mbering the “Forgotten War”

U.S. Army Engineer Officers in Korea
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Remembering the “Forgotten War”: U.S. Army Engineer Officers in Korea /edited by Barry W. Fowle and John Lonnquest p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Korean War, 1950-1953--Participation, American. 2. United States.Army. Corps of Engineers--History. 3. Korean War, 1950-1953--Personalnarratives, American. I. Fowle, Barry W., 1930- II. Lonnquest, John C.(John Clayton), 1958- DS919.R45 2003 951.904’24--dc22

2003063661

 bridge

s the Naktong River

h Korea

anti-tank mine

p
embering the “Forgotten War”

U.S. Army Engineer Officers in Korea

Edited by

Barry W. Fowle

and

John C. Lonnquest

Office of History

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Alexandria, VA

July 2004

EP 870-1-66
icated to the Army engineers

 who worked, fought, and died during the Korean War.

“Our nation honors her sons and daughterswho answered the call to defend a countrythey never knew and a people they never met.”DedicationKorean War Veterans MemorialWashington, D.C.

National Park Service photo
v

Table of Contents

ter: June–September 1950

L. Rowny, X Corps Engineer......................................................................... 10

Hyzer, 3d Engineer Combat Battalion .......................................................... 14

 Johnson, 72d Engineer Combat Company .................................................... 20

on H. Davidson, 24th Infantry Division......................................................... 44

Trayers, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion........................................................ 48

B. Farnum, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion .................................................... 60

M. Bussey, 77th Engineer Combat Company ................................................. 66

ng: September 1950

L. Rowny, X Corps Engineer......................................................................... 88

 Roberts, Jr., 2d Engineer Special Brigade ................................................. 100

er, Jr., 19th Engineer Combat Group........................................................... 112

Pickett, 73d Engineer Combat Battalion .................................................... 116

D. Roush, 13th Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................. 120

...................................................................................................................ix

.................................................................................................................. xi

.................................................................................................................. xv

................................................................................................................... 1

................................................................................................................ 83
Remembering the Forgotten War

CHAPTER THREENorth to Yalu: September–December 1950

Lt. Col. Peter C. Hyzer, 3d Engineer Combat Battalion ........................................................ 130Maj. John H. Elder, Jr., 19th Engineer Combat Group........................................................... 1381st Lt. James A. Johnson, 5th Regimental Combat Team .................................................... 146Maj. Harold R. Parfitt, 2d Engineer Construction Group ...................................................... 158Col. Emerson C. Itschner, I Corps Engineer........................................................................ 1601st Lt. Walter S. Medding, 14th Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................ 172Col. Miles M. Dawson, Yokohama Engineer Depot Operations ............................................. 176Capt. Lawrence B. Farnum, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion .................................................. 1782d Lt. James L. Trayers, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion ...................................................... 200Capt. Delbert M. Fowler, IX Corps Engineer Section ........................................................... 204

CHAPTER FOURThe East Coast Landing and Retreat: October–December 1950

Lt. Col. Edward L. Rowny, X Corps Engineer....................................................................... 2161st Lt. Claude L. Roberts, Jr., 2d Engineer Special Brigade ................................................. 2241st Lt. Maurice D. Roush, 13th Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................. 242Lt. Col. Evan S. Pickett, 73d Engineer Combat Battalion .................................................... 2461st Lt. Charles T. Williams, 73d Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................ 250

.............................................................................................................123

................................................................................................................211
vii

ommand: January–July 1951

on H. Davidson, The DAVIDSON LINE ......................................................... 260

D. Roush, 13th Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................. 266

Williams, 8224th Engineer Construction Group .......................................... 268

arfitt, 2d Engineer Construction Group ...................................................... 270

Pickett, 73d Engineer Combat Battalion .................................................... 272

trong, Jr., Eighth Army Engineer ............................................................... 282

Itschner, Engineering with the Chinese at Kaesong .................................... 286

. Farnum, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................... 288

tukhart, Jr., 2d Engineer Combat Battalion................................................. 300

Medding, 14th Engineer Combat Battalion.................................................. 304

Hoskins, Jr., Base Section, Eighth Army .................................................... 308

 Trayers, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion..................................................... 322

uly 1951– July 1953

W. Love, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion ....................................................... 334

 Fowler, IX Corps Engineer Section ........................................................... 338

 Parfitt, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion .................................................... 342

E. McIntyre, 802d Aviation Engineer Battalion ............................................ 350

. Wells, 378th Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................. 354

...............................................................................................................255

...............................................................................................................329
Remembering the Forgotten War

Lt. Col. Harry D. Hoskins, Jr., 378th Engineer Combat Battalion .......................................... 364Lt. Col. Harry D. Hoskins, Jr., 10th Engineer Combat Battalion ............................................ 3721st Lt. Floyd D. Wright, 62d Engineer Construction Battalion and 573d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company ................................................................. 380Lt. Col. Harrington W. Cochran, Jr., 808th & 809th Engineer Aviation Battalions ................... 3861st Lt. George B. Gray, Jr., 50th Engineer Port Construction Company ................................. 3921st Lt. Richard M. Wells, 72d Engineer Combat Company................................................... 398Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, Impressions .................................................................... 4041st Lt. Joseph K. Bratton, 13th Engineer Combat Battalion ................................................. 408

