Report of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

Strategic Communication 

September 2004 

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Table of Contents 

DSB Transmittal Letter............................................................................................ i 

Chairman’s Transmittal Letter............................................................................... iii 

Executive Summary.................................................................................................1 

Chapters

1. The Case for a New Vision...........................................................................11 

2. The New Strategic Environment...................................................................33 

3. Leveraging the Private Sector......................................................................48 

4. Strategic Communication: Direction, Coordination, Support, and 

 Execution ......................................................................................................60 

Appendices 

A. Summer Study Terms of Reference..............................................................87 

B. Strategic Communication Task Force Membership .....................................91 

C. Briefings Received by the Task Force..........................................................92 

D. Executive Summary and Recommendations of the DSB Task Force on 

 Managed Information Dissemination (MID) in October 2001.....................93 

E. List of Reports on Public Diplomacy..........................................................100 

F. Acronyms....................................................................................................102 
vi 
1 

Executive Summary 

The Defense Science Board Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities was 

formed in early 2004 (the terms of reference are contained in Appendix A) and 

culminated in the production of a final report and summary briefing in August of 2004. 

The DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication conducted its deliberations within the 

overall Summer Study schedule and revisited a topic that was addressed in October 

2001.1 Task Force members and Government advisors are identified in Appendix B. The 

current Strategic Communication Task Force re-examined the purposes of strategic 

communication and the salience of recommendations in the earlier study. It then 

considered the following questions: 

(1) What are the consequences of changes in the strategic communication environment? 

(2) What Presidential direction and strategic communication means are required? 

(3) What should be done about public diplomacy and open military information 

operations? 

The Task Force met with representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), 

White House Office of Global Communications, Department of State (DOS), Department 

of Defense (DOD), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and the private sector (the 

schedule of meetings, briefings and discussions is contained in Appendix C). Based on 

extensive interaction with a broad range of sectors in the government, commercial, and 

academic worlds, as well as a series of highly interactive internal debates, we have 

reached the following conclusions and recommendations. 

This Task Force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. 

America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are 

 

1

 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, October 2001, 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/. The report was briefed to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of 

State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Under Secretary of State for Management, and the 

National Security Council’s Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications and Information and Senior 

Advisor for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. 

 
2 

consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. 

Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and 

provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the 

problem, but it is a problem. 

Understanding the problem. Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. 

national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that 

matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and 

homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress 

are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an 

unprecedented scale is imperative. 

To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global 

struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against 

the tactic of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both government and 

non-government. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states (“getting it right” in 

Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), we will fail. Chapter 2 of this report 

examines the complex nature of this new paradigm and implications for sustained and 

imaginative action. 

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and 

influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on “doable 

tasks,” develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new 

strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. This approach will build on indepth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will 

adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, 

and mind sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create 

message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It 

will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes 

decades of sustained effort. Just as importantly, through evaluation and feedback, it will 

enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in 
3 

strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft. Chapter 3 of 

this report addresses ways in which strategic communication can be generated and 

managed with effect. 

We need to move beyond outdated concepts, stale structural models, and institutionallybased labels. Public diplomacy, public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) and 

open military information operations must be coordinated and energized. Chapter 4 of 

this report recommends changes in the strategic communication functions and structures 

of the Departments of State and Defense, U.S. embassies and combatant commands. 

Leadership from the top. A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with 

Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet 

secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required. 

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security 

objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and those of 

senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must 

be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a 

minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices. Policies will 

not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that 

are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone 

and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not 

increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards. These objectives 

mean officials must take full advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, 

understand cultures, and assess influence structures – not occasionally but as an iterative 

process. Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated. 

Swift and sustained Presidential direction is also required to connect strategy to structure. 

In 1947, America confronted new threats and opportunities as well. The President with 

bipartisan support in Congress carried out policy and organizational initiatives that 

shaped U.S. national security for two generations. Today, we face challenges of similar 
4 

magnitude, made more formidable by a world where geography, military power, and time 

to react are no longer sufficient to ensure our security. Strategic communication and 

other 21st century instruments of statecraft require changes different in kind but similar in 

scale to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. 

These changes will occur only with sustained, enthusiastic, and deeply committed 

Presidential leadership – and the collaborative and bipartisan support of the Foreign 

Relations and Armed Services Committees of Congress. 

Government-private sector partnership. Finding new ways to harness strategic 

communication to the flexibility and creative imagination of the private sector will be 

central to successful strategic communication in the 21st century. The commercial sector 

has a dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and media surveys, 

information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring the influence of 

communications. Academic and research communities offer vast untapped resources for 

education, training, area and language expertise, planning and consultative services. 

Effective sharing between government and society in the conduct of strategic 

communication is not new. Government grants to private organizations have long been a 

way to carry out international educational and cultural exchanges, foreign opinion 

polling, democratization and media training programs, and much of U.S. international 

broadcasting. Grants extend the reach of government programs and capitalize on the 

expertise and flexibility of non-government partner organizations. 

Recent study groups, including the October 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force, 

have recommended more extensive collaboration. These observers see value not only in 

leveraging private sector competencies but in new structures and a degree of distance that 

attracts credible messengers with non-government resumes, creative thinkers and talented 

communicators uncomfortable working with government agencies, and skilled, languagequalified professionals available for temporary crisis deployment. 
5 

Collaboration between government and the many benefits of private sector thinking and 

skills should be strongly encouraged. The complexity of strategic communication 

problems calls for balanced coordination of effort. Independent analysis is required in a 

wide range of fields: cultures and values, international intellectual engagement, 

communications studies, and applied science. Teamwork among civilian agencies and 

military services will be necessary to draw effectively on the seminars of universities, 

professional skills of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and imagination of the 

media production industry. Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For 

all their strengths, private organizations represent particular interests. Investments in 

strategic communication must be grounded in the public interest as determined by 

appropriate executive branch and Congressional authorities. 

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped implementation of U.S. strategic 

communication for more than half a century. New thinking and new collaborative 

structures hold promise of a transformed and continuous strategic communication 

capability that serves America’s interests. 

 

The Task Force has made a set of recommendations listed below which we believe will 

make a significant difference . The time line and scale of their impact is difficult to 

quantify but we will not succeed in revitalizing Strategic Communication if we tinker 

around the edges. Given the enormous challenges we face, we can succeed only if we use 

all the instruments of national power. We should expect to see some progress within a 

year but we are dealing with at least a decade to have a significant impact. US public 

diplomacy efforts in the Cold War, the creation of the Peace Corps and the launch of a 

new brand or product within the private sector in a highly competitive environment are 

examples of efforts that have required comparable time scales and the challenges we face 

today are potentially more complex. We must begin and maintain our intensity and focus 

until we succeed. 
6 

Recommendations 

(1) The Task Force recommends that the President issue a directive to: (a) strengthen the 

U.S. Government’s ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic 

implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences; (b) coordinate all 

components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, 

international broadcasting, and military information operations; and (c) provide a 

foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of 

strategic communication. 

 

(2) The Task Force recommends that the President should establish a permanent 

strategic communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create 

legislation and funding for a: 

• Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication; 

• Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC; and an 

• Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication 

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a 

Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under 

secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland 

Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the 

Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director 

of the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, 

this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign responsibilities 

and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public 

affairs, and military information operations; concur in strategic communication 

personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide 

program and project direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication. 

 
7 

(3) The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create 

legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for 

Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations 

represented on its Strategic Communication Committee. The Center should be a hybrid 

organization modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), 

such as the Rand Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be 

a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual appropriation 

approved by Congress as part of the Department of State budget. The NSC’s Deputy 

National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic 

Communication Committee should provide program and project direction to the Center. 

The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by an independent 

nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from 

relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The 

NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex 

officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center’s 

Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance. 

The Center should be guided by three purposes: 

• Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decisionmakers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the 

role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and 

influences on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source 

intelligence assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will 

sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices. 

• Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the 

creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace 

diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats. 
8 

• Support government strategic communications through services provided on a costrecovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural 

exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management 

systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector 

experts for short term assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; 

augment planning, recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate 

effectiveness. 

(4) The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State redefine the role and 

responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to 

be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. The Under Secretary should 

serve as the Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Committee; 

have adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation; direct the 

Department’s foreign opinion and media research activities; approve senior public 

diplomacy assignments; and review the performance ratings of public diplomacy office 

director and embassy public affairs officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives 

should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. The 

Department’s current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy should be 

tripled from current levels and placed under the control of the Under Secretary. The 

Department should provide a core funding grant to the Center for Strategic 

Communication in the amount of an annual appropriation in the Department’s budget. 

(5) The Task Force recommends that public diplomacy office directors in the Department 

of State should be at the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the 

Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission positions or the Senior 

Foreign Service should have served at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in 

the Department or in an interagency assignment relevant to public diplomacy. The 

Bureau of International Information Programs should be directed by an Assistant 

Secretary. 
9 

(6) The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should 

act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department’s 

principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee. The Under 

Secretary for Policy should coordinate strategic communication activities with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should extend the role and 

responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to 

act as the Department’s focal point for military support of public diplomacy and create a 

new Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs to coordinate all 

activities associated with military support for public diplomacy; and provide adequate 

staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation. 

(7) The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate 

strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with the Department of 

State’s diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. 

STRATCOM’s and U.S. SOCOM’s Information Operations responsibilities to include 

DoD support for public diplomacy. The Department should triple current resources 

(personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DoD support to public 

diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM for 

expanded support for strategic communication programs. 
10 
11 

Chapter 1, Strategic Communication: The Case for a New Vision 

Strategic communication is vital to America’s national security and foreign policy. 

Although recent attention to its value is driven by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, strategic 

communication describes a variety of instruments used by governments for generations to 

understand global attitudes and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people 

and institutions, advise policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public 

opinion implications of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior through 

communications strategies. 

Strategic communication can help to shape context and build relationships that enhance 

the achievement of political, economic, and military objectives. It can be used to 

mobilize publics in support of major policy initiatives – and to support objectives before, 

during, and after a conflict. To be effective, strategic communicators must understand 

attitudes and cultures, respect the importance of ideas, adopt advanced information 

technologies, and employ sophisticated communication skills and strategies. To be 

persuasive, they must be credible. 

Policies, diplomacy, military operations, and strategic communication should not be 

managed separately. Good strategic communication cannot build support for policies 

viewed unfavorably by large populations. Nor can the most carefully crafted messages, 

themes, and words persuade when the messenger lacks credibility and underlying 

message authority. 

For some the case for strategic communication is not self-evident. Global media already 

provide an abundance of information they suggest. “Why can’t CNN, Fox, or MSNBC 

do it?” But commercial media are selective in ways that serve news and business 

interests first. And few politicians, corporations, or advocacy groups are content to leave 

their political campaigns, business objectives, and policy agendas to improvisation or the 

media. The U.S. Government needs a strategic communication capability that is planned, 

directed, coordinated, funded, and conducted in ways that support the nation’s interests. 
12 

Strategic communication can be understood to embrace four core instruments. 

Public diplomacy seeks through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting 

relationships and receptivity to a nation’s culture, values, and policies. It seeks also to 

influence attitudes and mobilize publics in ways that support policies and interests. Its 

time horizons are decades and news cycles. Public diplomacy is distinguished from 

traditional diplomatic interactions between governments. In an age of global media, the 

Internet revolution, and powerful nonstate actors — an age in which almost everything 

governments do and say is understood through the mediating filters of news frames, 

culture, memory, and language — no major strategy, policy, or diplomatic initiative can 

succeed without public support. Fulbright scholarships, youth exchanges, embassy press 

briefings, official websites in language versions, and televised interviews with 

ambassadors and military commanders are examples of public diplomacy. 

Public affairs is used by the Departments of State and Defense to depict communication 

activities intended primarily to inform and influence U.S. media and the American 

people. The White House, the NSC, departments and agencies, and military commands 

all have public affairs staffs. They focus on domestic media, but their advocacy activities 

reach allies and adversaries around the world. Distinctions between public affairs and 

public diplomacy continue to shape doctrine, resource allocations, and organization 

charts. But public diplomacy and public affairs practitioners employ similar tools and 

methods; their audiences are global and local. This conceptual distinction is losing 

validity in the world of global media, global audiences, and porous borders. 

International broadcasting services are funded by governments to transmit news, 

information, public affairs programs, and entertainment to global audiences via AM/FM 

and shortwave radio, satellite television, and web-based systems. Voice of America, 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio/TV Marti, and the Radio Sawa, and Al Hurra 

Arabic language radio and television services are examples of U.S. international 

broadcasting. 
13 

Information operations (IO) is a term used by the DOD to include Computer Network 

Operations (Computer Network Attack and Defense), Electronic Warfare, Operational 

Security, Military Deception, and PSYOP. This report will discuss only open PSYOP, 

military activities that use selected information and indicators to influence the attitudes 

and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of 

military and national security objectives. 

1.1 Introduction 

Three weeks after 9/11, a Defense Science Board Task Force sponsored jointly by the 

DOD and Department of State issued a report on U.S. civilian and military information 

dissemination capabilities.2 In a ten month study, written before the attacks on the 

Pentagon and World Trade Center, the Task Force determined that the United States 

needed a sustained, coordinated capability to understand and influence global publics 

rooted in Presidential direction and the information age. 

 

The October 2001 Task Force recommended that America’s leaders give higher priority 

to strategic communication – public diplomacy, public affairs, and open international 

military information. Engaging the right audiences at the right time can create diplomatic 

opportunities, reduce tensions leading to war, help contain conflicts, and address 

nontraditional threats to U.S. security. Some of these “right audiences” are individuals, 

networks, and groups that can be mobilized to support U.S. goals. Some are publics that 

resent U.S. power and oppose it asymmetrically through rhetorical and political means. 

Some are enemies capable of deploying nuclear or biological weapons, computer viruses, 

hate broadcasts, or terrorist attacks. 

 

2

 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, October 2001, 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/. The report was briefed to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of 

State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Under Secretary of State for Management, and the 

NSC’s Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications and Information and Senior Advisor for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and International Operations. The Executive Summary appears in Appendix D. 
14 

Because the U.S. lacks an effective means to plan and coordinate strategic 

communication, the October 2001 Task Force called for a Presidential Decision Directive 

to: 

• Strengthen the nation’s ability to shape public understanding and support for foreign 

and national security policies; 

• Coordinate strategic communication activities through a NSC Policy Coordinating 

Committee (PCC); 

• Require regional and functional NSC committees to assess the potential impact of 

foreign public opinion when considering policy options and develop communication 

strategies for policy implementation; and 

• Leverage private sector capabilities and harness information assets to the Internet 

revolution. 

The strategic environment has changed radically since the October 2001 Task Force 

report. We face a war on terrorism, intensified conflict within Islam, and insurgency in 

Iraq. Worldwide anger and discontent are directed at America’s tarnished credibility and 

ways the U.S. pursues its goals. There is consensus that America’s power to persuade is 

in a state of crisis. Global transparency, driven by new media and low cost technologies, 

shape the strategic landscape. 

 

This Task Force re-examined the purposes of strategic communication and the salience of 

recommendations in the earlier study. We then addressed three questions: 

(1) What are the consequences of changes in the strategic communication environment? 

(2) What Presidential direction and strategic communication means are required? 

(3) What should be done about public diplomacy and open military information 

operations? 

1.2 The New Strategic Communication Environment 

Anti-American attitudes. Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew 

Research Center, Gallup (CNN/USA Today), and the Department of State (INR) reveal 

widespread animosity toward the United States and its policies. A year and a half after 
15 

going to war in Iraq, Arab/Muslim anger has intensified. Data from Zogby International 

in July 2004, for example, show that the U.S. is viewed unfavorably by overwhelming 

majorities in Egypt (98 percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and 

Jordan (78 percent). The war has increased mistrust of America in Europe, weakened 

support for the war on terrorism, and undermined U.S. credibility worldwide. Media 

commentary is consistent with polling data. In a State Department (INR) survey of 

editorials and op-eds in 72 countries, 82.5 % of commentaries were negative, 17.5% 

positive.3

 

Negative attitudes and the conditions that create them are the underlying sources of 

threats to America’s national security and reduced ability to leverage diplomatic 

opportunities. Terrorism, thin coalitions, harmful effects on business, restrictions on 

travel, declines in cross border tourism and education flows, and damaging consequences 

for other elements of U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive 

atmosphere of hostility. 

 

Although many observers correlate anti-Americanism with deficiencies in U.S. public 

diplomacy (its content, tone, and competence), the effectiveness of the means used to 

influence public opinion is only one metric. Policies, conflicts of interest, cultural 

differences, memories, time, dependence on mediated information, and other factors 

shape perceptions and limit the effectiveness of strategic communication. 

Perceptions of public diplomacy in crisis. Since the Defense Science Board’s October 

2001 Task Force study, more than 15 private sector and Congressional reports have 

examined public diplomacy: the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and 

 

3 Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America; How Arabs Learn About America, Zogby 

International, July 2004; Views of a Changing World 2003: War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics,

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, June 3, 2004; A Year After Iraq War Mistrust of America 

in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, March 16, 

2004; Iraq One Year Later: Global Media Assessment Largely Negative, U.S. Department of State, Office 

of Research, April 29, 2004; Views from the Muslim World: Opposition to U.S. Foreign Policy Contrasts 

with Admiration for American Innovation and Education, U.S. Department of State Office of Research, 

March 31, 2003. 

