Defense Science Board

2004 Summer Study

on

Transition To and From

Hostilities

ISTM 0-- UT1 STATEMENT A

Approved for Public Release

Distribution Unlimited

Supporting Papers

January 2005

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

20051004 146
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide independent advice

to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and

recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of

the Department of Defense.

This report is unclassified.
Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE JOWMB//o. *9704-0l88

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions,earching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reductiun Pruject (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

I January 2005 Final Supporting Papers 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

Defense Science Board Study 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From

Hostilities

6. AUTHOR(S)

Dr. Craig I. Fields and Mr. Philip A. Odeen,

Task Force Co-Chairmen

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

Defense Science Board REPORT NUMBER

3140 Defense Pentagon, Room 3C553

Washington, DC 20301-3140

9. SPONSORINGIMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORINGIMONITORING

Defense Science Board AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

3140 Defense Pentagon, Room 3C553

Washington, DC 20301-3140

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

A: Open Distribution

0iSTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for Public Release

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) Diatribution ldU limitd

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

133

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRAC

OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified Unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) (EG) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 230.18 Designed using Perform Pro, WHSIDIOR, Oct 94
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on

Transition to and from Hostilities -Supporting Papers

I am pleased to forward the supporting material volume of the final report

of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from

Hostilities. This volume contains supporting papers on historical perspectives

and organizing for post-conflict operations. These papers provide in-depth

discussion of some of the issues that underlie the recommendations, offered

in the main report, for enhancing U.S. effectiveness in stabilization and

reconstruction operations.

I encourage you to review their report.

William Schneider, Jr.

Chairman
This page intentionally left blank.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on

Transition to and from Hostilities - Supporting Papers

The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from

Hostilities presented a vision for enhancing U.S. effectiveness across the

spectrum of activities from peacetime through stabilization and

reconstruction (S&R). That vision contained two dimensions.

The first dimension is management discipline. The task force believes that the

military services' approach to management, now focused on combat, must be

extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction

operations, and to intelligence -not only in DOD but across the government.

The second dimension is building and maintaining certain fundamental

capabilities, now lacking, that are critical to success in stabilization and

reconstruction. While management discipline is essential, it must be coupled

with certain fundamental capabilities that are critical to preparing for and

executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. These capabilities

include stabilization and reconstruction capabilities; strategic communication;

knowledge, understanding, and intelligence for the 21st century; and

identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare.

This supporting volume of our study provides in-depth discussion of a

number of areas fundamental to the aforementioned vision. Part 1 of the

report provides a historical perspective on postconflict operations that

illuminates a pattern of repeated failures in conducting such operations -a

pattern that underscores the importance of the recommendations found in

our main report.

The topics covered in part 2 include an effective process for governmentwide stabilization and reconstruction operations, how the Department of

State can be better empowered to support these operations, and how the

Department of Defense should enhance its capabilities for S&R operations.

Two additional reports also offer further analysis of important capabilities

addressed in this study: the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

Strategic Communications (September 2004) and the Report of the Defense Science

Board Task Force on Identification Technologies of the Future (forthcoming).
Craig I Fields, Co-chair

Philip A. Ofdeen, Co-chair
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS*

PART I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ..................................................... 3

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................... 3

Chapter 2:Panama Case Study: "Just Cause" and "Blind

L ogic". .......................................................................................... 7

Chapter 3: Israel in Lebanon 1982-2000 ...................................... 20

Chapter 4: French in Algeria ........................................................ 26

Chapter 5: Experiences Post WWI and WWII ........................... 33

Chapter 6: British Presence in Iraq and the Middle East,

1914-1922 .................................................................................. 41

Chapter 7: Post Reconstruction: The American Civil War ............ 53

Chapter 8: The Roman Experience ............................................. 59

Chapter 9: Lessons of History ...................................................... 63

PART II. POSTCONFLICT ACTIVITIES ..................... ............................ 83

Executive Sum m ary ....................................................................... 83

Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................. 93

Chapter 2. An Effective Process for Government-Wide

S&R O perations ....................................................................... 99

Chapter 3. Empower Department of State .................................... 107

Chapter 4. Enhance Department of Defense Capabilities

for S& R O perations ................................................................... 115

APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE .................................................... 127

APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE PANEL MEMBERSHIP ................................. 129

APPENDIX C: BRIEFINGS RECEIVED BY THE PANELS ............................. 132

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS ...................................................................... 133

* The supporting papers of the DSB Summer Study task force on Transition To and From

Hostilities contain material that was provided as inputs to the task force, but whose

findings and recommendations may not represent the consensus view of this task force.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS i
TABLE OF CONTENTS_

This page intentionally left blank.

ii DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
INTRODUCTION

PART I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Why Are Postconflict Operations Important?

" Object of postconflict operations: translate military

success into political success

- Only way to secure strategic goals

"* Failed postconflict operations overshadow military

success

- Crucial to overall long-term political impact of victory

"* Military victory only the first stage

Operation Just Cause

- French in Algeria 1960-1962

Failure of postconflict settlement of WWI

Union victory in American Civil War

Military victories are the stuff of history. Since Homer's account

of the fall of Troy, the acts of war - assaults, tactics, heroic deeds,

great battles won, and armies defeated - have captured the Western

world's imagination. Even military historians, who should know

better, have focused their attention on the conduct of war and left its

aftermath for others to account. Yet, as Clausewitz aptly pointed out

nearly two centuries ago, "War is not merely an act of policy but a

true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse,

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HoSTzLrrTES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 3
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

carried on with other means."1 Military success by itself is irrelevant.

Allied victory in World War I proved hollow indeed, because it failed

to remove the danger of another German effort to achieve European

hegemony. Throughout history, the military, political, economic, and

social efforts of the victorious powers in the period after conventional

hostilities have proven essential to achieving the political goals for

which wars have fought. Where postconflict operations have failed,

the result has inevitably been to seize defeat from the jaws of victory.

The past's dismal record suggests that nations and their military

organizations have consistently failed to execute postconflict

operations with the same enthusiasm and intelligence with which

they have conducted war. In fact, history suggests that failure rather

than success has characterized postconflict periods. This section

presents a number of case studies of postconflict operations, some of

which achieved success, but most of which failed. Success in such

operations has inevitably demanded clear objectives, an

understanding of the defeated and his culture, the commitment of

sizeable forces for extended periods of time, and above all, patience.

When conducted successfully, postconflict operations have removed

the tensions and causes of war. When they have failed, they have

opened the door to new conflicts.

This section includes the following illustrative case studies:

0 Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama (1989-1990)

* The French campaign in Algeria (1954-1962)

* Germany following the two world wars (1918-1933

and 1945-1954)

* The British experience in Iraq (1920-1932)

0 The American South following the Civil War (1864-

1877)

0 The Roman Empire (30 B.C.-235 A.D.)

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,

NJ 1976), 87.

4 _ ___DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
INTRODUCTION

Patterns of Postconflict Operations

Se E

Keys to Planning and Execution S 0 Z~

Realistic, long-term objectives

Understand the cultural and

historical context

provide sufficient military forces

Seem less transition between combat

and stability operations

Understand the need for postconflict

security

Understand enositions .o postconfrict ops (chaos)

Open, Integrated planning process

Senior officials involvedx in

p ostconflict planning

sufficient resources for ece planning

Central agency for postcm n m T a f c operations

1 Failure '-Success EI] ncomplete

The above chart presents the degree of success - or lack - of

planning and execution in a variety of historical cases of postconflict operations. Light gray represents success; dark gray failure. White

indicates gaps in the historical record. These case studies reflect a

general framework for postconflict operations. The pattern suggests

a less than impressive record - one that has not improved with time

or historical experience. Two modern examples, however, do stand

out: the occupation of Germany following the Second World War and

postcorfflict operations in Panama following JUST CAUSE.

While fighting the Second World War, U.S. and British policy

makers kept the precedent of Germany's behavior after the First

World War firmly in mind. Thus, planning for postconflict

operations began as early as 1942. Within the historical context, the

policy of "unconditional surrender" made good sense. This time the

Western Allies would bring defeat directly to the doorstep of the

German people; hence the policy of unconditional surrender.

TRANSITONS TO AND FROM HOSmTILTES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 5
HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVES

Postwar plans aimed at ensuring that the settlement would integrate

the German economy into the larger European-wide economy. We

will examine the full import of the postconflict planning for victory

over the Third Reich later in this section.

Operation JUST CAUSE, the American invasion of Panama in

1989, provides an all-too illustrative example of postconflict

operations that failed. U.S. planning for the reestablishment of a

coherent Panamanian government quite simply did not exist. The

fact that JUST CAUSE occurred 14 years before Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM is not an encouraging sign regarding the American

military's ability to learn, even from the recent past.

6 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
PANAMA CASE STUDY

CHAPTER 2:PANAMA CASE STUDY" "JUST CAUSE"AND

"BLIND LOGIC"

The Panama Case Study

Combat operations:

- Brilliant military plan

o Focused on overthrowing Noriega and Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)

- Excellent execution

"o Multidimensionality and simultaneity

"o Physical and psychological domains

- Good operational security

"o Noriega did not believe United States would invade

"o Caught Panamanians completely by surprise

- Troops adapted to unexpected conditions

- Overwhelming force used cleverly

The overthrow of Manuel Noriega's regime by U.S. military forces

during the course of a single night represented a brilliant operational

achievement. The military plan, code-named JUST CAUSE, focused

almost exclusively on the removal of Noriega's regime and with it the

criminal enterprises in which the Panama Defense Forces had

engaged. A multifaceted, simultaneous military operation broke

Panamanian resistance at the start. Despite indications that

Panamanian actions had deeply annoyed American leaders, Noriega

and his henchmen refused to believe that U.S. military action was

about to occur, which further contributed to their disorientation and

lack of preparedness when it came. By the morning of the first day of

military operations, Panama's military and government had

collapsed before the onslaught of U.S. military forces.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 7
HISTORIC4L PERSPECTIVES

Panama Case Study

Background to "Just Cause"

- Deteriorating situation over the course of the previous decade

"o Noriega regime deeply involved in drug trade

"o Pervasive corruption - collapse of legal system

"o Expansion of military (Panamanian Defense Force) control

Immediate provocations: killing of US Marine officer and physical abuse of a

U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife by the PDF

"This was the Panamanian political legacy. Missing was a

democratic tradition, a professional civil service, a nonpoliticized military, and a civil culture. For two decades,

Panama had a very different experience that was marked by

extra-legal, corrupt, and increasingly repressive military rule." I

Richard Schultz, 1993

1. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "The Post-conflict Use of Military Forces: Lessons From Panama,

1989-1991," The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16, no. 2, (June 1993).

Over the course of the 1980s, Panama had steadily sunk into a

morass of corruption and criminality. Its political and judicial

institutions had degenerated into vehicles for the support of criminal

activities: arms smuggling, money laundering, and the transshipment

of drugs from Colombia to the United States and Europe. All of these

activities were hallmarks of Noreiga's regime. Moreover, as the

dictator took an increasingly hostile stance against the United States,

it was clear that he was drawing closer to Fidel Castro. In effect,

Panama had become a state run by criminals - one which joyously

and confidently thumbed its nose at the United States. At the same

time, political pressure and efforts to launch a successful coup against

the Noriega government had both failed.

The straw that broke the camel's back occurred on December 15,

1989. On that day some of Noriega's thugs, members of the

Panamanian Defense Force, shot and killed U.S. Marine Lieutenant

Robert Paz at a checkpoint near the Panama Canal. Furthermore, the

Panamanian Defense Force arrested, assaulted, and then beat a U.S.

8 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
PANAMA CASE STUDY

Navy lieutenant and his wife, witnesses to the incident. President

George H. Bush regarded these incidents as unacceptable and

ordered U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to execute JUST

CAUSE, the planning for which had been ongoing for over a year.

TRANSrTIONS TO AND FROM HOSTIL7m7ES, SUPPORTING PAPERS_9
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Panama Case Study

Serious U.S. military planning began in early 1988

- Planning for military takedown of Noriega regime

"o Major focus of effort

"o Rehearsal codenamed "Blue Spoon"; operation designated "Just Cause"

"o XVIII Airborne Corps brought in to support SOUTHCOM's J-3

- Planning for post-combat operations

o Received little attention

o Codenamed "Krystal Ball" and then "Blind Logic"

o XVIII Airborne Corps not involved in planning

o Small cell in SOUTHCOM's J-5 did planning

Late summer 1989 General Max Thurman took over

SOUTHCOM

- Focuses on "Blue Spoon" and not "Blind Logic"

o "I did not spend five minutes on 'Blind Logic' during my [incoming] briefing as

the incoming CINC in August"

Military planning for an invasion of Panama had begun in earnest

in the summer of 1988 as relations with Panama deteriorated. From

the beginning, planning developed in a bifurcated fashion: combat

operations were the responsibility of SOUTHCOM's J-3 (Operations),

while planning for postconflict operations was SOUTHCOM's J-5's

(Strategic Plans and Policies) responsibility. Communication

between officers working on the separate plans was weak at best. In

summer 1989, planning for the operation moved into high gear. To

exacerbate the lack of interest in the postconflict phase, XVIII

Airborne Corps planners became involved in the planning processes,

and their focus remained exclusively on the execution of military

operation.

10 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
PANAMA CASE STUDY

Moreover, the regional commander-in-chief (CINC), General Max

Thurmond, focused all of his attention on planning and preparations

for military operations. Planning for the postconflict phase

languished in the closet of the J-5 plans directorate. As Thurmond

later commented, "I did not spend five minutes on 'BLIND LOGIC'

[planning for postcombat operations] during my [update] briefing as

the incoming CINC in August." The result was that KRYSTAL BALL

(the initial code name for postconflict operations) and then BLIND

LOGIC (the final name) received little attention from senior officers in

either Panama or the United States.

TRANS!T!ONS TO AND FROM HOS-ILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS_11
HISTORICAL PERSPECFIVES

The Panama Case

The results of inadequate preparation and planning for the

postconflict operation, "Blind Logic" :

No anticipation or preparation for massive looting and collapse of civil government

o Looting estimates of $2 billion

No interagency coordination before military operations

o No country team existed: U.S. embassy down to one charge d' affaires and two clerks

No seamless transition to postconflict operations

o Result: higgledy piggledy adaptation to steadily worsening looting and violence

It took nearly a month to create a military government to run the country (not established

until 17 January)

New Panamanian government inherited an empty treasury and collapsing physical and

societal infrastructure

Finally, "the Civil-Military Operations Task Force proved unprepared to reshape the

security forces, lacked a coherent organizational structure, and found itself short of

personnel."' 2

2. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "The Post-conflict Use of Military Forces: Lessons From Panama,

1989-1991," The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16, no. 2, (June 1993).

The United States, but particularly the Panamanians, paid a

considerable price for this lack of focus on the postconflict phase.

There were simply no preparations to meet the massive looting that

broke out in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion. Estimates

are that upwards of $2 billion dollars in damage and stolen property

resulted from a complete breakdown of law and order after the

destruction of the Panamanian Defense Force and Noriega's police.

That total represented a catastrophic loss to an economy as small as

Panama's.

Even more serious was the collapse of government in general.

There was no money left in the treasury; the judiciary no longer

functioned; and there was no political framework on which to build

an effective new government. Planners should have foreseen and

prepared for all of these circumstances, but not within a

dysfunctional planning process. The planners in XVIII Airborne

Corps assumed they could turn the postconflict phase over to the

State Department's country team. But no such team existed. The

State Department had reduced the embassy itself to a single charg6

d'affaires and a couple of clerks. The J-5 planners had not bothered

12 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
PANAMA CASE STUD Y

to contact other federal agencies outside of the Department of

Defense. In fact, one of the "triumphs" of operational security was

that none of the rest of the federal government knew that JUST

CAUSE was about to occur. So unprepared for the postconflict tasks

was the U.S. military that it began training a new Panamanian police

force in January, only to discover that U.S. law prohibits the armed

forces from training such forces. It then had to turn the task over to

the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative

Training Program - an organization completely unprepared for

building a new Panamanian police force.

Moreover, it took nearly a month to establish a military

government and restore order in Panama. Almost immediately,

SOUTHCOM scrapped BLIND LOGIC and replaced it with an

improvised plan, PROMOTE LIBERTY. From December 21,1989, to

January 17,1990, Panama had no organized government. Only in

mid-January did the United States finally establish a military

government, at last recognizing what in fact had occurred with the

overthrow of the entire Panamanian government; the United States

and its military forces had to assume control of the remains of a

government they had destroyed.

TRANS!T!ONS TO AND FROM HOSTILiTIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 13
HISTORIC4L PERSPECTIVES

Panama Case Study

Obstacles to effective postconflict operations planning

First: Lack of clarity as to the mission for "Blind Logic"

o Questions not asked: o What would a post-Noriega government be?

o Was democratic government possible in Panama anytime soon?

How - long would it take to create the rule of law?

o What would replace PDF?

o What was state of Panamanian society?

o General Thurman: "'Blind Logic' was not suitable for the reconstruction of

Panama because it did not accurately assess the dimensions of the task...[I]t was a plan based on the hope that life would quickly return to normal."

- Second: planning process for "Blind Logic" did not even involve

SOUTHCOM's J-3

Third: Bifurcation in planning process

o "Just Cause" planned by SOUTHCOM J-3 and XVIII Airborne Corps

o "Blind Logic" preserve of SOUTHCOM's J-5 with little access to senior

commanders

o General Thurman: "The warfighting elements are mainly interested in conflict

termination as opposed to postconflict restoration, which is admittedly a problem

for us in the military establishment. If I had been XVIII Airborne commander, I

might very well have said 'Blind Logic' is going to be residual."

The lack of serious planning behind BLIND LOGIC suggests a

number of key points for planning postconflict operations. Planners

must examine a full range of potential consequences of contemplated

military actions. Those planning the Panama operations should have

asked themselves a series of questions, such as the following: Would

there even be a Panamanian government after military operations

removed Noriega and his cronies, while at the same time destroying

the Panamanian Defense Force and the police? What kind of

government did the United States wish to see arise in Panama during

the postconflict period? Was democracy a viable alternative, or

should the focus be on the establishment of law and order and

economic activity? What type of forces would the U.S. military need

to maintain order in Panama for both the short term and long term -

an army, a constabulary, a police force? What was the current state

of Panamanian society? Was there, for example, even a functioning

legal system? The failure to address such relatively simple questions

- although admittedly none had easy solutions - inevitably created

14 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
PANAMA CASE STUDY

problems that the U.S. government, not to mention its military

organizations, was unprepared to address.

The second significant point is that the planning for BLIND

LOGIC did not involve SOUTHCOM's J-3. Thus, the planning effort

for the postconflict period existed in a limbo disconnected from

military operations. With no plan, commanders and their troops had

to adapt on the fly. Admittedly skill at adaptation is one of the

admirable qualifications of American soldiers and Marines, but this

was no way to run a complex operation.

Moreover, because separate staffs executed the planning of

BLIND LOGIC and its execution, with little or no interchange among

planners, a series of dangerous assumptions crept into the planning

cycles. The most dangerous was the belief by the planners of JUST

CAUSE (particularly in XVIII Airborne Corps) that some other

agency would assume control in the postconflict period. Thus, there

would only be a matter of a relatively quick and simple hand-off. As

General Thurman suggested after the operation,

The warfighting elements were mainly interested in conflict

termination as opposed to postconflict restoration, which is

admittedly a problem for us in the military establishment. If I

had been the XVIII Airborne commander, I might have said

BLIND LOGIC is going to be residual. 2

2. Quoted in Richard Schultz, "The Post-Conflict Use of Military Forces: Lessons from

Panama, 1989-91," The Journal of Strategic Studies 16, no. 2 (June 1993), pp. 150-51.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILrrTEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS 15
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Panama Case Study

Obstacles to effective postconflict operations planning

(cont'd)

- Fourth: SOUTHCOM's J-5 had little competence in understanding political,

social, and institutional situation in Noriega's Panama

o Failed to understand extent to which previous 20 years had wrecked Panama's

social and political fabric.

- Fifth: Planners assigned responsibility for execution of "Blind Logic"

o General Thurman: "It is a bad plan when J-5 ends up commanding anything."

