Report of the

Defense Science Board Task Force

on

OPTIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF THE ADVANCED

TARGETING POD AND ADVANCED TARGETING

FLIR POD (ATP/ATFLIR)

February 2001

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquisition, Technology & Logistics

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The

DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide

independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements,

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not

necessarily represent to official position of the Department of

Defense.

This report is unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,

TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Options for Acquisition

of the Advanced Targeting Pod and Advanced Targeting FLIR Pod (ATP/ATFLIR)

I am pleased to forward the final report of the DSB Task Force on Options for Acquisition of the

Advanced Targeting Pod and Advanced Targeting FLIR Pod. This study, chaired by Mr. Walter

Morrow, was established to assess the options for acquisition of third generation Forward Looking

Infrared (FLIR) targeting pods for the Air Force and the Navy.

In their report, the Task Force recommends that the Department continues with both the Navy’s

ATFLIR program and the Air Force ATP program as currently planned since it offers the most expeditious

and cost-effective option to fielding a much needed capability.

I endorse all of the Task Force’s recommendations and propose you review the Task Force

Craig I. Fields

Chairman
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................. 2

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................ 1

II. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................... 2

III. FINDINGS.................................................................................................................................. 2

IV. RECOMMENDATION.............................................................................................................. 12

APPENDICES

A. Terms of Reference

B. Congressional Language

C. Task Force Member Biographies
iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) requested that the DSB form a brief study of

ongoing Navy and Air Force programs aimed at developing advanced laser guided weapon

targeting pods for their tactical aircraft. This request for a DSB Task Force was occasioned by

Congressional interest in the possibilities of a Joint development and production program for

these pods.

Current targeting pods are inadequate because improved enemy low altitude air

defenses have forced tactical aircraft to operate at significantly higher altitudes. As a result,

both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have declared that

obtaining an advanced targeting pod for the current Navy, Marine, and Air Force tactical air

fleets is an extremely urgent matter.

FINDINGS

A. The Navy Advanced Targeting FLIR (ATFLIR) Program, which was initiated in 1997,

is progressing well and should successfully meet Navy requirements for a high altitude targeting

system for laser guided weapons. The recent extension of the development schedule back to

the original schedule should permit the reduction of the angular jitter by the factor of two thus

meeting the requirement. All other requirements are anticipated to being met. 

B. The recently initiated Air Force Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP) Program plans

competitively to contract for advanced targeting pods as non-development items (NDI). The

Task Force believes that there is some risk that this approach may not meet Air Force needs.

 Modifying these NDI designs to meet Air Force needs may require development efforts

requiring additional time and expense.

C. The option of a Joint Program employing the Navy ATFLIR design may result in a

protest by the competitors for the Air Force ATP Program. In addition, a redesign of the Navy

version to accommodate Air Force needs for an in-pod cooling system may result in a pod that

is too large for F18 carrier operations. Thus, two physically different designs may be needed
iv

D. adding to the costs of a joint program compared with separate programs. Such a

joint program will very likely delay either service obtaining this badly needed capability by up to

two years, since joint requirements will have to be negotiated and a new contract let. Finally,

such a joint program could result in a lack of future competition for such pods with resulting

higher costs. 

E. The option of a Joint Program employing the Air Force ATP Program will require

termination of the Navy ATFLIR Program with resulting costs and perhaps a protest by the

contractor. This approach will also result in significant delays while a joint requirement is

negotiated, and a new contract negotiated. As discussed above, two pod configurations will

likely have to be developed resulting in additional costs that would likely offset the cost savings

of a larger production run. 

F. The option of continuing the current ATFLIR and ATP programs will result in the least

delay in obtaining this badly need capability for the Services tactical air forces; will probably be

least costly; and will maintain industrial competition thus minimizing long term costs as well as

maintain a strong technology base.

RECOMMENDATION

The Task Force recommends that the Department should continue with the current

ATFLIR and ATP targeting pod programs for the following reasons:

A. Because the pods for the F16 and F18 will be substantially different 

configurations, the cost of separate designs will very likely more than offset any savings due

to a doubling of the total quantity of pods procured.

