Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

SEPTEMBER 2014

Special Study 6

Richard A. Hunt

Series Editors Jeffrey A. Larsen • Erin R. Mahan

Cold War Foreign Policy Series

1969-1973

Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest

for a

Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy
Cover Photo

President Richard Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Deputy Secretary 

of Defense David Packard at the Pentagon, 1 May 1970.

Source: OSD Historical Office.

Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon.

1969-1973

Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest

for a

Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

September 2014

Series Editors

Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D.

Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D.

Director, Research Division 

NATO Defense College

Special Study 6

Richard A. Hunt
Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Laird and a Reorganized National Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Strategic Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Strains in NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Change in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

This study is cleared for public release. The views expressed or 

implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily 

represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, or any other agency of the Federal 

Government.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without 

permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. 

The Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.
vii

Foreword

This is the sixth special study by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Historical Office that emphasizes the secretary’s role in the U.S. 

foreign policymaking process and describes how the position evolved 

between 1947 and the end of the Cold War. The present work focuses on 

President Richard Nixon’s initial secretary of defense, Melvin R. Laird. 

In Nixon’s first term, Laird proved a more influential policymaker than 

the secretary of state, whose authority was constrained by a new national 

security system and the president’s desire to formulate and conduct 

foreign policy himself. Laird did not encroach on the traditional foreign 

policy sphere of the president or the secretary of state, but ceded no 

ground where foreign policy and defense issues met. 

The Historical Office views this series as part of an ongoing effort to 

highlight varied aspects of the secretary’s role and accomplishments. 

The series had its origins in a draft manuscript by Dr. Steven Rearden, 

author of The Formative Years, 1947–1950, the first volume in the 

Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. We anticipate that future 

series will cover a variety of other defense topics as they relate to the 

position of the secretary.

I wish to thank Cheryl Bratten at the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History for crossing organizational lanes and providing much-needed 

editorial support. I also continue to be indebted to Kathleen Jones in 

OSD Graphics for her expertise and design.

The series titles printed to date as well as other publications are 

available on the OSD Historical Office website. We invite you to 

peruse our selections at <http://history.defense.gov/>.

Erin R. Mahan

Chief Historian

Office of the Secretary of Defense
ix

Executive Summary

When Melvin Laird succeeded Clark Clifford as secretary of defense 

in January 1969, he realized that major changes in American 

foreign and defense policy, beginning with Vietnam, were only a 

matter of time. Yet the war was just one part of Laird’s agenda 

during his four years as secretary of defense. Laird carved out a 

broad, independent role for himself and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, although he heartily endorsed the need for teamwork 

and cooperation with the White House and the National Security 

Council (NSC). He had too much Washington experience and too 

many powerful allies in Congress to be hemmed in or pushed to 

the sidelines by Richard Nixon’s White House staff.

Laird made major contributions on several fronts. He transitioned 

the armed services from a conscripted force to an all-volunteer 

force (AVF), secured a strategic arms limitations agreement with 

the Soviet Union, and kept at bay congressional critics and 

White House budget cutters from slashing defense spending too 

severely. The secretary proved to be a key policymaker, particularly 

regarding Vietnam.

Laird assumed two formidable challenges when he became 

secretary. He sought to remove the U.S. military from Vietnam 

and ensure that the armed forces remained capable of carrying out 

U.S. national security objectives in Europe and Asia. Mired in a 

counterproductive war in Southeast Asia and facing antimilitary 

sentiment at home, the Department of Defense simultaneously 

experienced shrinking budgets in the late 1960s and unrelenting 

pressure for ever more reductions. Personnel and materiel problems 
x xi

Executive Summary Executive Summary

Offensive of 1972. Laird clearly lost influence and status during 

this period when the administration was under severe strain. The 

administration seemed to be waging war on its key officials at the 

same time it was fighting North Vietnam and pursuing peace talks 

in Paris. Laird’s role in the Paris negotiations was largely behind the 

scenes, although he demanded that the return of U.S. POWs be 

part of a peace settlement. 

At the start of his administration the president expressed his 

intention to change the character of U.S. relations with the Soviet 

Union from one of confrontation to negotiation and to hold talks 

on strategic arms. Nixon’s administration also embarked on two 

major strategic arms initiatives: deployment of an antiballistic 

missile (ABM) system to defend against incoming Soviet missiles 

and strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviets to 

limit the growth of nuclear weapons. Nixon and Laird considered 

ABM deployment as indispensable to serious strategic arms 

limitation talks, viewing the antimissile system as a bargaining 

chip in negotiations. Laird had less confidence than his immediate 

predecessors in what arms control could accomplish, but it was an 

issue he could scarcely ignore.

Except when circumstances dictated, Laird rarely participated 

directly in the day to day details of the SALT process, but he was 

instrumental in shaping the U.S. negotiating position. Laird’s 

role was pivotal during the crucial final stages when the SALT 

agreements went to Congress. Laird supported a strategic arms 

limitation agreement as a means of slowing the momentum of the 

Soviet strategic buildup and as a first step toward the success of 

expected follow-on arms control discussions. He stressed, however, 

that his support of these agreements was largely conditional upon 

congressional approval and full funding for a broad range of 

improvements in the U.S. strategic posture. 

As a member of NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear 

Planning Group, Laird was a major participant in establishing 

aggravated by the diversion of troops and equipment from NATO 

and other theaters to Vietnam further hampered Pentagon efforts to 

achieve a measure of stability. Laird viewed the costly Vietnam War 

as weakening the armed forces and thereby reducing their value as a 

deterrent against the Soviet Union. In this unsettled environment, 

Laird worked to shore up U.S. military ties in Europe and Asia. He 

also concentrated on strengthening American power and influence 

in foreign affairs. He believed that a strong conventional defense 

and a credible nuclear deterrent formed the foundation of a sound 

foreign policy.

During his tenure, Laird successfully fought efforts to impose 

what he believed were ruinous cuts in defense spending demanded 

by public and congressional critics. He expected an influential 

policymaking role in areas where defense and foreign issues 

overlapped, but Nixon insisted on conducting most foreign affairs 

himself. Nixon’s plan to enhance the NSC’s role forced Laird to 

oppose measures that would insert the national security adviser 

between the president and the secretary of defense or limit his 

authority over the Defense Department. Laird favored a strong 

and active NSC in foreign policy, but not if it infringed on the 

secretary’s customary authority.

The Vietnam War consumed the majority of Laird’s time and 

energy. Laird contributed to lessening U.S. military involvement 

with Vietnamization, the U.S. effort to improve and modernize 

South Vietnam’s forces so they could assume a greater share of the 

combat and permit U.S. forces to withdraw. In addition, given the 

special problems and sensitive nature of U.S. prisoners of war and 

servicemen missing in action, Laird treated those matters separately 

from other Vietnam policy issues. He supported Nixon’s 1969 

decision to widen the war by bombing North Vietnamese and Viet 

Cong base areas in Cambodia.

Relations between the White House and Laird worsened during 

his tenure, reaching a low point during the Vietnamese Easter 
xii 1

Executive Summary

guidelines for the use of NATO’s military assets, including nuclear 

weapons. Laird pushed allies to shoulder a larger share of the burden 

of defending Western Europe. In the mid-1960s the United States 

had withdrawn units, personnel, and equipment from NATO to 

fight the war in Vietnam, and the Nixon administration wanted its 

European partners to fill those gaps. But Laird’s exhortations had 

little effect. 

Constantly fighting budget cuts, Laird tried to lower costs wherever 

possible—NATO included. He made several attempts to reduce 

U.S. naval forces committed to NATO, but Nixon would not go 

along. Laird’s tenure also coincided with a transition in relations 

with two key Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. 

