This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that th is electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3 v. No. A-1-CA-37488 4 JIMMY JOHNSON, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY 7 Albert J. Mitchell, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 14 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Public Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 VANZI, Chief Judge. 19
{1} The State has appealed from an order of suppression. We previously issued a 20 notice of proposed summary disposition, propos ing to affirm. The State has filed a 212 memorandum in opposition. After due cons ideration, we remain unpersuaded by its 1 assertions of error. We therefore affirm. 2
{2} To briefly reiterate the relevant background, police obtained a warrant 3 authorizing a search of Defendant’s reside nce after a confidential informant completed 4 several controlled purchases of methamphe tamine there. [RP 226] In the supporting 5 affidavit, the officer indicated that the confidential informant had observed Defendant 6 to be in possession of both a quantity of methamphetamine and a semi-automatic 7 pistol within the preceding 72 hours. [Id.] Additionally, the affiant indicated that a 8 state police officer had advised that he had “recently responded to a call for service 9 where [Defendant] threatened another individual with a firearm.” [Id.] In light of this 10 information, the affiant specifically reque sted that a “no-knock entry be authorized 11 due to concern that the known occupants of the residence are armed and dangerous.” 12 [Id.] That request was granted. [RP 220] Police officers executed the search six days 13 after the warrant was issued. [RP 221] Although they seized numerous items 14 consistent with drug trafficking, no firearms were found. [RP 221-23] 15
{3} Defendant moved to suppress all items rec overed in the course of the search on 16 grounds that the officers’ failure to knock and announce prior to entry was unjustified. 17 [RP 79-86] The district court ultimately agreed. [RP 197-99] This determination is the 18 subject of the instant appeal. 193 {4} “Absent various exceptions, Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico 1 Constitution requires officers executing a warrant at a premises to knock and 2 announce their presence and authority and then wait a reasonable time to permit those 3 inside to voluntarily open the door.” State v. Jean-Paul , 2013-NMCA-032, ¶ 1, 295 4 P.3d 1072. One exception applies when there are exigent circumstances, such as in 5 situations involving specific information i ndicating that the danger to the officers 6 executing the warrant will be increased ifthe officers comply with the knock-and7 announce rule. Id. ¶ 10. “[The] court must look to the totality of the circumstances at 8 the time of entry from the point of view of a reasonable, well-trained, and prudent 9 police officer to decide whether the offi cer had a reasonable belief that there were 10 exigent circumstances.” Id. ¶ 11. The reasonableness of an officer’s belief in this 11 regard “requires specific, articulable f acts, together with reasonable inferences 12 therefrom, as a basis for concluding that th e facts and circumstances of the particular 13 entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” Id. (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted). 15
{5} Insofar as district court rejected the State’s claim of exigency, this Court must 16 view the facts in the light most favorable to that ruling and indulge in all reasonable 17 inferences accordingly. See State v. Lopez , 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 9, 22, 138 N.M. 9, 18 116 P.3d 80 (discussing and applying the standardof review in this context). Although 194 the State briefly suggests in its memorandum in opposition that this approach does not 1 give adequate deference to the issuing court’s earlier determin ation, [MIO 2, 13] 2 insofar as we are called upon to review a suppression order ba sed upon consideration 3 of the circumstances present at the time of entry, we remain of the opinion that Lopez 4 is the controlling authority. See id. ¶ 12 (indicating that where a no-knock entry is at 5 issue, “[t]he appellate c ourt must consider all of the circumstances as found or 6 impliedly found by the trial court to bepresent at the time of entry.”); State v. 7 Williams , 1992-NMCA-106, ¶¶ 3, 16- 18, 114 N.M. 485, 840 P.2d 1251 (holding that 8 regardless of the issuance of a no-knock sear ch warrant, if exigent circumstances have 9 not been established at the time of entry, failure to comply with the knock and 10 announce rule in executing a search warrantinvalidates the subsequent search). 11
{6} In light of the foregoing, we accept the district court’s determination that 12 officers who executed the warrant had reason to believe that Defendant was in 13 possession of methamphetamine and a semi-automatic pistol, [RP 197] and we take 14 into consideration the time of the entry, at 6:25 a.m. in th e morning six days after the 15 warrant was issued and ninedays after the firearm was seen by the confidential 16 informant. [RP 197-98] We also acknowledge the district court’s rejection of the 17 proffered evidence of propensity for viol ence, including the vague and unsubstantiated 18 information about the “call for assist ance” allegedly involvi ng Defendant. [RP 198] 195 We similarly accept the district court’s de termination that there was “no indication 1 that [D]efendant had a willingness to use the pistol.” [RP 198] We take all of these 2 facts into consideration in determining whether exigent circumstances existed under 3 the totality of the circumstances. 4