- Sixth: No interagency coordination, much less planning, existed

"o Compartmentalization of planning within DOD

o SOUTHCOM's J-3 and J-5 had neither interest nor experience in interagency arena

o XVIII Airborne had even less

"o Other federal agencies were neither consulted nor prepared to cooperate in

serious planning for postconflict operations

» Lacked culture and experience

o Lacked personnel and other resources

What is particularly surprising, given how long the United States

had been involved in Panamanian affairs, is the fact that the planners

of BLIND LOGIC had little understanding of the extent to which the

organs of Panamanian government had deteriorated under Noriega's

rule. Nor did they recognize the impact that 20 years of corruption

had had on the Panamanian psyche. In other words, they lacked the

most basic knowledge of what Panama had become and how

Panamanians were likely to react to the removal of controls on their

actions. If this were so in regards to the planners of BLIND LOGIC, it

was even more so in the case of those planning of JUST CAUSE.

Astonishingly, General Thurman entrusted command of BLIND

LOGIC to his J-5, the individual who had been responsible for the

planning, but who possessed no command authority. Not

surprisingly, General Thurman later wryly remarked that "it's a bad

plan when J-5 ends up commanding anything."

Finally, one must note that the planners of BLIND LOGIC failed

to bring other federal agencies into their efforts. Thus, no one else in

16 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
PANAMA CASE STUDY

the U.S. government could offer support when the operation

occurred and chaos followed in its trail. Without a country team in

place - or even established in Washington - and with virtually no

civil affairs units on call, the military discovered itself in a chaotic and

dysfunctional situation in which it possessed no plans, nor skill sets,

nor doctrine. Not surprisingly, it has taken Panama years to recover

from the results.

Lawrence Yates has commented:

The greatest flaw in [urban operations] in Panama was the

failure to coordinate the combat with the stability operations,

the latter of which would take place in the country's two

largest cities, Panama City and Colon. General Thurman, once

he became the CINCSO, gave little thought to BLIND LOGIC,

while General Steiner [commander of XVIII Airborne Corps]

had been directed to work only on [JUST CAUSE]. Attempts in

December 1989 to revise BLIND LOGIC and link it with the

planning for Blue Spoon came too late to accomplish either

goal. When PROMOTE LIBERTY began on December 20, the

effort lacked synchronization and focus, in part because key

assumptions underpinning the original plan - for example a

Reservist call up - were no longer valid. Furthermore, the lack

of coordination meant that U.S. combat troops were

unprepared for much of the non-combat chaos they

encountered and the numerous stability operations they were

called upon to perform during the first days of JUST CAUSE."3

3. Lawrence A. Yates, "Operation Just Cause in Panama City, December 1989," in Urban

Operations: An Historical Casebook.

TRANsrTIoNs TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 17
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Panama Case Study

Summary

"Following military action, the United States must implement a

postconflict policy that contributes to a positive consolidation of the

situation, promoting stability and development."

Richard H. Schultz (1993), commenting on the postconflict results of

"Just Cause"

"Just Cause" - an overwhelming military success

Destroyed Noriega's regime and dismantled the PDF in less than 24

hours

But virtually no postconflict planning. The results:

1) Extensive looting damage

2) Severe economic disruption that lasted nearly a decade

3) Stability and crime still a problem

Just Cause was an overwhelming military success. It toppled the

kleptocratic Panamanian regime in a matter of hours.

However, the postconflict operation, BLIND LOGIC,

demonstrated nearly all imaginable shortcomings, compounding the

postconflict difficulties:

"* A weak, compartmented planning process that failed

to ask basic questions about the desired endstate

"* Ignorance of the conditions prevailing in Panama

"• A lack of interest by senior SOUTHCOM leaders

"* A lack of coordination with combat forces

" A failure to involve civilian U.S. government

agencies essential to performing basic tasks, such as

police training

18 DSS SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
PANAMA CASE STUDLY

The result was loss of order in Panama, severe economic damage,

and a stability and crime problem that persists today.

The United States did displace Manuel Noriega and his

henchmen; but it did not leave Panama better than it found it.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HoSTILITEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS 19
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER 3: ISRAEL IN LEBANON 1982-2000

Israel in Lebanon

The origins

- Through 1968, Lebanon quietest of Israel's borders

- In 1969, PLO and other terrorists began basing in southern Lebanon

- Israeli response: air strikes and raids

o In some cases all the way to Beirut

Lebanon sinks into civil war

- Collapse of government

- Terror and criminal groups run amok

o Ironically Israelis receive considerable help from the Shi'a

Israel's foray into Lebanon represents a textbook example of how

success can decisively undermine strategy. This happened on several

levels. First, Israel's historical record of success on the battlefield

promoted a fixation on the operational level of war - what

American military professionals today call "kinetic strategy." Second,

the appearance of prompt and complete military success served to

reinforce the assumption that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had

achieved victory in the very arena where Israel had always excelled.

Third, an idWe fixe of combat as the essence of strategy assumed that

the authority of victory in battle equaled post-hostilities authority as

well. Fourth, the lopsided and almost effortless realization of

battlefield success encouraged a denigration of the enemy - the

Israelis dismissed even the thought that Arab resistance might prove

effective in other ways. Finally, the battlefield "fix" left the Israeli

army unprepared for the possibility that dominant military force

20 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ISRAEL Im LEBANON

might also be, over time, a strategic liability - ultimately even selfdefeating.

The Lebanon War was an outgrowth of the always-evanescent

resolutions of earlier wars. If the Six Day War had led to de facto

peace with Jordan after 1967, and the Yom Kippur War to peace with

Egypt after 1973, these wars had also resulted in the tortuous

emergence of Palestinian resistance. Expelled from Jordan after Black

September, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) made its

way to Lebanon and opened up another front against Israel. This

presence only added to the worrisome chaos of Lebanese sectarian

civil war - a morass into which Syria had now directly inserted

itself. Increasingly alarmed by these developments, Lebanese

Christians had been petitioning Israel to intervene on their behalf

since the mid-1970s.

Israel's leaders began to look for ways to end what they saw as an

emerging threat to the northern frontier through the same sort of

direct means that had seemed to end the issue in the south and west.

But the actual border with Lebanon had been relatively quiet. In spite

of intelligence that suggested that the PLO was fortifying its position

and preparing for future war, there was no imminent threat. Thus it

was necessary to create a case for preemption today: a "defensive

war" to forestall the emergence of a greater threat tomorrow.

As originally framed, such a preemptive operation looked simple

and straightforward: wipe out PLO nests and bases south of the

Litani River. But in the end the Israelis pursued a much grander

design: drive not only the PLO from Lebanon, but the Syrians as well,

and install a compliant Christian political leader who would sign a

peace treaty. The phrase of the day was: "create a new order in

Lebanon."

TRANSITIoNs TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 21
HSToRmAL PERSPECrIVES

Israel in Lebanon (cont'd)

In late '70s, increasing Syrian intervention in

Lebanon

- Supported PLO and other terrorists

- Viewed by Israelis as significant threat

Israeli response: "Operation Peace in Galilee"

- 6 June 1982: massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon

"o No fewer than six divisions

"o Huge military success

>> 100-I exchange ratio with Syrian air force

>> Complete destruction of Syrian air defense system in Lebanon

a Syrian ground forces in Lebanon largely destroyed

)) PLO chased out

)> Advance all the way to Beirut-Damascus highway

o Large booty:

a 1,350 trucks, 113 armored fighting vehicles, 22,000 small arms, 650 antitank missiles, 12,000 rockets, 43 artillery pieces, millions of rounds of

ammunition

At its beginning, Israel's invasion of Lebanon was a stunning

success. Furthermore, the PLO - when it had actively joined in the

ongoing Lebanese civil war - had killed thousands of Lebanese

Shi'a. It so alienated the Shi'a population of southern Lebanon that at

the beginning of military operations Israeli troops were actually

welcomed as liberators.

Moreover, the IDF thought it had planned well, taking history's

recent lessons to heart: "In Lebanon, we tried to figure out what was

similar to what went on in Vietnam," Avraham Burg, a member of

the Israeli Parliament who went to Lebanon as an officer in the

paratroopers, later commented.

But in spite of conventional combat success, big problems soon

emerged. The Likud leadership refused to let foreign news cameras

cover the operation, so the war ended up being covered from Beirut

- and thus from the Arab side. For the first time, the world watched

an Arab-Israeli war from the Arab perspective.

22 D58 SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ISRAEL IN LEBANON

The true negatives of this decision mounted as the IDF began its

investment and assault on Beirut. In a siege lasting almost three

months, it created a truly devastating piece of political theater that

eventually wrecked every objective that operation "Peace for Galilee"

had sought. Simply, the Israeli army was not ready for urban warfare

on a grand scale, a war conducted under the scrutiny of a hostile

international news media. Its army had sensible doctrine for urban

warfare, but lacked a force structure designed for such combat. To

reduce their own casualties, the Israelis relied on artillery to

neutralize enemy strong points. Heavy civilian casualties resulted.

Moreover, the Israelis were unprepared for the PLO's use of civilian

sites as tactical shields.

The spectacular failure in Beirut, however, only set up the fall.

Israel's single-minded support of the Christian Lebanese minority

undercut its bid to create a compliant Lebanese regime. Moreover,

the spirit of the age had changed, since the French had engaged in a

similar effort before - a century earlier. According to Menachem Klein

(Bar-Ilan University), "The problem of how to rule a society that is

divided, a country that does not exist as a state with a central

authority with legitimacy - this is a problem Israel faced in the 1980s

in Lebanon." It was a problem compounded by terrible missteps and

blindsidings. First, Israeli commanders on the scene permitted the

massacre of hundreds of PLO fighters by Christian Phalangists. Then,

the leader of their chosen regime was assassinated. Then, the entire

Israeli design unraveled.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 23
HISTORICAL PERSPECTVES

Israel in Lebanon (cont'd)

The making of a morass

- Lebanese politics a nightmare

o Shi'a, PLO, other terrorists, Syrians, Christian militias, Moslem militias,

criminal militias, tribal militias, Druze

- PLO prisoners mistreated

o "Special means" authorized

- Sabra and Shatilla massacres

- The real disaster in southern Lebanon

"o Israeli conscripts fire into innocent crowd of Shi'a

>) Israeli response slow and inadequate

"o Results in creation of Hamas

o Increasingly effective Shi'a guerrilla war against Israelis

17 years after beginning of Operation Peace in

Galilee, Israelis withdraw leaving a far worse

situation than '82

- Southern Lebanon now in hands of Hamas

Nonetheless, Israel might have salvaged a supportive Muslim

minority in Southern Lebanon, essentially assuring Israel's security

and perhaps keeping the PLO and Syria at bay. In 1982 Lebanon was

40 percent Shi'a. But the IDF entered "a conflicted maze of political

and religious rivalries" without any sort of preparation.

In hindsight, some have blamed Shi'a radicalism for the turning

against Israel, but Richard Norton (Boston University) argues that it

was not a lack of mainstream Shi'a clerics, but rather Israel's failure to

cultivate the Shi'a, that led to their radicalization. Israel had little feel

for the divisions within Lebanese society. It allied itself with elite

Christians, "fanning the Shiite sense of deprivation." Norton

describes a "tipping point" event more than a year after the invasion,

on October 16, 1983. That day, an Israeli military convoy provoked a

riot in Nabatiya when it tried to drive, honking, through tens of

thousands of Shi'a worshipers gathered to celebrate their most

important holiday, Ashura. Ultimately, it was the Shi'a cultural

24 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE O0v
ISRAEL I.N LEBANON

connection that Israel did not understand, and which in its hubris it

ignored. At its heart it was this: the Shi'a, organized around religious

rather than secular political leadership, were passionate in resistance,

if aroused, and could demonstrate a ferocity and tenacity across the

whole of society.

The embodiment of Shi'a ferocity and tenacity took the form of

Hizbollah, which emerged within a year after the invasion.

Unceasing Shi'a animus led to eighteen years of war against Israeli

forces in southern Lebanon. Israel tried to salvage at least a shred of

security for its wasted effort in Peace for Galilee by maintaining an

occupied buffer zone. The cost may be thought of as modest -

averaging thirty-one Israeli soldiers killed per year. But year after

year, the weight of this sacrifice grew until it became intolerable. By

the late 1990s a grass roots parents' movement called the "Four

Mothers" agitated for unilateral withdrawal, and in early 1999 polls

showed 75 percent of Israelis opposing continued occupation of the

buffer zone. Thus the final exodus.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 25
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER 4: FRENCH IN ALGERIA

Algeria: The Background

Revolution broke out in November 1954

- Posed revolutionary FLN against French republic

- Algeria divided into many tribes and cultures

o Berbers, Arabs, Pied Noir, Jews, French administrators, and others

- French had controlled Algeria since 1830s

o Knew the local cultures

o But unaware of depths of Moslem anger

- French response influenced by the ideological nature of their war against

the Viet Minh in Indo-China

"o Defeat at Dien Bien Phu had occurred previous spring

"o French theories of revolutionary war based on Indo-China experience

But French administrators had no desire to fight a

revolutionary war

- Over course of 1954-1956 period French lost control of situation

- FLN eliminated the middle ground

- French intelligence failed to penetrate revolutionary cell structure of the

FLN

In the 1830s, the French intervened in Algeria with the stated

intention of eliminating the various piratical regimes. In fact, they

came to stay. Over the remainder of the nineteenth century they

encouraged emigration not only from France, but from their

European neighbors bordering the Mediterranean as well. By the

turn of the century, Europeans - nicknamed pied noirs by French

authorities in Algeria -accounted for almost 15 percent of the

Algerian population. By that time the Europeans had expropriated

much of the best farmland in Algeria, with the Algerians - drawn

from many diverse groups - providing cheap labor. Nevertheless, in

both world wars the native populations in North Africa provided

some of the best troops in the French army. In May 1944, North

African troops spearheaded the breakthrough of the German Tenth

26 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
FRENCH IN ALGERIA

Army's positions south of Rome, making possible the liberation of

that city on June 5, 1944.

Despite the fact that France was eventually on the winning side in

World War II, the disastrous defeat of 1940 made a profound

impression on many of the peoples who formed the French empire.

In the late 1940s rebellion broke out in Indo-China (Vietnam,

Cambodia, and Laos), and the French waged an interminable

struggle over the next seven years that culminated in their defeat at

Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. French veterans of the Indo-China War

returned from Southeast Asia determined not to repeat the mistakes

of that conflict, where their generals had repeatedly failed to grasp

the revolutionary nature of the war against the Viet Minh.

The French Army almost immediately found itself involved in

another conflict: Algeria. In fact, that territory had been seething

with violence since the French defeat of 1940; the arrival of American

and British troops in November 1942 in Operation "Torch" further

exacerbated the political troubles. In early May 1945, a series of

spectacular atrocities by locals led to even more horrendous reprisals

that killed thousands of Muslims.

In November 1954, the FLN, an Algerian, nationalistic movement,

launched attacks across the length and breadth of Algeria. The

response by the authorities was lethargic and unimaginative. For the

most part they refused to pay attention to the lessons that the

veterans of the first Vietnam War had brought home. Thus, over the

course of the next two years the FLN eliminated the moderates

within the Algerian communities, while at the same time launching a

wave of terror attacks against the European settlers.

The FLN developed a cell structure modeled on that used by the

communists in most of their revolutionary movements. French police

work proved incapable of cracking the FLN's structure, while the

army's intelligence organizations proved no more successful. Despite

having over 130 years of experience in Algeria, the French discovered

that they did not really understand the Muslims, nor did they

understand the depths of bitterness that most Algerians felt toward

French rule.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 27
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Algeria: The Battle ofAlgiers

Battle of Algiers: a turning point

- By 1956 French security had broken down

o FLN bombing of Pied Noir hangouts

o Assassination of major political figures

- The French response: Jacques Massu's 10th Parachute division

o Massu and his paratroopers given complete control over city

- FLN general strike

"o Aimed at influencing international public opinion

"o Believed French could not penetrate organization

Massu's response

- No attention paid to legality

- Ruthless attacks on strikers

- Massive roundup of FLN supporters and suspects

"- "Special means" (i.e., torture) to break into structure of FLN

- Strike crushed in eight days

o FLN irreparably broken open throughout Algiers

By late 1956 French security throughout Algeria, but particularly

in the cities, had broken down. The European population was

carrying out acts of retaliation on its own; order, in the face of

communal violence, appeared on the brink of complete collapse. A

major campaign of FLN bombings of pied noir hangouts caused

considerable casualties among the Europeans and raised

temperatures to the boiling point. Problems were particularly severe

in the great city of Algiers, where the FLN was in almost complete

control of the native district, the famous Casbah.

At the same time, the FLN declared a general strike immediately

before a major vote in the United Nations to condemn continued

French rule in Algeria. Confronting a deteriorating situation in

Algeria, and particularly in the city of Algiers, as well as increasing

disapproval abroad, the French acted. The French high command

ordered General Jacques Massu's 10th Parachute Division to occupy

Algiers. It was first to break the strike and then the FLN. Up to this

point, Massu had had an extraordinary career. He had not hesitated

when France had collapsed in 1940, but had been one of the first to

28 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
FRENCH IN ALGERIA

rally to Charles de Gaulle and the Free French. He had proven

himself against both Germans and Viet Minh to be an extraordinarily

brave and competent officer.

Using extralegal means that included torture, Massu attacked the

FLN from the moment his troops arrived in Algiers. The contest was

a bloody and ferocious one that the movie "The Battle of Algiers" -

one of the greatest war films ever produced - captures. Within eight

days of its beginning Massu had broken the general strike, while

massive roundups of FLN suspects occurred throughout the city.

"Special means" (i.e., torture) allowed Massu's to break into and then

break up the FLN's secretive and highly compartmentalized

structure.

TRANsITIoNs TO AND FROM HoSTILITEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS 29
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Algeria

"* Devastating campaign in the countryside followed

"* Extensive use of "special means"

- Operational successes, but also blowback: growing opposition in

France

o Revived memories of WWII Gestapo torture

- French win the war, but lose the peace

"* "Special means" led to near-breakdown of the

French Army

- Torture led to loss of discipline, atrocities, and eventually loss of

civil discipline

- Motivated military coups of 1958 and 1961

The French military copied Massu's methods in one form or

another over the course of the next five years. And to a considerable

extent it achieved military success. Not only did it crush the Algerian

guerrillas in the hill and mountain country of the bled, but it was also

able to root out much of the FLN's political infrastructure. By so

doing it reinstituted a large measure of control over the countryside.

This was as complete a military victory as one could achieve over an

insurgency without achieving the political aim of a French Algeria

with which France had embarked on war.

The difficulty was that France is a democracy. Bit by bit the story

of the widespread use of torture by French troops came out in the

French press. For a nation which had experienced the atrocities of

Nazi occupation barely a decade earlier, this occurrence was simply

unacceptable. The result was increasing disaffection in France with

the war, which in turn had its impact on how the politicians acted

30 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
FRENCH IN ALGERIA

and debated. The blowback from the use of torture had a powerful

impact on Frenchmen, who increasingly separated themselves from

the war and their army. It had an equally powerful negative impact

on how the world community viewed the war in Algeria. France

found itself increasingly isolated even within the councils of NATO.

Finally, the use of torture embittered the native Algerian population

to the point that even without the FLN structure, anti-French riots

occurred.

Thus, the French army by 1960 found itself increasingly isolated

from its own nation. Given the traditions of the French Revolution,

this was a bitter experience - one which increasingly led to

dangerous talk about the need to clean up the political mess in Paris.

The moves that the French government was undertaking in the early

1960s to get France out of Algeria only exacerbated such feelings.

Charles de Gaulle, recalled to power by the Algerian troubles in 1958,

had by now recognized that politically, a French Algeria made no

sense, since France could not assimilate the Muslim population of

Algeria without itself losing its own identity and culture. A number

of senior and midlevel officers then embarked on a campaign to

overthrow de Gaulle's Fifth Republic - so much had the bonds of

disciplined obedience to civil authority loosened within the army. In

the end they failed, but they added to the pain and suffering that the

war had inflicted on Frenchmen and Algerians alike.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 31
HisTRicAL PERSPECTIVES

Algeria: The Lessons

" Political goals must come before military

expediency

" Realistic political goals essential

- Algerie Franqais not realistic

" Do not underestimate the effects of military

actions on people at home

" Thorough understanding of culture, society, and

history essential

"• The larger political context must influence strategy

"• "Special means" will destroy the cohesion of the

military and are ultimately self-defeating

The French confronted an extraordinarily difficult situation in

Algeria. At the beginning, they underestimated their opponent and

the extent of the insurgency. Then when matters spun out of control,

they fell back on the belief that any means that would result in

military victory were justified. From the beginning they failed to

establish realistic political goals. Alg~rie Frangais was simply not a.

realistic goal, given the divide between the two cultures. The

Algerians were not about to become Frenchmen, nor in the end

would Frenchmen have been all that eager to accept them as such.