By the time the Paris peace accords were signed in January 1973, 

all U.S. combatant forces had redeployed from Vietnam, and the 

United States remained a major contributor to NATO and its force 

structure. In addition, the military had become an all-volunteer 

force with the end of conscription. As the principal architect of 

both Vietnamization and the AVF, Laird believed that he had 

accomplished what he had set out to do. He left office shortly after 

Nixon began his second term.

Introduction

When Melvin R. Laird became secretary of defense in January 

1969, he assumed the formidable challenges of withdrawing U.S. 

troops from Vietnam and maintaining a military force capable 

of carrying out U.S. national security objectives in the postwar 

era. Mired in a counterproductive war in Southeast Asia and 

facing growing antimilitary sentiment at home, the Department 

of Defense experienced shrinking budgets in the late 1960s and 

unrelenting pressure for even more spending reductions. Personnel 

and materiel problems aggravated by the diversion of troops and 

equipment from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and other theaters to Vietnam further hampered Pentagon efforts to 

achieve a measure of stability. Laird viewed the costly Vietnam War 

as weakening the armed forces and thereby reducing their value as a 

deterrent against the Soviet Union. In this unsettled environment, 

Laird worked to shore up U.S. military ties in Europe and Asia. He 

also concentrated on strengthening American power and influence 

in foreign affairs. In his estimation, a strong conventional defense 

and a credible nuclear deterrent formed the foundation of a sound 

foreign policy.1

Reluctant to give up his seat in Congress and a leading role in the 

Republican Party, Laird agreed to serve as president-elect Richard 

M. Nixon’s secretary of defense but only for four years. Laird was 

convinced that staying in the post longer than that would result in 

diminishing effectiveness. To win over his new defense secretary, 

the president-elect made an important concession, granting him 

authority to make military and civilian appointments without 

interference from the president or members of his administration. 

This arrangement, combined with his ties to Congress, gave Laird 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6 Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

2 3

a unique degree of independence. During his tenure as secretary 

of defense, Laird played a central role in formulating Vietnam 

War policy, oversaw the drawdown of U.S. forces from Vietnam, 

worked to reshape military relations with U.S. allies in Europe and 

Asia, and successfully fought efforts to impose what he believed 

were ruinous cuts in defense spending demanded by public and 

congressional critics.2

Based on his experience as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s vice president 

in the 1950s, Nixon may have expected Laird—a last minute 

replacement when his first choice for secretary of defense, Senator 

Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D–WA), backed out—to be deferential. 

President Eisenhower’s secretaries, Charles Wilson and Neil 

McElroy, had resigned themselves to being managers from the start. 

Loyal and dutiful, they had seen to the execution of presidential 

decisions. Nixon may have hoped for the same from Laird.3

As a congressman, Laird had developed a basic approach to foreign 

policy. Hearkening to Eisenhower’s position that a strong economy 

and a strong defense went hand in hand, he had been uneasy 

with the Kennedy administration’s allocation of resources and its 

freewheeling approach to defense spending. He was also critical 

of military assistance for Third World countries. Laird’s most 

pointed criticism concerned strategic weapons, believing Kennedy’s 

accommodations had in the long run weakened the West’s security.

He was convinced that the United States should exploit its strength 

to roll back communist power and influence.4

Laird had similar concerns over President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 

foreign policy. The Vietnam War had weakened U.S. forces generally 

and the U.S. security posture in Europe, heightening political 

differences with allies. In Laird’s view, strong defense required 

equally strong alliances to help keep the peace and protect U.S. 

interests. With the United States heavily engaged in Vietnam, the 

number of Soviet strategic missiles had grown substantially in the 

second half of the 1960s. As secretary of defense, Laird would be 

the administration’s chief public advocate of an antiballistic missile 

(ABM) system as a means to defend the nation from the growing 

Soviet missile threat and as an essential bargaining chip to reach a 

strategic arms limitation agreement. Concerned that strong defense 

and foreign policy required adequate funding, Laird fought defense 

budget cuts, trying to inform the public and Congress how quickly 

and dramatically the nondefense portion of the federal budget had 

grown and how that growth corresponded with fewer resources for 

national security.5

Laird supported Nixon’s foreign policy of reorienting U.S. relations 

with the Soviet Union. Nixon was convinced that the Sino-Soviet 

split was a unique opportunity for dramatic foreign policy changes, 

a chance to break free of the rigid anticommunist mindset of U.S. 

foreign policy and to change the character of U.S. relations with 

communist powers. As a conservative, Nixon felt he could convince 

other conservatives to accept his new approach and win over the 

American public as well. Despite improved East-West relations, 

Laird, however, perceived fundamental differences that limited the 

scope of détente. He cited the Soviet resupply of North Vietnam 

and the continuing Soviet strategic buildup during his tenure as 

evidence of détente’s limited impact. Wary of communism, Laird 

found it difficult to imagine any alternative to the historically 

hostile pattern of East-West relations, especially while the war in 

Vietnam continued.6

Laird and a Reorganized National Security Council

Laird expected an influential policymaking role in areas where 

defense and foreign issues overlapped, but Nixon insisted on 

primarily conducting foreign affairs himself. Within hours of being 

inaugurated, the president approved National Security Decision 

Memorandum 2 setting up new national security policymaking 

procedures and abolishing the Senior Interdepartmental Group, 

chaired by the State Department during the Johnson administration. 

The president looked to Henry Kissinger, his national security 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6 Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

4 5

adviser, to lead a revitalized National Security Council (NSC) system 

similar to the one that Eisenhower had used. Nixon attributed the 

foreign policy setbacks of the previous eight years in large part to 

“the inability or disinclination of President Eisenhower’s successors 

to make use of” the NSC. To Nixon, sound policies and sound 

organization were inseparable.7

The NSC was the principal forum for the consideration of 

policy issues requiring presidential attention. Nixon resuscitated 

Eisenhower’s practice of adopting broad budgetary and policy 

reviews, authorizing Kissinger to request detailed reviews, National 

Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), on a wide range of national 

security and foreign policy issues.8

Kissinger also oversaw a network of specialized interagency 

committees to review issues before they reached the NSC. The 

Senior Interdepartmental Group reemerged as the NSC Under 

Secretaries Committee. Other interagency committees covering a 

wide range of issues included the Vietnam Special Studies Group 

(VSSG) to assess policy and progress in the war, the Defense 

Program Review Committee (DPRC) to review the defense budget 

and programs, the Verification Panel to evaluate strategic arms 

proposals, and the Washington Special Action Group established to 

manage crises after North Korean fighter jets shot down an unarmed 

U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in April 1969.Kissinger’s bureaucratic 

skills and his direct contact with the president enhanced his role in 

shaping foreign and national security policy. He was the linchpin 

of Nixon’s NSC.9

The new National Security Council system especially irritated 

Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who felt isolated over the 

lack of consultation on issuing NSSMs. The NSC staff frequently 

complained that the papers prepared by the State and Defense 

departments were unresponsive or too narrow and bureaucratic. 

