Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

Report 

February 2010 

 

CONTENTS 

PREFACE i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii

INTRODUCTION 1

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 3

Context 3

The Threat to the Homeland 4

Regional Threats 5

Trends 7

Implications 8

STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 11

Policy Priorities 11

Missile Defense: Deterrence, Extended Deterrence, and Assurance Goals 12

DEFENDING THE HOMELAND 15

Status of Current Capability 15

Hedging Against Future Uncertainties 16

In Summary 18

DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 19

Status of Current Capability 19

Near-term Capabilities 20

Long-term Capabilities 21

Integrating Capabilities Regionally 22

The Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe 24

Tailoring Phased Adaptive Approaches to Other Regions 24

The Implications of Phased Adaptive Approaches to Regional Architectures 25

Hedging Against Future Regional Uncertainties 27

Regional Architectures and Defense of the Homeland 27

In Summary 28

Case Study: The Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe 29
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 31

Europe 31

East Asia 32

The Middle East 33

Russia 34

China 34

In Summary 35

MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 37

Strengthening the Testing Program 38

Cost-Effectiveness 39

Internal DoD Oversight 41

External Transparency 44

CONCLUSION 47

 
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February 1, 2010 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Department of Defense conducted the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Review 

from March 2009 through January 2010. Mandated by Congress, and guided by a Presidential 

directive, the review comprehensively considered U.S. BMD policies, strategies, plans, and 

programs. The review was co-led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also involved participants from the Department of State, the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, the National Security Staff, and the Office 

of Management and Budget. 

The Ballistic Missile Threat 

The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to 

continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile 

systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also 

increasing in range. A number of states are also working to increase the protection of their 

ballistic missiles from pre-launch attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile 

defenses. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their 

missiles. Such capabilities could be significant sources of military advantage during a conflict. But 

they may be equally significant in times of relative peace, when they undergird efforts to coerce 

states near and far. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop long-range 

missiles that will be threatening to the United States. There is some uncertainty about when and 

how this type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the U.S. homeland will 

mature, but there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats. They are clear and 

present. The threat from short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 

(SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains 

security relationships is growing at a particularly rapid pace. 

Strategy and Policy Framework 

Following guidance from the President, this review has set the following policy priorities: 

1. The United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited 

ballistic missile attack. 

2. The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while 

protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves. 

3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment 

under realistic operational conditions. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. 

5. U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change. 

6. The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense. 

Defending the Homeland 

The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks. This is a result of 

investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense 

(GMD). Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of groundbased interceptors now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range 

ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to counter the projected 

threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. 

Given uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, including the rate at which it will mature, it is 

important that the United States maintain this advantageous position. But doing so does not 

require that the United States develop these capabilities at the same accelerated rate or with the 

same level of risk as in recent years. Rather, the United States will refocus its homeland ballistic 

missile defense program as it began to do with the fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget—maintaining the 

current level of capability with 30 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and further developing 

proven capabilities that will enhance homeland defense should a new threat emerge. 

 Toward that end, the United States will: 

 Maintain readiness and continue to develop existing operational capabilities at Fort 

Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 

 Complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely to hedge against the possibility that 

additional deployments become necessary. 

 Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at the United 

States by Iran or other potential adversaries in the Middle East. 

 Invest in further development of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) for future land-based 

deployment as the ICBM threat matures. 

 Increase investments in sensors and early-intercept kill systems to help defeat missile 

defense countermeasures. 

 Pursue a number of new GMD system enhancements, develop next generation missile 

defense capabilities, and advance other hedging strategies including continued 

development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based interceptor. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

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Defending Against Regional Threats 

Over the past decade, the United States has made 

significant progress in developing and fielding 

capabilities for protection against attack from 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These 

include increasingly capable PATRIOT batteries 

for point defense, the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar for 

detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries 

for area defense, space-based sensors, and sea-based 

capabilities such as the SM-3 Block IA interceptor. 

However, these capabilities exist in numbers that 

are only modest in view of the expanding regional 

missile threat. Accordingly, in the FY 2010 budget, 

and continuing across the FY 2011–15 time frame, 

the Department of Defense will further invest in 

these deployable assets while developing new 

capabilities such as a land-based SM-3 system (tentatively called “Aegis Ashore”) and airborne 

infrared sensors that will make possible the simultaneous detection and tracking of ballistic 

missiles by unmanned aerial vehicles. Looking out over the longer term (i.e., in the 2015 to 2020 

time frame), the Department is pursuing even more capable SM-3s and persistent overhead 

sensors in space capable of detecting and tracking large raid sizes. 

Integrating Capabilities Regionally 

As threats have advanced and technical solutions have matured, it has become increasingly 

important to think strategically about the deployment of low-density, high-demand missile 

defense assets in a regional context. Such deployments must be tailored to the unique deterrence 

and defense requirements of each region, which vary considerably in their geography, the 

character of the threat, and the military-to-military relationships on which to build cooperative 

missile defenses. 

Several principles will guide how BMD is used in the development of these regional approaches 

to deterrence and defense: 

1. The United States will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence 

architectures, which must be built on the foundation of strong cooperative relationships and 

appropriate burden sharing. 

PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES NEW APPROACH 

TO MISSILE DEFENSE. President Obama directed 

a comprehensive review of ballistic missile defense 

policy and programs. The review’s findings related to 

Europe were announced on Sept. 17, 2009. Official 

White House photo by Pete Souza. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

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2. The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach to missile defense within each 

region that is tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region. 

3. Because the potential global demand for missile defense assets over the next decade may 

exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are mobile and relocatable. 

These three principles will be applied on a region-by-region basis. The Department will rely on 

the Global Force Management process to assist in decisions on the allocation of missile defense 

forces. For the European region, the Administration announced the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach (PAA) in September 2009, following the unanimous recommendation to the President 

by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the prior plan for missile defense 

protection in Europe be revised. 

Strengthening International Cooperation 

Another key objective is to lead expanded international efforts and cooperation on missile 

defense. The United States seeks to create an environment in which the development, 

acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, 

principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks. Toward this end, 

the United States seeks broad-based international cooperation. 

Strengthening cooperation with allies and partners to develop and field robust, pragmatic, and 

cost-effective capabilities is an important priority. In Europe, the Administration is committed to 

implementing the new European Phased Adaptive Approach within a NATO context. In East 

Asia, the United States is working to improve missile defenses through a series of bilateral 

relationships. The United States is also pursuing strengthened cooperation with a number of 

partners in the Middle East. 

The Administration also seeks to engage Russia and China on missile defense. With Russia, it is 

pursuing a broad agenda focused on shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical 

cooperation, and even operational cooperation. With China, the Administration seeks further 

dialogue on strategic issues of interest to both nations, including missile defense. As it pursues 

these discussions, the Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. 

ballistic missile defenses. 

Managing the Missile Defense Program 

The Administration is committed to deploying capabilities that have been proven under 

extensive testing and assessment and are affordable over the long term. 

To strengthen the testing program, a number of steps are being taken. Working in close 

partnership with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, as requested by Congress, the 

Missile Defense Agency announced a new approach to testing in June 2009. This program sets 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

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out test activities over the full course of each system’s development, not just two years into the 

future as under the former program. These activities include a comprehensive set of ground and 

flight tests designed to demonstrate operational performance and validate models used to support 

an evaluation of system effectiveness. The new master plan is to be reviewed and updated 

semiannually. This new approach will be evaluated after one year of experience (June 2010), and 

any necessary adjustments will be made at that time. 

To ensure adequate oversight of the missile defense program, DoD has enhanced the roles and 

responsibilities of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). Established in March 2007, the 

MDEB provides oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode involving all missile defense 

stakeholders in DoD and some from outside DoD. The Board’s work on requirements is 

supplemented by the work of the Warfighter Involvement Process, which is chaired by U.S. 

Strategic Command. The MDEB also oversees the Ballistic Missile Defense System Life Cycle 

Management Process, which is used by DoD to identify requirements, allocate resources, and 

provide departmental insight to control costs. 

After careful study, DoD has come to the conclusion that it does not see benefit in bringing 

MDA into the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) or the full DoD 

5000 acquisition reporting process at this time. There is, however, benefit in further innovation 

in management of the program, and DoD is pursuing the creation of additional hybrid 

MDA/Service program offices. 

 
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INTRODUCTION 

 

Upon taking office, President Obama directed a comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile 

defense (BMD) policies, strategies, plans, and programs. The United States Congress also 

mandated that the Department of Defense (DoD) conduct a review of ballistic missile defense 

strategy and policy. This report contains the findings and recommendations pursuant to this 

guidance. It addresses the matters of particular interest to Congress, and does so in a broad 

framework that reflects the President’s guidance and sets out associated policy and programmatic 

decisions reflected in the current budget proposals. 

This report serves multiple purposes. It is intended to match U.S. strategies, policies, and 

capabilities to the requirements of the 21st-century threats facing the nation now and in the 

future and to inform DoD planning, programming, budgeting, and oversight. It is also intended 

to facilitate executive-legislative dialogue and decision making, dialogue with allies and partners, 

and informed public discussion of key policy choices. 

The BMD review was conducted over ten months in close coordination with many stakeholders 

both inside DoD and beyond. At DoD, the review was led jointly by the Under Secretary for 

Policy, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It involved close collaboration with the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA). The Military Departments, combatant commands, and multiple elements of the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense also contributed to the analytical work. Participants from outside 

DoD included the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Intelligence Community, the National Security Staff, and the Office of Management and 

Budget. This review was also developed in close coordination with ongoing parallel studies, 

including principally the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the 

Space Posture Review, with the aim of integrating analyses and addressing crosscutting issues. 

The report begins with an overview of the ballistic missile threat to the United States and its 

allies, considering specific threats in a broad context of key trends and uncertainties. The report 

then turns to the strategy and policy framework and the priorities of the Administration. In the 

following sections, the report describes the steps proposed by the Administration both to defend 

the homeland and to address threats to our forces overseas, and our allies and partners. It also sets 

out in detail steps to strengthen international cooperation on BMD. The report then addresses a 

series of issues associated with the Department’s management of the missile defense program. 

 
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THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

Context 

The threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to increase while growing more 

complex over the next decade. This judgment by the Intelligence Community is borne out by 

recent events, such as Iran’s launch of a new mobile, solid-propellant medium range ballistic 

missile (MRBM) in December 2009. Ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, 

mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate while also increasing in range. Pre-launch survivability is 

also likely to increase as potential adversaries strengthen their denial and deception measures and 

increasingly base their missiles on mobile platforms. 

Key trends in the development of the threat include the following: 

 The threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. 

 Quantitatively, many states with missiles are increasing their inventories, at the same time 

that a growing number of states are deploying missiles with greater capabilities. 

 More states are moving to advanced liquid-propellant systems and even to solid-propellant 

systems, which increase flexibility, mobility, survivability, and reliability. 

 Ranges are increasing, putting ever more targets at risk. 