The larger political context did not influence the French conduct

of the war until de Gaulle got his hands on the levers of power. By

then the widespread use of torture and various attempts to launch

military coups against the legitimate government had robbed the

French army of much of the respect in which the people of France

had traditionally held it. And one might note that the actions

undertaken by so many soldiers in torturing Algerians or executing

atrocities scarred them for life. Even as late as last year, a book by a

retired general on the use of torture by the French army caused a

scandal in France.

32 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EXPERIENCES POST WWZIAND WWII

CHAPTER 5: EXPERIENCES POST WWI AND WWII

Germany Post-WWI - Germany Post-WWII

"November 1918

- No thought to changing Germany's political and cultural

frameworks

- Idealist cant of 14 points

o Not applied to Sudetenland or Austria

- No Allied troops on German soil

"The Paris peace settlement

- Germany humiliated, but not permanently suppressed

- The confusing agenda of reparations

- Settlement saddled German Republic with impossible political

baggage

- Settlement fell between two stools

- Exacerbated German desire for revenge

In late July 1918, the German army's military situation on the

Western Front began to unravel. A series of Allied offensives broke

on a battered German army that had suffered nearly a million

casualties in its spring offensives, which had aimed at knocking the

Allies out of the war before the Americans could arrive. On August

8, 1918, the British, aided by a large number of tanks, smashed their

way through German lines near Amiens, a defeat which Eric

Ludendorff, the virtual dictator of Germany, characterized as the

"blackest day" of the war for the German army.4 In September,

4. Two recent books have examined in considerable detail the crucial role of the British

Army in defeating the Germans in the last six months of the war. See J.P. Harris, with

Niell Barr, Armiens to the Armistice, the BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign, 8 August

- 11 November 1918 (London, 1998); and Timothy Travers, How the War Was Won,

Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917 - 1918

(London, 1992).

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 33
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

British and Commonwealth forces broke through the "Hindenburg

Line," while American forces drove the Germans out of the St. Mihael

salient. By October, German forces in the west were reeling.

Battalions were down to company size. Platoons were down to the

size of squads.

While defeat was staring the Germans in the face in the west,

matters were even worse elsewhere. The army itself was coming

apart at the seams; by late summer there were over 700,000 deserters.

Meanwhile, Germany's allies were bailing out as fast as they could.

In October 1918 the Bulgarian and Turkish governments asked for

armistices. Even more disastrous from the German point of view was

the collapse of Austria-Hungary, which opened up all of southern

Germany to an Allied invasion - and there were no German reserves

available to defend the Reich. Finally, to seal Germany's fate, the

German people, on the brink of starvation and having suffered

horrendous casualties over four years of war, rose in revolt.

The suddenness and completeness of the German collapse caught

the Allied powers and the United States by surprise. Virtually

everyone expected the war to continue into 1919. Consequently, little

to no postwar planning had occurred. At best, Wilson's Fourteen

Points, which displayed little knowledge of European realities,

represented the only document presenting a framework for a peace.

But it also suggested a peace without retribution, an approach with

which not only the governments, but the people of France and Britain

could not agree - especially the French, given the extent of their

losses and the damage the Germans had done to their territory.

The result was a peace treaty that failed to address the fact that

Germany remained the most powerful nation in Europe. The treaty

was both too harsh and too lenient. On one hand it severed

territories from Germany (such as the Polish corridor) which the

Germans regarded as traditionally theirs.5 It saddled the Germans

with a clause on reparations for the damage they had caused that

5. Although it is worth noting that the majority of the population living in the Polish

corridor in fact regarded themselves as Poles.

34 _DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ONV
EXPERIENCES PosT WWIAAND WWII

only an economically powerful German nation with the potential to

dominate Europe could pay. The treaty, which the Germans had to

sign, also attributed the responsibility for the outbreak of the war in

August 1914 to the German state. Finally, despite the proclamation in

Wilson's Fourteen Points of the right of national self-determination,

the treaty expressly forbade the Germans and the Austrians from

unification of their states, while it included German-speaking

Sudetens in the new Czech state against their wishes.

All of these factors contributed to a mind-set in Germany that not

only rejected the treaty, but soon created a series of myths that helped

set the stage for the next conflict. The inequities in the peace

settlement led many Germans to believe that the spurious promises

of the Fourteen Points had tricked their nations into surrendering in

1918; that their army had remained unbroken and undefeated in the

field in November 1918;6 and that Jews and communist traitors at

home had been responsible for the collapse. The fact that Allied

advances of 1918 had yet to cross the frontier into the Reich

reinforced the belief that the German army had not been defeated.

None of these beliefs were true, but truth was far from the minds of

most Germans. The disastrous inflation of 1923 and the catastrophic

depression of the 1930s were then to exacerbate further the dark

feelings of revenge.

6. A claim that the Reichsstag hearings of 1924 indicated to be complete nonsense.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 3 5
HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Germany Post-WWI - Germany Post-WWII

May 1945

- Considerable focus on postwar order

- Major emphasis on changing German civic-constitutional

framework

- Germany suffers occupation by millions of victorious Allied troops

"o Police and judiciary remained, but tool of Allied occupation

"o Martial law decreed throughout Germany

- German industry incorporated into Western European framework

- Judicial processes ensured Nazi war criminals paid for crimes

- Germans knew they were defeated

"o Air campaigns razed their cities

"o Massive Allied armies crushed Nazi resistance in spring 1945

- Marshall plan offered Germans a hand up

- Western occupation managed to reshape German society

o Soviet behavior: a warning

Much of the preparation that the British and American policy

makers did for the post-World War II settlement reflected their

thinking about the mistakes the victorious powers had made in the

treatment of Germany after the First World War. This time the

settlement would not fall between two stools. The policy of

"unconditional surrender" reflected a belief that to make the

Germans accept the ensuing peace, the Allies must dictate the peace

on the Germans' own territory. With the help of the fanatics leading

the Third Reich, this certainly turned out to be the case. By May 1945

the strategic bombing offensive had smashed all of Germany's cities

to pieces, while across the length and breadth of the Reich, British,

Soviet, and American soldiers chased the broken remnants of the

Wehrmacht through the rubble.

While in the postwar era many Germans grumbled about how

unfair it had been for the Allies to reply to German aggression with

overwhelming power, no sane German could argue that his nation

had not been crushed. The Allies immediately made clear it would

be a victors' peace. In the east, Soviet and Polish troops drove

36 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EXPERIENCES POST WWIAND WWII

millions of Germans out of areas that had been a part of the

Germanies since the Middle Ages. In the west the Americans and

British declared martial law, with curfews and severe constraints on

when and how German civilians could travel.7 The occupying

powers ruthlessly maintained order. Looters and others who stepped

outside of the bounds of acceptable behavior (as defined by the

Allies) were shot. In the area around the Dachau concentration camp,

American commanders forced the local population not only to walk

through the camp, with its mounds of dead, but to participate in the

burial of those who had not survived the mercies of the Third Reich.

Military administration assumed responsibility for virtually every

aspect of German life. In the case of the Western Powers, the Allies

had begun preparing in 1942 for a large-scale postconflict

administration to administer the political and economic life of the

German population. Staffed with German speakers and economic

and technical advisers, the preparations and ensuing occupation

government ensured there was no break between the occupation of

German territory by combat troops and assumption of control by the

occupation.

Concurrent with the rapid occupation of German territory, the

Allies began a massive hunt for war criminals. In the east the Soviets

shot out-of-hand all members of the SS, including the Waffen SS,

while in the west those who had committed crimes such as the

murder of Allied POWs were tried by summary courts martial and

executed. The major figures in the Nazi regime who survived were

saved for trial at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and most

were hanged as a result of guilty verdicts.

Slowly but steadily order returned out of chaos. The diligence

with which the Germans were willing to rebuild their country, as

well as the high level of technological expertise and literacy that

characterized the German population as a whole, helped the process.

But two factors particularly helped in the recovery of the West

7. Although it certainly could not match the raping and looting that was occurring in the

areas that Soviet troops occupied as a result of their military operations.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILiTIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 37
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

German economy. The first was the integration of Germany's

industrial structure into a larger European-wide market - the

European coal and steel community being the first area addressed.

Second was the massive inflow of American aid, under the Marshall

Plan, which ensured the rapid stabilization and resurgence not only

of the German economy but that of Europe as a whole. In the end,

the immediate process of postconflict stabilization demanded the

commitment of large number of Americans as well as billions of

dollars. The success of that effort in building a stable, democratic

German state was a major factor in the winning of the Cold War.

38 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE O04
EXPERIENCES POST WWIAND WWII

Germany Post-WWI - Germany Post WWII

The settlement 1954-1989

- Sovereignty returned to Federal Republic in 1954

"o Nine year occupation

"o Extensive de-Nazification

"o Time for growth of new political leadership

"o Time for economic miracle (fueled by American aid)

)) German leadership shared credit for economic improvement

- Defeat discredited the old elite

- Careful pre-May 1945 preparations for sustained occupation

essential component in success

- By 1954, Germans felt they were full partners with West

In 1954 the Allies returned sovereignty to the West Germans and

their new Federal Republic. The nine years of occupation, as well as

the experiences of World War II, had created a different nation from

the one that had gone to war in 1939. From the point of view of

justice, the procedures of de-Nazification never reached sufficiently

into West German society to winnow out all the war criminals.

However, there was never a threat that right wing revanchism would

ever again establish itself as a significant political force in Germany. 8

There were now four key elements in the Federal Republic's

success in comparison to the failure of the post-World War I Weimar

Republic. First, there was no question among most Germans as to

who had lost the war. Second, the Soviet-administered zone of East

Germany - later called the German Democratic Republic - made it

clear to most West Germans that there was no alternative to

8. This was particularly true with regards to the German military. Moreover, once the

Federal Republic achieved its independence from Allied controls, it was to release large

numbers of Germans who had been convicted of war crimes by Allied courts.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 39
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

cooperation with the West and acceptance of the post-World War II

world they had done so much to create. But two other factors were

also important: first, the nine years of strict occupation allowed for

the growth of a new generation of German political leaders. Equally

important was the fact that American aid, reconstruction efforts by

the Germans themselves, and integration into the Western European

economic community created the basis for the economic miracle of

the next 20 years, which solidified the Bundesrepublik's political

framework.

By 1956, Germany's growing economic power and the stability of

its political institutions created the possibility of the Federal

Republic's full integration into NATO and the Western Alliance.

That integration allowed for German rearmament and the integration

of its military forces into NATO - a reality that few could have

foreseen in 1954. The success of American and British postconflict

operations reflected the careful and thorough planning of the

occupation, the provision of sufficient military and occupation forces

and resources, and the far-sighted economic and political policies that

underlined a deep and coherent understanding of German society

and culture and what had failed in the occupation policies of the

period after World War I.

40 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
BRITISH PRESENCE IN

IR_ AQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST

CHAPTER 6: BRITISH PRESENCE IN IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE

EAST, 1914-1922

Changing British and European Attitudes

Toward the Ottoman Empire in Early 2oth Century

" European powers had long assumed that the

Ottoman Empire would collapse

" During the nineteenth century, British supported

Ottomans against European, particularly Russian,

expansion

" British strategy in Middle East changed with onset

of World War I

- Oil entered the picture in the early twentieth century but not yet

decisive (reserves not known, strategic demand mostly naval)

- When Ottoman Empire allied with Germany, British reversed policy

Overall, British strategy and policy in the Middle East was

successful during the period between 1914 and 1932, in spite of

sustaining several hundred thousand Empire casualties in Gallipoli

in 1915, and surrendering an entire army in Mesopotamia to the

Turks in 1916. How did the British manage to succeed?

Before the war, the British had sustained the Ottoman Empire in

order to keep Russia from dominating the straits and the ByzantineSlavic states of the Balkans. But at the same time Britain had occupied

Egypt, carved out a sphere of influence in southern Iran, and

extended a cozy protectorate over most of the coastline emirates of

the Arabian Peninsula. These protectorates were of increasing

strategic significance because the minor emirs sat on a vast table of

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HosTlIrIIEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS _41
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

crude oil. The Royal Navy decided to convert its battle fleet from

coal-fired propulsion to oil in 1912, and this area was to be its future

source of fuel.

Turkey's turn to the Central Powers forced the British Empire to

make a quick strategic volte-face. The defeats that came in the united

effort to dismember the Ottoman Empire did not overturn the war

effort, and the British Empire (including significant Australian,

Indian, and Egyptian forces as well as British) eventually prevailed.

42 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
BRITISH PRESEACE IN

IRA QAVD THE MIDDLE EAST

British Appetite for Empire/

Nation-Building Plummets

* 1919: Fatigue trimmed tolerance for imperial adventures

* Fromkin thesis: "The long-expected European imperial

adventure in the Middle East had.. .begun too late;

Europeans could no longer pursue it either with adequate

resources or with a whole heart."

* By 1919, the British had reversed their views on the Middle

East

- Parliament and the press clamored for withdrawal from costly remote areas

- By 1922, Churchill eliminated 75 percent of Britain's expenditures in the

Middle East, from 45M £ to 1 IM £

* Public no longer accepted arguments for increased empire

Only Churchill's ingenious strategy of doing things on the cheap made the

British presence viable, for a time, but sowed seeds for departure

British society was not only fatigued at war's end: it was

exhausted. The empire's dead in the Great War totaled almost threequarters of a million men. Britain's economy was in the doldrums,

and the borrowing from America to finance the war had left its

Exchequer in a parlous state - certainly in the mind of His Majesty's

government. And then there was the growing situation in Ireland.

But now the British Empire - with the French ensconced on the

old Crusader coast of Lebanon - occupied nearly the whole of the

Ottoman Empire outside of its Turkic heartland. The victors, though

no longer fired by Victorian colonial appetites of old, wanted to keep

control. In this, however, they were defied. The Turks declared

complete independence in 1920, while the Arabs immediately

followed suit in Damascus. This was intolerable - especially in terms

of Faisal and the Arabs.

As for the Turks, the Greeks could be - and were - easily

encouraged to quash them. But the Arabs were another matter. They

longed for national recognition, and while His Majesty's government.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 43
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

was in no mood to rule them - with an electorate tired of foreign

commitments, and a domestic political scene obsessed by Ireland -

neither did it wish to let them go. If it gave up control there, then

Egypt (and the Suez Canal) could be next, and the canal was

important for access to oil. Furthermore, the Imperial web around

India had to be protected.

So the British marshaled its new technologies from the recent war:

aircraft, armored cars, and gas bombs. A smaller, transformed

military could manage the Arab world "on the cheap." Winston

Churchill - as Minister of War and Air - was this vision's greatest

proponent and a man clearly ahead of his time.

44 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE 01v
BRITISH PRESENCE IN

IRAQAND THE MIDDLE EAST

Broad British Policy Goals

" Advance British objectives through direct or

indirect rule in Middle East

- Direct: Egypt

- Indirect: Arabia, Persia, Palestine (League Mandate), Iraq (League

Mandate)

- Protectorates: Gulf Coast States

" Prevent other European powers from gaining

position in Middle East

" Pay lip service to independence and democratic

"tutelage"

- Paris Peace Conference principles initially discussed, but ignored

British imperial strategy had acquired in its halcyon Victorian

days, for better or worse, a neuralgic focus and perpetual selfexculpation in the framework of guarding the Indian Empire. After

the Great War, this focus fixed on the great Singapore naval base in

the Far East and the Suez Canal in the Near East. These two

geographical features represented the anchoring hubs around which

to festoon garlands of lesser strong points. The British now proceeded

to integrate the Middle East into the Suez hub, the region being of

strategic importance in and of itself because of its oil reserves.

Thus, for example, control of Egypt and Palestine protected the

canal directly. Aden and Somaliland protected the nether end of the

Red Sea leading to the canal from the South, while Cyprus did the

same from the north. It was a tracery-like worldview driven by an old

Victorian and naval-cartographic vision of strategy. But it nonetheless

determined the British definition of "interest" in Iraq, or for that

matter, almost every place in the Middle East.

TRANsrrziNs TO AND FROM HosTILITIEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS 45
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

A faraway but intrusive difficulty, however, had emerged. The

brief comet of American idealism, embodied by Woodrow Wilson at

Versailles, had flared even over the skies of an Arab world the British

considered primitive. In the wake of victory that they had secured

("saving" European civilization), the authority of American ideas

forced otherwise sober British statesmen into ringing declarations of

their own. They assured "liberation" and "self-determination" for all.

These would soon, in a new entity called Iraq, get them into trouble.

46 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
BRITISH PRESENCE IN

IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Military Occupation in Iraq

'"Our armies do no come into yor cities and lands as conuerors or nemies,

Small ground force

- Troop levels in Iraq slashed from wartime totals of 270,000 in 1918 to 14,000 in

1920

"* "Air control" strategy

Revolutionary (and economical) military innovation

Gave purpose to post-WWI RAF

Allowed Churchill to slash military budget for Iraq from £25M to £4M

* June 1920 revolt

130,000 Iraqis launch uprising

1,000 Empire troops killed, 8,500 Iraqis by February 1921 when revolt ends

Major reinforcements required

* Iraqi army (1921) built up to augment RAF in internal security

- Hoped to keep army small and representative, but became focus of Sunni authority

Grew significantly after independence in 1932

Political scientists often hold up British military occupation in Iraq

as classic postcolonial management - it suppressed an authentic

revolt against recent foreign occupation, not on the basis of Britain's

right to rule, but rather Britain's obligation to fulfill the mandate of

international authority. It is noteworthy as well that British

intervention in Mesopotamia had replaced the former Ottoman

"regime." Thus Britain was not simply in the business of occupying -

as in "stabilizing" -but also building a new state-as in

"reconstruction." In November 1918, the British declared that their

goal was "the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have

for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of

national governments and administrations that shall derive their

authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the

indigenous population."

The Kurds' leader, Sheikh Mahmud al-Barzani, took this pledge

so seriously that it is alleged that he kept a copy of it in an amulet as a

talisman. Within six months the Kurds had set up a state in northern

Iraq, which Imperial forces then crushed in May 1919. But other

TRANSr-IONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 47
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Iraqis also took British declarations of support for Iraqi selfdetermination seriously. Furthermore, there was the eloquent

example of Faisal feted in Damascus - if Arab liberation had been so

encouraged and hyped in Syria, then why not in Iraq?

Part of the problem was that Iraq was being run by the India

Office, and occupied by Indian and British troops from the Indian

army. This meant that although there were debates in Parliament and

the Foreign Office about Iraqi's political fate and future, such

arguments had little practical impact on what actually happened. The

civil commissioner for Iraq did not believe even in protectorate

status; rather he wanted direct British rule. His assistant Gertrude

Bell (the FAO equivalent) agreed: "The people of Mesopotamia,

having witnessed the successful termination of the war, had taken it

for granted that the country would remain under British control and

were as a whole content to accept the decision of arms."

They were not. Coming on the heels of recent declarations of

Turkish and Arab nationalism in Constantinople and Damascus, the

revolt in Iraq was more of a traditional tribal and religious revolt. The

Shi'a of Iraq rose up when the British in their effrontery tried to tax

them. There were at the time only some 14,000 Indian army regulars

in Iraq, and they were soon in difficulty. The authority in Baghdad

urgently requested reinforcements.

Those soon arrived, in sufficient numbers to put down the revolt

quite savagely. Most Imperial losses were Indian; however, this fact

did not get in the way of outcry in England. T.E. Lawrence was

blistering in his denunciation: "The people of England have been led

in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with

dignity and honour.... We say we are in Mesopotamia to develop it

for the benefit of the world.... How long will we permit millions of

pounds, thousands of Imperial troops, and tens of thousands of

Arabs to be sacrificed on behalf of colonial administration that can

benefit only its administrators?"

48 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
BRITISH PRESENCE IN

IRQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST

British Governance and Iraqi Reactions

. Strong internal British debate over goals in Iraq

. British dominated Iraqi politics

- Instituted constitutional monarchy

- Established Sunni minority as ruling elite, keep Kurds and Shi'a from

power

- British-ran Iraqi civil service (1,000 British in Iraqi civil service by 1920)

. Iraqis revolted in 1920

* The new state of Iraq:

- Sunni minority rule

- Military the power broker in state; tool for Sunni control

- Weak democratic institutions

o Parliament quickly loses semblance of "popular representation"

o Series of coups begin shortly after 1932 independence

Sufficient reserves from India - amounting to several divisions

before the revolt was suppressed - contained the crisis, but

highlighted a broader strategic problem for continued British

imperial management of the Arab Middle East: money. Britain could

not possibly keep nearly 100,000 Imperial troops in Iraq indefinitely;

it needed another approach.