Senior defense officials in the Offices of Systems Analysis and 

International Security Affairs (ISA) frequently complained about 

requests for too many, sometimes redundant NSSMs, poor 

coordination, a lack of follow-through, and insufficient time to 

prepare fully staffed responses.10

Caught off guard by Nixon’s plan to enhance the NSC’s role, Laird 

raised objections from the start. The defense secretary insisted 

that any department or agency, not just the White House, should 

have the right to propose the initiation of policy studies. Most 

significantly, he opposed measures that would insert the national 

security adviser between the president and secretary of defense or 

limit his authority over the Defense Department. Laird rightly 

pointed out that the president’s assistant for national security affairs 

was not a statutory member of the NSC.11 

Laird favored a strong and active National Security Council in 

foreign policy, but not if it infringed on the secretary’s customary 

authority. Kissinger tried to exercise oversight of the military 

budget through his chairmanship of the Defense Program Review 

Committee. Laird insisted on a limited role for the DPRC, which 

he envisioned as addressing broad problems (the allocation of 

resources within the economy, for example) and not the details 

of specific defense programs and weapons. Using delaying tactics 

and providing incomplete responses to requests for budget plans, 

Laird and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard ensured 

that the DPRC acquired no real authority over the formulation 

of the defense budget. As the chief of naval operations, Admiral 

Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., later explained: “Mel had enough support 

in Congress to be able to treat Kissinger not as an all-powerful 

potentate, but as a mere assistant to the President, with no standing 

in the chain of command and certainly no right to give orders to a 

member of the Cabinet.”12

From the start, Laird made it clear to the president, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

that he wanted all communications with the White House and NSC 

to go through his office. He sent numerous memos to Nixon on 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6 Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

6 7

the need to establish a single point of contact and liaison between 

the White House and Pentagon. Laird’s pleas did not stop Nixon, 

Kissinger, and the JCS from using private channels to bypass the 

defense secretary.13

Laird and Kissinger had known one another since the 1964 

Republican National Convention when Laird had chaired the 

platform committee and Kissinger had been a foreign policy 

adviser to New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Although 

Laird and Kissinger often disagreed bitterly on Vietnam, they 

found agreement on other issues, remained friends, and respected 

each other. Once or twice a month Kissinger joined Laird at the 

Pentagon for breakfast.14

Early policy differences strained relations between Laird and the 

White House. In 1969 Nixon and Kissinger developed a plan for 

secretly bombing North Vietnamese and Viet Cong bases located 

inside officially neutral Cambodia. Laird supported the idea of 

bombing these enemy sanctuaries, but argued it was a serious mistake 

to do it secretly because of the inevitability of public disclosure. 

When the press eventually uncovered the secret campaign, Nixon 

and Kissinger wrongly accused Laird of leaking the information. 

In April 1969, North Korean MiG fighters shot down an EC–

121 reconnaissance plane over international waters. Nixon and 

Kissinger wanted to retaliate to show American resolve. Laird 

advocated a more cautious approach, pointing out that retaliation 

against North Korea could lead to hostilities, opening a second 

war theater for which the United States lacked sufficient troops, 

equipment, and ammunition. Laird and Rogers even threatened 

to resign if Nixon went ahead with plans to hit North Korean air 

bases, forcing Nixon to back down. The new president was not 

prepared to handle the loss of two key cabinet members early in 

the administration. During the crisis, Laird, to Kissinger’s dismay, 

also canceled all U.S. reconnaissance flights to review the costs 

and benefits of the aerial reconnaissance program and minimize 

the likelihood of losing another aircraft. Laird deflected Nixon’s 

repeated orders to resume the flights.15

Laird and the White House also differed over the pace of U.S. troop 

withdrawals from Vietnam. Laird favored faster redeployments and 

used the defense budget as leverage to hasten the pull out and set 

the Vietnam troop ceiling below the level that the White House 

favored. His independence in these policy areas frustrated Nixon 

and Kissinger, leading them to circumvent Laird on other issues 

so he could not stymie their plans. To preserve their freedom of 

action, Nixon and Kissinger developed back-channel contacts for 

bypassing the State and Defense departments, as they did on the 

Paris peace talks, for example. Toward the end of his tenure Laird 

met with Nixon less frequently. Laird had made clear that he would 

serve only four years, so his influence would wane in any event as he 

entered the last months of his service. Nevertheless, by the spring 

of 1972, relations between Nixon and Laird had reached a low 

point in regard to Vietnam policy. In April, Laird told Kissinger 

that he felt the president had lost confidence in him.16

Laird and Nixon largely agreed on the topic of military assistance. 

In July 1969 the president announced the Nixon Doctrine, calling 

on America’s allies in Asia, supported by U.S. military assistance, 

to do more to provide for their defense and rely less on the 

presence of U.S. forces. The doctrine was intended to reduce direct 

U.S. involvement in future wars like the one in Vietnam, where 

problems of internal security predominated.17 Laird saw the Nixon 

Doctrine as an opportunity for the Department of Defense to 

reduce outlays and revamp its foreign military assistance program. 

Laird welcomed the new program, although as a congressman he 

had been an outspoken critic of U.S. foreign aid policy. 

Like Eisenhower a decade earlier, Nixon looked on security 

assistance largely as an investment to promote the defense of 

other countries and limit direct U.S. military expenditures. The 

blueprint for reform came from a 1970 report by the President’s 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6 Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

8 9

Task Force on International Development, chaired by Rudolph 

A. Peterson, a California banker. The task force recommended a 

new International Security Cooperation Program, designed with 

stricter criteria for awarding assistance and devoted to facilitating 

the withdrawal of U.S. forces overseas by encouraging more local 

self-reliance.18

Laird took steps to exercise greater control over military assistance 

funds so they could be employed more effectively. He integrated 

military grant aid and credit sales into the annual defense planning 

and budget cycle. In September 1971 he placed responsibility for 

the Military Assistance Program under a new organization, the 

Defense Security Assistance Agency, with its own director. The 

establishment of the agency represented a significant departure 

from the previous mode of operation, under which the regional 

deputy assistants in ISA had been responsible for broad policy in 

the security assistance field. But as funds for programs became 

tighter, centralized control over the allocation of resources grew, 

irritating ISA’s regional desk officers.19

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos 

The Vietnam War consumed the majority of Laird’s time and 

energy. The war affected U.S. foreign policy, arousing popular 

opposition at home and overseas, complicating relations with U.S. 

allies, and draining military resources from NATO. Beginning 

with Robert S. McNamara, the Pentagon had shifted troops, 

equipment, and ammunition from NATO and other commands 

to the war effort in Southeast Asia, which weakened the readiness 

of alliance units facing Warsaw Pact forces. The long, controversial 

war also tarnished the military’s public reputation, contributed to 

reductions of the defense budget, and forced the Pentagon to defer 

much modernization. 

Laird made a signal policy contribution to lessening U.S. military 

involvement with Vietnamization, the U.S. effort to improve and 

modernize South Vietnam’s forces so they could assume a greater 

share of the combat and permit U.S. forces to withdraw. The concept 

emerged from Laird’s trip to Vietnam in February 1969, the first of 

his annual journeys to consult with U.S. commanders and the U.S. 

ambassador and garner their support for a new approach to the 

war. During these trips he also held discussions on U.S. policy with 

South Vietnam’s military and political leaders. Extricating from the 

quagmire was necessary politically and would allow the Pentagon 

to refocus on America’s Cold War rival, the Soviet Union. 

Vietnamization became a critical component of Nixon’s policy to 

bring the war to an “honorable” conclusion. Another tactic was to 

use military pressure on the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong—

intensified bombing and cross-border operations—to induce the 

enemy to negotiate a settlement. The White House believed this 

“two-track” approach could provide the United States an exit from 

the war. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Nixon, expecting 

that a combination of bombing, military pressure, and negotiations 

would prove effective, confidently told his cabinet that he anticipated 

the war in Vietnam would be over inside of a year. It was only at 

the end of January 1973 that the United States and North Vietnam 

signed an agreement calling for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of U.S. 

forces, and the return of American prisoners of war.20

In surveying the prospects for turning the war around, Laird 

assumed that the newly established administration had a breathing 

spell of six months to a year in which it could act more or less 

with a free hand. The secretary of defense supported a negotiated 

settlement, but he doubted whether one could materialize 

before public and congressional opinion turned hostile to the 

administration’s conduct of the war, just as it had turned against 

President Johnson. Nor was he optimistic, as he reported to 

Nixon, that the United States could achieve a military victory in 

the foreseeable future. He promoted Vietnamization because it 

was militarily feasible and politically pragmatic. Winding down 

American military involvement in Vietnam was necessary in his 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6 Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

10 11

view because of growing public frustration with the stalemated 

conflict. Vietnamization was formalized as U.S. policy after an 

NSC review on Vietnamizing the war (NSSM 36) in the spring of 

1969, in which Laird had a prominent voice.

