combat trafficking of persons. the new action plan amended the penal

code to directly criminalize the conduct of buying and selling persons and

designated human trafficking as a predicate offence for money laundering.

It also increased scrutiny of immigration practices related to Japan’s

“amusement businesses” (otherwise known as the sex industry).

In recognition of these efforts, Japan has been removed from the tier 2

Watch list, but the 2009 tIP report indicates that the government of

Japan still does not fully comply with minimum standards for the

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Implications for the US-Japan Alliance

Increasing efforts to deal with transnational security challenges

worldwide holds both the potential for greater us-Japan security

cooperation as well as for increasing frustration regarding differences in

country priorities. If Japan can truly develop a leadership position in

dealing with disaster relief, climate change and other transnational issues,

it will help to offset the limitations placed on Japan’s contributions in

traditional security areas by its postwar constitution. on the other hand, if

tokyo sees the united states as overly preoccupied with the middle east

and international terrorism, Japan is likely to focus its energy and

resources on security concerns dealing with china and north Korea at the

risk of drawing criticism from Washington. In this sense, the broadening

security paradigm only heightens the ever-present need for closer

consultation and coordination between the two governments.

us concern with defeating international terrorism and its enabling

illicit activities is not likely to abate any time soon. Just as the united

states will need to reassure its ally on external deterrence, Japan will need

to more proactively deal with transnational organized crime flowing across

its own borders. While Japan will naturally reserve its greatest resources

for its highest-threat priorities, increasing cooperation in peacekeeping and

disaster relief activities—in line with Japan’s own previously stated

policy—will also enhance its diplomatic capital in Washington.

Japan’s new leadership is in the process of reviewing security policy

and, based on the DPJ’s established platform, will most likely focus the

international efforts of its self-Defense forces on noncombat, unsanctioned activities that do not stretch the limitations of the postwar

constitution. this does not mean, however, that Japan’s international

contribution to security will necessarily decline if it applies its wealth of

technological and diplomatic resources toward resolving the many

nontraditional, transnational security challenges the world faces today.

i

see tsuneo akaha, “Japan’s comprehensive security Policy: a new east asian

environment,” Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 4 april, 1991, pp. 324-340.

ii

united nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, available

online at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/.

iii

the emphasis on multilateralism was toned down significantly in the 1995 nDPo due to

us concerns that the bilateral alliance was being overshadowed.

transfer of high-quality environmental technology in an attempt to raise

global energy efficiency by 30 percent by the year 2020. the shift in

Japan’s policy on climate change can be attributed at least in part to

domestic industry’s concerns about Japan taking on an unfair burden vis-àvis china and India as economic competition in the region heats up.

Japan has made very little progress in meeting its own Kyoto Protocol

obligation to achieve a 6 percent emissions reduction from a 1990

baseline, with emissions being reported as 14 percent higher in 2009 than

in 1990 by the Japanese ministry of environment.

xx Japan’s commitment

to combating climate change became an issue in the august 2009 election,

where one poll indicated that 62 percent of the Japanese public felt that the

aso government was not doing enough in this effort, and a solid 63

percent majority favored the DPJ’s call for a 25 percent emissions

reduction by 2020 (versus the 15 percent reduction from 2005 levels

proposed by aso’s liberal Democratic Party).

xxi the DPJ’s platform

called for implementing a purchase system that would require power

companies to buy the entire power output of renewable energy and not

simply the surplus power. the DPJ also proposed increasing renewable

energy to 10 percent of Japan’s total primary supply by 2020. It also has

called for a cap-and-trade system that would bind polluters to mandatory

emission limits.

With the support of popular opinion, Japan’s newly elected Prime

minister yukio hatoyama made the announcement of Japan’s commitment

to a 25 percent reduction in emissions at the un summit on climate

change in september 2009. hatoyama also has pledged that Japan will

provide both technology and funding to developing countries attempting

to fight global warming. following his announcement of Japan’s 25

percent cut in september, Prime minister hatoyama took his message to

the second trilateral summit between the leaders of china, Japan and

south Korea held in Beijing in october 2009. the three leaders pledged to

work closely together to find a successful approach to climate change once

the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2013. climate change was also a major

agenda item when us President Barack obama visited tokyo in

november 2009. hatoyama and obama pledged to make the copenhagen

summit on climate change (the unfccc’s coP-15) in December 2009 a

success and to have their two countries work together through expanding

their research and development cooperation to provide solutions to the

challenges of global energy security and climate change.

100 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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xx

the Wall street Journal, “Japan Pledges to cut emissions by 15%,” 11 June 2009,

available online at: http://online.wsj.com/article/sB124462901241601729.html.

xxi

“new Japanese Poll: aso government failing on climate change,” available online at:

http://www.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/climate_deal/news/cli

mate_press_page/?unewsID=166021.

iv

Bert edstrom, “Japan and the challenge of human security: founding of a new Policy

1995-2003,” Institute for security and Development Policy. available online at:

http://www.isdp.eu/biblio/japanandchallengehumansecurity,foundingnewpolicy1995-2003.

v

the central readiness force regiment was established in march 2008.

vi

the national Institute for Defense studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2009 (The Japan

Times, may 2009) pp. 264-265.

vii

David fouse and yoichiro sato, “enhancing Basic governance: Japan’s comprehensive

counterterrorism assistance to southeast asia”, asia-Pacific center for security studies,

asia-Pacific Papers, feb., 2006. online at:

http://www.apcss.org/Publications/aPsss/Japanctcooperation.pdf.

viii

Joseph ferguson, “al Qaeda’s threat to Japan: tokyo’s Wake-up call to the War on

terrorism,” the Jamestown foundation, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 2, no. 2, Jan. 2004.

ix

Dumont was arrested in germany in December 2003 and extradited to france for crimes

he was convicted of committing there in the 1990s while a member of a radical Islamist

group known as the roubaix gang.

x

naofumi miyasaka, “Japan’s counterterrorism Policy,” sIs publication available online

at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090201_bsa_miyasaka.pdf.

xi

Ibid., p.15. miyasaka confirmed these reservations during a personal interview with the

author in July 2009.

xii

shinichi Kitaoka, akihiko tanaka, chikaku ueki, matake Kamiya, Ken Jimbo and

tsuneo Watanabe, “new security strategy for Japan: multilayered and cooperative

security strategy,” the tokyo foundation, Policy recommendations, october 8, 2008.

xiii

Ibid., p. 16.

xiv

us state Department, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report available

online at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/index.htm. for excellent background

on these issues see h. r. friman, “obstructing markets: organized crime networks and

Drug control in Japan” in h. richard friman and Peter andreas, eds., Illicit Global

Economy and State Power rowman & littlefield Publishers (february 28, 1999).

xv

us state Department, 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report available online at:

http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/.

xvi

see rollie lal, “Japanese trafficking and smuggling” in Kim thatchuk ed.,

Transnational Threats, Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life Prager

(may 30, 2007).

xvii

us state Department, 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report.

xviii

see takashi hattori, “Japan’s Way forward: mainstreaming the climate change

Policies in World Politics.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Isa’s 49th annual

convention, Bridging multiple Divides, hilton san francisco, ca, usa, mar 26, 2008.

xix

Prime minister shinzo abe’s speech to “the future of asia” conference held in tokyo,

24 may 2007 is cited in takashi hattori “Japan’s Way forward,” pp. 9-10.

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• By playing a global role in addressing transnational threats

commensurate with its national power, Korea believes that what it

is doing is good for the international community and, ultimately,

good for Korea in enhancing its capacity to deal with future

challenges.

With the end of the cold War, the security challenges facing south

Korea have not abated but have, in fact, increased in complexity and

scope. While many countries have reaped the peace dividend from the end

of the east-West conflict, the Korean Peninsula remains a security flash

point, with north and south Korea still bitterly divided and locked in a

military standoff along the most heavily fortified border in the world—the

Demilitarized Zone. With the Korean War still unresolved in the Korean

Peninsula, the dangerous stalemate has been exacerbated by the ongoing

development of nuclear arms program by north Korea. the controversy

over the program first emerged in the early 1990s (first nuclear crisis) only

to subside temporarily with the signing of the agreed framework in 1994

before reemerging in 2002 (second nuclear crisis) as the most pressing

regional security problem in the post–cold War period.

While north Korea has defended its nuclear program on the basis of

protecting its national sovereignty and security, south Korea and regional

powers such as the united states, china, russia, and Japan have been

united in their opposition to the program as destabilizing and undermining

regional peace and security. Despite ongoing efforts to find a lasting

solution to the north Korean nuclear problem, it remains an intractable

issue. With north Korea carrying out further nuclear and missile tests in

the first half of 2009, tensions continue to remain high on the Korean

Peninsula. therefore, even with the end of the cold War, the Korean

government has continued to focus on the traditional military threat from

north Korea.

however, due to fundamental changes in the international security

environment in the post–cold War period, Korean policymakers have

gradually expanded their threat perception to include security challenges

that do not conform to conventional criteria of a military threat—namely

nontraditional or transnational threats. In fact, the government has come to

recognize that Korea now faces new security challenges to the safety and

welfare of its citizens such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction (WmD), natural disasters, piracy, international organized

crime, and cyber-crime. Because these new threats are not only growing

Republic of Korea: Meeting the Challenge of

Transnational Threats in the Twenty-first Century

steven Kim

Key Findings

• Due to the changing nature of security threats in the post–cold War

period, the Korean government has developed a more expansive

concept of security to take into account the confluence of

traditional and nontraditional threat elements characterizing

Korea’s security environment.

• the Korean government’s desire not to passively follow but to

actively lead efforts in promoting international security reflects its

growing aspiration to become a global player—global Korea—

commensurate with its national power and international status.

• given the high threat perception of terrorism, the Korean

government has recognized the need for comprehensive and

systematic counterterrorism efforts not only at the domestic but

also at the global level.

• Korea’s participation in multilateral naval operations to suppress

piracy is a manifestation of its desire to assume greater

responsibility for maintaining international peace and safety.

• the Korean government has taken aggressive steps to prevent

transshipment of drugs through its borders and domestic export

of precursor chemicals.

• President lee has taken a visible and proactive stance in

addressing the problem of climate change through major, new

initiatives in the domestic and international arena.

• By agreeing to elevate the roK-us alliance to a strategic

partnership based on common values, the lee myung-bak

administration has broadened the scope of bilateral cooperation

with the united states to include countering transnational threats

at the regional and global levels.

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moreover, has passed or revised legislation to provide the legal basis for

interagency coordination such as the terrorism Prevention law and the

integrated civil Defense law.

lastly, since transnational threats by their nature cannot be effectively

addressed by the efforts of any one nation, the Korean government has

committed itself to working bilaterally and multilaterally with other

countries. as its most important bilateral partner, the Korean government

has agreed with the united states to transform their alliance relationship—

which traditionally focused on deterring north Korea—into a futureoriented, strategic relationship equipped to deal with global threats such as

terrorism, WmD proliferation, piracy, organized crime and narcotics,

climate change, and epidemic diseases. the Korean government also

intends to take a leadership role in multilateral organizations such as the

united nations, the asia-Pacific economic cooperation (aPec), the

association of southeast asian nations Plus three (asean+3), the

asean regional forum (arf), and the east asia summit (eas) to

promote greater dialogue and cooperation in addressing the new security

challenges of the twenty-first century. the Korean government’s desire not

to passively follow but to actively lead efforts in promoting international

security reflects its growing aspiration to become a global player—global

Korea—commensurate with its national power and international status.

Terrorism

terrorism is perceived not only by the public but also by the roK

government to be the most important transnational threat facing Korea.

south Korea has been no stranger to terrorism and since 1958 has suffered

from many terrorism-related events involving bombings, shootings,

hijacking, and kidnappings of its citizens. Prior to 1990, almost all of the

terrorist-related events occurred inside the country and were carried out by

the north Korean regime. since 1990, however, most of the terrorist

attacks against south Korean citizens—including diplomats, businessmen,

and tourists—have occurred abroad such as in Iraq, afghanistan, nigeria,

somalia, and yemen and have been carried out by international terrorist

organizations.

since 9/11, there have been four high-profile incidents that have

heightened public awareness and concern over terrorism as a security

threat. In may 2004, a Korean contractor was kidnapped and later

gruesomely executed by an Islamist group who claimed that the killing

but also are diversifying rapidly due to globalization and advances in

information technology, they have accentuated the already high level of

uncertainty surrounding Korea’s security environment. the changing

nature of security threats in the post–cold War period, therefore, has

prompted the Korean government to develop a more expansive concept of

security to take into account the confluence of traditional and nontraditional threat elements characterizing Korea’s security environment.

the expanded threat perception of the government also is reflected in

the Korean public at large. In a public opinion poll conducted in south

Korea, the Korean public identified not only traditional but also nontraditional security challenges as “critical threats” to their country’s vital

interests. among the nontraditional threats, the public cited international

terrorism (61 percent), potential epidemics (51 percent), and global

warming (48 percent). as for traditional threats, the public identified

“north Korea becoming a nuclear power” (59 percent), “the rise of

Japanese military power” (47 percent), and “development of china as a

world power” (46 percent) as critical threats.

i therefore, the Korean

public’s perception of the top two threats—one traditional and the other

nontraditional—reflects a broad societal consensus on the importance of

both types of threats to roK security.

the government has begun to develop a comprehensive security

posture to effectively respond to an increasingly wider spectrum of threats

to Korean security. first, the government seeks to enhance the capabilities

of its armed forces by creating a more technology-intensive and

information-centric military. the advanced capabilities will enable the

military not only to defend Korea from a military threat on the Korean

Peninsula, but also to respond with greater flexibility and efficiency to

diverse threats as they evolve from the rapidly changing international

security environment. to further ensure the effectiveness of the military in

responding to varied threats, the government has begun to reorganize the

force structure by establishing specific military units with the requisite

staff and equipment to deal with transnational and non-traditional threats

during peacetime.

second, the government has developed a “whole of government”

approach to responding to national contingencies such as terrorism and

large-scale natural disasters by integrating the crisis-response capabilities

of its civilian and military sectors through interagency coordination. the

coordinated response by the whole of government is necessary, since not

all threats can be addressed solely by military means. the government,

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emergency response system. the south Korean government first

established guidelines for countering terrorism in response to the terrorist

attack during the 1972 munich olympic games and north Korean

terrorist attacks in the 1980s. But it was only after south Korea was

chosen to host the 1988 olympic games that the government created a

national system of emergency management for terrorism-related events

with the passage of the Presidential order for counterterrorism of 1982.

the original law was amended in its entirety in 2005 to better respond to

large-scale, unconventional terrorist events in the wake of the 9/11 World

trade center and the us anthrax letter attacks in 2001. the law was

further revised in 2008.

the efficiency of the national emergency response system in

conducting anti-terrorism operations has been improved through the

creation of a unified system of command and inter-agency cooperation.

the Korean government also has begun issuing e-passports to protect the

identity of lawful travelers and prevent the use of fake passports by

terrorists. the government, moreover, has passed the anti-terrorist

financing legislation to curb money laundering by terrorist organizations,

either in or through the country. But, it has yet to pass a comprehensive

anti-terrorism bill, which has been pending in the national assembly for

years. although the bill would provide a solid legal basis for

government-led efforts to curb terrorism, human rights activists have

raised concerns about the possibility of granting excessive power to the

state intelligence agency, which may lead to violation of the right to

privacy and other civil liberties.

fully aware that comprehensive and systematic counterterrorism

efforts are indispensable at the global level, the Korean government also

has been active both bilaterally and multilaterally in promoting counterterrorism efforts. With increasing numbers of Koreans working, traveling,

and living abroad, the government is strengthening cooperation with

antiterrorism authorities in various countries where Korean nationals are

vulnerable to terrorism. In addition, the roK has held consultative

meetings with twenty countries and international organizations from

various regions to exchange information and expertise, to discuss

measures for counterterrorism capacity-building and technical support,

and for cooperation in case of a terrorist incident. the Korean government

also has signed twenty-four extradition treaties and nineteen mutual legal

assistance treaties with various foreign governments to expedite and

support cross border counterterrorist investigations and prosecution. as

was in response to south Korea’s plans to send three thousand troops to

participate in the us-led military operation in Iraq. In february 2007, a

Korean soldier was killed in a suicide bomb attack at the us Bagram air

Base in afghanistan. then, five months later in July 2007, twenty-three

Korean christian volunteers in afghanistan were kidnapped by the

taliban, who demanded the withdrawal of south Korean military

personnel from afghanistan. after the killing of two male Korean

hostages, the Korean government was able to secure the release of the

rest of the hostages by promising to withdraw the Korean military

personnel from afghanistan once their mandate expired in 2007. the

latest terrorist incident occurred in march 2009 when, for the first time,

four Korean tourists were killed by a suicide bomber linked to an alQaeda terrorist group in yemen. a few days later, the Korean government

officials who went to yemen to investigate the incident were attacked by

another suicide bomber but escaped without casualties. With thirteen

million Koreans traveling overseas annually, south Korean businesses

expanding their operations abroad, and Korean troops being dispatched to

foreign countries, terrorist attacks against Koreans are likely to increase

in the future.