 Accuracy is increasing, making these systems more effective against point targets. 

 Some states are working to defeat missile defenses, through both technical and operational 

countermeasures. 

 Some states are also taking steps to increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from 

pre-launch attack, including through more aggressive denial and deception practices as 

well as a shift to mobile systems. 

 Some states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for missiles, 

and if they are successful in these efforts, the threat to others will be greatly magnified. 

 These technical capabilities could be significant sources of military advantage during a 

conflict. But they may be equally significant in times of peace or crisis, when they may 

undergird efforts to coerce other states. 
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

The Threat to the Homeland 

One of the most significant threats to the U.S. homeland is the continued progress of regional 

actors in developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them by 

ballistic missiles. North Korea, which has demonstrated its nuclear ambitions and continues to 

develop long-range missiles, is of particular concern. Following the Taepo Dong 1 missile test in 

1998, North Korea has conducted flight tests of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) missile in 2006 and 

more recently in April 2009. Despite the most recent launch’s failure in its stated mission of 

orbiting a small communications satellite, it successfully tested many technologies associated with 

an ICBM. Although the test launches of the TD-2 in 2006 and 2009 were deemed unsuccessful, 

we must assume that sooner or later North Korea will have a successful test of its TD-2 and, if 

there are no major changes in its national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to 

mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system. 

Although Iran has not stated an intent to 

develop ICBMs, it continues to pursue 

longer-range ballistic missiles. Iran launched 

its Safir Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) in 

August 2008 with what it claims was a 

dummy satellite. Iran used the Safir-2 SLV to 

place the domestically produced Omid 

satellite in orbit in February 2009, according 

to statements made to the press by Iranian 

officials. Despite continued diplomatic efforts 

Iran also continues to defy its international 

obligations on its nuclear program, further 

reducing international confidence in the 

nature of its program. These factors only 

compound international concerns about the 

intent of its ballistic missile program. 

Looking ahead, it is difficult to predict precisely how the threat to the U.S. homeland will evolve, 

but it is certain that it will do so. Iran and North Korea have yet to demonstrate an ICBM-class 

warhead. How rapidly and successfully North Korea and Iran pursue this and other capabilities 

are an open question, as is the speed with which they might actually deploy capabilities and 

increase their numbers over time. Working with the international community, the United States 

will continue to seek to stem these threats, through diplomacy and other means. 

Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack 

on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD. As 

NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN BALLISTIC 

MISSILE ACTIVITIES. Ongoing developmental and 

testing efforts by North Korea and Iran include the launch of

an Iranian satellite on February 2, 2009 (left photo), and 

the April 5, 2009 launch of a North Korean Taepo Dong 2 

(right photo). The TD-2 could be capable of reaching parts 

of the United States. 
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

the President has made clear, both Russia and China are important partners for the future, and 

the United States seeks to continue building collaborative and cooperative relationships with 

them. With Russia, the Administration is pursuing an agenda aimed at bringing the strategic 

military postures of the two countries into alignment with their post – Cold War relationship – 

no longer enemies, no significant prospect of war between them, and cooperating when mutually 

advantageous. The United States will continue to engage with Russia’s neighbors as fully 

independent and sovereign states, and looks forward to a peaceful and prosperous Russia that 

makes contributions to international peace and security as a global partner. The Administration 

is closely monitoring China’s continuing buildup of military capability, including its missile 

forces. While the United States will ensure that we can defend our interests in the region, we 

remain committed to a relationship that is positive, cooperative, and comprehensive and do not 

believe a hostile or adversarial relationship with China is by any means inevitable. 

Regional Threats 

Regional actors, such as North Korea in Northeast Asia and Iran and Syria in the Middle East, 

have short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. forces, allies, and 

partners in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships. 

North Korea conducted seven widely publicized ballistic missile launches on July 4–5, 2006. It 

successfully tested six mobile theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating a capability to target U.S. 

and allied forces in South Korea and Japan. On July 3–4, 2009, it again exercised its capability to 

threaten U.S. and allied forces and populations in South Korea and Japan by launching seven 

ballistic missiles. North Korea has developed an advanced solid-propellant short-range ballistic 

missile (SRBM). A mobile IRBM is also under development. 

No Dong 1,300 km

New IRBM 3,200 km

Scud C 500 km

Scud B 300 km

Tokyo

Taipei

Beijing

Seoul

Shemya

Guam

New Solid MRBM and

Shahab-3 Variant 

2,000 km

Shahab-3 

1,300 km

Moscow

London

Prague Warsaw

Shahab 2 500 km

Fateh-110 250 km 

Shahab 1 300 km

Riyadh

Ankara

North Korea Iran

New Solid MRBM 

and Shahab-3 

Variant 2,000 km

Shahab-3 1,300 km 

Shahab-2 500 km

Shahab-1 300 km 

GROWING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS. Iran and North Korea continue to pursue ballistic missiles with 

extended ranges. Iran is developing and testing ballistic missiles capable of targeting much of Europe. 
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

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Iran also presents a significant regional missile threat. It has developed and acquired ballistic 

missiles capable of striking deployed forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and Eastern 

Europe. It is fielding increased numbers of mobile regional ballistic missiles and has claimed that 

it has incorporated anti-missile-defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile forces. 

Iran has an extensive missile 

development program and 

has received support in the 

past from entities in Russia, 

China, and North Korea. 

DIA believes that Iran still 

depends on outside sources 

for many of the related dualuse raw materials and 

components; for example, 

the Shahab-3 MRBM is based 

on the North Korean No 

Dong missile. Iran continues to modify this missile to extend its range and effectiveness. In 2004, 

Iran claimed that it tested an improved version of the Shahab-3; subsequent statements by 

Iranian officials suggest that the improved Shahab-3’s range is up to 2,000 kilometers and that 

Iran has the ability to mass-produce these missiles. In addition, Iran’s solid-propellant rocket and 

missile programs are progressing, and Iran has flight-tested a new solid-propellant MRBM with a 

claimed range of 2,000 kilometers. Iran is also likely working to improve the accuracy of its 

SRBMs. 

Syria also presents a regional threat. It has several hundred SCUD-class and SS-21 SRBMs and 

may have chemical warheads available for a portion of its SCUD missiles. All of Syria’s missiles 

are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from 

launch sites well within the country. 

The commitment of the United States to defend against ballistic missile capabilities from North 

Korea and Iran stems from the U.S. perception, shared by our allies and partners, that they are 

threatening. North Korea and Iran have shown contempt for international norms, pursued illicit 

weapons programs in defiance of the international community, and have been highly provocative 

in both their actions and statements. They have exploited the capabilities available to them to 

threaten others. Their neighbors—and the United States—may be limited in their actions and 

pursuit of their interests if they are vulnerable to North Korean or Iranian missiles. Deterrence is 

a powerful tool, and the United States is seeking to strengthen deterrence against these new 

challenges. But deterrence by threat of a strong offensive response may not be effective against 

IRANIAN SHAHAB-3 VARIANT MRBM. The Iranian Shahab-3, with 

a range of 1,300–2,000 km, is a mobile system capable of evasion. 
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

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these states in a time of political-military crisis. Risk-taking leaders may conclude that they can 

engage the United States in a confrontation if they can raise the stakes high enough by 

demonstrating the potential to do further harm with their missiles. Thus U.S. missile defenses are 

critical to strengthening regional deterrence. 

Trends 

It is difficult to make confident predictions about the future of the missile threat. However, there 

are a number of regional and global trends in the development, deployment, and proliferation of 

ballistic missiles and their associated technologies that are of concern to the United States. 

One regional trend that particularly concerns the United States is the growing imbalance of 

power across the Taiwan Strait in China’s favor. China is developing advanced ballistic missile 

capabilities that can threaten its neighbors, and anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capabilities 

that can attempt to target naval forces in the region. China continues to field very large numbers 

of conventionally armed SRBMs opposite Taiwan and is developing a number of new mobile 

conventionally armed medium-range systems. Moreover, China has upgraded programs for 

command and control, communications, intelligence, and other related force capabilities, and 

continues to develop new SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs. These missiles are key components of 

Beijing’s military modernization program. Chinese missiles will be capable of reaching not just 

important Taiwan military and civilian facilities but also U.S. and allied military installations in 

the region. 

Globally, the Intelligence Community continues to see a progression in development from shortto medium- and in some cases intermediate-range missiles. Development programs reflect 

increasing ambition in improving payload, range, precision, and operational performance. Those 

development programs could be helped by the open market that now exists in many of the 

associated technologies, materials, and expertise. These include the potential for salvo launches 

and for systems with technologies that enable the penetration of ballistic missile defenses. There 

is no global norm or treaty banning trade in ballistic missiles (the function of the Missile 

Technology Control Regime is to facilitate ad hoc coordination of export controls among likeminded exporters who desire to keep militarily sensitive technologies out of the hands of 

dangerous states). 

An important uncertainty exists in this future landscape. Some non-state actors have sought 

weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. These organizations, and the 

proliferation networks (front companies, shippers, facilitators) with which they are affiliated, are 

often able to sidestep or outpace international detection and export control regimes. So far, state 

sponsors of terror appear to be reluctant to transfer WMD capabilities to the terrorists 

themselves. This could change abruptly, however. The possibility of such transfer is on the rise in 

the Middle East. Hezbollah, for example, has already acquired and used rockets for the delivery 
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

of conventional munitions against Israel. The advent of ballistic missile threats from such 

terrorist organizations would raise profound new questions about regional security. 

Two additional factors stand out in this proliferation landscape. First, there is the potential for a 

substantial increase in the transfer of advanced capabilities from both government and 

nongovernment entities in some technically advanced countries. Some states with more advanced 

capabilities continue to transfer both technologies and systems to those with less mature 

capabilities. These actions underscore the importance of building consensus with other 

governments about the damaging impact on stability and security of such transfers, and of 

drawing them more deeply into a global approach that stigmatizes missile proliferation as a threat 

to peace. Second, there is the potential for increasingly sophisticated regional missile threat 

capabilities. Proliferators are increasing the number of deployed systems (and thus raid sizes), 

shifting from liquid- to solid-fueled systems, and deploying missile defense countermeasures. 

These threats are inherently difficult to predict, but indicators and warnings associated with such 

threats remain under intense scrutiny by the Intelligence Community and our allies and partners, 

who are similarly concerned about these destabilizing trends. 

Implications 

This assessment of the threat points to two key implications for U.S. defense planning. First, 

U.S. defense investments must be balanced in a way that enables the effective defense of the U.S. 

homeland and of U.S. forces, allies, and partners overseas in both the near term and long term. 

