STRENGTHENING

TRANSATLANTIC

SECURITY

A U.S. STRATEGY

FOR THE

21ST CENTURY

DECEMBER 2000
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .............................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER I: AMERICA’S VITAL INTERESTS IN EUROPE ...................... 5

Democracy and Human Rights ...................................... 5

Economic Prosperity ...................................................... 7

Security .......................................................................... 7

CHAPTER II: A STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT ....................................9

NATO............................................................................ 9

Multilateral and Bilateral Engagement ......................... 11

CHAPTER III: NATO—THE ANCHOR FOR

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY ............................................................... 13

Improving Defense Capabilities.................................... 13

Strengthening the European Pillar ................................ 18

Enlargement ................................................................. 22

CHAPTER IV: BUILDING BLOCKS OF A

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY BEYOND NATO .................................25

Partnership for Peace ................................................... 26

Southeastern Europe .................................................... 29

Engaging the Russian Federation ................................. 33

Engagement with Ukraine ............................................ 35

The Baltic States........................................................... 37

OSCE and Other Contributors to Security ................... 40

Arms Control ............................................................... 41
68 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

CHAPTER V: THE ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY

FORCES IN EUROPE ......................................................................... 43

Shaping the Security Environment................................ 43

Crisis Response and Smaller-Scale

Contingency Operations .............................................. 46

Deterrence and Collective Defense ............................... 47

CHAPTER VI: IMPROVING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

TO FACE GLOBAL CHALLENGES ...................................................... 49

Security Threats Posed by Nuclear,

Biological, and Chemical Weapons .............................. 49

Ballistic Missile Defenses.............................................. 52

Theater Missiles Defense .............................................. 53

National Missile Defense ............................................. 54

“Non-Traditional” Transnational Threats ................... 55

Building Security in Regions Beyond Europe ................ 57

Persian Gulf, Middle East, and

Mediterranean Littoral................................................. 57

Sub-Saharan Africa ...................................................... 59

Asia.............................................................................. 60

CONCLUSIONS: LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ................... 61

iv S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y
PREFACE

BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The United States and its transatlantic Allies enter the 21st century as

the strongest force for peace and freedom the world has ever known.

By supporting democracy and freedom in places such as the former

Yugoslavia, the people of Europe and North America have demonstrated the power of their shared values. In this report, the Department

of Defense (DoD) outlines U.S. strategy to prepare ourselves and our

Allies to meet 21st century challenges within the transatlantic community and to strengthen this community’s contribution to global security.

Our strategy to preserve the security and stability of the transatlantic community in the future is based on certain overarching principles

and realities:

■ Transatlantic security is indivisible. The United States has a permanent and vital national interest in preserving the security of our European and Canadian Allies. Conversely, our Allies in Europe recognize

that their security is inextricably tied to that of North America. While

there are many dimensions to the transatlantic security relationship, the

presence of significant and highly capable U.S. military forces in Europe

will remain, for the foreseeable future, a critical linchpin. Behind that

presence stands the full array of U.S.-based conventional forces, America’s

unsurpassed nuclear deterrent, our formidable economic power, and our

demonstrated political will to defend democratic ideals and values.

■ The transatlantic community should include all of Europe, and

multiple institutions and relationships will be necessary to unite that

community. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the

European Union (EU)—the leading pillars of this community—have enlarged their respective memberships in recent years. We are fully

confident that they will enlarge again. Throughout these separate but

mutually reinforcing enlargement processes, Americans and Europeans

also must work together to strengthen cooperative security, economic,

Secretary of Defense

William S. Cohen
2 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

and political relations with countries that, for a variety of reasons, might

not become NATO or EU members in the next few years. Complementary American and European efforts will be particularly important to

achieve stable, positive relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine,

since it is in our mutual interest to bring these countries steadily closer

to Euro-Atlantic structures.

■ The United States welcomes European efforts to increase their contribution to collective defense and crisis response operations within

NATO and to build a capability to act militarily under the EU where

NATO as a whole is not engaged. These efforts are part of Europe’s

longstanding and natural trend toward greater cooperation and deeper

union in economic, monetary, social, and political matters, a trend supported by the United States since the early post-World War II period.

America’s leadership role has adjusted before to changes in Europe, and

we are prepared to adapt ourselves in the future to work with stronger,

more versatile, and more united European partners.

■ To ensure transatlantic security in the future, the United States and

its Allies must improve defense capabilities in the fields most

relevant to modern warfare. Operation Allied Force reinforced the fact

that we need more deployable, sustainable, interoperable and flexible

forces to engage effectively in a wide variety of situations. The United

States is already moving to address these requirements, and we look to

the rest of NATO to do its share. This effort will not be cost-free. All

Allies have the responsibility to match their rhetoric with real resources.

In many cases this will require increased defense budgets as well

as smarter spending and pooling of resources.

■ In this era of globalization,

America and Europe have common

interests in dealing with security

challenges on the periphery of the

European continent and beyond that

can have important ramifications

for democracy and prosperity within

our transatlantic community. Globalization and the information revolution bring enormous benefits to

the transatlantic community, including its security structures, but they

also increase its vulnerabilities. They

Four U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons line up at the end of the runway at

Aviano Air Base, Italy, for final checks before taking off on NATO Operation

Allied Force missions in May 1999.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 3

A U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcat goes to full afterburner as it prepares to launch.

facilitate efforts by potential adversaries—both hostile states and

increasingly sophisticated terrorists—to develop or acquire nuclear,

biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the means to deliver them.

Humanitarian disasters beyond Europe can have an important impact

on transatlantic interest and require joint U.S.–European responses.

Looking ahead, we need to address

several challenges:

■ We must have international

structures where countries within the

transatlantic community work together

to help build security and prevent

conflict, deter and defend against any

external threat, respond effectively to

crises, and rebuild war-torn societies

after the shooting stops. To meet

tomorrow’s challenges we will need

to adapt multiple existing structures—including transatlantic, regional,

sub-regional, and bilateral arrangements—and, where necessary, create

new ones.

■ We must ensure that these international structures have the necessary capabilities to perform their missions. This is true not only for structures focused primarily on military cooperation, such as NATO and the

Partnership for Peace (PfP), but also for those structures best suited to

mobilize diplomatic or other non-military assets (e.g., expert assistance

to police and judiciary institutions, civilian teams to monitor human

rights and elections, and targeted economic and humanitarian assistance)

that will help shape the security situation in unstable regions.

■ We must pay special attention to certain key regions adjacent to

NATO. For example, destabilization in the Caucasus region, the area

around Turkey, and the Mediterranean’s southern littoral could have

huge consequences for transatlantic security. The transatlantic community as a whole must engage effectively to shape a more stable security

environment in these key regions.

■ Our future strategy must set a course for ensuring the long-term

success of our significant crisis response operations currently underway

in the Balkans. We also must better prepare the transatlantic community

to conduct such operations, if necessary, in the future.
4 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Secretary Cohen introduces President Bill Clinton at the Pentagon as he prepares to sign the National

Defense Authorization Act FY 2000, which provides for the first sustained increase in defense spending

in 15 years.

This report is intended to offer a clear vision of U.S. policy goals in

building transatlantic cooperation as a continuing force for freedom.

Working with the Congress and our Allies, we will vigorously pursue

this comprehensive agenda to strengthen our international security in

the years ahead.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 5

Secretary Cohen talks with U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon pilots of the

120th Fighter Squadron.

CHAPTER I

AMERICA’S VITAL INTERESTS IN EUROPE

The United States defines its “vital interests” as those interests of

broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of

our nation. Chief among these are the physical security and territorial

integrity of our nation and those of our Allies, and the protection of

our critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack. In Europe these

vital interests—and our enduring commitment to the principles of

democracy, human rights, individual liberty, and the rule of law—are

manifested in and defended by the NATO Alliance and the complex

web of interlocking relationships and partnerships that define the

architecture of European security in the 21st century.

Democracy and Human Rights

The promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights

remain core objectives of U.S. national security strategy. Strong and

vibrant democracies already exist in much of Europe. Thus, our efforts

to further these objectives focus on those

states that are making the difficult transition from closed to open societies. We

seek to strengthen their commitment to

human rights and enhance their capabilities to implement democratic reforms.

We are therefore working with Allies

and Partners to institutionalize democratic reforms in Central and Eastern

Europe, and to integrate the states of that

region into Euro-Atlantic structures. Such

reforms can help avert or resolve problems that, if left unchecked, may lead to

ethnic conflict and regional violence,
6 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

America stands with Europe. Today, no less than

50 years ago, our destinies are joined. If Europe is at peace,

America is more secure. If Europe prospers, America does

as well. We . . . move to a logic of mutually beneficial

interdependence, where each nation can grow stronger

and more prosperous because of the success of its neighbors and friends. . .We seek a transatlantic partnership that

is broad and open in scope, where the benefits and burdens

are shared, where we seek a stable and peaceful future

not only for ourselves, but for all the world.”

President Bill Clinton

Berlin, May 13, 1998

“

threatening the security of Allies and Partners. Our goal is to build and

strengthen the pillars of civil society throughout Europe. By helping

to build civil societies, we are building peace and prosperity, which

helps to strengthen U.S. security. By joining the Western democratic

family of nations, states that once lived under totalitarian or communist rule are today working to strengthen the forces of democracy and

reform, enhancing security for the United States and all of Europe.

Our abiding commitment to human rights and democracy is not

only the right thing to do, it is also in our own best national interests.

Grave violations of human rights, in the Balkans or elsewhere, challenge

our values and our security. The security of the Euro-Atlantic Community must spring from the consent of free peoples and must be built

upon shared purposes and values that can be defended when the need

arises. The United States, in concert with its Allies, may in some circumstances, where other measures have

failed, use coercive measures, including military force, to counter grave

violations of human rights.

The United States cannot be alone

in protecting or promoting democratic

values and human rights. European

states and institutions, such as the EU

and the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), play

an increasingly important role through

their political and cultural links with,

and economic aid and technical assistance to, developing and newly industrialized countries. We need a strong

partnership with Europe to meet challenges to our common values that no single country can cope with alone.

In reaffirming our commitment to democracy and human rights, the

United States will continue to make full use of every opportunity to help

build a Europe that is undivided, democratic and free.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 7

Economic Prosperity

Europe is an indispensable economic partner for the United States

and will remain so in the 21st century. The EU is the our largest trading

and investment partner. Two-way trade was valued at $507 billion in

1999. On the investment side, EU investments in the United States

totaled more than $481 billion at the end of 1998, while the United

States had more than $433 billion invested in the EU. These trade and

investment ties account for an estimated 14 million jobs on both sides

of the Atlantic. If the 15 member EU brings in as many as a dozen

new members in the next several years, it will comprise the world’s

largest single market, with some 500 million citizens and an economy

significantly larger than our own.

We have an important interest in preserving and strengthening

constructive economic relations within the transatlantic community.

Increased European economic prosperity inevitably will expand twoway trade and investment flows with the United States. It also will

contribute to European stability by creating a more positive environment for relatively new democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Economic growth and progress in democratic governance

should help, in turn, to moderate ethnic and religious tensions that

can lead to violent internal and international conflicts. In addition,

improved economic performance can serve transatlantic security by

increasing the resources available to governments for needed investments in defense capabilities. Finally, a strong transatlantic economy

will be an engine of growth and development for the global economy,

which is a necessary—albeit not sufficient—precondition for improving global security and stability.

Security

The United States seeks to shape a stable security environment that

brings enduring peace to all of Europe. Such an environment is indispensable to the promotion of democracy and economic prosperity. The

defense of North America remains inextricably tied to the defense of

Europe. The United States tried and failed to isolate itself from the

devastating wars in Europe during the 20th century, which were fought

with weapons that are markedly primitive by today’s standards. We could

not isolate ourselves at all from the catastrophic effects of an attack

against Europe in the 21st century, especially if it involved weapons
8 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

of mass destruction (WMD). There is no

better way to shape a stable security environment and prevent new lines of division

or confrontation in Europe than to reach

out to Central and Eastern European

states anxious to be integrated fully into

the political, economic, and security structures of the transatlantic community. For

the same reason, we need to build increasingly positive relations with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the other

independent and distinctive states that

emerged from the former Soviet Union.

To safeguard U.S. national security,

we must cooperate with Europe on issues

that transcend our respective borders. The United States seeks to

prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means to deliver

them, since such proliferation directly threatens our security and that

of our Allies. No American effort to deal with the proliferation threat

can succeed without the active cooperation of our Allies and other

European states that produce and sell dual use materials and technologies that, in the wrong hands, can be used for hostile purposes.

In addition, the defense of U.S. territory, our citizens, and our

economic well being depends upon free trade and access to strategic

natural resources and international waters and airways. The U.S. military presence in Europe plays a critical role in protecting our economic interests, as well as facilitating U.S. military deployments for

both crisis and non-crisis missions to assist allies and friends in neighboring regions. Without the basing and host nation support structures

available to U.S. forces through our defense arrangements in Europe,

protecting vital U.S. interests both within and outside Europe would

be immeasurably more complex, demanding, and costly.

65th Military Police Company secures road from Stublina, Kosovo

during the Operation Joint Guardian peacekeeping mission.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 9

CHAPTER II

A STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT

The key elements of U.S. defense strategy worldwide are:

■ To shape the international security environment in ways that

promote and protect U.S. national interests.

■ To respond, if necessary, to the full spectrum of crises, from

deterring aggression or coercion and conducting smaller-scale contingency operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars.

■ To prepare now for an uncertain future through focused

modernization efforts, pursuing the revolution in military affairs,

and hedging against unlikely but significant future threats.

In the Euro-Atlantic region, we pursue our shape, respond, and

prepare strategy through three mutually reinforcing layers of engagement centered on NATO, multilateral engagement with countries

par-ticipating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and members of

the EU, and bilateral engagement with individual Allies and Partners.

Within each layer of engagement, U.S. military forces stationed in

Europe play a key role in advancing our security objectives.

NATO

Although the United States maintains

strong bilateral defense links with many

countries around the world, in the EuroAtlantic region we have committed ourselves to an alliance of sovereign states

whose fundamental purpose is to protect the freedom and security of each

and every member. NATO is a living,

dynamic institution where U.S. military

officers, diplomats, and civil servants

work side-by-side with counterparts

from 17 European states and Canada to

President Clinton thanks personnel deployed overseas in support of

U.S. and NATO operations.
10 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

NATO in brief

In April 1949, ten European nations, Canada, and the United States signed the North

Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. Since 1952, seven more European nations have joined

the original twelve members of the Alliance. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set

out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members

by political and military means.

Article 4 of the Treaty states that “(t)he Parties will consult together whenever, in the

opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of

the Parties is threatened.” For this reason, NATO serves as an essential transatlantic forum

for Allied consultations on issues that affect the vital interests of the member nations.

Article 5 contains the commitment of all Allies to deter and defend against any threat of

aggression against any Ally. It states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or

more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,

and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise

of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter

of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including

the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Article 10 of the Treaty leaves the door open for the accession of new members, who

may be invited by unanimous agreement to accede to the Treaty. New members must be

in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and contribute to the security

of its member states.

Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, NATO has several key policy and decision-making

institutions:

n The North Atlantic Council (NAC), made up of Permanent Representatives of the 19

members, is the principal decision-making authority of the Alliance. The NAC—which also

meets at higher levels involving Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and Defense

Ministers—makes decisions based on consensus. The NAC selects a Secretary General who

chairs its meetings and directs an international staff of civil servants and military experts.

n The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is normally composed of Permanent Representatives, but meets at the level of Defense Ministers at least twice a year. It deals with

most defense matters and subjects related to collective defense planning. With the exception of France, all member countries are represented in the DPC.

n Defense Ministers of member countries participating in the DPC meet in the Nuclear

Planning Group (NPG), where they discuss specific policy issues associated with Alliance

nuclear forces.

n To assist and advise the NAC, DPC, and NPG on military matters, each member country

names a senior military officer to serve as their national Military Representative to NATO.

These representatives also form the Military Committee (MC), which is headed by an elected

chairman who serves as the MC’s spokesman and representative and acts on its behalf

in issuing guidance to the International Military Staff.

NATO’s integrated military structure is divided into two Strategic Commands. The headquarters of the Allied Command Europe—referred to as the Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe (SHAPE)—is located near Mons, Belgium. SHAPE is responsible for the overall planning, direction, and conduct of all Alliance military activities within its command area

(from the northern tip of Norway to Southern Europe, including the Mediterranean, and

from the Atlantic coastline to the eastern border of Turkey). The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. SACLANT is responsible

for safeguarding the Allies’ sea lanes of communication, supporting land and amphibious

operations, and protecting the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based nuclear deterrent

in his command area (from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal

waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa.)

consult on, organize, and carry out a

vast range of activities and operations

that advance agreed Alliance political

and military objectives.

NATO helps to shape the security

environment by building solidarity,

cohesion, and transparency in defense

planning within the Alliance, ensuring

that no Ally is forced to rely solely

upon its national efforts in dealing with

basic security challenges. Since 1995,

NATO has been conducting crisis

response operations with its Partners

in the Balkans every single-day, thus

actively building security in the European region. NATO’s maintenance of

credible military forces enables it to

deter aggression and coercion and, in a

crisis, respond to a range of security

threats. And through its political-military

consultative bodies and defense planning bodies, NATO helps to prepare

the Allies to meet future threats. Thus,

a fundamental point of U.S. strategy

is to maintain NATO as the preeminent

organization for ensuring transatlantic

security and the anchor of American

engagement in Europe.

In the years to come, NATO will

continue to play a leading role in guaranteeing European security and promoting and building stability throughout

Europe. The Alliance is now pursuing

numerous initiatives that will permit it

to function more effectively as it moves

into the 21st century.

At the Washington Summit in April

1999, NATO’s 19 heads of state and

government adopted a new Strategic

Concept to adapt and prepare the Alliance for current and future challenges.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 11

The Strategic Concept envisages a larger, more capable and more

flexible Alliance. It reaffirms NATO’s core function of collective

defense, even as it expresses NATO’s willingness to respond to crises

that arise from regional or ethnic conflicts.

In an effort to better prepare NATO internally to meet these challenges, the Strategic Concept provides guidance to NATO military

authorities and tasks them to develop, through the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)1

, military capabilities to carry out new missions

and improve interoperability among NATO forces. The Strategic

Concept also recognizes the importance of the European Security

and Defense Initiative (ESDI) as an essential element of Alliance adaptation that would foster a more effective European contribution to

Alliance security.

The Strategic Concept addresses future external adaptation of

the Alliance. It underscores, for example, the importance of NATO’s

Partnerships with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region and recognizes the need for consultation and joint action. As part of a broader

effort to enhance stability and sustain reform throughout Europe,

the Strategic Concept reaffirms that NATO’s door remains open to

future enlargement.

Multilateral and Bilateral Engagement

Complementing our engagement through NATO and other fora,

the United States advances its shape, respond, and prepare objectives

through diverse multilateral and bilateral security relations with Allies

and Partners.

In close cooperation with its Allies, the United States plays a key role

in several multilateral efforts to shape transatlantic security, build

regional stability, and reduce the risk of conflict. Through PfP and its

political component, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 26

states reaching from Ireland to Russia and Finland to Turkmenistan are

developing increasingly transparent and cooperative relationships with

NATO and with one another. Under NATO-sponsored PfP programs,

several Partners are receiving multilateral support for needed defense

reforms, which contribute to their development as viable democracies.2

Cooperation with our Allies and Partners has contributed to our

ability to respond to crises in Europe and beyond. Many of our Allies

1 The Defense Capabilities Initiative is discussed more fully in Chapter III.

2 The Partnership for Peace is more fully discussed in Chapter IV.

Secretary Cohen welcomes German

Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping

to the Pentagon.
12 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

have made military contributions to combined operations with U.S. forces

undertaken throughout the world. In Europe, our Allies and Partners

have assumed a large share of the responsibilities and burdens in peace

support operations in the Balkans.

In the multilateral realm, smaller groupings, such as the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) and Southeastern Europe Defense

Ministerial (SEDM) process, permit Allies and Partners to work together

on practical, regional defense cooperation. Such multilateral engagement

activities also prepare Partners to participate, when they so choose, in

NATO-led or other international crisis response operations.

In the bilateral realm, the United States cooperates with individual

Allies and Partners over a broad spectrum of activities, including military exercises, training, security assistance, and efforts to prevent the

proliferation of NBC weapons. To help build a basis for cooperation

and guide the implementation of agreed programs, we conduct rigorous

and regular bilateral working groups and staff talks with Allies and

Partners. Our bilateral relations also include tailored security assistance

and cooperation programs to provide certain Allies and Partners with

requested training and equipment to help them meet their Alliance

commitments or Partnership goals. With some Allies, the United States

has basing or other access arrangements involving the presence of

U.S. military forces on their territory. Such arrangements are vital to

meeting our Alliance commitments.

Bilateral engagement with European Allies remains a necessary

method to build consensus within NATO and address specific issues

where NATO as a whole is not involved, or where other multilateral

fora are found to be less effective. Certain Allies share broader interests

with the United States in other regions—for example, in the Middle East,

Africa, and Asia. Strong bilateral ties are indispensable in instances

where the United States might join with one or more Ally to undertake

military operations in a “coalition of the willing” outside NATO.

The United States seeks over the long term to achieve the greatest

possible synergies between our multilateral and bilateral engagement

strategies. Still, we remain sensitive to the legitimate political and security concerns of individual Allies, accept the fact that we cannot have

identical relationships with each of them, and understand that we will

not always agree with every Ally on issues of concern to us. That is

the inherent nature and one of the greatest strengths of our Alliance of

sovereign, democratic countries. Through complementary multilateral

and bilateral approaches, we will build transatlantic security links that

are strong, resilient, and able to ease the inevitable frictions—or even

absorb the occasional shocks—in U.S. relations with Europe.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 13

A fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy is that NATO will continue to

be the anchor of American engagement in Europe. Therefore, we place a

very high priority on working closely with our Allies to accomplish

the goals set forth in the Strategic Concept. In particular, the goals of

improving NATO’s defense capabilities, strengthening the “European

pillar” of the Alliance, and preparing for further enlargement of its

membership are mutually supportive approaches to strengthening

transatlantic security in the 21st century.

Improving Defense Capabilities to Meet Today’s Threat...

and Tomorrow’s

To be an effective military alliance, NATO must fulfill certain key

functions. Specifically, it must understand the likely threats to the

security of its members, decide on the capabilities needed to address

those threats, and develop and field those capabilities through a

combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts. This will remain a

dynamic process, since the threats—and tools needed to meet them—

change over time.

Over the past decade, the threat of direct invasion of NATO territory has decreased significantly while other types of threats (including

regional conflicts on the periphery of NATO,

proliferation of NBC weapons, and terrorist

attack) have increased significantly. These

emerging threats are further complicated by

the fact that they could emanate from a variety of sources, in combination or alone, and

at any time. In response, NATO forces and

structures have begun to change in important ways, and NATO Allies have agreed

that the Alliance will need new capabilities

applicable to both Article 5 and non-Article

5 contingencies.

CHAPTER III

NATO—THE ANCHOR FOR TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers at Birmingham, UK,

October 2000.
14 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Secretary of Defense Cohen introduced the idea of focused improvement of defense capabilities at the June 1998 meeting of NATO defense

ministers. He called attention to lessons learned from NATO’s experience in Bosnia, which suggested that future conflicts in Europe would

place a premium on the ability to deploy troops and equipment to a

crisis rapidly, often outside NATO territory, with little or no preexisting

host nation support. In addition, the Allies have learned that when a

military operation is conducted at a distance—even a relatively small

distance—deficiencies in mobility, communications, and ability to sustain forces over an extended period of time can compromise mission

goals. Secretary Cohen also reiterated that, in the face of NATO’s

conventional military superiority, hostile states are looking to NBC

weapons and increasingly long-range and accurate ballistic and cruise

missiles to offset that superiority. NATO, therefore, needs to develop

and field the capabilities, doctrine, and plans to deal effectively with

these growing threats.

Further intra-Alliance consultations based on the idea proposed

by Secretary Cohen resulted in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI),

which was launched by President Clinton and other Allied leaders at the

Washington Summit. Specifically, Allies agreed to improve capabilities

in five functional areas:

■ Deployability and mobility. NATO

must improve sealift, airlift, and reception

facility assets necessary to get forces to the

crisis area on short notice and deploy them

rapidly within their operational sectors,

even where local transportation infrastructure is marginal (as in the Balkans.)

■ Sustainability and logistics. Once

NATO commits forces, it must be able to

sustain their operations—with equipment, materiel, and personnel—until the

mission is completed. This will require, for

example, modern asset tracking systems

and a multinational joint logistic capability to ensure that all Allies have critical

supplies when and where they need them.

■ Command and control information systems. NATO urgently needs

a common architecture and assets to ensure rapid, secure, effective,

and deployable command and control among all its forces.

The North Atlantic Council convenes in Washington, D.C. on April 24, 1999

during the 50th Anniversary NATO Summit.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 15

■ Effective engagement. This category includes both weapons

(e.g., precision-guided munitions that can operate in all weather, day or

night) and electronic capabilities (e.g., systems to suppress enemy air

defenses). These capabilities are necessary to achieve our military objectives as quickly as possible with the lowest possible risk to NATO forces

and the lowest possible collateral damage.

■ Survivability of forces and infrastructures. NATO forces must

be better prepared to defend themselves and their facilities, and to

maintain operational effectiveness in contingencies where the adversary (including terrorist groups) could use chemical or biological

weapons and information warfare.

The need for effective implementation of the DCI was underscored

by NATO’s experience in Operation Allied Force, which was underway

during the Washington Summit.

On one hand, that operation was highly successful overall: NATO

accomplished its mission through the most precise and lowest collateral

damage air campaign in history, with no American or Allied combat

casualties in 78 days of operations and over 38,000 combat-related

aircraft sorties. The United States and its Allies were united in their

strategy and determination to prevail. Operation Allied Force could not

have been conducted without NATO and the air forces, infrastructure,

transit rights, basing access, and political and diplomatic support provided by our Allies and Partners. Broadly speaking, other members of

the Alliance contributed about the same or a greater share of their available aircraft for prosecuting the campaign as did the United States. They

also contributed the bulk of the ground forces to help stabilize neighboring countries and to conduct humanitarian relief organizations.

On the other hand, Operation Allied Force highlighted some worrisome imbalances and shortfalls in Alliance capabilities. There was a

significant gap between U.S. capabilities and those of our Allies in

areas such as precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and

communications capabilities. Because only a few of our Allies possessed

or could employ precision munitions in sufficient numbers (or at all),

the United States conducted the preponderance of the strike sorties during the early stages of the conflict. Over the course of the campaign, the

United States conducted roughly two-thirds of all support sorties and

half of all combat missions. The lack of fully interoperable communications equipment forced occasional reliance on non-secure methods that

could have compromised operational security. Insufficient air mobility

assets among our Allies contributed to the slow build-up of the

NATO-led Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR) ground forces in
16 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Kosovo once Serbian President Slobodan

Milosevic agreed to NATO’s terms to end

the conflict.

DCI implementation has made some

noteworthy progress since the Washington Summit, especially in setting clearer

priorities for, and improving coordination among, NATO’s defense-related

bodies. The Allies have agreed on 58 tasks

to improve specific capabilities. Most

of these have been translated, within

NATO’s ongoing defense planning process, into new “Force Goals”.3

 Our goal

is not to develop similar capabilities for

every NATO member, since not every

member needs or can afford the newest or

best fighter aircraft, long-range tanker aircraft or surveillance systems.

Rather, our goal is to provide NATO forces with compatible and complementary capabilities that meet our collective requirements.

As we encourage our Allies to improve their defense capabilities,

we are also taking important steps to improve our own capabilities

and reform our national policies to facilitate the sharing of technology.

For example:

■ We are augmenting or accelerating procurement in major areas

identified by the DCI, such as strategic airlift (we will acquire 130-135

C-17 aircraft by 2006), ground surveillance (we will field an additional

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), electronic jamming

(we will add a squadron of EA-6B electronic jamming aircraft), and

precision guided munitions (we will purchase additional Tomahawk cruise

missiles and accelerate procurement of precision guided bombs.) Overall, the United States has embarked on its largest sustained increase in

defense spending in 15 years.

■ We have provided commanders and staffs with policy, strategy,

and doctrinal guidelines for the planning and execution of joint and

multi-national military operations in NBC environments. The guidelines

effect not only passive defense capabilities, such as medical capabilities,

but also active defense and counterforce capabilities to enable U.S. military forces to survive, fight, and win in NBC-contaminated environments.

A B-2 Spirit refuels from a KC-135 Stratotanker during an air strike

mission in support of NATO Operation Allied Force.

3 Force Goals are part of NATO’s longstanding defense planning process. They represent an

agreement by Allies to provide forces and capabilities requested by NATO’s Strategic Commands.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 17

■ We also have begun implementation of the Defense Trade Security

Initiative (DTSI). Launched in May 2000, the DTSI will streamline our

export control process, improve the ability of industry on both sides of

the Atlantic to share critical technologies while reducing the risk of their

diversion to potential adversaries, and improve the ability of our respective military forces to operate together across the range of Alliance missions.

The Alliance will not remain healthy if the United States is alone in

this effort. At this point, the “jury is still out” on Europe’s willingness,

as a whole, to follow through on all agreed DCI objectives. Several

Allies have taken useful steps, including efforts to restructure their

forces consistent with both DCI and NATO’s Strategic Concept. In

addition, the United Kingdom, Canada and others have announced

increases in defense spending, in real terms, over the next several

years—the first such increases since the end of the Cold War. Still,

many Allies have indicated that their current plans are to implement

fully a disappointingly small number of Force Goals. Moreover, some

Allies are headed in the wrong direction, either seriously considering

or carrying out real reductions in defense spending.