{7} As we observed in the notice of proposed summary disposition, we have a 5 number of published cases dealing with cl aims of exigency, where officers have 6 reason to believe drugs and firearms are present. InLopez , our New Mexico Supreme 7 Court upheld a finding of exigent circumstances based on a reasonable suspicion of 8 increased danger to officers, when the officers had information that there were two to 9 four people in the residence with access to multiple firearms including automatic 10 weapons and sawed-off shotguns , and that one of the residents was a drug dealer, and 11 when the warrant was executed in the afternoon, thereby le ssening the degree of 12 intrusion but increasing the risk to o fficer safety. 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 25-26. In State 13 v. Vargas , 1996-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 9, 13, 121 N.M . 316, 910 P.2d 950, this Court 14 similarly upheld a finding of exigent circ umstances based on a reasonable suspicion 15 of increased danger to officers, when the officers had information that the defendants 16 were involved in dealing drugs, that both were gang members and carried weapons, 17 that one of the defendants had threatenedpolice, and that during numerous police 18 dispatches to the defendants’ residence over the prior ten years, the defendants and 196 other residents had a propensity to behave violently and to challenge the police. 1 Finally, in State v. Attaway , 1994-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 32-34, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103, 2 our Supreme Court upheld a finding of exigent circumstances based on a reasonable 3 suspicion of increased danger to officers, when the officers had information that the 4 defendant was a drug user and dealer, thathe had previously been convicted of 5 weapons and drug charges, that he possesse d a large arsenal of weapons including an 6 automatic weapon and a number of other guns, and he in the past had threatened 7 police officers. 8
{8} Collectively, the foregoing authorities reflect the significance of a particularized 9 showing of danger, under the to tality of the circumstances. Conversely, in the absence 10 of a reasonably particularized showing of danger, generalized concerns are typically 11 deemed inadequate to establish the exigency required to support no-knock entries. 12 For example, inWilliams , 1992-NMCA-106, ¶¶ 16-17, we affirmed the district court’s 13 finding of no exigent circumstances, where the officers believed that the occupants 14 were drug dealers and that drug dealers are generally armed, but “there was no 15 evidence at the time of ex ecution of the search warrant indicating that anyone 16 threatened the officers or th at they were placed in fearby persons either inside or 17 outside the residence.” 187 {9} In this case, viewing the evidence and th e inferences therefro m in the light most 1 favorable to the district court’s ruling, the only indicia of dangerousness included 2 Defendant’s drug trafficking and the confidential informant’s observation of a firearm 3 in the residence nine days earlier. In contrast to the cas es upholding findings of 4 exigent circumstances, there were no indications of numerous firearms within the 5 residence. And as previously stated, the di strict court specifically rejected the claim 6 of demonstrated propensity for violence, based on the vague and unsubstantiated 7 nature of the information concerning the call for assistance, and inthe absence of any 8 evidence of prior convictions for crimes of violence or historical willingness to 9 threaten the police or to use firearms. [RP 198] See Lopez , 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 9, 10 (observing that in this context, “[a]ll reas onable inferences in support of the district 11 court’s decision will be indulge d, and all inferences or evidence to the contrary will 12 be disregarded”); Attaway , 1994-NMSC-011, ¶ 5 (“[A] trial court is to be given wide 13 latitude in determining [whether] an histori cal fact has been proven.”). We remain of 14 the opinion that these circumstances render the case far more analogous to Williams 15 than Lopez , Vargas , or Attaway . Accordingly, we conclude that the no-knock entry 16 was impermissible. 17
{10} In its memorandum in opposition the State argues that our focus is misplaced, 18 urging us instead to overturn the district court’s decision on grounds that it was 198 unduly concerned about delay in the execution of the warrant. [MIO 2, 6-14] We 1 remain unpersuaded. The f undamental question is whether the circumstances at the 2 time of entry justified dispensing with the knock and announce requirement. For the 3 reasons previously stated, we conclude thatthis question is answered in the negative. 4 In so concluding, it is not necessary to giveadditional considerati on to the delay in the 5 execution of the warrant. We th erefore decline to considerfurther whether the delay 6 is of special significance. See State v. Martinez , 2015-NMCA-013, ¶ 18, 343 P.3d 194 7 (observing parenthetically that we avoid rendering advisory opinions, and declining 8 on that basis to resolve a novel and unnecessary question). 9
{11} Accordingly, for the reasons statedin the notice of proposed summary 10 disposition and above, we affirm. 11
{12} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15

16 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 17

18 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 19