Britain applied Churchill's vision of military transformation based

on high-technology systems to Iraq. Although Royal Air Force (RAF)

aircraft deployed to Iraq had a great effect, and although Churchill

suggested constantly that they had played a decisive role in beating

the revolt, there was much controversy as to their actual impact on

operations.

Nonetheless, the myth of the RAF in the 1920 revolt created a

mission that Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Trenchard ran with. The new

mission fit the expectation that technology could triumph over mere

primitives; furthermore, it was relatively cheap. Short of an actual,

full-scale insurrection (the Iraqis had fielded 130,000 fighters), the

TRANSrTIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 49
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

aircraft of the day could bring light machine guns into play against

tribesmen and flatten mud villages with modest explosive ordnance.

They were the perfect policing vehicle, and soon became ubiquitous

across the British Middle East, active variously against Egyptian

rioters, Sudanese pastoralists, and Somali nomads.

In the wake of insurrection, how did the British govern Iraq? The

revolt forced a compromise, and a partial accommodation. The

British agreed to give the Iraqi nationalists a measure of autonomy,

and gave them a king - the very Faisal who had caused so much

trouble in Damascus. Nevertheless, they insisted on setting

everything up their way. Britain first created a provisional governing

authority, then drafted a constitution according to British values, and

finally concluded the process with a treaty between Britain and Iraq

drawn up by British diplomats: a treaty wholly favorable to British

interests. The reality of the mandate, though not its form, persisted

for another 10 years until Iraqis finally - after much agitation -

gained real independence in 1932.

Looking back it is easy to criticize the political "solution" the

British advanced. To better serve Imperial interests, they had

overseen the creation of a state that favored the Sunni minority over

the Shi'a majority; whose parliament was shaky, with more than 50

cabinets in 33 years; and whose stability was ultimately undergirded

by the Iraqi army. It was the army, of course, that finally ended both

monarchy and constitution in 1958.

50 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
BRITISH PRESENCE I1

_IRANQAND THE MIDDLE EAST

Lessons From British Experience

" Set realistic and realizable goals

- Continuously assess strategy to ensure it remains valid

"* Ensure sufficiency of forces to achieve objectives

- Undermanned garrisons only embolden insurgent movements

"* Understand the culture

- Ignorance of Islam and local culture significantly undermined British effort

- British expected Muslim opposition to modernity would vanish

- Imposition of an alien and artificial state over disparate and disputatious

population created modem Iraq

"* Empowering military or ethnic minority may secure short-run

stability, but foster long-term structural problems

Created system of control rather than governance in Iraq

The four lessons numerated on the facing page do not really speak

to the British experience in Iraq - they speak to our own.

1- Set realistic and realizable goals. The British did that, but they

had to crush a major insurrection and continually put down minor

rebellions in order to do it. Overall they realized their strategic goal

in Iraq. Even after real independence was finalized in 1932, the British

retained key bases in Southern Iraq, and that was what they really

needed. The British had no problem keeping and using military

forces in Iraq indefinitely. (Imperial forces were in Iraq from 1914

until well after World War II.)

2- Ensure sufficiency of forces to achieve objectives. The British

knew the importance of that principle too, but they simply felt they

did not have the money to keep a large garrison in Iraq. Nevertheless

they wished to hold on to the place, so they took risks. When faced

with a large-scale rebellion, they had sufficient strategic reserves

nearby (in India) and could get them in-theater within weeks. As a

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 51
HIsTORICGL PERSPECTIVES

corollary to (1), the British never kept large forces in Iraq for extended

periods, but preferred small garrisons, financed by the Indian

exchequer.

3- Understand the culture. British administrators possessed a

flawed and limited understanding of the peoples and cultures of

Mesopotamia, but in the end that really did not matter - at least to

them in the early 1920s. After four hundred years of Turkish rule,

Iraq was a society with no mature political elites. It was

predominantly a tribal society, and as the British amply

demonstrated, modem states and their military can deal with tribal

societies. By the early 1930s, however, all this had changed, and has

continued to change, as Americans have seen in Iraq over the past

year and a half.

4- Empowering a minority may secure short-run stability, but

will eventually foster long-term problems. The British did not care

about long-term problems. They simply wanted to run the country

with a minimum of effort. Within a short time, events revealed the

path they would have to take to ensure Imperial security, while

letting go of direct rule. To the British, long-term direct rule or even a

protectorate was always a preference rather than a necessity. Their

strategic aim was a state that tolerated British bases on its soil - and

that is what they got. Beyond that, they held on to as much influence

in Iraq for as long as was convenient. In the event, their

administrators created a state that lasted as long as the British Empire

had - or required - influence in the region. The British simply did

not worry about, or demand, from Iraq the sorts of things that

Americans are demanding today.

52 D58 SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE Olv
POST RECONSTRUCrIoN

THEIAMERICAN CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER 7: POST RECONSTRUCTION: THE AMERICAN CIVIL

WAR

American Civil War

* 1865: Complete Union victory

- Destruction of Richmond; occupation of Virginia

- Sherman's destruction of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina

- Thorough destruction of Hood's Army

- Wilson's massive cavalry raid across Alabama and Mississippi, April 1865

* Results of victory

- A devastated South: chimneyvilles

- Broken and divided society

- One out of two Southern males between 15 and 50 either KIA or maimed

* Attitude of Union officer corps

Welcome Southern states back into Union

Brothers again under the same flag

By spring 1865, Union military victory in the American Civil War

was complete. Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia had

surrendered to Grant at Appomattox, and Richmond was in ruins.

Johnston surrendered to Sherman in North Carolina, after Sherman

had destroyed most of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina.

Thomas had shattered Hood's army in the west at the Battle of

Franklin, while Wilson's massive cavalry raid through Alabama and

Mississippi wrecked the remainder of the South's economic power

east of the Mississippi River. Union troops derisively referred to

Southern towns as "chimneyvilles" for the forest of chimneys that

remained from burned-out houses and other buildings in hundreds,

if not thousands, of Southern towns. The Shenandoah Valley,

breadbasket to much of Virginia, was in ruins.

TRANSmONS TO AAD FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 53
HISToRIcAL PERSPECTIVES

Moreover, the South's transportation and manufacturing

infrastructure had for all intents and purposes ceased to exist, and its

agricultural output had fallen drastically. The war had broken and

divided Southern society. Moreover, the war had killed or maimed

half of white Southern males between the ages of fifteen and 50.

Slaves, the bulk of many well-to-do Southerners' assets, were now

free, thus shattering the financial basis of the South's economy.

Nonetheless, the Union officer corps, once brothers to Southern

officers in the prewar U.S. Army, many of them classmates at West

Point, believed that a quick reconciliation with their former

compatriots was probable.

54 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE O/'
POST RECONSTRUCTION

TH1EAMERICAN CIVIl WAR

American Civil War (cont'd)

"* One of two basic issues solved:

- United States now a singular noun, not plural

"* Race issue had not been solved

- Slavery prompted the states rights issue that resulted in war

- Abolition raised issue of what should happen to the Freedmen

"o Education?

"o Civil rights?

"o Position in society?

"* Lincoln did considerable thinking about post-Civil War

period, but confided in few

- Sustained period of occupation experienced from 1862 in conquered areas

- No systemic planning for postwar period

o Triumph of hope over experience in thinking about postwar attitudes of South

The war's outcome had confirmed the preeminence of the Union.

The change ran deep; whereas before the War Between the States, the

United States was considered a plural noun ("the United States are..

."), usage following the war made the term singular ("the United

States is...").

Unfortunately, the one man who had given serious thought to the

orderly reconstruction of the South lay dead of an assassin's bullet in

April 1865 as the war came to an end. Abraham Lincoln had

communicated few of his reconstruction plans outside his immediate

staff, so whatever systemic planning had occurred disappeared.

Following his death, a political vacuum resulted that attracted

congressional radicals, moderates, and disobedient cabinet members

in a dysfunctional administration. The result was an inconsistent

program of military rule, new laws, and constitutional amendments

that had little lasting effect on the South, as well as a great

constitutional crisis that nearly resulted in the impeachment of a

sitting president.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 55
HISTORICAL PERSPEC-IVES

The resulting power struggle led to chaotic actions aimed at

restructuring Southern society, both economically and racially.

Freedmen's Bureaus, schooling for blacks, voting supervised by

Union troops, the 13th and 14th amendments to the Constitution, and

the adoption of new state laws and constitutions all aimed at leaving

the South repentant of slavery and establishing racial equality. The

reconstruction did not, however, produce lasting economic reform

that provided blacks economic viability - poorly prepared as they

were to assume an equal role in the South, while whites of all classes

opposed economic and social reform. By failing to achieve its goals,

post-Civil War reconstruction established the base for a Southern

culture that persisted in its inequalities until the 1960s.

56 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
POST RECONSTRUCrION

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

The American Civil War (cont'd)

Occupying Union forces confront serious problems

Destruction of Southern infrastructure

Antagonism of Southern population

Southern slave-owning culture antithetical to industrial-age society

Weak educational system, even for whites

o Only planter class had had access to education

Impact of slave culture (300 years in developing)

o Aimed at keeping blacks as passive participants only

* Neither money nor interest available to address these problems

- Freedman's Bureau

* Grant's administration: too little, too late

- Army attitudes aimed at causing fundamental changes in the South

"o But possessed neither size nor resources to address larger problems

"o Reconstruction experts ("carpetbaggers") largely viewed as alien

* 1876 resolution of conflict: "stabilization" achieved at the cost of

significant accommodation of Southern elites.

Result: 100 years of virulent racism

Occupying Union troops confronted many problems. The South

lay in ruins. The war had destroyed its infrastructure thoroughly.

Southern whites, resentful at having lost the war, were deeply

antagonistic toward occupying troops. Moreover, their culture was

incapable of adapting to the industrial age, with many previously

prosperous Southerners destitute. Furthermore, the educational

system, never strong, had served only the elite. The bulk of the

Southern populace was barely literate. Two hundred years of slavebased society had aimed at keeping the blacks passive ("in their

place").

The North dedicated neither money nor leadership to achieve its

postwar abolitionist aims. When reform finally came during the

Grant administration, it was too little and too late. Hatred of

outsiders ("carpetbaggers") and local reformers ("scallywags")

remained powerful influences and stymied meaningful reform.

TRANsrIONs TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 57
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The Reconstruction's punitive measures ceased in 1877 following

the election of Rutherford B. Hayes as president, leaving Southern

blacks again in servitude - this time economic - to Southern whites.

State constitutions and laws perpetuated the inequality of the races -

a situation that persisted for another 90 years.

The triumph of hope over experience, advocated by the

abolitionists, to change attitudes of the South remained a dream.

While the American Civil War's postconflict period did succeed in

outwardly pacifying the South, it left a legacy of internal racial

conflict perpetuated by organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, "Jim

Crow" laws, and popular prejudices that resulted in the lynching and

terrorizing of the South's blacks.

58 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
THE ROMAN D(PERIENCE

CHAPTER 8: THE ROMAN EXPERIENCE

What the Roman Empire Suggests:

3o BC - 235AD.

* Roman strategic problem similar to that of United States

today

- How do you achieve world security?

* Jerusalem and Masada not typical of how the Romans ran

their world

- But when necessary, they crushed intractable opponents

* 300 years of success due to careful weighing of interests

- External wars carefully calculated: Britain, Dacia, Parthia, Germany

- Interventions of two type: permanent fix, or teach the natives a lesson

- Appear to have taken both long-term and short-term into account

- Thorough understanding of opponents

- Willing to manipulate the barbarians; ultimate goal was to co-opt them

- Post conflict aimed at bringing stability, economic advantages, and good

government to defeated (those not sold into slavery)

The history of the early Roman Empire, which encompasses the

years 30 B.C. to 235 A.D., contains much that is worthy of note in

comparison with the complex strategic environment that the United

States confronts at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The

Romans controlled the entire Mediterranean basin from the Straits of

Gibraltar to the watershed of the Mesopotamian Valley and from the

southernmost reaches of the Nile Valley to the border of modern-day

Scotland. On most of their frontiers they confronted barbarians

whose fondest wish was to attack and loot the territories controlled

by Rome.

The Romans protected all of this vast territory with a relatively

small force structure - approximately 25 to 30 legions (150,000

legionaries) and 150,000 auxiliary troops. Because theirs was a

subsistence economy, the Romans could not afford to spend greater

TRANsITIoNS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS 59
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

sums on the Empire's defense. At the same time, they confronted

dangerous enemies on their borders. In the north a variety of

German, Dacian, and Gothic tribes threatened the Rhine and Danube

frontiers with varying degrees of intensity, while in the east the

Parthian kingdom remained a constant danger to the security of the

eastern provinces.

Roman strategic policy had to balance carefully the Empire's

economic vitality against its strategic needs. Thus, the Romans

carefully calculated the wars they had to fight in terms of whether

they should merely undertake punitive expeditions or wars of

outright conquest. The latter involved far greater expenses in both

the short term as well as the long term. The conquest of Britain in the

first century A.D. aimed at removing a substantial cultural threat to

Gaul's stability. Similarly, in the conquest of Dacia in the early

second century, the Dacians had become such a threat to the

Danubian frontier that the Romans felt it necessary to conquer an

area that today consists of modern-day Romania.

In both cases the postconflict phase involved major long-term

expenses: roads, bridges, aqueducts, and towns all had to be

constructed, in addition to new camps for the legions and auxiliaries.

Postconflict operations may have represented the most successful

aspect of Roman military operations. The Latin heritage of France,

Belgium, the Rhineland, and Rumania centuries after Roman

conquest all point to the success of Roman occupation in bringing

those areas into the framework of Roman civilization.

60 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
THE ROMAN EXPERIENCE

What the Roman Empire Suggests (cont'd)

Able to weigh costs and benefits of permanent versus shortterm occupation

Fundamental aim: security of the empire

Abandoned German conquest early in first century

"o Military defeat at Teutoburgwald incidental

"o For next 200 years consistently crushed Germans in battle

s> But only incorporated south Germany into empire

"o North Germany would have provided more defensible frontier

o) But new territory would not have been a paying concern

Abandoned Parthian conquests in early second century as:

"o Too difficult to defend

"o Too alien a civilization

Never allowed empire to be seen as defeated

The fundamental aim of Roman policy at the strategic level was

the security of the territories under imperial sway. The conquest of

new territories inevitably added new burdens on the Empire's hardpressed treasury. War did not pay for war. And the postconflict

phase was inevitably expensive over a considerable period of time.

In some cases, such as in Dacia, it is doubtful whether the new

territory ever paid for itself.

There were territories on the Roman frontier that the Romans

knew simply could not pay for themselves. Germany was a case in

point. Under the early empire, Augustus and his generals had

attempted to move the frontier from the Rhine and the Danube to the

Elbe. That effort had culminated in the disastrous defeat in the

Teutoburgwald, where the Germans massacred three Roman legions,

as a result of the incompetence of the Roman general. At this point

the Romans decided that the conquest of Germany was not worth the

costs it would entail.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HoSTILTIE5, SUPPORTIlNG PAPERS 61
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Nevertheless, they still had to deal with the German problem. For

the next two centuries they solved that problem by a variety of

means. First and most important was diplomacy and indirect

interventions, which aimed at preventing the Germans from uniting

and thus posing a direct military threat. When that failed, the

Romans conducted quick strikes aimed at warning the Germans. And

if that failed, the Romans were willing to carry out massive military

campaigns, which invariably devastated the territory from the Elbe to

the Rhine. In the period after the defeat at Teutoburgwald, three of

the foremost generals of the early Republic, Drusus, Tiberius - later

successor to Augustus as emperor - and Drusus's son Germanicus,

carried out a series of major campaigns to underscore to the German

tribes that the battle of Teutoburgwald was not what they could

expect in fighting the Romans.

Similarly, against the Parthians the Romans carried out a mixture

of diplomacy, political maneuvering with the border states, and

major campaigns when the Parthians appeared to pose too great a

threat. In the early second century A.D., the great soldier-emperor

Trajan actually conquered the Mesopotamian Valley and destroyed

most of Parthia's military power. But his successor Hadrian decided

that the cost of maintaining Roman control over Mesopotamia would

be too great, and withdrew the legions back to the eastern frontiers of

Anatolia and Syria.

62 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTOR Y

CHAPTER 9: LESSONS OF HISTORY

The Difficulties of Postconflict Period

"* Military defeat of the enemy forces essential but not

sufficient to achieve long-term aims

"* Enemy society as a whole only defeated when it

psychologically accepts defeat

"o After the U.S. Civil War, South refuses to acknowledge defeat

"o After World War I, Germans refuse to acknowledge defeat

"o After defeat of FLN, civilian population in Algeria refuses to acknowledge

defeat

"* Postconflict success often depends on significant political

changes

- Barriers to transformation of opponent's society immense

- U.S. military not prepared to deal with such transitions

"• Security is a key component of postconflict success

Perhaps the most basic theme in the history of the past two

millennia is that military victory in war is a precondition to realizing

the political goals for which war has been fought, but is rarely

sufficient for the achievement of long-term aims. There is of course

the example of Rome's treatment of Carthage in the Third Punic War,

when the Romans simply executed or sold into slavery the entire

Carthaginian population. But this has been the exception throughout

history, even with regards to the Romans.

One of the crucial issues involved in a successful postconflict

period has been the willingness of the enemy society to recognize that

it has been defeated. Without that acceptance, the defeated have

inevitably bided their time with the aim of overturning the result. In

the American South after the Civil War, Southerners invented a series

of myths aimed at whitewashing the extent of their defeat. The

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 63
HISToPRCAL PERSPECTIVES

South's aristocracy was able to strike a deal with northern politicians

that allowed it to restore its position at the expense of poor whites

and blacks. As a result, they changed their society and culture to a

minimum degree. The result was that the economic development of

the rest of the country largely skipped the South, while a racist

ideology further exacerbated the region's distance from the rest of the

nation. Outside of the abolition of slavery, no major political changes

were able to outlast Reconstruction.

The example of Germany after the First World War is even more

graphic. By November 1918, the German army confronted general

collapse on the Western Front, hundreds of thousands of deserters at

home, and (with the collapse of Austria-Hungary) Allied armies

invading the defenseless borders of the Reich from the south over the

Italian Alps and through the Balkans. Yet within a little over a year,

the majority of the German population, particularly those in the

upper and middle classes, had become firmly convinced that the

German army had not been defeated and that their leaders had been

tricked into agreeing to an armistice. That myth provided the basis

for the pernicious Nazi argument that Germany had been stabbed in

the back by communists and Jews - a myth that was to have a

devastating impact on European history. Not until after World War

II would Germany go through the political and cultural changes that

would fundamentally alter its position in Europe and the world. Nor

was there anyone left in Germany in 1945 who believed that the

Allies had not completely defeated the Wehrmacht.

Finally, it is necessary to underline that security has been a key

component in postconflict success. The success of the Allied

occupation of Germany after World War II rested to a considerable

degree on the toughness with which the Western Powers

administered their zones. The contrast with Panama, where riots and

looting were rampant for over a month, could not be more graphic.

Stability has invariably provided the basis on which all else -

economic, political, and cultural reconstruction - has rested. Where it

has not been present, the inevitable result has been the failure of

postconflict efforts to enable political and cultural changes.

64 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTORY

The Difficulties of Postconflict Period (cont'd)

"* Difficult to craft combat operations that maximize

postconflict success

"* Insistence on rapid decisive operations could lead to

postconflict difficulties

"* Time and patience essential components in all transitions

"• Nuanced, careful approach essential to achieving long-term

results

" Since 1965, increasingly difficult for United States to

influence world public opinion positively

- Consistent problems in selling Vietnam, Grenada, El Salvador, missile

deployments in Europe, Panama, First Gulf War and Somalia

- Also trends in the Middle East

" Clear and attainable goals essential

The recent example of Iraq suggests that concepts such as rapid

decisive operations may have fundamental flaws at their heart. Too

rapid a defeat of the enemy's conventional forces may have two

deleterious effects. First, if conventional victory comes too quickly,

the enemy population may not accept the reality of defeat. Second, it

may allow many of the defeated force to melt into the population in

preparation for a resumption of the struggle on another level.

Moreover, the very nature of violent combat operations may well

create unintended collateral damage that makes the political

settlement in the postconflict period that much more difficult to

realize.

Concepts such as rapid decisive operations suggest an American

desire to end a conflict as quickly as possible and return U.S. troops

to their regular peacetime duties. The difficulty with such an

approach is that successful postconflict operations have inevitably

required sustained commitments of resources and, above all, time.