B. The current pod programs are the fastest way to obtain high altitude targeting of

laser guided weapons, an urgently needed capability because of improved enemy air

defenses. Either of the Joint options will require substantial delays to negotiate joint

requirements, renegotiate contracts.

C. Pursuing both Programs is also the only option that will maintain competition; thus

preserving a strong technology and production base as well as achieving minimum costs in the

long term.
1

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Origin

The Under Secretary of Defense requested that the Defense Science Board form a

brief study of developments by both the Navy and the Air Force of third generation forward

looking infrared (FLIR) aircraft sensor systems. 

This study was in response to Congressional concerns about a possible duplication

of efforts including the issue of potential cost savings through a Joint development.

B. Tasking

The Task Force was asked to make recommendations for the preferred procurement

option given consideration of technical feasibility, schedule, and life cycle costs. At a minimum

the Task Force was asked to consider the following options:

1. The existing Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) Navy

program would continue and would be the Joint program for both services.

2. The Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP) Air Force program would be competed

and the winner would be the basis for a Joint program.

3. Both programs would proceed as planned (status quo).

A complete text of the Terms of Reference for the Task Force is contained in Appendix

A. Relevant Congressional language from the Report of the FY2001 Defense Appropriations

Bill is contained in Appendix B.

The Study was sponsored by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).

 C. Membership

The Task Force membership consisted of three individuals as follows:

(1) Walter E. Morrow - Director Emeritus, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Chair

(2) Lawrence A. Skantze, General USAF (Ret)

(3) Richard D. Friichtenicht, Rear Admiral USN (Ret)

Biographies of the Task Force Members are contained in Appendix C. The Executive

Secretary of the Task Force was Navy Captain Richard O. McHarg of the OSD Air Warfare

Office. Support from the Defense Science Board was provided by Air Force LtCol Tony Yang.
2

 D. Briefings

 Briefings were heard by the Task Force from:

(1) The OSD Air Warfare Office

(2) The Navy ATFLIR Program Office

(3) The Air Force ATP Office

(4) The OSD Cost Estimating Office

II. BACKGROUND

Laser guided precision air to surface weapons have been used since the South

East Asia conflict in the early 1970's. These weapons provided a quantum step in the kill

probabilities of strike warfare against military targets compared with the earlier unguided

gravity dropped weapons. 

In order to provide day and night targeting for laser guided weapons, forward

looking infrared (FLIR) targeting systems such as the LANTIRN have been used for more

than two decades against ground military targets. The initial targeting systems were

designed for operation from low altitudes and ranges because of limitations in the

resolution of the sensors and in the intensity of the lasers used for guidance of the

weapons. These systems produced a revolution in strike air warfare, in that they allowed

for the first time, precision day and night air strikes against small military targets; subject, of

course, to the presence of clear weather.

In addition, over the past few decades enormous improvements in the technology of

infrared sensors and the power of miniature lasers have occurred as the result of investments

by the DoD for other purposes. These developments will be further discussed below.

III. FINDINGS

A. Air Strike Operations

1. Precision Strike Is Vital To U.S. Military Tactical Air Forces

The ability to deliver precision weapons has become vital to U.S. Navy and Air

Force tactical air forces for two reasons:
3

- It is U.S. and allied policy to minimize collateral damage to civilian facilities and

personnel located near military targets.

- The military services do not have enough tactical air resources to achieve

success against strike objectives using conventional gravity bombing.

2. Strike Air Operations Have Been Forced to Significantly Higher Altitudes

As a result of tactical air strike experiences in the Persian Gulf War of 1990, the

continuing Northern and Southern Watches, the Bosnian Theater, and in Kosovo, U.S. tactical

air forces have been forced to operate at two to four times higher altitudes and ranges in order

to avoid vulnerability due to an enemy mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems which have

proved difficult to destroy due to their mobility and intermittent operation.

3. Older Precision Weapon Targeting Systems Have Become Inadequate

Due to the forced increases in altitude and range of strike air attack, the sensitivity and

resolution of the older infrared imagers as well as the power of the targeting lasers have

become inadequate, leading to much lower kill probabilities. The advent of Global Positioning

System guided weapons does not solve this problem because of the difficulty of obtaining

timely precision targeting information for mobile military targets.

