alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

December 27, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

129266 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. JAMES HALL, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellant, Justices 

v SC: 129266 

 COA: 252162 
 Wayne CC: 03-329761-CZ

WAYNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 

SERVICES, LORENZO BLOUNT, E. GLANTON, 

EDMOND LEE HAYES, AFSCME COUNCIL 29,

and AFSCME LOCAL 101,

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 17, 2005 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

s1219 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

December 27, 2005 

Clerk
#### 970.2671-2 Contract clause.

The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 970.5226-1, Diversity Plan, in all management and operating contracts.

[65 FR 81009, Dec. 22, 2000, as amended at 75 FR 68221, Nov. 5, 2010]
#### Gus Lazides, Appellant, v Peter Kouzounas et al., Respondents.

[776 NYS2d 824]

*677In an action, inter alia, for an accounting, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated May 8, 2003, as denied that branch of his motion which was to consolidate this action with another pending action and as granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendants Peter Kouzounas and P&G Enterprises which was to dismiss the cause of action for an accounting as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly dismissed his cause of action for an accounting, related to his one-half interest in property formerly owned by the subject partnership, as time-barred pursuant to the applicable six-year statute of limitations *(see*Partnership Law § 74; CPLR 213 [1]; *Green v Albert,*199 AD2d 465, 466 [1993]).

In any event, the accounting cause of action was also barred by the rule prohibiting claim splitting. “The rule prohibiting claim splitting prohibits two actions on the same claim or parts thereof’ *(Charles E.S. McLeod, Inc. v Hamilton Moving & Stor.,*89 AD2d 863, 864 [1982]). The plaintiff has a pending action seeking an accounting on the same facts and with respect to the same issues as those raised in this action.

The parties’ remaining contention are without merit. Florio, J.P., Townes, Cozier and Mastro, JJ., concur.
No. 85027 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL H. 

HAMILTON, BAR NO. 7730. 

ORDER OF DISBARMENT 

The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board has filed, under SCR 

112, a petition for attorney Michael H. Hamilton's disbarment by consent. 

The petition is supported by Hamilton's affidavit, stating that he freely and 

voluntarily consents to disbarment, after having had the opportunity to 

consult with counsel. Hamilton acknowledges in the affidavit that he has 

not complied with the orders entered in three prior disciplinary proceedings: 

In re Discipline of Hamilton, No. 81256, 2020 WL 5512516 (Nev. Sept. 11, 

2020) (Order Approving Conditional Guilty Plea Agreement) (suspending 

attorney for four years to run concurrently with suspensions imposed in two 

other cases); In re Discipline of Hamilton, No. 80556, 2020 WL 2319994 

(Nev. May 8, 2020) (Order of Suspension) (imposing previously stayed 42-

month suspension based on attorney's failure to comply with conditions on 

stayed portion of the suspension); In re Discipline of Hamilton, No. 78101, 

2019 WL 2140630 (Nev. May 14, 2019) (Order Approving Conditional Guilty 

Plea) (suspending attorney for four years with 42 months of the suspension 

stayed subject to certain conditions). And he admits that he could not 

successfully defend against a disciplinary complaint based on his failure to 

comply with the prior disciplinary orders. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I947A • 
, J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Stiglich 

J.

Herndon 

2 

SCR 112 provides that an attorney who is the subject of a 

proceeding involving allegations of misconduct may consent to disbarment 

by delivering an affidavit to bar counsel, who must file it with this court. 

Hamilton's affidavit meets the requirements of SCR 112(1), and we 

conclude that the petition should be granted. Accordingly, Hamilton is 

disbarred. The provisions of SCR 115 and SCR 121.1 governing notice and 

publication of orders of disbarment shall apply to this order. 

It is so ORDERED. 

Parraguirre 

J. J. 

Cadish Silver 

cc: Chair, Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board 

Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada 

Law Offices of Michael H. Hamilton 

Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada 

Admissions Officer, U.S. Supreme Court 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 1947A
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

KAISIM KEYES,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 65 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

KAISIM KEYES,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 66 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of August, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

SPECIALTY TIRES OF AMERICA,

INC.,

 Appellant,

v.