ConclusionBiographiesBibliographic EssayNotes on PhotographsGlossaryMapsIndex

.............................................................................................................................. 429

............................................................................................................................ 439

................................................................................................................ 447

............................................................................................................. 450

................................................................................................................................ 451

..................................................................................................................................... 454

..................................................................................................................................... 455
i x

Peninsula was an inhospitable

mountain ranges, narrow val

ers divided its landmass. The

vely hot, the winters bitterly

season turned what few roads

 quagmires and transformed

raging torrents. In short, Korea’s

imate, coupled with a poor

made it a very difficult envi

States and its United Nations

th the difficult terrain, North

so placed a premium on U.S.

ons. In the opening weeks of

t the UN forces valuable time;

nd other vital facilities to im

nce, and after the UN forces

neers helped build a defensive

eaguered defenders to hang on.

otic early months of the war,

 fought as infantry. Later, when

attack, engineers were in the

maintaining roads, construct

ferries, rebuilding ports, and

ervention of Chinese forces in

new challenges; engineers built

Foreword

roads and bridges to facilitate the UN withdrawal, whileat the same time destroying vital facilities and suppliesto deny them to the enemy. The engineers often werethe unsung heroes of the Korean War, for they helpedcreate the environment that allowed the United Statesand its allies to fight and win.

The oral history interviews that appear on these

pages reflect many facets of the engineer experienceduring the Korean War. They are decidedly personalglimpses, reminiscences of people, places, and events of50 years ago. As with any oral account, these interviewsmay contain differences of memory or interpretation,but that does not diminish their value. Readers will beable to experience the Korean War through the storiesand images of the engineers who fought there, andtheir hard-won experiences can provide today’s engineers with valuable insights.Carl A. StrockLieutenant General, US ArmyChief of Engineers
Remembering the Forgotten War

The EditorsBarry W. Fowle, Lt. Col., AUS(Ret.), received his Ph.D.in history from the University of Maryland. He has servedas historian for the Corps of Engineers and teacher ofmilitary history at the U.S. Army Engineer School. Hehas written a number of articles; coauthored The 51stAgain, a history of the 51st Engineer Combat Battalionduring World War II; and was general editor of Buildersand Fighters, U.S. Army Engineers in World War II.In 1998, Dr. Fowle retired from the Office of Historyand became a senior historian at the Office of theSurgeon General where he works on oral histories.

John Lonnquest received his Ph.D. in history from DukeUniversity in 1996. He joined the Air Force history program in 1997, and in 2000 accepted his current positionwith the Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineerswhere he is the director of the oral history program. Heis the co-author of To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of theUnited States Cold War Missile Program and the editor ofA Guide to Source Material on Ballistic Missile Defense.
x i

s manager of the oral history

of History, Headquarters, U.S.

ers, Barry Fowle discovered a

n anthology about the Korean

ean War ended more than 50

en written on the important

hat conflict. Barry began to as

Korean War composed almost

er oral interviews. Through this

y interviews, today’s engineer

unity to learn from those who

anthology, the editors divided

nto six sections, starting with

on on 25 June 1950 and ending

the armistice was signed. Each

erviewed officers’ experiences

ncompasses the initial period of

by North Korea against South

 and the retreat to the Pusan

hapter delves into the Inch’on

n 15 September and the cap

hapter three begins with the

ut, timed to coincide with the

Preface

Inch’on landing, and follows Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker’sEighth Army from Pusan to the Yalu, then the longwithdrawal south to below Seoul following the Chinesecounterattack of November 1950. Chapter four coversa similar period of time when X Corps landed on theeast coast of Korea in October and pushed up to theYalu. The chapter ends when the Chinese attacked inNovember and X Corps evacuated North Korea fromHungnam in December. Chapter five covers the periodof Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway’s command, followingthe death of Gen. Walker in December 1950. Ridgwayturned Eighth Army around and again moved north,eventually to the area of the 38th Parallel, while at thesame time raising the men’s low morale. The last chapterbegins with the opening of the peace talks and runsto the end of actual combat two years later on 27 July1953. Compared to earlier phases of the conflict, muchless movement occurred during this final period.

Each Korean War interview presented here has

been extracted and edited from a longer “career” oralhistory transcript. All nonessential items, including theQ’s and A’s denoting questions and answers, have been

removed to smooth the flow of the narrative. If an oralhistory covers more than one of the six sections, itis divided into separate sections and placed in the
Remembering the Forgotten War

appropriate chapter. The original tapes and uneditedtranscripts are in the Research Collections of theOffice on History. A number of the full career interviews contain restrictions concerning who may seethem. Readers interested in seeing any of the careeroral histories should first contact the Office of History,Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Virginia.

This book contains 52 articles, extracted from 26

oral histories and one published memoir. Each interviewee is introduced in the Table of Contents with therank he held during the Korean War. For certain individuals, the Table of Contents reflects promotions during the war. Many of these officers later achieved seniorrank. The Biographies list each interviewee alphabetically, including his final rank. It also includes thename of each interviewer and the date each interviewwas conducted.

Preparing these interviews for publication required

an editorial decision that bears special mention. Severalof the oral histories refer to KATUSAs, that is, participants in the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Armyprogram. In other publications, however, readers mayalso find KATUSA rendered as “Korean Army Training with the U.S. Army,” or “Korean Army Troops,U.S. Army.”

