Filed 12/10/20 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Edgerrin J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent ,

v. EDGERRIN J., Defendant and Appellant. D076461 (Super. Ct. No. J239465)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING

NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

In re Jamar D ., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respon dent,

v. JAMAR D., Defendant and Appellant. D076462 (Super. Ct. No. J242137)2

THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed on November 20, 2020 be modified to delete the image on page 11 of the opinion and replace it with the following
redac ted image:

Respondent’s petition for rehearing is denied. There is no change in judgment.

HALLER, Acting P. J.
Copies to: All partiesFiled 11/20/20 (unmodified opinion with modified pho to ) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Edgerrin J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. EDGERRIN J., Defendan t and Appellant. D076461

(Super. Ct. No. J239465)

In re Jamar D ., a Person Co ming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JAMAR D., Defendant and Appellant. D076462

(Super. Ct. No. J242137)

APPEAL f

rom judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Browder A. Willis, Judge. Rev ersed and remanded with directions. Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Edgerrin J.2

Christine M. Aros, under appointmen t by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jamar D. Xavier Becerra, Attorne y General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers , Christopher P. Beesley, Robin Urbanski, and G enevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent

.

After rec eiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were “acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, ac tivating emergency lights in one.
P ark ing behind the Mercedes , the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and ask ed the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was o n probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The o fficers searched the
vehicle an d recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery. The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming
their initial d etention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding
the encounter was consensu al rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed.
In this consolidated a ppeal, 1 two of the minors

— Edgerrin J. and Jamar
D.

— challenge the denial of their suppre ssion motions. They argue the

1 After both appeals were fully bri efed, we consolidated on our own motion People v. Ed

gerrin J. (D076461) and People v. Jamar D. (D076462) for purposes of decision, as both appeals involve the same facts, challenge the same ruling, and raise similar issues. (See, e.g., People v. Lieng (20 10) 1903

juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual and claim the citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them . We agree on both points. But there was conflicting evidence as to whether officers
knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth
Amendment waiver. Becaus e the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address th ese other issues, we reverse and remand for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance.

FACTUAL AND PROC EDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Police contact and search On March 13, 2019, SDPD o fficer Jerrad Schnautz was on patrol with his partner Willis Short in the Encanto neighborhood of southeast San Diego. At around 6:00 p.m., the two were parked on Madera Street alon g with fellow officers Kyle Williams and Samuel Euler. As the four officers dealt w ith an unrelated issue, a driver approaching southbound on Madera stopped her car in the middle of the street and stepped out. She said she lived nearby , provided her a ddress, and reported there were Black males in a parked black
Mercedes on her street wh o were “acting shady.” After receiving the tip, all
four officers drove three blocks to the location in two separate police vehicles. When they arrived , the officers found a legally parked black Mercedes with three young Black males inside. Williams a nd Euler parked directly behind the Mercedes, activating their vehicle’s emergency lights; Schnautz and Short pulled up behind them but did not activate their lights. T he four officers stepped out, walked over to the Mercedes, and positioned themselves

at each door to prevent its three occupants from leaving.
Cal.App.4th 1213, 1218.) Because only Edger rin requested oral argument, consolidation did not affect the hearing.4

When the officers asked the vehicle occupants for their names and information, Edgerrin (sitting in the driver ’s seat) initially gave a false name. Schnautz went back to his patrol vehicle to perf orm records checks on all three occupants. Upon learning Edgerrin’s identity and confirming that he was on probation subject to a condition waiving his Fourth Amendment rights (Fourth waiver), officers searched the Mercedes and recovered a loaded firearm underneath the driver’s seat, a pair of sneakers connected to a robbery, and a clear white canister containing marijuana. The minors were
arrested.
2. Charges and Moti ons to Suppress The San Diego County District Attorney filed petitions under Welfare

a nd Institutions Code section 602 accusing Edgerrin and Jamar of robbery (Pen. Code, 2 § 211), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and various

weapons
- related ch arges along with associated enhancements . Edgerrin was additionally charged with provi ding false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a), count 8). Defendants moved to suppress evidence obtained from the Mercedes. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700 .1.) 3 The People opposed the suppression motions, arguing in their briefs
that offic ers discovered Edgerrin’s Fourth waiver during “a consent [ sic ] encounter with the minors.” Although Officer Williams activated his emergency lights in parking behind t he Mercedes, the prosecution claimed this was done to “warn on

- coming traffic of office rs on foot,” and all officers proceeded to the vehicle “on foot in a slow and calm walk.” Alternatively, the People claimed that the officers had reasonable suspicion t o detain the

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 Our record does not disclose the charges filed against the t hird minor, D.W. , whose suppression motion was also considered at the same hearing.5

minors based on the citizen ’s tip. They argued that Encanto was a neighbo rhood where “[g]ang violence and violent crime [are] a fact of life” causing residents “to be hyper