 
16 

Muslim World (“Djerejian group”), the Council on Foreign Relations, The Heritage 

Foundation, The Brookings Institution, The Aspen Institute, the Public Diplomacy 

Institute, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and several reports each by the U.S. 

Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the U.S. General Accounting Office, and 

Congressional committees.4

 

There is consensus in these reports that U.S. public diplomacy is in crisis.5

 Missing are 

strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient resources, and a 

culture of measurement and evaluation. America’s image problem, many suggest, is 

linked to perceptions of the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-indulgent. 

There is agreement too that public diplomacy could be a powerful asset with stronger 

Presidential leadership, Congressional support, inter-agency coordination, partnership 

with the private sector, and resources (people, tools, structures, programs, funding). 

Solutions lie not in short term, manipulative public relations. Results will depend on 

fundamental transformation of strategic communication instruments and a sustained long 

term, approach at the level of ideas, cultures, and values. 

The number and depth of these reports indicate widespread concern among influential 

observers that something must be done about public diplomacy. But so far these 

concerns have produced no real change. The White House has paid little attention. 

Congressional actions have been limited to informational hearings and funding for 

Middle East broadcasting initiatives, Radio Sawa and Al Hurra. State Department and 

Broadcasting Board of Governors responses to Congress and the General Accounting 

Office (GAO) were not at the strategic level. 

One limitation of these post-9/11 studies is that most did not look comprehensively at 

civilian and military strategic communication assets. Several called for strategic 

 

4

 These reports are listed in Appendix E 

 

5

 Barry Fulton, Taking the Pulse of American Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World, Paper presented at 

the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18, 2004. 
17 

direction by the White House or the NSC. Some examined only State Department public 

diplomacy programs, others U.S. international broadcasting, others both. 

Terrorism as a national security frame. The events of September 11, 2001 were a 

catalyst in creating a new way to think about national security. The Global War on 

Terrorism replaced the Cold War as a national security meta narrative. Governments, 

media, and publics use the terrorism frame for cognitive, evaluative, and communication 

purposes. For political leaders, it is a way to link disparate events; identify priorities, 

friends, enemies, victims, and blame; and shape simple coherent messages. For 

journalists and news consumers the terrorism frame conflates and appears to make sense 

of diverse national security stories – Al Qaeda, Jihadists, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Iran, 

Chechnya, Indonesia, Kashmir, the Philippines, Kenya, Spain.6 

Frames simplify and help to communicate complex events. But like the Cold War frame, 

the terrorism frame marginalizes other significant issues and problems: failing states, 

non-proliferation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, economic globalization, transnational threats 

other than terrorism, and global warming. Often the terrorism frame directs attention to 

tactics not strategy. The focus is more on capturing and killing terrorists than attitudinal, 

political, and economic forces that are the underlying source of threats and opportunities 

in national security. 

Volatile Islam. Islam’s internal and external struggle over values, identity, and change is 

the dominant political arena in which strategic communication takes place. Analysts 

differ on causes and consequences. But there is widespread agreement that terrorist 

networks are symptomatic of a broader transformation within Islam and a continuation of 

the 20th century conflict between tolerance and totalitarianism. Islam’s crisis must be 

understood as a contest of ideas and engaged accordingly.7

 

6

 Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, eds., Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the 

Government, and the Public, (Routledge, 2003); Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, 

Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy, (The University of Chicago Press, 2004). 

7

 The literature on the struggle of ideas in Islam substantial. Particularly useful for strategic 

communication are Cheryl Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies, Rand 
18 

Islam’s struggle raises critical considerations for strategic communication: 

• The contest of ideas is taking place not just in Arab and other Islamic countries but in 

the cities and villages of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. 

• U.S. policies on Israeli-Palestinian issues and Iraq in 2003-2004 have damaged 

America’s credibility and power to persuade. 

• The hostile atmosphere in which terrorists act is reinforced by religious messages, 

sophisticated media strategies, and advanced information technologies. 

• Regimes based on consent may be intolerant and oppose U.S. policies. 

• More sophisticated influence and attitudinal segmentation models are needed. 

• Strategists face difficult trade-offs in determining feasible choices and funding 

priorities in using persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments of power.8

New Arab Media. Satellite television, FM radio, international newspapers edited in 

London and transmitted by satellite for printing in capitals throughout the Arab world, 

and growing Internet penetration are creating a complex Arab media environment no 

longer dominated by state-sponsored media. Qatar’s Al Jazeera, launched in 1996, is the 

best known satellite TV network, but Saudi MBC, Lebanon’s LBC-al Hayat, Abu Dhabi 

TV, Dubai-based Al Arabiya and other stations are contesting Al Jazeera with lively 

news and talk shows that spark political argument in homes and cafes throughout the 

Middle East.9

 

Greater amounts of real time information and decreasing costs are severely challenging 

state censors and changing the ways governments interact with their citizens. Arabs in 

the region and in Arab diasporas throughout the world increasingly see and read the same 

information with consequences for Arab self-identity. Although Internet use in the 

 Corporation, 2003; Michael Vlahos, Terror’s Mask: Insurgency Within Islam, Applied Physics Laboratory, 

Johns Hopkins University, 2002; Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism, (W.W. Norton & Company, 2003); 

Changing Minds, Winning Peace, Report of the (Djerejian) Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the 

Arab and Muslim World, October 1, 2003, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf. 

8

 The Task Force addresses many of these issues in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report. 

9

 Marc Lynch, “Taking Arabs Seriously,” Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2003, pp. 81-94; William 

A. Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics, (Praeger, 2004). 
19 

Middle East is the lowest in the world, this digital divide is narrowing, and cyberspace is 

an arena for both conflict and conflict resolution in the region. These new Arab media 

are creating the frames within which people understand and misunderstand events and 

U.S. political goals. 

Global transparency. Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television networks dominate 

discussion of the information and media environment. But a host of information 

technologies — in addition to satellite TV — are creating greater global transparency: 

cell phones, wireless handhelds, videophones, camcorders, digital cameras, miniaturized 

fly away units used by TV crews in remote locations, high resolution commercial space 

imaging, blogs, and email. Many are cheap; costs are declining.10 

These technologies have consequences for all three stakeholders in strategic 

communication: governments, media, and publics. Policymakers, diplomats, and 

military leaders face more breaking news from more places in a reactive mode. 

Journalists rely less on “institutionally based news” (i.e., official sources, press 

conferences). Publics (i.e., NGOs, image activists, soldiers with digital cameras) can 

drive perceptions and policies with pictures and stories. 

Transparency creates threats and opportunities – and changes in the strategy/tactics 

dynamic. Tactical events can instantly become strategic problems (digital cameras in 

Abu Ghraib). On the other hand, transparency can show strategic threats more clearly 

and enhance the capacity to undercut an opponent’s political will and ability to mislead 

(embedded media in Iraq). 

Transparency is only one element in a global environment characterized also by faster 

rates of change, shorter reaction times, asymmetry, interconnectivity, decentralization, 

disintermediation, declining communication costs, content/transport disconnects, multiple 

channels, more narrowcasting, Internet penetration at rates exceeding earlier 

 

10 Steven Livingston, “Diplomacy in the New Information Environment,” Georgetown Journal of 

International Affairs, Summer/Fall 2003, pp. 111-116. 
20 

technologies, greater volumes of information in less time, pervasive feelings of 

saturation, short news and memory cycles, digital divides, and interactive tensions 

between fragmenting consequences of conflict and integrative effects of cooperation.

There are critical consequences for strategic communication. New information 

technologies often separate information from the sender’s identity and the social frames 

that provide credibility and meaning. Social context on the Internet, for example, is not 

self-evident. Nor is the identity of those who generate information.11 Terrorists use 

websites in ways that mask their agendas. Their web-based narratives usually do not 

celebrate violence so as to elicit sympathy and resonate with supporters. 

Information saturation means attention, not information, becomes a scarce resource. 

Power flows to credible messengers. Asymmetrical credibility matters. What's around 

information is critical. Reputations count. Brands are important. Editors, filters, and cue 

givers are influential. Fifty years ago political struggles were about the ability to control 

and transmit scarce information. Today, political struggles are about the creation and 

destruction of credibility.12

Strategic communicators need to understand this new information environment, train for 

it, and deal with it. 

1.3 Post-9/11 – Tactical Achievements 

Strategic communication was a high priority in the months immediately after 9/11. 

Public statements by U.S. political leaders made clear that war on terrorists with global 

reach was not a war against Islam. Messages were tailored to global audiences as well as 

audiences at home. America’s political leaders, diplomats, and military leaders 

 

11 The Rise of Netpolitik: How the Internet is Changing International Politics and Diplomacy, A Report of 

the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology, Aspen Institute, 2003. 

12 Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford University Press, 2002). Nye speaks of a 

“paradox of plenty” in which “a plenitude of information leads to a poverty of attention.” 

 
21 

understood that a counter-terrorism strategy could not succeed without effective, 

coordinated strategic communication. 

National security agencies initiated networks and crisis response teams. The White 

House created a Coalition Information Centers (CICs) network linking Washington, 

London, and Islamabad. Modeled on techniques used successfully in British and 

American political campaigns, and by NATO in Kosovo, the CICs deployed 

language-qualified public affairs experts to respond to breaking news, Taliban and Al 

Qaeda claims, and regional events. They did so within news cycles — not hours and 

days later during business hours in western capitals. The CICs sought to dominate global 

media coverage with positive, coordinated coalition messages on humanitarian aid, 

building a representative government in Afghanistan, and other themes. 

In October 2001, the State Department established an unprecedented 24/7 public 

diplomacy coordination group in its Operations Center with links to the White House, 

Defense Department, U.S. embassies, and U.S. combatant commands. The NSC created 

a Counter Terrorism Information Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. The Defense 

Department retained skilled political communications consultants and gave high priority 

to strategic communications planning. White House officials, Cabinet secretaries, and 

military leaders appeared regularly on Al Jazeera and other global media outlets. 

Shaping message personally became part of the daily routine of America’s top political 

and military leaders.13

The promise of these early efforts did not lead to transformation of instruments and 

institutions. Three positive developments, however, deserve comment. 

Tactical communication. The President, the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries 

of Defense and State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military 

 

13 Secretary of State Colin Powell: “The terrorist attacks of September 11 underscored the urgency of 

implementing an effective public diplomacy campaign. Those who abet terror by spreading distortion and 

hate and inciting others take full advantage of the global news cycle. We must use the same cycle.” 

Statement before the House Budget Committee, March 7, 2002. 
22 

commanders continue to devote extraordinary amounts of personal time to advocating 

policies and shaping perceptions at home and abroad. Tactical public affairs coordination 

has been effective through the White House Office of Global Communication, the 

successor to the CICs. Daily videoconferences on talking points, the message of the day, 

and who takes the lead on what issue enhance a process among national security agencies 

that long pre-dates 9/11. 

U.S. International Broadcasting. U.S. government broadcasting in the Middle East is 

changing driven by events in the region, narrowcasting tendencies in mass audience 

broadcasting, Congressional pressures, policies of the Broadcasting Board of Governors 

(BBG), and a BBG marketing strategy that draws on research and emphasizes targeted 

programming. Radio Sawa broadcasts a mixture of American and Arabic popular music 

with brief news breaks on the half hour to young Arabs via FM, AM, and satellite. Al 

Hurra, a 24/7 U.S. funded Arabic language satellite television service launched in 2004, 

provides entertainment programs and American style news and information intended “to 

counter the lack of depth and balance in the Middle Eastern media.” Radio Farda 

broadcasts entertainment, news, and information and maintains a website for audiences in 

Iran. 

Supporters of U.S. international broadcasting cite market share (actual and potential), 

space in Middle East’s dominant media (satellite television, FM radio), and a U.S. voice 

in the Arab world that serves American interests. Critics of Radio Sawa question its 

music format. They assert that U.S. broadcasting needs to do more than just build an 

audience and point to Sawa’s irrelevance to Arab intellectuals and political reformers. 

Critics of Al Hurra doubt the value of a U.S. television network in a region skeptical of 

state-owned media. They contend that much larger appropriations will be required to 

compete with Al Jazeera and other powerful Arab networks in highly competitive Middle 

East television markets. 

Supporters and critics suggest that missing is a strong investment in Internet-based 

broadcasting. They agree too that audience research and independent evaluation will 
23 

enable firm conclusions on the long term value of these strategic communication 

initiatives to U.S. interests. 

Embedded Media Policy. The Defense Department’s policy of embedding journalists in 

Iraq has won broad support in government and the media. Reporting from embedded 

media during the spring of 2003 reduced the potential for Iraqi disinformation (e.g., on 

civilian casualties) that could have undermined political support in the U.S. and in other 

countries. Media coverage during the march to Baghdad may have influenced the 

political will of Iraqi military and civilian leaders. From the media’s perspective, 

journalists gained unusual access (at the tactical level), opportunities to challenge or 

confirm headquarters briefings, knowledge not otherwise attainable (censored news gets 

reported eventually), and a better understanding of the military. 

1.4 Post-9/11 – Strategic Limitations 

United States strategic communication lacks sustained Presidential direction, effective 

interagency coordination, optimal private sector partnerships, and adequate resources. 

Tactical message coordination does not equate with strategic planning and evaluation. 

Personal commitment by top leaders has not been matched by needed changes in the 

organizations they lead or in a dysfunctional interagency process. 

 

In 2002, the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) urged fundamental change in 

the major instruments of statecraft designed to meet different requirements in a different 

era — including “a different and more comprehensive approach to public information 

efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America.”14 

Two years later, the U.S. has made little progress in building and transforming its 

strategic communication assets. 

 

14 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September, 2002, p. 31. 

http://www.Globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf
24 

Strategic direction. There has been no Presidential directive on strategic communication 

since the Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information (PDD 68) 

issued April 30, 1999. The NSC terminated PDD 68 early in 2001 with the intent of 

reviewing its approach to public diplomacy. Pending the outcome of this review, the 

NSC placed public diplomacy under a PCC on Democracy, Human Rights, and 

International Operations, which exercised minimal direction and coordination.15 

Leaders in cabinet departments did not fill the gap. Short appointments and long 

vacancies occurred in the State Department’s office of the Under Secretary for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This office was vacant or filled in an acting capacity for 

two years during the Bush Administration (2000-2004).16 

The DOD created an Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) on October 30, 2001 to serve as 

the Department’s focal point for a “strategic information campaign in support of the war 

on terrorism.” The Office “was to develop a full spectrum influence strategy that would 

result in greater foreign support of U.S. goals and repudiation of terrorists and their 

methods.” OSI generated opposition from government public affairs officials who feared 

it would undermine their credibility and from negative press coverage in the U.S. and 

abroad alleging the Office intended to place lies and disinformation in foreign media 

organizations. The Secretary of Defense dissolved OSI on February 26, 2002 stating the 

“office has clearly been so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not function 

effectively.”17 

Inter-agency Coordination. The Bush Administration created two entities intended to 

coordinate strategic communication. In June 2002, the White House established an 

 

15 Shortly after 9/11, the NSC created an Office of Combating Terrorism with a Senor Director for Strategic 

Communications and Information. The NSC also created a Counter Terrorism Information Strategy Policy 

Coordinating Committee to focus on military and intelligence agency issues and coordination. 16 Charlotte Beers served 18 months, Margaret Tutwiler 6 months. 

17 Department of Defense Responses to Senator Carl Levin . . . Regarding the Office of Strategic Influence,

April 6, 2002; James Dao and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad,” The 

New York Times, February 19, 2001; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, “A ‘Damaged’ Information Office is 

Declared Closed by Rumsfeld,” The New York Times, February 27, 2002. 
25 

Office of Global Communications (OGC) as a successor to the Coalition Information 

Centers. According to the White House, the OCG “coordinates strategic communications 

with global audiences” and “advises on the strategic direction and themes that United 

States government agencies use to reach foreign audiences.”18 Despite sweeping 

authority calling for the OGC to develop strategies for developing messages, assess 

methods and strategies, coordinate temporary teams of communicators, and encourage 

state-of-the art media and technology, the OGC evolved into a second tier organization 

devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination. The OGC does not engage in 

strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation. 

In September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice established a Strategic 

Communication Policy Coordinating Committee “at the direction of the President and in 

consultation with the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense.” 

This NSC PCC was intended to “coordinate interagency activities, to ensure that all 

agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the 

President’s messages across the globe.” Its authority included “interagency support for 

international broadcasting, foreign information programs, and public diplomacy,” and 

“development of strategic communications capabilities throughout the government.” The 

PCC was co-chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affairs and the NSC’s Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights, 

and International Operations.19 The PCC met several times with marginal impact. It has 

not met for more than a year. 

The Task Force finds that the White House Office of Global Communications and the 

NSC’s Strategic Communication PCC have overlapping authorities. Both entities have 

 

18 The White House Office of Global Communications was formally established by Executive Order 13283, 

with an accompanying news release, on January 21, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/ogc/. 

 

19 Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordination Committee, Memorandum from 

Condoleeza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, September 10, 2002. The PCC 

members included the chair of the Combating Terrorism Information PCC, the Deputy Assistant to the 

President and Counselor to the National Security Advisor for Communications, the Director of the White 

House Office of Global Communications, and representatives from relevant agencies at the Assistant 

Secretary level. 