While there has been no domestic terrorist attack by international

terrorist organizations, the possibility of such an attack occurring cannot

be ruled out when considering Korea’s alliance relationship with the

united states and its involvement in us-led overseas military operations,

the presence of us military installations and personnel in the country, and

Korea’s hosting of major international events. the vulnerability to an

international terrorist attack in Korea is highlighted by the fact that from

2004–08, the roK government arrested seventy-four foreigners, mostly

muslims from south asia or southeast asia, as terrorism suspects. many

of the suspects were found to have been involved in collecting information

on us military forces in south Korea or planning terror attacks on nonKoreans. some arabs who have been caught were involved in criminal

activities to provide funding for terrorist activity. the suspects arrested by

the Korean government were expelled and sent back to their home

countries to face legal prosecution.

given the high threat perception of terrorism, the Korean government

has recognized the need for comprehensive and systematic

counterterrorism efforts not only at the domestic but also at the global

level. first, it has sought to strengthen its domestic counterterrorism

capacity by consolidating its domestic legal arrangements and the national

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latest incident involved the september 10, 2008 hijacking of a merchant

vessel, Bright ruby, with eight Koreans onboard. Prompted by increasing

public pressure to protect Korean vessels after the french government in

april 2008 rescued a hijacked french vessel by military means and the

passage of a series of un security council resolutions sanctioning

foreign military intervention to suppress piracy in somali territorial waters

in 2008, the Korean government approved the deployment of the naval

unit, cheonghae-jin, to somali waters in march of 2009. the unit

consisted of a destroyer, munmu the great (on a rotating six-month tour),

with three hundred crew-members, a lynx anti-submarine helicopter, and

three rigid inflatable boats. the name of the unit refers to a maritime base

in the yellow sea (on what is now Wando Island) that was established by

the renowned Korean general Jang Bogo (787–846 aD) of the unified

silla Kingdom to protect his vast commercial empire from pirate attacks.

the Korean destroyer’s primary mission is to ensure the safety of

Korean and other foreign commercial ships by escorting them through

pirate-infested waters. Its mandate also includes conducting operations to

monitor, inspect, stop and seize pirate vessels by using force, if necessary,

and to prevent arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and terrorism in

cooperation with us-led multinational combined task force 151 of the

combined forces maritime component command based in Bahrain. the

south Korean navy also is to coordinate closely with the us and Japanese

navies, on which they will rely for material support in conducting

operations in somali waters. since its deployment, munmu the great has

escorted a total of three hundred ships and has rescued seven commercial

vessels (including a north Korean ship) from pirate attacks.

the deployment of a Korean naval unit is significant beyond the

suppression of piracy. sending its military for the first time to protect the

lives and the property of its citizens abroad is the clearest affirmation by

the Korean government of the importance of protecting vital sea lanes

critical to Korea’s foreign trade and energy supply and of developing its

naval power to protect its national interests. second, instead of operating

independently or waiting for the creation of a un-led force, the decision

by Korea to join the us-led combined task force 151 to carry out

antipiracy operations is a sign of its commitment to cooperate with the

united states in mitigating transnational threats and, more broadly, to

strengthen the roK-us strategic alliance on the basis of common interests

and values. third, the roK’s participation in multilateral military

operations to suppress piracy is a manifestation of Korea’s desire to

part of its efforts to join the visa Waiver program, south Korea also has

agreed on a mechanism to exchange terrorist screening information with

Washington.

the Korean government also has vigorously supported the efforts of

the united nations and regional organizations, including aPec and arf,

to strengthen international cooperation in combating terrorism. Korea is

now a party to the twelve International antiterrorism conventions and

Protocols and has signed the “International convention for the

suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.” It is also actively involved in

implementing the travel restrictions and financial sanctions on the

individuals and entities linked to al-Qaeda and the taliban imposed by the

un al-Qaeda and taliban sanctions committee. from 2007–09, Korea

chaired the aPec counterterrorism task force and played a leading role

in launching various counterterrorism projects to ensure that regional trade

and investment not be disrupted by terrorism. the Korean government

also signed the roK-asean “Joint Declaration for cooperation to

combat International terrorism” in July 2005 to assist asean member

countries in strengthening their counter-terrorism capacity through

education, training, and consultations. lastly, the Korean government has

been very active in the annual Intersessional meeting, seminars, and

workshops sponsored by arf to address counterterrorism and

transnational criminal issues. In the early half of 2009, the roK cochaired the seventh arf Intersessional meeting on counterterrorism and

transnational crime. thus, the Korean government has been increasingly

proactive in trying to contain the threat of terrorism both at the domestic

and international level.

Piracy

along with terrorism, piracy is viewed as an important transnational

threat by the Korean public and the government. Piracy has garnered

public attention because of increasing incidents of somali pirates seizing

Korean merchant vessels—as well as foreign vessels with Korean sailors

onboard—and holding their crews for ransom in the gulf of aden.

approximately five hundred Korean vessels transit through the gulf of

aden each year, and about one hundred and fifty of them are vulnerable to

pirate attacks because of their low speed.

since 2006, six vessels that were either Korean-flagged or carrying

Korean crew members have been hijacked off the waters of somalia. the

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greater power to punish domestic companies for exporting precursor

chemicals. But the lead agency responsible for the program—the Korean

food and Drug administration—does not have sufficient resources and

manpower to monitor the program effectively. to curb the flow of drugs

through airports, the government has increased the presence of security

personnel and instituted tighter screening processes for persons, luggage,

express mail and cargo.

In addition, Korea has strengthened international cooperation to

mitigate drug trafficking. Korea is a party to the 1988 un Drug

convention, the 1971 un convention on Psychotropic substances, and

has signed the un convention on transnational organized crime. Korean

authorities also exchange information with international counter-narcotics

organizations such as the united nations office on Drugs and crime

(unoDc) and the International criminal Police organization

(InterPol). Korea, moreover, has signed extradition treaties with

twenty-three countries and mutual legal assistance treaties with seventeen

countries including the united states. these treaties are essential in

facilitating cross-border drug trafficking investigations and prosecution.

furthermore, roK narcotic law enforcement authorities work closely with

the us embassy’s Drug enforcement administration seoul country

office and the us Immigration and customs enforcement officials in cosponsoring training programs, sharing intelligence on the importation of

precursor chemicals into Korea, and monitoring airport and drug

transshipment methods and trends. In 2007 the Korean government also

established a liaison office for International cooperation in the golden

triangle region to provide laotian law enforcement officials with training

in drug investigation techniques and equipment, as well as assisting with

their anti-drug abuse public campaign. this capacity-building program

was extended to cambodia and vietnam in 2008, and the government is

now in discussions with asean to expand this program to other member

countries including Indonesia.

Climate Change and Environmental Degradation

although climate change and environmental degradation do not merit

the same degree of security concern as terrorism or piracy, the current lee

myung-bak administration has recognized climate change and

environmental disasters as potential new threats to the security and welfare

of the Korean people. according to one recent study, global warming on

assume greater responsibility for maintaining international peace and

safety in its pursuit of becoming a “global Korea.”

International Crime: Drug Trafficking

Because narcotics production and drug abuse are not significant

problems in south Korea, the roK regards the transshipment of drugs and

the export of precursor chemicals used in manufacturing illegal drugs as

its most serious drug trafficking concerns. as a result, the Korean

government has taken proactive steps to prevent transshipment of drugs

through its borders and domestic companies from exporting precursor

chemicals. transshipment of drugs is a growing concern because south

Korean ports are increasingly being used as a transit point for the shipment

of large quantities of narcotics by international drug traffickers. Korea has

become an attractive transshipment location because, paradoxically, Korea

does not have a serious drug problem and the Korean port of Pusan is one

of the largest in east asia. By transiting the drugs through Korea, the

illegal shipments are not as likely to draw the attention of contraband

inspectors upon arrival as are shipments from countries with a stronger

link to illegal drug usage or production.

the countries of origin for transshipped drugs include thailand,

china, north Korea and canada for heroin; the united states and spain

for ecstasy; Iran and south africa for marijuana and hashish; and china,

thailand, the Philippines and north Korea for methamphetamine. the

precursor chemicals used for manufacturing narcotics, such as ephedrine

and ascetic anhydride originate mostly from china for transshipment to

south america and to the middle east region. at present, drug abuse is not

a serious problem; however, Korean authorities are concerned that the

popularity of Korea as a transit point for shipping drugs may lead to an

increased supply of drugs in the Korean market. they fear that increased

accessibility and lower prices could lead to greater illicit drug use.

to combat the transshipment of drugs and precursor chemicals, the

Korean government has taken aggressive, proactive steps domestically as

well as internationally. In 2004, the government amended legislation to

enhance its control and enforcement procedures of certain precursor

chemicals and to impose criminal sanctions against companies that

transship precursor chemicals through Korea. Previously the government

could bring only administrative charges of mislabeling against these

companies. the Korean government also has created a program with

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cooperation with china, mongolia, and north Korea to resolve one of the

most serious environmental problems in northeast asia—the dust and

sandstorms (Dss) that are highly detrimental to people’s health and the

economies of countries in northeast asia. the sandstorms, which have

increased in their intensity and frequency in the last fifty years, blow from

the deserts of mongolia and china and, as they pass over the Korean

Peninsula and Japan each spring, deposit dust and fine sand particles

below. as the dust particles pass through the industrial complexes in

eastern china, they pick up pollutants that cause respiratory, skin, and eye

ailments, lung and immune diseases, and damage to the farming and

industrial sectors amounting to billions of dollars.

Korea has tried to tackle the Dss problem multilaterally, as well as

bilaterally, by establishing monitoring stations and promoting reforestation

efforts. But regional cooperation in mitigating Dss has been difficult due

to the security implications of sharing weather observation data. In 2006

Korea, china, Japan, and mongolia agreed to create a regional Dss

monitoring network, which would provide real-time data on dust levels

and wind movements to be shared by the four countries. But, according to

a Japanese press report, just before the start of the test run in february

2008, the chinese government notified the Japanese government that it

would not be able to provide the meteorological data, citing the passage of

a law prohibiting the release of the data as a state secret affecting national

security and interests. Insofar as most of the Dss originate in china, the

country’s lack of participation in the project casts serious doubt on the

feasibility of a regional monitoring network. In contrast to china’s

reluctance to share its weather data with Japan, Korea—which signed a

bilateral agreement with china in 2005 to establish monitoring stations in

central china to better observe and predict the movement of Dss—

continues to receive data from ten Korea-china collaborative Dss

observation centers in china. But the transmission of data to south Korea

from similar Dss observation facilities in north Korea, which the roK

government established in 2007, has been suspended.

In addition to the efforts of the Korean government to work with other

northeast asian countries in developing a regional monitoring and

forecasting network, it has tried to curtail the frequency and the intensity

of Dss by funding reforestation projects in the region. from 2000 to 2006,

Korea’s ministry of environment spent usD $5 million on reforestation in

china and mongolia by planting twenty million trees to prevent further

desertification. Korea also plans to continue helping mongolia with its

the Korean Peninsula is accelerating at twice the pace of the world average

and, in the case of seoul, at three times faster than the global average over

the past century. the effects of climate change are now being felt by

increasing occurrences of typhoons and torrential rainfall.

against this backdrop, President lee has taken a visible and proactive

stance in addressing the problem of climate change through major, new

initiatives in the domestic and international arena. the government has

announced that it will support the global vision of reducing greenhouse

gas emissions by 50 percent by 2050 and plans to announce by the end of

2009 a voluntary mid-term goal of mitigating emissions for the year 2020.

It is currently considering a 4 percent cut in greenhouse emissions by 2020

from 2005 levels, even though Korea is not required to declare a target for

reducing emissions because it is not currently included in annex 1 of the

united nations framework convention on climate change under the

Kyoto Protocol. although the business community is expected to oppose

the government initiative, the 4 percent target is quite modest when

compared with other advanced industrialized countries like Japan and

even some developing countries such as Indonesia, which has announced

it will reduce greenhouse gases by 26 percent by 2020. the Korean

government also has proposed establishing a registry within the secretariat

of the united nations framework convention on climate change to

encourage and support the voluntary reduction of greenhouse gas

emissions by developing countries. In addition, the government, through

its “east asia climate Partnership,” is investing usD $200 million over

the next five years to fund programs that will assist east asian countries in

promoting economic growth compatible with climate change.

to further deal with the global challenge of climate change, the lee

administration has announced an ambitious plan to develop a new

paradigm for economic development based on “low carbon, green

growth.” over the next five years, the government working in conjunction

with the private sector, plans to invest nearly usD $100 billion in

developing green technologies, improving energy efficiency in the

industrial sector, and promoting green lifestyle changes to reduce energy

consumption and resource use. thus, the Korean government has decided

to take a leadership role not only in increasing global awareness of the

dangers of climate change, but also in fostering international cooperation

to address this problem and in reducing gas emissions through the low

carbon, green growth economic model.

the lee administration also has announced that it will strengthen

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Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Transnational

Challenges and the New Afghan State

Kerry lynn nankivell

Key Findings

• afghanistan faces existential transnational threats such as

cross-border militancy and weapons smuggling, smuggling and

trafficking of both licit and illicit goods—including opiates and

refined heroin—and ethnically based extremist ideology.

• though the movement of militants across afghanistan’s border is

of concern, it is important to remember that insurgency is fuelled

by the movement of goods, including arms, drugs, and smuggled

goods such as timber, gems, and precious metals.

• the center of gravity for these threats remains the afghanPakistani border, though important trends show an increase in the

movement of guns and drugs across the northern border with

central asia.

• Improving local governance, with a view to accommodating local

power structures where possible, will be key to strengthening

border security and increasing afghans’stake in the viability of

the afghan state and its institutions of governance.

• the spectrum of activities undertaken by the us-led coalition will

have no lasting result if the activities are not locally adopted in a

sustainable manner. only by strengthening the afghan state can

the coalition ensure that afghanistan is no longer vulnerable to

manipulation and exploitation by outside state and nonstate actors.

afghanistan is not a country that suffers from transnational problems,

afghanistan is a transnational problem. a failed state in every sense of the

word, a lawless afghanistan mired in war for almost three decades has

been the cradle for transnational problems that continue to plague the

central asian region. militancy, arms transfers, smuggling, narcotics

trafficking, and the spread of transnational ethnic and religious ideologies

deployed against established states are only the most urgent of these. this

forestation efforts by planting five hundred hectares of trees every year

from 2007 to 2016 in mongolia. lastly, the four northeast asian countries

are working with the united nations environment Programme (uneP) in

monitoring and reducing dust levels through information sharing.

Conclusion

With the lee myung-bak administration, a major shift has occurred in

the way Korea views and responds to the increasing array of new and

diverse threats to its security in the twenty-first century. the Korean

government is acutely aware that, while the traditional military threat

remains high in the Korean Peninsula due to the ongoing controversy over

the north Korean nuclear issue, roK faces new transnational or

nontraditional threats that often are not subject to the control of national

governments. as a result, the Korean government is cognizant of the

importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in mitigating the danger

that the threats pose to the security and welfare of the Korean people.

By elevating the roK-us alliance to a strategic partnership, the lee

myung-bak administration has broadened the scope of bilateral

cooperation with the united states to counter transnational threats at the

regional and global levels. another noteworthy development that signals a

marked departure from previous administrations is the heightened

determination of the current government to work with the international

community in mitigating transnational threats, not by passively following

the lead of others, but by taking the lead in addressing those threats by

shaping the agenda, setting an example, and contributing expertise and

resources. this proactive response on the part of the Korean government is

a reflection of a growing sense of its own global responsibility for

maintaining international peace and security, of which Korea has been a

beneficiary in its rise to a prominent position in the international

community. By playing a global role in addressing these threats

commensurate with its national power, Korea believes that what it is doing

is good for the international community and, ultimately, good for meeting

Korea’s own future challenges.

i

“Global Views 2004: Comparing South Korean and American Public Opinion and Foreign

Policy,” chicago council on global affairs, 2004,

http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/userfiles/file/Pos_topline%20reports/Pos%202004/

2004%20us_Korea%20comparative%20global_views.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009).

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Focus on Pakistan: The Pashtun Connection

though the movement of troops, arms, and financing for insurgency

flows into afghanistan from each one of its neighbors, the widest and

most reliable stream has come from Pakistan. It is well known and

undisputed that today taliban forces make generous use of Pakistani

territory for staging posts and logistical rear bases, recruitment and rest

and recuperation. though as late as 2007 this circulation of men, arms,

and money seemed to affect only afghanistan, developments in Pakistan

demonstrate that the free movement of militant groups in the afghanPakistan border area presents a grave threat to both Islamabad and Kabul

in equal measure.

Pakistan has much to gain by pursuing a regional strategy against the

movement of militants and arms across its shared border with afghanistan.

While Pakistani leaders, beginning with Zia ul-haq, believed that an

Islamist afghanistan would provide strategic depth to Pakistan vis-à-vis

India, exactly the reverse has happened: Pakistan’s provincially and

federally administered territories have provided strategic depth to the

taliban. Decades of policies, nurturing first a refugee-based insurgency, an

arms pipeline, and an extremist Islamist regime next door, have seriously

threatened not only Pakistani democracy but also the integrity of the

Pakistani state.

Equipping Militants: Transnational Arms Flows

transnational militancy in afghanistan is multiplied by the immensity

of transnational arms flows in the same region. the ubiquity of small and

light weapons in afghanistan, particularly in the border region, means that

rival power centers are well armed and easily mobilized against the central

government. afghanistan is neither a producer nor an exporter of small

weapons but is awash in illegally imported weaponry as a legacy of the

campaign against the soviet union. During this period, the united states

and saudi arabia financed the largest known transfer of small and light

weapons into any single country. the structural design of this covert armssmuggling operation probably made the creation of an illicit, transborder

weapons market inevitable. Because the militants conducted training and

recruitment on one side of the border and insurgent operations on the

other, both rural afghanistan and Pakistan became irreversibly

weaponized. following the withdrawal of the soviets and the fall of the

najibullah government in 1992, considerable stockpiles of weaponry were

analysis will consider these problems under three wider headings:

militancy (including arms transfers), smuggling and trafficking (with an

emphasis on the latter), and the poor governance of afghanistan’s

multiethnic polity, contributing to state weakness. these challenges are

considered the most important in terms of the dangers they pose for the

afghan state and its population; they are by no means exhaustive.

In afghanistan, transnational challenges are more than an academic

diversion from traditional national security concerns. Indeed, the afghan

government’s ability to effectively address these problems will determine

the success or failure of the post–9/11 afghan state.

Fluid Battleground: Transnational Militancy

there is a widespread myth that afghanistan is unusually resistant to

foreign domination. an unromanticized view of the history of this troubled

country cannot but vigorously refute this. even if we discount the major

movements of foreign armies and establishments of great imperial regimes

over afghan people in the premodern period, a cursory examination of

afghanistan since 1747 shows that it has been consistently victim to

foreign intrigue and the overwhelming presence of foreign players,

whether political or military. most recently, afghanistan has been

vulnerable to the interest of a range of external players: Pakistan, the

united states, saudi arabia, India, the soviet union, and Iran, but also the

central asian states and the north american treaty organization (nato).

each of the named states has provided funds, arms, or military forces to

effect political change in afghanistan. of course, the domestic interests of

afghans themselves have shaped and guided modern afghanistan. the

taliban was an afghan movement (or at least, a Pashtun one) with afghan

political goals. It was sustained, however, with considerable outside

intervention, both financially and in terms of equipment and men in arms.

In fact, the majority of afghan governments have been enabled by foreign

support, including both the celebrated mujahidin and the current Karzai

government. the domestic political environment in afghanistan has been

heavily influenced by the transnational movement of funds, arms, and

militants. stemming the tide of arms and militants flowing into

afghanistan from neighboring states, primarily Pakistan, presents a

continuing challenge to the current afghan government.