ELIO VIRAMONTES,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

 § 

No. 08-09-00152-CV

Appeal from the

346th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2005-1364)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is a joint motion to set aside the trial court’s judgment and remand

for entry of an agreed judgment pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(2). The motion is granted. We

therefore set aside the trial court’s judgment without regard to the merits and remand the cause to

the trial court for rendition of judgment in accordance with the parties’ agreement. We further order

costs be assessed against the party incurring same.

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice

October 7, 2009

Before Chew, C.J., McClure, and Rivera, JJ.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-95,160-01

EX PARTE HARRY LEE GRADNEY, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 1472795-A IN THE 208TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam. YEARY, J. concurred.

O P I N I O N

Applicant pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eight

months’ imprisonment under Texas Penal Code § 12.44(a). Applicant did not file a direct appeal.

Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the

district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.

Applicant discharged this sentence in 2016. The habeas court finds credible Applicant’s

assertion that he suffers current and potential future consequences arising from this conviction,

including trouble finding a job; enhanced penalties for future convictions; and potential

impeachment of his credibility in future judicial hearings. Therefore, Applicant is “confined” for

purposes of Article 11.07.
2

Applicant claims that he was denied due process through the use of material false evidence,

and that his guilty plea was involuntary. These claims relate to the discovery of misconduct by

former Houston Police Officer Gerald Goines, who was the primary officer involved in the alleged

offense. Based on the record, the habeas court finds that Applicant was denied due process by the

use of material false evidence against him, and that Applicant’s guilty plea was involuntary. Ex parte

Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). The habeas court recommends granting relief on false evidence and involuntary plea

grounds. We agree.

Relief is granted. Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The

judgment in cause number 147279501010 in the 208th District Court of Harris County is set aside.

Applicant shall answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any

necessary orders within ten days from the date of this Court’s mandate.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of CriminalJustice–Correctional

Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Delivered: October 18, 2023

Do not publish
----

----

|   | 1.   The      Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of      1934, as amended; and |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2.   The      information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      the LP. |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: July 11,      2008                                                                                                    |   |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|                                                                                                                             |   |   |
| /s/      Mark Gatto                                                                                                              |   |   |
| Mark      Gatto                                                                                                                  |   |   |
| Co-Chief      Executive Officer and Co-PresidentICON      Capital Corp.General      Partner of ICON Income Fund Eight BL.P. |
#### 970.2701 General.
§ 1.149 Subpoenas.[3] ( a ) *Issuance of subpoenas.* The attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence from any place in the United States on behalf of any party to the proceeding may be required by subpoena at any designated place of hearing if authorized by the statute under which the proceeding is conducted. Subpoenas shall be issued by the Judge upon a reasonable showing by the applicant of the grounds and necessity thereof; and with respect to subpoenas for the production of documents, the request shall also show their competency, relevancy, and materiality. All requests for subpoenas shall be in writing, unless waived by the Judge for good cause shown. Except for good cause shown, requests for subpoenas shall be received by the Judge at least 10 days prior to the date set for the hearing.
( b ) *Service of subpoenas.* Subpoenas may be served by any person not less than 18 years of age. The party at whose instance a subpoena is issued shall be responsible for service thereof. Subpoenas shall be served as provided in § 1.147.
[42 FR 743, Jan. 4, 1977, as amended at 55 FR 30674, July 27, 1990; 60 FR 8457, Feb. 14, 1995; 68 FR 6341, Feb. 7, 2003] Footnotes -
1.149
[3] This section relates only to subpoenas for the stated purpose and has no relevance with respect to investigatory subpoenas.
Second Department,

June, 1962

(June 4, 1962)

#### Elene A. Ayers, Respondent, v. Horace E. Ayers, Appellant.

In an action by the plaintiff wife for a separation, in which judgment was rendered on September 22, 1953 after trial, granting her a separation and directing the defendant husband to pay her alimony of $75 a week, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated May 31, 1961, which referred to an Official Referee of the Supreme Court, for hearing and report, both the defendant’s motion to reduce such alimony to $5 a week and the plaintiff’s cross motion for a counsel fee to oppose defendant’s said motion for the reduction. Appeal dismissed, without costs. An order of reference to hear and report is not appealable. We have considered the merits of the appeal, however, and if we did not dismiss we would have affirmed the order in any event. Beldock, P. J., Brennan, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 11
                                                      Certifications pursuant to
                                                               Exchange Act Rule
                                                     13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b)

                                  CERTIFICATION
           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Petrofund Energy Trust ("Petrofund") is filing its annual report on Form 40-F
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report") with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission.