- vigilant of suspicious, or shady, activity,” and it was significant t hat the tipster “felt the conduct she saw rose to the level of needing to flag down and tell the police.”
3. Hearing and Ruling T he suppression motions were heard by Judge Willis. The People examined SDPD gang detective Amalia Sidhu and Officer Schnautz , and the court reviewed footage from Schnautz’s bodyworn camera (BWC) depicting office rs’ encounter with the minors and the subsequent search. The principal factual dispute between the parties centered on what Schnautz and the other officers knew about E dgerrin at the time they approached the Mercedes. The prosecution relied on testimony by Sidhu and Schnautz suggesting the officers knew by then that Edgerrin was a Lincoln Park gang member in rival gang territory, driving a black Mercedes, and on probati on with a Fourth waiver. Defense counsel vigorously challenged this account, questioni ng why such information was omitted from police reports and conflicted with the officers’ behavior in the BWC footage. 4 As noted, the prosecution identified two theorie s in its written opposition

— either the encounter was consensual, or there was reasonabl e suspicion to detain based on the citizen tip. At the hearing, the prosecutor expanded on these theories. Relying on testimony that officers knew beforehand of Edgerr in’s active Fourth waiver, he suggested it was a straightforward “Fourth waiver probati on search.” Alternatively, the prosecutor claimed there was reasonable suspicion to detain the minors based

4 To avoid repetition, the parties’ competing accounts are detail ed in the discussion.6

on officers’ awareness that Edgerrin was a gang member in ri val gang territory around a gang holiday

— “this is reasonable suspicion, pure and simple , even without the Fourth waiver, knowing who he is, knowing when it was, knowing where he was.” “And then you layer into that, we have a
civilian who lives in this nei ghborhood actively and affirmatively approaching gang unit officers .

. . flagging them down, telling them that this is shady.” Edgerrin’s counsel responded that the prosecution was using the ends to justify the means. Despite Sidhu’s testimony about w hat she told patrol officers, neither of her reports disclosed what transpired before t he stop, leaving the court with a “credibility issue.” And the citizen tip that people were “acting shady” was too vague to create reasonable suspicion that
criminal ac tivity was afoot. Although officers could have stopped to ask a few questions, they in stead “drove up in two separate cars, lights already on, up behind a Mercedes [whose] license plate they didn’t check. They had no idea who was in that vehicle,” as the BWC video seemed to confirm. At that point, the juvenile court interjected, asking “ Where was the stop? There was no stop in this circumstance.” The court rejected counsel’s assertion that a stop occurred when the officers pulled up, lights on, behind the Mercedes. Instead, the judge described what transpired as a proper “consensual en counter” following a citizen tip. After hearing from remaining defense counsel, the court denied the suppression motions , finding that no detention had occurred. As it explained, the officers had a right to be at that location and check on the vehicle after receiving the citizen tip. The court reasoned that at each step, the officers’ actions were lawful

— their initial investigation was justified by the tip, their

enc ounter with the minors remained consensual, and once they confirmed7

that Edgerrin was s ubject to a Fourth waiver, they could legally search the
vehicle. 5

4. Subsequent Proceedings Jamar admitted to robbery (§ 211) and the associated gang and firearm
enh ancements charged in count 1, and all remaining charges were dismissed. He was adjudge d a ward of the court and committed to Urban Camp, with his commitment stayed while he was placed on probation. Edgerrin admitted to assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd . (a)(2)) and the associated gang enhancement charged in count 2, and the charges remai ning against him
were likewise dismissed. The court committed Edgerrin to the Youthful Offender Unit Program, setting his maximum custody at 12 years, 4 months
with a c ustodial program not exceeding 480 days. DISCUSSION Challenging the suppression ruli ng, defendants argue the juvenile court erred in concluding the officers were engaged in a consensual encounter when they activated their lights, parked behind the Merce des, and surrounded the vehicle. They claim this conduct instead amounted to a
detenti on, for which the vague citizen tip did not provide reasonable suspicion. The People respond that the court could reasonably find that no detention occurred. And even otherwise, they suggest the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the minors base d on facts they knew at the
time. As we explain, there is no question a detention occurred. We further agree with defendants that the bare citizen tip of “shady” behav ior in this

5 As will be discussed, the judge focused on the fact that the officers made no exc essive show of authority by drawing weapons or activ ating their sirens, and although they had activated their lights, officers acted as though the encounter was consensual.8

case does not, without more, furnish reasonable suspicion. Nevertheless, w e must remand for further proceedings to permit the juvenile court to consider whether the detention and subsequent search could otherwise be justified by facts officers might have known about Edgerrin prior to the stop. Specifically, there were conflicti ng accounts at the suppression hearing as to whether officers knew at the time they approached the Mercedes that Edgerrin was inside with an active Fourth waiver, and/or that he was a gang member in rival gang territory. The evidence on these matters is h eavily contested, and competing inferences could be drawn. Because the juvenile court erroneously focused on whether the encounter was consensual, it had
no occasion to make a factual finding as to what facts the officers knew in making the detention. Re mand is therefore appropriate for the court to make such findings in the first instance.
1. Standard of review The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pr otects against unreasonable searches and seizures, including brief investigatory stops. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend

. ; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229 ( Souza ).) The appeals before us turn on whether a detention occurred and, if it did, whether it wa s lawful. These questions present mixed issues of law and fact. (See People v. Zamudi o (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.) In reviewing a suppression motion, the trial court is vested with the power to assess witness credibility, resolve evidentiary conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences; its findings are upheld on appeal so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673−674.) However, we exercise our independent judgment in determining whet her on these facts the challenged search or seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975 ( Brown )

. )
2. The minors were detained

.9

“An officer may approach a person in a public place and ask if the person is willin g to answer questions. If the person voluntarily answers, those responses, and the off icer's observations, are admissible in a criminal prosecution.” ( Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 974.) “Such consensual encounters present no constitutional concerns an d do not require justification.” ( Ibid. ) “However, ‘when the officer, by means of phy sical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,’ the officer effects a seizure of that person, which must be justified under the
F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” ( Ibid. ; quoting Terry v. Ohio (196 8) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 ( Terry ).) When an individual submits to a show of authority, “ ‘a seizure occurs if “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident , a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave,” [Citation].’ ” ( B rendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 255 ( Brendlin ); Brown , at p. 974.) Here, we readily conclude the minors were detained. Two marked police vehicles pulled up behind the legally parked Mercedes. As Detective Sidhu explained, this practice is cal led “contact and cover” and is designed to let people know there is more than one police vehicle present. The first of the vehicles to park behind the Mercedes activate d its lights. Though there is no bright

- line rule that activating lights always consti tutes a detention, the “Supreme Court has long recognized that activating sirens or flashing lights can amount to a show of authority.” ( Brown , supra , 61 Cal.4th at pp. 978, 980.) Even if a stop did not occur with the officers’ arrival on the scene, it plainly occurred immediately thereafter when four officers stepped out of their vehicles after parking and walked to each door of the sedan for the admitted purpose of preventing its occupants from leaving. The minors were10

directed to roll down their win dows, hand over proof of identification, and provide their names, addresses, and birthdays. When Edgerrin asked if he could call his father, Officer Williams ordered hi m, “Stay off this phone.
I don’t want you to do any of that kind of stuff, okay?” Jam ar spelled his name for officers and gave his date of birth, but when he could not provide proof of identification, Officer Short warned him, “don’t lie to me” and state d the officers were “not gonna leave here until we find out” his real name.
Under thes e facts, no reasonable person in defendants’ position would feel free to leave. ( Brendlin, supra , 551 U.S. at pp. 255, 257; see Brown, supra,
61 Cal.4th at pp. 977−980 [defendant was detained when deputy stopped behind his parked car and activated his lig hts].) Instead, a reasonable person in the minors’ position “would have perceived [the officers’] actions as a show of authority, directed at [them] and requiring that [they] submit by remaining where [they] [were].” ( Brown , at p. 978.) The juvenile cou rt found otherwise based on footage from Officer Schnautz’s bodyworn camera. Having requested transmission of that exhibit (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.2 2 4(d)) and revi ewed the video, we reach the opposite conclusion. While the officers seemed calm, cour teous, and used a conversational tone with the minors, there is no question a detention occurred. Overt displays of authority, such as drawing a gun or barking out

pere mptory commands, are not essential for police officers to establish control
and curtail an individual’s ability to leave. Specifically, the video shows a police vehicle with activated lights parked behind the Mercedes on a quiet, two

- way residential str eet. Williams and Euler step out and walk toward the two front doors of the Mercedes a s Schnautz pulls in behind. Schnautz parks behind Williams’s vehicle, and he and Short immediately step out and walk toward the two rear doors of the11

Mercedes. William s directs Edgerrin to roll down his windows and tells him they were there because peopl e reported something shady was going on. By then, Schnautz and Short reach the rear doors, and all four officers engage with its occupants. This still frame from the v ideo plainly reflects a show of authority and submission by the occupants inside:

Fa ced with this record, the People appropriately concede that the evidence supports “a reasonable conclusion that there was, in fact, a detention.” Indeed, that is the on ly reasonable conclusion.
3. Uncontested evidence does not furnish lawful justificati on for the stop

. Because the encounter was not consensual, the officers required legal justification to detain the minors. In their opposition brief below, the People maintained that the citizen tip, standing alone, furnished reasonable suspicion for a d etention. At the hearing the prosecutor shifted gears, arguing in closing that the tip furnished reasonable suspicion in combination
with officers’ prior knowledge that Edgerrin was a gang member present in rival gang territory around a gang holiday. Sep arate and apart from these theories, the People argued for the first time at the suppression hearing that the officers knew beforehand that Edgerrin had an active Fourth waiver, making it “a straight