 
26 

been ineffectual in carrying out intended responsibilities relating to strategic 

communication planning, coordination, and evaluation. 

Planning and implementation. In 1999, Presidential Decision Directive 68 authorized a 

“dedicated staff, under the direction of the Under Secretary [of State] for Public 

Diplomacy” to serve as a Secretariat for the interagency coordinating group established 

by the Directive. PDD 68 authorized non-reimbursable details of individuals from the 

DOD to the Department of State “in the national security interest of the United States and 

in the predominant interest of the Department of Defense.” Since then a tiny multiagency strategic communications planning staff has operated in the State Department’s 

Bureau of International Information Programs. 

This State Department planning staff continued after the rescission of PDD 68. It has 

provided support for strategic communications activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and the global war on terrorism. It supported meetings held by the 

Strategic Communications PCC. Recently it has been a catalyst for information sharing 

through interagency “fusion teams.” Its impact is constrained, however, by its location 

within a Departmental bureau, lack of tasking and contracting authorities, small staff and 

budget, inadequate State Department messaging technologies, limited evaluation 

capabilities, and insufficient attention from State and Defense Department leaders. 

Opinion/media research. U.S. strategic communication is limited by insufficient and 

decentralized research capabilities. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research (INR) engages in foreign opinion polling and provides daily reports on foreign 

media editorials and commentary. Its small annual budget has long been stable at 

approximately $6 million ($3 million for polling, $3 million for analysis). Opinion 

research is appreciated in the Bureau, but more for its contribution to all-source 

intelligence products than for strategic communication. 

Other government and private organizations also conduct opinion and media studies. The 

Foreign Broadcast Information Services collects and analyzes foreign print, radio, TV, 
27 

web-based, and gray literature publications, including assessments of Al Jazeera and 

other Arab/Muslim satellite TV broadcasting. The Broadcasting Board of Governors 

engages in audience and media research through contracts with Intermedia, a private 

research organization. Foreign opinion and attitude assessments are available also from 

U.S. embassies, the DOD, U.S. combatant commands, the CIA, non-governmental 

organizations, and commercial polling organizations. 

Each of these activities has merit, but overall U.S. government opinion and media 

research faces a number of challenges. Research findings are not used sufficiently in 

policy formulation and policy advocacy. Policymakers, diplomats and military leaders 

often do not appreciate that “listening” and influence analysis are critical prerequisites to 

effective communications strategies. Funding is woefully inadequate. Collection often 

outstrips analysis. Data bases are stovepiped; “the U.S. often doesn’t know what it 

knows.” Users often do not task for product; providers often are late in delivering 

product. Media trends research and media framing analysis have low priority relative to 

polling and strategic communication requirements. 

Technology. The October 2001 Task Force concluded that “the Government has taken 

only the first, most tentative steps toward the new ‘Internet-centric’ world of information 

dissemination.” Since then, State, Defense, and the combatant commands have made 

modest progress. The State Department’s e-Diplomacy initiatives hold promise as do 

VOANews.com, RFE/RL’s website, and VOA’s on-line New Europe Review. 

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has no Internet champions, as it does for radio and 

television. U.S. broadcasters lag well behind the private sector and America’s 

adversaries in developing interactive, content rich, targeted, multi-lingual web-based 

broadcasting services. Internet penetration in the Middle East is the lowest in world, but 

it is growing rapidly. Arab and Muslim Internet users worldwide include change agents, 

young and old, critical to the region’s future. The U.S. needs trusted, reliable web sites 

conducive to dialogue on political, intellectual, and cultural levels. 
28 

The impact of digital convergence is only beginning to be understood by political and 

military leaders. U.S. strategic communication has not evolved in ways to coordinate and 

leverage the potential of Internet-centric information dissemination. 

Resources. Annual spending for State Department information programs and U.S. 

international broadcasting is approximately $1.2 billion – one-quarter of 1 percent of the 

military budget. Political leaders need to determine whether a military budget 400 times 

greater than a strategic communication budget is adequate to U.S. national security 

strategy and to a global war on terrorism viewed as a struggle about ideas. Moreover, 

compartmentalized budget processes in departments and agencies, in the Office of 

Management and Budget, and in numerous Congressional committees prevent overall 

funding priorities and tradeoffs at the strategic level. 

1.5 Transforming Strategic Communication 

This Task Force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. 

America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are 

consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. 

Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and 

provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the 

problem, but it is a problem. 

Understanding the problem. Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. 

national security.20 It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose 

that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and 

homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress 

 

20 Secretary of Defense Donald S. Rumsfeld: “To win the war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas 

. . . That is why the president is using all elements of national power: military, financial, diplomatic, law 

enforcement, intelligence and public diplomacy.” See “Take the Fight to the Terrorists,” The Washington 

Post, October 26, 2003. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice: “We are engaged primarily in a war 

of ideas, not of armies. It will be won by visionaries who can look past the moment.” “It is absolutely the 

case that the United States needs to put new energy into its public diplomacy.” See “U.S. Needs New 

Energy in Public Diplomacy Campaign, Rice Says,” Washington File, Department of State, March 11, 

2004; “Dr. Rice Speaks at Michigan State University,” White House News Release, May 7. 2004. 

 
29 

are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an 

unprecedented scale is imperative. 

To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global 

struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against 

the tactic of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both government and 

non-government. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states (“getting it right” in 

Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), we will fail. Chapter 2 of this report 

examines the complex nature of this new paradigm and implications for sustained and 

imaginative action. 

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and 

influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on “doable 

tasks,” develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new 

strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. This approach will build on indepth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will 

adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, 

and mind sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create 

message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It 

will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes 

decades of sustained effort. Just as importantly, through evaluation and feedback, it will 

enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in 

strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft. Chapter 3 of 

this report addresses ways in which strategic communication can be generated and 

managed with effect. 

We need to move beyond outdated concepts, stale structural models, and institutionallybased labels. Public diplomacy, public affairs, PSYOP and open military information 

operations must be coordinated and energized. Chapter 4 of this report recommends 

changes in the strategic communication functions and structures of the Departments of 

State and Defense, U.S. embassies and combatant commands. 
30 

Leadership from the top. A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with 

Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet 

secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required. 

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security 

objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and those of 

senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must 

be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a 

minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices. Policies will 

not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that 

are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone 

and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not 

increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards. These objectives 

mean officials must take full advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, 

understand cultures, and assess influence structures – not occasionally, but as an iterative 

process. Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated. 

Swift and sustained Presidential direction is also required to connect strategy to structure. 

In 1947, America confronted new threats and opportunities as well. The President with 

bipartisan support in Congress carried out policy and organizational initiatives that 

shaped U.S. national security for two generations. Today, we face challenges of similar 

magnitude, made more formidable by a world where geography, military power, and time 

to react are no longer sufficient to ensure our security. Strategic communication and 

other 21st century instruments of statecraft require changes different in kind but similar in 

scale to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. 

These changes will occur only with sustained, enthusiastic, and deeply committed 

Presidential leadership – and the collaborative and bipartisan support of the Foreign 

Relations and Armed Services committees of Congress. 

Government-private sector partnership. Finding new ways to harness strategic 

communication to the flexibility and creative imagination of the private sector will be 
31 

central to successful strategic communication in the 21st century. The commercial sector 

has a dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and media surveys, 

information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring the influence of 

communications. Academic and research communities offer vast untapped resources for 

education, training, area and language expertise, planning and consultative services. 

Effective sharing between government and society in the conduct of strategic 

communication is not new. Government grants to private organizations have long been a 

way to carry out international educational and cultural exchanges, foreign opinion 

polling, democratization and media training programs, and much of U.S. international 

broadcasting. Grants extend the reach of government programs and capitalize on the 

expertise and flexibility of non-government partner organizations. 

Recent study groups, including the October 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force, 

have recommended more extensive collaboration.21 These observers see value not only 

in leveraging private sector competencies but in new structures and a degree of distance

that attracts credible messengers with non-government resumes, creative thinkers and 

talented communicators uncomfortable working with government agencies, and skilled, 

language qualified professionals available for temporary crisis deployment. 

Collaboration between government and the considerable benefits of private sector 

thinking and skills should be strongly encouraged. The complexity of strategic 

communication problems calls for balanced coordination of effort. Independent analysis 

is required in a wide range of fields: cultures and values, international intellectual 

engagement, communications studies, and applied science. Teamwork among civilian 

agencies and military services will be necessary to draw effectively on the seminars of 

universities, professional skills of NGOs, and imagination of the media production 

 

21 See Chapter 5 of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, 

October 2001, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/. A Council on Foreign Relations Task Force recommendation 

in 2003 to create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy analogous to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 

was endorsed by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. These reports 

are listed in Appendix ##. 

 
32 

industry. Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For all their 

strengths, private organizations represent particular interests. Investments in strategic 

communication must be grounded in the public interest as determined by appropriate 

executive branch and Congressional authorities. 

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped the implementation of U.S. 

strategic communication for more than half a century. New thinking and new 

collaborative structures hold promise of a transformed and continuous strategic 

communication capability that serves America’s interests. 
33 

Chapter 2 – The New Strategic Environment 

2.1 The Cold War Paradigm 

In the second half of the 20th century U.S. national security was driven by the Cold War. 

America and its allies faced a seemingly powerful adversary—the Soviet Union — whose 

strategic objectives were inimical to our own. During this long struggle we used the 

various elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military and economic—

to advance our interests. There is a conviction held by many that the “War on Terrorism” 

will have a similar influence in the 21st century. There are indeed similarities between 

the two struggles, and strategic communication will be as central to this war as it was to 

our Cold War strategy. 

Throughout the Cold War the U.S. used a variety of informational and cultural means to 

weaken Marxist-Leninist regimes and keep alive the hope of freedom for tens of millions 

behind the “Iron Curtain.” Over the course of the Cold War era a suite of organizations 

— especially the Voice of America, the United States Information Agency, and a broad 

program of cultural and educational exchanges — spearheaded this effort. Several 

Presidential decision directives staked out the central role to be played by strategic 

communication.22 When Ronald Reagan stood in Berlin in June 1987 and demanded, 

“Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”, he was speaking to a live television audience of 

millions behind that wall. East Germans had been watching Western TV for years, but 

Reagan turned this reality into a powerful metaphor that the wall’s days were numbered. 

The Cold War transformed the entire U.S. national security structure, and created what 

has been called the “national security state.” The National Security Act of 1947, the web 

of military departments and intelligence agencies that it created, and the overriding 

doctrines of deterrence and containment, were integral to the Cold War. But above all 

the Cold War represented a conservative strategy that nurtured a conservative mindset: its 

strategy spoke of change, but its pervasive charge in contrast was to preserve. Despite 

 

22 See, for example, National Security Decision Directive 77, “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative 

to National Security,” January 14, 1983. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1966t.gif
34 

seemingly black-and-white differences in governments and policies, over time we came 

to resemble our adversary, as our adversary came to resemble us. The U.S.S.R. generally 

acted like a normal nation state with which we could conduct diplomacy, conclude 

treaties, and engage in statecraft with a reasonably predictable leadership. By the 1960s 

the possibility of nuclear war declined as the terrible recognition of its apocalyptic 

consequences grew. In fact, both sides increasingly sought the assurance of stability to 

keep even the possibility of nuclear confrontation at arm’s length. But stability 

encouraged — even demanded — predictability, and thus the bureaucratic activities of 

both sides became highly routine. The Cold War evolved over time into a ritualized 

struggle that sought its own comfortable perpetuation. The very idea of “victory” slowly 

transformed from the idea of defeating Communism to the more perfect realization of 

“stability.” Thus the Cold War’s end and outcome, with Russia in the 1990s reduced 

almost to a client state of the U.S., came as a shocking surprise. 

Our thorough inability to grasp the final dynamic changes that led to the end of the Cold 

War should be unsettling to us, but after all, the outcome was also a total victory. So the 

Cold War template was almost mythically anointed in the decade before 9/11. Thus, with 

the surprise announcement of a new struggle, the U.S. Government reflexively inclined 

toward Cold War-style responses to the new threat, without a thought or a care as to 

whether these were the best responses to a very different strategic situation. 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Patriot Act 

were two such representative organizational and legislative responses. There will surely 

be many more the longer the struggle goes on — because deeper expectations within the 

Washington policy and defense cultures still seek out Cold War models. There is an 

expectation that, like the Cold War, the U.S. will naturally create enduring alliances and 

coalitions. Moreover, if the Cold War could be described as a struggle against one form 

of totalitarianism — Marxist-Leninism — so too there is a desire to describe the “War on 

Terrorism” as a struggle against yet another form of totalitarianism — this time in the 

form of a radical Islamist vision. Thus the problem is presented as one of how to confront 
35 

and eventually defeat another totalitarian evil. And as with the Cold War, many now also 

declare that it is incumbent on the U.S. to assume leadership in this struggle. 

But this is no Cold War. We call it a war on terrorism ― but Muslims in contrast see a 

history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, 

however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through 

many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents 

― of which radical fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for 

restoration also represent, in their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within 

Islam. 

If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the 

“apostate” regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf 

states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual 

fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward — and 

potentially dangerous — situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of 

these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the 

U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all 

Muslims and country-specific.23

This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and 

actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the 

survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction 

that the U.S. seeks to “dominate” and “weaken” the Muslim World.24 Not only is every 

 

23 See especially “Anonymous,” Imperial Hubris, Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Brassey’s, 

2004; and Michael Vlahos Terror’s Mask: Insurgency Within Islam, JHUAPL, 2002: 

http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/040429/50b2e2a45cf24e5cd381ca9033eace97/Terror%20s%20

Mask%20-%20Insurgency%20within%20Islam%20-%20Michael%20Vlahos%20(JHUAPL%20May%202002).pdf 

24 Impressions of America 2004, How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn About America, A Six 

Nation Study Commissioned by the Arab-American Institute, conducted by Zogby International, June 

2004, AAI, Arab Attitudes towards Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy and the Media, a Public 

Opinion Poll by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland/Zogby 

International, May 2004. 
36 

American initiative and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger 

dynamic of intra-Islamic hostilities — but Americans have inserted themselves into this 

intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims. 

Therefore, in stark contrast to the Cold War, the United States today is not seeking to 

contain a threatening state/empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within 

Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity — an agenda 

hidden within the official rubric of a “War on Terrorism.” 

But if the strategic situation is wholly unlike the Cold War, our response nonetheless has 

tended to imitate the routines and bureaucratic responses and mindset that so 

characterized that era. In terms of strategic communication especially, the Cold War 

emphasized: 

• Dissemination of information to “huddled masses yearning to be free.” Today we 

reflexively compare Muslim “masses” to those oppressed under Soviet rule. This is a 

strategic mistake. There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. groundswell 

among Muslim societies — except to be liberated perhaps from what they see as 

apostate tyrannies that the U.S. so determinedly promotes and defends. 

• An enduringly stable propaganda environment. The Cold War was a status quo 

setting that emphasized routine message-packaging — and whose essential objective 

was the most efficient enactment of the routine. In contrast the situation in Islam 

today is highly dynamic, and likely to move decisively in one direction or another. 

The U.S. urgently needs to think in terms of promoting actual positive change. 

• An acceptance of authoritarian regimes as long as they were anti-communist. This 

could be glossed over in our message of freedom and democracy because it was the 

main adversary only that truly mattered. Today, however, the perception of intimate 

U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in 

American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that 

of the enemy. 
37 

Communicating authority and persuading others has been an essential tool of statecraft 

since ancient times. Three millennia ago Assyrian kings carved scenes of their power 

and majesty into stone tableaux meant to impress their authority on peers and subjects 

alike. In the mid 20th century all of the major powers made extensive use of radio as a 

means of extending information and influence across borders. Twenty years ago the 

Reagan Administration had a sophisticated grasp of the power of information — 

especially television — characterizing information as one of the elements of national 

power. 

Yet the current national security strategy (October 2002) says nothing about the power of 

information nor does it allude to the necessity of integrating all of the forms of national 

power and authority. We now have national strategies for securing cyberspace, protecting 

national infrastructures, military strategy, and others, yet a national strategy for the 

employment of strategic communication does not exist. This blind spot existed 

throughout the 1990s, abetted in part by the belief that the end of the Cold War also 

ended our responsibility to continue strategic communication. This critical strategic 

mistake was made at the same time a new threat posed by radical Islam was emerging. 

Strategic communication must be at the center of America’s overall grand strategy in this 

war. But how should we begin to move in this direction? The U.S. Government does not 

even have a coherent statement of the problem, and refuses to address the importance of 

strategic communication in addressing it. Moreover, it has adopted a Cold War style 

response in terms of activity and organization. So where to begin? 

2.2 Strategic Communication Principles 

If there were a strategic communication corollary to the U.S. Military’s “intelligence 

preparation of the battle space” it would be: correctly analyze the combined impacts of 

audience, impact, message and means. We often speak of “the audience” we wish to 

influence as if there were only one. The reality is that in the global information 

environment in which we live and work there are numerous audiences that can be 

affected differently by the same message. Crafting an influence campaign means 

precisely identifying the key audience, but also other audiences as well. 
38 

What would we like our targeted audiences to see — and what impact do we wish to 

have? Do we want them to “like” us? Do we want them to question and doubt the 

information they get from their own governments, like we did with Radio Free Europe 

during the Cold War? Do we wish them similarly to cease supporting militant jihadists in 

their midst? Or are these traditional approaches to strategic communications even the 

right questions? Crafting an impact that we can see, measure, and realize is surely as 

important as accurately analyzing the audiences we wish to influence. But how to craft a 

message when our target audience is unwilling even to listen to us? 