Laird and the White House disagreed, however, over the pace of 

Vietnamization. Laird acted on the premise that he had a broad 

mandate to carry out the new policy. For political and budgetary 

reasons, he wanted a fairly fast-paced transfer of responsibility for 

the war to the South Vietnamese. Nixon and Kissinger, supported 

by the Joint Chiefs, wanted to proceed more slowly and retain 

sufficient American military power in theater as long as possible 

to maintain military pressure on the enemy. Kissinger feared the 

planned withdrawals would become inevitable and taken for 

granted, weakening any incentive for North Vietnam to make 

concessions and negotiate. Laird believed that the White House’s 

cautious approach entailed greater political risks, especially at 

a time of growing war weariness. Moreover, he worried that a 

slower withdrawal schedule would delay the necessary process of 

reshaping and restoring the armed forces for the post-Vietnam, 

Cold War era.21

At the outset of his presidency, Nixon issued strict instructions that 

there was to be no public or private criticism of South Vietnamese 

leaders, orders Laird scrupulously observed during his four years at 

the Pentagon. All the same, from what he witnessed personally of 

Vietnam’s military and government, Laird had mixed feelings about 

the country’s future after U.S. combat forces departed. Though 

distressed by the continuing high incidence of graft and corruption 

among senior South Vietnamese officials, he was encouraged that 

the process of nation building was going forward and that South 

Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu had a broad, popular 

mandate to govern. However, during his last trip to Vietnam in 

November 1971, Laird worried that Thieu was “dissipating” his 

political leverage by surrounding himself with sycophants and 

cronies and making no attempt to broaden his government with 

new faces. Nor had South Vietnam’s president acted decisively to 

remove ineffective general officers.22

To monitor progress, Laird established a Vietnam Task Force 

similar to the one that had operated in ISA during McNamara’s 

tenure. The task force, comprising deputy assistant secretaries 

from OSD, a representative of the Joint Staff, and observers 

from the State Department and CIA, met biweekly to review 

Vietnamization progress and to resolve issues having policy, 

planning, or programmatic implications. For the next three years 

Laird met almost daily, sometimes for two hours or more, with his 

Vietnam advisers in an effort to keep up on developments and to 

refine plans for American disengagement. Headed initially by Maj. 

Gen. David E. Ott, the task force reported directly to the secretary 

of defense and functioned in effect as his operating and planning 

arm within the Pentagon and as his principal liaison with other 

agencies for Vietnam matters. Laird had only the highest praise for 

the task force’s work.23

Under Vietnamization, U.S. withdrawals were related to progress in 

the war. In the fall of 1969 Nixon set up the Vietnam Special Studies 

Group, an interagency panel to develop more accurate and reliable 

measures of progress. Kissinger, who served as chairman, envisioned 

the group as providing systematic analyses of U.S. programs and 

activities in Vietnam. By an unwritten, prior understanding between 

Laird and Kissinger, the VSSG concerned itself with developing 

a common statistical database and assessing the situation in the 

countryside and prospects for a cease-fire. The VSSG completed 

detailed studies on the course of pacification in critical provinces 

to assess how they would fare vis-à-vis local communist forces if 

hostilities ceased. The Vietnam Special Studies Group was set up 

to assess the war independently and not from the perspective of the 

U.S. Embassy in Vietnam or the military command. The White 

House believed that the VSSG measurements and studies often 

offered more candid and insightful perspectives than those found in 

the routine reports of the U.S. command in Vietnam.24
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6 Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

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Because of the special problems involved and their exceedingly 

sensitive nature, Laird treated matters concerning U.S. prisoners 

of war (POWs) and servicemen missing in action (MIA) separately 

from other Vietnam policy issues. At the beginning of his tenure 

he had concluded that the Johnson administration’s policy of 

“quiet diplomacy” for dealing with POW and MIA issues had 

failed. He believed it was imperative to publicize Hanoi’s refusal 

to honor its obligations to POWs under the Geneva Convention. 

Despite State Department reservations, in the summer of 1969 

Laird launched the “Go Public” campaign, with the strong 

backing of other DoD officials. The aim was to highlight North 

Vietnam’s intransigence and violations of the Geneva Convention 

for refusing to provide information on American POWs and for 

barring impartial international inspections of prisoner-of-war 

camps. Laird saw Hanoi’s inhumane treatment of U.S. POWs as 

a vulnerability to exploit and a way to force North Vietnam to 

comply with the Geneva Convention and negotiate the return 

of U.S. prisoners. In February 1971, Laird directed the creation 

of a deputy-level POW/MIA Task Group and a POW/MIA Task 

Force in ISA, headed by a general officer with a full-time staff. 

Initially, this policy paid worthwhile dividends in the form of 

somewhat better treatment of Americans held as prisoners and a 

bolstering of support at home. But as time went on, in Kissinger’s 

view, it became an additional contributor to the pressure for U.S. 

concessions to hasten a peace settlement.25 

Laird supported Nixon’s 1969 decision to bomb North Vietnamese 

and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia. The administration 

had solid grounds for bombing the sanctuaries, which North 

Vietnamese forces occupied and from which they launched attacks 

into South Vietnam. Bombing offered the possibility of strategic 

gains and would signal U.S. resolve and demonstrate Nixon’s 

willingness to escalate the conflict. However, Laird believed it 

was a mistake to do it secretly as Nixon and Kissinger proposed. 

Laird was certain that the strikes would eventually become public 

knowledge and their disclosure would increase public distrust of 

the administration. When stories about the Cambodian bombing 

appeared in the press, a furious Kissinger blamed Laird for leaking 

the information. The White House requested that the FBI wiretap 

the home telephone of Col. Robert Pursley, Laird’s military aide. 

The 18-month wiretap found nothing to implicate Pursley. Laird 

vehemently denied Kissinger’s accusation.26

The 1970 Cambodian incursion also strained relations between 

Laird and the White House. After the overthrow of the Sihanouk 

government in March, Laird hoped to preserve Cambodia’s 

neutrality and provide military assistance to the new government 

of Lon Nol without the participation of U.S. forces. The White 

House, however, examined options for cross-border operations, 

including limited U.S. missions against enemy bases and supply 

lines inside Cambodia, without informing Laird or Rogers, both 

of whom were on record as opposing the use of U.S. ground forces 

in Cambodia. Laird favored continuation of small-scale South 

Vietnamese cross-border missions and protested personally to 

Nixon when in late March Kissinger had them suspended.27

As the situation in Cambodia deteriorated, Nixon considered 

additional military steps. Planning for the U.S.–South Vietnamese 

incursion into Cambodia in April–May 1970 took place through 

back-channel messages between Kissinger in Washington and 

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Creighton Abrams, 

the American commander, in Saigon. Laird and Rogers were not 

consulted in the early stages, although Laird knew that a major 

planning effort was under way. Questions he raised with the Joint 

Chiefs concerning the impact on the Vietnamization program of a 

possible cross-border attack, the redeployment of U.S. forces, and 

other operations in South Vietnam were all but ignored by the Joint 

Chiefs and the White House. In his memoirs, Nixon speculated 

that the real reason for Laird’s opposition was the “apparent snub 

of the Pentagon in our decision-making process.” But in actuality 

Nixon did not want to hear objections to the incursion. He 

wanted no repeat of the EC–121 episode when Laird and Rogers 
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had argued against retaliation. The Cambodian incursion went 

forward as planned, with Nixon claiming stupendous military 

results and declaring that the incursion’s success allowed U.S. 

withdrawals to continue. The operation did reduce the enemy 

military threat from Cambodia, contributing to increased security 

in South Vietnam’s countryside.28

The incursion had both military and political drawbacks. It failed 

to capture or destroy the Viet Cong headquarters located inside 

Cambodia, one of its major goals. At home, Congress took action 

to restrict U.S. military operations in Cambodia and Laos, and 

antiwar protesters took to the streets in the largest demonstrations 

yet seen. Protests, some of them violent, broke out on over 400 

campuses. At Kent State University in Ohio four students were 

killed by National Guardsmen sent to restore order on campus. 