This trend will have to be reversed.

The success of Allies in meeting DCI goals ultimately depends upon

the provision of sufficient resources. Allies will need to make the necessary investments to field a 21st century force. Defense budgets always

will be a function of national priorities, but they also must realistically

address international challenges and the capabilities needed to address

those challenges as an Alliance. In some areas, Allies’ military capabilities can be increased through innovative, more efficient, and bettercoordinated use of resources. Resources for needed capabilities can be

found, in some cases, through restructuring and reductions in military

personnel. A number of mobility and logistics capabilities can be met

through commercially available assets and off-the-shelf technology—

for example, by harnessing commercial transport assets in an emergency for military airlift or sealift support. Joint procurement of certain

defense equipment and technologies by a group of Allies is another

promising approach, which the United States will continue to support.

For many Allies, however, smarter spending will not be enough. To

meet the agreed DCI objectives, nations that reasonably can afford to

do so will need to inject additional resources into their defense budgets.

Through a combination of an effective DCI and force planning process,

we will help assure our respective legislative bodies and publics that our
18 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

need for additional resources is well

founded and that those additional

resources will be well spent.

Strengthening the European Pillar

The DCI’s objective of improving Alliance military capabilities (and reducing

the “capabilities gap” between the

United States and the Allies) is closely

linked to efforts to develop a European

Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

within NATO. It also is linked to the

EU’s decision to develop a European

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).4

The broad military goal of ESDP is

for European Union members to establish a military capability to perform a

range of crisis response operations either

within a NATO framework or, in cases

where NATO as a whole is not engaged,

on their own. Whether engaged in a

NATO-led or EU-led operation, European nations will still have only one set of forces and capabilities to

deploy. Hence, our long-term objective is to nurture and sustain strong

and mutually supportive links between NATO and the developing

military crisis response capabilities within the EU.

The EU also plans, as part of ESDP, to build a civilian crisis response

capability, to include the rapid deployment of 5,000 civilian police from

EU states to crisis spots and assistance to local authorities in rebuilding

effective judiciary and penal systems. Such a capability would be

of tremendous long-term benefit to NATO or EU-led forces involved in

post-conflict crisis response operations such as the Stablization Force

(SFOR) in Bosnia and KFOR.

The EU has made clear it has no intention for ESDP to challenge

the core NATO mission of, or responsibility for, collective defense. Rather,

The European Union (EU) in brief

The European Union is the latest permutation in a process of European integration that began

in the wake of World War II, when leaders of former Allied and Axis countries searched for an

effective means to rebuild their shattered economies and prevent future wars. The United States

consciously promoted this process by encouraging Western European states to cooperate among

themselves as part of the Marshall Plan launched in 1947.

A first step toward achieving a united Europe occurred in 1951, when Belgium, France, Germany,

Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands created the European Coal and Steel Community to

regulate coal and steel production. By 1958, “the Six” agreed to establish a European Economic

Community (to bring about the free movement of goods, people, capital and services) and a

European Atomic Energy Community (to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy). Under

the treaties of Maastricht (which entered into force in 1993) and Amsterdam (which entered into

force in 1999), the EU reformed and strengthened its institutions to include a single currency

and European Central Bank (in which 11 of its 15 members currently participate), systematic cooperation on major foreign policy issues, and close cooperation on a range of justice, immigration,

and social issues.

The EU is governed by a Parliament (directly elected in EU-wide elections, but with relatively

limited legislative powers), the Commission (an EU “cabinet” of 20 Commissioners appointed by

their respective governments and a President chosen by consensus), the Council of the EU (comprised of Ministers from member governments, it enacts EU laws based on proposals submitted

by the Commission), the Court of Justice (the EU’s “Supreme Court”), and the Court of Auditors

(overseeing the financial management of the EU budget).

In certain areas, such as agricultural policy and trade, EU members have “pooled” some of their

sovereign powers, allowing the Union to negotiate directly with the United States and other countries. In other areas, including defense and security, members retain their sovereignty. Since the

EU system is based on international treaties and not a Constitution, it remains an essentially

“supranational” entity—not a “federalist” structure like the United States.

4 ESDI is a mechanism within NATO by which European Allies can gain access to NATO

common assets and capabilities for operations led by the Western European Union. Its

objective is the creation of a “European Pillar” within NATO. ESDP was foreshadowed by

the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997. The Treaty calls for the progressive creation

of a common European defense policy, which covers humanitarian and rescue tasks,

peacekeeping, and the use of combat forces in crisis response. The Treaty does not call for

creation of a European Army.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 19

ESDP represents an acknowledgement by our European Allies that

their economic and political success is not matched by their ability to

respond to crises in their own backyard, such as the long-simmering

Balkan conflicts, and that this situation needs to be addressed. It

remains overwhelmingly likely that, in any situation where military

involvement on a significant scale is justified and where there is a

European consensus to undertake a military operation, the United

States would support a NATO role and would be part of the operation. Conversely, it is highly unlikely that, in any such situation, Europe

would ask the United States to step aside and not participate. Still, for

some Europeans, ESDP also represents an “insurance policy” that would

allow Europe to take independent action to deal with a non-Article 5

type of contingency in the unlikely event that the United States (or

any other member of NATO) did not join a consensus for NATO action.

As a centerpiece of ESDP, EU leaders agreed in December 1999 to

develop, by 2003, the ability to deploy a force of 50-60,000 troops within

60 days and to sustain that force for at least one year. To reach this

objective (known as the EU’s “Headline Goal”), EU members will need

significant new capabilities in the same five areas identified in the DCI.

This coincidence of requirements should not be surprising, since 11 of the

Overlapping Memberships in Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions

Vatican City

Belgium

France

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Portugal

Spain

UK

Germany

Greece

Denmark Iceland

Norway

US

Canada

Ireland

Sweden

Finland

Austria

Turkmenistan Croatia

Kyrgyzstan Belarus Uzbekistan

Armenia Ukraine

Switzerland Russia

Kazakhstan Tajikistan** Moldova

Hungary

Poland Turkey

Czech Rep

Monaco

Liechtenstein

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Serbia and Montenegro*

Andorra

San Marino

* suspended

** in EAPC, but not PFP

OSCE

PFP/ EAPC

EU

NATO

WEU

Cyprus

Malta Albania Lithuania

Bulgaria Romania

Estonia Slovakia

FYROM

Latvia

NATO ASPIRANTS

EU

 ASPIRANTS

Slovenia

Georgia

Azerbaijan
20 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

15 EU members are members of NATO and every nation has but one

defense budget and one set of forces. No European country, for example,

would be in a position to purchase one set of airlift assets for NATO

collective defense purposes or NATO-led crisis response operations and

a separate set of assets for EU-led crisis response operations. The same

holds true for communications and surveillance equipment, precision

guided munitions, and so on. Simply put, it is clear that when it comes

to building and maintaining real military capabilities, DCI stands to

make a vital contribution to both ESDI, which seeks an improved European pillar within NATO, and ESDP, which seeks to foster a European

capability to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged.

The United States actively supports

an ESDP that will benefit Allies on both

sides of the Atlantic. We recognize that

development of a foreign and security

policy for the EU is a natural, even an

inevitable, part of the development of

broader European integration. We agree

with the EU that NATO remains the

foundation of our collective defense of

its members. Greater European military

capabilities will make the Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden the United

States now has to carry in every crisis,

and make the U.S.-European relationship a more balanced partnership.

We seek a relationship that will benefit the current, and the potential future,

members of both organizations—a relationship wherein NATO and EU

efforts to strengthen European security are coherent and mutually reinforcing; where the autonomy and integrity of decision-making in both

organizations are respected, with each organization dealing with the other

on an equal footing; where both organizations place a high premium on

transparency, close and frequent contacts on a wide range of levels, and

on efforts that are complementary; and where there is no discrimination

against any of the member states of either organization.

The path to a successful strengthening of the European pillar of transatlantic security may appear, on occasion, excessively long or needlessly

contentious. Again, this should not be surprising, for NATO and the EU

are very different organizations that do not have a long history of dialogue and interaction. The process of developing their new relationship

European Leaders on the Need for Enhanced European Capabilities

“Our vision is clear. Europe must prepare to do more—to pull its weight. And it must develop

capabilities in ways that support action in NATO as well as under European Union leadership.

There is an expectation on both sides of the Atlantic that we will make real progress...We cannot

afford to fail.” Geoffrey Hoon, British Minister of Defense, April 2000

“The problem is not too much America in NATO but too little Europe. Enhancing Europe’s ability

to take action and assume responsibility means strengthening NATO as a whole and reorienting

transatlantic cooperation towards the challenges of the future.” Rudolf Scharping, German Minister of Defense, November 1999

“Improvement of our national capabilities will be of significant benefit to the Alliance as well as to

the European Union. The capacity to commit our forces will increase the Alliance’s and the United

States’ spectrum of options...Taking up greater responsibilities as Europeans will enable us to act

as collective partners in an Alliance of democratic countries.” Alain Richard, French Minister of

Defense, February 2000

“The burden of dealing with European security crises should not fall disproportionately on the

shoulders of the United States. We need to create a more balanced Alliance, with a stronger

European input. Europe recognizes this, and is starting to do something about it.” Lord Robertson,

Secretary General of NATO, December 1999
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 21

has only just begun, and we realize it will take time to complete.

NATO can and should be flexible and generous in establishing

such a relationship. Equally, the EU—a strong, confident, and

vibrant institution that has accomplished so much in bringing

Europeans toward an “ever closer union” in so many areas—

can and should be flexible and generous in its approach.

NATO and the EU must work cooperatively to develop (and

avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of) the military assets

and capabilities required by both organizations. This cooperation should extend to the creation of a common, coherent, and

collaborative defense planning review process, a complex area

where NATO has proven tools and is willing and able to assist

the EU in meeting its Headline Goal. The NATO-EU relationship will work best if close consultation takes place at many different

levels—political and technical, formal and informal—with an emphasis

on full transparency between the two. The right kind of links will serve

the mutual interests of all NATO and EU members, since they will

ensure that decisions about future military operations will meet the

security objectives of both organizations without infringing on their

respective, independent decision-making prerogatives.

We recognize that real cooperation requires a “two-way street.” For

example, the four EU members who participate in PfP but are not members of the Alliance should have appropriate access to NATO’s defense

planning arrangements and a role in the decision shaping of NATO-led

crisis response operations. This will enhance their capability as Partners

to act effectively alongside the 11 EU members who belong to the Alliance in an eventual EU-led crisis response contingency. Similarly, the six

European Allies who currently are not members of the EU should be

invited to participate, to the widest possible extent, in EU preparations

to meet its Headline Goal and, eventually, in the deliberations that must

take place before the EU takes a final decision on military action.

Once an EU decision has been taken to conduct an operation, nonEU European Allies contributing to the operation should participate in

the decision shaping. This participation by the non-EU European Allies

is justified on several grounds. They share security guarantees with the

eleven NATO members of the EU (non-NATO members of the EU do

not), contribute to common NATO assets that would be available to the

EU, and likely would be willing to contribute their important national

capabilities to EU military operations.

There would be no contradiction between the four non-NATO EU

members gaining broad transparency into NATO defense planning and

Secretary Cohen and British Secretary of State

for Defense Geoffrey Hoon sign a Declaration of

Principles for Defense Equipment and Industrial

Cooperation in February 2000.
22 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

the eight non-EU NATO members gaining reciprocal transparency into

the EU Headline Goal process and these nations’ status outside NATO

and the EU respectively. Simply put, our aim is to create a rational,

cooperative, complementary NATO-EU approach to building security

across the Euro-Atlantic community; it is not to bring four of the 15 EU

members into NATO “through the backdoor” or to inject the six nonEU NATO members into the EU’s decision-making.

While Americans might debate specific policies toward Europe, a

broad consensus exists in favor of a lasting U.S. political and military

engagement in major issues affecting European security. Simply put, the

notion that Europe must begin to prepare now for an eventual American “withdrawal” has no foundation in fact or in policy. Conversely,

while some in Europe have voiced concern that America’s prominent

role in the Alliance somehow inhibits Europe’s unity and political independence, most Europeans recognize that a “fortress Europe” is neither

a safe nor realistic option. In the end, the improved European military

capabilities that we seek to achieve through DCI, NATO force planning,

ESDI and ESDP will strengthen the Alliance as a whole and the European pillar of transatlantic security in particular.

Enlargement

Enlargement is not a new concept for NATO. Since its creation in 1949,

the Alliance has grown from 12 to 19 members in four rounds of enlargement, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of

Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and the Czech Republic, Hungary,

and Poland in 1999. Moreover, as NATO’s leaders declared at the

Washington Summit: “The three new members will not be the

last.” In fact, the record demonstrates that with every new

member, NATO has become stronger, and European stability

has been enhanced.

Immediately upon their accession, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland demonstrated their “added value” to NATO

with their support to Operation Allied Force and subsequent

troop contributions to KFOR. They also have demonstrated in

other ways that they take their NATO obligations seriously.

Examples include their troop contributions to SFOR, their

ongoing efforts to improve defense planning and implement

defense reforms, their constructive participation in a range of

NATO activities and deliberations, and their very positive role

in enhancing NATO’s relationships with Partners, including the

Russian Federation and Ukraine. While the newest members

President Vaclav Havel of the Czech

Republic is greeted as a new member of

NATO by Secretary Cohen and the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H.

Shelton (right).
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 23

may still lag behind other Allies in many areas, the United States is convinced they are on the right track.

As a matter of principle, there are several reasons why further enlargement of NATO will benefit U.S. security interests and those of our

Allies. Enlargement will:

■ help to erase lines of division and grow the family of European

nations committed to democratic institutions, individual liberty, rule

of law, market economies, and settlement of international disputes by

peaceful means; and

■ demonstrate to Partners the potential benefits of reforming their civil

and military institutions to be compatible with those of NATO members.

While the United States and its Allies are committed to an open door

policy and eventual further enlargement, enlargement is not an end in

itself. It is more important to ensure that enlargement contributes to our

strategic objectives than to meet any arbitrary schedule. For this reason,

NATO leaders agreed at the Washington Summit to review the enlargement question by 2002, and they endorsed a few key principles for considering requests for accession at that time. Specifically, they reaffirmed

that all states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their

own security and that no European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its history or geographic location. Thus, each

aspirant will be evaluated on its merits.

The United States, for its part, has proceeded carefully at every

stage of NATO enlargement over the past half century. This will be

true in the future, as well, reflecting the seriousness of America’s commitment to collective defense, the profound implications of a decision

to extend that commitment to additional European nations, and the

very important role of the United States Congress—especially the

Senate—in enlargement questions.5 The Senate has never rejected an

Executive Branch proposal to enlarge the Alliance, thanks to the painstaking efforts taken by Democratic and Republican Administrations,

Congressional leaders of both parties, and Allied governments to ensure

that aspirants are truly ready for membership. Everyone—the United

States, Allies and Partners—has an important interest in seeing that this

remarkable example of bipartisan support for a strong transatlantic

security link is preserved.