Racial tensions clearly were present in certain

U.S. Army units in Korea and engineer units were notexempt from these frictions. Contemporary readers will

note the absence of senior African-American officersamong the oral histories. The Army had integratedofficer training during World War II. Certainly, theKorean War was a catalyst speeding the further integration of the Army, but senior black officers in Korea stillwere a rarity. An excerpt from Lt. Col. Charles M. Bussey’smemoir has been included, with the publisher’s permission, to afford an African-American’s perspectiveon engineer activities in Korea.

One of the more interesting aspects of this history

is the broad spectrum of military engineer experiencescovered by the interviewees. Their activities were notnecessarily limited to the field of engineering; severalofficers recounted instances where engineers not onlyoperated under hostile fire, but also actually servedas infantry. For example, most engineers in the PusanPerimeter were put into the defensive line.

The engineer experiences covered in this volume

include such activities as road building, repair, and maintenance; bridge building, repair, and maintenance;airfield construction; laying and clearing of minefields; sweeping for mines; building barrier lines; erecting cantonments; and constructing port facilities.Some officers, including Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson,give interesting descriptions of personnel they workedwith. Some interviews describe examples of poor leadership. Several other interviews describe inadequacies intraining and the need to improvise ad hoc solutions

as situations arose.
xiii

he role of the engineers espe

orean War. Korea is extremely

esult, rivers tend to be narrow

 season in July and August in

uring the summer and added

ging and roadwork. Mountain

ow. To handle larger vehicles or

the engineers had to redesign

the narrow S-curves. Where

 often did not, and engineers

solid rock to handle the heavy

y uses to resupply front-line

ods, and debris on the rivers

w-level combat bridges, requir

permanent high-level bridges

in cold, rough, mountainous

and groups to use practical

etting work done. For example,

e U.S. Army Engineer School

 no more than a 20 percent

work done rapidly to support

some roads were given a 30

were pre-cut in the rear, then

they were dug in, assembled,

rtant area of concern to engi

rry Hoskins talks about operat

y system, that is, in the “black

market.” Others talk of using the “good old boy network,”—the trading and swapping of goods. Not requisitioning supplies through the system, especially atfirst, meant that logisticians did not recognize thatthe material was needed, and subsequently no reservoir of parts and equipment was established. Whendemands through requisitioning were documented, material often was lost in the supply system. For thesereasons the supply system did not work well in Korea.Brig. Gen. Miles Dawson, a logistician, was not inKorea, but was stationed at the Yokohama Depot inJapan. He contributes a very interesting interview onsupply support to Korea.

The experiences of these engineer officers provide excellent examples—both good and bad—of how

the U.S. Army operated during the war. This volume isnot the definitive history of the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers in Korea. The engineer interviews of theKorean War provide a valuable history of warfare in acold, mountainous country, as well as a history ofcombat where severe supply and equipment problemsplaced untold hardships on the soldiers and led to anemphasis on field expedients.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned

from this book is that the engineers, officers and men,are indeed the glue that holds the Army togetherand makes it go. The Corps of Engineers providesthe combat support on the front lines in the form ofbridges, ferries, roads, and road maintenance, so that
Remembering the Forgotten War

replacements and logistical support can be provided tothe front line. Engineers emplace and remove minefields, build airfields, maintain ports, and provide technical logistical support. The Korean War underscoresthat perhaps no other branch of the U.S. Army can boastof such a broad and extensive mission in wartime asthe Corps of Engineers. Essayons!

We would like to offer a few final thoughts about

this volume. Barry Fowle was the conceptual father ofthis book, and he selected representative interviews andorganized them into chronological chapters. After Barryretired in 1998, John Lonnquest was appointed coeditor, and in that capacity he reviewed the interviews, selected the photographs, supervised the layout,and oversaw the many other steps necessary to producethis history. Selecting photographs to illustrate thisvolume was a long but rewarding task, and the editorsgratefully acknowledge the contributions of the Military History Institute, Truman Presidential Library,the Marine Corps Historical Center, and the UnitedStates Naval Institute for providing copies of imagesfrom their collections. A very special thanks goes toJanet Fisher in the Office of the Command Historian,Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, who patiently and withunfailing good humor scanned dozens of images fromtheir collection for use in this book. Marilyn Hunter,USACE, Office of History, was an advisor on editorialmatters in the early stages of preparation but, tragically,

did not live to see the final publication. Arnold G.Fisch, Jr., also worked on the manuscript in the earlystages; his deft pen helped eliminate the inevitableredundancies that creep into a work such as this, andhe also helped craft much of the supporting narrativethat puts the interviews into their proper historicalcontext. Our neighbors down the hall, Rich Comisoand Jack O’Neill, of the Army Engineer Association,graciously responded to a steady stream of questionson engineer equipment, terminology, and procedures.Jean Diaz, USACE, Office of History, edited the finalmanuscript, scanned and prepared images and maps,was instrumental in implementing a standard, cohesivestyle throughout, and performed many other stepsthat shepherded this book to its final publication. Ourcolleague, Bill Baldwin, reviewed the manuscript, andhis keen eye caught a number of errors and inconsistencies that our eyes were too tired to see. Jessa Poppenhager,USACE, Office of History, designed the book coverand assisted in scanning and preparing electronic images. Cindy Dyer of Dyer Design handled book designand production. Although we are grateful for theirefforts, we alone are responsible for any substantiveerrors that may appear.Barry W. Fowle John Lonnquest
x v

