1

Filed 1/18/24 Ilumin v. Leach CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SEAN ILUMIN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

RUSSEL G. LEACH et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

PATRICK SULLIVAN et al.,

 Defendants.

 A167483

 (City and County of San Francisco

 Super. Ct. No. CGC-19-576664)

Three tenants sued their former landlords asserting a single cause of 

action for declaratory relief that alleges, among other theories, that two 

provisions contained in the standard form of rental agreement they signed 

are invalid and unenforceable: a mediation clause and a $1,000 limitation on 

otherwise recoverable attorney fees. The tenants allege they have 

meritorious damages claims against their landlords arising from 

uninhabitable conditions that culminated with their allegedly wrongful 

eviction but that these lease provisions have impeded their ability to hire 

counsel to pursue their claims. They seek a declaratory judgment that those

contractual provisions are invalid and unenforceable. 
2

The trial court sustained the landlords’ demurrer without leave to 

amend on the ground that the tenants have failed to state a cognizable claim 

for declaratory relief. We reverse. 

BACKGROUND

A.

Our recitation of the facts is based upon the standard governing our 

review of an order sustaining a demurrer, which requires us to “ ‘accept as 

true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially 

noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” 

(290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2022) 

86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 (290 Division (EAT)).) In so doing, we must “ ‘give 

the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts 

in their context.’ ” (Ibid.)

B.

In February 2018, Sean Ilumin, Tarika Hamilton and Roberto Espinoza 

(“tenants”) entered into a written lease to rent a residence located in San 

Francisco owned by Russell and Mary Leach (“landlords”), by and through 

the Leaches’ property manager, Patrick Sullivan. 

The lease is a pre-printed standard form promulgated by the California 

Association of Realtors. It includes a mandatory mediation provision which, 

in relevant part, requires the parties to “mediate any dispute or claim arising 

between them out of this Agreement . . . before resorting to court action,” and 

requires “mediation fees, if any, to be divided equally among the parties 

involved.” The mediation provision also states that “If, for any dispute or 

claim to which this paragraph applies, any party commences an action 

without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, or refuses 

to mediate after a request has been made, then than party shall not be 
3

entitled to recover attorney fees, even if they would otherwise be available to 

that party in such action.” 

The lease also contains an attorney fee clause. It states: “In any action 

or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between 

Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs, 

collectively not to exceed $1,000 (or _________), except as provided in 

paragraph 42A [governing mediation].” 

In November, about nine months into the lease term, the rental 

property experienced severe flooding. This precipitated months of disputes 

between the tenants and landlords over property damage, continued leaks, 

the adequacy of the landlords’ attempts to repair and remediate the situation, 

rent reduction issues and concerns over habitability of the premises. The 

local department of building inspection issued numerous notices of violation 

and none were abated, and no leaks were ever fixed. In February 2019, nine 

days after a building inspector confirmed the existence of continued leaking 

after a heavy rainstorm, the landlords’ attorney notified the tenants their 

lease would expire at the end of the month, giving the landlords the right to 

recover possession. Believing it was no longer safe to live there and that they 

had been constructively evicted, the tenants surrendered possession. 

The tenants believe their landlords’ actions have caused them 

significant damage, both economic and non-economic, and that they have 

numerous viable legal claims against their landlords including torts, 

statutory violations and violations of local ordinances. Their landlords have

demanded the tenants mediate and pay one half of the mediation costs. 

The tenants want to file suit to pursue their claims but are prevented 

from doing so because of the mediation and attorney fee clauses, both of 

which make it unaffordable for them to pursue their claims. Reasonably 
4

construed, their complaint alleges they can’t afford to split the fees of 

mediation. And their landlords are asserting that the attorney fee clause 

limits all potentially recoverable attorney fees to $1,000. 

The tenants filed suit alleging a single cause of action for declaratory 

relief, in a 31-page verified complaint, based on allegations concerning their 

inability to pursue relief against their landlord on the merits due to the terms 

of the written lease. They seek a declaration that: (1) the lease is void due to 

fraud; (2) the $1,000 cap on recoverable attorney fees applies only to breach of 

contract claims and not attorney fees recoverable by statute; (3) the $1,000 

cap on recoverable attorney fees is unconscionable; (4) the provision waiving 

recoverable attorney fees for refusal to mediate is void under Civil Code 

section 1717; and (5) the filing of their declaratory relief complaint does not 

breach the mediation clause or, alternatively, even if it does, they have not 

waived their right to recover attorney fees. 