The postconflict period in the zones of the defeated Germany

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 65
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

occupied by the Western Powers lasted until 1954 - nine years after

the Third Reich had gone down in defeat. Hundreds of thousands of

American, British, and French troops had to execute the occupation,

while economic aid, including the Marshall Plan, added up to billions

of dollars. Yet, the most successful contributor to the success of the

postconflict period may well have been the willingness of the

German people to rebuild their country and society within the

framework that the occupiers provided.

66 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTORY

What's Old About the Emerging World?

"* Thucydides and Clausewitz are still right:

- Human nature will remain the same

o Ambition, fear, invidia, anger, and fanaticism will dominate

- War and violence will play their part

- Strategic ambiguity and uncertainty will remain

- Friction and mistaken calculations will continue

"* Religious and cultural motivations crucial

"* Americans don't understand ourselves and how

different we are

- Our ignorance of our own history, as well as of others, is

extraordinary

There was considerable debate in the decade after U.S. and

coalition forces destroyed the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of

operations in Operation DESERT STORM. Many in Washington -

within as well as outside the military - claimed that the wave of new

information and computer-based technologies had made the old

verities of historians like Thucydides and theorists like Clausewitz

irrelevant in an era when U.S. forces would see and understand

everything in the battle space. Thus, war waged in the future by the

United States would be swift, decisive, and virtually without

casualties for American forces. Events in Iraq since March 2003 have

highlighted the fact that such views were premature, to say the least.

In fact, what has happened in Iraq has served to reiterate that

because nations fight wars for political purposes, military victory (no

matter how decisive) does not necessarily translate into the

achievement of political aims. Equally important, the events in Iraq

have again underlined that in war, ambiguity and uncertainty

dominate every facet of operations. U.S. forces in Iraq may have had

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 67
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

"information dominance" - amorphous and inchoate as that term is -

but they certainly did not have knowledge dominance - nor do they

have such dominance today. To put it bluntly, they never possessed

an understanding of the political and religious nature of their

opponent.

Even during the rapid coalition campaign that over threw

Saddam Hussein's regime, commanders, staffs, and troops lived in a

world of uncertainty. Friction is an inevitable part of war and its

aftermath. Technology may have mitigated some of the frictions that

have in the past affected the conduct of military operations, but it has

added new ones in their place. As the new sciences have been

underlining over the past 20 years, man lives in an unpredictable and

uncertain universe, where predictability is simply not in the cards.

As in the past, the events in Iraq have also served to emphasize

that religious and cultural motivations are crucial in determining

human behavior. The only way to understand the motivations of an

opponent is by having a real understanding of the historical and

religious framework that has molded his culture. It is clear that

Americans who waged the war and who have attempted to mold the

aftermath have had no clear idea of the framework that has molded

the personalities and attitudes of Iraqis. Finally, it might help if

Americans and their leaders were to show less arrogance and more

understanding of themselves and their place in history. Perhaps more

than any other people, Americans display a consistent amnesia

concerning their own past, as well as the history of those around

them.

68 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTORY

What's New About the Emerging World?

"* Political correctness prevents us from speaking to

our interests

"* Pervasive media influence

- The U.S. government has been ineffective in adapting

"* Our opponents have easy access to our world

"* WMD represent threat of catastrophic damage by a

few

"* Compression of time and speed of real-time

coverage

"* Tactical events have strategic impact

The world of the twenty-first century is increasingly becoming a

world of stunning contrasts. It is also a world that has become

interlinked by waves of technological change. The Internet is

bringing the world closer together. But at the same time it is making

the disparities and differences between rich and poor, between

Western and Islamic civilizations, between new and old, clearer and

sharper. Those who are or will be America's opponents also have

much easier access to the First World - and the United States - than

they did in the past. In a world where weapons of mass destruction

proliferate, this factor carries with it great significance. It will

inevitably force the United States and its allies to intervene in many

parts of the world - better an away game than a home game in order

to deal with these kinds of threats.

Moreover, the media now has a pervasive presence. It can at

times drive policy. At other times it can thwart or sabotage policy. It

has no responsibilities except to itself. It is global in reach, but

parochial in understanding. The speed of coverage from reporters on

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 69
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

the scene to television screens around the world already has

narrowed down the options that policy makers possess. It also

means that actions by a corporal on a street in Baghdad can have

wide-ranging strategic consequences. The actions of a few wayward

soldiers at the Abu Gharib prison have had an enormous impact on

the image of the United States throughout much of the Islamic world.

The pictures of soldiers taunting and demeaning their Arab prisoners

will haunt U.S. information operations for decades. Policy makers

and military leaders must pay the closest attention to how their

subordinates act in a world where perceptions may count for more

than actions.

70 DS8 SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTORY

"What Questions Does History Suggest We Should

Ask in Preparing for Postconflict Operations?

* How does this war fit into a larger strategic framework?

What are U.S. goals?

How do short-term political and military goals relate to the larger context of American strategy

and policy?

Long-term political goals?

* What is the nature of U.S. opponent?

How does his history and culture mold his - versus our -view of the world?

What are the change forces in his society?

o What factors drive him toward stability or instability?

What is the prospect for economic stability?

What is the educational level?

How does he think of us?

What is the basis for future relationships with us?

* What does history suggest about employing military force in similar

historical contexts?

* Can we assess the staying power of the United States in prolonged

postconflict operations?

* What are our alternatives, if things go south?

* Have we challenged our assumptions rigorously?

One of the unexamined aspects of the concept of effects-based

operations is the need to focus on the political aims for which military

force is being employed. It would seem, therefore, that political and

military leaders must focus not only on the short-term effects of

military operations that begin a conflict, but on the long-term goals of

U.S. strategic policy as well. Therefore, it would seem that planners

and policy makers must make every effort to elicit and develop clear

and realizable goals that span the entire spectrum from the initiation

of hostilities through to the end of occupation and the postconflict

phase.

Such questions should cover a broad range of topics. They should

move beyond an examination of America's political goals to those of

its opponents and even to the nature of the opponent's regime. Such

questions might include the following: What are his goals? How

does he view the world? The United States? What are the influences

of history, culture, religion, and ideology on his world view? They

should also examine historical analogies. At the same time, U.S.

TRANSiTIONS TO AND FROM HoSTILTrIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 71
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

goals, concepts, and understanding should receive coherent and wellthought-out challenges from red teams that examine the most

fundamental assumptions underlying U.S. policy, no matter how

uncomfortable those challenges make military and political leaders.

Finally, if things deteriorate, serious thinking and preparations must

provide alternatives to the initial course and design.

"72 D58 SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTORY

What Does History Suggests About

Postconflict Operations

"* Conflicts have always led to postconflict operations

- Major conflicts require sustained postwar efforts •

"• Time is of the essence - there must be no gap between

conflict and postconflict

"* Transition and reconstruction require security and stability

- Long-term not just an extension of short-term

- Maintenance of order crucial

- Economic reconstruction efforts must fit within societal context

"* Successful postconflict operations still demand significant

manpower and resource commitment

"* Conflicts within target society may exacerbate difficulties in

transition phase

One of the inevitable results of war is that there will be a

postconflict period, and the greater the war or military action, the

greater will be the challenges of the postconflict period. Here time is

of the essence. Where postconflict efforts have worked in the past,

there has been no gap between the end of conventional military

actions and a seamless transition to postconflict operations. Planning

for the postconflict period must begin in concert with the planning

for military operations, and it must begin as military operations are

ongoing. The model here is World War II, and the planning for and

the execution of postconflict operations in Germany. This is

particularly important, because the maintenance of order is the

essential precondition to all other efforts at reconstruction: economic,

judicial, political, and cultural. Only a seamless transition between

military and postconflict operations will ensure the maintenance of

civil order.

The case of Germany after World War II is a particularly good

example of a seamless transition from war to peace - one that rested

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 73
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

on an absolutely firm grip on the conquered territory, one that

ensured order - in some cases with ruthless determination. All of

this took extensive manpower and resources for nearly a decade until

the German economy and democracy were in a position to stand on

their own. Finally, one should not minimize the difficulties that the

defeated society may present in terms of internal tribal and religious

conflicts, which must be muted if there is to be success in the

postconflict period. Here the German occupation enjoyed a

significant advantage, given the homogeneity of German society.

74 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTOR Y

History Suggests the Following Drivers

for the 2 1 st Century

"* Culture and history will determine how people think

- Language and religion reflect culture and understanding

"* Human nature

"* Even more so today, the United States represents a combination of

modernity as promise and threat

"* People do not like change

"* Religion still frames reality for much of the world

"* Fundamentalism and revivalism are emerging as major factors

Particularly true in Islam

" Islamic world confronts shocking new challenges in historical terms

a> Must adapt in short period to what West has created in centuries

"a Jihad an essential component to Islamic narrative of identity

o To educated and elite, and throughout the Islamic masses

"o Islamic culture is universalist

But also true elsewhere, including the United States

Identity drives how people think and act ... and identity is all

about culture and history. In this sense, "human nature" - as we

observe it - expresses and exemplifies the overarching patterns of

human existence. These patterns lie at the existential level, and thus

we are not truly aware of them even as we speak them.

The United States - in the form of its American ethos -

represents to others a potent cultural cocktail of "modernity"

aggressively packaged as both promise and threat. Yet as Americans

we see ourselves very differently, as offering a universally correct

and even sacred framework through which the world can be

redeemed. We like to say that religion still frames reality for much of

the world - but we should not forget that such a sacred and

determinant belief system also frames our own reality as well.

We go even further in our assumptions and assert that people do

not like change. But as a deeply conservative society, we also have

problems with real change. We like to see change as a transforming

TRANSiTIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 75
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

agent that we offer to others - others who must change and become

more like us if they are ever to have the good things we have. Thus

their change, becoming more like us, ratifies our perception that we

have come the closest in all humankind to social and civic perfection.

In this sense we doubly misunderstand the revivalist forces

within Islam that we insist on calling "fundamentalist." Our abiding

expectation of the Muslim world is (on our terms) simple and

reasonable: embrace the world of secular Western modernity. Its

refusal to do so we blame on "fundamentalists" whose rejection

represents something primitive to us. At a deeper level we see their

rejection as expressive of a larger failure of Islamic civilization itself,

which is perceived to be in a state of unending decay, capable of

producing change only as an obdurate and evil return to the past.

But this view is not correct. In reality the world of Islam is in the

throes of vast and creative change - a revival that not only goes back

to first principles, but also ahead to new syntheses and new

frameworks of identity that mix old and new, Western with

traditional ways. Conflict, and even chaos, are thus indicators of

creative change - which we can understand through our historical

metaphor of "creative destruction." In this volatile cultural mix the

so-called "fundamentalists" should be seen as an element forcing

change rather than prefiguring some future cultural "outcome." It is

important to understand that violent "revival" (or better yet, "restoration") is the essential, mobilizing narrative in which they

have always organized and driven historical change in their world.

Radical Islamism, however, does not figure into the Muslim

historical narrative in terms of an ultimately emergent cultural "mix.'

Muslim historical tradition emphasizes working models where the

conservative is always preferred to the radical. Thus, even today we

can see alternative "New Islamist" movements that are tolerant and

quietist competing with radical Islamists. Moreover, the long-term

impact of American intervention in the Muslim-Arab world will only

encourage more and greater borrowings and adaptation to Western

modernity - on their terms.

76 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
LEsSoNS OF HIsTORY

Thus we should see fundamentalism and revivalism in the world

today as vehicles for change that need to be heeded and harnessed,

rather than as likely - and thus deeply threatening - working

models for future society.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 77
HISTORICAL PERSPEC-1VES

The Impact of War on Post Conflict Operations

" War, no matter how swift and decisive, brings

chaos in its wake

" Almost inevitable that defeated society will

crumble

- Stability absolutely essential

- All systems tend towards maximum entropy unless otherwise

controlled

- Indigenous military or police forces may not be available

Often no clear line of delineation between end of

military operations and start of postconflict period

postconflict operations must begin while military operations

continue

The harsh lesson of history is that war, no matter how decisive,

brings in its wake destruction and chaos. In the postconflict period,

the victors must inevitably grapple with the fact that the society they

have defeated will lack the most basic framework of stability.

Without stability progress in economic and political reconstruction

cannot begin. If the victorious power is not prepared to bring

stability in the wake of its military operations, it will inevitably

hazard the political aims for which it has waged the conflict.

Moreover, in the future - as in the past - there cannot be any

delineation between military operations and postconflict operations.

Any seam between the two will inevitably result in consequences that

may be in the end uncontrollable and that can place in jeopardy the

political goals. In the twenty-first century, with an omnipresent

media, the "three-block corporal" has come into his or her own.

78 DSB SUMMER STUDY TA 5K FORCE ON
LESSONS OF HISTORY

Conclusions as to What History Suggests

0 The past has no "answers," but raises the kinds of

questions we need to ask

0 If we don't understand the past, we will repeat its

errors

0 Speed of information will continue to disrupt

deliberative processes

0 We must be able to travel in the minds of our

opponents

- They are already traveling in our minds

- Don't begin military conflict unless the postconflict plan and

resource commitment is secure

History is not just the story of what has happened in the past, but

is also a treasure trove of evidence "through their eyes." As such, it is

not so much what "happened" that interests us, but how people

perceived things to happen, how they responded to problems and

challenges, and how they judged their own performance. Thus

history tells us not only about how people have spoken and acted in

response to problems and challenge and change, but also how others

observed their words and their actions. In essence, history is

unexpectedly like fieldwork in anthropology, except the evidence is

written down. This written record is an open window into other

cultures and their societies as they struggle with the difficulties of

their world. History shows us how other cultures defined the world

around them, how they assessed what was going on, and how they

made decisions to do something about what moved them.

That kind of understanding of the global context represents an

essential element for the U.S. military and political establishment as

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HoSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 79
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

they craft their responses to unfolding events. If the United States

does not understand its opponents, then it is unlikely to develop the

strategic and operational concepts that will allow it to go beyond

mere conventional military victory and shape the international

environment. But there are no "answers" from history in the

formulaic sense. Even in our "advanced" state of human intellectual

and scientific evolution, we cannot yet come up with an algorithm

that will truly reveal and predict human behavior.

In the absence of such algorithms, history does suggest patterns

that can be enormously useful in thinking about current and future

problems. History's importance is in suggesting the kinds of

questions that policy makers and military leaders should be asking.

As George Santayana has suggested, "Those who do not study the

past are condemned to relive it." It is clear that ignorance of the past

is a sure ticket to disastrous military and policy choices. The

similarity between what happened in the immediate aftermath of

JUST CAUSE and in the aftermath of the U.S. victory in IRAQI

FREEDOM affirms the truth of that statement.

But can we ever truly learn from the past?

As humans we are driven to repeat ancestral errors, no matter

how hard we try to learn from past "lessons" and avoid their

mistakes. That comes from the immutable commonalities all human

societies share. But we are also all different. Just in terms of material

size and complexity, contemporary society is incomparable in almost

all visible aspects to the ancient or medieval worlds - or even to our

own world just a century or two past. For example, the

Peloponnesian War took place in a preindustrial world of city-states,

and thus may have little to tell us about the planning and conduct of

modern strategy and its operations. But at the most enduring and

intimate level of personal command relationships, and of existential

strategic and operational choices, it is indeed revealing. In contrast,

however, a more developed human model - the Roman Empire,

with bureaucratic institutions and a military organization of much

greater complexity - offers us a much greater range of useful

comparison to problems we face today.

80 DSB SUMMER STUDY TA5K FORCE OCA
LESSONS OF HISTORY

Increasingly, the ability of the United States to understand fully

and operate within the constraints of differing cultures will have a

limiting effect on the ability to exercise the instruments of political,

economic, and military power. In addition, it must understand itself

better in order to see the holistic effects of its actions, and the actions

of those around it. If it fails in this task, the United States will find all

of its instruments blunted and hollow.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 81
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

This page intentionally left blank.

82 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
_EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART I. POSTCONFLIcT ACTIVITIES

EXECUTIVE SUMMA R Y

Enhancing stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) capabilities is vital to

U.S. interests. S&R operations can occur in conjunction with, or be

unconnected to, major combat operations. They can take place in the

aftermath of a regime change (as in Afghanistan and Iraq today), in

support of friendly governments, or in dealing with failing and failed

states. Major combat can defeat an enemy; S&R operations can secure

the peace.

The likelihood of U.S. involvement in S&R operations is high,

based on recent history. Since the end of the cold war the United

States has been engaged in six such operations - on average, one

every two to three years. It is not known whether this rate will

persist, but S&R operations will remain in the national interest.

Terrorists have declared war on the United States. They are

resourceful, committed, and adaptive. Failing and failed states are

ideal as terrorist breeding and training grounds. The Taliban in

Afghanistan has been described as a terrorist-sponsored state. Thus

the United States will have strong motivation - security-based as

well as humanitarian -to treat failing and failed states.

S&R operations are exceedingly difficult.9 Success requires strategic

vision, a wide range of competencies covering multiple elements of

national power, perseverance, excellence in planning and executing

multifaceted campaigns, and cooperation from international partners

(postwar Japan being an exception to this last requirement). S&R

operations are complex and chaotic. Stabilization and a start on

reconstruction can occur simultaneously and often in the same area

as, combat and counter insurgency. In addition, reconstruction calls

for a myriad of competencies: in humanitarian assistance, public

health, infrastructure, economics, rule of law, civil administration,

9. Lessons from history are provided as another paper in this publication.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 83
PoSTcoNFLIcT ACrIVITIEs

and media. It is counterproductive to consider these as distinct

phases.

Effective government-wide direction is needed to prosecute S&R

operations. The military plays vital roles in S&R operations; without

security there can be no reconstruction. But, much more so than in

major combat, the military campaign must be integrated within a

larger campaign framework employing multiple elements of national

power.

S&R operations need to become core competencies at both the

Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS).10 A

strong civilian agency is needed to lead the nonmilitary aspects of

S&R and to partner with DOD to plan and execute these operations.

DOS is the natural candidate. DOD and DOS will need an

extraordinarily close working relationship. This relationship must

transcend mere coordination. True collaboration is needed for

anticipatory precrisis planning, so that each department can serve in

either a supported or supporting role depending on the

circumstances.

There are daunting challenges associated with all of the above.

Cross-government processes and players lack the requisite discipline,

authority, and accountability. The Department of State lacks the

resources and culture to plan, execute, and lead complex stabilization

and reconstruction campaigns. The Department of Defense has not

taken S&R seriously enough, it does not open up its planning to

substantive interagency participation, and its culture works against

its being an effective "supporting command."

GOVERNMENT-WIDE DIRECTION

To address the first challenge - how to institute and integrate the

government-wide planning and execution of S&R campaigns - we

recommend the following:

10. The role of the intelligence community is covered in the main report.

84 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Create cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces

to orchestrate the planning and execution of extended campaigns (including

S&R operations) requiring multiple elements of national power.

These task forces would differ from the traditional working

groups in their authorities, accountability, longevity, resources, and

related support. We envision that several of the task forces would be

active at any time, with the lifetime of each more likely to be years

than months. Each would address a region or nation with emerging

serious consequences for U.S. security.

These task forces would integrate interagency activities and field

support for a campaign addressing an emerging crisis (or

opportunity). They would report to the National Security Council

(NSC) and go to the Principals Committee to resolve issues or enforce

action. The president would determine task force leadership, and

federal agencies would designate senior officials to participate as

representatives.

Establish a national center for contingency support to enable rapid startup and sustainment of the task forces.

The center (a federally funded research development center offers

advantages) would provide the staff, supporting facilities, and other

resources necessary to support the different task forces. It would

include a full-time research staff (supported by a network of

consultants) encompassing the array of requisite expertise including

cultural, regional, functional, technological, red teaming,

communication, logistical, and administrative expertise.

Set up in-country or in-region interagency task forces to coordinate and

integrate actions of the deployed (the operational and tactical level)

activities.

The operationally oriented counterdrug joint interagency task

forces provide a model.

The secretaries of defense and state should jointly propose a national

security presidential directive (NSPD) to codify the above by creating

TRANSIONS TO AND FROM HoSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 85
PoSTCoNFLICTrAcTIVTIES

processes for crisis-related interagency activities and assigning

responsibilities and authorities.

The NSPD would also make explicit the role of the NSC, create a

deputy NSC position to oversee these activities, and establish a small

permanent core NSC staff for expertise and continuity.

