SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0036-20

SHAN-MAR, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THERESA DIANE MITCHELL,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________

Submitted March 14, 2022 – Decided March 25, 2022

Before Judges Rothstadt and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-1233-18.

Kendall S. Murphy, attorney for appellant. 

Freidel & Kramer, PC, attorneys for respondent (Talbot 

B. Kramer Jr., on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Shan-Mar, Inc. (Shan-Mar) appeals from a July 20, 2020 order 

granting summary judgment to defendant Theresa Diane Mitchell and 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-0036-20

dismissing its complaint based on the entire controversy doctrine. Plaintiff also 

appeals from an August 17, 2020 order awarding attorney's fees and costs under 

Rule 1:4-8 and directing Mark Molz1to reimburse defendant in the amount of 

$16,426.25. We affirm both orders. 

The parties are familiar with the facts relevant to this appeal based on their 

prior divorce litigation. In January 2018, Molz and defendant were granted a 

final judgment of divorce (FJOD). In the equitable distribution portion of the 

FJOD, the family part judge determined a sailboat and boat slip held in the name 

of Shan-Mar were marital property and ordered the boat and slip to be sold. 

Molz refused to cooperate regarding the sale of the boat and slip under the

terms of the FJOD and defendant moved to enforce its terms. The family part 

judge held Molz in contempt of court and granted defendant a limited power of 

attorney to execute documents necessary to sell all property subject to equitable 

distribution, including the boat and slip. 

In March 2019, defendant entered into a purchase agreement to sell the 

sailboat, signing the document as "Theresa Mitchell, POA Mark Molz." 

1

 Mark Molz is a licensed New Jersey attorney and represented Shan-Mar prior 

to current counsel filing a substitution of attorney to represent the corporate 

entity. Additionally, Molz served as a corporate officer of Shan-Mar prior to 

the FJOD. 
3

A-0036-20

Defendant also obtained a duplicate title to the boat using the court-ordered

limited power of attorney. 

Molz appealed the FJOD and order authorizing defendant to sell assets as 

part of the equitable distribution award. On appeal, Molz argued the family part 

judge abused her discretion in allowing defendant to share corporately owned 

assets that should have been excluded from consideration as marital property 

subject to equitable distribution. He also claimed Shan-Mar was never a party 

to the divorce action and it was deprived of due process when the family part 

judge ordered the boat and slip to be sold. We affirmed the FJOD in its entirety 

and the order enforcing the equitable distribution award. Molz v. Molz, No. A2888-17 (App. Div. May 1, 2020). In affirming, we noted business assets, such 

as Shan-Mar's boat and slip, were subject to equitable distribution and the family 

part judge correctly included the boat and slip as part of the division of marital 

property in the FJOD. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied Molz's petition 

for certification. Molz v. Molz, 244 N.J. 163 (2020). 

Dissatisfied with the family part judge's FJOD and this court's affirmance 

of the FJOD, including the equitable distribution award, Molz filed a complaint 

on behalf of Shan-Mar in the Law Division in Ocean County.

2

 Shan-Mar sought 

2

 Venue for the divorce action was Mercer County.
4

A-0036-20

to set aside the sale of the boat and slip because the corporation was not a party 

to the divorce action. 

In its 2018 complaint, Shan-Mar asserted Molz and defendant formed the 

corporation in 2002 for the purpose of owning a sailboat and boat slip. In 

forming the corporation, Molz and defendant intended to gift to their daughters, 

Shannon and Marisa, the sailboat and slip as part of the annual maximum gift 

amount allowed by law. Shan-Mar's shareholders at the time it filed the 

complaint were Shannon and Marisa Molz. Marisa Molz is Shan-Mar's sole 

corporate officer. 

Ten months after Shan-Mar filed its complaint, defendant moved for 

summary judgment, arguing Shan-Mar's claims were previously litigated in the 

divorce action and resolved in the FJOD. Shan-Mar opposed defendant's motion 

and filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment and other relief. 

In a comprehensive oral decision placed on the record on June 19, 2020, 

Judge Robert E. Brenner granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and 

denied Shan-Mar's motions. Judge Brenner meticulously stated his factual 

findings after thoroughly reviewing the summary judgment record. The judge 

concluded Shan-Mar's claims were barred by the entire controversy doctrine. 

Judge Brenner expressly found Molz's arguments raised before the family part 
5

A-0036-20

judge in the divorce action, asserting the sailboat and slip were not marital assets 

subject to equitable distribution, were identical to Shan-Mar's arguments in the 

Law Division action. 

The judge rejected Shan-Mar's argument the entire controversy doctrine 

was inapplicable because the corporation was not a party to the divorce action. 