The landlords demurred on the ground the complaint fails to state a 

cause of action, for multiple reasons. Among others, they asserted that both 

the mediation clause and the $1,000 cap on attorney fees are valid and 

enforceable, the lease is not unconscionable, and declaratory relief was not an 

appropriate remedy. The trial court asked for, and received, supplemental 

briefing on “contractual limitations on [a party’s] ability to recover attorney’s 

fees authorized by statutes.” In supplemental briefing, the tenants asserted 

that that statutory attorney fees under two tenant protection statutes they 

allege were violated, Civil Code sections 1942.4 and 1942.5, are not waivable 

by private agreement. 

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The 

sole focus of the hearing was the availability of declaratory relief, with the 

court expressing the view the tenants were improperly asking for an advisory 
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opinion and “the court’s not going to do that in this instance.” The court 

remarked that “after the case is over, that’s when we usually . . . make 

determinations regarding attorney’s fees. . . . I’ve had thousands of 

attorney’s fees motions over the last 40 years. I have. And it’s when 

something is final.” Its written order cites section 1061 of the Code of Civil

Procedure as the basis for its ruling. That statute states: “The court may 

refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in any case where its 

declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all 

the circumstances.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.)

The tenants then appealed the order sustaining the demurrer; we 

directed them to procure an appealable judgment of dismissal; and they did 

so. We construe the appeal as having been timely taken from the 

subsequently entered judgment. (See K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

(2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 883-883; Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co. (2002) 

100 Cal.App.4th 736, 741, fn. 2.)

DISCUSSION

The tenants’ briefing contains many arguments that are difficult to 

understand, many that are not accompanied by a required argument 

heading, and many that are simply too undeveloped for us to consider. For 

example, captioned under the first argument heading “California Law 

Recognizes That the Mere Possibility of Winning Attorney’s Fees Is A 

Condition to Exercising the Right to Trial,” are four pages of discussion of 

general legal principles concerning various subjects with no analysis of how 

any of the principles apply here, and a concluding assertion that the trial 

court failed to accept as true the tenants’ allegations that they couldn’t afford 

to file suit because of the contractual restriction on recoverable attorney fees. 

Another argument, captioned under a heading “The Court Ignored Civil Code 
6

Section 1558,” is a one-half-page argument asserting the entire lease is void 

because it does not identify an existing landlord; the argument is supported 

by no factual analysis and no legal authority other than the statutory text1

(see Civ. Code, § 1558 [“It is essential to the validity of a contract, not only 

that the parties should exist, but that it should be possible to identify 

them”]). That section then devolves into one-and-a-half pages of discussion of 

principles governing abuse of discretion review and stray points concerning 

the availability declaratory relief. The brief contains scattershot references 

to violations of the right to a jury trial and many other arguments taking 

issue with the trial court’s reasoning. 

We disregard all such contentions. “ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an 

appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument 

supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. 

v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) “Mere 

suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than 

general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate 

review.” (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage 

Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) Furthermore, each 

point raised must be identified by an argument heading so that we are 

“ ‘ “advised, as [we] read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of 

being compelled to extricate it from the mass.” ’ ” (United Grand, at p. 153.) 

Further, the trial court’s reasoning is irrelevant. “ ‘ “To justify a reversal, it 

1 The lease identifies “Liberty Realty Property Management” as the 

landlord. The complaint alleges that entity is a fictitious entity registered by 

defendant Patrick Sullivan whom the complaint alleges is the real estate 

broker “who served as a manager of the Property for the benefit of defendants 

R[ussell] Leach and M[ary] Leach,” the owners of the property. 
7

is incumbent upon the appellant to show an erroneous ruling, and not merely 

bad reasoning or mistaken views of the law.” ’ ” (Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 

83 Cal.App.5th 640, 654.) We are exercising our discretion to consider 

arguments for which we can discern a coherent legal or factual basis in the 

briefs, but “[a]ny arguments not discussed in this opinion are deemed 

forfeited.” (United Grand, at p. 153.)

With that in mind, we understand the tenants to contend the trial court 

erred in sustaining the demurrer for two reasons: (1) the mediation clause 

and the attorney fees provisions violate public policy, and thus are void, to 

the extent they require mediation before filing suit and also waive or limit 

the amount of attorney fees recoverable under Civil Code sections 1942.4 and 

1942.5; and (2) the court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer on 

the ground that tenants were merely seeking an advisory opinion and 

declaratory relief was not an appropriate remedy. We conclude the court 

abused its discretion because tenants’ uncertainty about whether the 

mediation provision and attorney fee limitations are valid prevented them 

from filing a lawsuit on the merits, and thus there is an actual controversy 

for which it is necessary and proper to obtain a declaration of their rights.