What message can generate the desired impact on the targeted audience? We must begin 

by listening to that audience, because if we do not understand what resonates with them 

we have only a serendipitous chance of succeeding. Much of the current U.S. effort 

concentrates on delivering “the message” and omits the essential first step of listening to 

our targeted audiences. We can craft a message that actually gets through only by using 

language, symbols, and images that resonate with the targeted audience. 

Each synthesis of message-impact-audience suggests its own best means of delivery. 

Whether radio, TV, Internet, or print, we must understand how these factors interrelate 

before we can gauge the potential influence we might have. TV may be the most 

ubiquitous information medium in today’s world, but it is the blend of media and how 

they can mutually reinforce our message that is crucial. 

Information Age Dynamics. We must also take the measure of new dynamics emerging 

from the information age. The speed with which information becomes available to the 

global audience, the convergence of means by which we can capture many different kinds 

of information (visual, audio, print, etc) in a single digital format, and the ability to get 

that information to a global audience all suggest some of the advantages and limitations 

of this information age. Often the first information to reach an audience (a global 

audience that is really a galaxy of niche audiences) frames how an event is perceived and 

discussed — and thus can shape its ultimate impact as well. Always reacting to 

information is tantamount to losing. For example, NATO strategists were stunned to 
39 

discover that Slobodan Milosevic’s most effective weapon in the air campaign against 

him was not, say, an air defense network, but rather the global television network.25

Digital convergence is only beginning to be understood by decision makers. The 

significance of a common news language of bit and byte simply cannot be overstated. A 

truly global network is reshaping politics, diplomacy, warfare — all social interaction.26

Just one example: the ability of a blogger in a conflict zone to capture a digital image of 

an atrocity, upload it, paste it on a webpage, and have it available to millions in minutes 

is a startling development. 

Here is just one example of information age implications for old-style info-agency 

organization. While we focus inward our adversary is focusing outward, truly reaching 

and motivating those they hope to enlist against us. The U.S. has always operated from 

the proposition that in the “war of ideas” and the competition of ideologies, one form of 

governance and society functions best when the bright light of free-flowing information 

is pulsing — among free and democratic societies — while another — the tyrannical and 

fascistic — functions with difficulty, if at all, under those circumstances. Yet the paradox 

today is that our enemy is thriving in an environment of free and open information flows. 

Thus our challenge is to transcend Cold War clichés, to seek out new and creative 

responses — especially in the realm of strategic communication — and to do so most 

urgently, because at this moment it is the enemy that has the advantage. 

2.3 What is the Problem? Who Are We Dealing With? 

The information campaign — or as some still would have it, “the war of ideas,” or the 

struggle for “hearts and minds” — is important to every war effort. In this war it is an 

essential objective, because the larger goals of U.S. strategy depend on separating the 

vast majority of non-violent Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist-Jihadists. But 

 

25 Gary Pounder, “Opportunity Lost: Public Affairs, Information Operations, and the Air War Against 

Serbia,” Aerospace Power Journal, Volume 14, Number 2, Summer, 2000, 56-77. 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/pounder.htm 26 For more of the authors’ development of these themes see, Michael Vlahos, “Entering the Infosphere,” 

Journal of International Affairs, 1998, 51(2):497-525; Dan Kuehl, Wanted: A National Information 

Strategy for the Interconnected Age, 2004 FISSEA Conference, 11 March, 2004. 

http://csrc.nist.gov/organizations/fissea/conference/ 2004/presentations/Thursday/Kuehl-FISSEA031104.ppt 
40 

American efforts have not only failed in this respect: they may also have achieved the 

opposite of what they intended. 

American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature 

of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to 

single-digits in some Arab societies. 

• Muslims do not “hate our freedom,” but rather, they hate our policies. The 

overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in 

favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even increasing 

support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi 

Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states. 

• Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic 

societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy. Moreover, saying that 

“freedom is the future of the Middle East” is seen as patronizing, suggesting that 

Arabs are like the enslaved peoples of the old Communist World — but Muslims do 

not feel this way: they feel oppressed, but not enslaved. 

• Furthermore, in the eyes of Muslims, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq 

has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. U.S. actions 

appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in 

order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim selfdetermination. 

• Therefore, the dramatic narrative since 9/11 has essentially borne out the entire 

radical Islamist bill of particulars. American actions and the flow of events have 

elevated the authority of the Jihadi insurgents and tended to ratify their legitimacy 

among Muslims. Fighting groups portray themselves as the true defenders of an 

Ummah (the entire Muslim community) invaded and under attack — to broad public 

support. 

• What was a marginal network is now an Ummah-wide movement of fighting groups. 

Not only has there been a proliferation of “terrorist” groups: the unifying context of a 

shared cause creates a sense of affiliation across the many cultural and sectarian 

boundaries that divide Islam. 
41 

• Finally, Muslims see Americans as strangely narcissistic — namely, that the war is all 

about us. As the Muslims see it, everything about the war is — for Americans — 

really no more than an extension of American domestic politics and its great game. 

This perception is of course necessarily heightened by election-year atmospherics, but 

nonetheless sustains their impression that when Americans talk to Muslims they are 

really just talking to themselves. 

Thus the critical problem in American public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim 

World is not one of “dissemination of information,” or even one of crafting and 

delivering the “right” message. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of credibility. Simply, 

there is none — the United States today is without a working channel of communication 

to the world of Muslims and of Islam. Inevitably therefore, whatever Americans do and 

say only serves the party that has both the message and the “loud and clear” channel: the 

enemy. 

Arguably the first step toward mitigating and eventually even reversing this situation is to 

better understand the values and worldview of the target audience itself. 

Target Demographics and Values. The official take on the target audience has been 

gloriously simple. If the enemy is a relatively small group of crazies and criminals — 

“Bad Muslims” — then the rest must be “Good Muslims” and thus the people we want 

our public diplomacy to reach:

Good Muslims Bad Muslims

(Including friendly regimes and everybody else) (Only terrorists & sponsors) 

The difficulty of course is that the Muslim World looks nothing like this. Islam is a 

cacophony of competing and crosscutting groups, sub-cultures, and whole societies. A 

Muslim may be balancing up to five identities: as a Muslim, as a sectarian Muslim 
42 

(Sunni, Sh’ia, Ismaili, etc.), as a national citizen, as an ethnic “citizen” (Arab, Kurd, 

Turkmen, etc.), and as a tribal or clan member. If we were to grossly simplify this 

picture, and yet still have a roughly accurate yardstick of Muslim sociology today — 

especially in terms of the dynamics of the war — it might break down like this: 

• Regimes and their retainers: (including the army, bigwigs, cronies, & hangers-on) 

• The professional class (also known in some quarters as “technocrats”) 

• Establishment & activist Islamist preletes (plus social welfare & education networks) 

• Regular and poor Muslims (small entrepreneurs on-down) 

• Fighting groups and their networks 

These broad segments represent relatively distinct social and political constituencies, 

with varying weight and influence in national life. The norms of national life can be seen 

in some ways as a balance between the first three of these segments: a rough triad of 

regime elites, establishment Ulama (Muslim prelates) and the technocratic class.27

But the war has placed these norms under increasing stress, and conflicts below the 

surface in Muslim (and especially Arab) national life are emerging into a promise and 

anticipation of change. Change is the province of the fighting groups and the activist 

Islamists prelates who are not creatures of their regimes. Change means of course the 

vision of Islamic Restoration. Thus if we were to look at Muslim societies (again, Arab 

societies especially) in terms of their receptivity and support for change/restoration, the 

spectrum might look like this: 

Regimes Uncommitted Sympathizers Islamists Jihadis

This “change-spectrum” shows change constituencies in terms of a weighted mix of both 

numbers and authority. By this last measure, paradoxically, regimes may have the 

 

27 Raymond William Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists, Harvard, 2003, Ernest 

Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology, 1983; Amyn B. Sajoo, 

Civil Society in the Muslim World, Contemporary Perspectives, I. B. Tauris, 2002.
43 

highest level of power but the lowest level of authority within their societies. This sort of 

authority is not what has been referred to as “soft power” in the foreign policy context — 

rather it is ultimately the foundation of political legitimacy within society. Thus a 

developing shift in such authority within Muslim society presages eventual changes in 

political power — and so in today’s ruling regimes. 

And of course, the regimes are the most resistant to political and social change, while the 

Jihadis, the fighting groups, are its most active agents. Notably the regime and status quo

segments are quite small. Some elements within Arab regimes are actually quite 

committed, if subversively, to the change agenda. In Pakistan, regime support for Islamic 

Restoration is quite high. This sort of continuing sub rosa defection will be in fact a 

critical indicator of impending regime collapse. 

Thus it is possible to show the Jihadis as having a wider degree of sympathetic (Arab 

majorities), indirect (Islamists), and direct support than most of the regimes. Certainly 

Arabs, by an overwhelming majority, sympathize with, or are active in the cause of 

Islamic Restoration. Therefore it is even more interesting to track the relative weight of 

the non-Jihadi Islamists, also called “moderate” or “New Islamists,” because their 

professed vision of Islamic Restoration is non-violent, tolerant, and relatively pluralistic. 

It can be argued that the New Islamists are in fact the true center of gravity in the Muslim 

World today, in that they have the most authority to make change, and draw the highest 

levels of sympathy from less-active, but receptive and supportive Arab majorities28. In 

this construct the Jihadis are seen as perhaps necessary to make change begin and thus 

become eventually inevitable, but the radicals do not appeal to the majority of Muslims in 

terms of practical political change if and when old regimes finally collapse. 

The change spectrum reveals target demographics for U.S. public diplomacy that offer at 

best a highly constricted opportunity — how constricted it actually is can be shown by 

 

28 “Radical in their ultimate commitments, the New Islamists do not waver in the pacific gradualism of their 

means.” Raymond William Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists, Harvard, 2003; 

Geneive Abdo, No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam, Oxford, 2000. 
44 

mapping the change-spectrum above onto the marketing construct presented in Chapter 3 

which defines the “where to put your marketing effort” spectrum: 

• Hard Support (for U.S. Government): Regimes and their retainers 

• Soft Support: Regimes and their retainers, a few technocrats 

• Neutral: Some of the professional class and some regular & poor 

• Soft Opposition: The overwhelming majority 

• Hard Opposition: A substantial minority (more than we want to admit) 

This spectrum does not preclude future opportunities for us to reach key segments of 

these audiences. Neither, however, should we underestimate the magnitude of the 

problem we face. A June 2004 Zogby poll29 of Arab opinion shows that the audience 

receptive to the U.S. message is miniscule: 

Country June 2004 Favorable/ 

Unfavorable

April 2002 Favorable/ 

Unfavorable

Morocco 11/88 38/61

Saudi Arabia 4/94 12/87

Jordan 15/78 34/61

Lebanon 20/69 26/70

UAE 14/73 11/87

Egypt 2/98 15/76

But Americans believe that while the U.S. necessarily shapes foreign policies to support 

our national interests, those same interests are not necessarily in opposition to the 

interests of other nations and cultures. To the contrary, Americans are convinced that the 

U.S. is a benevolent “superpower” that elevates values emphasizing freedom and 

 

29 "Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn about America," A Six 

Nation Survey Conducted by Zogby International, July 2004. 
45 

prosperity as at the core of its own national interest. Thus, for Americans, “U.S. values” 

are in reality “world values” — exemplified by the United Nations’ Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights or the 1975 Helsinki Accords — so deep down we assume 

that everyone should naturally support our policies. 

Yet the world of Islam — by overwhelming majorities at this time — sees things 

differently. Muslims see American policies as inimical to their values, American rhetoric 

about freedom and democracy as hypocritical, and American actions as deeply 

threatening. Again, from the Zogby poll30: 

 

Morocco 

Fav/Unfav

Saudia 

Arabia 

Fav/Unfav

Jordan 

Fav/Unfav

Lebanon 

Fav/Unfav

UAE 

Fav/Unfav

Science/ 

Technology

90/8 48/51 83/13 52/46 84/12

Freedom/ 

Democracy

53/41 39/60 57/40 41/56 39/53

People 59/29 28/64 52/39 39/58 46/35

Movies/TV 60/37 35/60 56/41 30/66 54/43

Products 73/24 37/59 61/35 39/57 63/34

Education 61/16 12/74 59/29 38/54 63/23

Policy toward 

Arabs

4/90 4/85 8/89 5/86 7/87

Policy towards 

Palestinians

3/93 3/95 7/89 4/90 5/90

Policy on 

Terrorism

13/82 2/96 21/75 10/84 9/84

Iraq Policy 1/98 1/97 2/78 4/93 4/91

 

30 "Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn about America," A Six 

Nation Survey Conducted by Zogby International, July 2004. 
46 

In other words, they do not hate us for our values, but because of our policies. 

But this chart suggests an even more worrisome development. A similar series of 

questions showed even more favorable opinion ratios in favor of U.S. culture and its 

values — in 2002. Thus it seems that in two years the Jihadi message — that strongly 

attacks American values — is being accepted by more moderate and non-violent 

Muslims. This in turn implies that negative opinion of the U.S. has not yet bottomed-out, 

but is in fact continuing to move dynamically. But the movement is now qualitative 

rather and quantitative, meaning that regular Muslims are moving from “soft opposition” 

toward “hard opposition.” In Saudi Arabia, a large majority believes that the U.S. seeks 

to “weaken” and “dominate” Islam itself — in other words, Americans have become the 

enemy. It is noteworthy that opinion is hardest over against America in precisely those 

places ruled by what Muslims call “apostates” and tyrants — the tyrants we support. This 

should give us pause. 

Thus it is incumbent on the U.S. strategic information campaign to first find a way to 

address this near-unanimity of Muslim opinion hostile to the U.S.. If we want to truly 

demonstrate the linkage between American power and the universal values we support, 

and if we want to truly build a bridge between ourselves and the Muslim World, then we 

must first open a working channel of communication with that world, which as of now 

does not exist. Furthermore, if regular Muslims are indeed moving to hard “opposition” 

to the U.S. then we have only so much time to open such a channel before the possibility 

is closed for the duration of this war. 

Therefore it is not enough for us to preach to Muslims, telling them that they need to 

show us that they believe in our values — such as tolerance and pluralism — and that 

they must reject the bad values of the violent Islamists. It is patently patronizing, for 

example, to keep bringing up Islam’s “Golden Age” as though we were scolding Muslims 

for some sort of civilizational backsliding. This is in fact a counter-productive approach; 

a non-starter. If we really want to see the Muslim World as a whole and the Arabic-
47 

speaking World in particular, move more toward our understanding of “moderation” and 

“tolerance,” we must reassure Muslims that this does not mean that they must submit to 

the American Way. In other words, as we seek out Islamic voices that share essential 

beliefs with us, we must convey an important message of reassurance to them — before 

we can expect to usefully talk with them. 

This should not be seen as an intractable enterprise. In more moderate Muslim societies 

like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh, there is markedly more support for the U.S. — 

albeit still small minorities — so we might look to realize some small initial success 

there. Furthermore, the wider task of strategic communication reaches beyond the 

exigencies of this war and the Muslim World. Arguably it is just as essential to renew 

European attitudes toward America — and this is surely a more straightforward task. 

Strategic communication is still a global mission. 

The next chapter will examine means and methods that we can use towards this end. 
48 

Chapter 3 – Leveraging the Private Sector 

3.1 Borrowing Private Sector and Political Campaign Best Practices 

The U.S. approaches modern warfare with strategies, tactics and weapons that are 

cutting-edge, designed to be effective against modern foes and constantly upgraded. By 

contrast, our current strategic communication planning and execution is mired in 

diplomatic and marketing yesteryear. We have no clearly defined strategic framework, 

themes or messages. And we try to use the advantages of the incumbent and the tactics 

of mass marketing. Yet those advantages have diminished greatly in the past several 

years; and those tactics no longer work even in private sector marketing. 

 

Put simply, winning the global struggle for ideas requires waging a much more effective 

strategic communication effort here and abroad. There is widespread agreement on this 

point. To do this, however, we must give up the assumed advantages of the “incumbent” 

and trade them for the real edge of the “insurgent” in the information age. Building an 

insurgent global strategic communication culture that borrows the most effective private 

sector marketing and political campaign techniques will be at the core of rebuilding and 

reinventing the way the U.S. listens, engages, and communicates with the world. 

Consider, for example, the new environment in which the U.S. Government, political 

leaders and businesses must today communicate: 

• Information moves increasingly farther and faster than ever before. 

• Most individuals have almost infinite choice of information sources. 

• Changes in perceptions and attitudes, according to political and marketing polls, are 

taking place more and more quickly in more and more places. 

• The “change state” is the constant state in politics and business today. 

As a result, it’s a very, very difficult time for “incumbents” in politics and business, here 

in the U.S. and around the world. For example: 
49 

"Incumbents" tend today to be bloated, slow, cautious, bureaucratic, change-resistant 

and more likely to play “defense” than “offense” to maintain power. 