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inside afghanistan and trafficked elsewhere. Both the smuggling of licit

goods and the trafficking of illicit ones are important revenue streams for

nonstate actors seeking to control afghanistan.

contrary to some literature on this subject, smuggling and the

reemerging narco-economy in particular are not new phenomena to the

afghan economic landscape. the narco-economy, though disrupted by the

taliban’s eradication campaign in 2000 and the international invasion in

2001, has long been a pillar of afghanistan’s real economy. But there

have been changes in the last five years to the structure of afghanistan’s

smuggling problem. these changes reflect shifts occurring in the global

economy of the post–cold War world. traditional smuggling routes out of

afghanistan have been across the southern and western borders, through

Iran and Pakistan. analysts believe that Iran remains the primary route for

drug traffickers, because of the relative ease with which contraband can be

moved through Iran and then to turkey and Western europe. Iran also

provides an important consumer market for heroin, with the number of

addicts estimated in the millions. tehran has consistently waged an

aggressive and sometimes violent border campaign against smugglers and

traffickers, but the movement of goods continues nonetheless. Pakistan

also has seen a lot of illicit activity across almost the entire border, for

several reasons. first, the administrative freedoms granted by Islamabad to

the nWfP and the federally administered tribal areas (fata) have

facilitated an illicit economy out of the view of national authorities.

second, the existence of transborder kinship groups in the Pashtun

community provide built-in commercial relationships across the border.

third, until a crackdown in the late 1990s, Pakistan itself was a significant

global producer of opium, and though cultivation was successfully

eliminated before 2000, trafficking by transport mafias in that area

continues to operate with afghan opiates alone. finally, the so-called

“arms pipeline” that was established to move small and light weapons to

the mujahidin in their campaign against the russians meant that an illicit

transport corridor linking afghanistan and Pakistan was well established

by the mid-1980s and could be adopted for dual use.

In recent years, however, smuggling routes have been increasingly a

problem across afghanistan’s northern border as well, with large surges in

drug trafficking reported. un studies allege that central asia is now the

destination for as much as 65 percent of afghan opiates, with tajikistan

and turkmenistan identified as the primary northern routes. some of the

contraband travels to russia and europe, but much of it is consumed in

redistributed to competing afghan forces. mujahidin-era weaponry

remains the single largest category of weaponry in use in afghanistan. the

presence of these weapons has presented a decades-long transnational

challenge for both Pakistan and afghanistan.

today, Pakistani weapons bazaars, in the north-West frontier Province

(nWfP) in particular, are the site of the sale of both afghan and Pakistani

weapons to both afghan and Pakistani nationals. since the us-led

invasion of afghanistan in 2001, prices of small and light weapons in

afghanistan and Pakistan have undergone significant fluctuations, telling

us something about the forces of supply and demand. In 2002, for

example, weapon prices inside afghanistan appeared to collapse while the

same weapons were sold for three times as much in the Pakistani border

area. this resulted in a net outflow of weapons from afghanistan into

illegal Pakistani markets. more recent anecdotal reports suggest that

weapons prices have again increased inside afghanistan. a report

published in 2006 by the Christian Science Monitor alleges that weapons

prices in northern afghanistan in particular were on the rise, suggesting

that communities were re-arming in anticipation of increased taliban

activity. this price increase will no doubt be reflected in an increased flow

of weapons into afghanistan from Pakistani markets.

although the scale of the problem is of a different order, there is

evidence that some arms flows originate from central asia as well. an

academic quantitative study conducted by michael Bhatia and mark sedra

identifies the border area around Kunduz in particular as a transit point for

“specialized and rare” light weapons coming from russia. Weapons enter

afghanistan from both its northern borders with turkmenistan, uzbekistan

and tajikistan, as well as from the western border with Iran, although the

center of gravity for the transfer of weapons continues to be the afghanPakistani frontier.

Illicit Economy: Smuggling and Trafficking

afghanistan is often described as the ancient transit hub of eurasia.

today, afghanistan continues to exploit its comparative advantage as a

transit route linking south asia, Iran, russia, the central asian republics,

and china by acting as a lucrative conduit of smuggled and trafficked

goods. some of these goods transit through the country, illegally and

without the payment of custom or duty; some of this contraband—notably

opium, refined heroin, timber, gems, and precious stones—is produced

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national interests of afghanistan’s northern neighbors. thus, responding to

russian and central asian concerns, the Bush administration identified the

drug trade as a priority for us operations there in that year.

still, this was not viewed primarily as a transnational challenge.

rather, the us administration viewed the drug trade through the lens of

domestic militancy; i.e., its interest in combating drugs trafficking was

based on the fact that the drug trade was financing insurgent operations in

afghanistan. this narrow concern for insurgency and terrorism within

afghanistan alone meant that the energies of the administration and its

allies were immediately focused on domestic approaches only: crop

eradication, crop substitution, and law enforcement. this policy was

pursued in the following years with a variety of agencies—including the

afghan national Police, us forces, the us Drug enforcement

administration, and afghan provincial governors—but was limited to

activity within afghanistan itself and not in the administrative in-between

spaces of afghanistan’s border control strategy. such an approach ignores

the important transnational nature of the problem.

this domestic strategy appears not to have borne results. the manual

eradication that formed the backbone of coalition antidrug campaigns

resulted in only a mild drop in the number of hectares cultivated. for

much of 2002 to 2008, critics alleged that international policy on what to

do about afghanistan’s emerging narco-economy was stagnated by

disagreements within nato itself about the appropriate use of military

force and the lagging enthusiasm from the afghan government. this latter

problem is most often attributed to the fact that key players in the

international trafficking business in afghanistan are also key government

officials. many of them are local strongmen or warlords who were offered

attractive government posts as part of the reconstruction of the afghan

state. some argued that the situation was unavoidable: the participation of

drug lords in government was a means of increasing local loyalty to the

new central government and co-opting potential rival sources of power in

the afghan countryside. In other words, the counternarcotics agenda was

sidelined in favor of a counterinsurgency and counterterror agenda. By

2008, it seemed clear that this was a false dichotomy. the revenue streams

provided to terrorist and insurgent groups in afghanistan meant that

counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency campaigns needed to be

simultaneously pursued.

responses to other forms of smuggling also have been made

subordinate to other mission goals. though the movement of precious

central asia. today, central asia provides the largest single market for

opiates and heroin, with more users of these substances identified there

than in all of Western europe. tajikistan in particular has seen a

substantial increase in opiate-related crime, whether consumption and

addiction, or cross-border or local trafficking. like Pakistan, tajikistan has

a recent history of border porousness with northern afghanistan. crossborder tajik ethnic communities meant that militants found sympathy and

refuge in each others’ territory (e.g., afghan tajiks during their campaign

against the taliban; tajik Islamist militants in their campaign against the

post-soviet government). turkmenistan found itself vulnerable because of

President niyazov’s conciliatory policy toward the taliban, which

facilitated both licit and illicit trade. all of the central asian republics can

attribute at least part of the explosion in drug trade across their borders to

the fact that the russian mafia was already active in this region. organized

criminal elements from russia successfully acted as a bridge linking

central asia to russian and Western european markets, encouraging a

surge in drug flow. In sum, an unfortunate mix of preexisting communities

of interest, working supply routes, and criminal elements conspired to

ensure that afghanistan’s northern boundary witnessed the movement of a

healthy share of afghanistan’s heroin exports.

Poppy production centers have shifted to reflect this change in supply

routes to favor the northern border. for instance, Badakhstan in

northeastern afghanistan is now among the most productive afghan

provinces with respect to poppies. from afghanistan’s northern border

opiates are moved through central asia to russia and on to europe.

today, almost all of the heroin consumed in russia originates in

afghanistan, as does almost all of that consumed as far west as the

united Kingdom.

Agents of Change

not surprisingly, the first impetus to act against the drug trade in

afghanistan was prompted by an outcry by afghanistan’s northern

neighbors. relatively unaffected by militancy in afghanistan, russia and

the central asian states succeeded in convincing both the us

administration and its client administration in afghanistan that measures

needed to be taken to curb the exploding drug trade. By 2004, opium

production in afghanistan had reached unprecedented levels, and new

transit routes across afghanistan’s border were causing harm to the

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important to recognize that at its core, afghanistan suffers from weakness

as a cohesive state. afghanistan is challenged by inhospitable terrain, a

multiethnic, multilinguistic population base, poor infrastructure, weak

economic indicators, and an almost total lack of established national

institutions. all of these factors contribute to the weakness of the afghan

state as a source of social organization among afghans themselves. this is

not simply a legacy of colonialism or a problem of a multiethnic polity,

although it is often framed this way by the afghan-Pakistani Pashtun

community in particular; it cannot be remedied by redrawing the borders

of the modern afghan state. there is no reasonable way to draw borders

that will make afghanistan less multiethnic, less mountainous, more

institutionally developed or better economically endowed. the more

logical solution to afghanistan’s political fractiousness is to improve

governance in real and tangible ways. this is the only way local

communities, of whatever ethnicity, will feel vested in the afghan state

and its future.

thus, the development of institutions of governance—though a

domestic endeavor—will be an important step to addressing afghanistan’s

transnational challenges. the immensity of the governance challenge in

afghanistan becomes clear when one considers the predominance of what

afghan scholar amin saikal terms afghanistan’s “microsocieties” vis-àvis successive central governments. though these microsocieties have

long been a feature of afghan society, their “ancestral” nature should not

be overstated. In modern afghanistan, local leaders are largely legitimated

by their ability to distribute patronage and provide security, not simply by

their ethnic, religious, or tribal credentials. the bases of power in

afghanistan’s microsocieties are highly localized and cannot be

approached with a general view as to whether they are competitors or

allies of the new afghan state. this complicates nato’s nation-building

efforts in afghanistan, because it means that policymakers cannot exploit

economies of scale with respect to governance. governance will need to

be implemented locally on a case-by-case basis. community by

community, the success of nation-building in afghanistan will be largely

dependent on the central government’s ability to co-opt these

microsocieties and institutionalize a stable working relationship between

local autonomy centers and Kabul. It will be crucial that nation-builders in

afghanistan pay particular attention to local dynamics, working with local

partners where possible and taking on competitors where necessary. this

will require an immense store of local knowledge, patience, and

metals, timber, and semiprecious stones across the border is a known

source of taliban financing, action taken against smugglers seems to have

been taken only on an as-needed basis. Piecemeal and locally driven

responses have been enacted recently, including the setting up of

checkpoints in Kunar province by us military forces. the checkpoints are

intended to hinder the steady flow of illegal timber exported out of Kunar

into Pakistan. local officials say the timber trade is used to finance arms

purchases to further the insurgency. the primitively equipped but

surprisingly effective smugglers move their contraband largely by river

and pack mule, keeping their operation outside of the usual day-to-day

sight of coalition forces. however, according to us army Public affairs

material, a request by the governor of Kunar Province to us forces

operating in the region prompted the establishment of checkpoints along

the riverine routes in use by smugglers. the action has not resulted in

confrontations with smugglers thus far; smugglers have chosen to abandon

their shipments en route rather than face stiff coalition resistance.

recent statements made by top us envoy to afghanistan, richard

holbrooke, suggest that, at least with respect to the drugs trade, a major

policy overhaul will replace this ad hoc strategy with something more

coherent. holbrooke told g8 foreign ministers at their meeting in Italy in

the summer of 2009 that the united states was abandoning its crop

eradication campaign, previously a central element to its strategy.

holbrooke maintains that the united states, using data collected from the

united nations office on Drugs and crime, now recognizes that the

eradication campaign has not reduced the revenue stream that the drug

trade brings to taliban elements inside afghanistan. though the contours

of a new drug policy for afghanistan were not made clear, holbrooke did

confirm that the united states intends to increase its funding for crop

substitution programs tenfold. holbrooke also noted that the united states

will take steps to improve interdiction and rule of law. Perhaps already

indicating a shift in priorities, us and other nato forces have, since late

2008, focused military operations not only on taliban positions, but also

on known or suspected taliban drug labs and opium storage sites. clearly,

nato has made important shifts in drug policy, though these shifts have

not been made public thus far.

The Idea of State and the Problem of Governance

In considering afghanistan’s substantial transnational challenges, it is

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Islamabad.

another example of externally facilitated bilateral progress is seen in

the canadian-sponsored Dubai Process. following the launch of the g8

afghanistan-Pakistan Initiative at the 2007 Potsdam g8 conference,

canada took the lead in establishing a series of workshops in which

afghan and Pakistani officials could dialogue about their shared concerns.

Before its suspension in 2008, the Dubai Process yielded five documents

recommending further action on customs, counternarcotics, managing the

movement of people, law enforcement, and connecting government to the

people through social and economic development. In november 2007,

afghan and Pakistani officials agreed to develop a memorandum of

understanding (mou) that will allow the opening of their three legal

crossing points seven days a week (up from five) and discussed the

development of an mou on a customs-to-customs agreement. following

a suspension of the process in 2008, canada says that it is now committed

to “revitalizing” the process. no workshops or facilitations are currently

publicly scheduled.

all of these initiatives are embryonic and largely dependent on the

success of the greater nato reconstruction mission in afghanistan as a

whole. training of border police and capacity-building across the afghan

security sector need to go hand-in-hand with bilateral cooperative policy

changes in afghanistan and Pakistan. furthermore, evidence suggests that

badly needed afghan-Pakistani bilateral cooperation will materialize only

with third-party facilitation. In a sense, nato players active in the afghan

border regions will need to build capacity in diplomacy and transnational

border policymaking. Despite the urgency of the problem and its centrality

to the successful establishment of a viable afghan state, this process of

capacity-building is likely to be slow and incremental.

persistence. Without all three assets, the nato-led afghan nationbuilding project, like so many before it, may not survive beyond the

international patronage that supports it.

Final Thoughts: Avenues Forward

this abbreviated look makes it clear that the afghan-Pakistani frontier

is the center of gravity for afghanistan’s most urgent transnational

problems. still, the challenge is more easily identified than met. several

obstacles to increased border security between Pakistan and afghanistan

are immediately apparent. first, the terrain makes full border control

difficult, if not impossible. second, the existence of a single ethnic

community straddling the border strengthens local resistance to attempts

to tighten security. third, historical antipathy between local communities

and national governments in the border region make national border

security strategies seem incompatible with sound local governance.

fourth, the relationship between afghanistan and Pakistan has been

unstable and often disrupted by diplomatic breaks (most recently in 2007).

thus, few meaningful initiatives have been launched to improve

border security and stem the movement of fighters, arms or other illicit

materials across the border. What progress has been made has been

facilitated by outside powers. for instance, in may 2009, a bilateral

announcement was made by Interior minister rehman malik of Pakistan

and his afghan counterpart, minister abdul hanif autaf, that border

security would be enhanced. the announcement was the result of a

meeting facilitated by us officials in Washington. With third-party

facilitation, afghan officials and their Pakistani counterparts signaled an

intention to take important first steps in bringing law and order to their

shared border. this includes the introduction of a new system of

documenting expatriates living in each other’s countries who have, until

now, routinely crossed the border unregulated. this task of identifying

border-crossers is not a small one; the number of expatriates crossing the

afghan-Pakistani border annually without any validating documentation is

estimated at fifty thousand. most of these undocumented travelers are

likely Pashtuns who may have commercial interests, friends or family on

either side of the border. the introduction of government control to their

movements in this historically Pashtun territory will excite opposition by

many locals. this is particularly the case on the Pakistani side of the

border, where many Pashtuns currently reside in territories that have been

historically administered at arm’s length from Punjabi-dominated

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over Kashmir has been a central issue in the bilateral relationship. Pakistan

asserts that muslim-dominated Kashmir’s existence as an integral part of

the country is necessary to keep the country unified. conversely, India

argues that the muslim state of Kashmir is a testament to India’s

multiethnic and secular concept of a state. the dispute has expanded

beyond traditional war, providing fuel for terrorist and insurgent activity.

on the northeast border, the situation has been no more sanguine. In

1962, India fought an unsuccessful border war with china. mistrust and an

unsettled border dispute linger, although rapidly growing economic ties

are moving the relationship to a better footing.

overall, traditional security challenges from Pakistan and china have

created barriers against cooperative solutions to various transnational

threats endemic to the region. terrorism, a threat faced by both India and

Pakistan, is exacerbated by the existence of the Kashmir dispute and poor

bilateral ties. organized crime operates more effectively than legitimate

commerce through south asia, connecting the countries through a strong

trade in illicit drugs, people, weapons, and money. In fact, the criminal

networks revel in the lack of regional cooperation, which enables their

profit. rapid economic growth, mixed with traditional tensions between

regional actors, creates a struggle over scarce water resources. certainly,

there is a lack of attention paid to transnational threats not connected to

regional traditional security challenges. Whereas reports of terrorism,

crime, and water disputes remain in the news because of their connection

to tense bilateral relationships, pollution and environmental degradation—

as well as diseases such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(aIDs)—may not be receiving adequate attention from the media or from

the government.

Terrorism and Insurgency

the transnational threat of terrorism is closely related to India’s

traditional security threat vis-à-vis Pakistan. the radical Islamic groups

operating in Indian Kashmir, insurgent groups in the northeastern

provinces, and groups launching attacks on major cities generally have ties

to Pakistani extremist groups. as a result, it is difficult for Indian security

practitioners to rank this transnational threat against traditional ones.

although the terrorist threat in India is not new, the growth of

fundamentalist and radical Islam in India is a relatively recent

phenomenon. outside of Jammu and Kashmir, muslims in India have

Transnational Security Challenges in India

rollie lal

Key Findings

• India’s security situation is complex, with traditional and

transnational threats overlapping in many instances.

• India faces terrorist activity emanating from Islamic radical groups

based in Pakistan and insurgent activity stemming from maoist

and separatist groups inside India.

• organized crime poses a serious problem for India, with

well-established trade in drugs, weapons, and humans supported

by the informal hawala money transfer network.

• traditional security challenges from Pakistan and china have

created barriers against cooperative solutions to various

transnational threats endemic to the region.

• rapid growth is causing environmental challenges such as

pollution, and water disputes continue with the neighboring

countries of Pakistan, china, and Bangladesh.

• collaboration with the united states and regional actors on

information sharing regarding terror and criminal threats, and

collaboration on cleaner technologies to deal with environmental

challenges, will be central to India’s ability to address these

challenges.

India’s security environment faces a wide variety of traditional and

transnational challenges. as a massive nation with both land and sea

borders, the security sector must balance many threats vying for attention

and resources. In addition, the traditional and transnational threats overlap

in many ways. according to Indian policymakers, terrorism and

insurgency are the most significant among India’s security challenges.

these are followed by organized crime and environmental degradation.

India has been faced with a tense security environment since its

independence. to the northwest, poor relations with Pakistan have led to

multiple wars and intermittent skirmishes over the decades. the conflict

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manipur, assam, tripura, and meghalaya. these states have a history of

poor governance and are ethnically isolated from the rest of India.