I.

Standard of Review

“We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo and exercise our 

independent judgment as to whether the complaint states a cause of action as 

a matter of law.” (290 Division (EAT), supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.) As 

previously noted, we accept as true all properly pleaded facts. (Ibid.) 

Furthermore, “ ‘[w]hen a demurrer is sustained without leave to 

amend, it is the duty of the reviewing court to decide whether there is a 

reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. If it can, 
8

the trial court abused its discretion and we must reverse. If it cannot be 

reasonably cured, there has been no abuse of discretion. [Citation.] It is the 

plaintiff's burden to show the reviewing court how the complaint can be 

amended to state a cause of action.’ ” (290 Division (EAT), supra, 

86 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.)

A demurrer does not lie to challenge a cause of action that is only 

partially defective; the appropriate vehicle for challenging the legal 

sufficiency of a portion of a cause of action is a motion to strike. (See Moran 

v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 166, 174.) If 

any of the factual allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action, the 

demurrer should be overruled. (See, e.g., Olson v. Hornbrook Community 

Services Dist. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 522, fn. 9; accord, Selby Realty Co. 

v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 123 [Noting “well accepted 

principle that against a general demurrer the only requirement is that upon 

a consideration of all the facts stated it must appear plaintiff is entitled to 

some relief, notwithstanding that the facts may be inartfully stated, or may 

be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of 

action”].)

“In ruling on a demurrer to a complaint for declaratory relief, doubts 

regarding the propriety of a declaratory judgment are generally resolved in 

favor of the plaintiff.” (Widders v. Furchtenicht (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 769,

776.)

II.

Declaratory Relief

“ ‘ “ ‘The fundamental basis of declaratory relief is the existence of an 

actual, present controversy over a proper subject.’ ” ’ ” (In re Tobacco Cases II

(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779, 804.) In relevant part, Code of Civil Procedure 
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section 1060 states: “Any person interested . . . under a contract, or who 

desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another . . . 

may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of 

the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the 

superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the 

premises, including a determination of any question of construction or 

validity arising under the instrument or contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060, 

italics added.) It further states that “He or she may ask for a declaration of 

rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a 

binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is 

or could be claimed at the time. . . . The declaration may be had before there 

has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is 

sought.” (Ibid.) “Whether a claim presents an ‘actual controversy’ within the 

meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 is a question of law that we 

review de novo.” (Envt’l Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra

(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 885.) “[A] ‘complaint for declaratory relief is 

legally sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual 

controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.’ ” (In re 

Tobacco Cases II, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.)

Even if a complaint’s allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action 

for declaratory relief, however, “[d]eclaratory relief . . . may be refused in the 

discretion of the trial court” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1061, as 

the trial court did here. (Moss v. Moss (1942) 20 Cal.2d 640, 642 (Moss).) As 

noted, it states: “The court may refuse to exercise the power granted by this 

chapter in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or 

proper at the time under all the circumstances.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061, 

italics added.) Nevertheless, “the mere circumstance that another remedy is 
10

available is an insufficient ground for refusing declaratory relief, and doubts 

regarding the propriety of an action for declaratory relief pursuant to Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1060 generally are resolved in favor of granting 

relief.” (Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 433.)

The tenants’ appellate briefing conflates the legal elements for securing 

declaratory relief (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060) with the court’s discretion to 

withhold it (id., § 1061), but they address both points in substance and so will 

we. 

Here, the initial question properly framed is whether the complaint 

sufficiently alleges the existence of an “actual controversy.” (See Moss, supra, 

20 Cal.2d at pp. 641–642; Envt’l Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of 

Sierra, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.) 

The tenants argue that it does. They argue they are not seeking an 

advisory opinion but, rather, there is an actual controversy concerning the 

validity of the contract and the enforceability of various of its provisions. 

They allege they were wrongfully evicted and suffered other wrongs, and yet 

a dispute about the validity of the lease’s pre-dispute mediation clause and 

limitation on attorney fees have prevented them from bringing suit. We 

agree.