EMPOWERING DOS

DOS's responsibility should be to plan for, and lead the execution of, the

civilian aspects of S&R operations. This responsibility includes

developing a portfolio of plans, integrating other civilian government

agencies into these plans, incorporating international and

nongovernmental organization (NGO) capabilities, integrating its

plans and capabilities with DOD operational plans, and exercising

these plans with DOD and other government agencies.

Initiatives are already underway to provide these capabilities. The

creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and

Reconstruction (S/CRS) in DOS is a first step; 11 enactment and

implementation of the Lugar-Biden bill would provide more

significant capability. An endorsement from the Secretary of Defense

or the White House would be helpful.

To accomplish these ambitious responsibilities, DOS needs much more

than a small planning office and a set of planning tools. It needs resources

(funds and people) and an organization with an execution culture.

Those responsible for executing a plan should have the lead in

developing it. Those responsible for developing and executing the

plan should also have control over required resources and have the

authority to select key people. The plans and planning assumptions

should be continually challenged through red teaming and other

means and exercised with DOD's combatant commands and other

government agencies.

11. This office was initially named the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

(OSRO).

86 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EXECUTIVESUMMARY

We estimate that approximately 250 people will be needed to develop a

portfolio offive plans comparable in their degree of detail to DOD's

OPLANS. This number of people will be needed in order to integrate

complementary efforts of other government agencies, to exercise and

update the plans, and to serve as the core of an execution task force

when the need arises. They would also develop S&R operational

concepts to complement those being developed by DOD. The number

does not include the planners for communications, lift, logistics,

administration, and other support needs.

The proposed funding in the Lugar-Biden bill ($100 million) is a step

toward providing resources, but more funds and more funding flexibility

will be needed: to staff an approximately 250-person office for

stabilization and reconstruction, to create a new account with flexible

"notwithstanding" authority for S&R operations, to reprogram funds

from other DOS accounts into S&R to meet new contingencies, and to

use DOD funding (perhaps via the economy act).

We recommend that DOS be empowered with sufficient funds and

spending flexibility, comparable either to that provided to DOS for

assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

or to FEMA through access to emergency funds (Stafford act).

WHAT DOD NEEDS TO DO

Most important, by far, DOD must take S&R operations as seriously as

it does its other missions. Clearly DOD is taking S&R operations

seriously today given the circumstances in Iraq. The challenge is to

sustain the focus, apply the lessons, and institutionalize the training

and the organizational, doctrinal, leader development, and other

changes that will better prepare U.S. troops when they are called on

again to perform S&R missions.

A CRITICAL ELEMENT OFINS77TUTIONALIZING

"SERIOUSNESS" IS EMBEDDING S&R OPERA TIONS IN BOTH

OPERA TIONAL AND FUTURE FORCE PLANNING.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 87
POSTcOIVFLICT ACTIViTIES

The regional combatant commanders should be directed to fully integrate

S&R operations into their operational plans (OPLANs). S&R operations

should be afforded the same level of attention as major combat

operations and not treated as a peripheral annex. These plans must

be developed with active participation of interagency partners,

especially DOS. We suggest that responsibility for planning and

executing the S&R should be assigned to the Joint Force Land

Component Commander.' 2 Creating a separate component

commander for S&R operations would exacerbate the problem of

integrating combat and S&R operations

S&R operations should be given more weight in planning and

programming the future force, and appropriate objectives and metrics should

be established. S&R operations are not adequately accounted for in

DOD's current force-planning framework, which is driven by

objectives of rapid responses, swift defeats, and decisive wins. The

desired time for completion of these operations is measured in days

and weeks. These objectives and the associated metrics need to be

complemented by a set of objectives and metrics appropriate to S&R

operations, where the implementation time will likely be measured in

years.

We do not recommend establishing specialized organizations, at the

division or brigade level, dedicated to S&R operations. The rationale is that

unless the total force is considerably enlarged and many of these

organizations created (unless the nation builds a second army), a few

such specialized S&R organizations will be insufficient to handle

envisioned S&R operations. Moreover, U.S. general-purpose forces

have demonstrated on-the-job adaptability in meeting the challenges

of S&R operations. There is a need for specialized units below the

brigade level.

We do recommend that S&R operations should be made a core

competency of the general-purpose forces. There will be opportunity and

other costs in doing so. We believe U.S. supremacy in other forms of

combat provides some room for these trade-offs. There are initiatives

12. During peacetime or when a JFLCC has not been designated, the Army Forces

Commander will fulfill this responsibility.

88 DSB SUMMER STUD Y TASK FORCE ONv
EXECUTIVESUMMARY

already underway to enhance the department's S&R capabilities. For

example, the Army is creating a more modular force, based on

brigades rather than divisions as building blocks, and is increasing

the number of specialists crucial to S&R operations, including civil

affairs experts and military police.

We recommend additional steps involving training, doctrine,

organizations, readiness, technology insertion, and professional military

education.13 We highlight two of these here.

"* DOD should develop and promulgate joint doctrine for

S&R operations in the form of a living "best practices

handbook" continually informed by real-world experiences

and lessons. The military personnel who have gained these

experiences constitute a growing and invaluable asset to

DOD. The thoughtful draft "Joint Operational Concept on

Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations"

provides a starting point for the doctrine development.

"* The Army should extend the principle of modularity below

the brigade level. It should develop subbrigade modules of

critical capabilities, so that it can tailor a brigade to the

situation in its area of responsibility. The Army and

Marine Corps, with Joint Forces Command, should

experiment with innovative concepts of task organization

at the brigade level and below.

MONEY IS AMMUNITION IN S&R OPERA TIONS

The panel discussed the role of money, contracting, and legal

authority in S&R operations. These areas did not easily fit into any

category but were considered important enablers for DOD to enhance

it capabilities for S&R operations.

DOD should provide the authorities and accountability for U.S. forces to

disburse money in support of S&R operations. Experiences in Iraq have

13. Enhancing regional expertise and language skills is covered in more detail in the main

task force report. We did not address the critical issue of force protection in S&R

operations, since it will be the focus of a new DSB study starting this fall.

TRANSITIONS TO AIVD FROM Hos TILTIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 89
POSTCONFLicTACT-IVI-E S

demonstrated the value of empowering tactical-level commanders

with funds and the flexibility to disburse them as they see fit. The

tactics, techniques, and procedures of "funds as a weapon system"

should be explored in experiments and embedded in training. DOD

should seek congressional support in the form of legislation modeled

on the Commander's Emergency Response Fund.

The contracting community needs to organize and plan for success in

S&R operations. The problems today are not the result of laws or

regulations but rather policy and execution. The panel's

recommendations include predesignating contracting authorities to

support commander/S&R authority in the field and prepositioning

contracting and legal personnel.

The length of postconflict operations offers opportunities for

insertion of technology into existing systems, as well as the

introduction of new capabilities during operations.

We recommend that Director, Defense Research and Engineering,

(DDR&E) set up a process for more rapid and coherent exploitation of

service and departmental science and technology (S&T) organizations in

ongoing operations.

We strongly urge that DOD be more proactive in fostering interagency

collaboration and in exporting its campaign planning/execution skills to

other agencies.

The first includes more interagency involvement in DOD's

experiments, exercises and OPLANs. The second should include

detailing a group - including senior officers - to help the Office of the

Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) get started.

DOD and DOS should also create an integrated Foreign Service

Institute-National Defense University program to research and teach

S&R planning skills.

CONCLUSION

We offer three interdependent major recommendations.

90 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EXECUTIVESUMMARY

"* Establish an effective process to orchestrate crossgovernment S&R operations.

"* Empower DOS to lead the nonmilitary portion of

S&R.

" Enhance DOD capabilities for S&R operations as an

integral part of its mission.

These are very big challenges. Thus, we have directed most of our

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: to use his authorities

within DOD, and his influence outside of DOD. Addressing extraDOD aspects of security issues, as we do here, has become more

common in DSB studies, reflecting the need to consider the military

as part of a larger set of national security tools.

TRANVrrToNS TO AND FROM HosTILITIEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS 91
POSTCONFLJCTAC7IVITIES

This page intentionally left blank.

92 DS8 SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
INTRODUC7ION

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The global security environment of the 21st century offers new

challenges related to U.S. national security. In the post-cold war era,

failed states present not only humanitarian concerns, but also

breeding grounds for terrorist networks. The number of weak or

failed states around the world, coupled with the global war on

terrorism, makes it almost inevitable that the United States will be

called upon to engage in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)

operations in support of U.S. national interests.

During the past decade, the United States has engaged in new

S&R operations, on average, once every two or three years. U.S.

missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq

have demonstrated a wide variety of challenges, each case involving

its own set of complex (internal and external) political issues and

international relations. In some instances, the mission has focused on

humanitarian efforts, such as in Haiti, while more recent

engagements have sought to establish democracy and free markets,

as in Iraq. Each mission significantly draws on resources, as each is

long-lasting: "No effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in

less than five years." 14

In light of these factors, this panel's task was to review post-cold

war stabilization and reconstruction operations (e.g., Somalia, Haiti,

Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq) and recommend mechanisms for

improvement in several areas.

Based upon our review of prior operations, we have come to

several conclusions.

First, that U.S. national interest will periodically

require dealing with failing or failed states. The

number of failed or failing states around the world,

coupled with the global war on terrorism, makes it

14. Dobbins et al, America's Role in Nation-Building, p. xxiv

TRANSj7TONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIEs, SUPPORTING PAPERS 93
POSTCONFLICT ACrIVITIES

almost inevitable that the United States will be called

upon to intervene again somewhere in support of

U.S. national interest.

Second, that S&R operations present complex

problems that demand substantial and integrated

U.S. government efforts over long periods of time.

Interventions in other nations are always complex,

involving confusing internal and external political

issues, international relations, the likelihood of

combat, and the resulting need for stabilization and

reconstruction. This study convinced the panel that

the United States almost always underestimates the

amount of time and resources necessary to achieve

U.S. goals in stabilization and reconstruction. While

the United States can defeat almost any enemy armed

force quickly, this speed does not translate to

stabilization and reconstruction of a nation. S&R

requires different levels of skills and effort compared

to combat operations: the pace of S&R operations is

the pace of political progress and relation building.

The frequency of these missions - coupled with their length -

presents significant resource challenges to the U.S. government S&R

operations. This cumulative impact on S&R resources over time

(compared to that of combat operations) is illustrated in the graphic

below.

94 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
INTRODUCTION

Magnitude of the Challenge

DECISION MAKERS

PLANNERS

INTELLIGENCE

4.PAW COMBATI

Time

The ability of the United States to defeat an enemy on the

battlefield has become unequaled. The rapid advance of technology

now enables the United States to win major combat operations

quickly, with a smaller force than ever before. Indeed, it may come as

a surprise that combat may take far less time and be "easier" than

S&R operations. We believe that S&R operations may be the forcesizing mechanism for many future conflicts.

Despite the ability to quickly defeat the enemy in major combat,

the United States must be prepared to establish security in a lowintensity conflict environment. In Iraq, asymmetric attacks continue

against coalition forces, destroying many efforts to rebuild the

country. The Rand Corporation conducted detailed studies of

decades of prior conflicts to identify the numbers of forces that have

been required to provide stabilization in specific countries. The chart

below shows the Rand results, namely that the number of forces

required is, unsurprisingly, a function of the operating environment

and U.S. strategic objectives. Establishing security is the sine qua

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HosTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 95
PO5TCONFLACTIVITIES_ _ _ _

non, as all S&R activities (effective public safety, civil administration,

infrastructure, etc.) build upon adequate security.

Stabilization Force Requirements

* Ooh~~entir oent x Highly Conflicted

[ijl'~ L• lEnvironment f 

C do-1pt I rd orueS "No Functional Forces

for Social Order

MO~eSt Go'als~ •Ambitious Goals

S1 20

Troops/l000 inhabitants

Recent U.S. S&R missions have had very ambitious goals. Iraq is

the only nation-building operation since 1945 in which the United

States has had to actually govern the society that it is seeking to move

from conflict to peace and democracy. More often a weak but

legitimate indigenous government is in place (e.g., in Afghanistan) or

an international administration rules the country (e.g., in Kosovo). In

such circumstances, the United States has concentrated its efforts on

those areas where it has a comparative advantage or a special

interest, in particular on the security sector and political reforms.

Even as U.S. policy should seek to share the burdens of S&R missions

more broadly, U.S. planners must look to the possibility that the

United States might again have to assume the major role in S&R

operations.

96 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
INTRODUCTION

U.S. military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely

to be the last such excursions in the global war on terrorism.

Therefore, recent U.S. S&R efforts were examined to seek ways to

improve policy formulation, force structure, doctrine and training,

organization, and interagency processes. While every stabilization

operation will be unique in a number of ways, there are many

constants that apply to every such activity, and our recommendations

have, we believe, universal applicability to all stabilization and

reconstruction efforts.

We identified a number of significant factors or issues that come

into play:

"* Managing the security transition is crucial, and very

complex.

"* The military loses the initiative in the transition from

major combat operations.

"* Complex and diverse missions overlap in time and

space -missions related to internal security, public

safety, law enforcement, justice, humanitarian relief,

governance, etc.

"* DOD and DOS must work more closely with each

other and with other agencies, non-government

organizations (NGOs), different contractors, and

international organizations.

"* Effective interagency planning and execution are

more crucial than ever.

" Planning must take place well in advance of conflict

to be most effective.

" The nature of these operations requires that many

S&R activities occur simultaneously rather than

sequentially.

The DOD and the DOS each have leading roles in almost every

S&R operation. In any possible scenario involving S&R operations,

the Department of Defense and the Department of State will be major

TRANSITIoNS TO AND FROM HOSTILJTIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 97
POSTCONFLICT ACTIVjTIES

actors, and it is clear that their combined capabilities will be required

if the United States is to be successful.

The panel's findings and recommendations are centered on these

issues for three specific and interrelated areas:

" First, that national and interagency processes be

expanded and improved to bring together the best

capabilities of the U.S. government early enough to

set and achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

" Second, that the State Department be empowered

and resourced for S&R plans and work. While the

DOD has the major responsibility for combat, and for

establishing security, it is clear that the DOS must

play its own crucial role, from the early planning for

conflict avoidance through stabilization and

reconstruction. DOS must be empowered and

resourced to accomplish this range of tasks.

Third, that substantially improved planning and

capabilities for S&R operations are required and are

well within the capability of DOD. The DOD has

superb planning and execution capabilities for

contingency planning and must expand them to

bridge Phase III to Phase IV operations. Improved

planning must be accompanied by enhanced

capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction and

an outreach program by the DOD to participate more

fully in interagency processes.

The following chapters will examine each of these findings and

expand on the associated recommendations.

98 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ONv
AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR

GOVERNMENT-WIDE S&R OPERA TIONS

CHAPTER 2. AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR GOVERNMENTWIDE S&R OPERA TIONS

Recent events in the Middle East and South Asia have highlighted

both the criticalness and the difficulty of effective collaboration across

the full spectrum of the U.S. government in planning for S&R

activities. In today's S&R operations, combat, stabilization, and some

reconstruction will occur simultaneously and often in the same area.

Moreover, low-intensity warfare and asymmetric attacks often

continue after major combat ends -clearly complicating the security

transition. Indeed, it is the lack of a stabilization capability -not a

lack of combat capability - that is the limiting factor in successfully

executing U.S. strategic goals. Effective S&R planning and execution

are more crucial than ever.

S&R operations span a time continuum starting well in advance of

actual combat and extending potentially for years into economic and

political development. The chart below illustrates the multiyear

dimensions of these issues. Accordingly, the assumption that the

number of resources on the ground will diminish after armed combat

ends is no longer valid. In fact, the numbers of forces needed "incountry" could substantially increase after major combat. Moreover,

the United States may need to provide substantial resources for

stabilization and reconstruction in nations in which there was

essentially no combat.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 99
POSTCONFLICT ACrIVITIES _______________________

Findings

Achieving political objectives, not "just" military

objectives, depends on preparation years in advance and

stabilization */reconstruction years after open hostilities

Number of our

people "in country"

Large-Scale Peacetime Hostilities Sbiltzation art Renstrtttt

Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

*Stabilization: The period following cessation of high-intensity conflict wherein violence is the decisive factor

in daily life and indigenous capabilities, e.g., law enforcement, are unable to achieve security and stability.

Effective planning - in advance of conflict - is crucial to achieving

successful S&R operations and meeting U.S. strategic objectives.

National and interagency processes must be expanded and improved

to bring together the best capabilities of the U.S. government early in

the process. Planning for S&R operations requires different skills than

does planning for traditional combat, and it needs to be better

integrated with preconflict contingency and war plans. While

combat is uniquely a DOD role, S&R requires a very broad set of

players, potentially including foreign governments or institutions

(orchestrated by DOS), in addition to DOD. To implement these S&R

planning objectives at the national level, the U.S. government must

have clear government-wide direction, an effective coordination

mechanism, close defense-civilian collaboration, and enhanced S&R

capabilities.

100 D5B SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE O•v
AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR

GOVERNMENT-WIDE S&R OPERA TIONS

GOVERNMENT-WIDE DIRECTION

It is apparent that the current interagency processes do not always

function effectively in planning for crises. Integrated planning for

stability operations rarely occurs at the national level prior to conflict.

The full range of U.S. capabilities for stabilization must be included in

planning for the combat phase and the expected transition towards

reconstruction. It is the proper role of the National Security Council

(NSC) to orchestrate U.S. response to crises. A national security

presidential directive (NSPD) - driven set of processes can strengthen

and improve U.S. interagency processes.

We make the following recommendation:

The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State should jointly propose an

NSPD to

"* Make explicit the role of the National Security Council in

managing national resources for crisis planning

"* Assign specific roles and responsibilities to departments

and agencies

"* Create a formal set of processes for crisis-related

interagency activities

"* Create a deputy NSC position for pre-S&R planning

"* Establish a small permanent core NSC stafffor expertise

and continuity

Overall direction and coordination for S&R operations should be

provided by the president and NSC. A decision made by the two

should trigger aggressive interagency planning and actions for

peacetime, combat operations, stabilization, and reconstruction. The

deputy NSC position would provide a focal point to ensure that the

Principals and Deputies Committees work on crisis-planning issues

continuously. As significant issues emerge, the cross-government

contingency planning and integration task forces (operating

simultaneously) would orchestrate the planning of extended

campaigns utilizing multiple instruments of national power.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILr-IES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 101
PosTcoNFLIcrAT Ac vrrzES

COORDINATION MECHANISM

Coordination Mechanism

Nol Priority countrles

No S y Sustained focu.

Planning .0 . lo P .-, Wr abill iOn,

National Security Councl r uOi~fl

Conlng. I y P €0•n,-,,..oo, i.nningadInt • odidoogi.. in Tak Fo . S oR pl." i , tlIVn 

N.pnoannarti&canfo

DODI/ 00l DC, CI SC Doi Sta t,.Iot ..

. I.. Comm ICountryand S&R DI axpeftl I I Sal l n a n toe

Co""mbatan Fi I . Comm mL ContorforStratogic l Counfty and

I d. SupportCom SiR f.unct ,,ion

OprEational oln Intenagency e Tak For Su p0 rug-ont

11Ui~titryPlana, OF Aib-daoa Station I18515 C Mar pomonn.l- under

Icniiao Pa. CDR CMal Chin Plold Chin.% NtOna ISn fnty

Coordination requdred throughout/Plans validated by rehearsal, exercises, red teaming

We make the following recommendation:

m Establish a national center for contingency support - one

option is an FFRDC organized, managed, and focused to

provide broad expertise and support for the contingency

planning and integration task forces:

- Rapid start up and sustainment of task forces

- Standing core staff with standing presence with

customers

- Standing set of consultant agreements for rapid

assembly of needed expertise

In fulfilling these roles, this center would provide six types of

capabilities:

* Cultural and regional expertise

102 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FoRcE ON
AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR

GOVERNMEAT-WIDE S&R OPERA TIONS

"* Functional knowledge, such as that of utilities,

energy, transportation, and banking

"* Support to include administration, logistics, and

communications

" Deployable personnel contracted to enter a crisis or

combat zone

"* Red teaming and exercise coordination

"* Technical expertise

Also, the center would provide planning support for departments

and regional combatant commanders.