"Insurgents” invariably harbor today an attitude of difference, move faster and 

welcome31 change as opportunity. There modus operandi: mobile and agile.” 

In past decades, business and governmental incumbents—for example, a superpower or a 

leading global brand—had dominant control of the global dialogue as a result of superior 

resources and access to communications channels. Through the peak of mass marketing 

in the latter part of the 20th century, this domination of private sector mass 

communications resources literally developed the power of Western popular culture and 

the growth of global brands. 

 

But the same factors that added to the power of the incumbent leaders and brands also 

provided opportunity for insurgent movements and insurgent companies—for fresh, 

cutting-edge and sharply differentiated competitors. Today, as a result of the global 

Information Revolution, private sector mass marketing is losing its relative power. And 

the incumbent advantage for political and business leaders is being lost with it. 

 

Interestingly, in the private sector, it is not simply that incumbents have lost effectiveness 

in communicating. Insurgents have gained advantage at the same time—and have 

developed a new set of communications rules to help push that advantage. That’s why, in 

the private and campaign management sectors, insurgent political movements and 

insurgent brands are creating most of the energy and innovation in all parts of the world 

today. 

 

This is true, for example, in U.S. commercial marketplaces. Numerous insurgent 

companies and marketers have fought their way to the top of markets to challenge the 

leader brands by using a new set of communications and marketing rules. Moreover, the 

same is true in global politics and U.S. foreign policy. Having faced an enemy for more 

 

31 David Morey and Scott Miller, The Underdog Advantage: Using the Power of Insurgent Strategy to Put 

Your Business On Top, McGraw-Hill, 2004, see Introduction and pages 2-8. 
50 

than half a century that aligned its forces of mass against the U.S., we now face an enemy 

of tiny proportions and relatively meager resources, but clearly in control of the political 

dialogue in the war on terror. Objective observers say that Al Qaeda constantly outflanks 

the U.S. in the war of information. 

 

The argument of this report, then, is that this dynamic must be changed. In essence, this 

means the U.S. must adopt the strategies and tactics of the insurgent, not the incumbent: 

waging a proactive, bold and effective U.S. strategic communication effort. 

How best can the U.S. Government begin to drive this kind of culture change: moving 

from an incumbent to an insurgent strategic and tactical mindset in the way it 

communicates? And what best practices can the U.S. Government borrow from its 

private and campaign management sectors? Three overall answers: 

 (1) As in a successful political campaign, the U.S. must clearly define what success 

means in terms of its benefits for all of our target audiences. All these constituents must 

understand what success means for them in personal terms. And a carefully defined set 

of themes and messages must reinforce targeted audiences’ perceived and personal 

benefits. 

(2) We must communicate what our definition for the future promises on individual 

terms, not national or pan-national religious terms. We should personalize the benefits of 

our defined future: For example, personal control, choice and change, personal mobility, 

meritocracy, individual rights (and, particularly, women’s rights). And we must draw a 

stark difference between support and opposition along these personal lines. 

(3) As with the most effective private sector and political marketing campaigns, we must 

understand what constituents must be moved to achieve success. And we must 

understand what it will take to move them. More importantly, though, we must target 

those constituents who can be moved—pragmatically and strategically picking our target 

audience. We must adopt the practical principle of “do the doable”; otherwise we waste 
51 

our strategic communication resources on impossible goals, demoralize our allies and 

energize our enemies. 

 

The U.S. Government should target those who support, or are likely to support, our views 

based on their own culture, traditions and attitudes about such things as personal control, 

choice and change. Private sector best practices define this as the “hard support” and 

“soft support” in a marketplace and they are not only the likeliest to move in the U.S. 

Government’s direction, but they’re also the likeliest to move others. Both their behavior 

and viral communications form the most powerful and credible medium for attitudinal 

change. Specifically, for example, we believe the most “movable” targets will be the socalled secularists of the Muslim world: Business people, scientists, non-religious 

educators, politicians or public administrators, musicians, artists, poets, writers, 

journalists, actors and their audiences and admirers. 

3.2 Implications of Adapting Private Sector and Political Campaign Best 

Practices 

The current state of U.S. public diplomacy itself has become so stigmatized that it 

literally must re-invent itself. Given the generational national security damage that has 

accrued, a re-focused and transformed U.S. public diplomacy—we call it “strategic 

communication”—must be launched. Specifically, success in “strategic communication” 

necessarily involves institutional culture change and the selective borrowing of private 

sector best practices. 

For example, this new strategic communication function must be more comprehensive, 

substantive, locally agile and below the radar than public diplomacy today. Moreover, 

realistic expectations must be set: It will take decades to counter extremist terrorist 

recruiters and fully restore U.S. global standing and credibility. 
52 

Drawing on the insurgent culture change and private sector best practices discussed 

above, the following steps will be necessary to transform U.S. strategic communication:32

• Acknowledge the state and national security implications of public diplomacy in 

crisis. The first step to any solution is recognition of a problem. And this recognition 

needs to occur at the highest, and ultimately widest, levels of the U.S. Government. 

• Recognize that the solution lies in transforming this strategic communication 

function—even launching, as per the private sector, effective “change leadership” 

from within the U.S. Government. Just as the most successful private sector leaders 

pull their respective companies through culture change to continually make them 

more strategic, bold and insurgent, so must we drive culture change efforts 

throughout the U.S. Government’s new strategic communication function. 

Recruiting, training and motivating the next bold and cutting-edge generation of 

strategic communication officials will be critical to long-term success. 

• Define a future vision, measurable objectives, a strategic framework and key themes 

and messages. A transformed U.S. strategic communications function must frame its 

definition of future success and formulate a core strategy to drive all tactical efforts 

toward achieving this success. Moreover, strategic communication efforts must 

reinforce key themes and messages and constantly be measured against defined 

objectives. As a result, adjustments must be made and those responsible for 

implementation held accountable. 

• Search-out ways to promote a more robust dialogue within Islam. For example, as 

described below, a far more sophisticated attitudinal segmentation model must be 

built that targets “soft support” and “undecided”—and focuses on moving them to 

higher levels of support. For the U.S., where possible, helping forces within Islam 

drive a wedge between moderates and extremists is a top strategic priority. 

• Mobilize greater private sector initiatives that contain a built-in agility, credibility and 

even deniability that will be missing from government-sponsored initiatives. One 

thing is clear: Over coming years, the U.S. private sector’s stake in more effective 

 

32 Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap and Others Don’t, Harper Collins, 

2001. 
53 

U.S. strategic communication efforts will increase. More and more, they will be 

looking for channels to contribute where they can. 

3.3 Implementation Examples 

The argument of this study is that the U.S. Government must take a dramatically more 

disciplined, methodical and strategic approach to global communication. This, we 

believe, means selectively borrowing private sector best practices and creating a range of 

insurgent U.S. strategic communication vehicles, programs and products as detailed 

below. They are based, for example, on the following approaches: 

Analyze Perceptions: Utilizing cutting-edge research and political-strategic 

methodologies to better understand global perceptions toward the U.S., including 

American values and policies. 

Formulate Key Objectives and Strategies: One reason the U.S. has had difficulty 

managing the post-war occupation of Iraq is a near total confusion over objectives and 

strategies. The definition of post-war success has never been enunciated clearly. 

Similarly, in terms of U.S. strategic communication, a critical step in planning will be to 

detail exactly the destination toward which we must head. Put simply, the new strategic 

communication planning function must define what success looks like. And it must 

formulate a comprehensive strategic framework to achieve it. 

For example, as with the private sector, it is important for the U.S. Government’s new 

strategic communication function to develop an understanding of the U.S. “brand” 

positioning and strategy. In this sense, the word “brand” simply means a conceptual 

system to guide and navigate our constituents to an understanding of the meaning and 

essence of the U.S., including its values, interests and policies. 
54 

More specifically, strategic communication planning should very selectively borrow 

private sector best practices and begin to maximize the U.S. “brand” positioning in its 

five key dimensions: 

Presence: How will we develop awareness of the U.S. “brand” in terms of its 

constituents and audience? 

Relevance: How will the U.S. define the role of its “brand” in terms of the needs and 

wants of key target audiences? 

Differentiation: How will the U.S. distinguish its “brand?” While the U.S. Government 

clearly shares respect for human dignity and other values with many nations, there are 

attributes that set us apart and are especially admirable and inspirational to others. 

Credibility: How will the U.S. ensure that its “brand” fulfills its promises and delivers on 

defined expectations? 

Imagery: What images, icons and symbolic elements will help communicate and enrich 

this “brand” meaning? 

Determine Targets: Identifying audience targets that are “winnable” in terms of 

increased U.S. support will be critical to successful strategic communication. For 

example, this means borrowing from campaign and private sector methodologies and 

conducting political-style attitudinal research: identifying, as the highest priority, “soft 

support” targets.33 The best private sector marketing and political campaign management 

use the attitudinal continuum below to organize, maximize and focus communication 

resources. And this approach should be utilized to improve the effectiveness and 

efficiency of U.S. strategic communication: 

 

33 David Morey and Scott Miller, The Underdog Advantage: Using the Power of Insurgent Strategy to Put 

Your Business On Top, McGraw-Hill, 2004, pages 36-49. 
55 

HO SO UNDECIDED SOS HAS

 

HO = The Hard Opposition: In a political campaign, for example, these individuals will 

come out and vote against you in any circumstances. Of course, political campaigns do 

not want to waste a penny chasing their “un-gettable” votes, but they must also be ready 

to counter their negative effect on other voters. In elections, as in product marketing 

campaigns, these are the activists who form-up against you. 

SO = The Soft Opposition: In a political campaign, these individuals support your 

opponent, or prefer in marketing a competitive brand, but they might not vote, for 

example, in bad weather. In an election campaign, you try not to raise issues that will 

enflame soft opposition to vote. And in product or service marketing, you realize these 

consumers can be moved ... eventually. But you never target to their wants and needs 

directly; that will take the focus off much more productive targets. 

The UNDECIDED: Typically, a political campaign will do virtually anything to move 

the undecided before Election Day; after all, it needs whatever it takes to get to 50.1%. 

The 2000 U.S. Presidential election proved this. After hundreds of millions were spend 

through primaries and the general election, more millions were poured into the legal 

arguments that would decide the election. Campaigns will buy any vote they can. 

They’ll run negative advertising. They’ll rent fleets of vans to drive hard supporters to 

the polls. The votes of the undecided can move at any time and change in a light breeze. 

SOS = Soft Support: Constituents who are leaning your way and who, research tells us, 

are six times less expensive to move to hard support as undecided are to move to soft 

support. To win, you must engage and activate this segment to vote—or in consumer 

terms to come back and buy your product again. Identifying, targeting and moving soft 

support to hard support is the highest priority of any U.S. strategic communications 

effort. 

 
56 

HAS = Hard Support: Extremely loyal constituents who must not be taken for granted, 

but who ultimately are critical to success in political campaigns or marketing. This is 

your loyal support. And you must, in campaign terms, hold these constituents until 

Election Day and motivate them to help pull the soft support to hard support. 

Develop Themes and Messages: Based on the research referenced above—and 

specifically focusing on moving soft support constituents to hard support. A strategically 

formulated, focused and consistent set of themes and messages is a prerequisite for the 

success of a transformed strategic communication effort. These key themes and 

messages should, for example, communicate: 

Respect for human dignity and individual rights 

Individual education and economic opportunity 

Personal freedom, safety and mobility 

Identify Key Products and Programs: Again utilizing research, the new U.S. strategic 

communication effort must reach audience targets through a customized and even 

personalized dialogue that is relevant and credible to those targets. This will involve an 

array of products and programs: 

Conduct Audience Polling and Analysis: Including ethnographic, psychographic, 

demographic, behavioral and tracking research. As with a successful political or 

marketing campaign, the reality is you simply cannot know too much about your 

audience and their perceptions. For example, using hypothesis-testing methodologies in 

qualitative focus groups and quantitative benchmark research is a critical prerequisite for 

strategic communication success. 

Undertake Cultural Analysis: Including cultural factors involving values, religion, 

entertainment and education. Strategic communication must adopt a wide and incisive 

analytical view of how its audiences are continually influenced. 
57 

Conduct Media Analysis: Identifying daily influences on audiences including content 

analysis, agenda and biases, relevance and credibility, structure and control. 

Communicate to Target Audiences: Identifying and organizing key targets based on the 

above attitudinal continuum, demographics and other attributes. For example, this should 

include lists of influential “opinion leaders” country by country. And this should include 

a “friends and family” database of soft supporters and hard supporters who “self-select” 

themselves and are constantly engaged in a personal, relevant and credible dialogue. 

Deploy Strategic Communication Teams: Not unlike the Peace Corps, we should 

recruit a wave of former USIA and public diplomacy officials and next generation 

representatives from various private, non-profit, academic and entertainment sectors to 

articulate American values. These representatives must be talented, well-trained and 

strategically mobilized; and, importantly, their actions must communicate more loudly 

than their words. 

Mobilize Global Spokespeople: Including religious, ethnic or cultural leaders and 

representatives from sports, entertainment, culture, literature, music, local communities, 

education, health care, etc. is vital. These spokespeople can be an invaluable and highly 

credible source of information for key foreign audiences. 

Underwrite International Products: There is a world-wide community of expert story 

tellers who produce message products for television, radio, film and games. Some of 

their products are exquisitely sensitive to nuances of the culture of the target audience. 

Such products should be developed – or better – identified so that their broader 

distribution to the target audience can be underwritten. 

Use Interactive and Mediated Channels: Pervasive telecommunications technology 

permits the cost effective engagement of target audiences in sustained two-way 

interactions using electronic mail, interactive dialogue, virtual communication, 

interactive video games, and interactive Internet games. Similarly, this technology 
58 

supports ad hoc group interactions using blogs and chat rooms. Mediated interactions 

involve an individual who orchestrated the posting of material on a web site focused on a 

specific issue. These new forms of engagement should be harnessed for appropriate 

audiences. 

Utilize Private Sector Media Techniques: The new U.S. strategic communications 

effort should utilize the same media as do the private sector marketing and political 

campaigns. Their deployments tactics should be adapted to government needs. Channels 

include classic broadcast media such as television, film, newspaper, radio, periodicals 

and e-magazines. Interactive channels, as described above, permit a sustained 

conversation. Country by country, target audience by target audience, the most credible 

channels and the most promising techniques need to be identified and used to deliver 

appropriate messages. 

Bolster Exchanges: From 1993 to 2001, overall funding for the State Department’s 

educational and cultural exchange programs fell more than 33 percent—and exchanges in 

societies with significant Muslim populations has declined. This must change. 

Increased, expanded and targeted exchange programs must be significantly ramped-up 

under the new strategic communication function. 

Facilitate Events and Meetings: For example, a series of locally sponsored initiatives to 

counter Islamic jihadism should be launched within the Muslim world. Examples include 

economic development conferences, seminars discussing political openness and 

formation of a pan-Islamic council of respected spiritual and secular leaders to coordinate 

the Islamic world’s own ideological battle against extremism and terrorism. 

Bolster U.S. Recruitment and Training: While progress has been made in upgrading 

recruiting and training, it is only a beginning. Strategic communications must be infused 

with new blood: A concerted communications effort must be planned and launched to 

attract a next generation of cutting-edge, risk-friendly, private sector talent. And this 
59 

talent must be hired, trained, prepared, groomed, motivated, and promoted to 

communicate with an insurgent-like efficiency and effectiveness. 

Partner with Private Sector: U.S. strategic communication efforts must be synergized 

by the public sector. The bottom line: Government alone cannot today communicate 

credibly and effectively to foreign populations. It must be assisted by adjunct private 

sector efforts. 

Use Feedback to Monitor Success: Critical to the success of a new strategic 

communication effort will be creating a culture of measurement that helps the U.S. make 

necessary adjustments and learn from both past and present efforts and initiatives. This 

feedback loop must continually foster accountability and measure success against 

selected objectives—looping up to the highest levels of the new strategic communication 

function. 

Specifically, as in the private sector, this monitoring and feedback system must measure 

progress against the ten strategic communication objectives below. Cutting edge private 

sector measurement, models and management systems, both qualitative and quantitative, 

should be applied to calibrate progress against the following: 

• WHAT do we want to communicate? 

• WHY exactly do we want to communicate this? 

• WHAT do we want this to actually do? 

• WHO are we trying to reach? 

• WHAT do we want them to remember? 

• WHAT attitude or behavior do we expect? 

• WHEN will this be done? 

• HOW much will it cost? 

• WHAT exact results do we anticipate? 

• HOW will we measure success?
60 

Chapter 4 – Strategic Communication: Direction, Coordination, 

Support, and Execution 

4.1 Linking Purpose to Process 

Presidential efforts to plan and coordinate U.S. strategic communication since World War 

II have employed White House and cabinet department models. Presidents typically have 

used the NSC or the Department of State. Each has advantages and disadvantages. 

Neither has been consistently successful. 

The NSC’s Presidential imprimatur gives it more clout with line departments and 

agencies. The NSC “thinks” in interagency terms, and it is more suited to dealing with 

civilian/military and inter-agency rivalries. On the other hand, the NSC is susceptible to 

the pressures of election cycles. Its staff has less continuity. The NSC normally is not 

operational, and it has weak tasking authority. The NSC’s strategic communication 

senior advisors and policy planning committees come and go. Two Presidential 

directives, often cited as models to emulate (PDD 68, President Clinton; NSDD 77, 

President Reagan), contained elegant formal authorities but proved weak in sustained 

impact.34

 

Cabinet departments in contrast have more continuity, operating budgets, and contract 

authority. On balance they are less susceptible to the demands of election cycles. 