4. Upgrading Current Tactical Air Fleets Has Become Vital

The current Navy, Marine and Air Force tactical air fleets can be expected to remain

operational for as much as two decades longer, even if the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),

which incorporates an advanced precision targeting system, stays on its present schedule.

 In addition, future funding constraints on the JSF may result in current aircraft remaining in

the active inventory even longer. This possibility reinforces the concern of both the Chief of

Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that obtaining an advanced

targeting pod for the current Navy, Marine, and Air Force tactical air fleets is an extremely

urgent matter.

B. Advanced Technology Developments Make Possible Improved

Targeting Systems

The principal technologies that determine the effectiveness of precision targeting
4

systems are the sensitivity and resolution of the infrared imaging sensor, the power of the laser

designator, and the minimization of the angular jitter of the sensor / laser line of sight.

1. Infrared Imagers

Because of technology limitations, the early infrared imagers used a one dimension

linear array, of infrared individual sensors, which was scanned over the focal plane of the

sensor. This technology limited the sensitivity of the sensor because of the low duty cycle

(0.01) of the individual sensors on any single point in the focal plane. In recent years, as the

result of DoD and industry investments, the technology of infrared focal planes has advanced

to where two dimensional arrays of up to approximately 500 by 500 pixels of individual high

sensitivity detectors can be fabricated. This enhances the sensitivity of the sensors by one to

two orders of magnitude thus providing the needed additional range capability.

2. Laser Designators

Early laser designators employed high voltage flash lamps to pump YAG lasers. These

devices had relatively low power and also suffered from high voltage breakdown at high

altitudes. As the result of development in the 1980's, low voltage laser diode pumping was

developed resulting in the ability to develop much higher powers in miniature lasers as well as

eliminating the high voltage breakdown problem.

3. Angular Jitter

At the longer ranges that are now needed, the angular jitter of the sensor and laser

aiming must be reduced by a factor of two to four. Improved vibration isolation systems have

been developed in recent years to make this possible.

4. Automatic Target Acquisition and Boresighting

Advances in automatic target acquisition and boresighting techniques have improved

acquisition and identification of targets as well as improving the precision of weapon

targeting.

C. Current Service Programs for Advanced Targeting Systems

1. Navy Advanced Targeting FLIR Program (F18 C, D, E, F)

Because of an urgent need, the U.S. Navy in 1997 held a competition and awarded a
5

contract for the development of a next generation targeting FLIR and laser designator system.

 This upgraded targeting pod is designed to replace the Loral Nite Hawk pod on both U.S.

Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. The then CNO instructed the Program Office to shorten the

schedule by one year. Because of technical development difficulties, the schedule has had

to be pushed back one year to the original dates. The current schedule is shown below.

• Schedule

- Development Contract Awarded: 1997

- First Development Pod Delivery: 1999

- First Production Pod Scheduled: 2002

- OT&E (TechEval/OpEval): June 2002

- F18 ATFLIR First Deployment: June 2002

- Full Rate Production: May 2003

• Performance

The numerical performance values for the ATFLIR vs. earlier targeting pods are

classified. However, performance values relative to early targeting systems are unclassified.

 The most significant difference is its ability to detect and discriminate targets at altitudes and

ranges that are approximately double that of the AF LANTIRN and four times that of the Navy

and Marine Nite Hawk. In addition, ATFLIR laser designation range for the GBU-24 is

substantially greater than that of either the LANTIRN or the Nite Hawk. The Task Force

was shown side by side video comparisons of military target imagery from the ATFLIR and

LANTIRN pods. Target recognition improvement due to a 10:1 increase in the number of

pixels in the image was immediately evident. 

The following unclassified chart indicates the ATFLIR performance as compared

with the current LANTIRN and Nite Hawk systems in relative terms. 
6

 

• Current Cost Estimates

Projected RDT&E Costs: $247 M

Estimated Production Costs: $1790 M

No. Pods: 574

Estimated Initial Cost per Pod: $3.1 M

The Task Force finds that the current ATFLIR Program is now proceeding with

minimum risk and high confidence thus providing the Navy tactical air forces with a very

satisfactory targeting system for use at higher altitudes.