- up Fourth waiver probation search.”12

On appeal defenda nts contend the citizen tip did not, standing alone, furnish reasonable suspicion. Nor, in their view, could the detention be justified on the basis of Edgerrin’s proba tion status, as “the record leaves considerable ambiguity regarding whether the officer in fact knew about this status prior to the stop.” The People respond that there was reasonable suspicion because the citizen report of “shady” activity by occupants o f a
black Mercedes amplified officers’ preexisting knowledge that Edgerrin was a

gang m ember driving a black Mercedes in rival gang territory. Moreover, the People further claim that officers knew from Detective Sidhu that Edgerrin was on probation with a n active Fourth waiver. Addressing these arguments in turn, we conclude the vague ci tizen tip of “shady” behavior did not, standing alone, furnish reasonable suspicion for a detention. As to whether there were additional facts known to the officers
tha t could support the citizen tip

— or whether officers knew of Edgerrin’s
active Fourth wa iver at the time they initiated contact

— the facts are heavily contested, and no credibility finding was made by the juvenile court. Accordingly, on the present record t he detention and subsequent search cannot be justified on this potential alternative gr ound. It will be for the juvenile court on remand to make the necessary factual findings and determine whether the officers in fact had enough additional information to constitute reasonable suspicion.

a. Legal Principles Although a brief investigatory d etention need not be supported by probable cause, it must be based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot

— i.e., “specific articulable facts that, consid ered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestatio n that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” ( Souza, supra,
9 Cal.4th at pp. 230−231; see Navarette v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393, 39613

( Navaret te ); Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22.) The reasonable suspicion standard is objective in nature, “based on the facts and circumstances known
to the officer but without re gard to the officer’s subjective state of mind.” ( People v. Flores (2019) 38 Cal.App .5th 617, 626.) Mere rumor or hunch do not suffice. (See Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 981; Navarette , at p. 397; Terry, at p. 22; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 8 93.) “[W]here a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, ‘the public rightf ully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances “in the proper exercise of the officer's duties.” ’ ” ( People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.)
Re asonable suspicion is, of course, unnecessary here if the officers knew that Edgerrin was inside the black Mercedes and subject to an active Fourth waiver at the time they approached the vehicle. But such knowledge must exist at the time of the stop; afte r
- acquired knowledge of a probation search condition cannot justify an otherwise unla wful detention or search. (See In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 133 ( Jaime P. ) .)
b. The citizen tip
, by itself, did not provide reasonable suspicion for a detention. In its opposition papers and at the suppression hearing, the prosecution
relied on the citizen tip to argue in whole or in part that there was reasonable suspicion to detain the minors. Defendants maintain that this tip, standing alone, did not suffice. We agree with defendants. “The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify a stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability.’ ” ( Navarette, supra, 572 U.S. at p. 397; Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4 th at p. 981.) Where officers rely on a citizen’s tip, that tip must be “ ‘reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’ ” ( People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 471 ( Dolly ).) “A tip’s reliability depends upon an assessment of ‘the totality of the circumstances in14

a given case.’ ” ( Id. at p. 464.) “One simple rule will not cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or re quire further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.” ( Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 147.) Both quantity and quality matter: “ if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip we re more reliable.” (

Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330 ( White ).) Case law offers useful guideposts on the reliability requirement for citizen tips . In White, sup ra, 496 U.S. 325, an anonymous tip that a woman would drive from a particular apartme nt building to a particular motel in a station wagon with a broken right taillight, transporting cocaine, was sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion once off icers corroborated the innocent details. ( Id. at pp. 331

‒ 332.) A 911 caller’s tip t hat she had been run off the highway was likewise sufficiently reliable in Navarette where the caller identified the make and model of the vehicle, recited the license plate number, made a contemporaneous report, and used the 91 1 emergency system. ( Navare tte, supra, 572 U.S. at pp. 399−400.) Similarly, in
Brown , officers had reasonable suspicion for a detention based on a 911 call reporting a violent fight. ( Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 982

‒ 983.) “[The] caller’s eyewitness knowledge, contemporaneous reporting, use of the 911 system, and confirmation of his address”

— in addition to his overhearing one of the people in the fight claim to have a loaded gun

— “all provided additional indicia of reliability.” ( Id. at p. 982.) Fin ally in Dolly, supra, 40 Cal .4th 458, an anonymous tip by a 911 caller that “a light

- skinned African

- American male had ‘just pulled a gun’ on him and had mentioned a gang name” was15

sufficiently reliable because the caller provided key details about the

per petrator that could be corro borated by police. ( Id. at p. 462.) In contrast to these cases, there was no reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk a minor in Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266 ( J.L. ) , where police
received an anonymous telephone tip clai ming a young Black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a firearm. The tipster did not explain how he knew this information or suggest any particular familiarity
with the suspect , and the tip itself included no predictions of future b ehavior
that could be corrob orated to assess his credibility. ( Id. at pp. 271−272.) The court rejected the state’s contention that the tip was reliable because “there really was a young [B]lack male wearing a plaid shirt at the bus stop” as the tipster d escribed