Hoping to capitalize on the improved security in South Vietnam, 

Laird resolved to accelerate the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

Improvement and Modernization Program. This included not 

only the training and arming of South Vietnamese troops but also 

the fostering of a more self-reliant South Vietnamese economy, 

a necessary foundation for Vietnamization. As part of the war 

effort the United States financed a liberal import program and 

economic aid to maintain the standard of living in South Vietnam. 

The program had its negative aspects, including keeping the 

Vietnamese economy highly dependent on outside subsidies. To 

remedy this situation, the Vietnam Task Force, supported by ad 

hoc study groups and outside consultants, recommended a system 

of currency and fiscal reforms that in August 1970 restructured 

the U.S. aid program and sharpened the focus on building a more 

stable and self-sustaining South Vietnamese economy.29

The Cambodian incursion served as precedent for the 1971 strike 

by South Vietnamese forces against enemy supply routes and bases 

inside Laos. As in the Cambodian incursion, Nixon excluded Laird 

and Rogers, not wishing to contend with their likely objections. 

In November 1970 Admiral Thomas H. Moorer discussed with 

Kissinger and Deputy National Security Adviser Alexander M. 

Haig, Jr., a preliminary plan that included an operation to send 

South Vietnamese ground forces across the border to cut the flow of 

enemy supplies going through Laos. Laird was informed of the plan 

only in late December. The operation, named Lam Son 719, began 

in February 1971 and quickly encountered stiffer than expected 

resistance that slowed the advance toward the main objective, the 

town of Tchepone. Unwilling to risk heavy losses, President Van 

Thieu pulled his forces out of Laos earlier than the operational plan 

envisioned. South Vietnamese forces held Tchepone only briefly 

before withdrawing. Although Laird publicly supported Lam Son 

719, the planning for it revealed the administration’s distrust of the 

defense secretary. After the operation ended, Nixon and Kissinger 

claimed that the Pentagon had withheld vital information.30

Relations between the White House and Laird reached their 

lowest point during the Easter Offensive of 1972. The buildup 

of North Vietnamese forces for a widespread offensive worried 

General Abrams, who early in March 1972 requested authority for 

a sweeping air offensive in North Vietnam to blunt the expected 

offensive. Fearing the domestic political effects of a new bombing 

campaign in an election year, Laird scaled back Abrams’ request 

before passing it to Kissinger. Not wishing to jeopardize the nascent 

relationship with China, Kissinger in turn urged Nixon to reduce 

the air campaign even further. Nixon took Kissinger’s advice, but 

limited action offered little chance of derailing the visible enemy 

buildup. After the offensive began, Kissinger lambasted Laird for 

paring Abrams’ bombing request, forgetting that he had cut the 

authorities Abrams had sought even further. President Nixon also 

blamed Laird, denigrating him in Admiral Moorer’s presence. Later 

when Kissinger was willing to acknowledge his error, an upset Laird 

confronted him. He said he was willing to take the heat within the 

Pentagon for the White House’s decision to curtail the Abrams’ 

bombing request, but he was utterly dismayed by the lack of trust 

in him that Nixon and Kissinger displayed. Kissinger, nonetheless, 
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still wanted to bypass Laird and deal directly with Moorer and 

Abrams during the enemy assault. Laird had clearly lost influence 

and status during the Easter Offensive. Under severe strain, the 

administration was waging war on its key officials at the same time 

it was fighting North Vietnam and pursuing peace talks at Paris.31

Laird’s role in the Paris negotiations was largely behind the scenes, 

although he continued to ensure that the return of U.S. POWs 

had to be part of a peace settlement. He received feedback from 

a full-time military liaison to the talks in Paris, but Kissinger 

and Rogers had responsibility for the negotiations. By late 1972, 

with the Paris peace talks seemingly poised for a breakthrough, 

Laird’s list of “essential” elements of an agreement had narrowed 

to a handful: unencumbered air reconnaissance to verify North 

Vietnam’s compliance with any accord, delivery of all war materiel 

currently en route to South Vietnam, the release and return of all 

American POWs, and a full accounting of all missing in action to 

be obtained with the explicitly pledged cooperation of all parties. 

By the time the Paris peace accords were signed in January 1973, 

all U.S. combatant forces had redeployed from Vietnam. As the 

principal architect of Vietnamization, Laird believed that he had 

accomplished what he had set out to do when he left office shortly 

after Nixon began his second term.32

Strategic Arms

At the start of his administration President Nixon expressed his 

intention to change the character of U.S. relations with the Soviet 

Union from one of confrontation to negotiation and to hold talks 

on strategic arms. As a presidential candidate, Nixon had advocated 

U.S. nuclear superiority; as president, he adopted a policy of 

strategic sufficiency, a nuclear weapons capability that would 

provide an acceptable defense of the United States and its interests 

in lieu of overwhelming retaliation against the Soviet Union. In its 

first year, Nixon’s administration embarked on two major strategic 

arms initiatives: deployment of an ABM system to defend against 

incoming Soviet missiles and strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) 

to limit the growth of nuclear weapons. Nixon wanted a clean break 

from his predecessor.33

In 1962 the United States had decided to accept strategic parity 

with the Soviet Union in the number of offensive missiles and 

built no additional land-based missiles. In contrast, the Soviets had 

embarked on an ambitious program of building large land-based 

offensive strategic missiles, achieving equivalence with the United 

States by the late 1960s. The huge Soviet SS–9 missile, in particular, 

posed an offensive threat to U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) sites. An additional worry was the deployment of a Soviet 

defensive missile system code-named Galosh to defend Moscow. 

Concerns about the ability of the U.S. strategic missile force to 

withstand a nuclear attack from the growing number of Soviet 

offensive missiles led to consideration of a modified ABM system. 

Nixon and Laird considered antiballistic missile deployment as 

indispensable to serious strategic arms limitation talks, viewing 

the antimissile system as a bargaining chip in negotiations. In 

their judgment, if the United States had no ABM system and no 

plans to build one, it would have less leverage during arms talks 

and might be forced to accept a settlement that in effect codified 

Soviet superiority.34

Suspicious of Soviet intentions, Laird publicly stated his concerns 

over the continuing buildup of Soviet offensive and defensive 

strategic missiles. Laird initiated a review of the ABM program, 

directing his deputy David Packard and representatives of other 

agencies to examine options to reconfigure the system as begun 

under McNamara. He did this before Nixon decided in March 1969 

that he wanted to build the defensive missile system. Laird played 

a critical role in securing initial Senate approval of funds in the 

summer to deploy an ABM system. Through personal, behind-thescenes talks, he persuaded a key opponent of antiballistic missiles, 

Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R–ME), not to oppose the ABM 

system because its rejection would make arms talks unlikely. The 
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Senate approved funding for the system by one vote. Between 1969 

and 1972, when a SALT agreement was signed, Laird worked hard 

to ensure that Congress continued to fund the antimissile system, 

albeit on a smaller scale that included fewer sites than originally 

envisioned in 1969.35

The grave security threat of the growing Soviet strategic offensive 

missile program led Laird to advocate arms limitation talks as being 

in America’s interest. In mid-February 1969 he warned Kissinger 

that, militarily, a prolonged delay in reaching an arms control 

agreement would work to the Soviet Union’s advantage. Laird 

knew from intelligence reports that the Soviet strategic buildup 

was continuing apace. The longer the Soviet program remained 

unchecked, the less chance the United States would have of keeping 

its edge in strategic nuclear power.36

Early efforts to formulate negotiating options foundered. At the 

president’s direction, Kissinger in early March initiated a full-scale 

study (NSSM 28) of arms control negotiating options.Almost from 

the start, the project revealed deep interdepartmental differences over 

policy and the need for a more cohesive coordinating organization. 