2. Air Force Advanced Targeting Pod Program (F16 Block 30, Block 50)

More recently, as the result of experiences in the 1990 Kosovo air war, the Air

Force formed a new Program Office tasked with the development of a new FLIR and laser

designator called the Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP). The Air Force plans to let a

competitive fixed price contract initially for approximately 12 pods with options for fixed

price subsequent awards at one year intervals. 

ATFLIR ORD Key

Performance

Parameters

ATFLIR ORD

Threshold

NITE HAWK

(AAS-38B)

Geo-Point Accuracy

for GPS weapons XX meters CEP 5%

Recognition Range

(Discrimination tank

vs. truck)

X Nautical Miles 25%

Laser Designation

Range (Continuous

lasing for GBU-24)

Y nm Release

Z nm Egress 77%

Reliability

(MFHBOMF) 40 hours 18 hours

Maintainability

(MCMTOMF) 1.5 hours 1.5 hours

Availability 90% 82%

LANTIRN Predicted

ATFLIR

10% 100%

Compliant

60% >100%

Compliant

90% 100%

Compliant

19 hours 41 hours

1.0 hours 1.2 hours

N/A 91%
7

As a risk reduction effort prior to release of the Request for Proposals (RFP), the Air

Force and the prospective competitors have conducted extensive joint flight test

demonstrations using existing Non-Development Item (NDI) pods and components. No

development funds are involved in the ATP program since each of the three competitors

claims to have the technology and development in hand and are therefore offering NDI

equipment.

• Schedule

No contract is in place. This is the Air Force planned schedule.

Contract Award: July 2001

First Pod Delivery: October 2001

OT&E: October 2001

Lot 2 Award: June 2002

First Deployment: October 2002

• Performance

The details of the ATP performance cannot be determined at this time because they

will depend on the contractor chosen. However, where the requirement is similar to that of

the ATFLIR, we anticipate that similar performance will be achieved. Based on that

assumption, the ATP pod should have a geopointing capability 10 times more accurate

than the LANTIRN with triple the recognition range and twice the resolution. Substantial

advances in the reliability and maintainability should also occur. 

The following chart indicates the expected initial performance as derived from

current contractor pods. As with the ATFLIR performance chart, classification limits

presentation of performance parameters to relative values.
8

• Estimated Costs

Because no ATP contract has yet been let, only Air Force estimated costs are

available. They are based on fixed price consecutive contracts at one year intervals with a

variable number of pods delivered each year depending on costs of performance

improvements as well as learning experience. 

RDT&E (Non-Developmental Item): $0 M

Estimated Production Costs Within FYDP: $260 M

Estimated Number Pods Within FYDP: 168

Estimated Average Cost per Pod: $1.5 M

Note that each pod in the first lot is estimated to cost about: $2.9 M

The Task Force believes that the state of technology supports the ATP Program, but

that significant adaptation and development funds may be required to convert the

contractor’s Non Development Item (NDI) targeting pods to the needs of Air Force. As a

result, the Task Force is concerned about potential schedule delays and development

costs inherent in such an approach.

The Task Force notes that, while not part of the Task Force’s charter, the Air Force

should look at the possibility of upgrading its LANTIRN pods, numbering more than 300, with

advanced infrared imagers, higher power lasers, and new data processors. 

ATP

Performance

Parameters

ATP ORD

Threshold

Geo-Point Accuracy

for GPS weapons XX meters CEP

FLIR Recognition Range

(50% Probability)

X+ Nautical Miles

Maintainability

(MTTR)

30 Minutes

Availability 92%

LANTIRN Predicted ATP

Performance

10% 100%

Compliant

35% 100%

Compliant

8 - 12 hours < 30 Minutes

89% 92%

 

 Laser Ranging

Reliability

(MTBF)

400 hours 79 hours » 400 hours

 Y+ Nautical Miles 45% 100%

Compliant
9

D. Independent Cost Estimates of the Three Procurement Options

In addition to the cost estimates of the ATFLIR and ATP Program Offices, independent

cost estimates were made by OSD cost experts. The results of their efforts are shown in the

table below. The accuracy of these estimates, compared with actual costs, is generally

agreed to be ±10% at best. 

The independent estimates indicate that the two Joint program options are more costly

than the total costs of the separate programs as estimated by the Program Offices and are,

at most, 6% less than the costs for the separate programs as estimated by the independent

analysts.