Insurgencies in these states reflect separatist sentiments that the central

government has had difficulty addressing. various groups have often

adopted socialist, and even maoist ideologies to counter the existing

political structures. migration from Bangladesh into the region has

exacerbated the situation, causing tensions in indigenous communities

who sense a cultural and economic threat from the immigrants. absence of

coherent governing structures also has created a vacuum for insurgent

groups to fill. groups in these areas often are able to collect taxes and

administer localities through brute force. furthermore, insurgent groups

have developed bases in countries across the border including Bangladesh,

Bhutan, and myanmar, turning an internal issue into a transnational one.

Organized Crime

organized crime is a threat that is well connected with terrorism in

India and Pakistan. criminal groups in south asia have been known to

collaborate with terrorist groups in international operations on a variety of

levels. the connections include logistical support in weapons

procurement, shared routes, training, and ideological overlap. criminal

syndicates have also been identified for their involvement in the nuclear

smuggling network of Pakistan’s a. Q. Khan.

iv

south asian organized crime syndicates are transnational in character.

In response to efforts to intercept them, these groups increasingly seek

refuge in Pakistan, the united arab emirates, and other countries further

afield such as canada, thailand, malaysia, singapore, Kenya, and

Portugal. By fleeing across borders, their identities are difficult to track,

and their entry may go unnoticed. some countries may tacitly allow their

presence. During the 1980s, Pakistan’s military developed strong links to

drug barons involved in the afghan heroin trade. By the 1990s,

government and military efforts began in earnest to address the threat but

had limited effect. money laundering and kickbacks had already been well

integrated into Pakistani politics and industry, and laundered money

comprised a significant portion of the Pakistani economy.

v

organized crime in Pakistan, and to a lesser extent in India, has

invested in its own political support network by a combination of carrots

and sticks: contributing to political candidates and strong-arming local

officials. furthermore, inside both India and Pakistan, organized crime

advocated moderate politics, largely supporting the center-left congress

Party since independence. however, in the years after 9/11, Indian

fundamentalist groups have increasingly forged connections with the

global radical Islamic movement and with terror groups based in Pakistan.

i

this has meant a growing sentiment among Indian muslim radicals that

their ultimate goals are similar to those of Pakistani groups such as

lashkar-e-taiba and Jaish-e-mohammed. the globalized mindset also has

increased sympathies of these radical groups with al-Qaeda and has led to

the inclusion of disparate regional themes such as Palestine in the

ideological bases for their activities. While Kashmiri terrorist groups

continue to focus their primary tactical efforts in the region of Kashmir,

they have initiated a new strategy to include large urban areas across India.

attacks such as those on India’s parliament in 2001, on the us consulate

in calcutta in 2002, and the mumbai attacks of 2008, indicate a much

larger area and scale of attacks under consideration by south asian

terror groups.

radical maoist insurgents, known as the naxalites, are a serious threat

across several central Indian states including orissa, Jharkhand,

chhattisgarh, Bihar, madhya Pradesh, maharashtra, and andhra Pradesh.

naxalites are violently against the perceived intrusion of foreign

companies inside India and often attack foreign commercial interests, such

as mining operations, to force their departure. the groups seek to

overthrow the central government and attack the land-owning classes and

upper castes. With an appeal to the downtrodden, the naxalite movement

attracts followers particularly from the tribal areas, a group most often left

behind by India’s progress. after numerous deadly attacks on police forces

in these areas, the state governments have stepped up their response. In

2008, seventy-four security personnel and twenty-two civilians were killed

by the naxalites in orissa. the government of orissa has appointed two

thousand one hundred special police officers and has raised four battalions

of the Indian reserve Police to counter the insurgents.

ii overall, almost a

thousand people are estimated to have been killed by naxalites in 2008.

conversely, an untold number of naxalites have been killed by

government forces. Despite the strong appeal of the group to underserved

groups such as tribals, the Indian government largely persists in treating

the challenge as a law and order problem rather than a sociopolitical

concern.

iii Policies emphasize police mobilization rather than economic

development of the target areas.

In the northeast, insurgent groups similarly operate in nagaland,

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the scale of such transactions is unknown, thereby leading to ubiquitous

use of hawala by criminal and terrorist groups to transfer illegal proceeds.

Environmental Degradation

India’s economic growth has brought with it the challenge of

environmental degradation. Deforestation, air and water pollution, poor

sanitation, and the oversubsidized use of natural resources are just a few of

the problems plaguing the nation. excessive bureaucracy hampers the

ability of any agency to oversee and implement change. lack of

accountability among the agencies adds to the confusion, deterring

interagency cooperation on solving critical problems. as an example, the

yamuna river in Delhi demonstrates bureaucratic failure in addressing

pollution. although the state water board built new wastewater treatment

plants to deal with the flow of heavily tainted water in the river, the

municipal government had not cleared the garbage that was blocking the

drains. the result was that in 2008, the treatment plants were running at 30

percent of capacity, and the population succumbed to a cholera epidemic.

ix

a recent report by the central Pollution control Board stated that 70

percent of Indian urban areas have critically unhealthy air pollutant levels.

the report placed responsibility for these rising pollution levels on

increased vehicle usage and industrial production. Whereas car and twowheeler sales are increasing at the rate of 15 percent per year, road

capacity is expanding at less than 1 percent.

x the result is severe

congestion and rising emissions.

In addition, the shortage of environmental resources plays into

regional tensions with India’s neighbors. the border of Pakistan and India

cuts across critical waterways for both countries. the Indus Water treaty

regulates the use of this water between the two and has generally been

respected by both sides since its inception in 1960. however,

infringements do occur, creating mistrust over intentions. India’s

construction of the Baglihar hydroelectric dam over the chenab river in

2008 is representative of the type of dispute between India and Pakistan

over river usage. During construction of the Baglihar project, Pakistan

suffered a shortage of two hundred thousand acre-feet of water as a result

of alleged blockage of the chenab river to fill the dam reservoir.

xi

Pakistan has subsequently demanded compensation from India.

Bangladesh similarly has water disputes with India. the ganges river

takes 92 percent of its journey on the Indian side of the himalayas before

networks have constructed a strong cooperative relationship with terrorist

groups in the region. terrorist groups leverage criminal trafficking routes

for the transport of weaponry, while the syndicates in return request

training in the use of guns and explosives and safe passage through

militant territory.

vi

Drug trafficking poses a highly entrenched threat to India. much of the

trafficking of narcotics and other illegal drugs in asia traverses south

asia. routes cross from Burma, laos and thailand (golden triangle)

through India, as well as from afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran (golden

crescent). traffickers send narcotics from afghanistan to Pakistan and

through south India to the ocean and on to destinations in europe and

russia. heroin and other drugs are transferred from southeast asia and

myanmar through India to western destinations. India is also the world’s

largest legal producer of opium for pharmaceutical purposes. a small part

of this licit production is diverted to be sold abroad illegally by organized

crime, although the majority of diverted opium is used locally.

vii

crime syndicates dominate the trade in people in south asia, and the

numbers of prostitutes in or trafficked from the region runs into the

millions. Women are smuggled into India from nepal and Bangladesh.

the trafficking leads to yet another transnational threat, the rapid spread of

aIDs in the region. approximately 0.36 percent of the adult population of

India was infected with aIDs in 2006, representing more than 2.5 million

people.

viii the fact that a large number of the prostitutes in India are

trafficked underlines the need for a concerted effort to combat both

challenges.

In addition to human trafficking within south asia, an unknown large

number of young girls are sent and sold to arab countries each year, and

small boys are also sold to the arab states as camel racers. Dubai remains

a popular destination and transfer point for prostitution organized by

Indian criminal networks. these human smuggling routes could easily be

leveraged by terrorist groups to transfer personnel and weaponry.

transnational money laundering networks, also known in south asia

as hawala, pose a threat in several arenas. these hawala networks

originally arose from the weakness of the banking system in rural areas.

the system, which relies on trust between individuals and social networks,

is common in south asia and the middle east. transactions can be as

simple as an individual in mumbai paying the illegal vendor $5,000 in

cash (in rupees), with another individual receiving the $5,000 in dollars in

new york, with little or no record of the transaction having taken place.

132 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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compared with the counterterrorist measures, India’s

counterinsurgency policies are arguably less effective, in that the

government has a significant focus on responding to attacks and physically

destroying militant groups rather than addressing the underlying economic

issues driving the groups’ rise in popularity.

India’s tense relationship with Pakistan hinders its ability to

collaborate on solutions. In november 2008, India faced a series of more

than ten terrorist attacks, including bombings and shootings, across

mumbai. the attacks killed more than 179 people. the sole captured

militant stated that the attackers were part of lashkar-e-taiba, a terrorist

organization based out of Pakistan. nonetheless, Pakistan initially denied

the affiliation of Pakistani citizens in the attacks, stonewalling further

progress in the investigation until months after the event. cooperation

with Pakistan on information exchange in the context of tense bilateral

relations is a challenge for Indian leadership and the security sector.

Despite this, the Indian government has taken the stance that efforts in

support of counterterror cooperation with Pakistan must continue. the

administration of Prime minister manmohan singh in 2009 stated to

Pakistan that, “action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite

dialogue process, and, therefore, cannot await other developments. It was

agreed that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable

information on any future terrorist threats.”xv

the regional organization built to address these types of transnational

issues is the south asian association for regional cooperation (saarc).

saarc has moved forward in trying to address the challenges of

information sharing and legal issues regarding crime and terrorism across

south asian borders. In august 2008, saarc countries signed an

agreement to provide mutual assistance in legal matters. this convention

was intended to provide a framework for greater cooperation among

security forces of the member countries to extradite criminals and

terrorists from member countries.

xvi however, the case of the mumbai

attacks indicates that the convention has not been as effective as originally

anticipated. Weaknesses in the bilateral relationships between saarc

states undermine the ability of members to cohesively agree upon and

implement the organization’s initiatives.

In the environmental arena, India has acknowledged that it has

responsibility in the debate on climate change. nonetheless, India’s

minister for environment and forests, Jairam ramesh, says that by 2020

developed countries should commit to a 40 percent reduction in emission

leading into the Brahmaputra and meghna rivers in Bangladesh. India

diverts waters at the farraka Barrage, inside Indian territory, to help clear

silt from the port of Kolkata. During dry season, this diversion creates

shortages for agricultural use in Bangladesh.

xii In 1996, India and

Bangladesh signed a treaty to organize the division of water, but

implementation has been difficult.

India faces the converse problem with china regarding water scarcity.

the Brahmaputra river in India begins its journey in tibet as the yalong

tsangpo, travels through Bangladesh, and then enters India along with the

ganges. china plans to divert waters from the river inside tibet for

hydroelectric power, farming, and industrial use in the dry north and

northwestern regions of china. critics of this plan argue that the tibetan

water is sourced not only from rainfall, but also from melting glaciers. as

a result, heavy usage by china for the desert areas will cause tibet to

become water scarce within decades, leading to catastrophic

environmental damage. the effects of water diversion would also create

significant regional tensions between south asia and china. Diversion

would create shortages in both India and Bangladesh, raising alarm in both

countries that china will wield greater power over the region’s critical

water resources.

xiii

Water scarcity in south asia represents a transnational challenge to

neighboring countries that easily translates into bilateral tensions of a

more traditional type.

How India is Coping with the Challenge

the government of India is addressing the terrorist and organized

crime elements of the challenge through better legal infrastructure and

information sharing. moreover, in the past decade India has passed

legislation that grants law enforcement the ability to expedite prosecution

in organized crime cases. Ideologically, the Indian government has

historically taken the stance that religion must remain divorced from the

concept of terrorism, in order to contain the possibility of communal

violence erupting in the multireligious nation. for the Indian government,

terrorists are terrorists, regardless of their religious affiliation. In urban

areas, the police take the initiative with regard to counterterrorist activity,

and efforts are being made to enhance interagency capabilities. India also

has enhanced border security using fencing, sensor technology, and the

deployment of additional security forces.

xiv

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and technical issues, the countries of south asia must embark upon a more

robust set of confidence-building measures. trust and collaborative

approaches are greatly needed among the regional actors to effectively

interdict organized crime. criminal networks depend on the cracks in

bilateral relationships to negotiate their evasion of law enforcement.

In the arena of environmental degradation, government incentives to

implement clean best practices would move India in the right direction. a

new emphasis on local and state government accountability and

streamlined bureaucratic procedures for environmental cleanup are also

necessary. for India’s environmental policy to be truly effective, the

government will need a multipronged approach including innovative

ideas, effective government, and support from the central government in

terms of best practices, funding, and political pressure where needed.

Consequences and Engagement Opportunities

for the United States

the transnational threats facing India today are intrinsically linked to

us national security interests. the mumbai attacks of november 2008

killed six us citizens, and investigations revealed that the terrorists

targeted us citizens at the locations. radicals involved in terrorist activity

against India no longer differentiate between the government of India and

that of the united states. terrorist groups operating in India and Pakistan

have already shown their ability to affect the united states through the

attacks on 9/11, as well as through the militancy operating in Pakistan and

afghanistan. the ideology that existed as the basis for the Indian Islamic

militant in the past was largely regional in nature, and the militant groups

were highly focused on the Kashmir conflict and its resolution. With the

growth of the internationalist Islamic radical ideology espoused by alQaeda, Indian militants no longer constrain their goals geographically. us

targets inside India, as well as abroad, are the new terrain for these

terrorist groups.

organized criminal networks have a similar profile with regard to their

international agenda. globalization is connecting economies and countries

in ways unforeseen. criminal organizations are leveraging the new

semiborderless world with innovative uses of financial transactions and

concealed transport of weapons, people, and drugs under cover of

legitimate trade. this creates increased pressure to improve and streamline

border security. International coordination with trade partners and

levels compared with 1990 levels. he also has indicated that India and

china are coordinating closely on the topic in response to developed world

demands for developing country concessions. Discussions with china

include coordination of positions on forestry, adaptation, and financing

technology.

xvii In Prime minister manmohan singh’s 2009 meetings with

us President obama, the two countries agreed upon a clean energy

initiative designed to create jobs and improve access to cleaner, more

affordable energy; a partnership to reduce poverty through sustainable and

equitable development; and an effort to phase out subsidies for fossil

fuels.

xviii

Important Next Steps

the challenge of terrorism will continue to be difficult for India to

fully address. Instances of domestic terrorist activity stemming from

disaffected Indian communities can be more effectively approached by

improving governance and accountability in the concerned areas. In

addition, a greater focus on human rights issues and transparency will

build trust and confidence among these communities, whether in the

muslim areas of mumbai and Kashmir, or in the separatist regions of

northeast India. the solution is far more complex with regard to

transnationally supported activity. Pakistani cooperation will be integral to

interdicting terrorist groups in the future.

organized crime remains a difficult issue for domestic authorities, and

one that is compounded by syndicate ties to Pakistan and the middle east.

Inside India, criminal groups are rarely brought to justice for a variety of

basic and remediable reasons. Police forces have little training in forensic

techniques and in the legal bases for indictment. as a result, captured

criminals are often able to slip through the grasp of the legal system and

are returned to the streets to continue their business interests. In addition,

those criminals who are captured often are able to effectively use their

money or power to evade incarceration. lingering challenges in the legal

system include readily available bail and prevalent pressuring of

witnesses.

additional time and resources should be spent in training law

enforcement in legal and forensic techniques to aid in detaining organized

crime groups. at the strategic level, an increased focus on government

transparency and judicial reforms would help in addressing bureaucratic

roadblocks. to fully capitalize upon such training and education on legal

136 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 139

september 28, 2009.

xi

“Pakistan Warns Water Dispute with India may threaten Peace talks,” Deutsche PresseAgentur, october 13, 2008.

xii

Joel mcgregor, “the Internationalization of Disputes over Water: the case of

Bangladesh and India,” Paper for the australasion Political studies association

conference, october 2000, accessed December 21, 2009 at

http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/mcgregor.rtf

xiii

sudha ramachandran, “India Quakes over china’s Water Plan,” asia times, December

9, 2008, accessed at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/Jl09ad01.html

xiv

ajit Doval, “Islamic terrorism in south asia and India’s strategic response,” Policing

2007 1(1):63–69, oxford university Press, accessed at

http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/1/1/63

xv

no dilution in India’s stand on terrorism: manmohan (roundup), Thaindian.com, July 17,

2009 accessed at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/no-dilution-in-indiasstand-on-terrorism-manmohan-roundup_100219451.html#ixzz0eh9lID4Q

xvi

“saarc convention to help in combating terrorism,” Press release from the

government of sri lanka, august 27, 2008.

xvii

Jayshree Bajoria, “India’s climate change forecast,” council on foreign relations,

september 22, 2009, accessed at http://www.cfr.org/publication/20248/

xviii

merle David Kellerhals Jr., “obama, singh Pledge support and cooperation,”

november 24, 2009, america.gov

countries that do not have close ties with the united states is also critical.

criminal networks are highly adept in maneuvering through the

coordination gaps caused by poor bilateral relations.

the united states could play a significant role in addressing India’s

environmental challenges caused by pollution, and water scarcity.

collaboration with the united states to identify environmentally friendly

technologies and best practices in management could provide Indian

federal and state actors the necessary skills and tools to counter these

seemingly intractable challenges.

collaboration through the sharing of information and intelligence

about terrorism and organized crime is a fundamental need. additional

training for law enforcement and judiciaries could strengthen the Indian

response to organized crime and terror threats. India and the united states

have increased cooperation in the wake of the mumbai terrorist attacks,

with a focus on information sharing. areas of enhanced cooperation

include terrorist financing, law enforcement, and aviation security.

as these transnational threats evolve over time, it is clear that many

challenges overlap and compound each other. While it is necessary to deal

with each separately, a common thread connects them all. regional and

international cooperation is needed, and collaborative solutions must be

created to resolve the upcoming threats we face.

i

rollie lal, “Islam in India,” in The Muslim World after 9/11 (santa monica: ranD, 2004)

p. 316.

ii

mohit Joshi, “orissa government Determined to root out naxalism,” July 27, 2009,

TopNews.In, accessed at http://www.topnews.in/orissa-government-determined-root-outnaxalism-2194595

iii

manjeet Kripalani, “In India, Death to global Business,” Business Week, may 7, 2008,

accessed at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_20/b4084044908374.htm

iv

William J. Broad and David e. sanger, “as nuclear secrets emerge, more are

suspected,” New York Times, Dec. 26, 2004.

v

ahmed rashid, Taliban (new haven: yale university Press, 2000), 121–23.

vi

s. hussain Zaidi, Black Friday: The True Story of the Bombay Bomb Blasts (new Delhi:

Penguin Books, 2002).

vii

rollie lal, “south asian organized crime and terrorist networks,” Orbis, vol. 49, no.