The Department must ensure that the balance of investments is rigorously assessed and 

consistently applied across each annual budget and that the assessments of plans against projected 

IRANIAN SALVO LAUNCH. The technique of launching missiles in salvos (shown here during an Iranian exercise in 

2006) demonstrates interest and capability in defeating missile defenses, thereby increasing the likelihood of a missile 

reaching its target. Two years later Iran would make world headlines by doctoring a photo of a different salvo launch 

during a follow-on exercise, but that should not be construed as an inability to conduct such launches.
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

threats are updated periodically. This analysis also shows the need to maintain a strong focus by 

the Intelligence Community on the ballistic missile threat and strong intelligence relationships 

with allies and partners. Accurate and timely intelligence should play a vital role in informing 

defense planning; assessments of what we do not know with confidence play an equally vital role. 

Second, our defensive capabilities must be adaptable to unexpected threat developments. Threats 

may mature more rapidly or more slowly than predicted, may appear in unexpected locations, or 

may involve novel technologies or concepts of operations. It is essential that the United States be 

well hedged and have a strong posture against unpredicted threat developments. 

 
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 

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STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 

Policy Priorities 

In support of presidential guidance, this review has set the following policy priorities. 

First, the United States will continue to defend the homeland from limited ballistic missile 

attack. These efforts are focused on protecting the homeland from a ballistic missile attack by a 

regional actor such as North Korea or Iran. Through our continued commitment to maintain 

and develop the ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system, the United States seeks to 

dissuade such states from developing an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), deter them 

from using an ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM attack by 

such states should deterrence fail. 

Second, the United States will defend U.S. deployed forces from regional missile threats while 

also protecting our allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves. This policy has 

guided the development of U.S. capabilities since the emergence of the ballistic missile 

proliferation problem in the 1980s and the development of initial terminal defense capabilities 

(e.g., PATRIOT) in the early 1990s. As regional protection capabilities begin to take shape, it is 

important to ensure effective operational and political cooperation with allies and partners. 

Third, before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment 

under realistic operational conditions against threat-representative targets to demonstrate that 

they can reliably and effectively help U.S. forces accomplish their mission. Over the past decade, 

it was deemed necessary to rapidly put capabilities in place to address emerging threats while 

those systems were still in development. The Administration will take a different approach, best 

characterized as “fly before you buy,” which will result in a posture based on proven technology 

in order to improve reliability, confidence, and cost control. 

Fourth, the commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. 

National investments must be managed to ensure that there are sound capability improvements 

at reasonable cost and in overall balance with other defense priorities. Toward that end, the 

Administration has charted a new course for spending on its BMD programs. The President has 

made clear that the United States will move forward with missile defenses that are affordable, 

proven, and responsive to the threat. This primarily means that the Department of Defense will 

realign spending away from defenses planned to rely on currently immature technology, away 

from technologies that require unrealistic concepts of operations in order to be effective, and 

away from technologies intended to defeat adversarial missile threats that do not exist and are not 

expected to evolve in the near to midterm. These considerations led to the decisions to terminate 
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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

both the Multiple Kill Vehicle and Kinetic Energy Interceptor programs and to shift the 

Airborne Laser to a technology demonstration program in the FY 2010 budget. 

Fifth, U.S. BMD capabilities must be adaptable to future threats and flexible to adjust as the 

threats change. Hedging against potential changes in the threat is essential given the uncertainty 

associated with the missile capabilities of potential adversaries. 

Sixth, the United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense. It will 

work more intensively with allies and partners to provide pragmatic and cost-effective capacity. 

The United States will also continue in its efforts to establish a cooperative BMD relationship 

with Russia. The United States, with the support of allies and partners, seeks to create an 

environment in which the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional 

adversaries can be deterred, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of 

such attacks, and thereby devaluing their ballistic missile arsenals. This will help undergird a 

broader strategic objective: to strengthen deterrence in key regions through the integrated and 

innovative use of military and nonmilitary means that adapt regional deterrence architectures to 

21st-century requirements. 

Missile Defense: Deterrence, Extended Deterrence, and Assurance Goals 

Missile defenses support a number of defense strategy goals. Ballistic missile defenses help 

support U.S. security commitments to allies and partners. They provide reassurance that the 

United States will stand by those commitments despite the growth in the military potential of 

regional adversaries. Missile defenses also aid the United States in maintaining military freedom 

of maneuver, by helping to negate the coercive potential of regional actors intent on inhibiting 

and disrupting U.S. military access in their regions. Missile defenses are an essential element of 

the U.S. commitment to strengthen regional deterrence architectures against states acquiring 

nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in contravention of international norms 

and in defiance of the international community. They also support U.S. and allied capacities for 

mutual defense in the face of coercion and aggression by these defiant states. In these ways, 

missile defenses strengthen U.S. goals of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. In so 

doing, they contribute to international peace and stability and reinforce the global 

nonproliferation regime. If Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and other regions become more 

peaceful and stable as a result of these and other measures, then more states in these regions may 

be willing to take steps back from the “nuclear tipping point” and toward stronger and more 

effective implementation of global treaty regimes. 

Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely 

affect their own strategic capabilities and interests. The United States will continue to engage 

them on this issue to help them better understand the stabilizing benefits of missile defense—

particularly China, which claims to have successfully demonstrated its own ground-based 
STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 

13 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

midcourse interception on January 11, 2010. As the United States has stated in the past, the 

homeland missile defense capabilities are focused on regional actors such as Iran and North 

Korea. While the GMD system would be employed to defend the United States against limited 

missile launches from any source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian or 

Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with those countries. 

This missile defense strategy is part of a larger strategic framework. The Administration intends 

to leverage all elements of national power to prevent and deter conflicts. Doing so should help 

mitigate the factors that drive some countries to seek ballistic missiles. The Administration’s 

national security approach also seeks collaborative approaches with allies and partners, in order to 

strengthen international responses to shared challenges. Improved missile defenses and the 

supporting policy agenda elaborated here are integral to these larger purposes. They are intended 

to reinforce broad efforts to mitigate the missile (and nuclear) threats through political and 

cooperative measures rather than by reliance on military means alone. 

 
14 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

 
15 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

DEFENDING THE HOMELAND 

This section addresses the first element of the strategy and policy framework: to defend the 

homeland from the threat of a limited ballistic missile attack. 

Status of Current Capability 

The United States is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack, as a result of 

investments made over the past decade in a system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD). This system relies on ground-based interceptors at two sites: Fort Greely, Alaska, and 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. By the end of FY 2010, the United States will deploy a 

total of 30 GBIs, with 26 at Fort Greely and 4 at Vandenberg. To enable these ground-based 

systems to successfully intercept attacking missiles in the midcourse part of their trajectory, the 

United States employs early warning radars in Alaska, California, Greenland, and the United 

Kingdom; afloat radar systems (i.e., Aegis destroyers, Aegis cruisers, and Sea-Based X-band radar 

[SBX]); and a sophisticated command and control infrastructure. 

Over the past few years, the United States accelerated development of these homeland defense 

capabilities by simultaneously developing and fielding them. This step was taken largely in order 

to facilitate their deployment 

in time to coincide with the 

expected deployment of 

ICBMs by North Korea and 

its potential transfer of 

ICBMs to others. That 

projected ICBM deployment 

has not yet occurred. 

Given the continuing 

improvement in the GMD 

system and the number of 

ground-based interceptors 

currently deployed compared 

to potential North Korean and 

Iranian capabilities, the United States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected threats 

from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. 

Because of uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, including the rate at which it will mature, 

it is important that the United States maintain this advantageous position. But doing so does not 

PROTECTION AGAINST ICBM ATTACKS FROM NORTH KOREA. 

With ground-based interceptors fielded in Alaska and California, land-based 

radar in Alaska and Japan, and sea-based Radar in the Pacific, the United 

States can defend the shaded areas from any future long-range missile attack 

from North Korea.
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND 

16 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

require that the United 

States continue to develop 

these capabilities at the 

same accelerated rate as it 

has in recent years and 

accept the same level of 

risk in the developmental 

program. Rather, the 

United States will refocus 

its homeland missile 

defense plans to maintain 

the current level of 

capability, while 

developing future, proven capabilities that will enhance homeland defense should a new threat 

emerge. This refocused approach was introduced in the FY 2010 budget submission, in which 

the Department of Defense proposed to hold the number of operationally deployed GBIs at 30, 

instead of the 44 originally planned. 

Hedging Against Future Uncertainties 

An essential element of the United States’ homeland ballistic missile defense strategy is to hedge 

against future uncertainties, including both the uncertainty of future threat capabilities and the 

technical risk inherent to our own development plans. The United States must be prepared with 

other options if the threat assessment changes or if the development of new technical capabilities 

are delayed. 

The FY 2011 budget request demonstrates the Administration’s commitment to providing a 

robust defense of the United States against long-range threats and to hedge against improvements 

in the capabilities of potential adversaries. To ensure that our homeland defense remains 

effective and viable over the long term, the Department will seek funding for a substantial 

investment in a number of new GMD system enhancements. These include a program to 

increase GMD system reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM); a program to guard 

against ground system obsolescence; and funding to restart the Future Avionics 

Upgrade/Obsolescence Program (FAU/OP). The Department will also emphasize proven 

capabilities by requesting funding for additional GMD testing, including the addition of an 

ICBM-class target and planning for a salvo test. 

PROTECTION AGAINST ICBM ATTACKS FROM IRAN. The ground-based 

interceptors fielded in Alaska and California will provide protection from any future

Iranian ICBM capability. 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND 

17 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

The threat environment described earlier reinforces 

the need for the United States to maintain a flexible 

approach to developing missile defense capabilities. 

The Department must be prepared to adjust its 

plans as the threat evolves. The Missile Defense 

Agency is currently developing next-generation 

missile defense capabilities to counter future threats. 

Within this set of capabilities, a number of new 

technologies and concepts are being pursued to 

improve homeland defense. These include 

intercepting long-range missiles early in their flight, 

launching interceptors based on remote sensor 

information, and strengthening ballistic missile 

sensor networks. In addition, MDA will begin 

advanced technology development for a new 

Standard Missile 3 variant, the Block IIB, which 

should provide some capability to intercept longrange missiles. These developments will ensure that 

the United States will stay ahead of the emerging 

long-range ballistic missile threat. 

In addition to continuing to sustain and improve the GMD system through a variety of means, 

including a rigorous flight testing program, the United States is also pursuing several other 

hedging strategies for defense of the homeland against a ballistic missile attack. For example, the 

United States will continue development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based 

interceptor. We will also pursue multiple paths to develop and deploy ballistic missile sensors, 

including both airborne and space-based detection and tracking systems. Although the Airborne 

Laser (ABL) program has been restructured, the Department will continue to research the 

potential of directed energy systems for missile defenses, including the establishment of a directed 

energy research program inside MDA. MDA “red team” activities also support hedging by 

anticipating possible future changes in the threat. 

The Department also plans to complete the construction of Missile Field 2 in Fort Greely, Alaska 

by emplacing the full 14 GBI silos and making those silos operationally ready. This will both 

replace older, inadequate silos from Missile Field 1 and provide a reserve capability to rapidly 

deploy up to 8 additional GBIs from the pool of interceptors currently designated for testing. 

Although the Department does not currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, 

these extra operational silos will provide an additional hedge against future threat uncertainty. 