Furthermore, these Joint program costs do not take into account the potential costs of

protest should a Joint program be initiated at this point in the schedule of the ongoing ATFLIR

and ATP Programs.

ATFLIR

Program

Office

Estimate

ATP

Program

Office

Estimate

ATFLIR

Cost

Estimating

Team1

ATP

Cost

Estimating

Team2

Joint

ATFLIR3

Joint

ATP4

Joint

ATP5

R&D 75 0 75 0 75 90 176

Proc 1518 998 1518 1101 2481 2498 2498

O & S 1547 702 1547 1067

2442

2564 2564

T for C6

0 0 0 0 0 61 61

Total 4841 5308

4998

5213 5298

Savings 9% Baseline 6% 2% 0%

Notes:

1. The ATFLIR estimate does not account for concurrency of ATP pod production. The

ATFLIR estimate includes 70 more pods than the ATP estimate. 

2. The ATP AVDLR cost element (O&S) is based on ATFLIR estimating methodology.

3. No schedule delay or R&D costs associated with Joint ATFLIR based on USAF position

that Terminator has already been developed. Cost savings result from concurrent

production of pods.
10

4. Joint ORD will lead to two-year schedule delay for both services. USN incurs contractor

integration costs that are already sunk in ATFLIR. Contractor will receive existing R&D

funds in a Termination for Convenience scenario.

5. Same as Note 4. Also, contractor’s design warrants additional costs associated with

redesigning pod to fit on F/A-18 cheek station.

6. Costs of termination for convenience (T for C).

E. Pros and Cons of the Three Acquisition Options

In this section of the Findings, the Task Force evaluated the merits of the three

proposed acquisition options outlined in the Terms of Reference. Listed below are

summaries of the Task Forces Pros and Cons for each option.

Option 1: ATFLIR -led Joint Program

Pros

- A more mature program

- Results in a larger production run

- May result in cost savings because of

the larger production run

Cons

- Does not meet current Air Force design

requirements for internal cooling

- Likely to result in protest from ATP

competing contractors

- Will lead to substantial program delay

while joint requirements are determined

- Will result in a lack of competition which

will result in a narrowing of the industrial

base and have a negative impact of

future technology development

- Total cost of both programs will likely

increase thus off-setting the potential

savings of larger production runs
11

Option 2: ATP-led Joint Program

Option 3: Programs Proceed as Planned (Status Quo)

Pros

- Larger production runs

- Potential cost savings because

of competition and larger

production runs

Cons

- Will not meet current USN

requirements for length and diameter;

critical for F18 carrier operation

- Will severely delay introduction of this

critical capability to AF and Navy

forces (two year delay estimated)

- Protest and extra costs from ATFLIR

contractor because of “termination for

- Long term cost growth because of a

lack of competition

Pros

- Fastest way to get vital equipment

to the Navy and Air Force tactical

air forces

- Maintains industrial competition

and technology base

- Avoids protests and legal disputes

- Confidence in Navy Program

meeting its technical and schedule

goals

Cons

- Uncertainty that Air Force

dependence on Non-Development

Items will satisfy their needs without

additional development
12

IV. RECOMMENDATION

The Task Force recommends that the Department should continue with the current

ATFLIR and ATP targeting pod programs for the following reasons:

A. Because the pods for the F16 and F18 will have to be substantially different 

configurations, the cost of separate designs will very likely more than offset any savings due

to a doubling of the total quantity of pods procured .

B. The current pod programs are the fastest way to obtain high altitude targeting of

laser guided weapons, an urgently needed capability because of improved enemy air

defenses. Either of the Joint options will require substantial delays to negotiate joint

requirements, renegotiate contracts.

C. Pursuing both Programs is also the only option that will maintain competition,

preserve a strong technology and production base, as well as achieve minimum costs in the

long term
13

Appendix A

Terms of Reference


14

Appendix B

Congressional Language
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2001 House of Representatives Report of the Committee

on Appropriations -- Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Pages 127-128.