I, Jeffrey E. Errico, President and Chief Executive Officer of Petrofund,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Petrofund.

Dated: March 15, 2004

                               /s/  JEFFREY E. ERRICO
                               --------------------------------------------
                               Jeffrey E. Errico
                               President and Chief Executive Officer


<PAGE>


                                  CERTIFICATION
           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Petrofund Energy Trust ("Petrofund") is filing its annual report on Form 40-F
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report") with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission.

I, Vince P. Moyer, Senior Vice-President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Petrofund.

Dated: March 15, 2004

                                      /s/  VINCE P. MOYER
                                      ----------------------------------------
                                      Vince P. Moyer
                                      Senior Vice-President, Finance and
                                      Chief Financial Officer
#### § 1.194 Filing and service of documents.

Any application for an award or other pleading or document related to an application shall be filed and served on all parties to the proceeding in the same manner as other pleadings in the proceeding except as provided in § 1.191 of this part for confidential financial information. The provisions relating to filing, service, extensions of time, and computation of time contained in § 1.147 of this part are incorporated into and made applicable to this subpart, except that the statutory 30 day time limit on filing the application as set out in § 1.193 of this part may not be extended.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carl Williams, Appellant.

[775 NYS2d 864]

*345Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene Silver-man, J.), rendered August 29, 2001, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 6 years to life, unanimously affirmed. The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. There is' no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record *(see People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]).

The court properly exercised its discretion in imposing reasonable limitations on defendant’s direct and cross-examination of witnesses at the hearing *(see Delaware v Van Arsdall,*475 US 673, 678-679 [1986]). The precluded inquiries were improper in form or irrelevant, and defendant received ample opportunity to develop relevant matters. Defendant’s remaining complaints about the court’s conduct do not warrant a new hearing *(see e.g. People v Robinson,*3 AD3d 404 [2004]).

Defendant’s claims regarding his adjudication as a predicate felon are unpreserved *(see People v Smith,*73 NY2d 961 [1989]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the sentencing court substantially complied with the statutory procedures *(see*CPL 400.21; *People v Bouyea,*64 NY2d 1140 [1985]), and that defendant was properly adjudicated a second felony offender based upon his New Jersey conviction (NJ Stat Ann § 2C:35-7), in that it was undisputed that the prior conviction involved cocaine and not marijuana *(see People v Bell,*259 AD2d 429 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 922 [1999]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Sullivan, Ellerin and Williams, JJ.
#### PLANT, Respondent, v. BAHR, Appellant.

upreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth apartment.

March 7, 1906.)

Action by SoloDn Plant against Mary Bahr.

No opinion, otion for leave to appeal to the Court of Apals granted.
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002**

 

I, James E. Rogers, certifythat:

 

1. I have reviewed thisquarterly report on Form 10-Q of Cinergy Corp., The Cincinnati Gas &Electric Company, PSI Energy, Inc., and The Union Light, Heat and PowerCompany;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, thisreport does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, thefinancial statements, and other financial information included in this report,fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrants as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;

 

4. The registrants’ othercertifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrants and have:

 

a)    Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrants, including their consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)   Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrants’ disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c)    Disclosedin this report any change in the registrants’ internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrants’ most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrants’ fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrants’ internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrants’ othercertifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluationof internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants’ auditors andthe audit committee of the registrants’ board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

 

a)    Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrants’ ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)   Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrants’ internal control over financialreporting.

 

 

Date: November 13, 2003

 

 
| /s/ James E. Rogers     |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| James E. Rogers         |   |
| Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

----
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</TABLE>
LEROY FERGUSON, SR. , Appellant,

v. GEO GROUP, INC., ETC. , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 14

- 2373

_____________________________/ Opinion filed July 28, 2014. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County

. John F. Simon, Jr. , Judge

. Leroy Ferguson, Sr., pro se , Appellant. No appearance for Appellee.
PER CURIAM. Upon consideration of app ellant’s response to the Court’s order of May 30, 2014, the Court has determined that its jurisdiction was not timely invoked. It appears that appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed with the court within 30 days of rendition of the order on appeal. A ppellant’s attempt to file a notice of appeal by serving it on opposing counsel did not invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. PADOVANO, WETHERELL, and MAKAR , J J

. , CONCUR.
#### 9904.415-61 Interpretation. [Reserved]