Because S&R operational planning relates to so many noncombat

issues, the United States must develop and effectively use in-depth

knowledge of the languages, environments, and cultures of potential

adversaries. To underscore this point, a cursory examination of the

differences between Judeo-Christian and Islamic cultures indicates

that the areas in which the cultures exhibit the greatest apparent

differences (for example, the political, educational, and

social/cultural realms) are the areas to which the United States (and

in fact most of the "West") devotes relatively little effort in study and

research. A core capability at the national center for contingency

support in area and regional expertise would foster understanding of

cultural, regional, ideological, and economic differences among

nations. Moreover, we also believe that the Secretary of Defense and

the military services should task service schools and joint military

colleges and universities to develop studies in area and regional

expertise. Building this intellectual framework will enhance U.S.

initiatives to select achievable strategic objectives for public safety,

economic development, and political stability in the countries of

interest.

DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN COLLABORATION AND

ENHANCED CAPABILITIES

Discussions of "phases" for combat, stabilization, and

reconstruction have engendered visions of relatively crisp transitions

TRANSrITONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 103
PosTcoNFLicrT AcTlvrITE

(or hand-offs) between each phase. However, the nature of these

operations requires that many S&R activities occur simultaneously

rather than sequentially. Establishing security (a DOD role) in one

part of a country may occur simultaneously with establishing public

safety (a State role) in another part of the same country. As

illustrated in the graphic below, the amplitude lines show that both

DOS and DOD are involved in these operations on a continuing basis.

Complex and diverse missions overlap in time and space -such

missions as the provision of internal security, public safety, law

enforcement, justice, humanitarian relief, and governance. S&R

demands an extraordinarily close planning and working relationship

between the DOD and DOS that does not exist today.

State and Defense Share Collaborative Responsibilities for Stabilization

Control of Belligerents

U ioP. Snoont,

Protofion of Popule- ,

Rehugee end POW MRtten (Crood Control)

Protection of Key Individual, Infretruolor, DoD .d I •. gone State " Reorom of Locl So.uriy Ino.tiono

Records preeieralon .d omU arnent

Rogionreltroority,

VAW Detection, Identiticon, Secourity and

Ak IysO. (Coordirntion Mneuver rnd .rr

Spocroloed U.N.)

JLutle & Reconlliation

Tnerr onaIJustice %

LmiEnforcemnent

JudioleI Systern

Hu nr Right.

Crorretionrte Courts end Tribunalas --------_-

Truth Cornmisrsions - :

Comuounity Rebuilding

lndvidual Hleing end Engrnepment

OtpofEeertation./thctcre Phases 0/I/II I IV Oyorationdtear,'coe

Cooperaton inith International Humranitarianr

Orgiaizfion.- Cil iltrdey Operation. Center

IrteriptereThro ghout EcheonsofComrnnand Planning Level of Effort

As the major players, the Department of Defense and Department

of State must consider S&R planning and operations as primary

missions for their departments. While the DOD has the major

responsibility for combat and for establishing security, it is clear that

104 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR

GOVERNMENT-WIDE S&R OPERA TIONS

the DOS must play its own crucial role from the early planning for

conflict avoidance through execution of stabilization and

reconstruction. The Department of State and the Department of

Defense need to augment their existing capabilities for stabilization

and reconstruction planning and operations. To underscore these

points, the panel identified specific criteria for effective stabilization

capabilities that apply equally to both DOS and DOD, and then made

NOTIONAL assessments of each department, as illustrated in the

chart below.

Criteria for an Effective Stabilization Capability

I ~Findn

Effective Partnership S. . .Requires . . Improvernents . .. on BothSides .... DO DDO

Actively train, practice, exercise, rehearse

Evaluate readiness and validate plans

Available on short noticea i

Continuity Large in theater enough to support multiple concurrent t1

cumulative stabilization operations

Paddared for a range of cultures, languages

Elasticity o Ses brings together an adaptive resources enemy

Active experimentation program

S: ;"Recommendations

•DOD and DOS use these criteria to develop metrics to measure progress in S&R readiness

yDOD include So R readiness in the Joint Military Readiness Reporting System

i Inadequate Capability = Some Capability Exists but Needs to be Improved = Adequate Capability

It is absolutely clear that the DOD and the DOS have inextricably

interleaved equities in planning for stabilization and reconstruction

operations. The Department of Defense conducts combat operations and directs the transition to internal security operations--while the

Department of State brings together resources to provide public

safety, rule of law, governance, and other essential services. Planning

for contingencies is a primary mission of DOD, and it therefore has a

professional staff with a great deal of expertise in the planning

TRA NSITIONS TO A ND FROM Ho-10 75,~_TI~ 5UPPORTING PA PER5 105
PoSTcoNFLIcT AcrIvrTIE _

disciplines. These plans, and the premises upon which they are

based, are subjected to a complex set of evaluations and exercises that

improve the plans and integrate them with other DOD elements. The

U.S. government requires a strong DOS to lead nonmilitary aspects of

S&R and partner with the DOD to plan and execute these operations.

Given these intertwined roles and capabilities, the panel focuses its

findings and recommendations first on the Department of State and

then the Department of Defense.

106 D5B SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EMPOWER DEPARTMENT OF STA TE

CHAPTER 3. EMPOWER DEPARTMENT OF STA TE

OVERVIEW

The Department of State, like the Department of Defense, has not

traditionally regarded stabilization and reconstruction missions as

being among its core competencies. Both agencies need to recognize

that the S&R mission is inescapable, its importance irrefutable, and

closer cooperation between the two of them essential.

A hierarchy of tasks needs to be performed in any nation-building

operation. First comes security - demobilizing former combatants,

rebuilding police, and establishing an effective justice system. Next is

basic governance, public administration, and provision of public

services - garbage, water, schools, and power. Third are tasks related

to macroeconomics and regulation, including stabilization of

currency and resumption of commerce. Fourth is political reform,

which should result in a free press, civil society, political parties, and

elections. Finally, there is traditional economic development, to

include the development of heavy infrastructure.

By establishing a secure environment, military forces open a

window of opportunity during which political and economic changes

can take place, thereby allowing a society to move from conflict to

peace and democracy. It is the civil elements of an S&R mission that

must promote such changes. It is police, judges, civil administrators,

and technical advisors who help build new institutions for security,

rule of law, governance, civil society, a free press, and political

parties. If these civil capacities are not deployed and employed in a

timely fashion, then the window opened by the military intervention

eventually closes, leaving the situation no better than it was before.

The capacity to promote political and economic reform exists

in many civil agencies of the U.S. government, in international

organizations, in nongovernmental organizations, and in other

governments. Someone needs to mold these many strands into a

coherent pattern, based upon a common vision and a coordinated

TRANSIToNS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 107
PosTCOIVLzcrAcrIVmsES

strategy. The locus for this integration should be DOS, the only U.S.

agency that maintains connections to all the other essential actors.

DOD AND DOS PARTNERSHIP

Success in S&R operations depends upon a strong partnership

between the civil and military, between DOD and DOS. All civil

agencies of the U.S. government are accustomed to working abroad

under DOS oversight. U.S. military forces will never operate under

command of an ambassador, nor will embassies take instructions

form the local military commander, but the two must operate in

tandem, alternating in supported or supporting roles as the situation

may require. Success requires that plans be integrated and

capabilities exercised. At present, neither occurs with any regularity.

Genuine DOD-DOS partnership in S&R will require

adjustments on both sides. DOD will need to share aspects of its

operational planning; something the U.S. military has long been

reluctant to do. DOS will need to develop a capacity for operational

planning it currently does not possess.

We recommend that

0 The Secretary of Defense should urge DOS to participate

with regional combatant commanders in the creation and

exercising of contingency plans for stabilization and

reconstruction

0 The Secretary of Defense should share DOD contingency

plans with DOS early in the development process

PLANNING, READINESS, AND EXECUTION

Planning for S&R operations, to be most effective, must occur

prior to actual conflict. Since DOS and DOD will be both supported

and supporting "commanders," it is important that collaboration

between DOS and DOD begin early, prior to formalization of plans.

It is in this early process that assumptions can be challenged and

108 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EMPOWER DEPARTMENT OF STA TE

strategic objectives can be refined to more closely match capabilities.

Both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should work

to create this integration throughout planning processes for S&R.

S&R plans should be made by those who will execute them. This

objective is hard to achieve at DOS, where senior officials tend to be

fully occupied seeking to avoid the contingencies for which such

planning is intended. State's new Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) will provide a locus for

individuals who have the time and expertise to engage in such

planning, and a link to the policy makers who will ultimately have to

implement them.

In DOD, the locus for S&R plans and operations is the regional

combatant commanders. The plans and planning assumptions are

continually challenged through red teaming and other means and

exercised with combatant commanders /joint task force commanders.

It will be essential to create two-way links, which do not currently

exist between DOS and these regional commands. Like DOD, DOS

should develop metrics to measure progress in S&R readiness.

DOS will also need to develop a more robust capacity to execute

such plans. The Department of State's overseas operations are

managed through its regional bureaus, much as DOD's are through

the regional combatant commanders. The new office DOS has created

for S&R operations will perform a function analogous to the Joint

Forces Command, building a pool of expertise upon which the

regional bureaus can call, and creating a global doctrine for the civil

aspects of such operations.

DOD's extensive capabilities in crisis and deliberate planning

could substantially help kick start S/CRS if 10 or more experts, along

with an experienced senior leader, were assigned to DOS to bring to

it the intellectual capital and best practices developed over years

within DOD.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 109
POSTCONFLrIC'ACTIVITIES

We recommend:

The Secretary of Defense should export DOD's core

competencies in crisis and deliberate planning by

assigning a staff of ten experienced DOD planners (led by

a flag-level senior) to the Office of the Coordinator for

Stabilization and Reconstruction to provide models in

training, education, red teaming, course of action analysis,

worst casing, war gaming, and the like.

* DOD should develop metrics to measure progress in S&R

readiness

BUILDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY FOR S&R

SUPPORTING CURRENT INITIATIVES

DOS is creating the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization

and Reconstruction within the department. This step is important

and should be supported by DOD and other departments with

lessons learned, experienced people, and collaborative planning and

exercising of contingency plans. Secretary Powell has agreed to

provide the new S/CRS office 25 positions from the department's

current resources, but made clear that further increases depend upon

additional congressional funding and authorization.

The Secretary of Defense is in a position to help DOS by publicly

giving support to passage of the Stabilization and Reconstruction

Civilian Management Act of 2004 (the Lugar-Biden bill). The LugarBiden bill seeks to provide for the development -as a core mission of

DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) - of an

expert civilian response capability to carry out S&R activities in a

country or region in transition from conflict or civil strife (S.2127).

Similarly, the Secretary of Defense's public support of the new

office of reconstruction and stabilization in DOS, with commitment to

work collaboratively with it, would send a clear message to those in

110 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EMPOWER DEPARTMENT OF STATE

and out of government that the Departmefit of Defense is committed

to working with DOS on these crucial issues.

We recommend:

"* The Secretary of Defense should formally support the

Lugar-Biden bill and the creation of the Office of the

Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction in State.

"* The administration should seek and Congress should

appropriate proposed funding in the Lugar-Biden bill

($180 million).

RESOURCES AND FUNDING

The Lugar-Biden bill is a good starting point, but it does not

provide enough resources for either DOS staff or funding of

participation by other government agencies in supporting DOS's

contingency planning and operations. It is clear that the Department

of State needs substantially more resources, people, and funds if it is

to fulfill its proper role in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The administration should request and Congress should authorize

and appropriate the necessary positions and funding.

Further occasions like Iraq may arise wherein the United States

must assume responsibility for the full range of another nation's

government functions. Accordingly, S&R planning can require

expertise in all of the following areas:

"* Infrastructure: roads, rail, waterways, ports, airfields,

telecommunications, power

"* Public health: broad public health issues, sanitation,

hospital administration

"* Civil administration: agriculture, banking,

education, law enforcement

"* Governance and political processes

"* Rule of law and legal systems

TRANSrITONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS__ 111
PosTcoNFLIcTAc7vrrTES

* Economic development, commerce, and trade

* Humanitarian assistance

E Media: press, radio, television

Even as U.S. policy should seek to share such burdens more

broadly, U.S. planners must look to the possibility that the United

States might again have to assume such responsibilities. S/CRS seeks

to coordinate the civilian S&R capabilities for failing states emerging

from conflict and assist them on a path to peace, free markets and

democracy.

DOS will require a cadre of people with experience in S&R

operations, committed to the planning and preparation of future

operations as well as the conduct of ongoing ones. An addition of

approximately 250 positions will be required to' 5

"* Develop and maintain approximately five detailed

and executable plans for the civilian aspects of S&R

operations

"* Orchestrate and incorporate other civilian

government agency, international, and NGO

capabilities into these plans

"* Integrate DOS/ civilian plans and capabilities with

DOD operational plans

"* Exercise these plans with DOD and other

government agencies

"* Prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of the

S&R missions

This level of detail cannot be achieved by a handful of people.

Although some of these resources might be seconded from other

agencies, most of them will need to be full-time State employees.

15. The 250 additional positions do not include the planners for communications, lift,

logistics, administration, and other support needs.

112 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
EMPOWER DEPARTMENT OF STA TE

We recommend:

Additional funding, people, and authorities must be

provided.

- DOS should be provided adequate funds and

staffing for an approximately 250-person

capability.

- DOD and other departments should provide

personnel and other forms of support to S/CRS.

- DOS should seek and Congress should provide

more authority for DOS to move funds across

accounts for S&R purposes.

PROVIDING ADEQUA TE FUNDING AND RESOURCES FOR

KEY PAR TICIPA TING AGENCIES

The willingness of other agencies, such as Justice, Treasury,

and even USAID to participate in such missions will depend on

whether DOS has funding to pay their costs. No agency, and in

particular no domestic agency, will bear large out-of-pocket costs for

such missions from their own budgets.

Accordingly, DOS will also require access to adequate funding

if it is to be able to mobilize its own capabilities, and those of other

civil agencies, on short notice. This access requires either a

contingency fund, on the Federal Emergency Management Act model

(Stafford Act), or the freedom to reprogram funding from other

streams for S&R purposes. Ideally, all funding for the civil aspects of

such missions should be provided through a single flexible channel,

such as Congress provided for assistance to Central and Eastern

Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union.

In sum, while DOS and the Congress have pointed the way in

creating S/CRS and introducing the Lugar-Biden bill, these efforts

will need to be given more substantial and concrete form, to include

the necessary positions, contingency funding, and authority to

reprogram existing funding to S&R purposes expeditiously, to

TRANsrTIoNs TO AND FROM HOSTILrIrE5, SUPPORTING PAPERS__ 113
POSTcoNvFLicTAcTIvITIES

include the possibility that DOD would then transfer such funding

from its budget to DOS for S&R planning or operations alternatively,

would reimburse DOS for services performed under the economy

act.16

We recommend:

"* The administration should propose legislation (perhaps

similar to the Stafford Act) to provide DOS with

authorities and funds to plan, staff, and contract for S&R.

"* DOS should establish contingency contracts with requisite

agencies and companies to permit immediate response in

crisis.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. government needs a strong DOS to lead nonmilitary

aspects of S&R and to partner with DOD to plan and execute these

operations. The Department of State's role must be more explicit,

and it must have authorities and funding commensurate with that

role. Providing effective operational-level reconstruction planning

will require people and money, as well as flexibility to operate during

intense crisis and conflict. The level of preparation required for the

civilian side of S&R should approach that of DOD's operational

plans. Additionally, DOS would benefit from substantial

collaboration with the Department of Defense. The implementation of

these recommendations will provide DOS with the capabilities and

resources to plan and execute the civilian component of complex,

large-scale campaigns.

16. The economy act allows one agency to buy services from another agency.

114 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ENHANCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES FOR S&R OPERA TIONS

CHAPTER 4. ENHANCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES FOR S&R OPERA TIONS

OVERVIEW

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 led to a new national

military strategy for the United States. The strategy dictated that the

Department of Defense had four missions:

"* Defend the homeland

"* Deter potential enemies in four critical regions of the

world

"* Maintain the ability to swiftly defeat the efforts of

two potential adversaries

"* Remain able to fight and win one decisive military

operation

Known as the 1-4-2-1 strategy, it was used to determine the size of

the military departments. The strategy recognized the need to

conduct stability and reconstruction operations in the wake of a

decisive military operation, but it did not explicitly address the size

of the S&R force that might be needed. Additionally, the strategy did

not address the potential need for S&R operations attendant to

"swiftly defeat" efforts.

The new strategy seemed to assume, as its predecessor had done,

that S&R operations were a subset of combat operations. That is,

whatever military force was required to defeat an enemy would be

adequate to conduct successful S&R activities.

This panel challenged this assumption by looking at major S&R

operations conducted since the end of the cold war. We found that,

though there are many variables that affect the size of the force

required for S&R operations, the two most important are the political

goals of the conflict and the stability of the postconflict environment.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS__ 115
PO5TCoNFLICTACrIVITIES_

Force Size Has NotAlways Matched U.S. Strategic Goals

Difficulty

• Highly Conflicted

Environments Iraq

• No Functional Forces for 0

Social Order

* AmbitiousAI

SoC) Bosnia

0D Afghanistan 0 Kosovo

0 Somalia

0 Haiti

•CoherentfiwIIinment

-Co-opt Indigenous Forces

-Modest Goals _ __ _ Presence

5 10 15 20 25

Troops/1000 inhabitants

In general, the more ambitious the political goals of the conflict,

the larger the force required for their achievement. The chart above

illustrates that the ambitious political goals in Bosnia and Kosovo led

to a large S&R force requirement, even though the conflicts

themselves were relatively small. On the other hand, relatively

modest political goals in Haiti were temporarily achieved with a

much smaller force.

The stability of the S&R environment also has a major impact on

the size of the force required for S&R operations. The lack of any

political stability in Bosnia and Kosovo contributed to the large S&R

force requirement there. One can see from the chart that the United

States is attempting to accomplish very ambitious goals in Iraq in a

chaotic environment with a small ratio of force to inhabitants. More

modest U.S. goals in Afghanistan require a smaller force, though

116 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ENHANCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES FOR S&R OPERA T!ONS

perhaps a larger one than the United States and its coalition partners

have committed.

Our review of current and recent S&R operations leads us to

conclude that S&R operations are not a subset of combat operations.

They are an explicit mission of the Department of Defense, and

deserve equal consideration in force sizing, planning, training, and

execution. Technology has given U.S. military forces an

overwhelming advantage in the conduct of combat operations. So

powerful is this advantage that U.S. forces can defeat opponents with

less force than may be required to provide for the stabilization and

reconstruction of the defeated enemy. This fact has diverse

implications for the Department of Defense. In the pages that follow,

we make recommendations regarding four of the areas we believe are

most important:

m Planning and organization

. Force structure

"* Doctrine, training, and readiness

"* Enablers

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

The mind-set of the Department of Defense needs to change; the

department can no longer view S&R operations as a subset of combat

operations. It is now recognized that S&R operations can be even

more manpower-intensive than is combat, and S&R operations can

last for years, while periods of intense combat are getting shorter.

S&R operations also possess a level of complexity not found in

combat operations, since their successful execution requires the

application of many elements of national power besides military

force. S&R operations demand unprecedented levels of collaboration

among the departments of government, notably between the

Department of State and the Department of Defense.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 117
POSTCOIFLICT ACTIVTIES_

The military services have a robust planning culture, and they

nurture that culture with resources, adequate planning time, and

excellent people. None of the other departments of government have

the resources, training, or culture necessary for them to make the

necessary contribution to planning for postconflict S&R operations.

We recommend:

The Department of Defense should treat stability and reconstruction

operations as an explicit mission in force planning.

The Department of Defense should embed concepts for S&R operational

planning and execution in all service schools, specifically including

interagency roles, responsibilities, and processes.

The Department of Defense should proactively export its competence in

operational-level planning by

"* Assigning a staff of experienced planners to the new DOS

Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and

Reconstruction. Led by a flag or general officer, this group

can provide expertise in, training, red teaming, and war

gaming.

"* Increasing the numbers and frequency of liaison visits and

cross-department assignments for military officers to work

at the DOS and USAID.

" Designating a flag or general officer from each regional

combatant command as interagency liaison for S&R

planning.

The regional combatant commanders are the keys to successful

planning for S&R operations, but their staffs lack some of the

technical expertise unique to S&R planning, as well as access to all of

the interagency representation required to develop a comprehensive

S&R plan.

118 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ENHA NCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CAPABILUTIES FOR S&R OPERA TIONS

We recommend:

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should designate a military

service college or a college of the National Defense University to support

each regional combatant commander with stabilization and

reconstruction research and planning.

The Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of State,

should designate a federally funded research and development center as a

center of excellence for research on stabilization and reconstruction

planning and execution.