2, spring 2005.

viii

unaIDs Data, accessed December 22, 2009 at http://www.unaids.org.in/

ix

Jason overdorf, “Putrid rivers of sludge,” Newsweek, July 7–14, 2008. x

chetan chauhan, “air unhealthy in 70% of areas in urban India,” Hindustan Times,

138 Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges
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shortcomings in singapore’s measures and have stopped short

of giving a full mark to the country’s performance.

• cooperative opportunities for the united states are limited.

singapore sees itself capable of dealing with most transnational

challenges—except for terrorism and maritime security, where the

only limits to cooperation with the united states are perceptions of

its neighbors, malaysia and Indonesia. malaysia’s perceived

transnational threats are deeply embedded in the country’s

domestic political economy, thereby making the government

efforts to address these issues half-hearted at best. cooperation

with the united states on terrorism faces political sensitivity

within malaysia’s muslim population, leaving a narrow window

of cooperation on the drug problem.

Introduction

the transnational security issues faced by malaysia and singapore are

nearly identical, but the two countries’ perceptions of transnational threats

differ considerably. Being former British colonies—which by twists of

history became two separate states—malaysia and singapore have grown

into two distinct political systems with differing degrees of economic

performance. these domestic factors inevitably affect each country’s

perceptions of transnational threats in the region. us efforts to extend a

cooperative hand must take into account the similarities and differences of

these two countries.

Malaysia and Singapore—Commonalities and Differences

Both malaysia and singapore are highly open economies and societies.

their geographical locations along a major trade path have historically

exposed them to heavy international traffic and associated transnational

issues. government policies in both countries in recent years clearly aim at

taking advantage of the global economic linkage, encouraging trade, labor,

tourist, and international student flows. Both malaysia and singapore are

highly dependent on international trade. malaysia’s trade per gross

domestic product (gDP) ratio stands at 159.1 percent, whereas

singapore’s ratio is 309.1 percent.

i Previously singapore monopolized the

profitable transit trade, but malaysia is cutting into singapore’s share.

Perceptions of Transnational Security Threats in

Malaysia and Singapore: Windows of Cooperative

Opportunities for the United States

yoichiro sato, Professor,

ritsumeikan asia Pacific university (former aPcss Professor)

Key Lessons

• malaysia and singapore face a similar set of transnational security

challenges, but their perceptions differ considerably due to the

differences in their economic status, ethnic and religious

composition, and law-enforcement capacity.

• concerns regarding the rise of china are shared by malaysia and

singapore. Both have an interest in the increased maritime power

of china.

• concerns about transnational criminal activities by chinese

nationals are strong in malaysia, whereas singapore is confident

of its own ability to control such activities.

• While singapore is confident of its ability to control transnational

labor flows, malaysia lacks law-enforcement capabilities to deal

with illegal aliens and transnational crimes such as drug and

human smuggling.

• malaysia would benefit from increased security cooperation on

drug trafficking and broad maritime security capacity-building in

the tri-border area, but not in the malacca strait. Piracy, terrorism,

human trafficking, and money laundering are not among the

country’s priorities.

• singapore considers terrorism, global economic slumps, and

maritime piracy as important transnational security threats. the

country is confident of its ability to deal with drug issues and

illegal migrant workers. the singapore government does not

officially acknowledge money laundering to be a serious issue,

in view of the country’s claims to have a highly effective

regulatory framework. however, international experts have noted

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Malaysia

Within the southeast asia region, malaysia is a highly open economy

due to its maritime location, historically porous borders, geographic

proximity to major trade and traffic routes, small population combined

with relative affluence, shared ethnic heritages with the neighboring

countries inside and outside southeast asia, government policy to

encourage ties with the Islamic world, and globally oriented economic

outlook.

Benefits of international trade are clearly visible in the country’s rising

trade volume and trade-per-gDP ratio. In addition to attracting foreign

investments and signing free trade agreements (ftas) with association of

southeast asian nations (asean) members and other countries in asia

and beyond, the malaysian government has decided to compete for the

regional transshipment market against the previously dominant singapore.

While singapore has an advantage in advanced facilities and cumulative

management expertise, malaysia offers lower costs in labor and land.

migrant workers are attracted to malaysia because of the country’s

relative affluence compared with its southeast asian neighbors (excluding

singapore and Brunei) and other countries in asia. malaysia’s small

population and higher local labor costs disadvantage its labor-intensive

sectors and domestically focused industries. foreign migrant workers are

introduced both legally and illegally in such sectors as farming, food

processing, mining, construction, and housekeeping. Promotion of the

tourism industry also requires a large pool of low-skilled labor. the largest

source of migrant workers is Indonesia, but many workers from the

Philippines, Bangladesh, vietnam, cambodia, Pakistan, and afghanistan

are also present. on record, migrant workers represent 12 percent of the

country’s population of 25.7 million,

iii but the number of overstayers

(those who enter the country legally but overstay the term of their visas) is

estimated to be three to four million, adding to the “official” foreign

population. undocumented entries of an estimated two million people

further augment this number. Because transit use of the malaysian

territory is also common in this category, malaysia’s official population

figure is somewhat unreliable.

opportunities for transnational crimes coincide with malaysia’s

growing migrant population and increased trade. at the same time,

malaysian observers are cautious not to blame everything on the recent

globalization. In fact, malaysia’s geographic location has exposed the

country to long-distance commerce and migration since its precolonial

compared with other countries in the region, both malaysia and singapore

enjoy a relatively high standard of living, although the latter is much

richer than the former.

ii as a result, both countries receive a large influx of

foreign workers from the rest of southeast asia and beyond.

the two countries differ, however, in some important aspects. In

malaysia, ethnic chinese are the minority, along with the Indians. the

issue of ethnic relations with the dominant plurality (officially the

majority) of the malays is a controversial topic in malaysia. the “malay

first” policy of favoring ethnic malays over other ethnicities in economic

and educational opportunities has provided the politically connected

malay businesspeople with many benefits and protection against

competition. this measure was justified in the name of narrowing the

socioeconomic gap with the richer chinese. malay skepticism of the

chinese also has a root in the communist insurgencies of the 1960s backed

by the People’s republic of china (Prc). meanwhile, in singapore,

ethnic chinese are the majority. malay dominance in malaysia has a

religious dimension as well. ethnic malays are considered muslims by the

virtue of their birth, and Islam is the state religion. malaysia is active in

the organization of Islamic countries (oIc) and maintains special

relationships with Islamic countries of middle east, north africa, and

south and West asia. singapore, on the other hand, is a secular state that

closely identifies itself with the developed Western world, except for the

latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy.

although both malaysia and singapore attract a large number of

foreign workers, the gap in economic standings between malaysia and

singapore and the former’s lax regulations make malaysia a transit

country for illegal workers as well. singapore’s much stricter regulations

mean that those who want to transit through singapore to other countries,

like australia, tend to go through legal permanent residency status and

therefore are clearly visible to the government authority.

the other difference between malaysia and singapore is in their lawenforcement capacities. malaysian government suffers to a greater extent

from corruption, and its ability to effectively deal with transnational

security threats is hampered by widespread corruption from the lowest to

the highest levels of government. In singapore, the authoritarian

government sees corruption as a potential means of self-destruction of its

otherwise successful governance. however, its lax regulations in the

financial sector to attract foreign money have offered a high degree of

secrecy to potential abusers of the island’s financial system.

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and “smuggled” (willingly and knowingly brought in) people, but

government policy lags behind because the illegal status of these workers

provides the labor market flexibility and conveniently denies them certain

state benefits that are only available to legal migrant workers. Both

trafficked and smuggled workers are bonded by the recruiters, and treating

the trafficked people as victims in need of protection would place

additional financial burdens on the malaysian government.

During the economic boom of the 1990s and the recovery from the

asian financial crisis, job categories such as waiters, housemaids, and

construction and plantation workers attracted few local workers and were

subsequently filled by foreign workers. the ongoing economic recession

has turned local chinese and Indian workers against foreign workers to

compete for their jobs. the downturn has also turned the trade unions with

malay workers against foreign workers, resulting in massive deportations

and cancellations of visas for non-malay foreign workers. however,

political sensitivity about the treatment of Indonesian workers grants them

slightly better treatment than that of other migrant workers. ethnic malays

in malaysia see Indonesian workers as brothers and sisters, and resent

domestic chinese and Indian allegations that Indonesian workers commit

many crimes. Deported Indonesian workers are normally allowed to apply

for legal entry.

land routes of entries include illegal crossing from the Indonesian side

on the island of Borneo and from the southern provinces of thailand. the

porous nature of both borders and the corruption at official crossing points

are both identified as causes of malaysia’s ineffective immigration

management. sea routes include the malacca strait, south china sea, and

the tri-border area from the southern Philippines to the celebes sea.

Between southern mindanao and sabah in particular, the presence of

traditional seafarers who have their relatives living on both sides and their

stateless nature are abused by smugglers and traffickers.

further compounding the problem of illegal entries, overstayers and

those with other visa violations can potentially be exploited by more

serious criminals, including terrorists. “china dolls” is the term used by

malaysians to describe chinese female students working in prostitution.

faked marriages are said to be used to bring in vietnamese plantation

workers. malaysia accepts a large number of foreign students and tourists

from Islamic countries. In order to promote arab tourism, malaysia has

offered visa-free entries to tourists from Islamic countries. overstaying

nigerians are settling in parts of the country and are said to be developing

history, and many of the transnational issues malaysia faces today have

been present for a long time but have only recently been recognized as

“problems.” among these transnational issues, drug smuggling and

illegal workers are given the most attention by malaysian experts. human

trafficking is subsumed under the illegal workers category, leading the

government to focus on visa violations of the trafficked victims.

terrorism and maritime piracy—to which the united states pays close

attention—are not considered major problems; however, us reactions to

these issues are.

Drug Issues

Drug issues have existed in malaysia for a long time. the increased

opiate trafficking out of the golden triangle in the 1970s entered

malaysia through the transshipment point in Penang. By 1983 the problem

had worsened to the point that the malaysian government declared drug

trafficking the number one threat to the country. In more recent years, drug

production in thailand and myanmar shifted to synthetic drugs, and drug

usage in malaysia followed suit. today, drug users in malaysia are

overcrowding the prisons. Increases in the number of arrests of malaysian

“mules” (lowest-level traffickers, including many females) in both

malaysia and neighboring countries and drug usage among the malay

middle class are perceived as problematic by the security experts there.

arrest data indicate that the trafficking routes have considerably

diversified. Drug money is also laundered throughout southeast asia

(including malaysia) by chinese criminal networks.

Illegal Migrant Workers and Human Trafficking

malaysia sees itself on the receiving end of human trafficking. foreign

victims of human trafficking in malaysia have received little government

attention because they are not seen as doing much harm and are perceived

as being needed by the domestic economy. the country has signed the

international antihuman trafficking convention but has not ratified it. the

lack of government interest partly stems from the fact that the sectors in

which trafficked victims are forced to work also attract willing workers

who volunteer to be smuggled into malaysia. local and international

nongovernmental organizations (ngos) have clarified the distinction

between “trafficked” (involuntarily brought in through coercion or deceit)

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forces on high-speed boats” to the strait. malaysia is more open to

maritime security cooperation (broadly defined) in the tri-border area

(from sulu sea to celebes sea), where improved maritime domain

awareness would help the malaysian authorities deal with various

transnational criminal activities. the malaysian perception that the

chinese navy is tacitly aiding its nationals in certain criminal activities

(such as illegal fishing) is also a motivating factor for malaysia to seek

cooperation from the united states.

Singapore

singapore has a long history of viewing security from a broad,

comprehensive perspective. Its “total defense” doctrine since the mid1980s has encompassed military, economic, psychosocial, and

environmental dimensions of security. Being a small city-state, singapore

sees that all threats are transnational and interlinked. major security issues

singapore faced during the last decade—including the asian economic

crisis, the sudden acute respiratory syndrome (sars) epidemic, avian flu,

the 2002 Bali bombing, and the regional haze problems—only enhanced

singapore’s comprehensive security perspective. unlike malaysia,

singapore does not suffer from weak governance in facing transnational

threats. Its meritocratic bureaucracy and the ruling Peoples’action Party

(PaP) maintain a well-coordinated and stable working relationship that is

atypical of southeast asia.

singapore considers terrorism and global economic slumps as its most

serious transnational security threats, perhaps closely followed by

maritime piracy. Drug issues, illegal migrant workers, and money

laundering are not considered major problems. singapore’s transnational

security perceptions are directly linked to what the country is able and

willing to control. With exceptionally strong governance capacities, the

singapore government is confident that most transnational threats it

wishes to control are controllable. Drug syndicates, migrant workers, and

chinese criminals all fall in this category. the government is still working

on improving the state’s antiterrorism capacities. the perception of piracy

threats due to problems on Indonesian waters is partly beyond singapore’s

control. as for economic security, the country is at the mercy of global

economic conditions.

singapore most openly welcomes us involvement in the region’s

transnational security issues, including terrorism. In its domestic

criminal ties with chinese crime syndicates. malaysia took advantage of

the post–9/11 visa tightening in north america and europe against

students from Islamic countries to attract fee-paying foreign students.

some malaysians fear that with these entries comes the influence of

conservative Wahhabism, which challenges the malaysian government’s

emphasis on progressive Islam, and that radicalized Islam may lead to

terrorism.

iv

Terrorism

malaysia’s perception of terrorism is not based on a strong and

genuine concern that the country may be targeted by terrorists. rather, it is

more concerned about what the united states does in the region in

response to terrorism concerns. accordingly, malaysia’s responses to

terrorism are partly for precluding us actions. malaysia’s half-hearted

counterterrorism posture is also driven by domestic political

considerations. the ruling united malays national organization (umno)

has viewed Islam as an important source of popular support for the

government. however, its emphasis on “progressive Islam” (as opposed to

more conservative/radical interpretations) has not developed strong roots

in malaysia, and emotional ties with the middle east have persisted. the

government approach is also viewed as aiming to discredit the opposition

Islamic Party of malaysia (Pas).

While the country maintains an ambivalent stance on terrorism,

malaysia’s corrupt political system has revealed governance weakness

with regard to combating transnational crimes. the implication of highranking malaysian government officials and their family connections in

such scandals as the corrupt un oil-for-food program for Iraq and Dr.

Khan’s nuclear proliferation network have illustrated that malaysian ties

to the middle east and south asia could be more than emotional.

Maritime Piracy

malaysia does not see piracy as a serious problem. In fact, most

incidents in the malacca strait occur in Indonesian waters. malaysia

jealously guards its sovereign claims over the malacca strait, resisting the

user states’ effort to multilateralize policing of this strait. malaysia and

Indonesia strongly and negatively reacted to reports that admiral thomas

fargo had suggested the united states might deploy “marines or special

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not perceived to be as bad as that of malaysia. one major difference is

singapore’s comprehensive approach to the drug issue, which provides

treatment and rehabilitation for drug users. singaporeans view drug

businesses in thailand as being partly run by political groups, including

former communists and secessionists in the south. While this perception

was accurate in the past, more recent analyses see neither of these two

groups as significant actors in drug smuggling through thailand.

vi

Maritime Piracy

singapore’s strategic maritime location, connecting the Pacific ocean

and the Indian ocean, has made the country a world-class transshipping

point. Its economy depends on uninterrupted maritime traffic, and piracy

poses a major threat to its industry. as pirates are no longer based in the

tightly governed singapore, singaporeans see themselves as victims of

poor governance in the neighboring countries. most notably, economic

conditions on the island of sumatra (Indonesia) are perceived as a key

determinant of piracy activities in the malacca strait. for singapore,

piracy poses a threat to the physical danger of singaporeans and the

potential loss of ships and cargos. however, the threats are perceived more

in terms of lost business, as high insurance rates drive shipping companies

away from the malacca strait.

Money Laundering

singapore’s openness as a regional financial center attracts a large sum

of transnational money. like many other offshore financial centers,

singapore has become a place for laundering money of illegitimate and

dubious origins. the opening of a major casino on the sentosa Island in

february 2010 further enhanced this perception. In competition with other

offshore financial centers, singapore has kept lax financial regulations in

place. Based on its march 2007 evaluation of singapore, the financial

action task force (fatf), which works with the organization for

economic co-operation and Development (oecD), noted “[o]verall, the

regime for investigating ml [money laundering] has not been effectively

implemented, as is illustrated by the low number of ml investigations.”vii

In fact, the absence of comprehensive rules was less problematic in

singapore than was the lack of will to enforce them. the evaluation

further stated:

population, muslims are the minority, and this frees singapore from

having to pay closer attention to domestic reactions to the government’s

close cooperation with the united states. singapore’s working relationship

with the united states is also driven by its ambivalence about china’s

growing status and maritime military buildup. transnational issues

associated with the inflow of chinese migrants are considered to be within

singapore’s controlling abilities. yet, as a state, china poses a potential

threat to singapore due to its strategic maritime location, which has lured

major powers for control (such as the united Kingdom in the nineteenth

century and Japan during World War II). the multilateral maritime

Information fusion center in singapore is a manifestation of singapore’s

overlapping concerns about transnational threats and a rising china. the

center also demonstrates singapore’s willingness to keep the united states

engaged.

Migrant population

singapore’s higher income level and economic openness attract a large

number of migrant workers. out of its population of roughly 4.7 million,

v

one million are estimated to be foreign workers. While many foreign

workers enter singapore with fixed-term visas and go through periodic

renewals, the presence of a significant number of unregistered foreign

workers is suspected. singapore is listed on the tier 2 Watch list for

human trafficking by the us state Department for the presence of many

trafficked workers there. old criminal syndicates are suspected of bringing

in foreign sex workers into the country. unlike in malaysia, the large

inflow of mainland chinese into singapore as permanent residents is not

perceived as a security threat, perhaps partly for ethnic affinity, but more

importantly because of the country’s highly selective and controlled

recruitment of foreign workers. singapore’s highly taxed items, such as

cigarette and liquor, are often smuggled in. Indonesian workers are known

for their frequent smuggling in of cigarettes.