— reasonable suspicio n required “that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” ( Ibid. ) Turning to our record, Officer Schnautz testified a t the suppression hearing that he and hi s three colleagues were park ed on the northbound side of Madera Street when, around 6:05 p.m., a female driver approaching them southbound stopped and flagged them down. The driver told officers that she
lived on a street nearby, where a parked black Merc edes was occupied by
Black m ales who were “acting shady.” Although the tipster “didn’t elaborate on what she meant” by “acting shady,” officers decided to make contact with occupants of the vehicle. The BWC footage supports this account; after receiving the tip, the officers immedi ately drove a few blocks to the specified16

street and approached the Mercedes. 6 As we explain, this report of “shady” behavior lacked the requisite indicia of reliability

— particularly as to the assertion of illegality

— to be used as the sole justification f or the detention. “[P]rivate citizens who report criminal activity generally have no bias or motive other than good citizenship, and therefore tend to be reliable.” ( Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 982.) Tips are even more rel iable where “officers had th e opportunity to see the tipsters, observe them face

- to

- face and evaluate their credibility.” ( People v. Coulombe (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 52, 58 ( Coulombe ).) The tipster in this case spoke to officers face

- to

- face and
revealed h er address, providing some m eans of tracking her down. ( Brown, at p. 982.) Although not established by Schnautz’s testimony, it seems plausible that she was speaking from personal knowledge as someone who had just witnessed something she believed was “sh ady” behavior. ( Id. at

p. 9 81; but see J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at pp. 271

‒ 272 [anonymous tip was insufficiently reliable where the informant “neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had information about [the defe ndant]”].) Even so, a rel iability problem arises from the information the tipster conveyed. Although she contacted police in person and left identifying information, her tip provided only a vague and highly subjective characterization of the behavior s he saw. What is “shady” to one person may

6 The BWC footage shows the tipster’s conversation with officers and the events t hat follow, albeit without audio. A woman emerges f rom her vehicle and approaches the officers . Schnautz talks to her for about 40 seconds. He then walks to his car, gestures as if to direct Officer Williams in the other police vehicle to lead the way, and drives several blocks to where Williams is parke d directly behind the black Mercedes, lights flashing. Schnautz pulls in behind Williams’s patrol car, parks, and immediately steps out. At this point the audio begins.17

be unremarkable to another. Standing alone, nothing the tipster said was “reliable in its assertion of illegality.” ( J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 272.) Although officers confirmed the presence of Black males in a black Mercedes parked on t he specified street , this could not cure the tip’s central defect

— the car was legally parked, and officers did not observe any indicia of criminal activity when they arrived. On this record, the citizen’s tip was insufficiently
reliable as to any illegal behavior to provide a basis for a detention. ( Id. at pp. 271−272; see, e.g., Coulombe, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 57 [finding reasonable suspicion from contemporaneous in

- person citizen reports that someone fitting defendant’s description was carrying a firearm amongst a crowd of New Year’s Eve revelers ].) In isolation, an allegation of “shady” behavior is far too vague to suggest criminal activity. “Even a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that ‘cr iminal activity may be afoot.’ ” ( Navarette, supra
, 572 U.S. at p. 401 [finding reasonable suspicion where conduct alleged by 911 caller suggested drunk driving].) Just as a Terry stop may not rest on “bare

- boned tips” about guns or narcotics ( J.L.,

supr a, 529 U.S. at p. 273), a detention cannot be based solely on a citizen tip that someone is acting “shady.” Even Schnautz struggled to define what “acting shady” meant, testifying it could convey anything from a person casing cars or looking to commit bur glary to being “in the area for any
unknown reasons .” As Edgerrin’s counsel remarked at the suppression hearing, “shady” can mean any number of things, and does not necessarily suggest a crime is occurring. It follows that a bare

- bones tip of shady
behav ior conveys no more than a mere hunch of criminal a ctivity, which does not suffice to justify a stop. ( Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 981; Navarette,

supra, 572 U.S. at p. 397.)18

We pause here to clarify that, confronted with a tip that was insufficient t o create reasonable suspicion, officers were noneth eless entitled to investigate further. As the juvenile court stated, they had a right to drive
to the location after receiving the tip. Once there, t hey could have made additional observations before app roaching or attempted a consensual encounter by ask ing if the minors were willing to answer a few questions. What they could not do, without more, was immediately detain the minors. Here, it was uncontroverted that officers conducted no additional
invest igation after receiving the tip. Accordingly, unle ss they possessed
additional prior knowledge to justify the detention

— an issue the parties strenuously dispute

— their actions were unlawful.

c

. Basing reasonable suspicion on other contextual evidence would require a credibility assessment the juvenile cour t did not make