The Department does not require the procurement of additional GBIs for this purpose. 

GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR. Secretary 

Gates is shown here viewing a ground-based 

interceptor in its silo at one of three ballistic missile 

defense fields at Fort Greely, Alaska on June 1, 2009. 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND 

18 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

In Summary 

To sustain homeland protection over the near and long term, the Administration plans a 

comprehensive agenda with the following elements: 

1. Existing operational capabilities at the two sites will be maintained and their continued 

development will proceed through rigorous tests. These capabilities include both the 

three-stage missiles deployed at both sites and potentially the two-stage missiles originally 

planned for deployment in Europe. 

2. The second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely will be completed so that extra silos are ready if 

additional GBI deployments become necessary. Supplemental sensors will be deployed to 

improve the tracking of missiles launched at the United States. 

3. Investments in SM-3 development will be made for future land-based deployment as the 

ICBM threat matures. 

4. Investments in sensors and early-intercept kinetic kill systems will be increased to enable 

intercepts to help defeat countermeasures. 

5. Additional programs to hedge against future uncertainties will also be pursued. 

 
19 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

The second element of the Administration’s strategy and policy framework is defense against 

regional missile threats to U.S. forces, allies, and partners. Whereas homeland defense benefits 

from the relatively long flight times associated with ICBM threats, which allow time for complex 

system response and for large interceptors such as GBIs to provide an effective defense, defending 

against regional missile threats involves much shorter flight times and thus necessitates a highly 

agile missile defense system and responsive command and control authorities. Because of the 

large and increasing numbers of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, any regional missile 

defense capabilities must also be produced and fielded in sufficient quantity to deter and defend 

against those threats. 

Status of Current Capability 

Over the past decade the United States has made significant progress in developing and fielding 

essential capabilities for protection against attack from short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles. These capabilities include increasingly capable PATRIOT batteries that provide point 

defense against short-range ballistic missiles, the powerful AN/TPY-2 X-band radar for detecting 

and tracking ballistic missiles, and soon-to-be-deployed THAAD batteries for defense against 

both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Sea-based capabilities have also continued to 

develop. The Aegis system offers not only the ability to provide surveillance and tracking of 

ballistic missiles but also an upper-tier missile defense capability in the form of the SM-3 Block 

IA interceptor. Spaced-based sensors detect ballistic missile launches and provide data to groundand sea-based missile defense assets. 

However, these 

capabilities are modest 

numbers when set against 

the rapidly expanding 

regional missile threat. 

The Administration took 

steps to address this 

problem in the FY 2010 

budget, by providing 

additional money for 

THAAD interceptors, for 

SM-3 Block IA 

interceptors, and for the 

AEGIS BMD SM-3 FLIGHT TEST. The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile 

destroyer USS Hopper, equipped with the Aegis Weapons System, is shown launching 

a SM-3 while underway in the Pacific Ocean. The missile successfully intercepted a 

short-range ballistic missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in 

Kauai, Hawaii. This exercise marked the 19th successful intercept of 23 at-sea firings 

using the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

20 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

upgrading of more Navy ships to incorporate the Aegis BMD capability. The President’s Budget 

request for FY 2011 will further expand these deployable capabilities. 

Near-term Capabilities 

Looking to the future of regional defense, DoD is developing capabilities for deployment in the 

near term (out to 2015) and over the longer term. A key objective is to leverage recent successes 

in regional missile defense to further expand that capability at low risk. As part of the solution, 

DoD will increase the procurement of proven systems such as THAAD, the SM-3 interceptor, 

and the AN/TPY-2 radar. 

The second part of the solution is to further improve the technology that has already been 

developed. At the moment, the SM-3 interceptor is launched only from sea. In the 2015 time 

frame, a relocatable land-based SM-3 system, tentatively called “Aegis Ashore,” will be available 

that will make possible better regional coverage by virtue of its ability to be placed inland. These 

land-based interceptors will provide persistent coverage of the areas they protect and will be an 

important element of a future regional missile defense against medium- and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles. 

DoD will also continue to improve the SM-3 interceptor missile defense capability. By 2015 a 

more capable SM-3 missile, the Block IB, will be available. It will have an improved seeker 

capability for greater on-board discrimination and greater area coverage. This interceptor will be 

deployed both at sea and on land, with the “Aegis Ashore” system. The coverage area will also be 

increased by developing the technology to launch an SM-3 interceptor in response to remote 

AEGIS BMD SM-3 EVOLUTION. The SM-3 is being fielded in “blocks” as technology advances, enabling improved 

defense through upgrades to the interceptor.

Block IA Block IB Block IIA Block IIB

Stage 2 & 3: 

• 13.5

Propulsion

Stage 1:

• MK 72 Booster

• MK 41 Vertical 

Launch 

System (VLS) 

Compatible

Stage 1:

• MK 72 Booster

• MK 41 VLS

KW

• 2-Color Seeker

• Improved Optics

• Advanced Signal 

Processor

• Improved DACS

Kill Warhead (KW)

• 1-Color Seeker

• Divert & Attitude 

Control System 

(DACS)

21 Nosecone

Large Diameter KW

• Advanced 

Discrimination 

Seeker

• High Divert DACS

Stage 1:

• MK 72 Booster

• MK 41 VLS

Improved KW

High Performance 

Upper Stage

Stage 2: 

• 21

Propulsion

Stage 1: Existing 

MK 72 Booster

Stage 2 & 3: 

• 13.5

Propulsion

Stage 2 & 3: 

• 21

Propulsion
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

21 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

sensor data. Once this capability is fully developed, the interceptors—no longer constrained by 

the range of the Aegis radar to detect an incoming missile—will be able to be launched sooner 

and therefore fly further in order to defeat the incoming threat. 

It is also important that we continue development of the Command and Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications (C2BMC) Program, the overarching command and control 

system that brings together information from the various sensors, provides planning capability 

for missile defense operations, and makes available situational awareness for all levels of decision 

making. This continued development will incorporate the architecture of current and future 

sensor systems that support missile defense, the various weapons systems we currently use, and 

those in development such as the THAAD missile system, the PATRIOT, SM-3 variants, and 

GBIs. The continued development of C2BMC will allow for tailoring by each region’s needs, 

and it will be interoperable with systems we may develop with allies and partners. For defense of 

the homeland it will make possible a seamless, global picture that incorporates all aspects of the 

BMD architecture. 

A final capability intended for development in the 2015 time frame is an airborne infrared 

sensor. The goal of this program is to be able to simultaneously detect and track many ballistic 

missiles from unmanned aerial vehicles. These distributed airborne platforms will add significant 

depth to regional missile defenses. 

The Missile Defense Agency is now exploring another option, called “Early Intercept” (EI), 

which examines the feasibility of intercepting missiles early in their flight using currently planned 

interceptors and sensors. Instead of relying on larger and faster boosters, EI is achieved by 

reducing the timelines associated with early sensor tracking and rapidly developing fire-control 

solutions so that today’s missiles can intercept threat missiles much earlier in their flight. EI 

should provide an additional opportunity to shoot at incoming threat missiles. 

Long-term Capabilities 

Toward the end of the decade, more capable interceptors and sensors will become available. The 

SM-3 Block IIA will have a higher burnout velocity and a more advanced seeker. These features 

will make it much more capable than the SM-3 Block IA or IB and will provide greater regional 

coverage. 

A follow-on missile, the SM-3 Block IIB, is in the initial phase of technology assessment and 

development. It is expected to be even more capable than the IIA. With a higher burnout 

velocity and greater divert capability, the SM-3 Block IIB will have some early-intercept 

capability against a long-range missile. Matched against regional medium-range and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the SM-3 IIB will defend a greater area than the SM-3 IIA. 
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

22 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

 

Investments are also being made to develop an “engage on remote” technology that includes not 

only launching on data from a remote sensor track but also the ability to uplink data from assets 

other than the Aegis radar. This will allow the interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater 

ranges. 

A further long-term effort seeks to develop persistent overhead sensors to detect and track large 

raid sizes of ballistic missiles over their entire trajectories from space. Such an ability would 

greatly reduce the need for terrestrial sensors and the size of deployable missile defense systems. 

This Precision Tracking and Space System” (PTSS) is an important funding priority in the 

President’s Budget for FY 2011 and the Future Years Defense Program. 

Integrating Capabilities Regionally 

As we look back over recent efforts to develop these capabilities, they can reasonably be described 

as “bottom up”—the United States worked aggressively with available technologies to improve 

them and bring them rapidly to the field in growing numbers. Looking to the future, it is 

becoming increasingly important to think “top down,” or more strategically, about the 

deployment of missile defense assets in a regional context. In other words, regional approaches 

must be tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary 

considerably in their geography, in the history and character of the threat, and in the military-tomilitary relationships on which to build cooperative missile defenses. Several principles must 

guide the development of our regional approaches. 

Launch System

(Land- or Sea-based) Remote Sensor

Engagement

Zone

Space Sensor

2

Surveillance

and Track by 

Remote 

Sensors

Launch 

Detection by 

Remote 

Sensor(s)

Interceptor 

Launched Before 

Launch System Radar 

Detects Threat

Trajectory Refinement and 

Intercept by Launch 

System Radar

Launch System Radar 

Acquires Threat Missile

1

4

5

3

LAUNCH ON REMOTE CONCEPT. This represents a future capability to sense a threat remotely, transmit tracking

information to the interceptor’s flight computer, and launch the interceptor earlier and farther downrange than the ship’s 

own radar would allow.
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

23 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

First, the United States will strengthen regional deterrence 

architectures. Regional deterrence must be build on a solid 

foundation of strong cooperative relationships and 

appropriate burden sharing between the United States and 

its allies. Our alliances must be built on productive plans 

and action that enhance allied security. As such, it is 

important that allies have the opportunity to contribute 

appropriately to the defense of common interests. 

While missile defenses play an important role in regional 

deterrence, other components will also be significant. 

Against nuclear-armed states, regional deterrence will 

necessarily include a nuclear component (whether forwarddeployed or not). But the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in 

these regional deterrence architectures can be reduced by 

increasing the role of missile defenses and other capabilities. 

More broadly, the United States seeks new ways to deal with the challenges posed by states 

seeking nuclear weapons in contravention of international norms and in defiance of the 

international community. 

Second, the United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within each region that is 

tailored to the threats unique to that region, including their scale, the scope and pace of their 

development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. This does not 

require a globally integrated missile defense architecture that integrates allies into a uniform, 

global structure. Instead, the United States will pursue regional structures sharing common assets 

that are relevant and robust because they are tailored to the unique requirements and 

opportunities within each region. 

Third, because the demand for missile defense assets within each region over the next decade will 

exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are mobile and relocatable. This 

feature would make possible their movement from one region to another in time of crisis. This 

capacity for surge defense should help dissuade potential aggressor states in all regions from 

thinking they can gain some long-term advantage. 

These principles will be applied on a region-by-region basis. As previously stated, the 

Department will rely on the Global Force Management process to assist in decisions on the 

allocation of missile defense forces. 