“ ‘The “actual controversy” referred to in this statute is one which 

admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of 

judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a 

particular or hypothetical state of facts.’ ” (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton

(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 360.) There is no question that standard is met 

where parties disagree about the validity of contractual pre-dispute 

resolution rights or remedies. (See Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 

45 Cal.4th 634, 648 (Sprint) [holding “there is no doubt that a present 
11

controversy exists” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 where 

plaintiffs and cellular service provider disputed whether pre-dispute 

arbitration provision and other remedial provisions of consumer cellular 

service contract were illegal and unenforceable].)

Here, there is an actual controversy regarding the validity of the lease 

as a whole and the interpretation and enforceability of two of its provisions, 

all of which bear on the plaintiffs’ present ability to seek judicial redress for 

alleged wrongs committed by their landlords during the period of their 

tenancy. They have damages claims they wish to pursue in court—including 

statutory claims that would otherwise allow for the recovery of attorney fees 

(see Civ. Code, §§ 1942.4, subd. (b)(2), 1942.5, subd. (i))— but the landlords 

assert the mediation clause is enforceable and applies to the dispute, and 

that its breach will result in waiver of all potentially recoverable attorney 

fees, and that attorney fees are in any case limited to $1,000. The tenants, on 

the other hand, contend the mediation clause as a whole is not enforceable, 

but that even if is, the $1,000 fee limitation is not enforceable. That is an 

actual controversy. (See Sprint, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 648.)

The landlords argue the tenants did not plead a cause of action alleging 

the landlords violated Civil Code sections 1942.4 or 1942.5, which shows they 

were seeking only an advisory opinion because it was “premature for the trial 

court to rule on [their] ability to recover attorneys’ fees on causes of action 

which had not been pleaded.” That is an overly cramped reading of the 

complaint which alleges, among other facts, that “Defendants are liable to the 

Plaintiffs for numerous torts, including, but not limited to: (1) Collection of 

Rent for Untenantable Dwelling, Civil Code §§ 1941 and 1942.4; [and] (2) 

Retaliation in violation of Civil Code § 1942.5.” The landlords cite no 

authority suggesting that the existence of an actual controversy was required 
12

to be alleged with greater specificity. Nor do the landlords proffer any other 

reason there is no “actual controversy” under the circumstances alleged. We 

conclude the tenants have adequately alleged the existence of numerous 

actual controversies under the lease.

This brings us to whether the court abused its discretion in sustaining 

the demurrer on the ground declaratory relief is not “necessary or proper.” 

(Code of Civ. Proc., § 1061.) Here again, the tenants’ briefing on this point is 

not well-developed and somewhat unfocused, but nevertheless we are 

persuaded that the court erred.

Quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint, supra, 45 Cal.4th 634, 

the tenants assert that “ ‘One test of the right to institute proceedings for 

declaratory judgment is the necessity of present adjudication as a guide for 

plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve his legal rights.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 647.) They assert that before bringing suit, they need to know whether 

their potentially recoverable attorney fees would be limited to $1,000, 

because if the contractual limitation on recoverable attorney fees is 

enforceable then, as a practical matter, they cannot file suit for damages. 

They also argue they need to know if they are bound by the mediation 

provision because they “did not want to mediate, could not pay for mediation, 

and could not file a complaint for damages if their right to attorney’s fees was 

limited to $1,000.” We agree that the court had no discretion in these 

circumstances to conclude that declaratory relief was not “necessary or 

proper.” 

The Supreme Court decision the tenants cite, Sprint, supra, 

45 Cal.4th 634, is instructive. In that case, customers sued a cellular 

telephone company alleging that certain provisions of the company’s 

customer service agreement were unconscionable and illegal, including a 
13

binding arbitration provision and a waiver of the right to pursue class action 

relief, but they did not allege the provisions had been enforced against them 

or had otherwise caused them any harm. (Id. at pp. 638–639.) The trial 

court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to their declaratory relief 

cause of action, and the Supreme Court held there was no abuse of discretion 

in ruling that declaratory relief was not appropriate under these 

circumstances. (Id. at p. 638.) 

As previously noted, the Supreme Court held that there was an actual 

controversy about the validity of the various remedial provisions, just as 

there is here. (See Sprint, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 648.) Sprint also made the 

point that a court’s discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1061 “is 

not boundless.” (Sprint, at p. 647.) “ ‘ Where . . . a case is properly before the 

trial court, under a complaint which is legally sufficient and sets forth facts 

and circumstances showing that a declaratory adjudication is entirely 

appropriate, the trial court may not properly refuse to assume 

jurisdiction . . . .’ ” (Sprint, at p. 647, quoting Columbia Pictures v. DeToth

(1945) 26 Cal.2d 753, 762.) But it reasoned that “declaratory relief is 

designed in large part as a practical means of resolving controversies, so that 

parties can conform their conduct to the law and prevent future litigation.” 