. Contending there were additional factors at play, the People assert that Schnautz made the stop based on his knowledge that Edgerrin was a gang
member in rival territory combined with the citizen tip. True enough, Schnautz testified on di rect that he was helping Detective Sidhu with her surveillance on Edgerrin earlier that day and that she had informed him that Edgerrin was “a Lincoln Park gang member” present “in a rival set neighborhood .” Schnautz further claimed to know beforehand tha t Edgerrin
drove a black Mercedes and was on probation with an active Fourth waiver. Upon receiving the citizen tip, Schanutz claimed he suspected that Edgerrin was inside and “could be looking to commit some kind of act of violence against any rival set gang member.” Sidhu’s t estimony supported this version of events . She claimed on direct to know prior to the day of the stop that Edgerrin was on probation
with a Fourth waiver . I n surveilling Edgerri n that afternoon, she said she
saw him in a black M ercedes bearing the same license plate as the car later19

stopped. Sidhu testified that she relayed to Schnautz and other officers that Edgerrin was in a black Mercedes with an active Fourth waiver. She wa s unequivocal that officers knew Edgerrin’s probati on status before making the stop. While these contextual facts would surely affect our “totality of circumstances” analysis for reasonable suspicion (or justify the search outright as a straightforward probation search), we cannot rely on them to affirm for the simple reason that they were heavily disputed, with no credibility finding made by the juvenile court. Defense counsel vigorously challenged what officers knew in making the stop. As we describe below, the court at times cut off this inquiry, an d it did not ultimately make a credibility finding as to facts that were unnecessary to its (ultimately incorrect) decision
that no detention occurred . “Thus, we do not have before us any express or impli ed findings of fact and determinations of credibili ty that might permit us to uphold the search on this theory.” ( People v. Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1198.) 7 For example, defense counsel noted while c ross
- examining Detective Sidhu that her police reports on March 14 and 26 did not mention surveilling Edgerrin that afternoon or informing other officers about his Fourth waiver or the Mercedes. When Sidhu replied that she conveyed this information verbally to Schnautz and other officers over the radio, counsel for Edgerrin questioned why ther e was no such reference in the computer

- aided dispatch (CAD) generated in this case. The court stopped this inquiry, finding it “far

7 Edgerrin suggests the court m ade an implied finding that officers knew about his Fourth waiver only after making the stop. But we do not read the court’s comment that the Fourth waiver “came up” in the midst of a consensual encounter to suggest any implied finding that the officers w ere unaware of Edgerrin’s Fourth waiver (or other at tendant circumstances) before they approached the Mercedes.20

enough afield.” Edgerrin’s counsel eventually established that police reports are written in chronological order, and Sid hu’s reports did not mention seeing Edgerrin in a black Mercedes earlier that day nor reference any records check performed on Edgerrin prior to the stop. The first mention of a records check in Sidhu’s r eports instead followed her description of the stop . Once more, the court sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection, halting further inquiry. Defense counsel likewise identified several discrepancies in Schnautz’s account. Schnautz testified he ha d reviewed Officer Williams’s arrest report and fou nd it “accurate,” but conceded it contained nothing “related to Edgerrin [J.] driving around a black Mercedes” prior to his detention. Schnautz likewise did not recall being informed at any point about a license plate number for a particular black Mercede s. Edgerrin’s counsel then probed Schnautz’s “initial

. . . reasons for approaching the vehicle.” As Schnautz conceded, the tipster had simply conveyed that “there [were] some guys in a black Mercedes th at seemed shady.” This prompted him and the
three officers to drive directly to the location of the Mercedes, park, and step out of their vehicles to contact its occupants. Schnautz did not run the license plate before stepping out. He agreed he had no prior contact with Edgerrin before making the stop. Next up, Jamar’s attorney tried to pinpoint when Schnautz and Sidhu
had been in contact with each other . She asked Schnautz , “[Sidhu] didn’t relay any information to you on March 13 about Edgerrin [J. ]; correct?” Schnautz did not respond, invoking pr ivilege under Evidence Code section

1040. 8 After some discussion, the court permitted a “limited inquiry.” The

8 Evidence Code section 1040 protects “official information” acquired in confidence by a public employee during the course of his or her job, w hich21

question was read back, and Schnautz answered “Yes.” 9 Trying to clarify, counsel asked, “[a ]t what point in time did you receive this informat ion [from Sidhu] ?”