Introduction

h Korea, with the diplomatic

the Soviet Union, launched a

the Republic of Korea (ROK)

than six months previously,

Acheson, in a speech to the

d delineated the United States

nse in Asia, emphasizing the

etching from Japan to Taiwan

nes, but not mentioning the

Soviets, initially inclined to

st regime in the north, now

on as an invitation to back

 in the south.

tion in Asia had long been the

nese, and Russian interest, as

part of the U.S. Historically,

he control of China, but the

a in the Sino-Japanese War in

inese political influence. That

al Russia and Japan compet

a, with U.S. interests a distant

prise attack on Russia in the

04-05), only the U.S. remained

Japan in Korea. By 1922, the

he U.S. and all other foreign

ed Korea.
Remembering the Forgotten War

With Japan thoroughly defeated at the end of

World War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union dividedKorea at the 38th Parallel. Soviet troops occupied thenorthern half, while the U.S. occupied the more populous south, including the national capital, Seoul. Theleaders of both superpowers recognized the Koreanpeninsula’s strategic potential. Vladivostok was only80 miles northeast of the Soviet border with NorthKorea. China, 125 miles to the west of South Korea,lay across the Yellow Sea, and Japan was about thesame distance to the east, beyond the Sea of Japan. Despite its strategic importance in Asia, Korea was littleknown elsewhere. Many regarded the nation only byits ancient designation, the “Hermit Kingdom.”

In 1947 the U.S. brought the matter of reunification of Korea before the United Nations (UN), and

the General Assembly resolved to hold an election inthe spring of 1948 for both Koreas to elect one National Assembly. About 95 percent of the registered votersin the south voted, but the Soviets blocked participation in the north. On 17 July 1948 the NationalAssembly in Seoul established Korea’s first constitutionin 4,000 years. One month later, American military government below the 38th Parallel ended with the establishment of the Republic of South Korea. In September1948 the Soviets created a communist state in the northcalled the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, withits capital at P’yongyang. The U.S. began withdrawing

combat troops, and in June 1949, only the U.S. Army’sKorean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) of about 500people remained to continue training Korean forces.

As a result of the UN-sponsored election, the

General Assembly acknowledged the ROK as the onlyvalid Korean government and continued to worktoward reunification. Thirty-two foreign nations formally recognized the republic, but a Soviet veto deniedthe South Koreans UN membership. Despite the UN’swillingness to be flexible on the nature of a government for a reunited Korea, the North Koreans andSoviets stonewalled. Clearly, reunification would be adifficult goal. Both Kim Il Sung’s Soviet-supported regime in the north and strongman Syngman Rhee’sgovernment in the south were autocratic administrations, utterly unwilling to compromise with the regimeon the other side of the 38th Parallel.

The officials in P’yongyang concluded that Korea

could be united only by force. Accordingly, the NorthKorean Peoples’ Army attacked South Korea at approximately 0400 on 25 June 1950. The South Korean armyresisted but had to retreat in the face of better-armedNorth Korean forces. North Korea’s ground forces consisted of seven assault infantry divisions, a 6,000-mantank brigade, an independent infantry regiment, a motorcycle regiment, border constabulary, army and corpsheadquarters personnel, and three reserve divisions—a total ground force of 135,000, supported by ample
xvii

inst this host, the ROK Army

00 men, with no tanks, no me

ecoilless rifles. Moreover, South

ed of only 22 propeller-driven

aft. KMAG had 10 F-51s avail

s had been trained for the Mus

ns supported their land forces

ft, including 40 YAK fighters,

attack bombers.

the fate of the strategically

can officials brought the North

the United Nations Security

urs after learning of the invas

delegate, Yakov Malik, might

o any possible Security Council

was boycotting because of the

ognize Communist China in

regime. With the Soviet repre

absent, the Security Council

ention, calling upon the North

and asking UN members to

e aggressors. Two days later, a

cil resolution recommended

UN assist the ROK in repelling

e north.

S. independently took steps to

June, President Harry Truman

r in Chief, Far East, General of

the Army Douglas MacArthur, in Tokyo, to send ammunition and equipment to the ROK forces, along with asurvey team to assess the situation. The president’s response was immediate, but it also was remarkably measured. The U.S. government had long understood thedifficulties involved in projecting force onto the Asianmainland from American bases in Japan. Still, the NorthKorean Army was advancing unchecked.

On 26 June, General MacArthur reported from

Tokyo that South Korean forces could not hold thecapital of Seoul, a North Korean plane had been shotdown, and an evacuation of American nationals wasunderway. Truman then ordered air and naval forcesto provide cover and support to South Korean forcessouth of the 38th Parallel. By the morning of 29 June thesituation in Korea was serious as Secretary of DefenseLouis A. Johnson called President Truman to brief him.In response, Truman authorized General MacArthur touse supporting ground units in Korea. He also directedthe U.S. Air Force against targets in the north and ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet deployed to the FormosaStraits to insulate the Chinese Communists and theNationalists from one another in Taiwan. That sameday MacArthur flew from Japan to Korea and back.The Commander in Chief, Far East, saw with his owneyes the rapidly deteriorating military situation. His

report to Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collinswent next to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., who
Remembering the Forgotten War

in turn briefed the president at 0457 on 30 June. Atmidmorning President Truman announced his decisionto send two American divisions from Japan to Korea andto establish a naval blockade of North Korea.