Miscellaneous Production Charges

The Air Force requested $398,474,000 for Miscellaneous Production Charges. The Committee

recommends $363,553,000, a reduction of $34,921,000. Two years ago, the Navy initiated a next

generation infrared targeting pod program called ATFLIR and, according to the Air Force, invited the

Air Force to participate as a joint partner. The Air Force declined at that time. Now, the Air Force

plans to procure its own next generation targeting pod, a potential billion dollar program. Though the Air

Force's requirements for a next generation pod are similar to the Navy's, the planned acquisition

strategy could lead the service to procure a completely different pod. The Committee is disappointed

that the Navy and Air Force cannot work more closely together to develop joint solutions to meet

similar requirements. Joint programs reduce costs through higher production rates, greater commonality

in software development, stand-up single vs. multiple depots, and more efficient spares procurements

and management as well as numerous other efficiencies. To ensure joint commonality in DoD’s next

generation targeting pods, the Committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the Commander In Chief of the Joint

Forces Command to review the Department's plans to acquire next generation targeting pods (including

pods that would be procured by Guard and Reserve components) to ensure the requirements and

acquisition approach appropriately promote joint commonality. The Committee directs the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the

Commander in Chief of the Joint Forces Command to report its findings and the steps taken to promote

joint commonality to the congressional defense committees no later than February 15, 2001. The

Committee fully supports Air Force acquisition of a next generation targeting pod, but will not stand by

and accept another lost opportunity for joint commonality. Accordingly, the Committee recommends no

funds for an Air Force Advanced Targeting Pod until these issues are resolved and the report directed

above is submitted.

FY0I Appropriations Conference Report, Page 200.

Advanced Targeting Pods

The Air Force requested $34,921,000 for the Advanced Targeting Pod program. The conferees agree

to provide this amount to the reporting requirements directed by the House. The conferees direct that of

the quantity of Advanced Targeting Pods procured with fiscal year 2001 appropriations, no less that 15

pods shall he assigned on a permanent basis to Air National Guard units deployed to Desert Storm

which have otherwise not been upgraded to perform the SEAD mission. The conferees further direct the

Air Force to implement its proposal to upgrade such units with F-16 Block 30 or better aircraft no later

than fiscal year 2003.
Appendix C

Task Force Member Biographies
WALTER E. MORROW, JR.

Walter E. Morrow, Jr. was born in Springfield, Massachusetts on 24 July 1928. He received the Bachelor of

Science and Master of Science degrees in Electrical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology in 1949 and 1951, respectively. As a graduate student, from June 1949 to February 1951, he was

a Research Assistant in the MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics.

In September 1951 Mr. Morrow joined the MIT Lincoln Laboratory as a staff member in the Long-Range

Communications Group. From 1951 until 1958 he was active in the early research and development in

ionospheric and tropospheric beyond-the-horizon communication techniques. From July 1955 to January 1964

he was the Leader of the Communications Systems Group. He was instrumental in creating the foundation of

the WEST FORD Program and guiding it through a successful experimental test. In February 1964 Mr. Morrow

was appointed Associate Head of the Communications Division and a member of the Lincoln Laboratory

Steering Committee, and in September 1966 he was appointed Head of that Division. In September 1968 he

was appointed Assistant Director of the Laboratory, and in January 1972 he became Associate Director. In April

1977 he was appointed Director of the Laboratory and in July 1977 he was appointed Professor of Electrical

Engineering at MIT.

Mr. Morrow retired from the Directorship of MIT Lincoln Laboratory on 30 June 1998. He is currently the Director

Emeritus of Lincoln Laboratory.

On 29 October 1963 MIT President Julius A. Stratton presented Mr. Morrow with an Award for Outstanding

Achievement. The award was given to Mr. Morrow "for his imaginative contribution to a new concept of

intercontinental microwave communication by means of orbiting metallic dipoles, and his skillful

persevering guidance of the research and development that translated the concept into a successful

experimental test."

Mr. Morrow is a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. He was Vice Chairman of the

IEEE Northeast Electronics Research and Engineering Meeting (NEREM) in 1968, Chairman of NEREM-69, and

Chairman of the NEREM Board of Directors in 1970. From 1976 to 1979 he was a member of the IEEE Energy

Committee. On 30 November 1976 the IEEE Communications Society presented Mr. Morrow with the Edwin

Howard Armstrong Achievement Award "in recognition of innovative contributions to space

communications." He was Chairman of the IEEE Technical Activities Board Technical Appraisal Committee

from 1977 to 1979.