As the judge explained, "[t]he factual circumstances which give rise to Shan[-]

Mar's allegations in the amended complaint all arise from the issues which have 

previously been considered and disposed of in the divorce action and affirmed 

by the Appellate Division." Judge Brenner stated, "the arguments proffered by 

Shan[-]Mar were previously made and rejected in the divorce action . . . and 

affirmed on appeal." The judge concluded Shan-Mar's action was 

a textbook example of a party seeking a second bite of 

the apple by reframing issues that were lost in a 

different forum. Mr. Molz had every opportunity to 

join Shan-Mar . . . in the divorce action if he felt that 

was necessary and . . . chose not to do so. His failure 

to do so now bars this matter pursuant to the entire 

controversy doctrine. 

Judge Brenner's detailed and thorough oral decision was memorialized in a July 

20, 2020 order.

After prevailing on her summary judgment motion, defendant filed a 

motion for counsel fees under Rule 1:4-8. The motion judge deemed Shan-Mar's 
6

A-0036-20

claims "frivolous," without basis in law or in fact, and "completely untenable." 

In an August 17, 2020 order, the judge required Molz to reimburse defendant 

$16,025 in counsel fees and $401.25 in expenses. 

On appeal, Shan-Mar argues the entire controversy doctrine did not bar its 

claims and summary judgment was premature because discovery was 

incomplete. Shan-Mar further claims the motion judge's dismissal of the 

complaint violated its right to due process. Shan-Mar also asserts its Law 

Division claims were filed in good faith and, therefore, the judge erred in 

awarding counsel fees to defendant. 

We disagree and affirm for the thoughtful and well-reasoned oral 

decisions rendered by Judge Brenner. We add only the following comments.

The entire controversy doctrine, codified in Rule 4:30A, requires the

parties to an action raise all transactionally-related claims in that action. See

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:30A (2022). The 

doctrine requires parties in an action to raise all transactionally related claims 

against each other. Bank Leumi U.S.A. v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 227 (2020). 

"Underlying the [e]ntire [c]ontroversy [d]octrine are the twin goals of 

ensuring fairness to parties and achieving economy of judicial resources." Kent 

Motor Cars, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds, Co., 207 N.J. 428, 443 (2011). The 
7

A-0036-20

doctrine "embodies the principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy 

should occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly, all parties involved 

in a litigation should at the very least present in that proceeding all of their 

claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy." Wadeer v. 

N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605 (2015) (quoting Highland Lakes Country 

Club & Cmty. Ass'n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 123, 125 (2009)). The goals of the 

entire controversy doctrine include "(1) the need for complete and final 

disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties 

to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency 

and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay." Ibid. (quoting DiTrolio 

v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995)).

"In determining whether a subsequent claim should be barred under [the 

entire controversy] doctrine - 'the central consideration is whether the claims 

against the different parties arise from related facts or the same transaction or 

series of transactions.'" Ibid. (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 267). In applying 

the doctrine, fairness and a reasonable opportunity to litigate must be accorded 

to the party whose claim is sought to be barred. Gelber v. Zito P'ship, 147 N.J. 

561, 565 (1997). 
8

A-0036-20

"The entire controversy doctrine 'seeks to impel litigants to consolidate 

their claims arising from a single controversy whenever possible.'" 

Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 

N.J. 91, 98 (2019) (quoting Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 5 

(1983)). "The doctrine serves 'to encourage complete and final dispositions 

through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions and to promote judicial efficiency 

and the reduction of delay.'" Ibid. (quoting Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 610).

Having reviewed the record, Judge Brenner appropriately applied the 

entire controversy doctrine to bar Shan-Mar's claims. Shan-Mar's Law Division 

claims were directly related to the disposition of its property, specifically the 

sailboat and boat slip. In the divorce action, Molz raised the very same argument 

asserted by Shan-Mar in the Law Division matter. The family part judge 

determined the sailboat and slip were marital property and we affirmed that 

determination on appeal.

Nothing in the entire controversy doctrine required Shan-Mar to be named 

as a party in the divorce action for the family part judge to dispose of its assets 

acquired during the marriage. While Shan-Mar could have been named as a 

party in the divorce action, Molz elected not to do so. The sailboat and slip were 

assets acquired during the marriage and thus subject to equitable distribution 
9

A-0036-20

despite their corporate ownership as determined by the family part judge and 

affirmed by this court. Shan-Mar's claims have been litigated and resolved

previously by two courts and are barred by the entire controversy doctrine. 

To the extent we have not addressed Shan-Mar's remaining arguments, we 

determine the arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.