However, cabinet departments properly advance their own interests and tend not to 

“think” in interagency terms. The State Department delegates interagency strategic 

communication coordination to an Under Secretary with minimal planning and staff 

support at the bureau level. Under Secretaries rarely advise Presidents directly and are 

 

34 The bipartisan Presidentially-appointed U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy in its 1989 

report concluded: “The elaborate public diplomacy coordinating mechanism established by National 

Security Decision Directive (NSDD 77) in 1982 has not worked well. The Senior Planning Group (SPG), 

chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and its four subordinate committees 

have met infrequently and have not played the role expected of them” (p. 27). The Advisory 

Commission’s conclusion applies equally to PDD 68 on International Public Information signed by 

President Clinton in 1999 and the Strategic Communication PCC created by National Security Advisor 

Condoleeza Rice in 2002. 

 
61 

much less suited to dealing with interagency turf battles than the NSC. State occasionally 

has planned and coordinated strategic communication well on single issues (e.g., during 

the 1991 Persian Gulf war), but it has failed to do so successfully on a consistent basis 

when it has had the responsibility. 

The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was an independent executive branch agency from 

1953 until it was merged with the Department of State in 1999. USIA’s core 

competencies were information dissemination and managing educational and cultural 

exchanges overseas. Until the Broadcasting Act of 1994, U.S. international broadcasting 

services were independent grantees (RFE/RL) and linked organizationally, albeit 

tenuously, to USIA (Voice of America). USIA was flexible and responsive. USIA’s 

mission and critical mass gave it a level of strength in the execution of public diplomacy 

that so far has eluded the Department of State. 

USIA seldom developed communications strategies or coordinated interagency activities 

at the strategic level, however, despite statutory advisory responsibilities. USIA’s 

Directors by law reported directly to and served as the “principal advisor to the President, 

the NSC, and the Secretary of State.”35 Some USIA directors were invited occasionally 

to attend NSC meetings; some were not. The degree of participation depended almost 

always on personal relations between a President and a Director. Only rarely did it 

demonstrate appreciation of the value of understanding public opinion, other cultures, 

and communication strategies in making and implementing foreign policy. 

For sixty years strategic communication planning and coordination has been ephemeral 

and usually treated with indifference. The United States can no longer afford a 

repetitious pattern of hollow authorities, ineffectual committees, and stifling turf battles 

in strategic communication. The White House Office of Global Communications and a 

NSC PCC now have formal authorities relating to strategic communication coordination. 

 

35 Section 2, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977. The USIA Director’s legal authority as “statutory 

advisor” was contained in the Agency’s enabling legislation. USIA’s advisory role was analogous, at least 

formally, with the advisory authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 

provided in the National Security Act of 1947. For example, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal 

military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.” 10 U.S.C. 141(b). 
62 

Their practical influence is marginal at best, non-existent at worst. Their authorities 

should be rescinded. Given ample evidence that traditional NSC and cabinet models 

have not worked, these entities should be replaced with new structures grounded in 

legislation that address 21st century realities. 

America needs a revolution in strategic communication rooted in: 

• Presidential direction reinforced and made permanent with bipartisan Congressional 

funding and support and the backing of cabinet secretaries and agency heads who will 

build strong cooperative institutional capabilities. 

• Direction, planning, and coordination led by a new statutory Deputy National 

Security Advisor and an interagency Strategic Communication Committee. 

• Support from an orchestrated blend of public and private sector components 

dedicated to addressing critical challenges and providing operational support through 

an independent non-profit and nonpartisan Center for Global Strategic 

Communication. 

There is no such thing as a “perfect” planning and coordinating structure. The success or 

failure of new structures ultimately will be determined by the skill and integrity of the 

people involved. But substance and structure are integrally related. Good organizations 

can help shape good outcomes. 

4.2 Presidential and NSC Direction 

A unifying Presidential vision and broad bipartisan Congressional support are the critical 

starting points in transforming America’s strategic communication. Only Presidential 

direction and the focused actions of Congressional leaders can create the political will 

needed to build the long-term strategic communication capabilities America needs. 

Incremental changes to structures designed generations ago are not the answer. We need 

a new vision, new structures, and new Congressional authorities. Leadership from the 

top must drive widespread understanding that 21st century foreign and national security 

policies will fail unless interlinked with strategic communication. 
63 

The Task Force recommends a Presidential directive that will (1) strengthen the U.S. 

government’s ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic 

implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences; (2) coordinate all 

components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, 

international broadcasting, and military information operations; and (3) provide a 

foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of 

strategic communication. 

To achieve these goals the President should establish a permanent strategic 

communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create legislation 

and funding for a: 

• Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication; 

• Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC; and an 

• Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication (described 

in Section 4.3 below). 

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be equivalent 

in rank to a deputy head of a cabinet department and report to the National Security 

Advisor and to the NSC. The NSC Deputy for Strategic Communication would also 

serve as the President’s principal advisor on all matters relating strategic communication. 

This should be a highly experienced individual with a close relationship to the President, 

superb political communication skills, the stature to work at the highest levels of 

government, sensitivity to the cultures of civilian and military departments of 

government, and strong ties to the private sector. 

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a 

Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under 

secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland 

Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the 

Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of 
64 

the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board 

of Governors. 

The Strategic Communication Committee (SCC) should be given the strategic direction, 

coordination, and evaluation authorities that now exist in Executive Order 13283 

establishing the White House Office of Global Communications and the NSC 

Memorandum of September 10, 2002 establishing the NSC’s Strategic Communication 

Policy Coordinating Committee. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal 

authority, the new Strategic Communication Committee also should have authority to 

plan the work of line agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and 

military information operations. The SCC should assign operational responsibilities, but 

not direct execution. It should provide program and project direction to the new Center 

for Strategic Communication. 

The Deputy National Security Advisor should have the right to concur in the choices of 

personnel leading operating entities in the SCC’s departments and agencies including the 

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for Strategic Communication, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and the Chair of the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. The Deputy National Security Advisor also should work with the 

Director of the Office of Management and Budget in developing strategic communication 

budget priorities. 

Most of today’s strategic communication instruments were constructed during and after 

World War II. Missions and interagency coordinating structures reflect Cold War 

models. Just as an earlier generation of Americans created new ways to meet the national 

security challenges of the 1940s and 1950s, we must make changes on a similar scale 

today, and we must ground these changes in legislation. 
65 

Recommendation 1 

The Task Force recommends that the President issue a directive to (1) strengthen the 

U.S. government’s ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic 

implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences; (2) coordinate all 

components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, 

international broadcasting, and military information operations; and (3) provide a 

foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of 

strategic communication. 

Recommendation 2 

The Task Force recommends that the President should establish a permanent strategic 

communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create legislation 

and funding for a: 

• Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication, 

• Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC, and an 

• Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication 

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a 

Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under 

secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland 

Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the 

Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director 

of the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, 

this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign responsibilities 

and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public 

affairs; and military information operations; concur in strategic communication 

personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide 

program and project direction to the new Center for Strategic Communication. 
66 

4.3 Center for Strategic Communication 

In seeking ways to enhance government-private sector collaboration in support of 

strategic communication, the Task Force examined roles, functions, and organizational 

structures. We concluded that direction, planning, and coordination is a government 

responsibility requiring change at the White House and NSC level. We also concluded 

that America’s interests would be well served by creating a Congressionally-mandated 

independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication (CSC). 

The Center should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research and 

development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Rand Corporation, and the National 

Endowment for Democracy. The Center should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) 

corporation. The Center’s authority should enable it to provide services to government 

departments on a cost-recovery basis and contract with academic, commercial, and other 

non-government organizations. 

The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the 

members of the Strategic Communication Committee should provide program and project 

direction to the Center. The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by 

an independent nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished 

Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a 

bipartisan basis. The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 

Communication should be an ex officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors 

should appoint the Center’s Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of 

performance. 

The Center should be guided by three purposes: 

(1) Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decisionmakers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the role 

of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences 

on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source intelligence 
67 

assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment 

and provide a basis for informed choices. 

 (2) Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the 

creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic 

opportunities and respond to national security threats. 

(3) Support government strategic communications through services provided on a costrecovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges 

of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language 

and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term 

assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, 

and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness. 

The Center would perform functions in seven critical areas: 

(1) Audience polling and analysis including ethnographic, psychographic, demographic, 

behavioral and tracking research; hypothesis testing (e.g. focus groups); and other 

“listening” and assessment techniques used in political campaigns. 

(2) Cultural influence analysis including values, religion, entertainment, and education. 

(3) Analysis of media influences on audiences including content analysis, agendas, 

political/social tendencies, relevance and credibility, and media organization structure, 

ownership, and business models. 

(4) Foster cross cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information. 

(5) Sub-contract to the commercial and academic sectors for a range of products and 

programs that communicate strategic themes and messages to appropriate target 

audiences. Broad themes and messages would include respect for human dignity and 
68 

individual rights; individual education and economic opportunity; and personal freedom, 

safety, and mobility. Examples of products would be a children’s TV series (Arabic 

Sesame Street); video and interactive games; support for the distribution and production 

of selected foreign films; and web communications including BLOGs, chat rooms, and 

electronic journals. Programs might include training and exchanges of journalists, 

support for selected foreign television documentaries; maintenance of databases of third 

party validators and supporters for conferences; and the design and implementation of 

country and regional campaigns to support themes and messages and de-legitimize 

extremism and terrorism. 

(6) Mobilize non-government initiatives including temporary communication teams, 

coalition building partnerships and deployment of language-qualified global messengers. 

(7) Continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness, efficiency, and message continuity to 

adapt themes, products, and programs as directed by the Chair of the Strategic 

Communications Committee and its members. 

The Center should receive core funding that supports steady state operations through a 

Congressional line item in the Department of State’s annual appropriation. Funds 

appropriated to the Center should be placed in a revolving fund in the U.S. Treasury 

without fiscal year limitation. 

The Center’s core funding would support basic operations (staff and administration), 

information and analysis (polling, media research, cultural studies), maintenance of 

databases and skills inventories, and self-initiated projects and programs. The Task Force 

estimates that at least $100 million would be necessary to sustain the Center’s core 

mission and operations. An additional $150 million is recommended for projects and 

programs the Center would develop through contracts with the commercial and academic 

sectors as directed NSC’s Deputy Advisor for Strategic Communication. Additional 

funding for projects and programs would be provided through contracts and task orders 

from the Strategic Communication Committee’s departments and agencies. 
69 

The Center’s success will depend on its ability to serve as a central source of 

independent, objective expertise safeguarded from special pleadings of organizational 

interests. Structures and methods that are agile, adaptable, and cutting edge; that are 

multi-disciplinary and fuse capabilities from a variety of sources; that respect past gains 

as they lay a strong foundation for the future. Regular critical feedback to key decisionmakers based on polling and research, and longer term independent analyses that help 

refocus and reassess policy and strategic communication initiatives will be essential.

Recommendation 3 

The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create legislation 

and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for Strategic 

Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations represented 

on its Strategic Communication Committee. The Center should be a hybrid organization 

modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the 

Rand Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a taxexempt private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual appropriation 

approved by Congress as part of the Department of State budget. The NSC’s Deputy 

National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic 

Communication Committee should provide program and project direction to the Center. 

The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by an independent 

nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from 

relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The 

NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex 

officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center’s 

Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance. 

The Center should be guided by three purposes: 

(1) Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decisionmakers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the role 
70 

of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences 

on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source intelligence 

assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment 

and provide a basis for informed choices. 

 (2) Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the 

creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic 

opportunities and respond to national security threats. 

(3) Support government strategic communications through services provided on a costrecovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural 

exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, 

language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short 

term assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, 

recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness. 

4.4 Department of State — Public Diplomacy 

Public diplomacy in the Department of State is carried out by the Secretary of State, the 

Deputy Secretary, officials and diplomats throughout the Department, American 

ambassadors, and officers in U.S. embassies around the world. In today’s world, public 

diplomacy is not only the core function of a few specialists. It should be in the position 

description of every Department of State officer engaged in the conduct of diplomacy. 

Organizationally, public diplomacy is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of State 

for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Bureaus of International Information 

Programs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, and Public Affairs; public diplomacy offices 

in State’s regional and functional bureaus, the Office of Foreign Opinion Research in the 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and all U.S. missions abroad. In 1999, the U.S. 

Information Agency was abolished. Its functions, other than international broadcasting, 

were distributed among these State Department elements. 
71 

U.S. international broadcasting services including the Voice of America, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio/TV Marti were placed under an 

independent federal entity, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The BBG also 

directs Radio Sawa and the Al Hurra satellite TV channel, two new U.S. Arabic language 

services, and Radio Farda, a Persian language service broadcasting primarily to Iran. 

Together the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors spend 

approximately $1.2 billion annually on public diplomacy programs. The State 

Department’s public diplomacy budget totaled an estimated $628 million in fiscal year 

2004. About 51 percent, $320 million, is spent on Fulbright Scholarships and other 

educational and cultural exchange programs. Of the remaining 49 percent, approximately 

$240 million is spent on embassy public diplomacy activities managed by the 

Department’s regional bureaus and approximately $70 million funds the Bureau of 

International Information Programs and related activities including opinion and media 

research ($6 million). The Broadcasting Board of Governors budget for fiscal year 2004 

is somewhat in excess of $600 million with recent funding initiatives for Radio Sawa, Al 

Hurra, and Radio Farda.36 

More than fifteen studies since 9/11 have proposed major changes in the State 

Department’s conduct of public diplomacy. In addition to these studies and this Task 

Force report, the Department’s Inspector General has drafted reports recommending 

changes in the Department’s Bureaus of International Information Programs and 

Education and Cultural Affairs. The General Accountability Office is conducting a study 

of interagency coordination of public diplomacy. Recommendations in the 9/11 

Commission’s report address public diplomacy, U.S. international broadcasting, and “the 

struggle of ideas” in the conflict against Islamist terrorism. 

 

36 U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the 

Middle East but Fact Significant Challenges, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director of International Affairs 

and Trade, U.S. General Accountability Office before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives, 

February 10, 2004, pp. 5-6. 
72 

Public diplomacy clearly falls far short of its potential usefulness and needs to be 

strengthened. The Task Force has identified five areas in which re-evaluation and action 

is needed in the Department of State’s conduct of public diplomacy. 

Redefine the role and responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The role of the Under Secretary must reflect the reality 

that public diplomacy is a function of both policy formulation and policy implementation. 

Today, neither function is adequately served. The Under Secretary must have a mandate 

to act as: 

• Advisor to the Secretary of State, the Department, and Chiefs of Mission on the 

public diplomacy implications of foreign policy, 

• Manager for public diplomacy within the Department of State, and 

• The Secretary’s principal representative on the U.S. government’s highest level 

interagency strategic communication direction and planning body. 

To fulfill this mandate, the Under Secretary must have adequate staff and resources for 

policy advice, program direction, and evaluation. Unlike other Under Secretary positions 

in the Department of State, the unique advisory and program characteristics of public 

diplomacy require that the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs have 

the capability to manage and oversee worldwide public diplomacy programs and 

operations. 

The Department’s decision in the summer of 2004 to create a strategic communication 

planning and resource management staff within the Office of the Undersecretary is an 

overdue step in the right direction. This staff should be strengthened to ensure the Under 

Secretary is equipped to give timely policy advice, effective program direction, and 

comprehensive program evaluation. Currently this staff can provide support for the 

NSC’s Muslim outreach coordinating committee and the fusion teams that act as a 

clearinghouse for military and other sources of information for the public diplomacy 

community and a point of contact for resources for all public diplomacy products. This 

staff is well positioned also to assist the Under Secretary in developing task orders for 
73 

information, analysis, and services in support of public diplomacy from the Center for 

Strategic Communication recommended in Section 4.3 above. 

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Pubic Affairs should serve as the 

Department’s principal representative on the NSC Strategic Communication Committee 

recommended in Section 4.2 above. The Under Secretary could advise on the 

implications of foreign public opinion for policymaking by the NSC and its regional and 

functional bureaus; influence development of strategic communication goals, priorities, 

themes, and messages; help to create centers of action on key policy issues; and assist the 

NSC Deputy Advisor for Strategic Communication in providing program and project 

direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication. 

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should direct the State 

Department’s foreign opinion and media research activities. These activities, previously 

carried out by the U.S. Information Agency, are intended primarily to contribute to 

understanding foreign public and media opinion for policymaking and public diplomacy 

purposes. The Office of Foreign Opinion and Media Research, now located in the 

Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is valued principally for its 

contribution to all source intelligence products. It should be located in the office of the 

Under Secretary. This would strengthen the Under Secretary’s representations on the 

NSC’s Strategic Communication Committee, as well as their ability to foster mutually 

reinforcing opinion and media research activities with the private sector and other 

government agencies including the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the 

BBG, and the DOD. Funds for the State Department’s foreign opinion and media 

research activities should be tripled. 