Major disagreements between the U.S. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency and the Joint Chiefs involved the treatment 

of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 

which the United States had begun testing in 1968, and verification 

procedures. Laird agreed with the Joint Chiefs on the need for 

further MIRV testing in the face of preliminary evidence that the 

Soviets had embarked on a MIRV-testing program of their own.37

Throughout the preparations for SALT and into the negotiations 

themselves, Laird routinely looked to Deputy Secretary Packard to 

represent the Defense Department and to coordinate the input of 

senior defense officials. Laird correctly assumed that many of the 

critical issues in SALT were likely to be technical in nature, and 

that Packard’s engineering and scientific background provided him 

solid command of the emerging issues. This change in handling 

arms control recast relationships throughout the department, 

giving a large role to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems 

Analysis Gardiner L. Tucker and Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E) John S. Foster. The OSD representative to 

SALT I, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, was 

on the rolls of DDR&E but dealt directly with Laird or Packard.38

Except when circumstances dictated, as at NSC meetings, Laird 

rarely participated directly in the day-to-day details of the SALT 

process. Delegating that participation to Nitze and Packard, he was 

invariably kept regularly informed on developments. He wanted 

it firmly understood by members of the U.S. delegation—State 

and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency representatives, 

particularly—that ultimate authority for review and approval of 

their actions rested in Washington.39

Although not directly involved in talks with the Soviet delegation, 

Laird was instrumental in shaping the U.S. negotiating position. 

Well before the arms discussions began, Laird fully understood 

that the Safeguard ABM program was essential to the negotiations. 

He refused to budge from his insistence that an agreement on 

defensive missiles had to be an integral part of the deal on limiting 

offensive weapons. The Soviet Union had no incentive to discuss 

offensive weapons because the United States had already stopped 

building them, making defensive missiles the critical negotiating 

issue. Without the credible threat to deploy the ABM the United 

States would have entered the talks in a weaker position and might 

have had to accept an agreement that allowed the Soviet Union 

even greater superiority in ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic 

missile (SLBM) launchers. Laird played a crucial role in convincing 

the Senate to approve the first phase of the ABM and insisted in 

public on continuing to deploy the full system.40 

Laird recommended a strategic arms limitation agreement to 

Congress as a means of slowing the momentum of the Soviet strategic 

buildup and as a first step toward the success of expected follow-on 
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arms control discussions. He stressed, however, that his support 

of these agreements was largely conditional upon congressional 

approval and full funding for a broad range of JCS-recommended 

improvements in the U.S. strategic posture, including the Trident 

submarine, an advanced manned strategic bomber (the B–1), a 

submarine-launched cruise missile, and new strategic warheads.41

In helping broker the SALT accords through Congress, Laird 

made a significant contribution, convincing wavering Republicans 

to add their approval. Had Laird balked at supporting the SALT 

agreements, the results undoubtedly could have been grave—a 

personal embarrassment for Nixon as he headed into the 1972 

presidential campaign and a foreign-policy fiasco of the first 

order. Laird understood the importance of approving the SALT 

agreement and the political problems that would arise if Congress 

failed to go along. 

Laird’s role in SALT was not particularly visible, but it was pivotal, 

especially in the crucial final stages when the SALT agreements 

went to Congress. Laird had less confidence than his two immediate 

predecessors—McNamara and Clark Clifford—in what arms 

control could accomplish, but it was an issue he could scarcely 

ignore. Increasingly institutionalized throughout the executive 

branch, arms control would occupy an ever-growing part of the 

secretary’s agenda in the years ahead.

Strains in NATO 

NATO celebrated its twentieth anniversary shortly after Laird 

became defense secretary. Although the organization and basic 

policies were well established, Laird contended with essentially the 

same issues that had beset McNamara and Clifford. Reconciling 

disparities, especially in the size of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces 

and between the American and European military and financial 

contributions to NATO, framed policymaking in the Johnson and 

Nixon administrations. 

The semiannual meetings of NATO defense ministers brought 

Laird into direct contact with other alliance leaders. As a member 

of NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning 

Group, Laird was a major participant in establishing guidelines 

for the use of NATO’s military assets, including nuclear weapons. 

Through these and other contacts Laird developed a close, personal 

rapport with the West German minister of defense (later chancellor), 

Helmut Schmidt. Without that personal relationship, members of 

Laird’s staff doubted whether a 1971 offset agreement, under which 

the West German government agreed to pay $160 million toward 

the rehabilitation of barracks for U.S. soldiers, would have come 

to fruition; or whether, on another occasion, it would have been 

possible for U.S. forces to move sensitive munitions across German 

territory without public protest.42

The maturing alliance came up against a number of vexing issues. 

During the period of postwar reconstruction in NATO’s early 

years, alliance members, devastated by World War II, of necessity 

had relied on the United States to carry the main responsibility for 

defending the continent. Despite growing affluence in the 1950s 

and 1960s, European allies resisted the higher military spending 

or increases in their armed forces that the United States advocated. 

From the U.S. perspective, NATO did little to address the 

troubling disparity between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. The 

United States wanted European nations to increase their defense 

spending to ensure that NATO provided credible deterrence. 

European nations were reluctant to do more, regarding a Warsaw 

Pact offensive as unlikely. At the same time, a restive Congress was 

looking for ways to cut the high cost of stationing large numbers of 

armed forces in Europe. Mindful of the increasing U.S. balance of 

payments deficit and Europe’s prosperity, Senator Mike Mansfield 

(D–MT) and others in Congress advocated a permanent reduction 

in the number of U.S. troops in Europe.

Laird pushed allies to shoulder a larger share of the burden of 

defending Western Europe. In the mid-1960s the United States 
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had withdrawn units, personnel, and equipment from NATO 

to fight the war in Vietnam. The high cost of the Vietnam War, 

looming cuts in defense budgets, and growing Soviet military 

might, in his view, precluded increases in the U.S. commitment to 

NATO. Further, he urged European allies to make a determined 

effort to improve the combat effectiveness and readiness of their 

conventional forces. His exhortations had little effect. 

Constantly fighting budget cuts, Laird tried to lower costs 

wherever possible—NATO included. He made several attempts to 

reduce U.S. naval forces committed to NATO, but Nixon would 

not go along. The president insisted the United States continue 

to provide a credible conventional defense for Western Europe 

and demonstrate a steadfast commitment to the alliance. The 

president was reluctant to demand that European nations provide 

more assets to NATO or allow his administration to take steps that 

indicated diminished U.S. support. Those imperatives ruled out 

troop reductions. Nor would Nixon seek any additional European 

financial support to offset the dollar costs of stationing U.S. troops 

in Europe. Moreover, he decided to cut overall fiscal year (FY) 

1972 DoD expenditures, putting Laird in a bind. Nixon not only 

prevented Laird from cutting forces to save money, he also directed 

the secretary to improve the U.S. military in Europe.43

The FY 1972 reductions followed decreases in FYs 1970 and 1971. 

Having to deal with three consecutive years of cuts, the secretary 

concluded that defense spending could not go any lower, a position 

that Nixon and Kissinger also adopted. If Nixon expected Laird 

to improve the readiness and capability of U.S. forces in Europe, 

then in the future the president would have no choice but increase 

defense spending. 