We believe that the planning and execution of S&R operations

will benefit from the same unity of command that is so important in

combat operations. We also recognize that stabilization and

reconstruction planning has unique intelligence requirements. S&R

planning must be conducted concurrently with and mesh seamlessly

with combat planning, and needs the active collaboration of many

agencies outside of DOD.

Another unique aspect of S&R operations is their transition from

DOD lead to DOS lead as operations move from initial stabilization

operations to longer term reconstruction operations. This transition is

just as critical as the transition from combat to stabilization. Using the

familiar analogy of supported and supporting commands, military

forces are the supported command during combat and stabilization

operations, but become the supporting command as the DOS

assumes control of reconstruction operations.

We recommend:

Each regional combatant commander should designate a joint

commander for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations.

Planning should include:

"* Aggressive outreach to appropriate interagency partners

" Appropriate plans for exercises and red teaming

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 119
POSTCOIVFLIcTACI VI TIES

Transition planning for combat-to-stability operations and

stability-to-reconstruction operations

FORCE STRUCTURE

The panel identified eleven critical capabilities, listed in italics

throughout the section below, necessary for successful stability and

reconstruction operations, which were grouped into four major areas:

security, communication, humanitarian services, and focused

expertise.

Security is the bedrock of S&R operations. It is the umbrella under

which all other S&R operations proceed. Security requires robust

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. There is no

substitute for the ability to gather human and technical intelligence,

observe the environment, and conduct reconnaissance. Adequate

numbers of security forces must be in place in the immediate aftermath

of combat operations to ensure adequate force protection and

security for the indigenous population. Adequate numbers of trained

military police are also required to properly execute law enforcement

functions and maintain order.

Communication, both internally and externally, is critical for S&R

forces. Strategic communication and public affairs allows S&R forces to

get their story before the public, and to counter rumors and

misinformation. A robust information operations (G0) capability is

necessary to protect S&R forces as well as to control the

communications environment.

Humanitarian services are most critical for S&R operations, as

they tend to be one of the most visible manifestations of U.S. and

coalition efforts. Adequate numbers of well-trained civil affairs

personnel are vital to successful humanitarian operations. Robust

engineering capability, including civil engineers, is required, especially if

infrastructure has been damaged or neglected. S&R forces need to be

prepared to render humanitarian assistance (medical treatment and

provision of basic human services) as well as to disburse funds to hire

local labor.

120 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ENHANCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CA PA BILIIES FOR S&R OPERA TIONS

Focused expertise is at once critical to success and difficult to

acquire. Language capability is vital. While the panel recognizes that no

S&R force is likely to have adequate numbers of linguists, cultural

familiarity and sensitivity can and should be a prerequisite for troops

assigned to S&R missions.

These critical capabilities come from a wide variety of units at

multiple levels in the DOD. Some of them, like military police, are

traditionally task-organized into existing formations. In these cases,

the units are comfortable being attached, and commanders of the

gaining units are generally familiar with the attachment's capabilities

and support requirements.

Other critical capabilities are less well known at the brigade and

battalion levels. They typically reside at the highest operational level

of the Army, or outside of the Army in the various defense agencies.

They do not typically train with brigades and battalions, and gaining

commanders are not likely to be familiar with their capabilities or

their support requirements.

We recommend:

The Army and Marine Corps, in conjunction with the Joint Forces

Command (JFCOM), should develop some modules of various critical

capabilities and experiment with them to determine whether there are

some combinations of these capabilities that bring synergy to S&R

operations.

We believe that this recommendation will also lead to a greater

familiarity on the part of brigade and battalion commanders with the

capabilities and support requirements of some of these providers of

critical capability, enhancing planning and execution of S&R

operations.

The Army is currently undergoing a dramatic restructuring from

its traditional divisions to modular combat brigades. In addition, a

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HosT.zmurIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 121
PO5TCONFLICT ACTIVITIES

rebalancing between the active and reserve force is underway. This

process should provide the nation with more flexible generalpurpose forces, which we believe are the right forces for S&R

operations. As the Army proceeds with its restructuring, it is

important to recognize the critical role the reserve force will play in

future S&R operations.

We recommend:

The Department of the Army should accelerate the restructuring of guard

and reserve forces, with emphasis on modular capability for the S&R

mission.

We specifically do not recommend the creation of specialized units at any

level dedicated to S&R operations. The size, complexity, and length of S&R

operations demand that they be a core competency of U.S. general-purpose

forces.

DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND READINESS

DOCTRINE

The current draft Joint Operational Concept on Stability, Transition,

and Reconstruction Operations published by Joint Forces Command is a

good baseline doctrinal publication. If Joint Forces Command taps

into the wealth of recent experience currently available, it will be able

to publish usable joint doctrine quickly. We should think of this

doctrine as constantly evolving, informed by the latest experience of

U.S. men and women in theater. As this doctrine is developed, joint

planners need to give additional thought to the contributions of the

Navy and the Air Force.

We also urge the DOS to give careful thought to the current draft

joint operational concept, and use it as a model to produce

complementary guidance for DOS. With DOS in the lead, other

federal agencies should be encouraged to produce usable guidance

for the conduct of S&R operations.

122 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ENHANCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CAPABILJTIES FOR S&R OPERATIONS

We recommend:

Joint Forces Command should use the current draft "Joint Operational

Concept on Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations" as a

guide to develop, publish, and refine joint doctrine for stability and

reconstruction operations.

"* Make it a living best-practice guide informed by real-world

experience.

"* Clearly identify the contributions of all the services to

S&R.

The DOS should use the current draft operation guidance as a model to

produce complementary documents for its use and the use of other federal

agencies.

TRAINING

While creating and publishing joint doctrine for S&R operations is

important, it is only the first step. DOD general-purpose forces must

be adequately trained in the doctrine. It must be a part of major

service and joint exercises, and should form an important part of the

curriculum in both service and joint schools at every level. To be

effective, this training should involve other federal agencies likely to

play a role in S&R operations, notably the DOS, Department of

Justice, and USAID.

We recommend:

Service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate

stabilization and reconstruction operations into all joint and military

service schools and premier training events.

The under Secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness should

provide additional funding and classroom seats at service and joint

TRANSTrIONs TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 123
POSTCONFLCTACTIVITIES_ _

education institutions to accommodate more students from other federal

agencies.

DOD should partner with the Foreign Service Institute to create a

program at the National Defense University to teach integrated planning

skills.

READINESS

The DOD has a formal process (the Joint Military Readiness

Reporting System) for checking and reporting the combat readiness

of various service units. This process has agreed-upon metrics and

common measures of readiness that apply to personnel, training,

force structure, and equipment. No such system or metrics exist to

measure the readiness of military forces to execute S&R operations.

We recommend:

DOD should develop metrics to measure the readiness of military units to

conduct S&R operations, and include those metrics in the Joint Military

Readiness Reporting System.

ENABLERS

This section was created to describe some of the additional areas

on which DOD will need to focus in order to enhance S&R

capabilities as an integral part of its mission. While they do not fit

neatly into any particular category, these factors emerged as key

enablers to successful S&R operations.

MONEY

At the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq, commanders were

provided with money confiscated from the former Iraqi government.

They used this money to finance local projects and boost local

economies throughout the country. When this confiscated money was

spent, there was a substantial delay before appropriated funds were

124 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
ENHANCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES FOR S&R OPERATIONS

made available. Even then, the bureaucracy made it difficult for

commanders to spend the money without the risk of censure.

The Iraqi experience makes it very clear that "money is

ammunition" in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Commanders need the ability to disburse resources at the tactical

level to help achieve coalition goals.

We recognize the utility of the Commanders Emergency Response

Fund, but we believe that much more can be done to make this fund

an effective weapon in S&R operations.

We recommend:

The Secretary of Defense should move aggressively to gain the support of

the Congress and related government agencies to design a program

whereby money can be made available for commanders at the tactical level

to support S&R operations.

The rules governing the use of the Commanders Emergency Response

Fund should be liberalized, and training should be provided to

commanders in the proper disbursement of these resources. We strongly

believe that commanders in the filed can be entrusted with these funds

when given proper guidance and common-sense regulations.

CONTRACTING

Commanders in the field found that contracting procedures were

too difficult, slow, and risk-averse to be effective in a fluid situation

such as that in Iraq. For the most part, the panel found that the

problems responsible for this circumstance were not legal problems,

but policy restrictions. Had contracting professionals been a part of

the planning process, many of the contracting problems could have

been avoided or quickly resolved.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 125
PosTcONFLICTACrIVrriES

Operational commanders need access to contracting expertise

during the planning process and at every step of combat and

postcombat operations.

We recommend:

As part of the planning process for S&R operations, a team led by the

staff of the combatant commander should

"m Analyze prior contracting problems and anticipate

solutions

"0 Predesignate operational contracting authority and

adequately resource that authority to execute contracts

"0 Position contracting and legal personnel in the fieldfor

continuous support to operational commanders

LEGAL AUTHORITY

In some postconflict situations (notably in Iraq, relating to DOD

participation in training indigenous police forces) operational

commanders labor under the assumption that they do not have the

necessary legal authority to act in the best interest of their mission. In

fact, adequate legal authority often exists, but overly risk-averse

policies a lack of expert advice lead to poor outcomes.

We recommend:

Commanders should be encouraged to utilize the full extent of their legal

authority in the interest of mission accomplishment, and senior

departmental leadership should provide strong encouragement and

support for common-sense decisions made with the best available legal

advice.

126 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE OL
APPENDIXA

APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE

TRANSrTIOlVS TO AND FROM HoSTILITIES, suPPoRTING PAPERS 127
TERMS OF REFERENCE

This page intentionally left blank.

128 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

~ ~-~"3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON

U WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SJAN23

ACQUISITION.

TECHNOLOGY

AND'LOGISTICs MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the

Transition to and from Hostilities

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force addressing

the Transition to and from Hostilities.

Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such

excursion in the global war on terrorism. We may need to support an ally under attack by

terrorists determined to replace the legitimate government; we may need to effect change

in the governance of a country that is blatantly sustaining support for terrorism; or we

may need to assist an ally who is unable to govern areas of their own country - where

terrorists may recruit, train and plan without interference by the legitimate government.

Our armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving

conventional military victory. However, we have learned that sustainment of military

success must be accompanied by concomitant location of enemy leaders, location of

weapons including WMD, interruption of terrorist's finances, and interdiction of couriers

providing communication so as to truly progress in the global war on terrorism. These

latter challenges cannot be ensured during hostilities unless there has been effective

intelligence preparation of the battlespace in the years - not weeks or months - preceding

hostilities.

Furthermore, we have and will encounter significant challenges following

conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights

and a productive economy. Achieving these ends would be facilitated by successful

shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the

capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities.

To enhance the effectiveness across this spectrum of pre- and post-conflict issues,

the 2004 Summer Study shall focus on the following issues:

1. Understanding and shaping the environment: the gathering of longlead intelligence and effective preparation of the battlespace - in the absence of

an immediate threat - requires diligence, foresight and preparation.

GN
Long-lead intelligence preparation of the battlespace will involve terrestrial

sensing, tagging and tracking in concert with HUMINT, SIGINT, and open

sources; and the application of sophisticated means of data tracking in cyberspace.

Are there gaps in our technology? How can we assess our 'intelligence readiness',

as we now assess our military readiness, in selected regions where hostilities may

occur?

Shaping is extremely complicated, requires significant cultural understanding and

a long attention span, well in advance of hostilities.

The handoff from long-term shaping efforts to shorter term DoD interests

can significantly impact the intensity of hostilities and its aftermath.

Likewise, the post-hostility environment is likely to be affected

significantly by details of the war prosecution such as collateral damage

and treatment of combatants and civilians alike.

How can our capabilities in shaping, language and cultural understanding

be enhanced by technology?

2. Force protection during transition: Increasingly, US military forces

rely more on speed and mobility than hardening to achieve their objectives. In the

transition to the post hostilities phase, forces become much more stationary, and

become easier targets for residual resistance. What technologies, and tactics,

techniques, and procedures can provide force protection during transformation

from maneuver warfare to peace keeping operations such as a garrison force

charged with establishing order?

3. Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks: The deposed

regime may leave behind many dangerous devices; e.g. conventional munitions

and.WMD, and other legacies. What capabilities are needed to address disposal,

as well as environmental and security issues associated with these unwanted

devices?

4. Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath: Rapid, decisive battlespace

victory can produce a rich vein of captured documents, materiel, and human

sources, but their exploitation, today, is personnel-intensive and requires good

language skills coupled with substantive and cultural understanding. What

approaches can more swiftly and economically process said collection?

5. Stabilizing the civilian population: There will be inevitable need to

address problems of refugees and displaced persons, mortuary assistance, food
supply, housing and health care. DoD will likely be charged with these

challenges: what preparation, training and technology can be applied to facilitate

these elements of infrastructure?

6. Re-establishing the rule of law: One important step in establishing

order is the need to reconstitute a constabulary force. Improvements are needed in

our methods for vetting applicants, tracking them and their behavior, and avoiding

friendly fire incidents between them and our own forces. Improved technologies

are desirable for their selection, training, and interoperability with US forces.

Furthermore, the use of precision munitions results in much less damage to the

enemy's military infrastructure and armed forces. Therefore, the post-hostility

phase will likely face large numbers of motivated individuals with military

training who view the US as an enemy. Are there techniques and technologies

which can identify those who will or will not present an insurgency threat in the

post hostilities phase? Can something be done in the pre hostility phase which

will minimize or even eliminate post hostility phase insurgency and terrorism

problems?

7. Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure: This requires reliable

communications and interim power and potable water sources. How rapidly can

these be inserted? Might there be opportunity for establishing subsequent

monitoring capabilities?

After the initial effort, it is critical to put in place the infrastructure, economic

enablers, and a political/legal structure to establish a successful post-war economy,

a representative and democratic government, and a stable social structure. What

can and should DoD do to further these goals? What other agencies, international

organizations and non-governmental organizations should be involved? How

should DoD work with them?

In responding to the above challenges, it must be recognized that transitioning to

and from hostilities requires such a wide range of capabilities that many are not

integral to the Department of Defense (DoD). It is important to manage the

transitions in such a way that those capabilities are exploited fully despite

organizational boundaries. Sound capability management requires DoD to

identify those capabilities resident within other US government agencies, those

inherent within DoD and those needing development by the DoD or others.

Where the capabilities are external to DoD, provision for their transfer to DoD

control if appropriate should be pre-arranged and tested in joint exercises.

This study will be co-sponsored by me as the Under Secretary of Defense

(AT&L), Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence). Dr. Craig Fields and Mr. Phil Odeen will serve as co-Chairmen. Dr. Jerry

McGinn and COL Kevin McLaughlin will serve as co-Executive Secretaries. LTC Scott

Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal

Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force

will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title

18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as

procurement official.
APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE PANEL MEMBERSHIP

PosTCONFL ICTACTI VTIES

Mr. Larry Wright, Co-chair Current: Private Consultant

Former: Senior Vice President and Senior

Partner, Booz Allen Hamilton

Gen Mike Williams, USMC, (Ret), Current: Senior Fellow, Logistic Management

Co-chair Institute

Former: Assistant Commandant of the

Marine Corps

Dr. Janet Ballantyne Current: Group Vice President International,

Abt Associates

i Former: Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Agency

for International Development (USAID),

rank of career minister

Dr. Joseph Braddock Current: Potomac Institute

Former: Founder, Corporate Officer, and

i Director, BDM International

AMB James Dobbins Current: Director, International Security and

Defense Policy Center, RAND

Former: Special Envoy to Afghanistan,

Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia;

Assistant Secretary of State for Europe

Dr. Ted Gold Current: Chief Technology Officer, Science

Application International Corporation,

Transformation, Test, Training and Logistic

Group

Former: Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense for Chemical Warfare & Biological

Defense Matters

Dr. George Heilmeier Current: Chairman Emeritus, Telcordia

Technologies

Former: Director, DARPA; Senior Vice

President and Chief Technical Officer, Texas

Instruments

Mr. Noel Koch Current: President and CEO, International

Security Management, Inc.

Former: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense for International Security Affairs

ADM Joe Lopez, USN (Ret) Current: President, Information

Manufacturing Corporation (IMC)

Former: Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 129
TA5K FORCE MEMBERSHIP

Forces Europe and Allied Forces Southern

Europe

Dr. Joe Markowitz Current: Private Consultant

Dr. Susan Marquis Current: Vice President, Resource

Management, LMI

Forner. Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations (Resources, Requirements and

Assessments) (N8B)

Ms. Judith Miller Current: Partner, Williams & Connolly LLP

Formen. General Counsel, Department of

Defense

Prof Harvey Sapolsky Current: Professor of Public Policy and

Organization, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology; Director of the MIT Security

Studies Program

Mr. Rich Wilhelm Current: Vice President, Global Resilience,

Booz Allen Hamilton

Former: Senior Policy Advisor to Vice

President Gore

Government Advisors

Dr. Jerry McGinn Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy,

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy

Dr. Stewart Patrick Department of State

Mr. Michael Shama I HQ, Army Corps of Engineers

Mr. Ross Wherry U.S. Agency for International Development

Staff

Ms. Tamara DiGregorio Booz Allen Hamilton

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Dr. Bill Howard, Co-chair Current: Private Consultant

Former: Senior Vice President and Director of

Research and Development, Motorola, Inc.

Dr. Williamson Murray, Co-chair Current: Senior Fellow, Institute for Defense

Analyses; Professor Emeritus of History,

Ohio State University

Mr. Alan Ellinthorpe Current: Private Consultant

Mr. Frank Hoffman Current: Research Fellow at the Center for

Emerging Threats and Opportunities at

130 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
APPENDIX B

Quantico

Former: National Security Analyst and

Director, Marine Strategic Studies Group

Mr. Norman Polmar Current: U.S. Naval Institute and Anteon

Corporation

Dr. Michael Vlahos Current: Director, Security Studies Program,

The Johns Hopkins University School of

Advanced International Studies

Former: Director, Center for the Study of

Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Gen Mike Williams, USMC (Ret) f Current: Senior Fellow, Logistics

Management Institute

Former: Assistant Commandant of the

Marine Corps

Government Advisor

Dr. Jerry McGinn Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy,

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

.. ... ................ .. ..... ... Policy ............................................ ............................. ............. .. .. .. ............................................. .. .................. . . . . ........... -

Staff

Mr. Kevin Gates Strategic Analysis, Inc.

TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 131
APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS RECEIVED BY THE PANEL

APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS RECEIVED BY THE PANELS

PosTcoNFucrAcTvInEs

Mr. Lincoln Bloomfield-Assistant Discussion on Post Conflict and

Secretary of State, Bureau of Reconstruction

Political - Military Affairs

Mr. Jim Kunder - Deputy USAID role in stabilization and

Assistant Administrator for Asia reconstruction

and the Near East in USAID

Mr. Rick Barton - CSIS Governance issues

Dr. Harvey Sapolsky - Director of Governance issues

the MIT Security Studies

Mr. Dave Oliver Iraq experience

Ms. Janet Ballantyne USAID role in stabilization and

reconstruction

Mr. Jim Bishop Discussion: How to improve U.S. and

international performance in Post Conflict

operations

Gen Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) OIF Lessons Learned

Mr. Robert Perito Discussion: how can we improve public

security

Mr. Ken Adelman Lessons for Today's Leaders

MG Buford Blount, USA Army's view of post-hostilities

reconstruction ............- G e . M ........... .h.a e -- -- ... .e..U. ....... M ............... ................. !s ~ s i n ............ ................. ............. .. .. ......

Gen Michael Hagee, USMC Discussion

MG Bill Nash, USA (Ret) Discussion Post Conflict activities

Mr. Ross Wherry - USAID Post Conflict Planning

Mr. Anthony Cordesman Discussion

Mr. Pat Patterson-DOS Future of Iraq

Ms. Jane Lute - (Assistant Discussion on Post Conflict Phase

Secretary-General for Mission

Support in the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations of the

UN (Military)

Prof Francis Fukuyama Discussion on Post Conflict

132 DSB SUMMER STUDY TASK FORCE ON
APPENDIX X: ACRONYMS

APPENDIX D. ACRONYMS

C/JFLCC Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander

CINC Commander-in-Chief

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering

DOD Department of Defense

DOS Department of State

DSB Defense Science Board

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center

IDF Israeli Defense Force

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JTIAF Joint Interagency Task Force

NGO Nongovernment Organization

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OPLANS Operational Plans

OSRO Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and

Stabilization

S&R Stabilization and Reconstruction

SSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command

USAID U.S Agency for International Development

TRANSrrIONS TO AND FROM HoSTILITIES, SUPPORTING PAPERS 133