(Sprint, at p. 648.) It observed that “[t]here may indeed be cases in which the 

settlement of questions of the validity of contractual remedies has practical 

consequences.” (Ibid.) But, it explained, “when resolution of the controversy 

over future remedies would have little practical effect in terms of altering 

parties’ behavior, courts have considerable discretion, pursuant to Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1061, to deny declaratory relief because it ‘is not 

necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.) 
14

The Court upheld the rejection of the declaratory relief cause of action 

because the consumers did not allege “with any particularity” that resolution 

of the dispute over the enforceability of the arbitration provision or other 

contractual remedies provisions “would, at this point, have any practical 

consequences.” (Sprint, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 648.) It observed that “[n]o 

dispute has arisen that would cause these remedial provisions to come into 

play” nor was there any other practical consequence alleged. (Ibid., italics 

added.) 

Here, the opposite is true. The remedial provisions of the lease are 

very much in play because the parties are disputing whether the tenants 

must comply with them as a condition of bringing suit or else forfeit their 

right to recover any attorney fees. They also dispute whether the $1,000 

limit on otherwise recoverable attorney fees applies to statutory attorney 

fees. And both questions are alleged to directly impact the tenants’ ability to 

hire counsel to file a lawsuit on the merits. Thus, the present case is 

precisely the kind of situation contemplated by Sprint “in which the 

settlement of questions of the validity of contractual remedies has practical 

consequences.” (Sprint, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 648) 

Another case tenants say is applicable is Bess v. Park (1955) 

132 Cal.App.2d 49 (Bess), which upheld a judgment awarding declaratory 

relief and the Supreme Court cited with approval in Sprint. (See Sprint, 

supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 647 [noting one purpose of declaratory relief is “to 

liquidate doubts with respect to uncertainties or controversies which might 

otherwise result in subsequent litigation’ ”], quoting Bess, at p. 52.) 

Although the tenants do not really analyze Bess, we find it illustrative 

because at issue there, similar to Sprint, was another controversy over predispute resolution procedures. In Bess, an employment agency had a 
15

contractual claim for unpaid fees against a client for whom it had secured a 

job opportunity but was statutorily required under the Labor Code to exhaust 

its administrative remedies before filing suit. (See Bess, supra, 

132 Cal.App.2d at pp. 50–51.) The labor commissioner, however, refused to 

hear the dispute for 90 days (for policy reasons that are immaterial). (Id. at 

p. 51.) The employment agency filed suit against the labor commissioner and 

obtained a favorable declaratory judgment that the commissioner had no 

power to arbitrarily refuse to hear such a dispute or postpone an award for 

the payment of unpaid fees. (Id. at p. 52.) 

The appellate court affirmed, holding that declaratory relief was proper 

in these circumstances. As relevant here, it explained that the availability of 

other potential remedies (there, the possibility of seeking mandamus relief to 

compel the labor commissioner to act) did not deprive courts of discretion to 

grant declaratory relief. (Bess, supra, 132 Cal.App.2d at p. 54.) And in 

affirming the declaratory judgment, Bess specifically observed that “the 

provisional remedies of suit, attachment and garnishment are unavailable to 

the [employment] agency [against its client] until it is authorized to institute 

an action at law following the labor commissioner’s award.” (Id. at p. 54.) 

Thus, at bottom, the controversy for which declaratory relief was sought 

created an obstacle to the aggrieved party’s ability to file a lawsuit on the 

merits to address past wrongs, just as it does here. 

Finally, also instructive is Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth (1945) 

26 Cal.2d 753 (Columbia Pictures), a decision Sprint cited concerning the 

limits of a trial court’s discretion.2 In that case, a movie director allegedly 

2 Columbia Pictures is also discussed extensively in another appellate 

decision both parties cite and discuss, Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. 

v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 369–370. 
16

refused to continue working for a movie studio on the ground the parties’ oral 

contract was void and unenforceable. In the midst of the dispute, the movie 

studio sought declaratory relief concerning the contract’s validity, and the 

Supreme Court held the trial court had abused its discretion in sustaining a 

demurrer without leave to amend that claim. (Columbia Pictures, at pp. 757–

758.) The Court held there was an actual controversy because the director 

maintained he was no longer bound by the agreement whereas the movie 

studio contended that he was. (Id. at p. 758.) With regard to the court’s 

discretionary powers, the Supreme Court held that the facts that a cause of 

action for breach had already accrued and that the studio may have had 

other remedies were factors to be considered but they were not a basis to 

deny relief. (Id. at p. 761.) It explained that a declaratory relief cause of 

action “is not barred by the fact that the contract sued upon may have 

already been breached and that . . . alternative remedies are available.” 