On 7 July, the efforts of the U.S. and the UN

merged. Since other UN members intended to sendmen and materiel to Korea, the Security Council authorized the unified command in Korea to use the UNflag in the course of operations against the NorthKoreans and asked the U.S. to designate the commander of unified forces. The next day Truman namedGeneral MacArthur as Commander in Chief, UnitedNations Command. The new UN commander appointed Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army commander, to direct all UN ground forces in Korea. There was no turning back now. The U.S. was com- mitted to a major land war in Asia, one that would grow even more bitter with the entry of Communist Chinese forces. It proved to be a conflict that would test the U.S. Army in general, and the skills and adaptability of the U.S. Army engineers in particular. Both the harsh and rugged nature of Korea’s terrain and the ebb and flow of combat operations forced the engineers to build, to fight, to destroy, and to rebuild. From the very onset of hostilities until the truce talks years later, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played a significant role in the Korean War.
Engineers preparing to mine a bridge

near the front lines in South Korea,

July 1950 Engineer School, 71-19-27

The Pusan Perimeter

June–September 1950

Chapter 1

1
In the weeks following the North Korean invasion,

Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. Army units

fought a protracted retrograde movement as

they slowly withdrew toward a defensive position

around the port of Pusan on the southeast

tip of Korea.

While the U.S. rushed reinforcements to

Korea, in early August Lt. Gen. Walton Walker,

commander of the Eighth Army, established a

defensive perimeter around Pusan that eventually

included four U.S. and five ROK divisions. Fighting

in and around the perimeter was intense, but with

the arrival of additional troops, heavy weapons,

and American air support, the defenders were

slowly able to blunt the attack and stabilize the

situation. The fighting around Pusan soon sapped

the strength of the North Korean Army, and by

mid-September, the UN forces in Pusan were

poised to launch a counterattack.

The Pusan

Perimeter
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 3

n 28 June 1950, three days after the North from the 24th Infantry Division. Although it was the

smallest (12,197 men) among the divisions available to

him in Japan, MacArthur chose the 24th Infantry Division because it was stationed in southern Japan, near ports

closest to Korea, and he knew that time was critical. TASK

FORCE SMITH, two reinforced companies from the

division’s 21st Infantry Regiment, was rushed to the

South Korean port of Pusan on 2 July 1950. Heading

north by truck, these elements made contact with enemy troops on 5 July 1950 near Osan, Korea.

A strong force of North Korean infantry and 33

tanks struck TASK FORCE SMITH. For seven hours the

outnumbered Americans held on, knocking out four

tanks and killing 42 of the enemy. The North Koreans

flanked the American positions, forcing a withdrawal and

inflicting 150 casualties on the task force. The rest of

the 24th Division caught up to TASK FORCE SMITH

and fought a delaying action through central Korea,

while three other U.S. divisions (2d Infantry, 25th

Infantry, and 1st Cavalry Divisions) prepared to cross

from Japan. Elements of the original eight ROK divisions tried to recover after the breakthrough and performed well against those North Korean units not

supported by tanks.

Introduction

On 28 June 1950,

three days after the

North Koreans took

the offensive, the

South Korean

capital fell.

Chapter 1

O

Koreans took the offensive, the South Korean capital

fell. Seoul is only some 30 miles south of the 38th Parallel, and the defending Republic of Korea (ROK) units

could not stem the invasion. The Communist tank

columns then continued the attack south of the city

against weakening South Korean resistance. Although the

armies of the two Koreas were not all that different in

size, South Korea lacked tanks, aircraft, artillery, adequate

anti-tank weapons, and M-1 rifles. By contrast, the

North Koreans began their offensive with modern Russian equipment including aircraft, such as the battleproven IL-10 “Stormovik” fighter-bomber, automatic

weapons, and tanks with 85-mm main guns.

From his headquarters in Japan, General Douglas

MacArthur took immediate action to prevent a complete

disaster and to gain time to create a defensive zone in

Korea’s southeast. Warships and American airplanes from

Japan blasted North Korean troops and installations. At

least in the air, the initial American response quickly prevailed, achieving air superiority over South Korea by 10

July. On the ground, however, the challenge was far more

difficult and the initial American response woefully inadequate. The first U.S. ground forces sent to Korea came
4 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Korea

The mountainous Korean Peninsula encompasses 85,000 square miles. The width of

the peninsula varies between 90 and 200

miles and it is between 525 and 600 miles

long. The mountains are highest in the north,

with some peaks rising to 8,500 feet. The

Taebaek Range extends along much of the

east coast.

In 1950 Korea had a population of

30 million people, of which 21 million lived in

the south and 9 million in the north. At that

time, although only 20 percent of the country

was considered arable, 70 percent of the

population secured its livelihood from agriculture. Korean summers are hot and humid with

a monsoon season generally lasting from June

to September. In the winter, cold, biting winds

sweep down from central Asia.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 5

 During the next four weeks, American forces

fought a number of sharp engagements against the

advancing North Koreans. None of these battles, e.g.,

the Kum River line, Taejon, Sangju, Masan, could stem

the onrushing enemy tide, nor was that the immediate objective. American field commanders sought to

delay the North Koreans while executing a retrograde

action to a sustainable defensive line. Unfortunately,

during the action around Sangju, accusations arose of

American forces “bugging out.” Although these were

not the first such charges of American soldiers fleeing

before the North Koreans they were the most serious

and widespread. Because some of the soldiers involved

were from the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment, the

Army’s ill-considered segregation policy came under

increasing scrutiny and harsh criticism. Maj. Gen.