Drugs

singaporeans are fairly confident that no major local drug syndicate

operates in the city-state. however, drugs from thailand find their way

into singapore, and some singaporeans are working as “mules” to carry

illicit drugs across state borders. overall, the drug problem in singapore is

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Conclusion

although malaysia and singapore share borders and face similar

transnational security challenges, their perceptions of such challenges

differ considerably due to differences in domestic, political, economic, and

societal factors. the two countries are similar in their dismissive

perceptions about the seriousness of the human trafficking problem, for

these countries are recipient and transit (malaysia) countries rather than

source countries (like the Philippines and Indonesia). malaysia and

singapore, however, differ in their ability to assess the extent of their

illegal worker problems and to deal with the issues. malaysians view the

issue as a bigger problem than do singaporeans, due to the former’s lack

of confidence in its own monitoring and enforcement capabilities and

historically held negative perceptions about the chinese. singapore, with a

muslim-malay minority, does not overtly demonstrate such ethnoreligious

bias, partly due to its emphasis on meritocratic society, and also because of

its confidence in monitoring of and enforcement capabilities for dealing

with the imported workers and transnational criminals. for issues related

to illegal workers, singapore does not need external help, and malaysia

does not want external help, for illegal workers are heavily entrenched in

the country’s economic interests.

on drug problems, both singapore and malaysia face common

challenges that mainly stem from thailand. Both countries impose tough

penalties against traffickers, but the two countries differ in their ways of

dealing with drug users. malaysia’s straightforward criminalization of

drug use without rehabilitation of the users is less effective than

singapore’s comprehensive approach. the drug issue is a potential venue

of closer cooperation between the united states and malaysia. for

example, the Joint Interagency taskforce-West (JIatf-West) of the us

Pacific command has been active in counternarcotics efforts in thailand.

extending this cooperation to malaysian ground and maritime lawenforcement agencies with minimal footprints, mainly focusing on

information sharing, may open up further venues of cooperation in the

future. as singapore’s success indicates, a rehabilitation program for drug

users in malaysia would complement the countertrafficking approach.

Quiet us assistance in this venue would also be welcomed by malaysia.

the expressed concerns about terrorism in the region are more genuine

in singapore, which welcomes closer cooperation with the united states

in every conceivable way, provided that such cooperation is not aimed at

singapore’s two most immediate neighbors—malaysia and Indonesia. In

mas [the monetary authority singapore] reports that administrative

sanctions such as letter of reprimand or letter requiring remedial

action have been very effective in getting financial institutions to

rectify their breaches and deficiencies. no criminal sanctions have

been issued; fines have only been issued against money remitters

and bureau de change.

viii

singapore avoided being listed by the oecD in 2000 as one of the

thirty-five offshore tax havens. however, singapore’s law protected

financial information of the clients of banks and other financial services to

such an extent that sharing of their tax-related information with treaty

partners was practically impossible. according to Jeffrey owens, director

of the oecD center for tax Policy and administration, singapore has

“used the fact that it is not on the oecD list of tax havens and the

restrictive exchange of information provisions in its tax treaties to market

itself as the ultimate secrecy jurisdiction.”ix

While the fatf acknowledged some improvements, lack of sufficient

progress earned the country a “gray” designation by the oecD in early

2009—which indicated less-than-substantial implementation of the oecD

standard on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes.

since then, singapore has passed new laws to empower the domestic tax

authority to “exchange information, including bank and fiduciary

information, with tax authorities in other countries” and signed a protocol

with france to bring their bilateral tax treaty up to the oecD standard—a

move that qualified singapore as a “white list” (substantial

implementation) country.

x It is too soon to evaluate efficacy and

implementation of these new measures.

Economic Slumps

singaporeans see economic slumps as the trigger and multiplier of

transnational security problems. for instance, at times of economic crisis

and high unemployment inside Indonesia, the influx of illegal workers from

Indonesia is feared. similarly, singapore views piracy as closely associated

with sumatra’s economic conditions. furthermore, at times of economic

slump, political instability may ensue in the neighboring countries and spill

over into singapore. most notably, the governing elite of singapore is

concerned that during economic crises transitional democracies in the

region may face open criticism and disfranchisement of the populace, and

the same pressure may reach the singaporean government.

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Issues for engagement: asIan PersPectIves on transnatIonal securIty challenges 153

measures by a regional military command or the us Department of

Defense. Instead, windows of opportunities for the united states are

found in anti-drug and maritime law enforcement efforts, where

developing the capacity of the partner country’s authority in a quiet

manner is welcomed.

i

estimated as of 2008. computed from data in the cIa, World Factbook, 2009.

ii

singapore’s estimated gDP per capita (purchase power parity) for 2008 was us$51,500,

whereas malaysia’s figure for the same year was us$15,200. they both compare favorably

against most other countries in the region, like Burma (us$1,200), Bangladesh

(us$1,500), cambodia (us$2,000), vietnam (us$2,800), the Philippines (us$3,300),

Indonesia (us$3,900), china (us$6,000), and thailand (us$8,400). Data source: cIa,

World Factbook, 2009.

iii

estimated as of July 2009. cIa, World Factbook, 2009.

iv

for a history of Wahhabism’s influence in malaysia and its link to Jemaah Islamiya, see

Zachary abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, co: lynne

rienner, 2003), pp. 125–38.

v

estimated as of July 2009. cIa, World Factbook 2009.

vi

“thailand Islamic Insurgency,” globalsecurity.org.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm. accessed on 9 December

2009.

vii

financial action task force, “third mutual evaluation on anti-money laundering and

combating the financing of terrorism, singapore, executive summary,” Paris: financial

action task force, 29 february 2008, p. 5.

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/52/40211135.pdf. Downloaded on 9 December 2009.

viii

financial action task force, p. 7.

ix

us congress, senate, committee on finance, “Written testimony of Jeffrey owens,

Director, oecD center for tax Policy and administration before senate finance

committee on offshore tax evasion,” 3 may 2007, pp. 7–8, 15.

http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/050307testjo.pdf. Downloaded on 9

December 2009.

x

francis chin, “s’pore in the white,” strait times, 14 november 2009, reproduced on the

singapore ministry of foreign affairs website at:

http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?view.14045. accessed on 9 December 2009.

xi

yoichiro sato, “southeast asian receptiveness to Japan’s maritime security

cooperation,” asia-Pacific center for security studies, september 2007.

http://www.apcss.org/Publications/maritime%20security%20cooperation%20Japanse%20asia%20sato.pdf. accessed on 9 December 2009.

malaysia, the primary concern with terrorism has to do with us actions in

the region and the repercussions of these actions on domestic politics.

malaysians recognize that the country is more prone to the influence of

radicalized Islam from West asia, south asia, and north africa and that

its territory may harbor terrorists and their sympathizers. however,

malaysians seem to take some comfort in their belief that the terrorists’

targets are elsewhere. terrorism and its perceived association with Islam

are sensitive topics in malaysia’s domestic party politics. the country’s

ethnoreligious divide on these topics largely precludes publicly visible

antiterrorism cooperation with the united states. singapore’s concerns

about maritime piracy are not closely shared by malaysia. malaysia’s

strong sovereign claims over its territorial waters in the malacca strait

preclude formalized multilateral cooperation that includes nonlittoral

partners.

xi the two countries, however, share concerns about the

expansion of chinese naval activities in southeast asia. to counter the

increasing chinese naval activities, singapore openly welcomes a us

naval presence in the country. however, malaysia cannot do the same for

domestic considerations. With malaysia, broader maritime security

cooperation outside the malacca strait—which only implicitly embeds

improvement of the antipiracy capabilities—is more likely to be fruitful.

such cooperation could go a long way toward improving malaysia’s

maritime enforcement agency’s capabilities in maritime border patrol and

interceptions, information-sharing with other agencies (such as

immigration, police, customs, the navy, and other regional governments),

legal prosecuting capabilities, and anticorruption measures at the

enforcement level.

finally, both malaysia and singapore are hotbeds of money

laundering. the presence of traditional transnational criminal networks

in the region, combined with the recent “race to the bottom” (financial

liberalization and deregulation) among the regional financial centers in

terms of liberalization of cross-border financial transactions, has made

criminal money an important part of southeast asian economies.

White-collar crimes and unethical but legal (due to lax regulations)

business practices have the potential to severely destabilize the

security of the region, as singaporeans clearly see economic conditions

in the region as a critical variable affecting all other transnational

security issues. the money laundering issue, however, involves

enhancement of the global financial rules and standardization of the

national rules, which are far beyond the scope of security cooperation

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• ethnic tensions in sri lanka have the potential to spill over and

destabilize India, america’s key economic and strategic partner in

south asia. given that sri lanka has been a friend and democratic

partner of the united states since gaining independence in 1948,

disengaging from sri lanka could have negative consequences for

us geostrategic interests in the region.

for more than a quarter century, a war between the government of sri

lanka (gosl) and the liberation tigers of tamil eelam (ltte) ravaged

the island nation in the Indian ocean, killing more than seventy thousand

people as the ruling ethnic sinhalese majority fought the separatist tamils.

the fighting came to an end in may 2009, as sri lanka’s army trapped the

remnants of the ltte in the nation’s northeast, killed velupillai

Prabhakaran (the group’s elusive supremo) and took control of the entire

country for the first time since the riots of July 1983. the victory came at

a great cost: with the gosl suppressing dissent, curtailing human rights

and, in the final onslaught, according to the united nations, killing seven

thousand civilians.

During the final stages of the war, sri lanka came under increasing

attack—for violations of international humanitarian law and the

internment of more than a quarter million tamils displaced by the

fighting—by the very countries that had provided it legal, diplomatic,

military hardware and muscle. the united states terminated its supply of

arms and allied itself with the european union in its effort to pass a

resolution against sri lanka in the united nations security council. the

european union, based on its commissioned report on sri lanka’s failure

to honor human rights commitments, scrapped a trade concession known

as the “gsP Plus” and lobbied intensively against the grant of a us$2.6

billion loan by the International monetary fund toward reconstruction of

the country following the devastation of the twenty-six-year-old war.

this paper argues that it would be counterproductive for the united

states and the european union to disengage from sri lanka and deny it

the sustenance it requires for the reconstruction of the country. the

potential outcomes of a policy of disengagement and noncooperation are

the reemergence of an insurgent group that used terror as a tactic,

providing a model for learning by other insurgent groups and an increase

in influence over a strategic location by regional powers like china,

russia and India.

Sri Lanka: Transnational Security and

Postinsurgency Issues

shyam tekwani

Key Findings

• sri lanka’s quarter-century civil war may be over, but many of the

underlying causes of the war continue to linger.

• the international network of the defeated tamil tigers continues

to control immense financial and logistical resources and is

supported by the nearly one million tamil diaspora. meanwhile,

the victorious rajapaksa government has been slow in

implementing its promise of political settlement and integrating the

minorities into the political and socioeconomic life of the country.

these realities may contribute to the radicalization of a new

generation of tamils, both on the island and in the diaspora in

north america, europe, australia and asia.

• International sanctions on the island nation will impede the process

of reconstruction and resettlement—even as inflation drags the

economy down further—and lead to social unrest.

• no amount of foreign aid will mitigate sri lanka’s problems

without ensuring better governance to address the country’s serious

economic and political challenges.

• the last stages of the war saw a rush of internally displaced

persons (IDPs) take to the high seas, sailing off to countries of the

european union, canada and australia seeking asylum as

refugees. the urgent task of resettling three hundred thousand

tamil IDPs has been slow, creating further resentment among the

minority community.

• the last stages of the war saw a rush of internally displaced

persons (IDPs) take to the high seas, sailing off to countries of the

european union, canada and australia seeking asylum as

refugees. the urgent task of resettling three hundred thousand

tamil IDPs has been slow, creating further resentment among the

minority community.

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refusal to endorse tamil separatism, launched an offensive against the

IPKf. India’s two and one-half year experience on the island ended with

a humiliating withdrawal and the assassination of rajiv gandhi by a

female suicide bomber a year later. following the assassination, Indian

support for the tamil cause dried up, the group was proscribed as a

terrorist organization and India adopted a “hands-off” policy in the

affairs of the island.

INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS AND FUNDS

In the aftermath of the July 1983 sinhala-tamil riots in sri lanka, a

large number of minority tamils fled the country as refugees, mainly to

India, canada, the united Kingdom, australia, the united states and

europe. shortly thereafter, and with the passive support of the liberaldemocratic host countries, the ltte set about leveraging the scattered

diaspora—a group earning and saving in the world’s strongest

currencies—through its offices in more than sixty countries to establish a

sophisticated and extensive network of propaganda, funding and arms

procurement to sustain its armed insurgency. about 80 percent of the

ltte’s us$1 billion in annual donations came from the diaspora.

following the crackdown on the ltte by canada and the european

union in 2006, the royal canadian mounted Police released a report of its

four-year investigation (operation osaluki) of the fundraising efforts of

the tamil tigers in canada. the report revealed that the ltte had

subjected sri lankan tamils living in canada and other Western countries

to intimidation, extortion and even violence to ensure a steady flow of

funds for its operations. other sources of its revenue were front

organizations and proxy businesses.

testimony in may 2003 by an officer of the us Drug enforcement

administration (Dea) at a hearing of the senate Judiciary committee

revealed that since the mid-1980s tamil tiger communities in europe

were involved in narcotics smuggling, having historically served as drug

couriers moving narcotics into europe. the report also indicated that the

ltte had close ties to drug trafficking networks in Burma, and that tamil

expatriates carried drugs in exchange for training from Burma, Pakistan

and afghanistan. the testimony concluded that sri lanka’s preoccupation

with the ltte depleted its resources, preventing the adequate patrol of sri

lanka’s nine hundred miles of coastline to effectively curb the drug trade.

the most significant sources of weapons for the ltte were cambodia

Transnational Insurgency: Local agenda, global network

THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM

centuries of mistrust between ethnic tamils and sinhalese preceded

British colonial rule (1815–1948). the divisions deepened after

independence and a militarized tamil insurgency took form during the late

1970s. following an internecine war among the assorted militant groups,

the tigers emerged supreme and dictated the course of the country’s

history from July 1983 to may 2009. the tigers—labeled as the most

ruthless terrorist organization in the world—were pioneers of suicide

bombing as an insurgent tactic and were the only group to have

assassinated two heads of state. at the height of its power the ltte

controlled a quarter of the country with its fully developed armed

capabilities on land, sea and air; the ltte also installed its own system of

roads, taxes, police and courts.

the ltte’s achievements were the result of the global scale on which

it operated. to its supporters, the tigers were freedom fighters struggling

to carve out Eelam, a tamil homeland in the northeastern part of the

sinhalese-majority island. that view had sympathy among the majority of

the nearly one million tamil diaspora in the West. the overseas operations

of the tigers were central to their ability to sustain an armed campaign for

more than a quarter century.

INDIA: THE TAMIL CONNECTION

home to more than seventy million tamils in the southern state of

tamilnadu—and with fewer than twenty nautical miles separating it from

the northern coast of sri lanka in the Indian ocean—India played a key

role in actively supporting and sponsoring tamil militant groups during

the early 1980s, providing them training, arms and funds. this support

was also a product of wider ideological and geopolitical concerns during

the cold War. the ltte attained dominance among the other militant

groups and emerged as the sole representative of the tamil cause for a

separate state by the mid-80s, with support and infrastructure networks

based in India.

In an attempt to stabilize the region, the new government of rajiv

gandhi in India underwrote a peace accord between the gosl and the

ltte in July 1987, and Indian troops were sent to sri lanka as the Indian

Peace Keeping force (IPKf). the ltte, unhappy with India’s firm

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transnational security is most intensive with India and china. India’s tacit

support in the sphere of strategic intelligence, maritime cooperation and

air defense contributed to the military victory over the ltte. sri lanka’s

war machine also was fostered by chinese and Pakistani military

hardware, foreign intelligence sharing, and a focus on military

professionalism. the united states supplied intelligence on ltte ship

movements, which helped sri lanka choke illegal arms imports.

help also came from Burma, russia, libya and Iran as sri lanka

turned toward countries that offered donations without criticism of its

human rights violations. Iran emerged as a major economic donor—when

sri lanka was under pressure on human rights issues during the war—

with a us$1.9 billion line of credit, primarily to buy Iranian oil and for a

hydroelectric and irrigation scheme to upgrade a refinery. President

rajapaksa became the first sri lankan head of state to visit libya when he

called on the libyan leader, muammar gaddafi, toward the closing phase

of the war when Western criticism was at its highest. the meeting,

ostensibly aimed at improving trade relations and economic cooperation,

yielded a us$500 million financial package for development along with

an appreciative comment from the libyan leader on sri lanka’s handling

of the ongoing war against the tamil tigers.

Burma and sri lanka stepped up bilateral cooperation to curb

terrorism and to increase investments, trade and tourism. the Burmese

denied the enfeebled tigers any further use of their traditional sanctuaries

in Burma. russia, one of sri lanka’s main arms suppliers, backed

colombo at the geneva human rights council to deflect a debate over the

conduct of the war in sri lanka. moscow, along with tripoli, is one of the

largest buyers of tea from sri lanka. Within a week of being reelected as

president for a second term in January 2010, mr. rajapaksa signed a

us$300 million loan to buy military and dual-purpose equipment from

russia despite an end to the quarter-century war. sri lanka’s 2009 defense

spending was estimated at us$1.74 billion (from us$1.48 billion in

2008), which represents 17 percent of the country’s total estimated

expenditure and about 5 percent of gDP, nearly double that spent by India

and Pakistan. the russia deal came after the former army commander said

the island nation had cancelled a us$200 million purchase of arms from

Pakistan and china after the end of its war with the tamil tigers in may

2009. meanwhile India, whose two-way trade with sri lanka surged to

over us$4 billion last year, extended loans of us$700 million to improve

sri lanka’s railways.

and the rest of southeast asia, north Korea, afghanistan, lebanon,

cyprus, greece, turkey and ukraine.

9/11 AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: THE CHANGED

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

In July 2001 the ltte staged attacks on the sri lankan air force base

and the Bandaranaike International airport in colombo, wiping out half of

the country’s civil aviation fleet, in addition to a few military aircraft. With

sri lanka’s army in a deadlock, the navy restrained and the air fleet

neutralized, the ltte seemed on the verge of a major victory.

two months later, the planes that brought the twin towers crashing

down in new york on september 11 laid the groundwork for a hardening

of global opinion against the kind of violent tactics used by the ltte, and

Western attitudes underwent a shift to resolve regional conflicts. the

ltte had already been proscribed as a terrorist organization in India, the

united states and the united Kingdom before september 11 and

subsequently saw its credibility erode further when canada and the

european union also banned it in July 2006, curtailing the ltte’s

financial operations. Due in part to this bolstered legal awareness, an

international crackdown by law enforcement agencies on the ltte’s

overseas network resulted in numerous arrests and crippled the group’s

fundraising and arms procurement capabilities. In the united states, an

fBI sting operation in early 2007 led to the capture of four Indonesians, a

singaporean and a sri lankan tamil who pleaded guilty to attempting to

smuggle weapons to the ltte.