(Ibid.) It reiterated the principle that “before declaratory relief may be 

denied on the ground of the existence of other remedies, ‘it must clearly

appear that the asserted alternative remedies are available to the plaintiff 

and that they are speedy and adequate or as well suited to the plaintiff’s needs 

as declaratory relief.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) The Court explained that 

standard was not met because the complaint’s allegations “do not necessarily 

show that the remedy of declaratory relief may not have been better suited to 

[the movie studio’s] needs” than other remedies. (Ibid.) Stressing that the 

trial court’s wide discretion under the declaratory relief statutes “is not 

unlimited,” is judicially reviewable by the appellate courts, and “must be 

bottomed upon good reason,” the Supreme Court held the movie studio’s 

complaint was sufficient to allege a cause of action for declaratory relief and 
17

not vulnerable to a general demurrer. (Id. at p. 762.) Accordingly, the trial 

court had erred in rejecting the cause of action.

Here, just as in Columbia Pictures, the complaint’s allegations do not 

“clearly” show that alternative remedies for the tenants are available, speedy 

and adequate. (Columbia Pictures, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 761). Indeed, the 

complaint’s allegations clearly show they are not, because the whole point of 

the tenants’ declaratory relief claim is to enable them to pursue a judicial 

remedy they might not otherwise be able to pursue; if anything, these 

circumstances present an even greater reason to reverse than in Columbia 

Pictures. Further, as in Columbia Pictures, the tenants need to know 

whether the lease (or portions of it) are valid and enforceable because the 

answer will impact their future course of action.

Taken together, these authorities compel the conclusion that the trial 

court did not exercise its discretion in a manner that was “controlled in a 

great measure by legal principles” and “bottomed upon good reason.” 

(Columbia Pictures, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 762.) The court abused its 

discretion in concluding declaratory relief was not “necessary or proper” 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1061.

The landlords argue that all that the tenants are trying to do is seek 

redress for past wrongdoing, which is not an appropriate subject for 

declaratory relief. (See Cardellini v. Casey (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 389, 395–

397; Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 393, 407–

408.) But as their cited authority acknowledges, “[i]f there is a controversy 

which calls for a declaration of rights, it is no objection that past wrongs are 

also to be redressed.” (Baldwin, at p. 407, italics added.) 

And that is not even what is happening here. It is true that the 

tenants allege they have various accrued causes of action against the 
18

landlords. But they are not seeking redress in this lawsuit for any of them. 

As explained, they are seeking declaratory relief on a prospective basis

concerning their pre-filing procedural rights and obligations concerning those 

claims, the resolution of which will guide their litigation decisions and 

conduct. Unlike in the authority the landlords cite which involved no 

continuing relationship between the parties (see Cardellini, supra, 

181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 396–397 [dispute concerning validity of municipal fee 

paid under protest]; Baldwin, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at pp. 406-408 [dispute 

concerning past capital contribution made by general partner that allegedly 

harmed third-party secured creditor of limited partner]), this declaratory 

relief claim concerns a controversy over the parties’ future rights and 

obligations to each other. Resolution of that controversy would have actual, 

“practical consequences.” (Sprint, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 648.) 

In sum, the court erred in sustaining the demurrer. The tenants have 

stated a cause of action for declaratory relief. (See Columbia Pictures, supra, 

26 Cal.2d at p. 762.) 

Our conclusion that the complaint adequately states a cause of action 

for declaratory relief makes it unnecessary for us to address the merits of the 

controversy between the parties. (See Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan 

Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 728–729, 737; accord, Columbia Pictures, supra, 

26 Cal.2d at p. 760.) The purpose of declaratory relief is merely to serve the 

practical goal of resolving uncertainty concerning the parties’ respective 

rights and duties, and so a plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of his rights 

whether it is favorable or not. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. Appellants shall recover their costs.
19

STEWART, P. J. 

WE CONCUR:

MILLER, J. 

MARKMAN, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.