Change in Asia

Laird’s tenure coincided with a transition in relations with two key 

Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. Both countries had become 

more stable and prosperous since the end of World War II, and 

under the Nixon Doctrine, the administration expected its Asian 

allies to play a larger role in regional defense. Laird wanted to lessen 

their dependence on the presence of U.S. military forces. Greater 

involvement by the Japanese and South Koreans could also ease 

somewhat the pressure on DoD to cut back U.S. defense spending. 

This was analogous to his efforts to have America’s NATO allies 

assume a greater share of the defense burden in Europe. 

The war in Vietnam complicated Asian relations. Some Japanese 

political groups opposed U.S. involvement in the war and protested 

the presence of U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa, from which the 

United States waged the war. Strategically located in the Pacific, 

Okinawa was a staging area for troops and equipment for Vietnam, 

the location for numerous U.S. military bases, and a storage depot 

for strategic and chemical weapons. Basing forward-deployed 

military forces on the island was indispensable to U.S. strategy. The 

Japanese desire to rule Okinawa, which the United States controlled 

since Japan’s defeat in World War II, was well-nigh universal.

Reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control at some point was certain 

and necessary to maintain good relations with Japan. Growing proreversion sentiment in Japan could not be ignored, but Laird wanted 

to ensure that a hand-over of the island did not compromise U.S. 

national security. JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler feared a 

reversion settlement that would hamper military operations.44 The 

agreement signed by the United States and Japan in June 1971 

returned Okinawa to Japan but allowed Washington to keep most 

of its military personnel and installations on the island. The United 

States also obtained renewal of a security treaty with Japan and the 

right to mount operations from U.S. military bases on Japanese soil. 

At Laird’s insistence the Japanese government agreed to increase its 

share of the costs of keeping U.S. military units in Japan and to pay 

reimbursement for relinquished facilities and their relocation. The 

reversion of Okinawa strengthened the alliance with Japan without 

diminishing American military might or presence in the Pacific.45
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South Korea was also growing stronger economically and militarily 

but still desired the continued presence of two U.S. Army combat 

divisions to help defend the demilitarized zone and likely invasion 

corridors. It could not yet protect itself without U.S. forces and military 

assistance. To keep South Korea secure and independent, the United 

States had signed a formal defense treaty with the Seoul government 

and provided economic and military aid. It would not prove easy to 

win Korean support for a smaller U.S. military presence.46

During a time of retrenchment in U.S. spending, Laird had the 

Joint Chiefs consider how large a force the United States needed to 

keep stationed in Korea as well as how much assistance was required 

to modernize South Korea’s armed forces. The president forced the 

issue, however, demanding in December 1969 the development of 

a plan to have the South Korean army assume the defense of Korea 

with only U.S. air and sea support. Then, in March 1970, Nixon 

decided to withdraw 20,000 U.S. military personnel from Korea 

by the end of FY 1971. This was not as many as Laird wanted to 

pull out. As part of the withdrawal, the United States agreed to 

provide South Korea with a $1.5 billion modernization program. 

The United States would also continue to support stationing two 

Korean divisions in South Vietnam despite Laird’s attempts to have 

them return to South Korea.47

Although Laird was not directly involved in Nixon’s breakthrough 

visit to mainland China in February 1972, that event portended a 

change in relations with China and Taiwan that would be felt only 

after Laird was long out of office. Nixon wanted better ties with 

the People’s Republic of China but not at the cost of harming longterm allies. The Shanghai communiqué of February 1972 issued 

by the United States and China at the end of Nixon’s visit ensured 

continuity of U.S. policy toward Taiwan in the near term. In the 

communiqué the United States also affirmed its existing regional 

defense commitments with Japan and South Korea.48

Conclusion

When Melvin Laird succeeded Clark Clifford as secretary of defense 

in January 1969, he realized that major changes in American 

foreign and defense policy, beginning with Vietnam, were only a 

matter of time. The Vietnam War, to Laird’s chagrin, dominated 

his agenda, as it had McNamara’s and Clifford’s. During Laird’s 

tenure the United States began to redeploy forces from Vietnam. 

The social, economic, political, and military costs of the war were 

too onerous, and Laird succeeded in withdrawing U.S. combatants 

from Vietnam. Yet the war was only one part of Laird’s agenda 

during his four years as secretary of defense. 

President Nixon changed the policymaking process, forcing 

Laird to operate under a new national security system intended 

to circumscribe his sphere of action. After eight years of what he 

considered loosely structured Kennedy-Johnson policymaking, 

Nixon sought to impose a more ordered process that stressed White 

House oversight and coordination. The new system created fresh 

problems, owing to Nixon’s penchant for conducting policy and 

diplomacy secretively at times. 

Laird carved out a broad, even independent role for himself 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although he heartily 

endorsed the need for teamwork and cooperation with the White 

House and NSC. He had too much Washington experience and 

too many powerful allies in Congress to be hemmed in or pushed 

to the sidelines by Nixon’s aides. Laird had broad knowledge and 

experience in national security affairs, having served in the House 

of Representatives for 16 years. He was a member of the Defense 

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. He 

made major contributions in transitioning the armed services from 

conscription to an all-volunteer force, in helping secure a strategic 

arms limitations agreement with the Soviet Union, and in keeping 

at bay congressional critics and White House budget cutters. Laird 

remained a major policymaker, particularly regarding Vietnam. 
27

Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6

26

Further, he insisted and obtained, as a condition of his becoming 

secretary of defense, the right to select and promote his civilian 

and military subordinates, a significant concession that Nixon later 

regretted on more than one occasion. Laird enjoyed the advantage 

of an independent power base that included friends in the news 

media and, most important of all, strong bipartisan connections 

on Capitol Hill. Intimately familiar with the ways of Washington 

politics, he was an adept practitioner of the backstage maneuvering 

that flourished during Nixon’s presidency. With grudging 

admiration, Kissinger considered Laird his most formidable and 

challenging bureaucratic rival.49

Notes

1 This study is drawn from Richard A. Hunt, Melvin Laird and the 

Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969–1973, vol. 7 of Secretaries 

of Defense Historical Series (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 

forthcoming).

2 Dale Van Atta, With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and 

Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 3–6.

3 See Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive 

Retaliation: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates, 1953–1961, 

Cold War Foreign Policy Series, Special Study 3 (Washington, DC: OSD 

Historical Office, September 2012). 

4 Melvin R. Laird, A House Divided: America’s Strategy Gap (Chicago: 

Regnery Co., 1962), 48, 123, 135, 145–146.

5 For a discussion of Congressman Laird’s views on the Vietnam 

War, see Andrew L. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front: Domestic Politics, the 

Republican Party, and the War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 

2010).

6 Melvin Laird, interview by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg, 

29 Oct 1986, 20, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection. 

7 Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New 

York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 340; Department of State, “Evolution 

of the Position of National Security Adviser, 1947–1980” (Office 

of the Historian, Research Project No. 1225, Apr 1980), 8; Henry A. 

Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 38 (quote); 

National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 2, 20 Jan 1969, subj: 

Reorganization of the NSC System, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1969–1976, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

2006), 30–33 (hereafter cited as FRUS). 

8 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 60, no. 1548 (24 February 1969): 

163; John P. Leacacos, “Kissinger’s Apparat,” Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 

1971–1972): 5; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, “Reconstructing the Nixon Foreign 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6 Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

28 29

Policy,” in The Nixon Presidency, Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. (Lanham, 

MD: University Press of America, 1987), 319; NSDM 1, 20 Jan 1969, 

Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series, FRUS 

1969–1976, 2:29–30. 

9 Chester A. Crocker, “The Nixon-Kissinger National Security 

Council System, 1969–1972: A Study in Foreign Policy Management,” 

in Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for 

the Conduct of Foreign Policy: Appendices, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, June 1975), 79–99; Peter W. Rodman, 

Presidential Command (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009); John Prados, 

Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman 

to Bush (New York: Morrow, 1991), 273.