PATRIOT MISSILE LAUNCH. 

PATRIOT missile defense interceptors 

are capable of intercepting short- and 

medium-range missiles at relatively close 

range in their terminal phase of flight.
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

24 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

The Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe 

The Administration’s approach to missile defense in Europe was announced in September 2009. 

This announcement followed a unanimous recommendation to the President by the Secretary of 

Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff that the 2007 plan for European missile defense be revised. 

Under this new approach, in Phase 1 (2011 time frame) existing missile defense systems will be 

deployed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Phase 1 will focus on the 

protection of portions of southern Europe by utilizing sea-based Aegis missile defense-capable 

ships and interceptors (the SM-3 Block IA). This first phase will also include a forward-based 

radar, which, by providing data earlier in the engagement, will enhance the defense of Europe 

and augment homeland defense capabilities already in place in Alaska and California. 

In Phase 2 (2015 time frame) our capabilities will be enhanced by the fielding of a more 

advanced interceptor (the SM-3 Block IB) and additional sensors. Phase 2 will include landbased SM-3s in southern Europe, in addition to their sea-based locations, expanding coverage to 

additional NATO allies. 

In Phase 3 (2018 time frame) coverage against medium- and intermediate-range threats will be 

improved with a second land-based SM-3 site, located in northern Europe, as well as an 

upgraded Standard Missile 3 (the SM-3 Block IIA, which is already under development) at seaand land-based sites. These changes will extend coverage to all NATO allies in Europe. 

In Phase 4 (2020 time frame) an additional capability against a potential ICBM launched from 

the Middle East against the United States will be available. This phase will take advantage of yet 

another upgrade to the Standard Missile 3, the Block IIB. All four phases will include upgrades 

to the missile defense command and control system. 

The United States has been working closely with NATO allies on the relationship of the 

European PAA to the Alliance’s missile defense plans. In addition to these NATO-wide 

consultations, the Czech Republic and Poland, both close allies, continue to play an important 

role in our collective missile defense efforts. The United States values the leadership of these 

nations on missile defense at NATO and welcomes their commitment to involvement in the new 

architecture. We also see opportunities for cooperation with Russia in the context of the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach, which are discussed in greater detail in the section titled 

“Strengthening International Cooperation.” 

Tailoring Phased Adaptive Approaches to Other Regions 

Missile defenses are an integral part of U.S. military and diplomatic strategies wherever the 

United States has security commitments. In East Asia and the Middle East, the United States 
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

25 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

faces challenges similar to those in Europe regarding how to phase in needed capabilities in a way 

that is adaptive to developments in the threat. 

It is essential to note that the regions differ in the range, volume, and technical sophistication of 

the existing and potential threat. This variation has important implications for how phased 

adaptive approaches to missile defense are applied in each regional context. The regions also 

differ in terms of the U.S. role and interests in the region: in Europe, the United States engages 

as a party to a multilateral alliance; in East Asia, the United States cooperates through bilateral 

alliances and with key partners; in the Middle East, the United States has a number of key 

partners and deployed forces. These differences have important implications for the authorities 

under which the United States is able to operationally employ defenses in protection of local 

partners. 

The regions also differ in how they 

currently cooperate in BMD with the 

United States. The United States and 

Japan cooperate in a way that is highly 

interoperable, and the nations are 

working together to jointly develop a 

future system. The United States and 

Israel are involved in the coproduction of the Arrow 2 missile 

defense system as well as in additional 

BMD research and development 

activities. The United States is also 

beginning to work with some partners of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In short, the 

foundations for applying phased adaptive approaches in these regions are different, and thus so 

too are the pathways forward. 

The Implications of Phased Adaptive Approaches to Regional Architectures 

The benefits of comprehensive, phased adaptive approaches to regional missile defense 

architectures are considerable. They allow strong partnerships with regional allies and partners in 

meeting emerging security challenges, as well as a responsible measure of burden sharing. They 

focus resources on real, emerging threats and rely on proven solutions. 

Another benefit is improved deterrence. Missile-armed challengers in the Middle East and 

Northeast Asia will find it more difficult to threaten and coerce their neighbors in the region and 

beyond. U.S. allies and partners will remain confident in the role of the United States as security 

guarantor. These results could help significantly reduce pressures at the so-called nuclear tipping 

point. 

AN/TPY-2 RADAR. This transportable X-band radar is currently 

deployed to Japan to aid in detecting and tracking potential threats 

in the Pacific region.
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

26 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

But there are also some challenges. Perhaps the most important derives from the fact that 

regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for some years to come. 

Although the missile threat is developing at different rates in different regions, overall it is 

developing rapidly. Today there are thousands of ballistic missiles and hundreds of launchers in 

countries other than Russia, China, the United States, and NATO members; roughly 90 percent 

of those missiles have ranges less than 1,000 kilometers. Against this threat, the United States 

currently has only a few hundred defensive short-range interceptors deployed in multiple regions. 

U.S. combatant commanders are expressing steadily rising interest in and requirements for 

protection against these threats. U.S. regional allies and partners are also expressing increasing 

interest and demand. 

In the short term, the United States will address this mismatch between supply and demand with 

a comprehensive force management process that adjudicates competing requirements from the 

combatant commands. This approach underscores the value of developing capabilities that are 

flexible and adaptive and also relocatable, so that they can be surged into troubled regions in 

times of political-military crisis. 

Over the longer term, the potential solutions are more numerous. The Department of Defense 

has proposed a robust procurement pathway for the years ahead to meet surging demand. It is 

also seeking to increase the contributions that allies make to regional architectures and to research 

and development. In addition, DoD is emphasizing the importance of strengthening regional 

deterrence by multiple means and not just through reliance on missile defense (or extended 

nuclear deterrence). The Department also supports efforts to increase international cooperation 

to suppress the development of specific regional threats of a particularly troubling kind—such as 

those posed by North Korea and Iran. 

THAAD Fire Control and Communication with Launcher in Background Mobile THAAD Equipment

THAAD BATTERIES. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system is used for area defense of short- and mediumrange missiles in their terminal phase of flight. It is air-transportable for rapid deployment in times of crisis.
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

27 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

Whatever measures are taken to address this problem, it is not necessary that the United States be 

able to negate every deployable missile in an enemy’s arsenal. Our forces must be able to protect 

what we and our partners value. These include the political and economic targets, including 

population centers, that an enemy may want to put at risk, as well as military capabilities essential 

for prevailing in a conflict. The ability to protect these assets helps reinforce deterrence and 

greatly magnifies the challenges for a leader contemplating aggression against some U.S. interest. 

Hedging Against Future Regional Uncertainties 

As with the defense of the homeland, it is important to hedge against future uncertainties in the 

regional threat. In particular, the United States will hedge against the possibility of more rapid 

than projected quantitative and qualitative developments in the existing threat, and against the 

possibility of new missile threats developing in an unexpected location. 

The phased adaptive approach provides an inherent hedge against these uncertainties by 

deploying missile defenses that are both relocatable and scalable. Relocatable assets can be surged 

to a region in times of crisis, providing increased capability against a larger threat raid size. This 

feature will also allow missile defenses to be brought to bear in new regions relatively swiftly. 

Scalable assets can be integrated into existing regional architectures. Furthermore, the same 

multiple pathways for ballistic missile sensor development that provide a hedge for homeland 

defense will also provide a hedge for regional missile defense, but for a different reason. More 

capable threat sensors will improve our ability to counter larger threat raid sizes. 

Meeting the regional ballistic missile threat requires increased missile defense inventories. To 

that end, the Department intends to increase both inventory and production capacity of 

THAAD and SM-3 interceptors. To further add to the system’s flexibility, DoD will also 

convert more ships to the Aegis weapons system to provide more sea-based ballistic missile 

defense capabilities. The mobility of these systems provides a critical hedge against potential 

expansion of the ballistic missile threats in a given region. 

Regional Architectures and Defense of the Homeland 

These regional architectures are not meant to substitute for the defense of the homeland. 

However, over time they can become effective means to that end if threats to the homeland 

appear in specific regions as states develop and deploy intercontinental-range capabilities. 

In the European Phased Adaptive Approach, for example, Phase 4 explicitly envisages additional 

capabilities that can be added to the European architecture to improve on the current defense of 

the homeland. Specifically, advanced technology assessments and development are under way on 

the SM-3 Block IIB with an expected deployment less than a decade from now. This more 

capable interceptor will be deployed to Europe in order to augment existing homeland protection 

against ICBM threats from the Middle East. The sensor architecture can also be supplemented 
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

over time in ways that promise much-improved performance against systems in the Middle East 

aimed at the United States. In other regions, phased adaptive approaches can be applied with 

similar longer-term objectives. 

In Summary 

To implement this new focus on regional architectures, the Administration will pursue the 

following initiatives: 

 Deploy the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which accelerates the deployment of 

proven technologies and also promises improved long-term protection of the homeland. 

 Apply phased adaptive approaches in other regions by building on current efforts, with a 

principal focus on East Asia and the Middle East. 

Furthermore, the development of these regional architectures will be guided by three principles: 

1. The United States will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence 

architectures, that must be built on the foundation of strong cooperative relationships and 

appropriate burden sharing. 

2. The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within each region that is 

tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region. 

3. Because the potential global demand for missile defense assets over the next decade may 

exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are mobile and relocatable. 

 
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

Case Study: The Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe 

Key Elements of the September 2009 Decision

The 2007 plan called for a “third site” in Europe. First proposed early in the decade, it was intended to 

supplement the national protection of the United States at the two existing sites in Alaska and California. By 

locating a site for supplemental protection in Europe, the plan offered improved protection against ICBM 

threats emanating from the Middle East while also providing some protection of Europe against mediumand intermediate-range ballistic missiles. It was a sound technical solution based on the technology available 

at the time. Poland agreed to host the field of interceptors and the Czech Republic offered to host a radar 

needed for target discrimination over Europe (the European Midcourse Radar, or EMR). In addition, the 

decision involved a commitment to deploy closer to Iran an AN/TPY-2 radar useful for early target 

identification. 

Against the backdrop of the new strategy and policy framework described earlier, two key factors led to the 

decision to revise this plan and apply a new approach in Europe. First, since the 2007 plan was initially 

considered, U.S. investments in missile defense technology have created new technical opportunities. The 

Standard Missile 3 Block IA has entered into service with the U.S. Navy and has a demonstrated track record 

of success in its test program. The development of improved versions has begun, including Blocks IB and 

IIA, which will be deployable both at sea and on land. In addition, advanced technology development for an 

even more capable land-based variant, the SM-3 Block IIB, will begin in 2011. 

There have been similarly important advances in sensor technology, producing a variety of options to detect, 

classify, and track enemy missiles and to guide the interceptor in flight. The result is that an alternative 

emerged to the GBI-based architecture, one that had to be assessed on its relative merits and on its quality of 

protection, timelines to initial operational capability, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness, among other features. 