— but the court ended the inquiry, finding it irrelevant to whether
the encounter was consensual. When counsel asked whether either of the police reports Schnautz reviewed (authored by Wi lliams and Short) contained any information related to prior surveillance on Edgerrin, the court sustained the prosecutor’s objection, stating the topic had been covered by Edgerrin’s counsel. Schnautz did not recall anything in the police reports relatin g to officers’ prior knowledge of Edgerrin’s probat ion status, Fourth waiver, or gang affiliation. During closing arguments, Edgerrin’s counsel stated that there remained a “credibility issue” as to what transpired earlier that day, as officers’ alleged surveillance on Edgerrin was not reflected in any o f the police reports. He understandably relied on several apparent inconsistencies between the police testimony and t he BWC footage to suggest that officers “had no idea who was in that vehicle” when they surrounded it. For instance,

includes all evidence gathered in ongoing crimi nal investigations. ( County of Orange v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) Where the privilege is asserted in criminal proceedings, the court must consider the defendant’s due process inte rests

— the prosecution cannot commence criminal proce edings “and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.” ( United States v. Reynolds (1953) 345 U.S. 1, 12.) If the privilege is invoked, the defendant must make a prima facie showing for disclosure, upon which the court examines the party claiming privilege in camera to determine whether it should be upheld. ( People v. Montgomery (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1021; accord, In re Marcos B. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 299, 308 [defense counsel has the right to propose questions for the in camera hearing].)
9 Between the original question being framed in the negative, an evidentiary objection ca using a lengthy gap, and a readback, there may be some ambiguity in what Schnautz meant in answering “Yes.”22

Schnautz stumbled ov er how to spell or pronounce Edgerrin’s name and did not appear to know who he was. Not until he later ran a records check did Schnautz seem to realize that Edgerrin was on probation. Jamar’s counsel joi ned these arguments, further questioning the prosec utor’s claim that this was a straightforward probation search: “If it was so clear and simpl[e], then there would have been evidence of knowledge of this Fourth waiver prior to this hearing, prior to Dete ctive Sidhu sitting there on the stand.” Instead, prior communication about the Fourth waiver was not mentioned in reports prepared by Williams, Short, or Sidhu. Counsel maintained that there wasn’t “any credible information that there was knowledge that Edgerrin [J.] was on probation with a Fourth waive r prior to the stop.”
In summary , counsel for both Edgerrin and Jamar argued that Schnautz and Sidhu had made up a justification after the fact

— nothing in the police reports or BWC footage suggested tha t officers were surveilling Edgerrin that day, knew he was in a black Mercedes, knew he was a gang member in rival gang territory, or knew his probation and Fourth waiver status before making the stop. The juvenile court did not entertain these
credibilit y questions , cutting the defense inquiry short beca use it rejected at
the threshold that a detention occurred. “A detention may not be justified after the fact on a basis not relied on by the officer.” ( People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 647; see J aime P.
, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 133 [otherwise unl awful search of minor subject to probation search condition could not be justified by post

- search discovery of that condition].) Absent a factual finding as to what officers knew about Edgerrin at the tim e they first approached the Mercedes, we cannot
det ermine whether additional contextual evidence either provides reasonable23

suspicion for a detention, or justifies the search completely based on Edgerrin’s Fourth waiver. 10
d. Remand is necessary. Because justification for the stop turns on credibility as sessments that have yet to be made , remand is necessary. Following a hearing, the juvenile

court must make necessary factual findings as to what the officers knew when they stopped the minors. (See Peopl e v. Bowers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273 ( Bowe rs ) [remanding for the trial court to consider additional theories justifying the search]; People v. LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 168 [same].) 11
If the court determines that the officers knew Edger rin had an active Fourth waiver prior to the detent ion, that ends the inquiry. ( Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 134.) Likewise, if officers knew other contextual facts

— such

10 The only other evidence at the hearing concerned the neighborhood where the detention occurred. Schnautz described Encanto as a “high

- crime

area ,” with reports of drugs, prostitution, vehicular and residential burglaries, and stolen vehicles. While this may provide relevant context for the stop, “reasonable suspicion cannot be based solely on factors unrelated to the defendant, such as criminal a ctivity in the area.” ( People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 838; see People v. Walker (2012) 21 0 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1391 [“the fact that the detainee happens to find himself or herself in a high

crime neighborhood is, of itself, insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion for a peace officer to stop that person”]; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230 [“ ‘the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity’ ” (italics add ed)].)
11 At oral argument before this court Edgerrin and the People expressed different thoughts r egarding the proper scope of proceedings on remand. We leave this issue to the experienced trial judge, who can consider the parties’ positions and evaluat e whether to hold an entirely new suppression hearing or instead conduct a more limited proceeding t o make the necessary factual findings.24

as Edgerrin’s gang membership, his presence in rival gang territory, or his sig hting in a black Mercedes hours before the stop

— tho se facts might enhance the reliability of the citizen tip or, in their totality, create reasonable suspicion to justify the detention . If the court upholds the detention on one or both of these grounds, c rediting the officers’ accounts, it should deny the motions to suppress and reinstate the judgments. ( Bowers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273.) But if the court instead resolves the credibility questions in defendants’ favor and finds the search unlawf ul , it should grant the motions to suppress and aff ord Edgerrin and Jamar an opportunity to withdraw their guilty pleas. ( People v. Ruggles (1985) 39 Cal.3d 1, 13; People
v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 769.) 12

