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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-1780

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GEORGE THOMAS,

also known as GEORGE THOMAS EL

George Thomas,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-05-cr-00138-001

District Judge: The Honorable William H. Yohn

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 13, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 13, 2012)

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OPINION

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

George Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. A grand jury 
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returned an indictment in March of 2005, charging Thomas with two counts of 

bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. On July 19, 2005, when Thomas 

failed to appear for trial, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. A superseding 

indictment was returned in February of 2009, adding thirteen new charges: (1) one 

count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to commit an offense against the 

United States; (2) eleven counts of knowingly and unlawfully possessing, 

transferring, and using a means of identification of another person in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5), and aiding and abetting such conduct in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) one count of failing to appear for trial as required by the 

conditions of his release in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(1) and (b)(A)(ii). 

Thomas waived his right to a jury trial. On November 17, 2009, the District Court 

found him guilty of each of the fifteen counts in the superseding indictment. At 

sentencing, the District Court imposed, inter alia, a sentence on each count, 

yielding a total term of imprisonment of 138 months. 

Thomas, proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal.

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 The District 

Court granted a motion by defense counsel to withdraw. On appeal, we appointed 

new counsel to represent Thomas. Thereafter, Thomas moved to represent himself 

and filed a waiver of counsel. In light of Thomas‟s waiver of counsel, we granted 

his motion. At our direction, Thomas‟s discharged counsel mailed him transcripts 

 

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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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of the District Court proceedings. When Thomas failed to file a brief and 

appendix, we ordered him to show cause why his appeal should not be

administratively closed and gave him fourteen days to file his brief and appendix. 

He complied in part with this order, filing only a pro se brief of five pages.

Thomas identified the District Court‟s sentence as the order being appealed. 

We review a District Court‟s sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Thomas does not provide any basis for disturbing 

the District Court‟s sentence, which is within the guidelines range. Our review 

fails to reveal any basis for finding procedural or substantive error. 

Thomas‟s pro se brief also alleged prosecutorial misconduct by presenting 

the testimony of one of his coconspirators, Kesimu Clark, “who received a benefit 

from their testimony in the form of a sentence reduction.” Because Thomas has 

not demonstrated that this issue was preserved for appeal, we review for plain 

error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). “In order to 

demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct under a plain error standard, the review must 

reveal „egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of justice.‟” United States v. 

Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We find neither an 

error nor a miscarriage of justice in presenting Clark‟s testimony. See United 

States v. Hunte, 193 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that the 

government may promise “leniency to cooperating witnesses in exchange for 

truthful testimony”). 
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Thomas‟s pro se brief also asserted that a search of certain property was 

conducted without a warrant or consent. A review of the District Court docket 

fails to reveal that any motion to suppress was raised before trial. Accordingly, we 

conclude that Thomas waived any ground for suppressing evidence seized as a 

result of the search. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e); United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 

184 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that Rule 12(e) “governs motions to suppress 

evidence raised for the first time on appeal”).

Thomas took issue with the admission of evidence that was not “personally 

signed” and “sworn under penalty of perjury and legally notarized.” We are not 

aware of any such requirement. Furthermore, Thomas failed to provide any 

citation to the record. We are, therefore, unable to address his argument that the 

evidence was inadmissible and we deem it waived. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7) 

and (9)(A). 

Thomas also asserted that “since no „mala in se‟ crime has been committed 

. . . [he] should be immediately released.” In addition, he submitted that his 

appearance was induced by fraud. Without more, neither statement provides a

ground for setting aside his convictions for § 371 conspiracy, identity theft, bank 

fraud, and failure to appear for trial.

We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.