10 Memo, William Rogers for Henry Kissinger, 26 Feb 1971, FRUS 

1969–1976, 2:300; see also 2:225–229.

11 Memo, Laird for Kissinger, 9 Jan 1969, Your Memo Jan. 3, 1969 

concerning a New NSC System, FRUS 1969–1976, 2:22–24; Kissinger, 

White House Years, 44–45.

12 Walter Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1969–

1972 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 2013), 6–7; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: 

Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976), 241.

13 Stephen P. Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, 

Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

2007), 19–20.

14 Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 

1974), 89–90. 

15 FRUS 1969–1976, 8:425. For a recent account of the EC–121 

episode see Richard A. Mobley, Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and 

EC–121 Crises (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003). 

16 See Hunt, Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 

for details of the changing relationship.

17 Nixon’s informal remarks in Guam with newsmen, 25 Jul 1969, 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), 544–556.

18 “Special Message to the Congress Proposing Reform of the Foreign 

Assistance Program,” 15 Sep 1970, Nixon Public Papers 1970, 745–756; 

“Special Message to the Congress Proposing Supplemental Foreign 

Assistance Appropriations,” 18 Nov 1970, 1074–1076, ibid.; President’s 

Task Force on International Development, U.S. Foreign Assistance in 

the 1970s: A New Approach—Report to the President (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1970).

19 Laird, A House Divided, 138, emphasis in original; DoD Directive 

No. 5105.38, 11 Aug 1971, subj: Defense Security Assistance Agency 

(DSSA). Also see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 

Hearings: Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1973, 

92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

1972), pt. 1, 716–717; and Stanley L. Harrison, “Congress and Foreign 

Military Sales,” Military Review 51 (October 1971): 79–87.

20 Nixon, Memoirs, 380–381.

21 Willard J. Webb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 

1969–1970 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 2002), 12–14.

22 “List of Actions Resulting from NSC Meeting on January 25, 

1969,” attached to memo, Kissinger for Vice President, et al., 28 Jan 1969, 

FRUS 1969–1976, 6:42–44; Webb, JCS and the War in Vietnam, 9–12. 

23 Richard A Ware, “The Pentagon’s Office of International Security 

Affairs, 1969–1973,” 7, in The G. Warren Nutter Lectures in Political 

Economy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1986). Ware 

was Nutter’s deputy. Vernon E. Davis, The Long Road Home: U.S. Prisoner 

of War Policy and Planning in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: OSD 

Historical Office, 2000), 178, 198; Van Atta, With Honor, 142. Laird’s 

papers at the Gerald Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 

contain an extensive collection of memoranda for the record of the 

numerous Vietnamization meetings.

24 NSDM 23, 16 Sep 1969, Vietnam Special Studies Group, FRUS 

1969–1976, 2:156–157; Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American 

Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

1995), 210–211. 

25 Memo, Laird for Service Secretaries, et al., 13 Feb 1971, POW/

MIA Task Force Files, OSD Historical Office; Davis, The Long Road 

Home, 532–535; Kissinger, White House Years, 303. 

26 Laird, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Richard Hunt, 11 Oct 

2001, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection.
Melvin Laird and Nixon’s Quest for a Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy

30 31

27 Memo, Alexander Haig for Kissinger, 1 Apr 1970, FRUS 1969–

1976, 6:745–49; msg, WHS 0012 Haig to Bunker, 31 Mar 1970; 

msg, 933 Saigon to State, 8 Apr 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, 6:798–799; 

Kissinger, White House Years, 487–492.

28 Webb, JCS and the War in Vietnam, 234–235; H. R. Haldeman, 

The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: Putnam 

and Sons, 1994), 152; Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 2004), 202; Nixon, Memoirs, 450.

29 Webb, JCS and the War in Vietnam, 236–237.

30 Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s 

Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon 

and Schuster, 2003), 201; Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons, 82–

83. See also Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 239–245; and John Prados, 

Vietnam: History of an Unwinnable War (Lawrence: University Press of 

Kansas, 2009), 406–410. 

31 Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons, 52–53, 80–93.

32 Memo, Laird for Kissinger, 10 Nov 1972, folder Vietnam 1158–

1162, box 43, Melvin Laird Papers, Ford Library.

33 Burton R. Rosenthal, “Formulating Negotiating Positions for 

SALT: 1968, 1969–72,” Appendix K, Report of the Commission on 

the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 333–334.

34 The Military Balance, 1969–1970 (London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, 1970), 1–6; Kissinger, White House Years, 196–197. 

See, for example, Laird’s testimony of 20 February 1969 in U.S. Congress, 

Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Nonproliferation 

Treaty, 90th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1969), 387ff; and Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I

(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 28. 

35 Van Atta, With Honor, 191–193.

36 Ibid., 188–190.

37 Editorial note, FRUS 1969–1976, 32:9–10; ibid., 26–39; 

Kissinger, White House Years, 147–148; John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The 

Story of SALT (New York: Henry Holt, 1973), 158.

38 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of 

Decision: A Memoir (New York: G. Weidenfeld, 1989), 302. 

39 Van Atta, With Honor, 194–195.

40 Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense, FRUS 1969–1976, 

32:2–6; Newhouse, Cold Dawn, 265. 

41 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I concluded in 1972 

and resulted in two accords: the five-year Interim Agreement governing 

strategic offensive launchers (ICBMs and SLBMs) and the Antiballistic 

Missile Treaty. For the text of these documents see FRUS 1969–

1976, 32:908–917. See also Laird’s testimony of 21 June 1972, U.S. 

Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Strategic 

Arms Limitation Agreements, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1972), 60–117. 

42 Van Atta, With Honor, 285–289.

43 Nixon, Memoirs, 370; Kissinger, White House Years, 394, 399–400; 

Poole, JCS and National Policy, 1969–1972, surveys U.S. policy toward 

NATO during Laird’s tenure. 

44 Van Atta, With Honor, 290–291; Poole, JCS and National Security, 

1969–1972, 232–239.

45 Van Atta, With Honor, 296–297; William Bundy, A Tangled Web: 

The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and 

Wang, 1998), 139, 141. 

46 Bundy, Tangled Web, 136–137. 

47 Memo, Nixon for Kissinger, 24 Nov 1969, folder HAK/President 

Memos 1969–1970, box 341, Subject Files; memo, Kissinger for Nixon, 

25 Nov 1969, folder Haig Chron Dec 9–16, 1969 [2 of 2], box 960, Haig 

Chron Files: both in NSC, Nixon Library.

48 FRUS 1969–1976, 17:812–816.

49 See Kissinger, White House Years, 32–33. 
About the Author

Richard A. Hunt serves as a consultant with the OSD Historical Office. He 

is also the author of the forthcoming volume in the Secretaries of Defense 

Historical Series, Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam 

Military, 1969–1973. He served in the U.S. Army and as a historian with 

the Army’s Center of Military History, where he produced studies on the 

Vietnam War and headed the Oral History Program. He holds a Ph.D. in 

history from the University of Pennsylvania. 

About the Editors

Erin R. Mahan has been Chief Historian for the Secretary of Defense since 

2010. Previously she worked in the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction at National Defense University and in the Historian’s 

Office at the U.S. Department of State, where she was an editor of the 

Foreign Relations of the United States series. Dr. Mahan holds a Ph.D. in 

history from the University of Virginia.

Jeffrey A. Larsen is Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense 

College in Rome. He previously served as president of Larsen Consulting 

Group and as a senior scientist with Science Applications International 

Corporation. He has been an adjunct graduate professor at the universities 

of Denver, Northwestern, and Texas A&M, and he served on the faculty 

of the U.S. Air Force Academy. Widely published, Dr. Larsen holds an 

M.A. in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School and 

an M.A. and Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University.
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 6

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

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