12 Our disposition eliminates the need to address Edgerrin’s final argument, conceded by the People, that the juveni le court failed to calculate his predisposition custody credits pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726. If the court on remand again denies Edgerrin’s suppression motion and reinstates the judgment, he will have the opportunity to seek

corr ection of the judgment to properly reflect the predisposition custody credits accrued.25 DISPOSITION The judgments in People v. Edgerr in J. (case No. J239465) and People
v. Jamar D. (ca se No. J242137) are reversed, and the matter s are remanded to the juvenile court with directions to vacate its order denying the motions to suppress and conduct a renewed suppression hearing, consistent wi th this opinion, to resolve credibility conflicts a s to what the officers knew at the time they detained defendants. If the court again denies the motions to suppress, it shall reinstate the judgments; but if it grants the motions, it shall afford defenda nts an opportunity to withdraw their guilty pleas. (See Bowers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274.)

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.Dato, J., Concurring.

I take the somewhat unusual step of concurring in my own majority opinion to add a few personal observations. Nearly a century ago Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote: “The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.” (Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921)

p. 168.) Nor should they. As our bro ader cultural views on racial injustice evolve, courts and judges are compelled to acknowledge and confront the problem. (See, e.g., B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 31 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [citing “the troubling racial dynamics that have resulted
in state

- sanctioned violence, including lethal violence, against Black people throughout our history to this very day”]; Utah v. Strieff (2016) 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2070−2071 (dis. opn. of Sotom ayor, J.) [“it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny” in suspicionless stops]; State v. Saintcalle (Wash. 2013) 309 P.3d 326, 341 ( Saintcalle ) [“Racial in equalities permeate our criminal justice system and present important moral issues we all must grapple with.”]; Glossip v. Gross (2015) 576 U.S. 863, 921 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.) [contemplating how conscious and unconscious bias affect jury determinations of relative culpability in capital cases “despite t heir legal irrelevance”].) Although he ultimately denied the suppression motion
, Judge Willis presciently anticipated issues that would soon stir our national consciousness when he remarked, “ Now, we c ould go into the social justice analysis of young [B ] lack men in [B] lack communities being over

- policed, directly or indirectly, and discuss all manner of circumstances. ” He declined to do so, however,2

believing “the law hasn't reached that point as of ye t. ” Speaking in May

20 19 , h e could not have known w hat a difference a year would make. 1
W e have resolved this appeal without delving into complex issues of race and policing, but I submit that as judges we must remain mindful of the
broader context in which this case arose. Three Black male teen ager s s itting in a legally parked vehicle were detained by four police officers

. The detention may have been based on nothing more than a tip from a woman

— who appears to be White

— that the teens were “acting sha dy.” In situations like this, law enforcement offic ers must be sensitive to how implicit biases might influence what passersby perceive as a threat , just as judges must appreciate how officers on the receiving end of a vague, subjective tip might interpre t the information they obtain. 2 (See, e.g., Saintce lle, supra, 309 P.3d at p. 335 [“we all live our lives with stereotypes that are ingrained and often unconscious, implicit biases that endure despite our best efforts to eliminate them”].) Similarly, rac ial dynamics can affect how officers’ actions are

pe rceived by someone in defendants’ shoes. (See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Warren (Mass. 2016) 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 [Black males in Boston who flee police “might just as easily be motivated by the desire to avoi d the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by the desire to hide criminal activity”];

1 Referencin g recent events, Jamar argues that even “in this day and age, [B]lack males continue to be reported to police for innocuous conduct.” H e lays some of the b lame on courts for justifying detentions “without more specific articulable facts.”
2 It is signif

icant that recent legislation “to ameliorate bias

- based injustice in the courtroom” will soon require all public

- facing court staff in this state to complet e implicit bias training. (Stats. 2020, ch. 418, §§ 1(b), 3 (Assem. Bill No. 242) .) Effective Janu ary 1, 2021, an amended Rule of Court will likewise mandate anti

- bias training for all judicial officers. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.469(e), as amended by the Judicial Council on Sept. 25, 2020.)3

Jamison v. McClendon (S.D. Miss., Aug. 4, 2020, No. 3:16

- CV

- 595

- CWR

- LRA) __ F.Supp.3d __ [2020 WL 4497723, at *22] [decades after the 1960 ’ s, “Black
male tee ns still report a ‘fear of police and a serious conc ern for their personal safety and mortality in the presence of police officers ’ ”].) Ultimately, t here are myriad ways in which racial perceptions and biases might surface in a given criminal case, as in everyday life. And while the police officers her e never inquired further to find out what exactly the tipster saw that concerned her, our opinion appropriately emphasizes the perils of relying solely on th is type of report as a basis to detain . To tha t end, the objective standard of reasonable suspicio n, which has always required more than a mere hunch to justify a detention, remains a vital safeguard for protecting our important Fourth Amendment rights.

DATO, J.