alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# ES The State of New H amps hire D EPAR TMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL S ERV ICES

T homas S. 

### Burack, Commi ssioner June 30, 2014 David Conroy, Air Programs Branch Chief U.S. Env ironmental Protection Agency, Region I 5 Post Office Square, Suite 100 Boston, MA 02109-3912 Re: Revision of Submittal of Env- A 1300 (formerly Env-A 1211) Dear Dave: On March 31, 2011, the state ofNew Hampshire Department ofEnvironmental Services (DES) submitted for approval as a revision to the State Implementation Plan (SIP) the rules formerly known as Env- A 1211, now known as Env -A 1300, 

### Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT). Recently 

### it was brought to my attention that Env-A 1311.03(a)(5) contains a reference to Env-A 2000, a chapter that has been submitted to EPA as a revision to the SIP, but which has not been approved to date. Since approval ofEnv-A 1300 with that reference would, in effect, be an a pproval ofEnv-A 2000 without the necessary review by EPA, DES is with drawing the reference. For the purpose of revising the SIP, Env -A 13ll.03(a)(5) should now read: "Env-A 1311.03 Control Requirements for Stationary Combustion Turbines. (a)(5) Confirm that NOx emissions from the equipment or source operation do not cause an exceeda nee of any maximum allowable emission rate for NOx or any other state and federally regulated air pollutant ... ;" Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, p lease contact Karla McManus, Planning and Rules Manager at karla.mcmanus @ des.nh.gov or (603) 271-6854. Thank you.

Ec: Robert McConnell, EPA Region I Sincerely , 

# t;otu_ 0 t._<t Craig A. Wright Director Air Resources Division

DES Web site: www.dcs.nh.gov P.O Box 95. 29 Hazen Drive, Concord. New Hampshire 03102 -0095 Telephone : (603) 271 1370 • Fax: (603) "71 1181 • TDD Access. Relay NH 1- 800 715 2964
8.707 Prices. ( a ) The prices of items on the Procurement List are fair market prices established by the Committee. All prices for supplies ordered under this subpart are f.o.b. origin.
( b ) Prices for supplies are normally adjusted semiannually. Prices for services are normally adjusted annually.
( c ) The Committee may request the agency responsible for acquiring the supplies or service to assist it in establishing or revising the fair market price. The Committee has the authority to establish prices without prior coordination with the responsible contracting office.
( d ) Price changes shall normally apply to all orders received by the AbilityOne participating nonprofit agency on or after the effective date of the change. In special cases, after considering the views of the ordering office, the Committee may make price changes applicable to orders received by the AbilityOne participating nonprofit agency prior to the effective date of the change.
( e ) If an ordering office desires packing, packaging, or marking of supplies other than the standard pack as provided on the Procurement List, any difference in costs shall be included as a separate item on the nonprofit agency's invoice. The ordering office shall reimburse the nonprofit agency for these costs.
( f ) Ordering offices may make recommendations to the Committee at any time for price revisions for supplies and services on the Procurement List.
[48 FR 42129, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 59 FR 67028, 67029, Dec. 28, 1994; 73 FR 53995, Sept. 17, 2008]
#### Buttignol Construction Co., Inc., Respondent, v. Allstate Insurance Company, Appellant.

In an action: (1) on a fire insurance policy issued to plaintiff by defendant, to recover the amount of a fire loss allegedly sustained by the plaintiff (first cause of action); and (2) to recover compensatory and punitive damages based on defendant’s alleged fraud and deceit in making false representations as to its insurance policies (second cause of action), the defendant appeals from the following two orders of the Supreme Court, Westchester County: (a) an order, dated February 7, 1964, which granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the first cause of action and directed an assessment of the damages and the entry of judgment for the amount thus fixed together with interest thereon from January 30, 1963 — the date of the fire; and (b) an order, dated February 27, 1964, which denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. Order of February 7, 1964 modified by amending its third decretal paragraph so as to direct that interset upon the amount fixed as damages upon the assessment be computed from September 23, 1963, instead of from January 30, 1963. As so modified, order affirmed, without costs. Order of February 27, 1964 modified: (a) by amending its decretal paragraph so as to direct that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is granted as to the second cause of action and denied as to the first cause of action; and (b) by adding a decretal paragraph severing the second cause of action and dismissing it. As so modified, order affirmed, without costs. In our opinion, interest should be computed from the date defendant may be deemed to have breached its contract of insurance. Upon the facts in this ease, we find that date to be September 23, 1963 —• the date on which the appraisal award was made. We are further of the opinion that the plaintiff, in its opposition to the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment (insofar as it related to the second cause of action), failed to present any facts from which it could be said that the defendant, in its dealings with the general public, had engaged in a fraudulent scheme evincing such “ a high degree of moral turpitude and * * * such wanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal indifference to civil .obligations ” *(Walker*v. *Sheldon,*10 N Y 2d 401, 405). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Brennan, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 20, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-30486 Summary Calendar