Congress and the Department of State should strengthen the status, functions, and 

funding of the Bureau of International Information Programs. Congress should provide 

legal authority for the Bureau to be directed by a Presidentially-appointed Assistant 

Secretary of State. This would constitute overdue recognition of the Bureau’s 

increasingly important public diplomacy functions and give it standing equivalent to the 
74 

other Bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary – the Bureaus of Public Affairs and 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Department should modernize and consolidate its 

international information functions – e.g., website management, radio and TV 

broadcasting, library management and reference services. It has been a decade since this 

experimental “I Bureau” was created in the former USIA. It is time for a thorough 

reexamination of how the Bureau can best serve U.S. interests in a rapidly changing 

information environment. The Under Secretary should reinforce its effectiveness through 

a top-down review of its functions, technologies, methods, management structures, and 

program evaluation capabilities. 

Ensure that all foreign policy initiatives have a public diplomacy component. All major 

foreign policy directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the 

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. A principal goal in merging 

USIA into the Department was integrating public diplomacy into policy making and 

policy implementation processes. Some progress has been made. However, substantial 

changes in the Department’s organizational culture are still necessary. Policymakers 

should be much more conscious of public diplomacy’s value to effective policies. In 

turn, public diplomacy officers should be much more informed about policies and the 

relevance of policy priorities to successful public diplomacy programs. 

Public diplomacy considerations in the formulation of all major policies should include: 

• Shaping themes and messages and choosing means of delivery to ensure that 

priorities are clear, overall themes are established, messages are consistent, and 

resources are used effectively; 

• Identifying communication tools that will most effectively reach intended targets with 

the specific messages indicated by the policy; 

• Mapping the results of public opinion polling and media analyses to specific policies 

and issues; 

• Analyzing the potential impact of policies on public attitudes, strongly held personal 

convictions, and divergent interests; 
75 

• Understanding what constitutes “message authority,” the implications of crosscultural communication, and how messages are “heard” in different cultural 

environments; 

• Determining the nature, extent, and limitations of public influence on official 

decision-making in a given environment; and 

• Evaluating results and providing short term and long term feedback to policymakers 

and public diplomacy program officers. 

Redefine the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs’ relationships 

within the Department of State to improve public diplomacy planning and 

implementation. Changes in human resource policies are required to strengthen public 

diplomacy. The Under Secretary should concur in all senior public diplomacy 

assignments and review the performance ratings of all public diplomacy office directors 

in the Department’s geographic bureaus, public affairs officers in major embassies, and 

the Department’s public affairs advisors assigned to other agencies, combatant 

commands, and international organizations. 

Performance ratings for all Chiefs of Mission and Foreign Service officers in political 

and economic career paths should include mandatory comment on public diplomacy 

skills. Within a reasonable period of time, officers promoted to the Chief of Mission and 

Senior Foreign Service level should have served in a public diplomacy or relevant 

interagency assignment. Public diplomacy officers should be assigned to responsible 

positions in the Secretary and Deputy Secretary’s offices, and offices of each of the 

Under Secretaries. This can begin immediately. 

The Department should strengthen the public diplomacy offices in its geographic bureaus 

and their role in managing public diplomacy operations at U.S. embassies and consulates. 

Within the Department’s hierarchy, they would be more effective as Deputy Assistant 

Secretaries or senior advisors reporting directly to Assistant secretaries. These changes 

would raise the profile of public diplomacy in the geographic bureaus and increase public 

diplomacy’s influence on policy initiatives management in the field. 
76 

Triple resources (personnel and funding) for the Department of State’s public diplomacy 

activities (information programs, educational and cultural exchanges, embassy activities, 

and opinion research) and place them under the direction of the Under Secretary of State 

for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Department’s current funding for public 

diplomacy (approximately $600 million), is substantially less in real terms than public 

diplomacy budgets during the Cold War. When combined with the BBG’s international 

broadcasting budget (also approximately $600 million) the public diplomacy budget 

totals $1.2 billion. The Task Force recommends the Department’s public diplomacy 

funding be increased to $1.8 billion resulting in a total public diplomacy budget of $2.4 

billion. In addition the BBG has requested increases in funding. The Task Force also 

supports increased BBG funding for web based broadcasting services and those radio and 

television services where research and program reviews demonstrates significant 

audiences for news and public affairs programming. 

The 9/11 Commission, senior political leaders in both parties, and the findings of recent 

public diplomacy studies are in agreement on two fundamental assumptions. America is 

engaged in a “struggle of ideas.” Existing levels of investment in public diplomacy are 

not commensurate with current threats and opportunities. Funds allocated for strategic 

communications are anemic in contrast to what is spent by corporations and political 

campaigns. Public diplomacy resources (staff and funding) have eroded by more than 30 

percent since 1989. More than 60 percent of the Department’s overseas missions today 

have only one public diplomacy officer. The Department of State should request and 

Congress should appropriate significant increases in public diplomacy budgets. Within 

the Department all public diplomacy resources should be under the control of the Under 

Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 

Core funding for the Center for Strategic Communication should be appropriated within 

the budget of the Department of State. As a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation, most of 

the Center’s project and program funds will flow from cost recovery contracts and task 

orders from the U.S. government agencies who are members of the Strategic 
77 

Communication Committee. However, the Congress should appropriate funding to the 

Department of State to enable the Department to provide an annual grant to the Center for 

its core operations. 

There are existing models for this in public diplomacy. Funding for the National 

Endowment for Democracy, a nonprofit corporation, derives from an annual grant based 

on appropriations to the Department of State. Similarly, funding for U.S. international 

broadcasting’s nonprofit corporations – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free 

Asia, and Al Hurra – comes in the form of grants based on appropriations to the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

 

Based on these findings, the Task Force makes two recommendations. The first 

addresses the roles and responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The second calls for changes in the Department of State’s 

culture, structure, and human resources policies in support for public diplomacy. 

Recommendation 4 

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State redefine the role and 

responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to 

be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. The Under Secretary should 

serve as the Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Committee; 

have adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation; direct the 

Department’s foreign opinion and media research activities; approve senior public 

diplomacy assignments; and review the performance ratings of public diplomacy office 

director and embassy public affairs officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives 

should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. The 

Department’s current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy should be 

tripled from current levels and placed under the control of the Under Secretary. The 

Department should provide a core funding grant to the Center for Strategic 

Communication in the amount of an annual appropriation in the Department’s budget. 
78 

Recommendation 5 

The Task Force recommends that public diplomacy office directors in the Department of 

State should be at the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant 

Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission positions or the Senior Foreign Service 

should have served at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in the Department 

or in an interagency assignment relevant to public diplomacy. The Bureau of 

International Information Programs should be directed by an Assistant Secretary. 

4.5 Department of Defense Strategic Communication Responsibilities 

The creation of the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) in October of 2001, and its 

subsequent implosion four months later, produced a bow wave of effects in the strategic 

communication arena. The renewed emphasis by the White House and DOD for the need 

to maintain a firewall between operational and tactical influence efforts (PSYOP) and 

broader influence efforts like Public Diplomacy (PD), produced a bifurcated interagency 

process. Two NSC Policy Coordination Committees on information strategy and a new 

White House Office of Global Communication have proven ineffective thus far in 

producing an NSC-approved strategic information campaign for the War on Terror. 

The Secretary of Defense approved an Information Operations (IO) roadmap in October 

2003 aimed at addressing perceived organizational shortfalls within the Department. 

Among the assigned tasks was to define “lanes in the road” regarding Public Affairs, 

Public Diplomacy and PSYOP. Work is under way to implement the Secretary’s 

guidance, but final solutions aimed at assigning responsibilities for what are often 

overlapping functions have not been established. 

 

Major military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—followed in each case by a very 

difficult post-conflict phase—produced unprecedented demands on already undermanned 

and under equipped PSYOP forces.37 Smaller scale PSYOP programs in support of 

 

37 In both cases, the national radio broadcasting network had been taken down; there was virtually no TV in 

Afghanistan and limited TV coverage in a few large cities in Iraq. The security environment in both 

countries prohibited rapid re-establishment of regional or national broadcasting grids, and U.S. PSYOP 

assets were asked to provide the bulk of Coalition capabilities for several months. 
79 

humanitarian crises in Liberia and Haiti have been carried out successfully within current 

resource constraints. 

 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Public Affairs’ embedded journalist 

program in Iraq proved to be highly successful; and the Secretary of Defense’s frequent 

press conferences on Afghanistan and Iraq operations served to define the U.S. 

Government’s policies in those regions. 

The desire within DOD for a coherent and dynamic interagency process is stronger than 

ever and progress has been made in important areas over the last year. 

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) received a significant plus-up in fiscal year 

2004 (FY04) for PSYOP and Civil Affairs; $205 million for the next five years for 

PSYOP forces and equipment—including a trans-regionally focused PSYOP unit—and 

significant increases in both reserve and active duty force authorizations for Civil Affairs. 

A $45 million Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is underway, 

focused on developing better ways to disseminate information, particularly into denied or 

remote areas. 

Two trans-regional PSYOP initiatives have been approved and are in the initial phases of 

execution. These initiatives are aimed at reinforcing U.S. country teams’ ability to assist 

selected host nations in their struggle to identify terrorists in their region and to exercise 

better control over territory that is being used, or will inevitably be used, by terrorists as 

safe havens. 

Regional web sites aimed at providing open source information supporting the U.S. 

Government and Coalition policies have been proposed by U.S. European Command 

(EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). 

A process has been developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint 

Staff to monitor and analyze Arab broadcast media in near real time based on open 
80 

sources and using sophisticated translation, storage and retrieval techniques. A 

cooperative working relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and State Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research (INR) in this area provides the Deputy Secretary, Combatant Commanders, and 

the Department of State with a better picture of how the U.S. and its coalition partners are 

viewed in the Arab world. 

The Information Operations (IO) Roadmap

The DOD has developed an Information Operations (IO) roadmap that identifies roles 

and responsibilities within the DoD. The roadmap designates PSYOP as one of five core 

elements of IO (which also includes military deception, computer network operations, 

electronic warfare and operational security). Parallel changes in DOD regulations and 

the Unified Command Plan (UCP) responsibilities have also occurred. The Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) has been designated by DOD regulation as 

the “Principal Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Information Operations”; the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) has been designated as the lead for IO 

interagency coordination. 

U.S. STRATCOM has been designated in the UCP as the primary supporting command 

for IO; U.S. SOCOM has been given the responsibility for integrating and coordinating 

its PSYOP assets—primarily resourced by the U.S. Army—with those of the Services to 

provide more effective support to the regional combatant commands. 

Within USD(P), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) has retained oversight within OSD Policy for 

operational and tactical PSYOP planning and execution, and the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD ISA) has assumed responsibility for 

DoD support to public diplomacy in addition to primary responsibilities for policy 

coordination and planning for regional areas of the globe involved in countering 

ideological support for terrorism. These activities are led by Deputy Assistant Secretaries 
81 

(DASDs) who work with the Joint Staff (J3/J5) and the Combatant Commanders to 

insure that public diplomacy plans and policy oversight are consistent and are 

coordinated globally. A new functionally oriented DASD should be established to 

provide the necessary public diplomacy and PSYOP expertise to these activities and to 

support the ASD/ISA in representing DOD in the interagency. 

The Secretary of Defense recently approved for NSC consideration a strategy for 

reinvigorating the Global War on Terror. That strategy includes as a significant 

component countering ideological support for terrorists, with emphasis on Islamic 

extremists. This proposal advocates increasing senior DOD level representation at key 

embassies and missions, and increasing senior DOS representation to combatant 

commands. A principal task for both would be to ensure that a Strategic Communication 

plan for each region is developed and incorporated into theater security cooperation 

guidance and made a part of theater contingency planning. Supporting commands (U.S. 

STRATCOM, U.S. SOCOM) would develop mechanisms to assist in such planning. 

Initial actions to develop trans-regional PSYOP and other informational programs should 

be expanded and institutionalized at regional combatant commands and at key embassies 

and missions. Informal arrangements such as the Joint Staff J-3/J-5 strategic 

communication working group and the interagency counterpropaganda coordination 

panel should be combined. DOS representatives should work with combatant commands 

to incorporate strategic communication annexes in applicable plans. U.S. STRATCOM 

and U.S. SOCOM should build on capabilities represented by the Joint Information 

Operation Center (JIOC) and the Joint PSYOP Support Element (JPSE) to coordinate and 

support regional web sites and trans-regional PSYOP planning. 

The Department’s current funding for PSYOP is approximately $45 million annually. 

The level of funding by Combatant Commanders for military-to-military exchanges and 

public diplomacy programs and coordination activities within the regions of 

responsibility are hard to estimate. An educated estimate would put the funding level at 

no more than $75 million for the aggregate across all Combatant Commanders. The Task 
82 

Force believes that funding for public diplomacy programs and military exchanges 

should be tripled. There are plans to increase funding for PSYOP activities and the Task 

Force supports increased funding to expand activities associated with web based 

interactive services that are targeted to specific audiences. 

The Department should become over time a primary user of the proposed independent 

Center for Strategic Communication. DOD would bring valuable expertise to its work; 

and important support for combatant commands in areas such as media mapping, 

sophisticated measurements of message effectiveness and prototype products for testing 

and distribution in key geographic regions could result. 

In sum, there is much to be gained by the Department preparing, on a priority basis, to act 

as a full and essential partner in the reconstruction of a capable and effective U.S. 

Government process for re-capturing the strategic information high ground. 

Recommendations 

The following recommendations are aimed at furthering internal DOD efforts at 

organizing for more effective support to both the interagency and combatant 

commanders. 

Recommendation 6 

The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should act as 

the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department’s 

principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee. The Under 

Secretary for Policy should coordinate strategic communication activities with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should extend the role and 

responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to 

act as the Department’s focal point for DoD support of public diplomacy and create a 

new Deputy Assistant Secretary to coordinate all activities associated with support for 
83 

public diplomacy; and provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and 

evaluation. 

Recommendation 7 

The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic 

communication components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s 

diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. 

STRATCOM’s and U.S. SOCOM’s Information Operations responsibilities to include 

DoD support for public diplomacy. The Department should triple current resources 

(personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DoD support to public 

diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM for 

expanded support for strategic communication programs. 

4.6 Recommendations Impact 

If we adopt the recommendations of this Task Force and those of the 9/11 Commission 

and other study groups, will they make a significant difference? No one can say for sure. 

But we cannot succeed if we tinker at the margins. Given the enormous challenges we 

face, we can succeed only if we use all the instruments of national power. 

America's response in the early days of the Cold War is instructive for 21st century 

strategic communication. There are of course substantial differences. Conflict between 

two superpower states with large armies and nuclear weapons -- and competing 

ideological claims within a shared Enlightenment tradition -- is vastly different from 

conflict in which terrorism by extremist networks, proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, and fissures within societies are critical threats in a globalizing world. 

Disseminating scarce information to closed societies was central during the Cold War. 

Today, there are few closed societies. Satellite TV, the Internet, computers, and cell 

phones mean political struggles are about gaining attention and maintaining credibility. 

But there are similarities and lessons. 
84 

First, the challenges and what we must do about them are comparable in scale. Until now 

Americans could build information instruments in wartime and allow them to rust when 

the war was over. We did so after WWI and WWII, and again after the Cold War. Fifty 

years ago, we developed imaginative new approaches to embassy and military 

information services, to cross cultural exchanges of people and ideas, and to international 

broadcasting. Today on a scale not seen since the 1940s we are shaping new approaches 

to intelligence, military force structures, nation-building, and homeland security. We 

must devote comparable creativity and energy to strategic communication. The 9/11 

Commission and other voices agree. We can't get the job done with intelligence and 

military force alone. 

Second, we understood then that actions are the most credible form of communication. 

The Marshall Plan sparked imaginations around the world. The Berlin airlift brought 

supplies to the citizens of West Berlin and hope to millions. Ditto aid to Greece and 

Turkey. U.S. civilian and military information agencies were needed to draw worldwide 

attention to these efforts. But their messages were persuasive because they were 

associated with actions and values that were attractive. What we were doing was seen as 

legitimate and having moral authority. This is just as important today. 

Third, those who shaped overseas information and cultural activities believed the 

challenges required an American response, not just a government response. It was not a 

task for diplomats and military commanders only. Writers, film directors, scholars, 

journalists, poets, playwrights, librarians, scientists, foundation executives, business 

leaders, and labor leaders became involved directly through temporary service in 

government and indirectly through exchanges and other means. Organizational 

arrangements in the 21st century will be different; the need for robust public-private 

partnership is the same. 

Tensions and turf struggles were a reality among lawmakers, policymakers, and 

bureaucrats then, as they are today. Yet the nation developed the political will for efforts 
85 

that over two generations played a critical role in ending the Cold War. We cannot 

succeed again without comparable vision and commitment. 
86 
87 

Appendix A: Summer Study Terms of Reference 
88 

Appendix A: Summer Study Terms of Reference (continued) 
89 

Appendix A: Summer Study Terms of Reference (continued) 
90 

Appendix A: Summer Study Terms of Reference (continued) 
91 

Appendix B: Strategic Communication Task Force Membership 

Chairman 

Mr. Vince Vitto C.S. Draper Laboratory 

 

Executive Secretary 

Mr. Mark Ellis OUSD 

 

Members 

Dr. Anita Jones University of Virginia 

Mr. Bran Ferren Applied Minds, Inc. 