Second, while Iran and other regional actors have not yet acquired or deployed ICBMs, the threat from 

shorter-range missiles has developed very quickly. For example, Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles 

that threaten its neighbors, and it is actively developing and testing ballistic missiles that can reach beyond its 

neighbors and further into Europe. This capability poses a clear and present danger to U.S. deployed forces, 

allies, and partners. 

Iran also continues to work on longer-range ballistic missiles, space-launch vehicles, and other technologies 

that could contribute to an ICBM capability. Moreover, it has an ongoing program of missile cooperation 

with North Korea. These factors suggest that a future transfer of technologies or entire systems may be 

possible when and if North Korea’s ICBM program reaches a point of technical maturity. These concerns 

about Iran’s missile capabilities are magnified by Iran’s determination to continue its nuclear program in 

long-standing defiance of its international obligations. So far, Iran has not taken adequate steps to increase 

international confidence in its claims of an exclusively peaceful nuclear program. Likewise, its development of 

long-range and robust missile capabilities does not increase confidence in the alleged peaceful intent of its 

nuclear program. 

The continued development and improvements of the GBI capability increase our confidence that 30 

deployed GBIs are sufficient to defend the United States against an ICBM threat from Iran and North Korea 

for several years. However, the existing and growing threat in Europe to deployed forces, allies, and partners 

needs to be matched by the deployment of missile defense capabilities able to counter short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles as well as longer-range threats in the future. 

The previous plan was thus replaced by the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense.
DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

Case Study: The Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe (continued) 

Benefits of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe

There are many benefits to the European PAA. First, the PAA more directly addresses the threat in Europe. 

As Iran continues to develop its short- and medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, protection for U.S. 

forces, allies, and partners is provided much sooner under the PAA than the previous plan. In Phase 1, 

protection is planned to be available as early as 2011, whereas under the previous plan the GBI site in Europe 

would not have been operational until approximately 2017. Not only does the PAA provide protection years 

earlier, but it also brings it to those parts of Europe and those deployed forces that are most vulnerable to 

existing and near-term threats. 

Second, the PAA utilizes existing and proven capabilities to meet current threats, and then will improve those 

capabilities over time by integrating new technology after operationally realistic testing. This approach 

provides flexibility to upgrade and adjust the architecture and to do so in a cost-effective manner as the threat 

evolves and our capabilities develop. Furthermore, the PAA’s use of distributed, mobile, and relocatable 

systems also increases the system’s survivability by making the assets more difficult for an adversary to target. 

In addition to upholding our NATO Article 5 commitments to U.S. allies in Europe, the European PAA will 

also be able to improve on the protection of the U.S. homeland against ICBMs currently provided by the 

GBIs located on U.S. soil. In the short term, the PAA does this by adding the forward-based radar in 

southern Europe, which will provide data to augment missile defense coverage of the United States and 

Europe. Over time, as the four phases progress, defense of the U.S. homeland will be augmented by Europebased SM-3 Block IIB interceptors, which are planned to be able to provide an early-intercept capability 

against potential Iranian ICBMs. Moreover, if the threat grows quantitatively, the PAA will be able to grow 

as well, adding additional interceptors without having to construct heavy infrastructure such as silos, and at 

much lower cost per interceptor than with GBIs. 

The European PAA also offers increased opportunities for allied participation and burden sharing. Allies have 

unanimously welcomed the PAA and are studying architectures for a potential NATO missile defense system. 

The United States is committed to making the PAA its national contribution to a NATO missile defense 

effort, and seeks an Alliance decision to pursue a NATO-wide effort for missile defense of allied populations 

and territory. To share the burden, we support NATO’s development of a command and control system for 

territorial missile defense. Individual NATO allies will also be able to contribute by providing missile defense 

assets, by hosting European PAA assets on their territory, or both. 
31 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL 

COOPERATION 

Another key objective in the Administration’s strategy and policy framework is to lead expanded 

international efforts and cooperation on missile defense. The United States is committed to 

working intensively with allies and partners in two categories: (1) developing and fielding robust, 

pragmatic, and cost-effective capabilities, and (2) engaging in international cooperation on a 

broad range of missile defense–related activities, including technological and industrial 

cooperation. As part of this effort, DoD will also work to expand cooperation with Russia on 

missile defense, counterproliferation, and related issues. 

The United States seeks to create an environment in which the development, acquisition, 

deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, principally by 

eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks. This approach will reinforce 

elements of the broader national security strategy that emphasize practical solutions to emerging 

challenges, solutions that involve all elements of national power. In addition, by working with 

allies and partners to promote effective missile defense capabilities, the United States builds closer 

defense cooperation ties as it accomplishes its direct purpose of making U.S. partners less 

vulnerable to coercion and ballistic missile attack. 

The Department is also participating in a broad-based interagency review of the current U.S. 

export control system. The current system, founded during the Cold War and rooted in the 

concept of a bipolar world, was designed to control technologies and manufacture of U.S. origin. 

The global economy has changed. Technologies and processes once deemed critical are now 

widely available and in many cases no longer controlled by the United States. The Department 

will seek to understand how best to develop key missile defense technologies while also 

controlling them via multilateral arrangements so that we and our allies can maximize the 

benefits for our own security as we prevent their acquisition by those who would use them in 

ways contrary to our interests. 

Europe 

In Europe, the Administration is committed to implementing the new European Phased 

Adaptive Approach within a NATO context. In December 2009, NATO foreign ministers 

welcomed the European PAA and declared that it reinforces NATO’s central role in missile 

defense in Europe. The United States sees the European PAA as part of our extended deterrent 

and a visible demonstration of our Article 5 commitment to Europe. In practical terms, this 

means that the European PAA would be the U.S. national contribution to a NATO missile 
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 

32 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

defense capability. Toward this end, the United States is working within Alliance structures to 

define an agreed implementation plan. First, the United States supports a potential NATO 

decision to adopt the role of missile defense of allied territory and populations. Second, we 

support NATO’s efforts to build and strengthen the Alliance’s program for an integrated 

command and control system for missile defenses (Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile 

Defense, or ALTBMD). 

ALTBMD is currently designed 

to link allies’ assets together for 

missile defense of deployed 

forces, but it could be expanded 

to coordinate allied assets for 

the defense of populations and 

territory. As NATO takes these 

important steps, the United 

States will be able to contribute 

the European PAA to the 

Alliance’s developing missile 

defense capability. 

The Administration is also working directly with specific partners to develop and deploy needed 

capabilities for the defense of Europe. Poland and the Czech Republic, which were to play an 

important role in the previous plan, continue to play a role in implementing the European PAA. 

Other allies already own or are working with the United States to acquire specific capabilities, 

such as naval vessels equipped with the Aegis defensive system, that could be adapted to include a 

missile defense capability. These systems could be linked with the PAA to create a networked 

defense. A primary U.S. emphasis is on ensuring appropriate burden sharing. The 

Administration recognizes that allies do not view the specifics of the missile threat in the same 

way, and do not have equal resources to apply to this problem, but there is general recognition of 

a growing threat and the need to take steps now to address both existing threats and emerging 

ones. 

East Asia 

In East Asia, the United States has a range of cooperative relationships. Japan is one of our most 

significant international BMD partners. The United States and Japan have made considerable 

strides in BMD cooperation and interoperability in support of bilateral missile defense 

operations. Japan has acquired a layered integrated missile defense system that includes Aegis 

BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire 

units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. The United States and Japan 

A MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC). 

(Photo courtesy of NATO)
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 

33 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

regularly train together, and our forces have 

successfully executed cooperative BMD 

operations. One of our most significant 

cooperative efforts is the co-development of a 

next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the 

Block IIA. This co-development program 

represents not only an area of significant 

technical cooperation but also the basis for 

enhanced operational cooperation to 

strengthen regional security. The U.S.-Japan 

partnership is an outstanding example of the 

kind of cooperation the United States seeks in 

order to tailor a phased adaptive approach to 

the unique threats and capabilities in a region. 

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is also an important U.S. BMD partner. The ROK has indicated 

interest in acquiring a missile defense capability that includes land- and sea-based systems, early 

warning radars, and a command and control system. The United States and ROK are working to 

define possible future BMD requirements. As these requirements are determined, the United 

States stands ready to work with the ROK to strengthen its protection against the North Korean 

missile threat. The United States looks forward to taking further steps to enhance operational 

coordination and build upon ongoing missile defense cooperation. 

The United States continues to consult bilaterally with Australia regarding U.S. BMD 

capabilities and plans in order to share information that would help Australia with decisions 

regarding BMD should the need for it be seen in the future. 

The United States is also engaged in multilateral discussions on BMD capability development 

with several partners in the East Asia region. As we enter into bilateral discussions of missile 

defense in East Asia, an additional goal is to share BMD information among countries on a 

multilateral basis in order to help each country improve its own capabilities. 

The Middle East 

The United States is also cooperating with security partners in the Middle East to strengthen 

missile defense in the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. 

The United States and Israel coordinate extensively on missile defense issues. The two have a 

long history of cooperative research and development, which has borne fruit in the deployment 

of Israel’s Arrow missile defense system. Through various exercises, the United States and Israel 

have established a capability to cooperate operationally. 

GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER. In Nov. 2009 The 

guided-missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54) 

transits through the Pacific Ocean with Mount Fuji in the 

background. 
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

In the Persian Gulf, the United States has a continuous 

missile defense presence and seeks to build on the Bilateral 

Air Defense Initiative to strengthen cooperation. A number 

of states in the region are exploring purchases of some 

missile defense capability under the auspices of the foreign 

military sales (FMS) program. 

Russia 

The Administration has given a special emphasis to 

renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense. U.S. 

officials have discussed with Russia’s leaders our view that 

U.S. missile defenses are a needed response to an emerging 

challenge to international peace and stability. 

One of the benefits of the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach is that it allows for a Russian contribution if 

political circumstances make that possible. For example, Russian radars could contribute useful 

and welcome tracking data, although the functioning of the U.S. system will not be dependent 

on that data. 

The Administration is committed to substantive and sustained dialogue with the leadership of 

Russia on U.S. missile defenses and their roles in different regions. For example, the United 

States and Russia have initiated a joint assessment of the ballistic missile threat, as agreed to by 

Presidents Obama and Medvedev at the July 2009 Moscow Summit. Our goals are to enlist 

Russia in a new structure of deterrence that addresses the emerging challenges to international 

peace and security posed by a small number of states seeking illicit capabilities. Moreover, the 

Administration seeks to develop a mutual understanding of a new approach to strategic stability 

that integrates both defensive and offensive capabilities in the hope that this will enable the two 

nations to commit to even deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals. As it pursues this goal, the 

Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses. 