JIM F. BLACKWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus OVERTON BROOKS MEDICAL CENTER; ADETOKUNBO DESILU; GEORGE M. MOORE, JR.; STAFF OF VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL CENTER; KAREN MUNN; DALE E. ROBINSON;

BILL CALLAHAN, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:05-CV-415

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Jim F. Blackwell appeals the dismissal of his complaint filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court noted that the instant complaint was the sixth complaint Blackwell has filed in relation to claims that the defendants have refused to provide him with his preferred narcotic medication , Oxycontin. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous.No. 05-30486 -2- Blackwell’s appellate brief is largely conclusional and asserts that the district court failed to consider the merits of his complaint. After reviewing the briefs and the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Siglar v. Hightower , 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). This appeal is without arguable merit and is dismissed as frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR . R. 42.2. APPEAL DISMISSED.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. John Sullivan, Appellant, v. Edward M. Fay, as Warden of Green Haven Prison, Respondent.

—In a habeas corpus proceeding, relator appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, made October 23,1961, after a hearing, which dismissed the writ and remanded him to custody of respondent. Order affirmed. Defendant seeks to obtain his release from imprisonment under a judgment duly rendered in 1954 after trial. In support of his writ, the defendant invoked the rule in *Mapp*v. *Ohio*(367 U. S. 643), i.e., that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is inadmissible in a State court criminal trial. His petition states facts purporting to establish that the evidence received upon the trial and upon which he was convicted had been so obtained. It appears upon the face of the petition, however, that defendant’s conviction and its affirmance on appeal *(People*v. *Sullivan,*1 A D 2d 767) both occurred *prior*to the decision in *Mapp*v. *Ohio*(supra); and that, prior to the writ issued in this proceeding, his time to appeal further had expired. Under such circumstances, defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction by habeas corpus or otherwise, even assuming that the conviction rests upon evidence erroneously received *(People*v. *Muller,*11 N Y 2d 154). Beldock, P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Brennan and Rabin, JJ., concur.
#### Will W. Hall, defendant in error, v. Chicago Motor Bus Company, plaintiff in error.

Gen. No. 30,280.

Action for negligent injury. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. John D. Biggs, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1925.

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion filed October 5, 1926.

F. J. Canty, for plaintiff in error; George W. Lennon, of counsel.

No appearance for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.
§ 1033.62 Announcement of producer prices. On or before the 13th day after the end of each month, the market administrator shall announce publicly the following prices and information: ( a ) The producer price differential;
( b ) The protein price;
( c ) The nonfat solids price;
( d ) The other solids price;
( e ) The butterfat price;
( f ) The somatic cell adjustment rate;
( g ) The average butterfat, protein, nonfat solids, and other solids content of producer milk; and
( h ) The statistical uniform price for milk containing 3.5 percent butterfat, computed by combining the Class III price and the producer price differential.
[64 FR 47991, Sept. 1, 1999, as amended at 65 FR 82839, Dec. 28, 2000; 68 FR 7068, Feb. 12, 2003]
Exhibit 32.1

         Certificate Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18
         --------------------------------------------------------------
                               United States Code
                               ------------------

         The undersigned officer hereby certifies, as to the Quarterly Report on
     Form 10-Q of Exelon  Corporation  for the  quarterly  period ended June 30,
     2003,  that (i) the report fully complies with the  requirements of section
     13(a)  or  15(d)  of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of  1934,  and (ii) the
     information  contained  in the  report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
     respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of  operations  of Exelon
     Corporation.


     Date:  July 30, 2003                   /s/ John W. Rowe
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            John W. Rowe
                                            Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-60210

Summary Calendar

 

JAMES HARBIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROSIE WASHINGTON, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:95CV84-B-A

- - - - - - - - - -

August 20, 1996

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

James Harbin appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

civil rights action. He contends that the affidavit of Officer

Murphree alone, without substantiation by physical evidence, was

insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of his

residence. Murphree’s affidavit was competent summary judgment

evidence and established probable cause for the search, and

Harbin’s conclusional allegations of fabricated evidence are not
No. 96-60210

- 2 -

sufficient to overcome defendant’s summary judgment evidence. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Defendants Rosie Washington, Theresa Files, and the Grenada

Police Department were not named in Harbin's amended complaint,

which superseded his original complaint, and so they were no

longer parties to the civil action and are not parties to this

appeal. Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th

Cir. 1985).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1

            Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                         As Adopted Pursuant to
             Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



     In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of  AmBase  Corporation  (the
"Issuer")  on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  March 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard
A. Bianco, Chief Executive Officer of the Issuer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15 (d) of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of  1934;  and (2)  the  information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Issuer.



