United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-1444

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Jorge Barillas-Mendez,

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner,

v.

Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General of United States ,

*

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent.

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Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

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 Submitted: October 9, 2014

 Filed: June 4, 2015

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Before COLLOTON, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Jorge Roberto Barillas-Mendez petitions for review of an order of the Board

of Immigration Appeals. The Board affirmed an immigration judge’s decision

denying Barillas-Mendez’s applicationsfor asylum and withholding of removal, and

Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for Eric H. Holder pursuant to *

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
ordering himremoved fromthe United States. Barillas-Mendez argues that the Board

erred in ruling that he had not established past persecution in Guatemala, because it

failed to consider the cumulative impact of the physical and economic abuse he

suffered and did not take into account his young age at the time of the abuse. We

conclude that the Board considered the relevant factors, and that the record does not

compel a finding contrary to the Board’s. We therefore deny the petition.

I.

The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to an alien who, due to

past persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion,” is unable or unwilling to return to his home

country, and thus qualifies as a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b). Barillas-Mendez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States in

April 2006 without inspection and sought asylum and withholding of removal. He

contendsthat in Guatemala, he suffered economic and physical abuse by an aunt, and

a beating by a cousin, that amounted to persecution.

Barillas-Mendez testified that from age thirteen to seventeen, he lived with his

aunt Hilda in Escuintla, Guatemala, and that his parents were in the United States

during this time. He said that Hilda beat him every second day with either a piece of

wood or an electricity cable, leaving red marks and bruises. Hilda also kept money

that his father sent her to provide for Barillas-Mendez. Barillas-Mendez explained

that he was unable to tell his parents about the abuse, because Hilda monitored their

phone conversations. He said that police never learned of the abuse, as neighbors

never knew about it and would not have reported it anyway. Barillas-Mendez

testified that his mother arranged for him to travel to the United States after she

visited Escuintla and observed his living conditions.

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Barillas-Mendez testified about one beating allegedly administered by his

second cousin, a member of the MS-13 gang, and a group of the cousin’s friends. 

Barillas-Mendez said that his second cousin initiated the beating because Hilda told

him negative things about Barillas-Mendez, and because the cousin believed that

Barillas-Mendez was a member of a rival gang. As a result of the beating, BarillasMendez suffered bleeding from his mouth.

On the same day that Barillas-Mendez entered the United States, the

Department of Homeland Security issued him a Notice to Appear, charging that he

was subject to removal. Barillas-Mendez admitted that he was removable, but filed

an application for asylum and withholding of removal. He argued that he suffered

persecution by his aunt and cousin in Guatemala, and that he has a well-founded fear

that he would be persecuted if he were returned to Guatemala.

The IJ denied Barillas-Mendez’s application and ordered his removal. While

the IJfound Barillas-Mendez to be generally credible, he concluded first thatBarillasMendez’s allegations of abuse suffered in Guatemala did not establish persecution or

a well-founded fear of future persecution. Second, the IJ ruled alternatively that

actions by private individuals such as the aunt and cousin would not amount to

persecution, and that Barillas-Mendez failed to show that the government was

unwilling or unable to control them. Third, the IJ reached another alternative

conclusion that Barillas-Mendez failed to show that the alleged persecution was on

account of the protected grounds alleged—political opinion or membership in a

particular social group—as required for relief.

The Board affirmed the IJ’s determination that Barillas-Mendez had not

established past persecution in Guatemala because the physical abuse he suffered did

not rise to the level of harmrequired to constitute persecution. The Board also agreed

with the IJ that Barillas-Mendez had not established a well-founded fear of future

persecution based on a protected ground, but the Board did not appear to address the

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IJ’s conclusion that abuse by the aunt and cousin as private individuals did not

constitute persecution. Because Barillas-Mendez was not eligible for asylum, the

Board concluded that he could not meet the more rigorous standard required for

withholding of removal. On review, we must uphold administrative findings of fact

unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Kimumwe

v. Gonzalez, 431 F.3d 319, 321 (8th Cir. 2005).

II.

Barillas-Mendez argues that he suffered persecution at the hands of his aunt

and cousin, and that no reasonable factfinder could have found otherwise. 

Persecution is generally defined as “the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury

to one’s person or freedom.” Regalado-Garcia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir.

2002). It is “an extreme concept that excludes low-level intimidation and

harassment.” Alavez-Hernandez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation mark omitted). As such, neither isolated violence nor minor

beatings require a finding of persecution. Garcia-Colindres v. Holder, 700 F.3d

1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012). Persecution also may include “the deliberate imposition

of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food . . . or other

essentials of life.” Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation mark omitted). Whether harmamounts to persecution depends on

the “cumulative significance” of all instances of abuse. See id. at 1036-37.

We conclude that the Board was not compelled to find that the physical abuse

inflicted by Hilda, the petitioner’s cousin, and the cousin’s friends amounted to

persecution, either in isolation or cumulatively. There is no evidence that BarillasMendez suffered lasting physical injury, and “[t]he mere presence of some physical

harm does not require a finding of past persecution.” Al Tawm v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d

740, 743 (8th Cir. 2004); see Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 990 (8th Cir. 2004). 

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The red marks and bruises inflicted by the aunt, and the bloody mouth caused by the

cousin, do not compel a finding of persecution. See Alavez-Hernandez, 714 F.3d at

1067 (upholding Board’s determination that physical attacks that had not “threatened

the victims’ lives” and resulted in “bruises and scratches” did not amount to

persecution); Malonga v. Holder, 621 F.3d 757, 765 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Although the

beatings and injuries . . . suffered are not insignificant, the presence of physical harm

does not require a finding of past persecution.”); Al Tawm, 363 F.3d at 743.

Barillas-Mendez complains that the Board did not consider the cumulative

impact of the abuse inflicted by his aunt and his cousin. While the Board did not

expressly speak of cumulative effect, the Board “has no duty to write an exegesis on

every contention,” Malonga, 621 F.3d at 764 (internal quotation mark omitted), and

it is apparent that the Board thought combining the “single altercation” involving the

cousin with the beatings inflicted by the aunt did not amount to persecution. The

Board’s concluding statement that Barillas-Mendez had “not identified any further

harm that would constitute past persecution” implies that the Board had considered

the totality of the events already discussed.

Barillas-Mendez also asserts that the Board failed to consider his age at the

time that he suffered the abuse in Guatemala, but the record does not support this

contention. The Board recounted Barillas-Mendez’s allegation that he was

“physically mistreated as a child,” so it is apparent that the Board was aware of the

context. Under the circumstances here, that Barillas-Mendez was a minor during the

events in question does not compel a different conclusion about whether he suffered

past persecution.

Barillas-Mendez contends that economic harm inflicted on him by Hilda also

should be part of the persecution analysis, but he failed to present this argument to

the Board. In his administrative appeal, Barillas-Mendez mentioned twice in passing

that Hilda took money his parents sent to provide for him, but never argued that

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Hilda’s actions constituted economic deprivation that amounted to persecution by

itself or in combination with physical abuse. We therefore conclude that BarillasMendez failed to exhaust this issue before the Board, and it is not properly before us. 

See Agha v. Holder, 743 F.3d 609, 616 (8th Cir. 2014). 

Apart fromhis argument that the Board was compelled to find past persecution,

Barillas-Mendez does not challenge the Board’s determination that he failed to show

a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground. Having

concluded that the Board permissibly found no past persecution, we uphold the

Board’s conclusion that Barillas-Mendez failed to qualify for asylum or withholding

of removal.

* * *

The petition for review is denied.

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