China 

Engaging China in discussions of U.S. missile defense plans is also an important part of our 

international efforts. China is one of the countries most vocal about U.S. ballistic missile defenses 

and their strategic implications, and its leaders have expressed concern that such defenses might 

negate China’s strategic deterrent. The United States will continue to discuss these matters with 

China. Maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship is as important to the 

Administration as maintaining strategic stability with other major powers. At the same time, it is 

important that China understand that the United States will work to ensure protection of our 

ARROW 2 LAUNCH. The United States

is working with Israel to develop the Arrow 

2 ballistic missile defense system against 

regional threats.
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 

35 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

forces, allies, and partners in East Asia against all regional ballistic missile threats. Consequently, 

the Administration is committed to substantive and sustained dialogue with China, with the 

goals of enhancing confidence, improving transparency, and reducing mistrust on strategic 

security issues. 

In Summary 

To implement its commitment to strengthen international cooperation, the Administration will 

take a number of steps (some of which have been elaborated in the previous section on regional 

architectures). It will: 

1. Pursue the European Phased Adaptive Approach in a NATO context and support 

enhanced multilateral cooperation together with intensified bilateral cooperation with 

partners seeking to deploy capabilities. This effort should include building on the 

ALTBMD foundation. 

2. Work with allies in East Asia to advance cooperative agendas to develop and deploy 

capabilities and adapt regional deterrence architectures to emerging requirements. 

3. Work with security partners in the Middle East and elsewhere on similarly tailored 

agendas of cooperative action. 

4. Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with Russia on all dimensions of the missile 

defense issue. However, the United States will not negotiate restraints on U.S. BMD 

capabilities. 

5. Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with China to deepen mutual 

understanding of the challenges of strategic stability. 

 
36 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

 
37 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

The strategy and policy framework reflects the commitment of this Administration to deploy 

capabilities that have been proven under rigorous testing and are affordable over the long term. 

These commitments are part of a broader effort to align management of the missile defense 

program with the current strategy and policy framework and with national and international 

requirements. Toward that end, this review has considered the following specific questions. 

1. What more can or should be done now to strengthen the testing program? 

2. Can missile defense be made more cost-effective? 

3. Is internal DoD oversight of the program adequate? 

4. Is external transparency adequate? 

The legislative mandate for this review specified a longer list of questions. Those questions have 

been fully explored as a part of this review, and the answers have been gathered under these four 

overarching questions for the sake of clarity. 

In answering these questions, this review built on a comprehensive evolution of management 

practices associated with the missile defense program that has been overseen by Secretary Gates 

over the past three years. 

 In March 2007, the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) was established, bringing 

together senior DoD executives (and also representatives of the Department of State and 

National Security Staff) to review and provide guidance for missile defense. 

 In September 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued innovative guidance to allow 

the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and other 

directorates within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to participate in and influence 

the development of the Missile Defense Agency’s annual program plan and budget 

submittal. 

 Further, the Deputy’s guidance provided guidelines for responsibilities and authorities for 

resource execution as the developing elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS) reach maturity and are transitioned to the Military Departments for operation 

and support. The guidance, termed the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process, was used 

to develop the Missile Defense Agency’s inputs to the President’s Budget for FY 2011. 
MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

 In June 2009 the Missile Defense Agency adopted a new approach to test planning that 

integrates recommendations made by DoD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

(DOT&E), among others. 

These steps have been studied in this review in the context of the new strategy and policy 

framework and broader initiatives by the Administration to promote improved planning and 

effective acquisition reform, with the following results. 

Strengthening the Testing Program 

The 2002 decision to proceed with the simultaneous development and deployment of groundbased interceptors was a high-risk acquisition strategy intended to quickly field ballistic missile 

defenses before testing was complete. President Obama’s commitment to deploying proven 

technologies reinforces the urgency of adopting a new approach to the testing of missile defense 

capabilities in development. 

In June 2009, the Missile Defense Agency announced a new approach to testing, embodied in an 

Integrated Master Test Plan. Consistent with recommendations of the DOT&E, the new 

approach addresses the testing of each system through its entire development, replacing an 

approach that looked only two years into the future. The intent is to update the plan 

semiannually to accommodate test results, emerging threats, or a new strategic direction such as 

the Phased Adaptive Approach. Given the complexity and global scale of the BMD system and of 

overall missile defense operations, assessments of system effectiveness must leverage the results of 

independently accredited models and simulations to supplement flight tests. The plan outlines a 

combination of ground and flight tests aimed specifically at acquiring test data to validate those 

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. The U.S. BMDS is composed of integrated land-, sea-, air- and 

space-based sensors and “shooters” capable of intercepting a range of ballistic missile threats in various stages of flight.
MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

models and simulations. Specific tests are also designed to demonstrate key performance elements 

that cannot be effectively modeled. For the first time, the plan incorporates a series of dedicated, 

operational test events. The combination of models, simulations, and actual flight test data can 

then be used in evaluating operational effectiveness. 

Congress has expressed a particular interest in the metrics by which reliability is evaluated. In 

addition to tracking each system’s operational availability, the plan incorporates assessment 

objectives that address system- and component-level reliability and maintainability. These data 

are collected during day-to-day operations of the deployed elements, as well as during dedicated 

exercises and flight test events. Other key assessment criteria include the systems’ logistics 

supportability, the quality and maturity of their software, and their use of computer resources. 

The results of these assessments form the basis for an evaluation of operational suitability. 

In DoD’s view, this procedure is a major step forward and addresses concerns raised with the 

prior test construct. The DOT&E has been actively engaged in overseeing the development of 

this new approach and has concurred with its implementation. While there will undoubtedly be 

refinements to this new testing construct, the Department needs to gain experience with its 

implementation before assessing the need for adjustments. DoD expects to work with Congress 

over the coming year to conduct that assessment. 

Cost-Effectiveness 

How can missile defenses be made more cost-effective? Answering this question requires a 

definition of the metrics by which a weapon system is determined to be cost-effective. This 

review has focused on the following metrics. 

One metric of cost-effectiveness is cost in comparison with other available options. In principle, 

less expensive interceptors that provide the same capability should be favored over more 

expensive ones. For example, a future variant of the SM-3 could provide a complement to the 

existing GBIs. The current cost of a GBI is approximately six times the cost of the SM-3 today. 

A second metric of cost-effectiveness is affordability. Is the BMD system, as currently being 

developed, affordable from the larger perspective of the Department’s and the nation’s competing 

priorities? It should be noted that since 2001, the average funding for missile defense has 

accounted for about 2 percent of the Department’s top line. 

A third metric of cost-effectiveness is the relationship between incurred costs and costs avoided. 

Strong and effective missile defenses are intended to have a deterrent effect by making clear to 

potential proliferators the impossibility of gaining an advantage in threatening to employ or 

employing ballistic missiles. Strong and effective defenses thus may help mitigate the emergence 

of future threats, whether from additional countries or of a more advanced kind from among the 
MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

ranks of countries now of concern. Such a dampening effect could reduce other types of costs for 

the United States and its allies in meeting those future threats. Investment in stronger missile 

defenses with the aim of strengthening deterrence must also be considered in the context of 

broader investments with the same aim, including larger deployments of conventional military 

forces, advanced forms of strategic strike, and even nuclear forces. 

The actual life-cycle cost of the missile defense system is difficult to determine, because there is 

no final configuration for the system. It is clear that an effort to match one-for-one the potential 

deployments of short-range missiles within the regions would be prohibitively expensive. 

Accordingly, the United States must pursue a comprehensive approach to risk management. This 

must include a robust international norm against missile proliferation and technology transfer, 

effective action by members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and diplomacy 

concentrated on particular countries of concern. Such an approach also supports the 

Administration’s decision to focus on developing and deploying mobile systems, which enable us 

to bring more missile defenses to bear on the most immediate threat. 

Adopting a cost-effective approach to BMD development occasionally involves taking decisive 

action on programs that do not meet cost, schedule, or performance goals. Accordingly, the 

Secretary announced his intention in the FY 2010 President’s Budget request to seek the 

termination of two troubled programs and the restructuring of a third. 

The Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program was one such troubled program. The MKV was 

intended to be deployed on midcourse interceptors, like the ground-based interceptor, so that 

one interceptor could address complex countermeasures by identifying and destroying all lethal 

objects in a threat cluster. However, the MKV technology was not maturing at a reasonable rate. 

Since continuing to develop those technologies required to demonstrate MKV effectiveness 

would have been time-consuming and costly, the Department chose to terminate the MKV 

program and invest in other approaches. 

The Defense Department also terminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program. The 

KEI mission was designed to counter advanced ballistic missile threats by intercepting missiles in 

the boost phase of flight. KEI was neither affordable nor proven, could not be integrated into 

existing weapons platforms or systems, and did not conform to the strategy of focusing on 

emerging regional missile threats. As a result, it grew in cost from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion, 

the development schedule continued to slip, and the average-unit production cost grew from $25 

million to more than $50 million per interceptor. In addition, the KEI’s size meant that any 

existing operational platform would need significant modifications to host it. 

Finally, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program was identified for restructuring because it had 

experienced repeated schedule delays and technical problems since its inception in 1996, and 
MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

because its operating concept was not adequately defined. Plans for a second ABL aircraft were 

canceled, and the existing ABL aircraft—a highly modified 747 transport—was retained but 

shifted to a technology demonstration program. The Department is examining the implications 

of retaining the current ABL aircraft as a high-energy laser research test bed. 

Cost control is an important aspect of cost-effectiveness. MDA is subject to existing DoD-wide 

programming and budgeting oversight processes, and MDA programs are reviewed and compete 

equally in the annual Program Planning Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. This practice 

is reflected in the September 2008 decision to adopt the Ballistic Missile Defense Life Cycle 

Management Process. This topic is taken up in further detail in the following section on 

oversight, but the main point is clear: in the view of DoD, the Life Cycle Management Process is 

functioning well to identify requirements, allocate resources, and provide departmental insight to 

control costs, and it should be maintained. 

Internal DoD Oversight 

Congress has posed multiple questions regarding oversight 

of the missile defense program that reflect different 

concerns about the acquisition and requirements processes, 

among others. Some historical context is useful for 

defining the issues. 

Reacting to heightened concern about missile 

proliferation, in 2002 then-Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld redefined some of the roles of the newly 

renamed Missile Defense Agency and streamlined its 

oversight and reporting processes. MDA was exempted 

from DoD’s standard acquisitions rules and requirements 

generation process. This decision reflected the then broad 

consensus within DoD’s leadership that the rapid 

development of capability was an urgent priority and, 

further, that there was need for a centralized approach to 

the management and oversight of the missile defense 

program in the context of special authorities. It establishes 

business rules, and it facilitates the transition of 

developmental capabilities to operational status. 

This approach, while successful in developing deployable capabilities, also generated some 

challenges. The Military Departments were generally not closely involved in determining 

requirements or in the development process. As BMDS elements approached technical maturity, 

THE INTEGRATED MASTER TEST

PLAN. IMTP is a key planning document 

for the Missile Defense Agency’s test 

program, which provides critical data to 

demonstrate the performance of ballistic 

missile defenses. Ground and flight tests 

demonstrate and assess system capabilities 

and provide data for advanced modeling 

and simulation activities that measure and 

predict the performance of all missile 

defense technologies.
MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

this lack of engagement worked against orderly transition of capabilities from MDA to the 

Services, blurring responsibilities for operation and support and for budget formulation and 

execution. 