/s/ Richard A. Bianco
---------------------------------------------------
Richard A. Bianco
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
(Chief Executive Officer)
AmBase Corporation
August 12, 2005
EPA420-B-04-007

June 2004

Boundary Scenarios for 8-hour Ozone Nonattainment Areas

Previously Designated as Nonattainment or Maintenance

for the 1-hour Ozone Standard

Reference Document

Note: The purpose of this reference document is to assist the public in understanding Section

VI.A.2. of EPA’s final rule entitled, “Transportation Conformity Rule Amendments for the New

8-hour Ozone and PM2.5 National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Miscellaneous Revisions

for Existing Areas; Transportation Conformity Rule Amendments: Response to Court Decision

and Additional Rule Changes.” The final transportation conformity rule was signed on June 14,

2004. Section VI. of the rule is entitled, “Regional Conformity Tests in 8-hour Ozone Areas That

Have 1-hour Ozone SIPs.”

The generic boundary scenarios described in Section VI. are for 8-hour ozone nonattainment

areas that were also designated nonattainment under the 1-hour ozone air quality standard. These

boundary scenarios are important for applying conformity tests in these areas. The tests apply for

such areas before motor vehicle emissions budgets from SIPs that address the 8-hour ozone

standard are available for conformity purposes.

Please note that scenarios are determined according to how the entire 8-hour nonattainment area

relates to the entire 1-hour nonattainment or maintenance area(s).

EPA will post more detailed implementation guidance on its transportation conformity Web site

for conformity determinations in new standard areas, including 8-hour ozone areas with 1-hour

SIP budgets and multi-state/multi-MPO nonattainment areas.

State and local agencies can consult with EPA and DOT field offices to determine which

scenario applies to a given 8-hour nonattainment area.

SCENARIO 1: 8-hour and 1-hour Ozone Boundaries Are Exactly the Same

In this scenario, the 8-hour and 1-hour ozone boundaries cover exactly the same geographical

area.
2

SCENARIO 2: 8-hour Ozone Boundary Is Smaller Than and Within the 1-hour Ozone

Boundary

In this scenario, the 8-hour ozone nonattainment area is smaller than and completely

encompassed by the 1-hour ozone boundary.

SCENARIO 3: 8-hour Ozone Boundary Is Larger Than the 1-hour Ozone Boundary

In this scenario, the entire 1-hour ozone boundary is completely within a larger 8-hour ozone

nonattainment area.

SCENARIO 4: 8-hour Ozone Boundary Overlaps With the 1-hour Ozone Boundary

In this scenario, the 8-hour and 1-hour ozone boundaries partially overlap.
#### § 1.215 How soon before I need the official information or testimony relating to official information should I submit my demand?

You must submit your demand, including all information identified in § 1.214, at least 14 calendar days before the date when you need the official information or testimony relating to official information.
<PAGE>
 
                                              Exhibit (23)-1
                                              Unicom Corporation
                                              Form 10-Q File No. 1-11375



                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
                   -----------------------------------------
                                        


     As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation
by reference of our report in this Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 1998 (Report), into Unicom Corporation's previously filed prospectuses
dated March 18, 1994, constituting part of Form S-4 Registration Statement File
No. 33-52109, as amended (relating to Common Stock of Unicom Corporation), as
further amended by Post-Effective Amendment No. 1 on Form S-8 (relating to
Commonwealth Edison Company's Employee Savings and Investment Plan) and Post-
Effective Amendment No. 2 on Form S-8 (relating to Unicom Corporation's Employee
Stock Purchase Plan); Form S-8 Registration Statement File No. 33-56991
(relating to Unicom Corporation's Long-Term Incentive Plan), Form S-4
Registration Statement File No. 333-01003 (relating to Common Stock of Unicom
Corporation), Form S-8 Registration Statement File No. 333-04749 (relating to
Unicom Corporation's 1996 Directors' Fee Plan); Form S-8 Registration Statements
File Nos. 333-10613 and 333-26779 (relating to Commonwealth Edison Company's
Employee Savings and Investment Plan) and Form S-8 Registration Statement File
No. 333-39677 (relating to the Unicom Corporation Management Deferred
Compensation Plan).  We also consent to the application of our Report to
Commonwealth Edison Company and subsidiary companies' ratios of earnings to
fixed charges and ratios of earnings to fixed charges and preferred and
preference stock dividend requirements for each of the twelve months ended March
31, 1998 and December 31, 1997 appearing in this Form 10-Q.