With the ltte’s smuggling and trafficking routes cut off, its flow of

arms and funds drying up, and its maritime capability reduced, the gosl

was emboldened to revive its own war on terror. this culminated in a

military victory over the ltte—an organization that had transformed sri

lanka from a major tourist destination with a model democracy and an

open economy to a country whose very existence as a nation-state was

threatened.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

sri lanka’s defiance of Western governments that railed against the

country’s conduct during the final phase of the war signaled a historic shift

in sri lanka’s foreign policy. sri lanka’s international cooperation on

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In 2009, colombo granted Beijing an exclusive investment zone in

mirigama, thirty-four miles from colombo’s port. this was enough to

concern both the united states and India, despite chinese insistence that

such actions are purely a commercial venture. While some accept the

chinese viewpoint at face value—given the fact that around 70 percent of

china’s oil imports are shipped via this sea lane from the middle east to

chinese ports—others see ominous designs behind the project. India’s

home minister, sri lanka’s long-time ally and the dominant power in

south asia, warned, “china is fishing in troubled waters.”ii

ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE

far from the ruins of war in the northeast, colombo is enjoying a

peace dividend. the economy, suffering from a slump in garment exports

and tourism because of the war, is vibrant. this year the country is

expected to see some six hundred thousand foreign tourists, compared

with five hundred thousand in 2009. the New York Times has named sri

lanka its top tourist destination for 2010. annual remittances from the

overseas sri lankan workforce are rebounding to around us$3 billion.

last year the sri lankan stock market more than doubled in value, making

it one of the best performing in the world. food prices remain high. the

economy is expected to grow by around 6 percent this year. and yet much

needs to be done if sri lanka is to ride the current wave of optimism

toward sustainable growth.

Despite 5 percent annual growth in gross domestic product (gDP) in

recent years and the highest per capita income in south asia (us$2,000),

the strength of sri lanka’s economy is tenuous as the budget was skewed

heavily toward the war effort. the fragile economy will require massive

amounts of money for reconstruction and development. towards that end,

the recently approved us$2.6 billion International monetary fund (Imf)

loan will bolster sri lanka’s reserves. however, the european union’s

decision to suspend special trade preferences known as “gsP Plus”

(unless progress is made on human rights and political freedoms), entails

the withdrawal of trade benefits worth about us$135m that will hit the

garment and fishing industries the hardest.

In contrast to its bigger neighbors, India and Pakistan, sri lanka’s

security force was largely symbolic. It was only after the emergence of the

separatist tamil insurgency in the 1980s that sri lanka’s armed forces

underwent a transformation and began to focus exclusively on

ROLE OF CHINA

During the closing stages of the war in early 2009, when reports of

tens of thousands civilians trapped in the war zone began filtering out

despite a ban on the media, un security council members austria,

mexico and costa rica, backed by the united states and Britain, called

for an informal briefing on the humanitarian crisis. china, supported by

russia, blocked the move declaring that it was “an internal matter” for sri

lanka and was not a threat to international security. china’s decision

increased its influence in sri lanka. In an effort to revive its us$40 billion

economy, sri lanka granted china an exclusive economic zone in its first

postwar drive to attract more foreign direct investment and also gave a

green light to an us$891 million power project, even as the united states

warned its citizens against traveling to sri lanka.

With the united states ending direct military aid to sri lanka over its

questionable human rights record, china agreed to sell significant

quantities of arms (worth us$37.6 million) including Jian-7 fighter jets,

antiaircraft guns, sophisticated Jy-11 3D air surveillance radars and other

military hardware and munitions that helped tip the balance against the

insurgents.

In 2007 Beijing moved to secure its maritime strategic goals through

brokering a us$1 billion deal with colombo to develop a deepwater port

in the southern town of hambantota into a major transshipment hub with a

container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an airport and other

facilities. hambantota, on the southern tip of sri lanka, is just six nautical

miles from the main east-west trade route across the Indian ocean. around

70 percent of china’s oil imports are shipped through this sea lane, which

stretches from the middle east through the strait of malacca to chinese

ports. china has been expanding its navy to preempt any potential

vulnerability in the event of a conflict, particularly with the united states.

china also has been developing a “string of pearls,” a phrase coined by

defense contractor Booz allen hamilton to describe the shipping routes

along strategic sea lines to ensure a steady supply of oil by developing

port facilities across the south china sea through the strait of malacca

and across the Indian ocean, and on to the arabian gulf.

i hambantota,

like the chinese-built port of gwadar in Pakistan and sittwe in Burma, is

one such pearl.

china also provided us$1 billion in economic assistance last year

(replacing Japan as sri lanka’s largest foreign donor) while the united

states gave us$7.4 million and the united Kingdom gave us$2 million.

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freshwater resources being polluted by industrial waste and poor drainage,

water scarcity is a looming threat. Increased pollution, poaching and

urbanization pose a great threat to wildlife populations.

as a source and destination for human trafficking, sri lanka ranks as a

tier 2 Watch list country by the us state Department’s office to monitor

and combat trafficking in Persons (g/tIP). tier 2 Watch list countries

are those whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum

standards of the trafficking victims Protection act (tvPa) but are

making significant efforts toward compliance. a recent announcement by

the g/tIP that it would fund an International organization for migration

(Iom) project to help sri lanka develop a national strategy on combating

human trafficking is a step in the right direction. the us$300,000

program, which will build on an earlier us-funded Iom countertrafficking

project in sri lanka, will provide training for law enforcement and

government officials. technical support also will be provided for the

government’s antitrafficking task force to help it develop a comprehensive

national strategy. similar support for other development and governancerelated programs will strengthen us-sri lanka relations and assist in the

development of the island nation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

for the united states, stability in sri lanka is essential to securing its

energy resources from the Persian gulf and ensuring the free flow of trade

in the Indian ocean. after a highly publicized fallout with colombo over

alleged atrocities during the final stages of war with the tigers, the us

administration is now working on a more pragmatic policy toward sri

lanka on the basis of a new report by the us senate committee on

foreign relations. the report recommends that “the obama

administration should take a broader and more robust approach to sri

lanka that appreciates new political and economic realities in sri lanka

and us geostrategic interests. such an approach should be

multidimensional so that us policy is not driven by short-term

humanitarian concerns but rather an integrated strategy that leverages

political, economic, and security tools for more effective long-term

(political) reforms.”iii

emphasizing that the united states cannot afford to “lose” sri lanka,

the report expounds on the “geostrategic interests” of Washington and says

they could be further jeopardized if the current state of strained relations

counterinsurgency. since then, the government’s spending priorities have

not been in line with the challenges the country faces, as evidenced by the

20 percent increase (over the us$1.74 billion expenditure in 2009) in the

defense budget despite the fact that the war has ended. analysts predict

that the increased defense spending would put pressure on its budget

deficit, which the government had agreed to contain by the end of this year

as an assurance for the loan from the Imf.

a 2006 study (“cost of conflict in sri lanka”) by the mumbai-based

think tank strategic foresight group (sfg) reported that sri lanka was

one of the most militarized societies in south asia. the study said the

island nation had eight thousand military personnel per one million

people. even Pakistan has only half that number. the corresponding

figures for other south asian countries are 2,700 in nepal, 1,300 in India,

and 1,000 in Bangladesh. In terms of military expenditure as a percentage

of gDP, sri lanka spent the most (4.1 percent), compared with Pakistan

(3.5 percent), India and nepal (2.5 percent), and Bangladesh (1.5 percent).

the victory of the military forces over the separatists has opened up a

range of opportunities for the government to address other issues of

governance that were dealt with distractedly during the course of the war.

the war had its greatest impact largely on the populations in the northeast

and the bordering areas of the island nation. Psychological trauma,

damage to infrastructure and homes, displacement, restricted mobility,

disruption of local economies, disruption of community and institutional

networks, and the deterioration of health services are the most affected. sri

lanka, according to the World health organization, is in an

epidemiological transition. While malaria and diarrhea are prevalent

among IDPs and those living in the uncleared areas in the northeast (the

main theater of the war), diseases like tuberculosis, dengue, Japanese

encephalitis, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections are still prevalent.

the two and a half decades of war also saw an increase in tobacco,

substance and alcohol abuse.

environmental issues demand equal attention. Demining the populated

areas of the northeast is essential to the resettlement of IDPs who wish to

return to the villages they were forced to abandon during the course of the

war. sri lanka is prone to occasional cyclones and tornadoes, and the

tsunami of December 2004 killed about 31,000 people, left more than

6,300 missing, 443,000 displaced, and destroyed an estimated us$1.5

billion worth of property. Issues of deforestation, soil erosion, and coastal

degradation from mining activities are beginning to cause concern. With

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reach out to the diaspora groups to become partners in rebuilding the

country. In addition, the government will need to accelerate the

resettlement process, and ensure a lasting political settlement to the ethnic

issue.

the return in January 2010 of nearly two hundred thousand IDPs to

their home districts and the increased freedom of movement for the one

hundred thousand still remaining in military-run camps are important steps

forward and were brought about mostly as a result of international

pressure and the political need to win tamil votes. With high literacy rates,

a young population and a strategic location along trade routes, the island

of sri lanka is on the cusp of becoming a vibrant business hub and the

paradise that its tourist brochures describe. this will require the assistance

of the international community to reconstruct the country’s battered

democratic institutions and establish conditions for enduring peace.

Political and governance reforms will be resisted until the northeast is

reconstructed and developed. until the grievances that generated and

sustained the militancy are resolved, and constitutional reforms to end the

marginalization of the tamils are made, there will be neither enduring

peace nor political stability.

to achieve enduring peace and stability, the international community

will need to engage and use its financial clout to ensure reconstruction and

development in sri lanka. the united states is uniquely placed to lead the

effort, due to its influence in sri lanka as a friend and democratic partner

since 1948.

vi

the report of the committee on foreign relations states, “the united

states and sri lanka have a long history of cordial relations based in large

part on shared democratic traditions.”vii accounting for more than onequarter of sri lanka’s total exports, the united states is its most important

trade partner. the report’s recommendation that the united states

recalibrates its relationship in tune with new political and economic

realities is a sound one. so too is the recognition that foreign policy should

not be dominated by a single agenda—in this case, violations of

humanitarian law—which works against us geostrategic interests in the

region. In the words of mahinda rajapaksa, the president of sri lanka,

who made an appeal through the op-ed column of the Philadelphia

Inquirer, “reconciliation will be a multifaceted task, and it is important to

look at the many aspects of nation-building through a broad lens, rather

than a narrow one.”viii more importantly, however, will be the leadership

the united states will have to provide to engage the international

were to continue. “sri lanka is strategically located at the nexus of

maritime trading routes connecting europe and the middle east to china

and the rest of asia, where an estimated half of the world’s container ships

transit the Indian ocean.”iv

equally important for the united states is the prevention of the

reemergence of tamil militancy. the ltte was an integral part of the

international terror network, and by all accounts it offered a model for

tactical and operational learning for other terrorist groups. the ltte

represented the terrorist model of the future, having harnessed the forces

of globalization to attain maximum strategic reach with a global diaspora

support network of one million tamils, pioneering the use of suicide

bombers and maritime attacks, being adept in the use of new media

technologies, and preceding the al-Qaeda network by almost two decades.

a senior policy analyst testifying before the subcommittee on national

security in april 2001 observed, “although fighting a national war of

liberation, the long established and formidably skilled, organized and

equipped maritime arm of the liberation tamil tigers of eelam (ltte)

presents al-Qaeda with a source to plagiarize for maritime terrorism

knowledge. moreover, the ltte perpetuated its expertise in a maritime

school and academy, formally packaging and publishing a body of

knowledge applicable to maritime terrorism.”v

IMPORTANT NEXT STEPS

the victory of incumbent President rajapaksa in the 26 January 2010

election by a margin of 1.8 million votes (58 percent of the vote) has

ensured him another seven years in power. While his victory has placed

the possibility of reforms on the table for the first time since the country

gained independence in 1948, the electoral challenge by his erstwhile

army chief general, sarath fonseka, highlighted the politicization of the

armed forces. the general’s defeat resulted in a purge in the higher

echelons of the military and the detention of several former military

officers and soldiers.

the rump of the ltte is still active in sri lanka, with a few hundred

armed cadres hiding in the jungles. these groups aim to rekindle their

insurgency and make use of large quantities of arms buried in hideouts.

the million-strong sri lankan tamil diaspora is a crucial factor for any

revival of the ltte. colombo will need to continue working with

countries to prevent a resurgence of support for militancy and will need to

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Vietnamese Perspectives on

Transnational Security Challenges

alexander vuving

Key Findings

• vietnam’s perspectives on security challenges are being shaped by

four paradigms: regime security, rapid wealth creation, human

security, and national survival.

• the regime security and rapid wealth creation agendas are

dominant, but the government is under increasing pressure from

forces representing the human security and national survival

agendas.

• the major transnational security challenges as perceived by the

vietnamese are those that threaten the values upheld by the four

paradigms. these include regime opposition, terrorism, infectious

diseases, natural disasters, environmental crimes, climate change,

resource scarcity, hazardous cheap products, drug trafficking, and

human trafficking. also of concern are sea attacks and oil spills in

the south china sea, illegal immigration from china, and money

laundering.

• as vietnam pursues two conflicting grand strategies—international

integration versus regime preservation—its officials share a thin

common view on security challenges, and the government’s

perspective suffers from a lack of coherence.

• microlevel perspectives, stovepiped practices, lack of social

responsiveness, and a general tendency to pass the buck to others

are prevalent features of vietnam’s government approach to

transnational security issues. however, the reform-minded portion

of the media, which still has to operate under state ownership, is

playing an important role in mobilizing societal forces and

pressuring government agencies toward action.

• With increasing convergence on some strategic interests between

the us and vietnam related to china’s rise, there is greater

community, Western donors, the World Bank and the european union in

developing resettlement, development and reconstruction strategies.

i from a 2005 report commissioned by the us Department of Defense’s office of net

assessment, titled “energy futures in asia.”

ii “China is fishing in troubled waters in Sri Lanka: Chidambaram”; Hindustan Times

dated april 25, 2009. available online: (www.hindustantimes.com/news-feed/india/chinais-fishing-in-troubled-waters-in-lanka-chidambaram/article1-404073.aspx) . accessed 25

march 2010.

iii “sri lanka: recharting us strategy after the War” , a report by the united states senate

committee on foreign relations, December 7, 2009.

iv Ibid.

v testimony of frank J. cilluffo senior Policy analyst center for strategic & International

before the subcommittee on national security, veterans affairs, house committee on

government 03 april 2001 as cited in captain James Pelkofski “Al Qaeda’s Maritime

Campaign”. available online: http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,83909,00.html

accessed 25 march 2010.

vi “sri lanka: recharting us strategy after the War”, a report by the united states senate

committee on foreign relations, December 7, 2009.

vii Ibid.

viii “How Sri Lanka defeated terrorism” by mahinda rajapksa in the Philadelphia Inquirer.

available online: http://www.philly.com/inquirer/currents/81082802.html accessed 25

march 2010

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must rehabilitate market mechanisms and join the global mainstream.

however, these measures also undermined the communist regime. the

tiananmen square protests in china and the transformation of communist

regimes in eastern europe during 1989 provided an object lesson for antiimperialists in this regard. for the old thinkers, such events could happen

because liberal ideas originating in the West had crossed the border and

influenced parts of the population, including the elite. the process was

called “peaceful evolution” and was identified by anti-imperialists as the

primary threat to vietnam’s security in the era of doi moi.

Poverty and peaceful evolution are the two traumas that have driven

vietnamese policies in the 1990s and well into the twenty-first century.

correspondingly, the chief objectives of vietnamese politics in the post–

cold War period have been economic growth and regime preservation,

with the latter enjoying a slight primacy throughout most of the period.

the cohabitation of these two paradigms has exerted an enormous

impact on how vietnam’s policymakers perceive and manage the

transnational security challenges to their country. Integrationists generally

favor greater openness with the world and see transnational activities as

bringing more good than harm. on the contrary, anti-imperialists tend to

emphasize the negative effects of external influence. hence, security

challenges are given different priorities according to whether they are

political or socioeconomic in nature. Political security challenges are

defined by the authorities as those activities that are directed against the

communist regime or undermining the ideological and organizational

foundation of the regime. high priority is put on fighting political security

challenges, sometimes at the expense of measures to curb socioeconomic

security problems. as a result, threats to the communist regime are likely

to be seen as more alarming and are met with tougher countermeasures

than are threats to the livelihood of the population.

In vietnam’s government agencies, the perspectives of antiimperialism and integration, along with the underlying values of regime

security and rapid wealth creation, continue to prevail over other

perspectives. the government is, however, under increasing pressure from

two recent developments. first, two decades of limited liberalization have

opened up some breathing space for civil society, which, in its function as

a corrective to the authorities, emphasizes the values of human security

and sustainable development. second is the perception of a great danger to

national survival that emanates from a powerful, assertive, and expanding

china. this perception expresses itself more emphatically through civil

potential for closer cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally,

between the two countries. the areas of greater potential are as

various as combating drug trafficking, infectious diseases and

terrorism, environment protection, disaster management,

enhancing resource security, and coping with climate change

The Views Behind the Views

In the second half of the 1980s, serious debates emerged within the

vietnamese leadership over the country’s security outlook. at first, the

debates revolved around the question of “security by what” and not

“security for whom.” While the focus was state security rather than human

security, adherents of “new thinking” argued that security would be more

effectively provided by economic means than by military means. this was

because the rigid binary structure of a military confrontation between the

socialist bloc (of which vietnam was a member) and the capitalist world

had given way to interdependence and globalization. In accordance with

their worldview, the new thinkers advocated liberalization inside the

country and a more open approach to the outside world. however, old

thinkers, clinging to an anti-imperialist doctrine that prioritizes regime

stability, feared that such measures would bring in “negative elements”—

human, ideological or otherwise—from outside and increase subversive

and criminal activities. In response, new thinkers agreed to the need for

political stability but maintained that the benefits of international

integration would outweigh the costs of transnational security challenges.

While the core debate remained unsettled, the two camps cut a

pragmatic compromise. Both economic reform and political stability

became the dual linchpins of vietnamese policies in the era of doi moi

(“renewal”), which began in the late 1980s. vietnam’s security outlook in

the current era reflects the ongoing conflicting visions of anti-imperialism

and integration. two major experiences have defined the main thrust of

anti-imperialism and integration since the late 1980s. the first is the

experience of an economy on the verge of collapse. this gave rise to

integration. the second is the experience of a regime on the verge of

collapse. this determined the content of anti-imperialism in the post–cold

War era. after decades of warfare and experiments with a socialist

command economy, vietnam fell into economic collapse in the mid-1980s.

this prompted the country’s leadership to adopt wide-ranging reforms

both in domestic and foreign policies. a main lesson learned was that one

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promoting their opinion peacefully and did not engage in terrorist

activities.