5 Under the Constitution, a two-thirds affirmative vote of the Senate is required to give its

advice and consent to ratification of a treaty or treaty amendment.
24 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

It follows, therefore, that an essential element of U.S. strategy will

be to assist those countries that aspire to join NATO to become the

strongest possible candidates for membership. For this reason, we will

continue to support actively the Membership Action Plan (MAP) launched

at the Washington Summit.6 Aspiring candidates must know that NATO

membership will be founded upon the key principle of adherence to the

democratic and other shared values of the Alliance, which are rooted in

the notions of individual liberty, the rule of law and civilian control of

military forces. Such values cannot be subject to change in the face of

electoral cycles or changes in individual and party leadership. Toward

this end, MAP offers aspirants a robust, structured list of voluntary

activities designed to help them build their candidacies in five principal

areas of interest to the Allies. These include:

■ Political and economic issues. For example, aspirants are expected

to settle ethnic disputes or territorial disputes by peaceful means, establish

appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and

promote stability and well-being through solid macro-economic policies.

■ Defense and military issues. Aspirants need to be ready to provide

forces and capabilities that contribute to collective defense and other

Alliance missions.

■ Resource issues. New members must commit sufficient budget

resources to fund needed national capabilities and to participate at

appropriate levels in NATO’s commonly funded activities.

■ Security issues. New members need established safeguards and

procedures to protect sensitive information in accordance with NATO

standards.

■ Legal issues. New members need, for example, to understand and

implement all legal arrangements governing accession to and cooperation with NATO.

The MAP is a demanding process, and active participation in it—

or, indeed, recognized progress in all of its categories—does not carry

a guarantee of eventual membership. Aspirants understand that, under

the North Atlantic Treaty, all Allies must agree to the accession of any

new member.

Moreover, the MAP is one part of a larger process of U.S. and

NATO outreach to Partners, which is described in the next chapter.

6 The current NATO aspirants participating in the MAP are: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 25

The United States and its Allies can fully achieve the Washington Treaty’s

objectives only through close partnership with other states across the

European continent. For the foreseeable future, there will be no single

transatlantic institution that meets the varied security requirements

of North America and all of Europe. Therefore, our strategy calls for

a multidimensional approach to building the “conditions of stability

and well-being” noted in Article 2.

In practice, this means that there

exists no single solution—no “one stop

shopping”—available to U.S. policy

makers to address the wide range of

military, political, economic and other

problems (e.g., transnational crime,

ethnic conflict, violations of human

rights, illegal immigration, environmental security) that directly or indirectly affect transatlantic security. In

some cases, NATO will be best suited

to take the lead in organizing and implementing multilateral efforts that

promote stability and security across Europe—for example, through PfP

and special relations between NATO, the Russian Federation, and

Ukraine. In many instances, however, the United States and Allies can

work most effectively through bilateral or regional defense cooperation

agreements or arrangements. In other cases, the EU, United Nations (UN),

OSCE, or multilateral arms control agreements and nonproliferation

regimes have important roles to play.

Moreover, the challenge of framing and executing a coherent and

comprehensive transatlantic security policy likely will become more

difficult in the coming years. Increasingly, the United States, Allies

and Partners will need to work with a growing but loosely connected

network of intergovernmental institutions, ad hoc “coalitions of the

willing,” and non-governmental organizations. Getting this network to

CHAPTER IV

BUILDING BLOCKS OF A TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

NETWORK BEYOND NATO

 The Parties will contribute toward the further

development of peaceful and friendly international relations

by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about

a better understanding of the principles upon which these

institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of

stability and well-being.”

Article 2

The Washington Treaty

“
26 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

operate more effectively—in effect, coaxing a disparate team of independent (and independent minded) organizations and actors to pull

in the same direction—will not be easy.7 Still, our goal should be to

develop a comprehensive set of tools to prevent the outbreak of a crisis

in the first place, manage it if our preventive efforts fail, and rebuild

conflict-torn societies once the violent stage of the crisis has passed.

This chapter describes the principal “building blocks” of a transatlantic security network that reaches beyond the NATO Alliance.

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

For all countries in Europe that seek closer cooperation with NATO,

PfP and the EAPC have provided multiple avenues for practical

political-military cooperation and dialogue with the Alliance. These

structures will continue to be of significant benefit not only to those

Partners seeking future Alliance membership, but also to those seeking

greater familiarity with NATO procedures in order to maximize prospects of successful cooperation with NATO. U.S. strategy looks to build

upon these successes and strengthen PfP’s role as NATO’s principal means

of political and military outreach to the rest of Europe.

PfP provides for a wide range of practical cooperation between the

19 NATO Allies and 26 PfP Partners. For example, NATO BI-SCs

(Bi-Strategic Command bodies), ACLANT (Allied Command Atlantic),

and SHAPE are now extending invitations to PfP nations for participation in regular NATO land, air and naval exercises. PfP also continues

to prove its value by enabling aspiring members to build the

interoperability necessary for possible NATO membership. PfP’s stipulations for consultations between the Alliance and Partners that feel a

threat to their security also proved invaluable during NATO’s air campaign against Serbia.

Evidence of PfP’s practical, on-the-ground success has been the way

it has helped prepare Partners to become more militarily capable to participate in NATO-led peacekeeping operations, such as SFOR and KFOR.

Partners have made important contributions to both of these operations,

which in turn have reduced the burden on the United States and other

Allies. This new pattern of Partner involvement, whereby Partners have

gained more experience and capabilities through their involvement with

PfP structures and operations, has set an important precedent for future

NATO-led crisis response operations.

7 The complexity of this task is illustrated by the fact that an estimated 300 non-governmental

organizations of various sizes and abilities have participated in humanitarian assistance efforts

related to Kosovo.

Paratroopers from the U.S. Army’s

82nd Airborne and the Ukraine

Department of Air Mobility line up

to load into a C-17 Globemaster III

at Fort Bragg preparing to jump in

support of Peaceshield 2000.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 27

The 1999 Washington Summit saw

the strengthening of the NATO-Partner

relationship and the further enhancement

of PfP through the adoption of a package of measures called the “Enhanced

and More Operational Partnership”

(EMOP). This package contained four

primary components: the PoliticalMilitary Framework for NATO-led

PfP Operations; the Expanded and

Adapted Planning and Review Process

(PARP); the Operational Capabilities

Concept (OCC); and the PfP Training

and Education Enhancement Program

(TEEP). These elements, which are in

various stages of implementation, are

discussed in detail below.

Political-Military Framework for

NATO-led PfP Operations. The “PolMil Framework” enhances the military and political role of Partners in

the planning and execution of non-Article 5 crisis response

operations. It allows for more active involvement in political consultations, decision making, operational planning, and command arrangements. By institutionalizing the scope and nature of contacts between

the Alliance and various Partners through each phase of an unfolding

crisis, the Framework is improving NATO’s ability to work with Partners on crisis response. The premier example is KFOR, where 15 Partners participate in the political guidance and oversight of KFOR in a

“NATO+15” EAPC format.

Expanded and Adapted PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP).

PARP is designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating

forces and capabilities that might be made available for operations in

conjunction with Alliance forces. The expanded PARP is increasingly

modeled after the NATO defense planning process. Each cycle has been

extended from two to six years (reflecting NATO’s process), and, just

as defense ministers do for the Alliance’s defense planning, NATO and

PARP defense ministers are to agree on Ministerial Guidance every two

years, in order to provide strategic direction for the PARP. The first ever

PARP Ministerial Guidance was developed last year, adopted at the

December 1999 Ministerials, and applied in the establishment of Partnership Goals for PARP participants during Spring 2000.

PfP in brief

Created in 1994 through the framework of NATO, the Partnership for Peace (PfP)

has as its primary goal the forging of a strong, cooperative relationship between

NATO members and the 26 non-NATO participating states. In cooperation with

the Alliance, Partners pursue several core objectives, including:

n Facilitating transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes.

n Ensuring democratic control of defense forces.

n Maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to crisis response

operations under an appropriate international mandate.

n Developing forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO members.

Each Partner has a unique and individual agreement with NATO. However, consistent with PfP’s overarching goals, in 1997 NATO and Partner states established the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as a cooperative mechanism bringing

together Allies and Partners for political and security-related consultations and

enhanced practical cooperation.

Partner countries have representatives at the Partnership Coordination Cell

adjacent to SHAPE and liaison offices adjacent to NATO headquarters.
28 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). The OCC aims to improve

the military capabilities and interoperability of Partner forces that are

slated to participate in NATO-led PfP operations. The OCC will also

enable NATO in future SFOR or KFOR-like scenarios to put together

tailor-made force packages, which may include Partners, for mounting

and sustaining such operations. The OCC provides for enhanced “peacetime working relationships” between Alliance and Partner forces and

will help Partners enjoy a greater voice in PfP decision-making.

PfP Training and Education Enhancement Program

(TEEP). TEEP is designed to ensure that training and

educational aspects of the PfP keep pace with advances

in other areas of the Partnership, focussing specifically

on the achievements of interoperability. It also seeks to

promote greater cooperation and dialogue among a

wider set of defense and security communities in NATO

and Partner nations.

Based on proposals by Secretary Cohen during the

1998 Defense Ministerials, President Clinton and his

fellow Heads of State and Government at the 1999

Summit endorsed three initiatives for improving PfP

education and training:

■ PfP Simulation Network (SIMNET). SIMNET

aims to expand training and lower costs. The Network allows Allied

and Partner military command staffs to train together from remote sites

via computer simulation. A SIMNET demonstration exercise (with a

crisis response/humanitarian assistance scenario) was conducted during

the NATO Summit. Simulation technology and practices were further

developed at the VIKING ’99 simulation exercise hosted by Sweden in

December 1999.

■ Consortium of Defense Academies & Security Studies Institutes.

The Consortium is dedicated to strengthening defense and military

education through enhanced national and institutional cooperation.

It achieves this by linking defense practitioners, scholars, and experts

into networks that facilitate sharing of knowledge. The Consortium

has extended the scope of PfP to include universities and non-governmental institutes in addition to governmental bodies. In the last two

years, representatives from more than 200 organizations drawn from

45 nations have participated in the Consortium’s conferences and working group meetings.

President Bill Clinton speaks to Allied and Partner troops

deployed to Skopje, Macedonia in June 1999.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 29

■ PfP Training Centers: Designated training centers in Allied and

Partner countries help enhance PfP activities, education, and cooperation. The goal is to develop a web of training centers, each dedicated

to distinctive competence in one or more fields of activity related to the

PfP Work Program. Examples of potential training activities include

peacekeeping, defense resource management, and field training.

Within each of these areas, the United States will continue to encourage what has been a growing trend over recent years. Specifically, other

Allies and Partners—large and small, those with strong economies and

those with more limited means—are stepping forward to take a leadership role in organizing, financing, and implementing PfP regional training centers, exercises and simulation activities, and conferences and

workshops. This trend has both practical and political benefits. It facilitates cooperation among defense structures that are closer in size,

orientation, and experience to each other than to our own. It also

demonstrates convincingly that PfP has taken root as a true transatlantic partnership with a committed and effective European pillar.

There exists no pre-ordained limit on future cooperation between

NATO and Partners in any security-related area where they choose to

work together. Thus, active participation in PfP programs can be equally

attractive and important to those Partners who are NATO aspirants,

those who wish to keep the membership option open, and those

who, for various reasons, choose for now not to pursue membership.

PfP’s unique flexibility, which allows Partners to exercise “selfdifferentiation” in their relationship with NATO, should ensure that

it remains a worthy effort in and of itself for many years to come.

Southeastern Europe

Twice in the past five years, NATO has been obliged to take decisive

action to arrest armed conflicts in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the stability of the Balkans is still precarious and threatened by ethnic hatred,

revenge-seekers, and political uncertainty. However, this region is

not condemned to be a crucible of war. To build a lasting peace in

Southeastern Europe, the United States, its Allies, and Partners need

to create positive forces that pull the countries of Southeastern Europe

closer to each other and toward increasing integration with the

successful economic, political, and security institutions of the transatlantic community.

Although we have successfully deployed military forces to the region

and put a stop to ethnic cleansing, longer-term success will require greater
30 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

efforts to complement military power through the application of more robust economic and political

mechanisms. In addition, because the military aspects

of intervention do not end when the shooting stops,

our security approach to the region must also focus

on further enhancing the ability of NATO Allies and

Partners to assist with political rebuilding and the normalization of civil society and other functions.

Specifically, we seek to work through the DCI and

PfP to encourage the development of “enablers” for

mission success—elements of force structure that

assist with the normalization of civil society and

help accelerate the return to civilian control. Such

enablers can include: robust communications, control

and intelligence capabilities to assist with the demands

of multinational deployments; civil affairs and military police units to replace combat units once conflict has ended; and

enhanced public affairs detachments, which can help handle the very

high media presence initial operations generate.

Beyond these immediate force structure needs, other enablers

include: highly trained personnel who have the language skills and

cultural understanding to act as liaison with local communities and

factions; and organizations that can address the immediate needs of

the local populace, deal with displaced persons and refugees, coordinate

humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction, and help reestablish a civilian police force and judicial system. Until these types

of enablers are deployed, in place and working effectively, the intervention of military forces will not be enough to restore civil society—the

absence of which will perpetuate the reasons for conflict, imperil the

safety of our deployed military forces, and challenge our long-term

security interests.

With these requirements in mind, our strategy to bring a lasting

and real peace to Southeastern Europe draws upon four mutually supportive processes:

■ Stability Pact. Launched in June 1999 by some three dozen countries and international institutions, the Stability Pact for Southeastern

Europe represents a “grand bargain.”8 In return for a commitment by

North Dakota Army National Guard soldier hands out

pens and pencils to students in a schoolhouse in Kosovo.

8 Participants in the Stability Pact include all of the Southeastern European countries (including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), plus the United States, European Union, Canada,

Japan, Russian Federation, Turkey, and numerous international organizations (e.g., UN, NATO,

World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and OSCE.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 31

countries in the region to continue political and economic reforms and

increase cooperation with one another, countries outside the region and

international organizations have pledged to assist the regional states to

move steadily toward integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Under

Stability Pact auspices, participating states and organizations have

mobilized new resources and undertaken numerous projects aimed at

fostering democratization, human rights, economic reconstruction and

development, and fighting corruption. The Stability Pact also contributes to the security environment by mobilizing support for regional

cooperation in areas such as border controls against illicit trafficking,

destruction of small arms and light weapons, and retraining former military personnel for productive employment in the civilian economy.

■ NATO’s Southeastern Europe Initiative (SEEI). Launched at

the Washington Summit, the SEEI draws upon existing structures—in

particular, the PfP and EAPC—and tailors a range of PfP-related activities to the specific needs of the region. For example, the SEEI facilitates

cooperation between NATO and Partners in the region to meet the Partners’ security assistance requirements, improve the interoperability of

Partner and NATO forces, promote regional transparency in defense

matters through exchanges of military and civilian defense and foreign

ministry officials, and address specific regional needs such as humanitarian de-mining. In addition, the SEEI provides a forum for NATO

consultations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is not a PfP member.9 In

the future, the SEEI could facilitate a greater interface between NATO

and the Stability Pact, following the example of NATO’s contribution of

technical expertise to a World Bank-funded project, endorsed by the

Stability Pact, to retrain former Bulgarian and Romanian military personnel for civilian jobs.

■ Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM). Begun in 1996,

SEDM brings together senior defense leaders from four NATO Allies

(the United States, Greece, Italy, Turkey) and six Partners (Albania,

Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia.) Although SEDM

has no permanent structures—e.g., no founding charter or standing

secretariat—its annual meetings at the level of ministers and their

deputies have spawned a variety of consultations, exercises, and workshops that build effective cooperation among regional defense leaders

and facilitate the interoperability of Partners’ forces with NATO.

9 This was the case for Croatia, as well, before its accession to PfP in May 2000. Indeed, Croatia’s

positive transition over the past year—its democratic elections, improved relations with BosniaHerzegovina, unilateral commitment to accept returning refugees, and cooperation with the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia—is a hopeful sign of progress for

the entire region. It also demonstrates the transforming power of PFP membership, which

encourages nations to pursue reform efforts.
32 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

A leading symbol of SEDM’s contribution to regional security is the

Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE).10 The

MPFSEE will be capable of fielding up to a brigade-level multilateral

force for employment in regional conflict prevention and peace support

operations. Its force structure, command and control, training, information and logistical structures will be broadly compatible with those

of NATO. In addition, the MPFSEE will draw upon capabilities being

developed under SEDM to mount regionally based responses to humanitarian crises, natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes), or other emergency

contingencies. Examples of these capabilities are: the Crisis Information

Network, a computer-based system that allows the SEDM countries to

exchange planning data and coordinate multilateral emergency relief

efforts; and the Engineer Task Force, on-call units of military engineers

able to perform road, bridge, and rail repairs and conduct limited

de-mining and unexploded ordnance clearing operations. The SEDM’s

“can do” spirit exemplifies what the United States and its Allies want

to encourage across the board—a growing pattern of cooperation on

practical problem-solving and security-building steps that emanate

from within Southeastern Europe.

■ Bilateral security cooperation and engagement. Complementing

its active role in the Stability Pact, NATO SEEI, and SEDM, the United

States employs a variety of bilateral tools aimed at improving the

regional security environment. For example, DoD has worked closely

with several Partners in the region to conduct defense assessments and

meet critical shortfalls in training and equipment.11 Similarly, United

States European Command (USEUCOM) has adjusted its exercise planning to support SEDM’s Engineer Task Force concept. These engagement activities will have over time a significant impact on improving the

Southeastern European Partners’ capability to operate with NATO and

other Partner forces, thereby relieving some of the burden on U.S. forces.

We welcome the triumph of democratic forces in Yugoslavia and the

departure from power of Slobodan Milosevic. We are working with our

Allies and Partners to help the Serbian people institute democratic

reforms, rebuild their economy, and integrate their nation fully into the

international community. Part of this process includes the lifting of

10The MPFSEE was established by a formal agreement signed at the SEDM ministerial in

Skopje, Macedonia in September 1998. All SEDM countries joined the MPFSEE, except the

United States and Slovenia, who have observer status at MPFSEE activities. The first headquarters of the MPFSEE’s military organization (known as the Southeastern Europe Brigade,

or SEEBRIG) was activated in Plovdiv, Bulgaria in August 1999. The headquarters site and

nationality of officers holding key SEEBRIG positions rotate among the participating countries according to an agreed schedule.

11 See also USEUCOM section in Chapter V.

Secretary Cohen listens to his

defense counterparts at the

Southeastern Europe Defense

Ministerial in Thessaloniki, Greece

in October 2000.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 33

international sanctions that have a direct impact upon the people and

economy of Yugoslavia. We expect Milosevic to be held fully accountable for the alleged war crimes for which he has been indicted.

Meanwhile, the NATO-led KFOR will remain critical in the nearterm to provide security for all the people of Kosovo. Without such

security, the difficult tasks of economic reconstruction and building

institutions of self-government cannot move forward. Similarly, the

NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina will contribute to maintaining

the secure environment essential to meeting the objectives of the Dayton

Agreement. As effective local institutions and a reduction in ethnic tensions take hold in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the requirements

for a significant international military presence in both will be reduced.

It would be imprudent to set an arbitrary deadline for such a reduction.

Engaging the Russian Federation

The United States, Allies and Partners share a vital interest in enabling

the Russian Federation to become a stable, market-oriented democracy

that is ruled by law, at peace with itself, and willing and able to contribute to and participate fully in the security and prosperity of Europe.

The transatlantic community cannot be truly secure if its enormous

nuclear-armed neighbor, with its rich human and natural resources,

withdraws behind a new curtain of hostility and authoritarian rule

or collapses economically.

Our ongoing sustained bilateral and multilateral engagement efforts

with Russia in political, economic, and security matters must be continued if we are to reach our long-term objectives. Success on one front will

help advance progress on the others. For example, by facilitating Russia

in its effort to build a stronger economy through increased trade and

investment relations with the United States and EU, we hope to create

powerful incentives for improved political and security cooperation.

In the realm of security affairs, U.S. strategy toward the Russian

Federation contains three major elements, which should be pursued in

both bilateral and multilateral channels:

■ First, we seek to minimize Russian perceptions of the United States

and NATO as potential threats to Russia’s national security. Russian

official pronouncements on military doctrine, which are based on

such perceptions, have often appeared menacing, particularly to Russia’s

neighbors. Such threat perceptions also have potentially damaging

internal consequences.
34 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

■ Second, we seek to expand programs of practical cooperation

with the Russian Federation on security-related issues. Through regular

contact at many levels, we hope to develop relations wherein cooperation with the United States, Allies and Partners becomes a normal and

highly valued activity for Russian military and defense officials.

■ Third, when Russia’s actions or policies raise serious concerns

about its commitment to values important to the transatlantic and wider

international communities, we will not remain silent. We want Russia

to realize that negative behavior has negative consequences.

In the bilateral arena, the U.S. commitment to stabilizing reductions in each side’s strategic nuclear forces testifies to our desire not to

return to the dangerous nuclear competition of the Cold War era. These

reductions will be accompanied by nuclear-related confidence building

measures (for example, the recent agreement to establish a joint U.S.-

Russian center in Moscow to exchange information on ballistic missile

launches) that demonstrate our desire to work with Russia to avoid possible misunderstandings. High-level consultations between American

and Russian defense and military officials also serve as a primary

vehicle to improve each side’s understanding of the other’s military

doctrines and policies.

In the multilateral arena, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), established in 1997, is an important venue for consultations,

cooperation and, wherever possible, consensus-building between the

Alliance and Russia.

While we strive to reach a common understanding with Russia, we

must also underscore that it is in Russia’s own national interest to broaden

security-related cooperation with the United States, NATO and Partners. Here, as well, we have an excellent foundation upon which to

build. For example, under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative,

the United States is enhancing and enlarging existing programs that over

the past eight years have helped the Russians to: deactivate thousands of

nuclear warheads; destroy hundreds of missiles, bombers and ballistic

missile submarines; improve security of nuclear weapons and materials

at dozens of sites; prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and

associated capabilities; begin safe destruction of the world’s largest stocks

of chemical weapons; and provide opportunities and inducements for

thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists to participate in peaceful

commercial and research activities. Several NATO and EU countries are

engaged in related bilateral and multilateral efforts to assist Russia in

dealing with the WMD-related legacy of the former Soviet Union.

U.S. Army soldier explains the

M-137A1 Panoramic Telescope

to members of the Russian

Separate Airborne Brigade at

Camp Eagle, Bosnia.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 35

Over time, we seek to develop new areas of cooperation where

Russia can become an active contributor to transatlantic security. An

important precedent in this regard has been established in the Balkans,

where Russian military forces have worked well with NATO and Partner forces in SFOR and KFOR. As part of our strategy, we seek to

improve our ability to cooperate with Russia in crisis response operations by arranging joint U.S.-Russian exercises and by cooperating with

Russia on theater missile defense technologies.

An integral part of our strategy of engagement involves communicating our expectation that Russia will adhere to international norms

and standards. While we acknowledge, for example, the right of Russia

to preserve its territorial integrity and its right and responsibility to protect its citizens against terrorism and criminal elements, Russia’s use of

massive and indiscriminate force against Chechen civilians has raised

serious questions about its commitment to international norms and

particularly human rights. We will continue to urge the Russian government to pursue every avenue for a political solution to the conflict,

including through a substantive dialogue with Chechen representatives.

In the final analysis, our ability to work with Russia to reduce Cold

War arsenals, prevent the proliferation of WMD, and ease the transformation of its political, economic and social institutions toward more

democratic and free market practices will depend heavily on decisions

made by Russia. Because progress in each of these areas likely will be

subject to occasional set backs, our long-term success is not assured.

That said, taking a “wait-and-see” attitude toward Russia is not an

option for Allies, Partners, or the United States.

Engagement with Ukraine

The United States seeks to help Ukraine preserve its independence and

sovereignty, fulfill its legitimate security needs, and play a constructive

role in regional political, military, and economic stability. Ukraine’s long

border with Russia and the important and complex—albeit sometimes

problematic—relations between them must be taken into account in our

overall strategy toward Ukraine. However, we must keep in mind the

important differences between the two and not base our policies toward

one on the presumed reaction of the other. Indeed, we do not regard our

relations with these countries as a “zero sum” game, wherein efforts to

help Ukraine move closer to Euro-Atlantic structures must come at the

expense of parallel efforts with Russia. If anything, the opposite is true:

our efforts with each should be mutually reinforcing.
36 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

In the security realm, U.S. strategy focuses on helping Ukraine restructure its forces to make them increasingly interoperable with NATO

and other Partners. In this regard we want to assist Ukraine in carrying

out needed reforms of its defense establishment. These include the institutionalization and effective practice of civilian control over the military

and greater openness in the military establishment as a whole. In addition, Ukraine’s defense establishment must be sized and resourced in a

realistic manner that reflects a comprehensive assessment of Ukraine’s

security environment and is consistent with its overall national priorities of economic reform and revitalization.

To achieve these goals, we are proceeding on a bilateral track that

involves a range of activities agreed by USCINCEUR and the Ukrainian

Chief of Defense that includes:

■ Bringing together senior U.S. and Ukrainian commanders and

their staffs to discuss issues such as the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the defense ministry and general staff in a manner that promotes effective civilian control.

■ Providing military education and training enhancements for Ukrainian officers and non-commissioned officers. This includes Ukrainian

participation in courses at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch,

Germany and at Harvard University’s “Generals’ Program.” This also

involves sending U.S. teams to Ukraine for short-term programs (e.g.,

on civil-military affairs, military medicine, and air defense) or bringing

Ukrainian military personnel to the United States (e.g., for familiarization with U.S. military education methods and technologies.)

■ Supporting Ukraine’s force contributions to SFOR and KFOR.

Through joint planning and the conduct of live exercises, we are helping Ukraine to learn U.S. and NATO-compatible procedures and skills

that will improve its capabilities to participate in such NATO-led crisis

response operations. Under our State Partnership Program, U.S.

National Guard units from California and Kansas conduct training

and exercises on civil-military emergency preparedness with Ukrainian

border troops, internal troops, and Ministry of Emergency units.

■ Maintaining a Military Liaison Team in Kiev, with representatives

from EUCOM and the National Guard State Partnership Program, to

facilitate continuous dialogue and a robust military to military

exchange program.

At the same time, the United States is working closely with

Ukraine, under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, to strengthen

cooperation in the area of non-proliferation. Our efforts include
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 37

improved training for border security and customs personnel and

assistance to redirect the expertise of Ukrainian weapon scientists to

work on peaceful scientific and engineering projects, such as improved

safety and security for civilian nuclear installations and managing

the environmental and health consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

Our bilateral efforts are complemented by those of

NATO, which reached agreement with Ukraine in 1997

on a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. The Charter

established a NATO-Ukraine Commission that meets

at least twice a year for consultations on subjects such

as peacekeeping, technical cooperation on armaments,

economic and environmental aspects of defense-related

activities, civil-military emergency planning, and

combating terrorism and drug trafficking. The NATOUkraine relationship has also been enhanced considerably by the establishment of a NATO Information and

Documentation Center as well as a Military Liaison

Office in Kiev.

We also seek to encourage closer multilateral engagement between Ukraine and its regional neighbors. For example, Poland

and Ukraine recently have formed a joint peacekeeping battalion, which

has been deployed to KFOR. This unprecedented arrangement between

a new NATO Ally and a Partner is a hopeful example of how the NATO

enlargement process and PfP can work hand in hand to improve security

and stability in Europe.

Ukraine, of course, must do its part. In particular, our efforts to assist

Ukraine in its desire to move closer to integration with the transatlantic

community will not succeed if its government is unable or unwilling to

implement needed defense reforms and, more broadly, vital economic

and political reforms to free up markets and combat corruption.

The Baltic States

The Baltic Sea region was spared the mass violence, repression, and

economic free-fall that afflicted parts of Southeastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union during the first decade of the post-Cold War era.

After some 70 years of occupation by a totalitarian system, Estonia,

Latvia and Lithuania reclaimed their cherished independence and set

their course squarely toward full integration in the political, economic,

and security institutions of the transatlantic community.

Paratroopers from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne

and the Ukraine’s 80th Air Mobile parachute from

a C-17 Globemaster III.
38 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Their progress to date has been very encouraging. Estonia, Latvia

and Lithuania have become solid democracies with promising marketoriented economies, which have made them viable candidates for

admission to the EU. In addition, they have demonstrated their commitment to promote stability and security in Northeast Europe and

beyond in several ways:

■ National efforts. A decade ago, all three countries were faced with

building a defense establishment literally from scratch. Each has made

important—albeit not identical— strides toward developing a

comprehensive national military strategy, a defense force structure

integrating regular and national guard/volunteer units, and training,

infrastructure, and procurement programs to support that structure.

Democratic and civilian control of the defense establishment is firmly

rooted in all three governments.

■ Regional cooperation. In 1994, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

formed the Baltic Battalion, a joint peacekeeping unit that has deployed

three light infantry company rotations to SFOR. The three countries

also have formed: a Baltic Naval Squadron, which enhances

minesweeping and coastal defense capabilities in the Baltic Sea; a Baltic

Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Center, with national

radars and a regional center that shares and manages data needed for

a comprehensive airspace picture; and the joint Baltic Defense College,

which offers combined command and general staff training.

■ PfP-related activities. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been

active participants in a wide range of PfP-related programs and exercises. As declared aspirants for NATO membership, they are fully

engaged in the MAP process as well.