In October 1969 Mr. Morrow was appointed Lincoln Laboratory representative to the MIT Standing Committee

on Special Laboratories. In January 1976 he was appointed to the MIT Department of Electrical Engineering

Area I Subcommittee on Communications. In April 1976 he was made a member of the MIT Solar Energy

Advisory committee. From 1964 to 1969 Mr. Morrow was a member of the DoD/NASA Technical Committee

on Communications Satellites. 

In May 1971 he was made a member of the CNO Industry Advisory Committee for Telecommunications (CIACT),

later known as the CNO C3 Advisory Committee and, in November 1972, a member of its Subcommittee on

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. In 1978 he became a member of the C3 Sub-Panel, now known

as the Force Enhancement Sub-Panel, of the CNO Executive Panel (CEP). He has served as a member of the

CEP since 1982. He was the co-chair of the CEP Naval Warfare Innovations Task Force from 1994-2000.

In September 1972 Mr. Morrow was appointed a member of the Applications Committee of the NASA Space

Systems and Technology Advisory Committee, NASA Advisory Council. During 1974-75 Mr. Morrow was a
Walter E. Morrow, Jr. Page 2

member of the USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) ad hoc Committee on Future Air Force Energy Needs

- Fuels and Systems. In December 1975 he was appointed to membership on the National Research Council

- Assembly of Engineering Space Applications Board, Committee on Satellite Communications; and in 1977

he became Chairman of its Air Force Studies Board Data Link Technology Panel. He was a member of the

Defense Communications Agency Scientific Advisory Group from January 1976 to December 1986. Mr. Morrow

was appointed a member of the USAF Scientific Advisory Board in 1978, and in 1980 became Chairman of its

Electronics Panel and continued to serve on the USAF/SAB until June 1984. In November 1985 he was

reappointed to membership on the USAF/SAB and served until 1989.

In 1983 Mr. Morrow was appointed a member of the Voice of America Radio Engineering Advisory Committee,

and in 1984 was appointed Chairman and served in that capacity through 1987, and as a member through 1989.

 Also in 1984 he was appointed a member of the American Physical Society Study on Directed Energy

Weapons.

He has served as a member of the Defense Science Board since 1987. In 1987-89 he served as a member of

the Technology Assessment Committee to the U.S. Space Command of the Air Force Studies Board,

Commission on Engineering and Tactical Systems. In 1988-89 he served as a member of the Editorial Board

of the Journal of Defense Research. 

In December 1991 he was appointed a member of the Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board.

In 1978 Mr. Morrow was elected a Fellow of the National Academy of Engineering.

In June 1980 Mr. Morrow received the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)

Medal of Merit Award.

In March 1995 the American Association of Engineering Societies awarded Mr. Morrow the 1995 National

Engineering Award "in recognition of an engineer whose career and accomplishments have particularly

benefitted humanity".

In May 1998 Mr. Morrow was awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.
LAWRENCE A. SKANTZE, GENERAL USAF (Ret)

INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE

Independent Consultant (1987-Present)

• Retained by several Commercial and Defense firms (Northrop Grumman; Raytheon: United

Technologies; Lockheed Martin; ORINCON; APTI. Modern Technologies (MTC) as a management

and strategic planning advisor, providing analysis and advice on program management and technology

investment to the CEO and COO levels.

• Fiduciary Board Membership: Vice Chair. Aerospace Corp; UNC Inc; Elbit Fort Worth (EFW);

ORINCON Corp: MTC, Logistic Management Institute (LMI); ADPA/NSIA, USO.

• Consultant to Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Science Board; National Academy of Science,

Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO).

• Regular contributor of commentaries on National Defense issues to weekly publication DEFENSE

NEWS.

MILITARY EXPERIENCE

Commander Air Force Systems Command (1984 - 1987)

• Managed an organization (325 major projects. 53,000 people, 167 facilities. 32 Billion annual budget)

with direct responsibility for strategy, budgeting, advocacy, and program execution for research,

development, test, and procurement of all new weapon systems and support equipment for the U.S.

Air Force.

Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (1983 - 1984)

• Acted as the principal deputy to the Chief of Staff, USAF in the management and guidance of all

functions of HQ U.S. Air Force in executing the day-to-day mission and operations of the Air Force.

Also acted as the primary interface with DoD, the Joint Chief of Staff, and Congress.

HIGHLIGHTS

Program Management

• Worked in planning and engineering positions on the Nuclear Powered Aircraft and Manned Orbiting

Laboratory Programs.

• Managed the development, procurement and deployment of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM).

Received the Air Force Association's Outstanding Management Award 1973.

• Managed the development. procurement. and deployment of the Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS). Received the Air Force Association's Theodore Von Karman Award for greatest

technical achievement.

LAWRENCE A. SKANTZE, GENERAL USAF (Ret) Page 2

Technology Investment

• Developed the technical investment strategy for the Air Force's Advanced Technology Fighter (ATF)

Program.
• Created a new Air Force Science and Technology ($1.8 Billion) annual budgeting strategy that

provided new stability to the annual funding process.

• Conceived, created, and directed PROJECT FORECAST 11 which synthesized the best Air Force

and Aerospace Industry thinking on the best technology and weapon system concept pursuits for the

21st Century States Air Force.

Corporate Business Strategy

• Created. articulated, and negotiated the Department of Defense two bomber program (B-1 & B-2)

and defended it before the Congress.

• Revised Air Force Acquisition strategy to place Product Assurance (Reliability, Maintainability,

Producibility and Quality) at a higher priority than system performance in awarding contracts.

• Formulated on an annual basis Air Force Acquisition Financial Strategy and Budgets, advocating and

defending the proposals through the Air Force and the Department of Defense.

ASSIGNMENT HISTORY

1984 - 1987 Commander, U.S. Air Force Systems Command

1983 - 1984 Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

1979 - 1992 Commander, USAF Aeronautical Systems Product Division

1977 - 1979 Deputy chief or staff, Systems, HO, Air Force Systems Command

1973 - 1977 Program Manager, USAF Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS)

1971 - 1973 Program Manager, USAF Short Range Attach Missile (SRAM)

1960 - 1971 Planning & Engineering assignments in a number of Air Force development programs

1953 - 1957 Flying assignments as a technical squadron pilot in South Korea and in the U.S.

EDUCATION

U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology, MS. (Nuclear Engineering) 1959

U.S. Naval Academy, B.S. (Electrical Engineering) 1952
RICHARD D. FRIICHTENICHT, RADM, USN (Ret)

Dick Friichtenicht is an Adjunct (Consultant) with the Operational Evaluation Division of

the Institute of Defense Analyses. As a member of the Tactical Air Systems team, he performs

evaluation and anaylsis in support of the office of the Director of Operational Test and

Evaluation (DOT&E) in its role of providing oversight of operational testing of major weapon

systems.

In addition. Dick is an Associate with Slay Enterprises, Incorporated (SEI) and

Burdeshaw Associates Limited (BAL). As an Associate. he performs consulting services for

major aerospace companies, including Boeing, Lockheed-Martin Northrup-Grumman, and

others.

Dick retired from the U.S. Navy in 1991 at the rank of Rear Admiral (0-8). At the time

of his retirement. he was Vice Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).

From 1984 to 1989. Rear Admiral Friichtenicht was the Deputy Commander for Programs at

NAVAIR. He also carried the titles of Acquisition Executive and Deputy for Operations. Dick

also had previous tours in NAVAIR in program management, engineering and research and

development.

Dick is a designated Naval Aviator, Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officer and Material

Acquisition Professional. He has a Masters Degree in Electronics Engineering from the U.S.

Naval Postgraduate School and an additional Masters in Systems Management from tile

University of Southern California.

Prior to specializing in acquisition, Dick had operational flying tours in electronic

intelligence collection (VP). photographic reconnaissance (VAP). and anti-submarine warfare

(VP). He has over 5000 pilot hours flying A-7, A-3, P-2, and other fixed wing aircraft.

His military awards include the Legion of Merit, Air Medal, Meritorious Service Medal

and Vietnam Service Medal.

Dick is a native Of Matherville, Illinois. He received his Bachelor of Science degree

from Western Illinois University and entered the Navy through the Officer Candidate School.

He and his wife Dixie now live in Alexandria Virginia.