Infectious diseases. the last two decades have seen vietnam heavily

exposed to a number of pandemic diseases such as the human

immunodeficiency virus (hIv), severe acute respiratory syndrome

(sars), and h5n1 (bird flu). more recently, through the country’s human

connections with the united states, h1n1 (swine flu) also has been

spreading rapidly in vietnam. Because infectious diseases threaten the

well-being of a vast number of the population, the issue is perennial on the

watch lists of advocates for human security, rapid wealth creation, and

national survival.

hIv was introduced to the country in the 1990s, along with vietnam’s

international opening and economic liberalization. the spread of hIv has

been closely related to the sex industry and the narcotics trade, which are

considered by vietnamese as two of the most dangerous social crimes.

Despite sustained efforts by authorities, hIv, prostitution, and drug abuse

remain acute and widespread. this current reality seems to be attributable

to the lack of political will and material resources to fight against these

challenges.

sars was introduced to vietnam in early 2003 by a businessman

flying in from hong Kong. Within weeks, the disease caused the death of

this man and four other people who had contact with him in the hospital.

the dramatic loss of life raised public awareness of pandemic health

concerns, and the management of this disease provided valuable lessons for

the subsequent cases. Drawing upon the lessons learned from sars,

vietnam was relatively successful in limiting the negative effects of the

avian influenza pandemic. the government spent a large amount of money

to compensate for farmers’losses, and there were effective efforts to

quarantine the virus. these efforts, according to a senior healthcare official,

are the major reasons for the success. however, both the h5n1 and the

h1n1 influenza were spreading with high speed over large areas. this was

largely because many of the infected (in the case of h1n1) and the affected

(in the case of h5n1) did not comply with the quarantine procedures. lax

hygiene practices and the spread of contaminated food are also some of the

main causes of recurrent diarrhea outbreaks in recent years.

society actors but is also present among a large part of the ruling elite

when they are in their private capacity. symbolically, general vo nguyen

giap, the only living founder of the socialist republic, is a prominent

figure in these emerging forces.

Major Transnational Security Threats

Regime opposition and terrorism. regime opposition normally is

considered an internal threat. But in an age of globalization and with

millions of vietnamese exiled from their country after the communist

takeover of south vietnam, regime opposition has acquired a transnational

nature and is arguably the top security concern of the vietnamese

government. a communist state, vietnam does not allow legal opposition

to the government. even public “critical feedback” (phan bien) is not

tolerated. With this mindset, vietnam’s government has an extremely

broad view of what it sees as oppositional activities. for example, getting

in contact with an exile vietnamese group that advocates democracy and

human rights in vietnam is seen as a threat to the communist regime.

Propagating liberal ideas is also seen by the authorities as a dangerous

phenomenon. a medical doctor was arrested and sentenced to five years in

prison and three years of house arrest after he translated and posted online

an article from the us embassy website entitled “What Is Democracy?”

missionary activities to create organized communities of faith that are

independent from the state are also perceived as threatening. control of

political ideology and control of organized association are two strongholds

of communist Party power. thus, activities that challenge the regime’s

control of these spheres will be watched with the highest vigilance and

treated with the harshest methods.

vietnam has tried to secure the cooperation of foreign governments in

fighting its regime opposition. It has reached mutual agreements with

noncommunist neighbors such as cambodia, thailand, and the

Philippines with regard to not allowing dissidents to organize within each

other’s territory. vietnam also took advantage of increased us terrorism

concerns to gain support from the united states. While taking us

requests to fight terrorism seriously, it also labeled some us-based

vietnamese groups as “terrorists” and requested that Washington do the

same. the subtext was simple: If I help you fight your enemy, you must

also help me fight my enemy. however, much to the disappointment of

hanoi, Washington refused to reciprocate, stating that these groups were

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recent decades. In addition, vietnam’s water and forest resources are being

rapidly diminished by the expansion of mining, hydropower, logging, land

development, and other industries.

according to the World Bank, vietnam is one of the five countries

most threatened by climate change. experts have estimated that a onemeter rise in sea level would result in 10 percent of vietnam’s population

being displaced and 4.4 percent of the country’s territory—including 90

percent of rice fields in the mekong delta—being permanently submerged.

If the sea level were to rise one meter, vietnam’s largest city, ho chi minh

city, which is now home to eight million inhabitants, would lose half of its

current area, while one-third of the vietnamese portion of the mekong

Delta, which is home to eighteen million people, or 22 percent of

vietnam’s population, also would be inundated. although ho chi minh

city accounts for nearly 30 percent of vietnam’s industrial output, the

mekong Delta produces half of vietnam’s rice and more than a quarter of

its gross domestic product (gDP). the rise in sea level, combined with

economic expansion in greater mekong, has already caused water scarcity

for vietnam and other countries in lower mekong. food insecurity and

massive migration are expected if this issue is not effectively dealt with.

Hazardous cheap products. few countries would identify hazardous

products as a major transnational security challenge. But in vietnam, the

abundance of cheap, poor-quality but products, mostly of chinese origin,

has become a security concern. these goods include foods, garments,

chemicals, and other products containing a high level of toxic preserving

agents, formaldehyde, and other hazardous ingredients used to drastically

reduce the costs of production. another type of hazardous product is the

equipment of an older technological generation that produces low-quality

goods at a high environmental cost. these products are sold at incredibly

cheap prices and have been conquering large segments of vietnam’s

domestic market. the issue of hazardous cheap products, most of which

are imported or smuggled from china, is high on the human security and

national survival agendas, which see these products and their flooding of

the domestic market as a danger to vietnamese consumers, producers, and

the environment. however, proponents of regime security and rapid

wealth creation view things differently. hazardous products do not pose a

direct threat to the regime. rather, they have helped many vietnamese

enterprises, both state-owned and private, in their race for quantity and

Natural disasters, environmental crimes, climate change, and

resource scarcity. these threats, separately or in combination, place

vietnam’s natural and material resources and those who depend on them

in a precarious position. the issues are placed high on the human security

and national survival agendas. While these challenges do not directly

threaten the ruling regime’s security, they pose a challenge to the rapid

wealth agenda. however, the long-term nature of the above issues (except

natural disasters) ensures that they are not a high priority on the rapid

wealth creation agenda, which is characterized by its short-term sight and

its role in contributing to these threats.

tropical storms and floods are the two major types of natural disasters

in vietnam. every year, a dozen typhoons come from the south china sea

and ravage the country’s most populous areas. on sea, the typhoons pose a

recurrent existential threat to thousands of vietnam’s small and illequipped fishing boats. on land, heavy rains cause floods and landslides,

while strong winds damage or destroy cities and villages. these problems

have been exacerbated in recent years by an economic expansion that

often included the leveling of lakes and the burning of forests to make way

for new urban, mining, and agricultural areas.

vietnam has a well-developed system of coordination among

governmental agencies at all territorial levels to deal with flooding and

storms. recently, a national committee for search and rescue, with the

military as the lead agency, has also been set up. the political will is,

however, often compromised by poor equipment, corrupt officials, and a

limited budget. for example, damage caused by storms has been made

more severe by the poor capacities of vietnam’s state-owned weather

forecasters.

While vietnam’s rapid economic development in recent decades has

dramatically raised the wealth of the nation, it also has placed a huge

stress on the environment. Parallel with the mushrooming of industrial

factories is the dramatic increase of chemicals that are discharged into the

soil and the air. In the race for fast profit, most factories do not comply

with the law and instead shift the environmental costs to their surrounding

areas. one popular case is the decade-long pollution of the thi vai river

in Dong nai Province by a food factory supported by foreign investment.

there is also increased media coverage about “cancer villages,” where

significant numbers of villagers are killed by strange cancers after a

factory is built in the neighborhood. the overuse of chemicals in

manufacturing, agriculture, and food processing has become widespread in

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sex workers, mostly in china, cambodia and the larger cities of vietnam,

but also in macau, thailand, and malaysia. tens of thousands of

vietnamese women have been sold as wives to chinese men, mostly in

rural areas, where the men are incapable of finding local wives. traffickers

also lure young vietnamese men and sell them across the borders to illegal

factories that use captive workers in china, mostly brickworks factories,

where they work like slaves. men sold to illegal factories are typically

chained so they cannot escape.

Because of its one-child policy and the popular preference for male

children, china is also a big market for the trafficking of young boys and

babies from neighboring vietnam. In the areas bordering china, this has

created a serious security threat to young boys, male babies, and their

families. the media have reported cases in which traffickers murdered an

entire family in order to take the newborn and young boys across the

border, where they would be sold at a high price. Despite the authorities’

efforts, the issue of human trafficking remains intractable. typically,

traffickers are local people who know the victims very well. like the

traffic of drugs, the illicit trade of women in vietnam is usually organized

in pyramid schemes. many victims become conduits in the network and,

trying to make profit from their local knowledge, return to their home

villages and lure their own recruits. this creates a hard nut for the

authorities to crack as victims become culprits and are fearful of revenge.

In other situations, women are sold to remote areas, where local

authorities are unable to identify the women’s origins.

Approaches to Dealing with the Threats

the centralized bureaucratic nature of the vietnamese government

augments the challenge of dealing with transnational security issues

created by the competing priorities within vietnamese society. the role of

government, as conceived by the ruling communist Party, is to supervise

and manage (quan ly) society. the government is differentiated into

various ministries and branches (bo nganh), each of which is supposed to

take control of a distinct sector in society. the mindset and the structure of

this “control by sector” approach have promoted microlevel perspectives

and stovepiped practices in government agencies.

on the other hand, control by sector has created large overlaps in

jurisdiction and vast no-man’s lands, since many social and natural

phenomena affect different areas and do not pay respect to bureaucratic

speed, which is pursued regardless of quality and long-term consequences.

for years, the vietnamese government has suppressed complaints about

the overabundance of hazardous, cheap products from china. nor have the

authorities done anything significant to improve quality control and border

protection against the smuggling of these products. the issue was only

recently (i.e., 2009) brought to larger public awareness. But after a

chinese embassy counselor intervened with the vietnamese ministry of

Information and communications, vietnam’s state-controlled media

stopped calling attention to the issue. the counselor noted that the

opinions voiced by some vietnamese newspapers were “unfriendly” to

china and needed to be controlled. vietnam, having formally pledged to

be a “good neighbor, good friend, good comrade, good partner” of china,

is under pressure to behave faithfully to its pledge.

Drug trafficking. several factors have made vietnam a key transit point

in the global network of drug trafficking routes. these include the

country’s proximity to the golden triangle, a world center for narcotic

production; the long and porous land borders with laos, a large supply

market, and with china, a large consumer market; and the ethnic

vietnamese connections with the advanced industrial countries, which also

is a large consumer market.

vietnam is also a destination for drug traffickers. Drug abuse has

become a widespread phenomenon not only in urban areas but also in the

countryside, affecting all strata of vietnamese society. the drug issue is

placed high on the human security agenda. however, the authorities’

handling of this issue remains ineffective. a common excuse is that

authorities lack finance, equipment, and personnel. But from an alternative

perspective, factors such as corruption, the lack of political will, and the

lack of effective interagency collaboration present major hurdles in coping

with drug abuse and trafficking.

Human trafficking. vietnam has been at a crossroads of people ever

since human memory. today, human trafficking is a pressing threat to

security in the country. young women, men, and boys are the major targets

of the traffickers. young women in poor families with poor education are

especially vulnerable to traffickers who pretend to broker jobs for them in

larger cities or abroad. many women then are sold and forced to become

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cambodia, and its ties with laos are the strongest. vietnam has signed

several government-level agreements with laos and cambodia on

cooperation in fighting transnational security challenges. In addition,

vietnam’s ministry of Public security annually signs a detailed

cooperation plan with its laotian and cambodian counterparts. these

regional agreements provide a solid framework for cross-border

collaboration and foster cooperation in fighting regime opposition, drug

trafficking, human trafficking, and goods smuggling. these four issues

also top the list of transnational security cooperation between vietnam

and china.

however, sino-vietnamese cooperation on transnational security

issues still lags far behind that of vietnam and its two other neighbors.

With australia, the united Kingdom, and south Korea, most of the

cooperation is focused on fighting drug trafficking, illegal immigration,

and money laundering. vietnam is also developing transnational security

cooperation with other asean countries such as thailand, malaysia, the

Philippines, singapore, and Indonesia.

many factors determine the intensiveness and effectiveness of

international cooperation on transnational security issues. the intensity of

cooperation depends on the level of threat and the resources available to

the related countries, as well as the partner-friendliness of their approach.

Drug and human trafficking, money laundering, and infectious diseases in

vietnam are concentrated in movements between neighboring countries

and along ethnic connections. Due to this nature, bilateral cooperation

often trumps multilateral cooperation on these issues. one reason australia

and the united Kingdom maintain the best cooperation with vietnam on

transnational security is due to the high value of human security in their

overall security perspective, their resources, and the flexibility and

patience in their dealings with the partner country. With their sizable

ethnic vietnamese communities, certain countries such as germany,

russia, the czech republic, the united states, and canada also share

significant transnational security issues with vietnam, including drug

trafficking, human trafficking, and money laundering. however,

cooperation with eastern european countries is less intensive due to lack

of resources. In germany, canada, and the united states, progress has

been hampered either by the incompatibility of their approaches or the

interference of political interests.

the effectiveness of international cooperation largely depends on how

the partners manage their asymmetries of power. according to vietnamese

categorization. this is especially true of transnational security challenges,

which by nature are irrespective of borders. stovepiped practices,

overlaps, and no-man’s lands can be balanced by coordination

mechanisms, either ad hoc or institutionalized. But the vietnamese

government has an acute lack of these mechanisms.

one way to overcome these problems, then, is for the highest levels of

government, that is, the prime minister, or alternatively, the politburo of

the communist Party, to deal with the issue at hand. however, only highpriority issues of the regime security and rapid wealth creation agendas—

such as regime opposition, infectious diseases, and natural disasters—

are likely to reach these levels.

low-priority issues are more likely to land in no-man’s land. for

example, when illegal laborers from china were spotlighted in the media

in 2009, no government agency assumed responsibility. the minister of

labor said her ministry was in charge of only one part of the whole

phenomenon, while the key to solving the issue lay elsewhere. as illegal

chinese workers do not directly challenge the communist regime or pose

an immediate threat to economic development, they normally are off the

radar of the coalition of anti-imperialists and integrationists that form

vietnam’s government. these illegal workers became a security issue only

when people looked at them from a different perspective. this different

perspective came to the fore via a nascent civil society.

civil society channels its voice to the public mostly through the

reform-minded vein of the state-sanctioned media. thus, newspapers such

as VietNamNet, Tuoi Tre (Youth), Thanh Nien (Young People), Saigon Tiep

Thi (Saigon Marketing), Phap Luat Thanh Pho (Ho Chi Minh City Law),

Lao Dong (Labor), and Tien Phong (Vanguard) have become unofficial

mouthpieces of the human security and national survival agendas.

typically, these newspapers spotlight the issue, mount a publicity

campaign, and try to elicit a response from the officials. several issues

related to environmental crimes have made their way to the prime minister

through this approach.

International Cooperation

vietnam’s international cooperation on transnational security is most

intensive with its neighbors—laos, cambodia, and china—as well as

with a few industrial countries such as australia, the united Kingdom, and

south Korea. vietnam has a thick history of cooperation with laos and

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resources for communication programs that aim at enhancing popular

awareness, knowledge, and discipline regarding pandemic diseases and

environmental pollution. the united states also can effectively assist

vietnam with community healthcare. us experts, volunteers, equipment,

and medicine may provide a valuable force to prevent and fight pandemic

outbreaks.

other areas that appear promising for us-vietnam cooperation include

disaster management, environment protection, and coping with climate

change. more specifically, vietnam has dire need of international support

to assist with training, equipping and sharing information in weather

forecasting, training and joint exercises in search and rescue, and waste

treatment in urban and industrial areas. to date, the united states and

vietnam have taken initial steps in cooperation for search and rescue,

weather forecasting, and environment protection.

Wartime legacies still linger and hamper cooperation between the

united states and vietnam. In 2009 President Barack obama signed a bill

that doubled us assistance to us$6 million for dioxin cleanup efforts and

related health activities. agent orange, or dioxin, a chemical that us

forces used for defoliation missions during the vietnam War, has

contaminated the soils surrounding its storage and application sites and

has affected a large number of vietnamese, along with american and

south Korean troops and their descendants. until now, vietnam has used

the issue for propaganda purposes, and the united states has

acknowledged only limited responsibility. however, with genuine political

will from both sides to overcome the past and look to the future, the two

countries can transform a blighted historical legacy into a mutually

favorable opportunity for cooperation. recent us initiatives for closer

cooperation with the lower mekong countries—vietnam, laos,

cambodia, and thailand—in the areas of the environment, health,

education, and infrastructure development, have signaled a new stage and

raised great hope for stronger transnational security.

officials, it is much easier for vietnam to put forward its initiatives in

cooperation with laos and cambodia than with china. and while vietnam

is more ready to cooperate when china proposes initiatives, china is

harder for vietnam to persuade. this may be explained by the fact that less

powerful countries tend to defer to the more powerful. this principle also

holds true for vietnam’s cooperation with advanced industrial countries.

Power asymmetries and the principle of “deference to the powerful”—

which is entrenched in the foreign policy culture of asian countries—

are the main culprit for hindering regional cooperation on transnational

security issues. one burning issue that has been largely silenced is the

negative impact (e.g., resource depletion, water scarcity, food insecurity,

and environmental degradation) caused by dams in the upper mekong

countries, mostly china. other transnational security issues that recently

have stirred great anxiety in vietnam include oil spills and sea attacks in

the south china sea, but these have little chance of making their way to

the policy agenda due to power asymmetries and the deference principle.

Implications for the United States

historically vietnam’s cooperation on transnational security issues

with the united states has concentrated on combating drug trafficking,

money laundering, terrorism, and pandemic diseases. the intensive human

connections between the two countries have made cooperation on these

issues necessary. however, with each country championing an opposite

ideology and political system, security cooperation remains a sensitive

issue that demands keen attention and delicate approaches. the situation

has begun to change for the better as the two countries’strategic interests

have converged in maintaining the status quo in the regional balance of

power, and in the face of increased chinese assertiveness, vietnam has

gained more strategic value in us foreign policy.

vietnamese officials have indicated that their government would

welcome the strengthening of cooperation in protecting against a wide

range of threats, including drug and human trafficking, infectious diseases,

money laundering, terrorism, environmental pollution, and climate

change. Both vietnam and the united states see poverty and lack of

education as root causes of drug and human trafficking and infectious

diseases. us assistance can be used to help vietnam expand education,

training, and microfinance programs, especially in rural areas.

International partners can help vietnam with material and ideational

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