In recognition of the United States’ special relationship with

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the four countries signed a Charter of

Partnership in 1998. The Charter reaffirms, inter alia: our common

commitments to a transatlantic community of free and democratic

nations; America’s “real, profound and enduring interest in the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” of the Baltic states;

and the Baltic states’ determination to promote the security, prosperity,

and stability of the region, including through close and cooperative

relations with their neighbors. The Charter also highlights our shared

goal of “the full integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into

European and transatlantic political, economic, security, and defense

institutions.”
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 39

Within the security and defense area, U.S. engagement with the

Baltic states will continue to be multidimensional:

■ Bilateral mechanisms. The DoD will work closely with each of the

states to implement the recommendations of our defense assessments.

This effort will be complemented by the Foreign Military Financing,

International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Sales

programs managed by the DoD, training and exercises conducted under

USEUCOM auspices, and annual high-level bilateral working groups

on defense issues.

■ Regional bodies. Consistent with the Charter of Partnership’s

emphasis on regional cooperation, the United States will continue to

work closely with Allies and Partners in the region to support Estonian,

Latvian, and Lithuanian defense efforts. The Baltic Security Assistance

Coordination Group (BALTSEA)—consisting of the 3 Baltic states, the

United States, and 13 other Allies and Partners— serves as the umbrella

forum to provide the Baltic states advice on defense plans, coordinate

efforts among security assistance providers, and assist in the implementation and oversight of the Baltic regional cooperative projects. Over

time, BALTSEA’s role in helping to guide the regional projects will

diminish as the Baltic states take on greater responsibility for their

day-to-day planning and operation.

■ NATO/PfP. Together with its Allies, the United States will

continue to encourage the Baltic states to take full advantage of PfP

activities and the MAP process. We will provide fair and straightforward feedback to the Baltic states on their MAP submissions,

noting their accomplishments as well as areas where improved efforts

will be necessary. As stated in the Charter, the United States supports

the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO, and our

efforts will be designed to help each of these countries become as strong

a candidate as possible.

It is difficult to predict when a consensus will be reached within the

Alliance to invite one or more of the Baltic States or other Partners to

join. This ultimately will depend upon their respective efforts to prepare for the burdens and responsibilities of membership. On one point

of particular importance to the Baltic states, the principles regarding

enlargement adopted at the Washington Summit and reflected in the

Charter of Partnership are clear: no non-NATO country will have a

veto over Alliance decisions.
40 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

and Other Contributors to Transatlantic Security

A number of international organizations contribute, in various ways,

to building a more stable security environment across the European

continent. As described earlier, the EU, for example, has provided the

lion’s share of international assistance resources devoted to the reconstruction and revitalization of war-ravaged economies in the Balkans.

The UN and several of its specialized agencies have played an important

role in organizing and delivering humanitarian relief and assistance

in civil administration to several Balkan countries.12 The intergovernmental Council of Europe promotes democratic governance, respect for

human rights and the rule of law—three essential pillars for enduring

security and stability— in its 41 member states, with a particular focus

on cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The OSCE, a body of 54 states stretching eastward from “Vancouver

to Vladivostok”, has a useful role in building security and stability in

the transatlantic community. In the past few years, the OSCE has fielded

dozens of advisor teams on short and longer-term missions across parts

of Europe and Central Asia to monitor and promote respect for human

rights and democratic processes (e.g., free and fair elections, media freedom, and the rule of law). OSCE representatives have facilitated the

resolution of issues between participating states, as was the case in the

successful closure and destruction of a major Russian radar station in

Skrunda, Latvia. In Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, OSCE representatives

have helped organize elections, mediated disputes among ethnic communities, and provided specialized assistance to improve local civilian

administrations and police forces—all of which rendered important

support to implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the securitybuilding efforts of SFOR and KFOR. The OSCE also provides a significant forum wherein its members can be called to account for

their failure to abide by international norms of behavior in the use of

military force.

In the years to come, the United States will continue to support

the development of the OSCE as an important and useful forum for

European security, based on the Charter on European Security agreed at

the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul. The Charter commits

members inter alia to establish Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT). Full implementation of the REACT initiative will

12 Non-UN bodies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (based in Geneva,

Switzerland) also have played an important role in humanitarian efforts in the Balkans.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 41

make the OSCE more operational by giving it the capability to develop

and deploy trained, professional civilian conflict prevention forces that

can respond to and contain threats to peace on short notice, before the

outbreak of large-scale violence and resultant mass refugee flows.

Arms Control

The United States and its NATO Allies will continue to have a shared

interest in arms control regimes that enhance security and stability at

the lowest possible level of forces consistent with preserving Alliance

capabilities for collective defense and other security-building missions.

Among the arms control regimes applicable specifically to European territory, none is more central than the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe (CFE). Signed in November 1990 by the 16 members

of NATO and 6 members of the Warsaw Pact, the CFE Treaty established equal East-West (i.e., “bloc-to-bloc”) limits on five key categories

of conventional armaments—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles,

artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. This approach

was appropriate at the time, since it eliminated the Warsaw Pact’s

longstanding and destabilizing numerical superiority in armor and

artillery. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and break-up of the

Soviet Union, those former Soviet states in the area covered by the

Treaty (Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals) acceded to the CFE Treaty,

which now covers 30 Treaty Parties.

The CFE Treaty’s accomplishments to date are remarkable. More

than 70,000 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment have been destroyed,

more than 3,500 intrusive on-site inspections have been conducted,

and those inspections—along with the CFE Treaty’s detailed reporting

requirements—have provided unprecedented transparency and predictability of military forces in Europe.

The CFE Adaptation Agreement signed in November 1999 updates

the original CFE Treaty. Once it has been ratified and enters into force,

the Adaptation Agreement will create a new, highly stable, transparent

set of limitations on conventional forces and bring the CFE Treaty into

line with today’s European security environment.

The CFE Final Act associated with the Adaptation Agreement

contains several significant political commitments by Treaty Parties,

including agreements on the complete withdrawal of Russian armed

forces from Moldova and partial withdrawal of Russian forces from

Georgia. The Final Act also reaffirms Russia’s commitment to bring

its equipment levels in the “flank” region, which includes the North
42 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Caucasus (and Chechnya), back down below the “flank” limits set forth

in the adapted Treaty. President Clinton has stated that he will only

submit the Adaptation Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent

to ratification when Russian forces have been reduced to these levels,

and Allies have taken similar positions.

In addition to the CFE Treaty, the United States will continue

actively to support full implementation of, and compliance with, other

arms control and Confidence Building Measures (CBM) regimes that

help to build security and stability in Europe. These include:

■ The Vienna Document, updated at the 1999 OSCE Summit

in Istanbul, which builds trust and enhances stability among OSCE

members through various measures, such as inspections of military

units, base visits, observation of exercises, and notifications of military

deployments.

■ The arms control and transparency provisions of the Dayton

Agreement, which draw upon CFE Treaty and Vienna Document principles and practices, and are aimed at stabilizing reductions of military

forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the FRY.

■ The Open Skies Treaty, which upon entry-into-force will allow

the United States, Canada, and 25 European signatories to conduct

reciprocal, unarmed observation flights over their entire territories to

gather information about each other’s military forces and activities.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 43

U.S. military forces continue to play critical roles in Europe. They are

one of the essential instruments by which the United States makes

manifest its continued commitment to the security of Europe. They

underwrite America’s national strategy of engagement and protect vital

interests and lines of communication in Europe and beyond. These

stationed forces—combined with frequent temporary deployments of

U.S.-based personnel for exercise, training, and crisis response purposes—ensure that the United States will always have the means to meet

its treaty commitments to NATO. They also underscore our national

will to deter or defeat aggression and prevail in crisis management

operations, since we will not place our service members in harm’s way

without giving them the means and authorities necessary to defend

themselves and accomplish their assigned mission.

In addition to their role as security guarantors within Europe, U.S.

military units based in Europe are often the first to react to emerging

crises in Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. In their dayto-day non-crisis operations, our stationed forces play a key role in

sustaining and improving bilateral security ties with, and the military

capabilities of, both Allies and Partners.

Shaping the Security Environment

USEUCOM plays a vital role in shaping the international security environment. Through thousands of multilateral and bilateral engagement

activities every year (ranging from field exercises and training missions

to military education courses at the Marshall Center), USEUCOM helps

Allies and Partners improve their military skills and capabilities. In

conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USEUCOM

has worked closely with several Partners in the region to conduct indepth Defense Assessments and Defense Planning Exchanges. These

assessments and exchanges assist the Partners in developing: a coherent

national defense strategy compatible with those of NATO members;

the force structure, personnel, and infrastructure systems necessary to

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE
44 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

support that strategy; and a realistic

time-phased plan to accomplish priority

objectives within an affordable defense

budget. Through the Foreign Military

Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Sales programs managed by DoD,

USEUCOM assists nations to meet

critical shortfalls in training and equipment, and to focus on and improve

the quality of life of their military personnel. Through its administration of

Warsaw Initiative Funds, USEUCOM

provides needed support to Partner

countries that otherwise would not be

able to participate in certain PfP activities and exercises.

USEUCOM’s engagement activities

remain an important element of our

long-term strategy to strengthen transatlantic security through building cooperative relationships between the United

States and European militaries.13 They

produce impressive dividends for a relatively modest investment in resources,

and contribute directly to our ability

to work effectively with Allies and Partners in military missions ranging from

humanitarian relief to crisis response

operations such as Kosovo.

The precise nature of these engagement activities, however, must

be sufficiently flexible to accommodate a diverse and evolving set of

requirements and opportunities. For example, by virtue of their greater

capabilities and continuing political, economic, or security ties to former

overseas possessions, certain Allies might be more willing than others

to cooperate with USEUCOM on Small Scale Contingency operations

United States European Command in brief

The U.S. military presence in Europe is organized under the unified combatant command

known as the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). Under the Commander in Chief,

U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), USEUCOM is responsible for planning and

conducting all military operations and military engagement activities within an “Area of

Responsibility” (AOR) that stretches from the North Cape of Norway to the Cape of

Good Hope in South Africa—an expanse of nearly 14 million square miles that includes

91 countries and territories and more than one billion people. Another 9 countries and

territories fall within USEUCOM’s “area of interest,” because of possible USEUCOM participation in operations, including engagement exercises, involving those countries.

Since 1995, roughly 100,000 military personnel have been assigned to USEUCOM. This total

necessarily has fluctuated as a result of operational requirements, including naval deployments. USEUCOM’s current forcesinclude:

n 65,000 U.S. Army personnel. Headquartered in Heidelberg, Germany, U.S. Army Europe

(USAREUR) commands the Army’s major heavy combatant force in Europe, which includes

6 tank and 6 mechanized infantry battalions, 2 aviation brigades, artillery and other support

units. In addition, USEUCOM maintains a quick reaction force, comprised of a light infantry

battalion and aviation assets, as part of the Southern European Task Force headquartered in

Vicenza, Italy.

n 34,000 U.S. Air Force personnel. Headquartered in Ramstein, Germany, U.S. Air Forces

Europe (USAFE) has operational control over air assets based principally in Germany,

the UK, Italy, and Turkey. These include combat aircraft for the full range of air-to-air and

air-to-ground missions, and “force multiplier” aircraft for air-to-air refueling, transport, and

command, control, and surveillance.

n 22,000 U.S. Navy personnel. Headquartered in London, U.S. Naval Forces Europe

(NAVEUR) commands more than 8,000 personnel stationed throughout the EUCOM

AOR, and an additional 14,000 personnel who are forward deployed on more than 30 ships

in the Mediterranean.

n 3900 U.S. Marine Corps personnel. Headquartered in Boeblingen, Germany, U.S.

Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) provides forces to various joint task forces in the

EUCOM AOR, including a Fleet Antiterrorism Support Team in Naples, Italy.

n 1400 U.S. Special Operations Forces. Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, U.S. Special

Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) commands units based in Germany, Spain, and

the UK, and provides USEUCOM with the capability to insert appropriate forces for any level

of conflict/operation.

13USEUCOM’s engagement activities can significantly affect countries outside its AOR.

For example, USEUCOM, working in coordination with Turkey (a NATO Ally), supports

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) engagement programs with states in the Central

Asia region. For other examples of U.S. involvement in multilateral engagement efforts,

see chapter V.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 45

A Day in the Life of USEUCOM

A unified combatant command, USEUCOM’s mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full scpecturm of miliary

operations unilaterally or in concert with the coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support NATO; to

promote regional stability; and advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

Two U.S. Air Force Fighting Falcons fly in formation during a mission

in support of NATO Operation Allied Force.

An Air Force security specialist watches the perimeter at Rinas Airport in

Tirane, Albania during NATO Operation Allied Force. Air Force personnel

provided airfield security for incoming aircraft and personnel deployed to

the airport in support of Task Force Hawk and Joint Task Force Shining Hope.

A soldier deployed to Kosovo as part of KFOR works to

sterilize and bandage a dog bite on a young boy’s leg in

the town of Vitina Kosovo.

The aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65) steams to the southern end of

its operating area in the Persian Gulf the morning of the first wave of air

strikes on Iraqi targets in support of Operation Desert Fox.

While on a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, an Air Force

service member prepares an unexploded BLU-97 bomblet

for demolition in a field outside of Urosevac, Kosovo.

■ Area of Responsibility

■ Area of Interest
46 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

within the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility outside Europe. Joint

training exercises will serve to improve our capability to work together

in such instances. They also will improve our Allies’ capabilities to act

without U.S. combat or combat-support assistance, but in ways that

still serve our common security interests. Similarly, some Partners

will progress faster than others in accomplishing needed military

reforms and restructuring. Our future engagement plans must be flexible enough to allow us to redirect resources, when necessary, to those

who need them the most and have demonstrated an ability to use

them most effectively.

Crisis Response and Smaller-Scale

Contingency (SSC) Operations

While maintaining its capability to fight and win a major conflict,

USEUCOM must simultaneously adapt its forces to respond to the

evolving security environment. In this regard, the future spectrum of

USEUCOM operations likely will be just as wide-ranging as that of

the past several years. For example, in its most significant combat

operation to date, USEUCOM provided over 25,000 U.S. military

personnel to support NATO’s Operation Allied Force (and related

humanitarian efforts in Albania and Macedonia) during the 1999

conflict with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo. As of

July 2000, USEUCOM provided some 5,700 of the 6,200 U.S. military

personnel in KFOR and another 155 of the 4,600 U.S. military personnel in the ongoing SFOR mission in Bosnia. USEUCOM personnel also

have played a key role in Operation Northern Watch, which enforces

(with the cooperation of the UK and Turkey) the Northern No-Fly Zone

over Iraq and monitors Iraqi compliance with applicable UN Security

Council resolutions. Lastly, in Africa and the Middle East, USEUCOM

personnel have been committed to a wide range of demanding and

time-sensitive SSCs, including Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

and humanitarian relief missions.14

The number of USEUCOM operations has increased by a factor of

20 over the past decade. An important goal of U.S. national security

strategy is to reduce the number and scope of such operational commitments through a combination of crisis prevention tools and long-term

diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian efforts. Hard experience and

prudence dictate, however, that USEUCOM remain prepared to respond

to such operational challenges when they do occur.