As noted above, an initial step was taken to address these and some related oversight challenges in 

March 2007 with the creation of the Missile Defense Executive Board. The MDEB is chaired by 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [AT&L]), and its 

membership includes representatives from USD (Policy); USD (Intelligence); Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation; the Joint Staff; the Department of State; the Military Departments; 

U.S. Strategic Command; DOT&E; the Director, Defense Research and Engineering; and 

MDA. Advisers now include USD (Comptroller); Commander, U.S. Northern Command; and 

the National Security Staff. The board provides oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode. 

The board’s work on requirements is supplemented by the work of the Warfighter Involvement 

Process, which is chaired by USSTRATCOM. One of the tasks of this group is to assess force 

structure and inventory requirements. The MDEB is supported by four committees: Program, 

Acquisition, and Budget Development; Policy; Test and Evaluation; and Operational Forces. 

Together, they provide the opportunity for the Department to review a broad spectrum of 

program topics in detail. 

The MDEB also oversees the BMDS Lifecycle Management Process described in the preceding 

section and recommends to the Department’s leadership a strategic program plan and associated 

funding strategy. The process manages missile defense as a comprehensive portfolio, following a 

recommendation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. This approach helps ensure a proper 

balance among different funding demands. It clarifies the roles of stakeholders in determining the 

program plan and budget. It establishes business rules. And it facilitates the transition of 

developmental capabilities to operational status. 

Within DoD, the MDA budget now moves through the following steps. First, initial direction 

for the development of the missile defense program plan and budget is provided by the 

Department’s leadership through the National Defense Strategy, Guidance for the Development 

of the Force, and departmental fiscal guidance. Warfighter and Military Departments then lead 

the development of required capabilities as well as requests for specific operational elements and 

amounts for operational support. MDA—with USD(AT&L), USD (Comptroller), 

USSTRATCOM, and the Military Departments—then develops a draft program plan and a 

budget. The program plan and budget are next presented to the MDEB for review, endorsement, 

and forwarding to the Deputy Secretary for final approval. Last, MDA’s program and budget are 

tracked through multiple reviews by the MDEB for compliance during the execution year. 

This review of this oversight process has come to the following main conclusions. 
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First, the approach adopted in 2007 has effectively addressed the concerns then evident about 

Service involvement and capability transition. The Services are now involved in the process of 

setting requirements for capabilities and support, monitoring the development of capabilities, 

and working through their components with the combatant commands to flow capability into 

the force. Indeed, all of the stakeholders in future BMD capabilities are closely engaged in the 

oversight of the developmental process. Since March 2007, the MDEB has engaged with and has 

directed or endorsed a number of Military Department–specific topics, including Terminal High 

Altitude Area Defense Transition Readiness, Joint Capability Mix Study recommendations for 

acquiring additional THAAD and standard missiles, formulation and execution of the BMDS 

Life Cycle Management Process, and Lead Military Department decisions for the original BMDS 

elements. Frequent MDEB meetings and the variety of topics presented for review and 

deliberation have resulted in departmental decisions on planning, development, and transition 

from element development to Military Department operation. The MDEB is well positioned to 

oversee and direct the efforts to execute the Administration’s direction on the new capabilities to 

be established by the development of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. 

Second, there would be no benefit in bringing MDA into JCIDS or the full DoD 5000 

acquisition reporting processes at this time. The current approach functions well to define 

requirements and acquire needed capabilities in a timely fashion. The MDEB is convened a 

minimum of six times each year, allowing senior Department leadership almost continuous 

insight and involvement in Missile Defense Agency issues, decisions, and planning. The four 

committees supporting the MDEB also meet numerous times each year and provide further 

opportunities for the Department to examine and discuss Missile Defense issues and plans in 

detail. 

Over the past two and a half years, the MDEB has reviewed and made decisions on requirements 

and acquisitions in areas including budget preparation and execution reviews; Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty target alternatives; air-launched target options; missions, roles, and structures 

of the Missile Defense Agency; Missile Defense Policy Guidance; and Warfighter Prioritized 

Capability List input to system requirements. 

Third, there is benefit in continued innovation in managing the missile defense program. A 

further, supplemental step can be taken to improve the integration of Service and MDA program 

and systems engineering. The Department has determined that it would be useful to transition to 

MDA/Service program offices to ensure that missile defense systems are not only developed 

through MDA’s highly integrated systems engineering process but also meet the doctrine, 

organizational, training, leadership, personnel, and facility needs of the Services. These “hybrid” 

program offices are intended to develop missile defense systems that are fully interoperable and 

thus leverage all the capabilities of the “network-centric” ballistic missile defense system, while 
MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

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Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report 

being operationally effective, suitable, and survivable within each Service’s force structure. The 

initial hybrid program office for the Sea-Based X-band radar (SBX) was established in 2008. The 

THAAD and AN/TPY-2 hybrid program offices are due to become a reality in 2010. Other 

hybrid program offices are in the planning stages. 

An additional measure of Department oversight is represented by the planned MDEB reviews of 

the BMDS elements. For example, USD(AT&L) chaired an MDEB in November 2008 to 

conduct a comprehensive review of the THAAD program’s progress and readiness for warfighter 

operation, with the intent to assess the program’s progress before awarding a THAAD hardware 

contract. The review successfully provided detailed information needed for the MDEB to 

endorse THAAD acquisition plans. Such element reviews will be undertaken whenever the 

Missile Defense Agency prepares to add to the missile defense inventory. Plans are in place for 

the next review, involving the AEGIS BMD program element. These reviews enable detailed 

departmental oversight and provide the flexibility for adjustments to a system composed of 

multiple systems. 

External Transparency 

The special responsibilities granted to MDA in 

2002 left concerns about congressional oversight 

and the adequacy of the external transparency 

provided by the Department on its missile defense 

programs, priorities, and commitments. This 

report is intended in part to signal the 

commitment of the Administration to full 

transparency and to informed national and 

international discussion and debate on these topics. 

It reflects the ongoing high-level engagement of 

Department leadership in communicating with 

Congress about the missile defense program. 

One illustration of this engagement is the unusual 

intensity of the Department’s reporting to Congress 

on this particular topic. MDA, the Military 

Departments, and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense are engaged in a sustained effort to keep members of Congress, the relevant committees, 

and interested staff informed about policies and priorities. In the budget process, this begins with 

detailed reports on program content typical of all major acquisition programs. (As these budgets 

shift from mostly research, development, test, and evaluation to a mix of RDT&E and 

procurement, military construction, and operations and maintenance, external transparency will 

THAAD FLIGHT TEST. White Sands, NM.

Successful test of the Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense system at the White Sands Missile Range. 

The launch was an integrated flight test of THAAD 

components, including the launcher, radar, fire 

control and communications and interceptor. 
MANAGING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 

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be further enhanced.) But there is much more. MDA produces numerous reports on areas of 

particular interest to Congress, usually between six and ten per year. MDA and DoD have also 

supported congressionally commissioned studies carried out by the Government Accountability 

Office—more than 20 in-depth studies since 2002. Congress has also commissioned 

independent studies of the agency and of emerging capabilities, and the Department has helped 

facilitate these as well. 

From the Department’s perspective, this is a very high degree of transparency and meets the 

needs of legislative oversight. DoD welcomes sustained and substantive executive-legislative 

discussion of the nation’s missile defense agenda. 

 
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CONCLUSION 

Under the direction of the President and in accordance with congressional legislation, the 

Department has conducted a comprehensive review of U.S. missile defense policies, strategies, 

plans and programs. 

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review has taken a broad view. It has surveyed the spectrum of 

threat capabilities and possible intent. It has assessed the current state and potential growth of 

U.S. BMD technical capabilities. It has considered opportunities for cooperation with allies and 

partners in missile defense. It has considered the underlying technical, organizational, and 

programmatic structure of U.S. missile defense. The result is a refocused policy and a 

comprehensive strategy to improve our missile defenses. 

The key policy priorities set out earlier are to 

 Defend the United States homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack; 

 Defend against existing regional missile threats to U.S. forces while protecting our allies 

and partners and enabling them to defend themselves; 

 Test our developing capabilities to ensure that they can reliably and effectively help U.S. 

forces accomplish their mission; 

 Develop and field BMD capability that is fiscally sustainable over the long term; 

 Base BMD planning on reasonable judgments about current and prospective threats to the 

United States and its allies and ensure that capabilities are adaptable; and 

 Seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense with allies and partners that 

will provide pragmatic, cost-effective capability. 

The review determined that the United States possesses sufficient capability to defend the 

homeland against a ballistic missile attack from states such as North Korea or Iran for the 

foreseeable future. Moreover, it identified steps that will strengthen homeland defense in the 

years ahead. The advent of new sensor capabilities and the development of a comprehensive 

integrated plan for testing and evaluation will better enable us to understand, employ, and 

further improve BMD capabilities. 

One of the most significant changes resulting from the review has been the decision to pursue 

regional phased adaptive approaches that are tailored to the threats facing each region, the 

capabilities available, and the technologies best suited for deployment. These phased adaptive 
CONCLUSION 

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approaches comprise many components and are not limited to European defense, though to date 

the European Phased Adaptive Approach has received the most attention. 

Phased adaptive approaches will enable a flexible, scalable response to BMD threats around the 

world by incorporating new technologies quickly and cost-effectively and by maintaining a focus 

on current threat assessments. These approaches will provide warfighters with the BMD 

capabilities required now, while also maintaining the flexibility necessary to respond to new 

threats as they materialize. In addition, such approaches will provide a number of additional 

opportunities to create interoperable and shared missile defenses with BMD allies and partners. 

The combined effort will be a substantial improvement in regional deterrence and defense 

architectures. 

The review has also conducted a thorough assessment of the organizational and programmatic 

structure for the development, fielding, operation, and maintenance of BMD capability. The 

current structure, as recently revised, appears to be working well. With each budget cycle the 

process will be improved. The report addresses some actions and identifies areas for further study 

regarding specific smaller aspects of the process. Departmental efforts subsequent to the review 

are already beginning or will be initiated in the near term. These include comprehensive planning 

for the management of missile defense forces and elements on both a global and regional basis 

across the combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility, as well as the alignment of emerging 

capabilities and systems with individual Services for training, manning, deployment, and 

sustainment. These actions will be enacted in consultation with Congress and officials within the 

executive branch. We look forward to making progress on those areas as soon as possible. 

Throughout the review the efforts of all the participants within DoD and across the interagency 

have been focused on the interaction of the many different factors—strategy, tactics, technology, 

force capability, fiscal requirements, and international engagement—that are essential to 

providing effective ballistic missile defense. This review, by enabling us to consider all of these 

challenges and opportunities in a comprehensive manner, will result in an enhanced defense of 

the United States and its forces, allies, and partners from the danger of ballistic missiles wherever 

and whenever they threaten us.