                                         Arthur Andersen LLP

 
 



Chicago, Illinois
May 11, 1998
#### 9904.414-10 [Reserved]
#### § 1131.9 Handler.

See § 1000.9.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David P. Van Housen, Appellant.

[775 NYS2d 914]

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tioga County (Sgueglia, J.), rendered March 29, 2002, which revoked defendant’s probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment.

Defendant was charged with six counts of rape in the third degree and one count of criminal contempt in the second degree as a result of his sexual relationship with a 16-year-old female and violation of a prior order of protection. He pleaded guilty to one count of rape in the third degree in full satisfaction of the charges and was sentenced, in accordance with the plea agreement, to 10 years’ probation, which was to include sex offender treatment. A declaration of delinquency was issued after defendant violated the terms of his probation by, among other things, cohabitating with the victim, whom he impregnated. He pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his probation and was sentenced to 1 to 3 years in prison, to run consecutive to an 87-month sentence previously imposed in connection with a federal charge.

Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the 1 to 3-year prison term imposed is harsh and excessive insofar as County Court should have directed it to run concurrent, instead of consecutive, to the federal charge. We disagree. The record discloses that defendant has a fairly extensive criminal history, which includes prior sex crimes, and he appears to have deliberately disregarded the conditions of his probation in committing the instant offense. We therefore find no abuse of discretion or extraordinary circumstances warranting modification of the sentence *(see People v MacGilfrey,*288 AD2d 554, 556 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 757 [2002]; *People v Mann,*283 AD2d 724 [2001]).

*885Mercure, J.P., Peters, Mugglin, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Philip E. Jackson, Respondent, v. Antoinette J. Mitchell, Appellant.

In a habeas corpus proceeding, initiated by a father for the purpose of defining his visitation rights to his infant -child in the mother’s custody pursuant to a separation agreement, and to permit the father, for two weeks each Summer to take the child to California, the mother appeals from a resettled order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered October 21, 1963 without a- hearing but upon a purported stipulation, which *inter alia*sustained the writ and granted permission to the father, during his annual two-week visitation period, to take the child anywhere outside of the State of Hew York, provided the child is returned to the mother at the conclusion of. the said two-week visitation *904period. Order reversed on the law, without costs, and proceeding remitted to the Special Term for the purpose of: (1) holding a hearing at which oral testimony shall be taken with respect to all the issues of fact raised by the petition and return; and (2) making a determinátion *de novo*of all the issues on the basis of the proof adduced upon such hearing. Ho questions of fact have been considered. When controversial issues arise in a proceeding to determine visitation rights, such issues should not be decided without a hearing, especially if the decision may affect the welfare of the child involved. Beldoek, P. J., Ughetta, ICleinfeld, Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
"Clark, Deborah" 

<DClark@votepinellas.com>

08/18/2010 02:36 PM 

To <testimony@eac.gov> 

Subject Written testimony on proposed NVRA regulations 

 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission:

We are providing the following written testimony on the proposed NVRA regulations:

Page 9 – Part B “Additional Information Required” and Page 19 Question 2

Question – “Will you be 18 years of age on or before election day?”

We believe the question is too vague.  To which election day is the voter referring?  The

application will be processed based on the birth date provided on the application.  If states

have pre‐registration laws, and the applicant is eligible, he/she will be pre‐registered to vote.  If

states do not have pre‐registration laws, the applicant should be notified that he/she is not

eligible.  We suggest removing the question from the application.

Current Application Instructions:

Box 6 – ID Number

We suggest the following language “If you have neither a drivers license nor a social security

number, please indicate this NONE on the form and a number will be assigned to you by your

state.”

Current "Application Instructions," the application itself, and "State Information:"

We suggest adding "political" to all places where "party" is discussed.  Example ‐ Application

Instructions: “Box 7 – Choice of Political Party” and “In some States, you must register with a

political party if you...”  

We thank you for the opportunity to provide written testimony.  If you have any questions or

concerns, please contact Rick Becker at (727) 464‐6108.

Deborah Clark/J

Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections

13001 Starkey Rd.

Largo, Florida 33773

(727) 464‐4987

dclark@votepinellas.com