14For specific examples, see Sub-Saharan Africa section.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 47

At the same time, the anticipated continued demand for USEUCOM

involvement in a range of crisis response and SSC operations does not

mean that USEUCOM should develop two sets of forces—one to deal

with collective defense and another to deal other contingencies. Many

capabilities required for crisis response and SSC operations are similar

or identical to those required for fighting and winning major theater

wars. Moreover, because of the range and unpredictability of crisis

response and SSC operations, U.S. forces must be multi-mission capable.

This capability can be maintained only if our forces are equipped, trained,

and led with multiple mission responsibilities in mind. Finally, given its

unique and vital role in ensuring European defense and supporting U.S.

force projection in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, USEUCOM

must be capable of withdrawing from crisis response and SSC operations, reconstituting its forces, and then deploying to a major theater

war within required timelines.

Deterrence and Collective Defense

USEUCOM’s readiness and capabilities will allow it to respond more

quickly than U.S.-based conventional forces to any threat to, or from

within, the region—thereby demonstrating America’s commitment to

deter and, if necessary, defeat adversaries without ceding the loss of

any NATO territory. Through its sustained peacetime engagement and

regular exercises with Allied militaries, USEUCOM also will reinforce

deterrence by warning any potential aggressor to expect to be confronted

not just by the United States, but by the formidable additional capabilities of a large and effective Allied coalition.

U.S. conventional capabilities to deter and, if necessary, fight and

win a major conflict in the European region do not depend solely on

USEUCOM’s combat ready forces and their ability to fight in coalition

with our Allies. USEUCOM’s command, control, communications,

intelligence, and logistics infrastructure—including pre-positioned

equipment and stocks on land and ships—can be and have been used to

receive and deploy reinforcements rapidly from the United States. Our

strategy calls for preserving and enhancing, where necessary, our ability

to anticipate any crisis and to quickly reinforce and sustain additional

forces in Europe. USEUCOM’s infrastructure also provides significant

support to U.S. capabilities to fight and win a major theater war in

Southwest Asia—as demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm in 1990-91.

In addition to its formidable conventional capabilities to respond

to any aggression directed against NATO, the United States maintains
48 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

non-strategic nuclear weapons, under highly secure conditions, at

storage sites in several NATO countries. Since the end of the Cold

War, the United States, in consultation with its Allies, has dramatically

reduced the numbers and types of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons

in Europe. For example, all nuclear artillery and ground-launched

short-range nuclear missiles have been eliminated. Together with Allies,

we also have modified the readiness criteria for forces with a nuclear

role and terminated standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans.15

The fundamental purpose of U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe

is—and will remain—to preserve peace and prevent coercion. They provide an essential political and military link between the European and

North American members of the Alliance, as well as linkage to U.S.

strategic nuclear systems. They make the risks of aggression against

NATO incalculable and unacceptable in a way that conventional forces

alone cannot. The participation of non-nuclear Allies in NATO’s nuclear

posture demonstrates Alliance solidarity, determination, and willingness to share the risks and responsibilities of collective defense. The

circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be

contemplated by NATO are extremely remote, but prudent security

planning dictates that we maintain an appropriate mix of conventional

and nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future.

15The UK and France maintain independent nuclear forces. Like the United States, they have

reduced the size of their respective nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 49

Just as America and Europe cannot remain secure and prosperous

without one another, our transatlantic community cannot be secure

and prosperous in isolation from the rest of the world. Globalization

and the information revolution are proceeding at different speeds across

the globe, but certain overall trends are clear and irreversible. Economic

interdependence is growing, artificial barriers to the free dissemination

of knowledge are falling, and constraints on international relations once

imposed by time and distance are shrinking. These developments open

new opportunities for cooperation between the United States and

Europe to advance our shared interests beyond the Euro-Atlantic Community. But they also bring new risks and challenges to those interests

that no nation can meet alone.

This chapter outlines U.S. strategy to work with Europe on global

security issues. It also highlights specific regions where U.S.-European

cooperation could be strengthened.

Security Threats Posed by Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical (NBC) Weapons

NBC weapons and their delivery systems pose a major threat to international security. Over 20 countries—several of which are virtually on

Europe’s doorstep—already possess or are developing such weapons

and/or delivery systems. The continued proliferation and potential use

of NBC weapons directly threatens the United States, its Allies and

friends, and could destabilize other regions of critical importance to us.

American military superiority cannot shield us completely from this

threat. U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena will likely

encourage potential adversaries to resort to asymmetric means for

attacking U.S. forces and interests overseas and Americans at home.

U.S. defense planners must assume that use of NBC weapons to disrupt

U.S. operations and logistics is a likely condition of future warfare.

CHAPTER VI

IMPROVING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

TO FACE GLOBAL CHALLENGES
50 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

To address the NBC weapons threat, the

United States pursues a multi-dimensional strategy. Each component of our strategy depends,

to varying degrees, on close cooperation with

our transatlantic Allies and Partners, backed

up by active bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts. For example:

■ Export control regimes. The United States

has no monopoly on the development, application, and sale of “dual-use” equipment,

technologies, and technical information. These

are legitimate, even indispensable staples of

our domestic economy and of international trade

within and beyond the transatlantic community.

However, a large and growing range of “dualuse” goods and expertise also are actively sought by proliferators for

offensive weapons programs. Through international regimes such as

the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Nuclear

Suppliers Group, the United States works with a number of European

and other states to limit the transfer of sensitive “dual-use” items to

states posing a proliferation concern.

■ Arms control and international non-proliferation agreements.

The United States, its Allies and Partners (including Russia and Ukraine)

play vital roles in several legally binding multinational agreements aimed,

at least in part, at preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons. These

include the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1972 Biological

Weapons and Toxins Convention, and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Close cooperation among our Allies and Partners on a routine

basis is required to ensure effective implementation of and compliance

with existing agreements, and this will be the case as well for the 1994

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, once it enters into force.16 While our

primary objective is to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons and

their associated delivery systems, we recognize that prevention might

not succeed in every case.

■ Deterrence. The United States deters threats and potential threats

to its national security, including those from NBC weapons states, by

USS Normandy steams in the Atlantic while operating with the

USS George Washington battle group.

16Other examples of the need for close U.S.-European cooperation have involved the UNmandated effort, which has been frustrated by Iraqi intransigence, to eliminate Iraq’s WMD

capabilities and to prevent their re-emergence.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 51

maintaining powerful nuclear and conventional forces. Those who would

threaten America or its allies in Europe

or elsewhere with NBC weapons

should have no doubt that any attack

on us would meet an overwhelming

and devastating response. DoD also

has undertaken a comprehensive program to equip, train, and prepare U.S.

forces to prevail in conditions in which

an adversary threatens to use or actually uses these weapons against our populations, territories, or military

forces. This combination of offensive and defense capabilities both

strengthens deterrence and ensures that we will prevail should deterrence fail.

■ As previously discussed, our Allies contribute—for example,

through basing, infrastructure, and overflight and transit rights—to

U.S. capabilities to project our forces, if necessary, beyond Europe.

Moreover, the independent British and French nuclear forces play an

important role in deterring any attack on their respective vital national

interests. Our Allies and potential coalition partners also must be prepared to counter NBC threats or attacks to ensure that we maintain a

cohesive political and military front during a crisis.

Since 1994, NATO’s Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP)

has broadened a consensus within NATO about NBC threats, identified concrete capabilities needed to counter those threats, and injected

those requirements into NATO’s Force Planning process. The DGP is

focused on improvement of the concepts, doctrine, training, and exercises needed for counterproliferation operations. Force Goals (including key areas agreed under the DCI) emphasize, inter alia, capabilities

for biological and chemical weapons detection, identification, and

warning; individual and collective protection equipment; and NBChardened automated and deployable command, control, and communication systems.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, Alliance leaders took increased

note of the NBC threat and agreed, in response, that NATO capabilities, doctrine, training, and exercises must be improved to better deter

and defend against the use of such weapons. In concert with the DCI,

counterproliferation-related capabilities must be fielded and commensurate NBC defense doctrine, training, and exercises improved.

 We’ve made it very clear to Iraq and the rest of the

world that if you should ever even contemplate using weapons

of mass destruction—chemical, biological, any other type—against

our forces, we will deliver a response (that is) overwhelming

and devastating.”

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen

at the National Press Club in

March 1998

“
52 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

As a result of the Washington Summit WMD Initiative, several

complementary efforts are underway. NATO’s Senior Politico-Military

Group on Proliferation (SGP) has expanded its discussion of nonproliferation issues in support of the Alliance’s primary prevention goal.

At NATO headquarters, there is a newly established WMD Center,

comprised of political, defense, military, and intelligence experts, to

integrate and coordinate intra-Alliance work on a wide range of

NBC-related issues. Notably, work has begun on a data collection

that will serve as a common resource for Alliance decision-making

and will support cooperative means to respond to the use of NBC

weapons against civilians.

The United States continues to work to enhance cooperative

activities with our Allies, and we are extending these activities where

appropriate to Partner countries. We complement these activities

through bilateral programs of information exchange and technical

cooperation with Allies. As we do so, the United States is likely to

encounter differences with some nations over the assessment of capabilities and intentions of any given state of concern. We will do our best

to prevent such disagreements from blocking needed improvements

to Alliance capabilities.

Ballistic Missile Defenses

For America and Europe, the threat posed by ballistic missiles capable

of delivering NBC weapons from several states of concern is substantial and increasing.

■ Iran is buying and developing long-range missiles. It has flight

tested a 1,300-km Shahab-3 missile and, within a decade, could test

a missile capable of reaching all NATO territory and much of the

United States. Iran has chemical weapons, and is seeking nuclear and

biological capabilities.

■ Before the Gulf War, Iraq had loaded chemical and biological

weapons into missile warheads, and was close to achieving a nuclear

capability. UN sanctions have slowed, but probably not stopped, Iraq’s

efforts to produce NBC weapons and develop or buy long-range missiles to deliver them.

■ Libya has chemical weapons capabilities and is trying, as well,

to acquire long-range missiles.

■ North Korea is building and selling long-range missiles and

has assembled an arsenal with chemical, biological, and probably
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 53

nuclear capabilities. It has developed and may soon test the Taepo

Dong 2 missile that could reach U.S. territory.

We project that all of the above states will have missile forces in

the next 5 to 15 years that could be used to threaten the homelands of

all NATO members.

Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

As part of broader efforts to enhance the security of the United States,

Allied and coalition forces against ballistic missile strikes and to

complement our counterproliferation strategy, the United States is

pursuing opportunities for TMD cooperation with NATO Partners.

The objectives of United States cooperative efforts are to provide

effective missile defense for coalition forces in both Article 5 and

non-Article 5 operations against short to medium range missiles. In

its Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed the risk posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles, and the Alliance reached

general agreement on the framework for addressing these threats.

As part of NATO’s DCI, Allies agreed to develop Alliance forces that

can respond with active and passive defenses from NBC attack. Allies

further agreed that TMD is necessary for NATO’s deployed forces.

Several Allies currently field or will shortly acquire lower tier

TMD systems. For example, Germany and the Netherlands both field

the PAC-2 missile and naval forces of several Allies are considering

cooperation with the United States to field maritime missile defenses.

An important development in the operational TMD area was the creation in December 1999 of a trilateral U.S.-German-Dutch Extended

Air Defense Task Force.

The Alliance is undertaking a feasibility analysis for a layered

defense architecture. As the ballistic missile threat to Europe evolves

in the direction of longer ranges, the Alliance will need to consider

further measures of defense incorporating upper-tier TMD and/or a

defense against longer-range missiles.

On a separate but complementary track, ongoing U.S. TMD

cooperation with Russia is an excellent example of how cooperative

approaches to dealing with new regional security challenges of mutual

interest, such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles, can advance U.S.

and transatlantic security interests.
54 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

National Missile Defense (NMD)

Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea do not need long-range missiles to

intimidate their neighbors; they already have shorter-range missiles to

do so. Instead, they want long-range missiles to coerce and threaten

more distant countries in North America and Europe. They presumably

believe that even a small number of missiles, against which we have

no defense, could be enough to inhibit U.S. actions in support of our

Allies or coalition partners in a crisis.

Based on our assessment of these trends, the United States has

concluded that we must counter this threat before one of these states

attempts to blackmail the United States from protecting its interests,

including commitments to our Allies in Europe and elsewhere. Thus,

the United States is developing a NMD system that would protect all

50 states from a limited attack of a few to a few tens of warheads.

NATO’s Strategic Concept recognizes that “(t)he Alliance’s defense

posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of

(nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and their means of delivery

must continue to be improved, including through work on missiles defenses.” As the U.S. NMD effort progresses, we need to continue close

consultations with our Allies on relevant policy and technical issues.

Although Moscow argues to the contrary, the limited NMD system

the United States is developing would not threaten the Russian strategic

deterrent, which could overwhelm our defense even if Russian strategic

forces were much lower than levels foreseen under existing U.S.-Russian

strategic arms reduction agreements. Moreover, the U.S. proposal to

modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty include measures

of cooperation and transparency that would give Russia confidence that

the NMD system was not being expanded beyond its limited scale.

China has a more modest nuclear force than Russia, but has a multifaceted nuclear modernization program that predates NMD. Our NMD

system is not designed to neutralize China’s strategic capabilities.

NMD is a complement to our policies of deterrence and prevention,

not a substitute. We will continue to rely on diplomacy, arms control

and traditional deterrence—the credible threat of an overwhelming and

devastating response—to dissuade states of concern from attacking or

coercing their neighbors or anyone else.17 But today, when a state of

17Similarly, the independent British and French nuclear deterrents would not be undermined

by the NMD capabilities allowed under the U.S. proposal to modify the ABM Treaty.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 55

concern might attempt to coerce the United States or it Allies, it is not

prudent to rely exclusively on deterrence by overwhelming response,

especially when we have the option of a limited, but effective defense.

The NMD we envisage would reinforce the credibility of U.S. security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole. Europe would

not be more secure if the United States were less secure from a missile

attack by a state of concern. An America that is less vulnerable to ballistic missile attack is more likely to defend Europe and common Western

security interests than an America that is more vulnerable.

As consultations proceed with our Allies on NMD, we realize that

Allies will continue to consider the appropriate role of missile defenses

in their respective national security strategies. In keeping with the fundamental principle of the Alliance that the security of its members is

indivisible, the United States is open to discussing possible cooperation

with Allies on longer-range ballistic missile defense, just as we have with

our discussions and cooperation in the area of TMD. As President Clinton

said in May 2000, “every country that is part of a responsible international arms control and nonproliferation regime should have the

benefit of this protection.”

In September 2000, President Clinton announced that while NMD

was sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued development and testing, there was not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move

forward with deployment. In making this decision, he considered the

threat, the cost, technical feasibility and the impact on our national

security of proceeding with NMD. The President’s decision will provide

flexibility to a new administration and will preserve the option to

deploy a national missile defense system in the 2006-2007 time frame.