William B. Kean relieved the commander of the 24th

Infantry, Col. Horton V. White, when the regiment’s

hasty retreat threatened the orderly American withdrawal to the southeast.

On 12 July, Eighth Army’s Lt. Gen. Walton H.

Walker assumed command of all ground forces in

Korea and began establishing a defensive line. Although

a few Sherman tanks and a handful of the effective

new 3.5-inch bazookas eventually reached troops in

Korea, initially the 24th Division lacked the adequate

weapons and well-trained men necessary to face the

Russian-equipped North Koreans. TASK FORCE

SMITH, for example, had discovered how ineffective

the American 75-mm recoilless rifle and 2.36-inch

bazooka were against Russian-made T34 tanks.

Throughout July, battered American and ROK

forces fought a 75-mile retrograde action along Korea’s

dusty “roads.” The mornings often brought fog and

sometimes rain, but most days were oppressively hot.

The unpaved roads were shared with thousands of

Korean civilians fleeing the invaders. Refugees not only

choked the few roads, but also made communications

After loading their possessions into a

small cart, a Korean family flees south

RG 111, SC-355017
6 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

more difficult. They often cut out sections of telephone wire to improvise harnesses for their meager

possessions. Later, when strengthened Allied forces

would move forward again, the image of American

forces moving up toward the front while refugees

streamed in the opposite direction would become a

familiar one.

By 4 August, U.S. and South Korean forces

generally withdrew to a defensive position anchored

by Pusan on Korea’s coast. It was critical that this port,

only 120 miles from Japan, be held open. The so-called

Pusan Perimeter was a rough rectangle, approximately

200 square miles of terrain, bounded by the Naktong

River in the west, the Korea Straits to the south, the

Sea of Japan in the east, and by rugged mountains

above Waegwan to Yongdok in the north. With his

defensive line around Taegu and Pusan, Gen. Walker

directed an army composed of four U.S. divisions

[1st Cavalry, 2d, 24th, and 25th Infantry], the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and five ROK divisions [approximately 45,000 men]. Advance elements of other units,

including the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from

Hawaii, also had begun to arrive.

MacArthur and Walker made a vigorous stand all

along the line, although the term “line” is not entirely

accurate in this instance. The Pusan Perimeter was in

reality a collection of loosely connected strongpoints,

around which the North Koreans frequently infiltrated.

By early August, UN combat forces outnumbered the

Communist attackers by perhaps 20,000 men, although

this numerical advantage was not fully appreciated at

the time. The UN defenders now had the advantage of

interior lines of communication, while the attacking

North Koreans were stretched along a long and tenuous

supply line. On 7 August, TASK FORCE KEAN, [named

for Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, 25th Division commanding general] opened an offensive on the perimeter’s

left flank to protect Pusan from attack. In the center

of the line, the enemy tried to take the rail junction at

Taegu, but Walker contained the attack. The North

Koreans struck again, but UN air power had previously

destroyed many of their tanks and killed many of their

veteran soldiers—untrained recruits took their places.

The North Koreans herded refugees in front of their

attacks to confuse U.S. troops, but that tactic ultimately failed. Late in August, UN forces drove back several

more attacks. The bravery of the many soldiers and

Marines killed in action prevented the North Koreans

from driving UN forces from the perimeter and into

the sea.

Lt. Col. Edward L. Rowny’s interview introduces

this section on the Pusan Perimeter. He offers his

perspective as a member of the Plans Section, G-3

[plans and policy] at MacArthur’s Tokyo headquarters,

and speculates about the possibility of a North Korean

invasion.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 7

Engineer activities were crucial to the successful

fall back into the Pusan Perimeter. The first engineer

unit in combat in Korea was Lt. Col. Peter C. Hyzer’s

3d Engineer Combat Battalion, arriving in Pusan on

5 July in support of the 24th Infantry Division. Engineer activities in those first weeks of the war consisted

primarily of planting mines and blowing bridges.

The battalion also supported the division by maintaining the dirt and gravel roads as the division pulled

back its men and equipment. Sgt. George D. Libby,

Company C, 3d Engineer Combat Battalion (ECB), won

the Medal of Honor supporting Gen. Dean’s defense of

Taejon. The battalion continued in a defensive posture

until Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan Perimeter

in September.

Another unit arriving during the early days of the

war, the 72d Engineer Combat Company (ECC), returned to Korea from Hawaii, landing at Pusan on 31

July 1950. First Lt. James A. Johnson was an engineer

platoon leader who also found himself serving as a

combat infantryman. The company spent the early

days in Korea transporting ammunition to the front, supporting TASK FORCE KEAN, preparing defensive positions, and fighting as infantry. Johnson’s recollections

introduce two controversial subjects: the performance

of the 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, and the stillunresolved issue of how and when engineer troops

should be attached to infantry units and used.

Engineer activities were

crucial to the successful

fall back into the Pusan

Perimeter. The first

engineer unit in combat

in Korea was Lt. Col.

