### ocW

## No. S 

### WO22

A~usta Westla rod 

### comments & 

### the FAA 

### SAR Modes 

## 8-q dih

Foreword Theporhrhons ofthe FX.4 Special Conditionare in red characters. Agusta W~thnd conwnents are in black characters

(a) 

### SIR F@hf 

### rf. TIpe 

### mpbd 

### SIR mht 

### rn- rnmtpmw:

This requirement sounds 

### like a request 

### for a

### mode that

### is 

### similar to what 

### is provided in case ofan 

### aborted 

### ILS approach. Any way some clarification 

### is required Does this mode autdcallyengage in case of 

### an dmrtedtransitionto Hover or 

### should it 

### be ~dly engagedby the pilot? 

### If it 

### needs to 

### be mually engaged, what 

### is the 

### difference with respect to 

### what is required 

### in the previous point (2) 7 

### Should this mode perform 

### an automatic ascent and 

### accelerationto 

### an D?R 

### flight condition or 

### should itjust disengage any 

### coupled Flight Director 

### mode ? 

### Shouldthe 

### mode 

### be made 

### available only during automatictransition to Hover (i.e., Transition Down, Mark On Target) 

### or should it 

### be available 

### in any flight 

### condition with AFCS SAR mode engaged 

### (Transition to 

### Elover, Hover, Departure 

### fkom Hover, Low Height Cruise flight, Search Pattern LNAV coupling) ? For 

### which 

### SAR system 

### failure 

### should the Go

### Around 

### mode 

### tnade available?

AW 

### does not 

### concur with arequirement for a function that possibly perform an_autdc ascent in
case 

### of a 

### detected Mure.This 

### could be even an unsafe maneuver during Hover 

### while operating 

### on the winch. What has 

### been specified in the EASA CRI B-03 "The automaticcollective control 

### should provide a 

### high integrity 

### function tkatjlia up whenever a 

### SAR made is coup2ed and the aimraft is below the 

### minimumsrcjety height, ifnee& to sati& thefbrlwe 

### demo~'m 

### in $ 

### G, 2. 

### Theminimum 

### height must not re& on crew setting 

### on&" 

### is a more generic requirement 

### that mes the safety aspects 

### induced by SAR operatimi at 

### low 

### height.

Those requirements 

### should 

### be better 

### clarified. Are the pilot-selected heading, 

### l&uW 

### and lateral ground 

### speeds the sensor 

### variables used 

### by the AFCS 

### or are they the pilot 

### selectedheading 

### taad ground 

### speed references ? 

### Shouldn't

### bath the sensorvariables 

### and the 

### AFCS rnoderefhence6 

### be to 

### the crew?Why should the wind indication 

### be available only when the autmdc

### modes are engaged, or 

### tmmitiming &om 

### om mode to 

### another ? Wind 

### information 

### should be made available, hdqmdently 

### fromany AFCS engagedmode, at the beginning ofthe transitionbm cruise to 

### hover.

(3) 

### Foranyshgkp 

### &/irm army mmbhahim 

### uf~ilums OlCUlie

AC 29-1329 

### d (5)

### explains how the deviations 

### caused

### by a 

### mdfunctiw should 

### be evaluated during

an 

### ILS approach. The requirementprofi~Wg 

### &viation morethan a specific 

### threshold from

### the desired glide slope is based on the assumption that, within 

### that thshold, a sufficient margin still remains clear fiom 

### otrstructions. 

### The penetration 

### ofthe 

### region below the 

### specified 

### threshold would 

### result 

### in the 

### erosion 

### ofthe safety margin 

### and eventually m a catastrophic event 

### ic when the mrargin is completely 

### eroded, an okhuction 

### is present. When between the 

### specifiedthreshold and 

### the obstructionlterrain,the condition 

### should be considered (not more h) 

### hazardous 

### due to a "large reduction 

### in safety margins." Specifying that 

### half

### ofthe 

### MUH ofa 

### particularAFCS mode must 

### not 

### be exceeded 

### implies that the remaining

### halfprovi&s 

### the sufficientsafety margin 

### clear l?om

### obtmctim.The condition

### becomes potentially catastrophic 

### only if, 

### due to 

### amalfunction, the entire height is lost 

### and the slrrface 

### is reached Therefore the above paragraph should

### be modified m away that the 

### fail- that 

### are not shown to 

### be extremely remote (a sa&y objective 

### for hazardous 

### failures) must not result 

### in a 

### loss 

### ofheight that is greater than 

### half ofthe MUH 

### with a 

### minimum 

### of 15 

### feet above 

### the 

### surface.

(4) A 

### &w/ure Mr'6n 

### fiat 13

### rwtshow 

### fo be 

### twtnwnw irn- 

### musi h



### (i-g-, wwews 

### &a h andhis 

### of 

### fhe rrrdib 

### whirnew 

### -, btxd4rg, and

The in-£light 

### demonmation 

### of failures 

### should be required only for failures that cannot

### be shown to 

### h extremely remote. This rsquirerrmt, with 

### respect to what 

### is specified in the 

### aboveparagraphs, would provide some deviation for the db&on flight didation. This should 

### be allowed 

### in ~idedon

### that 

### SARmissions are 

### normally conducted

### by trained pilots and, once 

### the mission

### has begun, 

### they should 

### b able to complete

### the mission 

### even 

### aRer some malfunction 

### has occurred in flight. In particular, 

### due to the considerablecrew workload that a SARmission ndly reqd, it is 

### considered important to pentnit coupling ofthe 

### Flight Director

### modes even aRer a malfunction, affecting 

### the

### AFCS (e.g.

### loss of one autopilot 

### channel), has occurred 

### The reddon ofpilot 

### workload provided 

### by a coupled

### Flight Director

### would 

### considerably reduce the 

### risk of inadvertent dot 

### operation, a hefit

### that should 

### be considered in comparison to the probability 

### of "an mtremely remote" 

### failure.

AgusbWcstW 

## - Italy