“Non-Traditional” Transnational Threats

Terrorism, international crime, and illegal trade in fissile materials and

other dangerous substances are prime examples of “non-traditional”

transnational threats to the security of the transatlantic community and

its citizens. These threats come in many forms. Terrorist groups might

have nationalist, ethnic, or religious motivations—or a combination

of these. Their means of terror range from conventional firearms and

explosives to chemical, biological, and possibly radiological weapons,

to “cyber” attacks on state- or privately-run information systems.

Transnational criminal organizations based on trafficking in drugs

and human beings are growing more diversified and sophisticated. The
56 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

lawless groups involved in these activities have no hesitation in taking

major steps to disrupt existing political and economic structures for their

own gain. In the end, their use of corruption and extortion undermines

the integrity and effectiveness of governments, particularly in fragile

democracies. Most victims of terrorism and transnational criminal

organizations are civilians, but military and government personnel also

are targets of deadly attack.

The United States, its Allies and Partners share important security

interests in cooperating in the fight against terrorism and international

crime in all its forms. Americans and Europeans alike are the targets—

and victims—of these scourges. No government within the transatlantic

community can properly defend and protect its citizens, whether at home

or abroad, if those who would prey upon them enjoy safe havens or

even protection from states beyond our common borders.

While our first line of defense relies heavily on civilian authorities—

including intelligence agencies, national and local law enforcement, and

civilian emergency response—military forces have unique capabilities

to defend against and, if necessary, respond to attacks on our national

interests by terrorists or others. Even so, military forces and infrastructure—and particularly deployed U.S. and Allied forces—can often

become targets of terrorist attack, the most trenchant example being

the attack against the USS Cole in Yemen. We will continue to work

closely with our Allies and Partners to ensure that force protection

remains a priority.

At the strategic level, we seek to ensure that the emerging threat

of NBC terrorism and the proliferation of NBC materials and expertise

are vigorously addressed. The 1999 Washington Summit provided an

opportunity for NATO to set in motion concrete steps to strengthen its

political will and military capabilities to deal with the threat of modern

terrorism and NBC weapons.

NATO’s Strategic Concept acknowledged the threat such weapons

pose to Allied territory and citizens and launched an effort, under the

WMD Initiative, to strengthen common understanding about NBC

issues, improve intelligence and information sharing, and integrate

political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to NBC

proliferation. Although the United States remains a target for terrorism,

we will not be intimidated, and we will not withdraw from our role in

Europe or elsewhere in the world. We are upgrading security at home

and overseas, at diplomatic posts and military installations worldwide.

We remain steadfast in our determination to protect American citizens

and diplomatic and military personnel, and we will continue to use all
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 57

necessary means to counter terrorism and hold terrorists accountable

for their actions.

Building Security in Regions Beyond Europe

In contrast with the United States, European states—with a few notable

exceptions—have not maintained military forces or engaged in largescale military actions outside Europe since the end of World War II.18

Instead, European states, acting individually or within the EU, have concentrated almost exclusively on political and economic levers to advance

their interests in regions outside Europe. The most notable exception in

recent years has been the coalition effort that was assembled and, to a

considerable degree, has been sustained in response to Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait in 1990.

Should this remain true indefinitely? The EU, after all, represents

a powerful economic force and increasingly seeks to take joint action

in foreign and security affairs. The United States, for its part, has

neither the desire nor the capability to engage its military in every crisis

response or humanitarian relief contingency that might arise anywhere in the world. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to find better

ways for the American and European pillars of the transatlantic

community to work together to strengthen security and stability in

regions outside Europe.

Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Mediterranean Littoral

The United States and Europe share a number of common long-term

interests in these strategic areas. These include maintaining uninterrupted access to regional energy resources, stemming the development and

proliferation of NBC weapons, ensuring the success of the Middle East

Peace Process (MEPP), and combating terrorism. In practice, the United

States has worked with several European states to advance our common

interests. Examples of this include: our multilateral efforts during the

1980s to end the Lebanese civil war; the 1990-91 international coalition

to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the subsequent establishment of

UN sanctions intended to destroy Iraq’s NBC capabilities and prevent

their reconstitution; and arranging, at critical times, sensitive negotiations to advance a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Military cooperation in pursuit of stability in the Gulf has continued since the liberation of Kuwait. For example, at least ten NATO

French Minister of Defense

Alain Richard responds to a

question during a joint press

briefing with Secretary Cohen.

18France and the UK are the principal exceptions.
58 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

countries have participated in maritime interception operations for

sanctions enforcement since then, and the UK and France have participated with the United States in patrolling the no-fly zones over Iraq in

support of UN resolutions. Turkish support was indispensable to preventing a humanitarian disaster in northern Iraq in the wake of the

Baghdad regime’s repression of the people of the area. European states

have also taken an active part in the multinational BRIGHT STAR

exercise program conducted biennially with Egypt.

We have had differences with some of our Allies over specific aspects

of each of these and other regional issues. In some cases, these reflect

differences in our respective historical and cultural ties to countries in

the region and our assessments of those countries’ capabilities and intentions. In other cases, differing economic interests (real or perceived)

can influence debates over appropriate policies to address regional

problems. Indeed, in the security sphere, we often find our cooperation

hampered by intense competition for sales of defense equipment, sometimes to the detriment of regional interoperability.

Although it is unrealistic to expect that the United States and its

European Allies will adopt identical policies toward this region anytime

soon, we should seek to improve our cooperation and develop complementary efforts in key areas to meet common long-term interests.

Specifically, we need to work in concert—through export controls,

diplomatic and economic pressures, and (if necessary) the appropriate

use of military force—to prevent the proliferation of NBC capabilities

throughout the region. In the near term, these capabilities will pose a

greater direct threat to European territory than to our own.

U.S.-European cooperation also is essential to build stronger support within the region for the MEPP. European states can play an

important role in encouraging both sides to take the difficult but necessary steps to a just and lasting peace. Together, we should look for ways

to apply our collective experience to lessen tensions, improve confidence,

and build positive security relations among all parties in the Middle

East. OSCE, CFE, and PfP all have elements that could serve as models

for post-MEPP relations in the Middle East. In addition, the military

and civilian crisis response capabilities that the EU seeks to build through

ESDP could play a role in the implementation of eventual peace settlements between Israel and the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon.

We also need to seek ways to build bridges between the greater

Middle East and the Euro-Atlantic Community. One forum for this

already exists in the form of NATO’s “Mediterranean Dialogue,”

encompassing Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco,
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 59

and Tunisia. To date, however, the press of other business in the Alliance has not allowed the Dialogue to receive the attention it requires.

Both the Dialogue and less formal opportunities to link these two vital

regions require increased effort.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is another region where the United States and

Europe have a broad, common interest in promoting a stable security

environment. Without basic security, several countries in the region will

be unable to sustain their positive movement toward democratic government, respect for human rights, and economic development based

on free markets. Meanwhile, countries still in the grip of authoritarian

rule or mired in civil war and economic collapse will lose any hope of

modernization or recovery. The plagues of environmental degradation,

drug trafficking, support for international terrorism, highly infectious diseases such as HIV, and large-scale humanitarian disasters will

intensify and expand across Africa. For many reasons—historical and

cultural ties, the importance of African natural resources, humanitarian

and national security concerns—the transatlantic community cannot

turn its back on this region.

In fact, U.S. military forces have had to deploy to Sub-Saharan

Africa several times in recent years. For example, we have supplied

critical logistical support for humanitarian relief operations in

Mozambique; conducted noncombatant evacuation or security

operations for U.S. embassies in the Democratic Republic of Congo,

Sierra Leone, and Liberia; and provided security, medical support and

investigation services in Kenya and Tanzania after terrorists struck the

U.S. embassies in 1998. Similarly, several European countries have

deployed military forces, either on a national basis or within the context

of UN-mandated operations, to safeguard their citizens, stabilize fragile

democratic governments, or respond to humanitarian crises.

Nevertheless, the ever-increasing demands on U.S. military forces

around the globe, combined with Europe’s preoccupation with the

situation in the Balkans, likely will continue to limit our respective

operational capacities and domestic political support for military

deployments to Sub-Saharan Africa. The advantages of improved

cooperation among the United States, Europe, and the sub-Saharan

governments willing to work with us should be clear to all. We will

continue to work closely with several Allies on specific projects, training

programs, and exercises aimed at contributing more efficiently to building African capabilities to stabilize their security environment.
60 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

Asia

The United States and Europe share a strong interest in promoting

stability and security in Asia. Both have extensive trade and investment ties with this enormous and dynamic region, and are aiming to

strengthen their presence in Asian markets. The EU, for example, is the

third largest trading partner—after Japan and the United States—of

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Like the United

States, the EU provides extensive economic assistance, through both

governments and non-governmental organizations, to the region’s less

developed members. Both the United States and EU seek to promote

respect for human rights in Asia and advocate the gradual integration

of China into the world economy together with the promotion of

democracy and the rule of law. Both are concerned by the proliferation of NBC capabilities in and emanating from the region.

Unlike the United States, which maintains approximately 100,000

military personnel in the Asian-Pacific region and strong defense and

military links to key countries such as Japan and the Republic of Korea,

the EU has not been directly involved in security arrangements in

Asia. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated that it can play a helpful role in

improving the security environment. In the critical matter of relieving

tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the EU contributes about $15 million

annually to the Korea Energy Development Organization to buy heavy

fuel oil for North Korea in support of international efforts to discourage

that country’s development of nuclear weapons. The EU also has joined

ASEAN and the United States in region-wide discussions to promote

mutual understanding, transparency, and trust. In addition, several

European countries have contributed military personnel to the UN-led

peacekeeping operation in East Timor.

The United States would welcome a growing EU dialogue with

Asian countries on security-related issues, including the need to prevent

NBC proliferation, control the sale of ballistic missile technologies, and

resolve outstanding territorial issues by peaceful means. U.S. cooperation with European nations during the East Timor crisis, when the United

States provided logistical and other support for the deployment of European peacekeepers, is another example of how we can work

productively together to respond to regional crises outside Europe. In

addition, it is useful to note that some PfP nations are located in Central

Asia, and their capitals are closer to the Pacific than to the Atlantic.

Thus transatlantic cooperation can have a direct impact on essentially

Asian nations.
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 61

The success of U.S. strategy for strengthening transatlantic security

will depend in large measure on how we approach relations with

our NATO Allies and Partners. Getting these relations right has not

always been an easy task. Even during the height of the Cold War in

the 1950s and 1960s, NATO was at the center of heated—and sometimes very public—debates over military strategy, command structure,

and “burdensharing.”

One explanation for this has been well understood since the founding of the Alliance: NATO’s unity ultimately rests on the enlightened

self-interest of each participating nation, but sovereign and democratic states do not necessarily have identical interests in every security

domain. Differences in geography, history, political culture and, of course,

in military capabilities still count—and they always will. The United

States, which has contributed far more resources and capabilities to

NATO than any other single Ally, cannot be expected to act as if these

differences did not exist and did not influence our policies. Nor can we

expect our Allies to match our military power

in every category or to act contrary to their

perceived interests. The Alliance has proved

so strong precisely because its members have

not allowed their differences ever to rival,

in scope or in depth, their shared interests.

A second explanation is less self-evident:

in far too many instances, the substance of

our transatlantic cooperation is overshadowed or even impeded by differences in tone.

Americans, for example, frequently refer to

their “leadership” of the Alliance. For many

Americans, this concept is essentially an

accurate reflection of objective facts—in

particular, the real disparities in military

capabilities between the United States and

CONCLUSIONS

LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Defense officials and members of Congress surround President

Clinton as he signs the National Defense Authorization Act FY 2000.
62 S T R E N G T H E N I N G T R A N S A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y

our Allies. But for many Europeans, who in recent years have made

important commitments on the ground to crisis response operations

in the Balkans and have every reason to be proud of their strong, expanding economic and political links (as well as their rich cultures),

“American leadership” has come to be understood, at best, as a somewhat outdated notion from the Cold War era or, at worst, a grating

expression of a “dominating” or “overbearing” superpower.

What can or should be done to address this situation?

First, we must continue to set an example, by word and by deed,

that convinces others to join efforts described in previous chapters to

strengthen transatlantic security. If America does not demonstrate the

political will and devote the resources necessary to sustain these

efforts, it will be harder for Allies and Partners to do so.

Second, the watchwords of transatlantic security relations must

remain “inclusion” and “cooperation,” not “competition” or “confrontation.” Historically, there have been very few instances when the

United States has been at odds with Europe as a whole over a significant

security policy issue. More often, we have disagreed with certain Allies

or Partners over aspects of a particular policy and received either full

or qualified support from others. In short, there are no grounds for

portraying U.S.-European relations as an “us against them” dynamic.

Third, we must anticipate that as NATO and the EU enlarge, their

internal decision-making processes will become more complex and

possibly slower. While this should not be a problem in normal circumstances, it cannot be allowed to lead to paralysis in a crisis. We will

work with all our Allies—and, where appropriate, Partners—to ensure

that they have the fullest possible access to information necessary to

participate meaningfully in transatlantic security deliberations and to

take effective and timely collective action. This will require more, not

less, contact between U.S. officials and their counterparts in national

capitals as well as in NATO and EU headquarters in Brussels. In this

context, and without prejudice to our special ties to larger Allies, we

should not forget that smaller Allies frequently have made invaluable

contributions to the Alliance. Indeed, several of these smaller Allies are

pursuing joint and multilateral defense cooperation and acquisition programs that stand to increase their relative weight within the Alliance—

a development that we will recognize and encourage.

Fourth, we must be straightforward in acknowledging that the

United States—like every other country—reserves a right to act alone,

or within a coalition of the willing, when our vital interests are at stake
A U. S. S T R A T E G Y F O R T H E 2 1 S T C E N T U R Y 63

and an Alliance-wide consensus for action simply does not exist.

We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when

necessary, using our military might unilaterally. In practice, however,

this has occurred very rarely. We see a broad and growing spectrum of

issues that are important to our security and where close cooperation

with our Allies and Partners is a requirement—not an option. While

some foreign policy commentators on both sides of the Atlantic seem

quick to level charges of American “unilateralist” or “isolationist”

tendencies, the facts almost never support such claims—and we should

not be reluctant to point this out.

Finally, while recognizing that America’s

unique political, economic, and military

strengths will continue to ensure a preponderant role for our country within the transatlantic community—and most Europeans

accept and welcome this fact—we need to

be prepared to share responsibility and leadership. Our self-interest will not be served

by rhetoric or actions that encourage some

Europeans to abdicate their security responsibilities and encourage others to affirm their

“European identity” by weakening transatlantic bonds. Indeed, we seek to encourage

greater leadership by Allies in areas—such

as improvements in defense capabilities,

outreach to Partners, and support for democratic values beyond the

transatlantic community—that reinforce our common security.

In the 21st century, America can best achieve its long-term goals

by doing more of what it does so well: acting resolutely—and always

in a spirit of true partnership—as a catalyst, builder, symbol and

defender of an ever-growing coalition of democratic, prosperous, and

secure Euro-Atlantic states and peoples.

An EA-6B Prowler is prepared for launch off the USS Enterprise

in the Adriatic Sea.