Peter C. Hyzer’s 3d Engineer

Combat Battalion, arriving

in Pusan on 5 July in support

of the 24th Infantry Division.

When the war began, Brig. Gen. Garrison “Gar”

H. Davidson was chief of staff, Sixth Army. His first

assignment was to prepare the 2d Infantry Division

for overseas movement (POM) to Korea from Fort

Lewis, Washington. He arrived in Korea before that

division, having been assigned to Eighth Army. He reported to Gen. Walker, who directed him to lay out a

defensive line around Pusan. Following this assignment,

Gen. Davidson was assigned to the 24th Infantry

Division and later took a 24th Division task force to

P’ohang-dong to plug a hole in the American line.

Second Lt. James L. Trayers, fresh from the U.S.

Military Academy at West Point, New York, and without basic officer training, reported in to the 1st Cavalry

Division in August 1950 and was assigned to Company

D. His duties included laying minefields, clearing

roadways by sweeping for mines, and building bridges.

His experiences exemplify the problems any young,

inexperienced, newly-commissioned 2d lieutenant

faces when in combat for the first time.

Capt. Lawrence B. Farnum describes his call to

active duty and assignment to the 2d Infantry Division

at Fort Lewis, Washington. He recalls the efforts at

getting the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion up to strength

in personnel and equipment, and in training the

personnel for going to war. Capt. Farnum further describes the battalion going on line upon his arrival in

Korea, and the problems encountered by engineers at-
8 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

tempting to fight as infantry without normal infantry

weapons or support. As a result, the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion suffered numerous casualties. With the X

Corps landing at Inch’on 15 September 1950 and the

Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter shortly

thereafter, the 2d Engineers worked on roads and

bridges on the way north to Yongdungp’o during the

rest of September and October 1950.

First Lt. Charles M. Bussey brings an African

American perspective to engineer service in Korea in

excerpts from his own written account of the war.

Bussey describes his service as commander of the allblack 77th Engineer Combat Company (ECC), during

which time he was promoted to captain.

 On 15 September, the U.S. X Corps with the

1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division landed at Inch’on, well behind enemy lines. The forces in

the Pusan perimeter began their breakout, streaking

northward to connect with X Corps in hopes of entrapping much of the North Korean army.
9

A soldier preparing a rail-cutting

charge to destroy a bridge

Engineer School, 71-19-60
1 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

Colonel Rowny was a member of General

Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commander of X Corps, studies

a sand-table terrain map at X Corps headquarters in Korea,

October 1950. Lt. Col. Rowny is second from left Rowny Collection

MacArthur’s planning staff and kept a wary eye on

events unfolding on the Korean Peninsula. After reviewing intelligence reports and cable traffic in early

June 1950, Rowny urged his superiors to be alert

for a possible attack in Korea.

I was sent to Japan in 1949 to join the Plans Section, G-3, of General MacArthur’s headquarters. There

was an interesting windfall occasioned by my early arrival. The officer I was replacing was not ready to leave

and the headquarters didn’t want a long overlap. As a

result, I was given an open ticket—air, rail, and ship—

to travel around Japan for 30 days. By coincidence,

a civilian historian/anthropologist, Dr. Kenneth Morrow, had

also planned a 30-day tour. I enjoyed his company and profited

a great deal from his expertise.

We started from Tokyo and

went down the east coast of

Japan, around the southern islands, and up the west coast.

We then went to Hokkaido, returning to Tokyo by way of the

east coast of Honshu.

While my purpose was not

to inspect or check on military installations, I could not help but note the failings

of the so-called “occupation force.” In every village

and hamlet there were small detachments of U.S.

troops not serving any useful function. There was no

need for occupation forces in Japan because there was

no danger of a Japanese military revival. In fact, our

troops were only interfering with the Japanese civil

authorities who were functioning well. General

MacArthur’s instructions were carried out in the

name of the emperor.

When I returned from the tour, I wrote a trip

report to Maj. Gen. Edward Almond, the chief of

staff to General MacArthur. I said that our so-called

“occupation forces” were not carrying out any real

function; in fact, they were interfering with the Japanese civilian authorities. Almond directed Col. Dewitt

Armstrong, the G-3, to have me make a study of the

occupation. My recommendation that the troops be

pulled back to training camps for possible use elsewhere was approved. The “elsewhere” I had in mind

was, of course, Korea. To replace the occupation forces,

I recommended the formation of a “Japanese Self Defense Force,” patterned after the U.S. National Guard.

Their mission would be to handle disasters and maintain law and order.

In retrospect, the idea of pulling out our occupation forces didn’t happen any too soon. We were still

pulling out the remainder of the troops in June 1950
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 1 1

Col. Edward L. Rowny,

March 1953 Rowny Collection

I remember well how

stunned we were when

Secretary of State Dean

Acheson made his public

statement that left Korea

outside the area of U.S.

strategic interest....to say

this publicly seemed to us

the height of folly and

irresponsibility.

1 1

Edward L. Rowny compares

Soviet and U.S. missiles,

November 1974 Rowny Collection

when the Korean War broke out. But

we had been able to reassemble some

of the troops into regimental-sized

units that were available to go to

Korea soon after the North Koreans

invaded South Korea.

This planning for the retraining

of the occupation force and the Japanese Self Defense Force was done by

a rather small number of officers. As

I recall, there were not more than

eight or nine officers in the entire plans section.