Mr. Bruce Gregory George Washington University 

Mr. Dan Kuehl National Defense University 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Consultant 

Mr. David Morey DMG, Inc. 

Mr. Robert Nesbit The Mitre Corporation 

Dr. Michael Vlahos Johns Hopkins University 

 

Government Advisors 

Mr. Joel Fischman Department of State 

Mr. David Jakubek DDR&E 

Mr. Chris Lamb National Defense University 

Mr. John Matheny Department of Defense SO/LIC 

Mr. Lloyd Neighbors Department of State 

Mr. William Parker Department of State 

Mr. Robert Reilly Department of Defense 

 

Support 

Ms. Nicole Coene SAIC 

Mr. Mark Mateski SAIC 

 

DSB Secretariat 

LtCol David Robertson DSB 
92 

Appendix C: Briefings Received by the Task Force 

March 31 – April 1, 2004

Dr. Barry Fulton, Public Diplomacy Institute and Research Professor, GWU

Mr. Paul Hanley, Strategic Communications, Office of the CJCS

Mr. Jeff Jones, NSC 

Mr. Rob Tappan, Strategic Communications, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 

Iraq

Mr. Jim Wilkinson, Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications

April 20 – April 21, 2004 

Ms. Mary Catherine Andrews, White House Office of Global Communications

Mr. Jeremy Curtin, Department of State

Mr. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P))

Mr. Peter Kovach, Department of State

Mr. Lloyd Neighbors, Department of State 

Mr. Tom O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense, (SO/LIC) 

Mr. Steve Schaffer, Department of State

Mr. Frank Ward, Department of State

Ms. Betsy Whitaker, Department of State

Mr. Sam Wunder, Department of State

May 19 – 20, 2004 

Mr. Dan Kuehl, National Defense University

Mr. James Farwell, DOD (SO/LIC) 

Mr. Mouafac Harb, Al Hurra Network

Mr. Mark Helmke, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Mr. David Morey, DMG, Inc. 

Mr. Joe Norris, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Dr. Marc Sageman, Private Practice in Forensic and General Psychiatry

Mr. Mike Vlahos, John Hopkins University

June 8, 2004

Mr. James Farwell, DOD (SO/LIC) 

Mr. Scott Miller, Core Strategy Group

Mr. Seth Cropsey, International Broadcast Bureau

Mr. Jim Glassman, American Enterprise Institute

June 10, 2004

Mr. John Rendon, The Rendon Group 
93 

Appendix D: Executive Summary and Recommendations of the DSB Task 

Force on Managed Information Dissemination (MID) in October 2001 

Executive Summary 

U.S. civilian and military information dissemination capabilities are powerful assets vital 

to national security. They can create diplomatic opportunities, lessen tensions that might 

lead to war, help contain conflicts, and address nontraditional threats to America’s 

interests. In the information age, no diplomatic or military strategy can succeed without 

them. Yet America’s political and military leaders too often appreciate their value only 

during a crisis or in retrospect when hostilities are concluded. 

Used effectively, public diplomacy, public affairs, and international military information 

can mobilize publics to avert or resolve a short-term crisis. Sophisticated strategic 

communications can set the agenda and create a context that enhances the achievement of 

political, economic, and military objectives. Over time, they may shape foreign 

perceptions in ways that support America’s interests. 

The U.S. Government’s information dissemination organizations today are understaffed 

and underfunded. They suffer from poor coordination, and they are not integrated into the 

national security planning and implementation process. 

The United States needs a sustained, coordinated capability to understand, inform, and 

influence foreign publics that is rooted in the information age. It should be multiagency 

and multiservice, adequately funded and adequately staffed. Its communications channels 

must be highly differentiated. Its technologies should be state-of-the-art. Products and 

messages must be credible, consistent, and tailored to different audiences in different 

cultures. Channels and brand identities must be firmly established in peace so they can be 

used successfully in crisis and in war. America’s leaders need to give information 

dissemination a much higher priority and be willing to use it to communicate effectively 

to foreign publics. It is a critical element in all policy planning and implementation. 

Without it, no policy or strategy is complete. 

The Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination was charged with determining 

the need for and feasibility of a coordinated U.S. information dissemination capability. 

Specifically, the Task Force was asked to examine strategic information activities of the 

Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DOS). To this end, the study is 

sponsored jointly by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under 

Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R). 

 

The Task Force investigated a broad range of issues including: 

• The roles of DoD, State, and nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting services 

in a coordinated strategic information dissemination capability. 

• Acquisition and use of communications channels and the value of established 

“brand identities.” 
94 

Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued) 

• Policy, legal, and resource limitations on U.S. information dissemination 

capabilities. 

• New and emerging technologies capable of enhancing U.S. information 

dissemination capabilities. 

The Task Force assessment went beyond the Departments of State and Defense to include 

other U.S. entities such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. 

international broadcasting services as well as nongovernment organizations and 

individuals skilled in emerging media and strategic communications. The briefings 

received and extensive internal discussions form the basis for the findings and 

recommendations in this report. 

Early on, the Task Force addressed several basic questions: 

• Why study managed information dissemination at all? 

• Assuming a study is needed, what do we mean by information dissemination and 

what should be the appropriate level and scope of analysis? 

• What are the salient historical, political, organizational, and technological 

considerations? 

• How should information dissemination be coordinated and carried out? 

Arguments against the need for coordinated information dissemination include the notion 

that CNN, AOL-Time Warner, and other global media already provide an abundance of 

credible information. In a pluralistic society with a government based on divided powers, 

there are inevitably diverse, deeply held views on significant national security issues. 

Some contend this means it is futile even to try to achieve coordinated information 

dissemination. Others suggest multiple, uncoordinated voices are a positive good—a 

beneficial consequence of a free society. 

Mindful of these arguments, the Task Force concluded that the U.S. Government does 

require a coordinated means to speak with a coherent voice abroad. Private media, 

however credible, have their own goals and priorities. They are selective in ways that 

serve news and business interests. They cannot and should not be relied on to act as 

advocates for national security policies. At the same time, media increasingly will carry 

the statements of America’s leaders, when and if they have something of consequence to 

say to foreign publics, without the need for Government-sponsored channels. 

Moreover, there are moments of crisis and issues of long-term importance to which only 

the Government can speak with full authority. Information— not as "spin," but as 

policy—is not simply a rhetorical flourish in which solutions to a crisis are presented; it 

is an integral part of the solution itself. If an authoritarian regime threatens U.S. interests, 

its population should understand the consequences of its government's actions. If hate 

radio broadcasts incite to genocide, rational voices should respond. If epidemics threaten 

populations, accurate information must be provided quickly. If terrorists deploy 

biological weapons, publics need to know. 
95 

Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued) 

Coordinated information dissemination is an essential tool in a world where U.S. interests 

and long- term policies are often misunderstood, where issues are complex, and where 

efforts to undermine U.S. positions increasingly appeal to those who lack the means to 

challenge American power. Whether the issue is missile defense, the Kyoto Protocol, or 

long-term conflict in the Middle East, effective communications strategies and wellcoordinated information systems can shape perceptions and promote foreign acceptance 

of U.S. strategic objectives. 

The Task Force assessed requirements at the strategic level and focused on public 

diplomacy, public affairs, and international military information activities. This report 

does not address the topics of information warfare, computer attack, and computer 

defense. The Task Force looked closely at U.S. international broadcasting services 

directed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The Task Force determined that the 

mission, culture, and statutory authority of these broadcasting organizations do not permit 

their use by policymakers in tailored communications strategies intended to shape and 

influence public opinion on national security issues. 

Although there is ample room to improve operational and tactical information 

dissemination activities, the Task Force concluded that the U.S. Government's highest 

priority is to provide an adequate framework to help coordinate strategic international 

information dissemination. For this reason, the Task Force looked at previous 

coordination efforts, particularly Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68 on 

International Public Information. The Task Force found the core principles of PDD-68 to 

be valid, but also concluded that PDD-68 suffered from a lack of sustained leadership 

interest and was deficient in its implementing authorities and structure. PDD-68 did not 

assign specific responsibilities to the Departments of State and Defense. Its interagency 

coordinating group was understaffed, underfunded, and focused on crises situations. 

In addition, the coordinating group was underutilized at the strategic level and 

coordination was episodic. 

The Task Force also examined U.S. Government information dissemination systems 

coordinated in varying degrees under PDD-68: the Department of State’s Office of 

International Information Programs, Department of Defense psychological operations 

(PSYOP) and public affairs activities, and U.S. international broadcasting services. In 

each case the Task Force found deficiencies. The State Department's International 

Information Programs are underfunded and underutilized within the Department, and 

they have yet to realize their full potential for information dissemination using the 

Internet and satellite television. Military public affairs, CINC Theater Engagement Plans, 

and operational and tactical PSYOP activities need improved coordination. Voice of 

America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), 

and other U.S. broadcasting services face structural weaknesses and fundamental 

challenges presented by emerging technologies, television, language priorities, and 

clarification of broadcasting's appropriate role in national security. 
96 

Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued) 

The Task Force found that all U.S. Government information dissemination assets would 

benefit from more effective use of commercial audience research, content production, 

and transport media (Internet, satellite TV, and radio). Each needs improved surge 

capacity for communicating in times of crisis. Greater use of commercial production and 

communication resources can enable them to leverage trends in global information 

dissemination. 

The Task Force also examined U.S.-funded international exchange programs such as the 

State's International Visitor and educational exchange programs and military exchange 

programs such as IMET and the National Defense University's International Fellows 

program. These activities are not and should not be linked to short term policies. 

Nevertheless, no programs have greater long-term strategic value for U.S. interests. 

The report opens with a review of the May 2000 Defense Science Board study that 

examined psychological operations (PSYOP) in time of military conflict.38 This study 

responded to Congressional concerns about limitations on the performance of the 

Commando Solo (EC-130E) aircraft in disseminating radio and TV broadcasts in the 

Balkans during Operation Allied Force. The study recommended increased use of the 

Internet and emerging media, better use of television and radio, and information 

dissemination policies and practices that respect the power of networking technologies to 

render tactical/strategic distinctions obsolete. 

Chapter 1 establishes the need for managed information dissemination. It examines the 

objectives and legacy of PDD-68 on International Public Information and its coordinating 

body, the International Public Information Core Group. Chapter 2 addresses DoD 

managed information dissemination activities, including military public affairs, the 

Theater Engagement Plans of regional CINCs, and operational and tactical PSYOP. 

Chapter 3 addresses the mission, structure, and key issues facing nonmilitary U.S. 

international broadcasting. Chapter 4 discusses current international information 

dissemination programs within the Department of State and U.S. international exchanges. 

Chapter 5 examines central trends in commercial information dissemination, media 

production, and audience research. Chapter 6 offers the Task Force’s conclusions 

regarding the road ahead for managed information dissemination based on revitalized 

program and production capabilities and provides a set of specific recommendations. 

 

38 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of 

Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict, Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, DC, May 2000. 
97 

Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued) 

Summary of Recommendations 

Recommendation 1 

The Task Force recommends that the President issue a National Security Presidential 

Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to (1) strengthen the U.S. 

Government’s ability to communicate with foreign audiences and thereby shape 

understanding of and support for U.S. national security policies, and (2) coordinate 

public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information. The 

directive should require all regional and functional National Security Council (NSC) 

Policy Coordinating Committees to (1) assess the potential impact of foreign public 

opinion when national security options are considered and (2) recommend or develop 

strategies for public information dissemination strategies before or in concert with policy 

implementation. 

Recommendation 2 

The Task Force recommends that the NSPD establish an NSC Policy Coordinating 

Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. The committee should be 

chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State. The 

chair will be assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs. Members of senior rank should be designated by the 

Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors. 

Recommendation 3 

The Task Force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy Coordinating 

Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, 

public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities, 

including the authority to require 

• Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures, 

• Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response 

communications, 

• Identify appropriate media channels, and 

• Produce information products. 

Recommendation 4 

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy Coordinating 

Committee on International Information Dissemination through a dedicated and 

expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the current interagency 

working group on international public information augmented by an expanded staff and 

budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A robust, expanded, and 

multiagency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon expertise from DOS, DoD, the 
98 

Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued)

Joint Staff, 4th PSYOP Group, CIA, and commercial media and communications entities 

must be established to facilitate audience research and to develop channels and 

information products. 

Recommendation 5 

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the Department of 

State’s International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; 

substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence 

foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and 

make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of 

the Policy Coordinating Committee’s Secretariat. 

Recommendation 6 

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and diversify the 

products and services of the Department of State’s International Information Bureau to 

include significantly expanded use of 

• Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging satellite TV 

and FM radio broadcast channels; 

• American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for both 

direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels; 

• The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to 

communicate with foreign publics though foreign press and media channels; 

• Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) containing key 

foreign 

• audiences and influence structures; 

• Joint State-DoD training and increased interagency assignments; and 

• A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DoD officers available 

for crisis response deployment. 

Recommendation 7 

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an International 

Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DoD 

open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating 

Committee on International Information Dissemination. DOD membership should 

include senior Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives. 

Recommendation 8 

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DoD’s draft OASD 

(SO/LIC) guidelines to 

• Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff, 

• Revitalize the CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plans, 

• Strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government’s strategic 

information programs, and 
99 

Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued) 

• Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating 

Committee’s Secretariat. 

Recommendation 9 

The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DoD’s information 

dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs’ Theater 

Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the 

Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy 

objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International 

Information Dissemination. Enhancements include 

• Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV, 

• Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue, 

• Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and 

• Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Recommendation 10 

The Task Force recommends that the President and his senior national security advisors 

strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by 

• Insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed to the 

Internet revolution, 

• Taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and 

• Significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media 

environments and influence structures. 

* * * 

Information is a strategic resource—less understood but no less important to national 

security than political, military, and economic power. In the information age, influence 

and power go to those who can disseminate credible information in ways that will 

mobilize publics to support interests, goals, and objectives. What is required is a coherent 

approach as to how we think about managed information dissemination and the 

investments that are required for its more effective use by America’s diplomats and 

military leaders. 
100 

Appendix E: Government and Independent Organization Studies of 

Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy, September 2001 – 

September 2004 

Building Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources,

Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2002. 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13622.pdf

Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public 

Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World, Report of the Advisory Group on Public 

Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Submitted to the Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1, 2003. 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf

Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy,

Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 

September 2003. 

http://www.cfr.org/pdf/public_diplomacy.pdf

How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy, The Heritage Foundation, April 2003. 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1645.cfm

Managed Information Dissemination, Report of a Defense Science Board Task Force 

sponsored by the Department of Defense and Department of State, September 2001. 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/

Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform, Report of an Independent Task Force 

sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, July 2002. 

http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=4754.xml

Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century, Report submitted by the Public Diplomacy 

Institute and Public Diplomacy Council in response to requests from staffs of the 

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Committee on International Relations, 

U.S. House of Representatives, May 31, 2002. 

http://pdi.gwu.edu/

Reclaiming America’s Voice Overseas, The Heritage Foundation, May 2003. 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm273.cfm

The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic 

World, The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper #6, January 2004. 

http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/amr20040101.htm
101 

The New Diplomacy: Utilizing Innovative Communication Concepts that Recognize 

Resource Constraints, Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 

2003. 

http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/22818.htm

Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications, Report of the Center for the Study of the 

Presidency, July 2003. 

http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/US-MuslimCommunications.pdf

The Rise of Netpolitik: How the Internet is Changing International Politics and 

Diplomacy, Report of the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information 

Technology, 2003. 

http://www.aspeninstitute.org/AspenInstitute/files/CCLIBRARYFILES/FILENAME/000

0000077/netpolitik.pdf

U.S. International Broadcasting: Enhanced Measure of Local Media Conditions 

Would Facilitate Decisions to Terminate Language Services. Report of the U.S. 

General Accountability Office to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 

February 2004. 

http://www.gao.gao/cgi-bin/getrpt?GA0-04-374

U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching 

Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives, Report of the U.S. General 

Accountability Office to the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of 

Representatives, July 2003 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03772.pdf

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors 

Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant Challenges, Testimony of the 

U.S. General Accountability Office before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. 

House of Representatives, February 10, 2004. 

http://www.gao.gov/cgl-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-435T

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts But Faces Significant 

Challenges, Report of the U.S. General Accountability Office to the Committee on 

International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, September 2003. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03951.pdf

 

U.S. International Broadcasting: Challenges Facing the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors, Testimony of the U.S. General Accountability Office before the 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate, April 29, 2004. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04627t.pdf
102 

Appendix F: Acronyms 

ACTD Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration 

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense 

BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CIC Coalition Information Centers 

CSC Center for Strategic Communication 

DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOS Department of State 

EUCOM U.S. European Command 

FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 

GAO General Accounting Office 

HAS Hard Support 

HO Hard Opposition 

INR State Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

IO Information Operations 

ISA International Security Affairs 

JIOC Joint Information Operation Center 

JPSE Joint PSYOP Support Element 

NGO Non-Government Organizations 

NSC National Security Council 

NSS National Security Strategy 

OGC Office of Global Communications 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSI Office of Strategic Influence 

OSI Office of Strategic Influence 

PCC Policy Coordination Committee 

PD Public Diplomacy 

PDD Presidential Decision Directive 

PSYOP Psychological Operations 

SCC Strategic Communications Committee 

SO Soft Opposition 

SO/LIC Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 

SOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command 

SOS Soft Support 

STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USIA U.S. Information Agency 
103