I worked exclusively on the military side, but I made

friends with a number of planners on the civilian side

through Dr. Morrow, with whom I had traveled around

Japan. I was fascinated with the way General MacArthur’s

civilian staff, SCAP (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers) was restructuring the entire political, social, and economic fabric of the Japanese government. This staff contained a number of the best minds in the U.S.—all experts and highly regarded in their respective fields.

MacArthur was revolutionizing—and this is an understatement—the entire Japanese society. He drew up a

new constitution, redesigned the judiciary and economic

systems, and set up industrial standards. Japanese industry had a very low reputation up to that time because of

shoddy workmanship and low standards of quality.

MacArthur turned all that around; in fact, the Toyotas

and Sonys that are so reliably built

today can trace their success to

MacArthur’s directives.

Reaction to Dean

Acheson’s Statement

I remember well how stunned we

were when Secretary of State Dean

Acheson made his public statement

that “left Korea outside the area of

U.S. strategic interest.” It would have

been one thing to say privately among

ourselves that Korea would no longer be within our sphere

of interest, but to say this publicly seemed to us the

height of folly and irresponsibility. We were shocked

that anyone in a high place, and especially

a man with the reputation that Acheson

enjoyed, would make such a statement.

I might add that now, in hindsight, I

feel even more strongly about Acheson’s

statement. On one occasion a high-ranking

Soviet negotiator told me in Geneva, in the

late 1970s, that it was hard for the Soviets

to understand Americans. He said that the

Soviets were surprised when Acheson, in
1 2 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

1950, announced that Korea was outside the area of

U.S. strategic interest. This caused the Soviets, he

said, to “unleash” North Korea and authorize them to

invade South Korea. “At that,” he said, “the United

States went back on its word and mobilized not only

its own forces but called on the United Nations to come

to the aid of Seoul. We can’t trust the United States

to keep its word. The United States is very volatile; it

changes its mind.”

“You’d better believe it,” I said, not wanting to disabuse the Soviets of our volatility. I told him that Americans are slow to anger, but once aroused, are quick to

react when our national interest is threatened.

Up until the time the North Koreans attacked south

of the 38th Parallel, I worked on plans for the Japanese

Self Defense Force and on contingency plans. I worked

in the planning section drawing up plans in the event

the North Koreans attacked South Korea. I remember

sending a memorandum to my boss early in June 1950

telling him that from reading intelligence reports and

reporting cables I believed we should be more alert to a

possible attack in Korea. My boss, Col. Armstrong, sent

my memo to the chief of staff, Gen. Almond. He, in

turn, sent it to the G-2, (intelligence section) Maj. Gen.

Charles A. Willoughby. The G-2 took a dim view of

anybody in G-3 interfering in his business. He said the

North Koreans would not attack. Moreover, he said, G-3

should in the future send memos on intelligence matters

to him, and he would decide whether or not to send

them to the chief of staff. Fortunately, Gen. Almond

did not listen to Willough-by. He sent my memo to

General MacArthur.

When the Korean conflict broke out in June

of 1950, by coincidence, one might say poetic justice,

I was the G-3 duty officer that Sunday that the

North Koreans attacked. When the news came in I

went to see the G-2 duty officer and we called the

chief of staff. He told us to meet him in General

MacArthur’s apartment.

General MacArthur said, “Rowny, are you going

to say ‘I told you so’?” I didn’t say anything but must

have looked like the cat that swallowed the canary.

I recall that General MacArthur was quite calm and

appeared unperturbed. He directed Gen. Almond to

call the military staff back to work immediately. Gen.

Almond had the staff prepare messages for MacArthur

to send to Seoul and Washington. MacArthur, meanwhile, was on the phone to Seoul, Washington, FECOM

(Far East Command) military headquarters, and the

Japanese government. He ordered all U.S. troops in

Japan to return to barracks.

I disappeared into the Dai Ichi Building. For the

next several days my wife brought me clean clothing and

toilet articles. We worked around the clock, except for

time off for catnaps on cots in our offices. For a week we

worked, slept, and ate in the Dai Ichi Building.

 I remember sending a

memorandum to my boss

early in June 1950 telling

him that from reading intelligence reports and reporting

cables I believed we should

be more alert to a possible

attack in Korea.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 1 3

It was a very chaotic period. Most of our contacts

in Seoul were with a remarkable individual, Ambassador

John J. Muccio, our ambassador in Seoul. He was well

organized, calm, and courageous. We were getting better estimates about the situation from him than from

our military headquarters. This, in hindsight, is understandable because the military had its own problems

trying to cope with the enemy. However, we were fortunate that Muccio was a broad-gauge and capable

Foreign Service officer. He believed our troops could

be organized to stand and fight. He did not think

that we should simply pick up and move to the rear.

Several days after the attack, a crisis developed

within MacArthur’s staff. His public relations advisor

couldn’t cope with the situation. Reporters had started

to arrive from the U.S. almost immediately and were

putting General MacArthur under a great deal of

pressure. On one occasion, the public relations officer,

having fortified his courage with several stiff drinks,

passed out while briefing reporters. Later that day I received a two-line directive from the Supreme Commander. It read:

1. Effective immediately, you will—in addition to your

other duties—act as my official spokesman.

2. You will tell the press everything they need to know

and nothing they need not know.

Signed: Douglas MacArthur.

It was a very simple, direct order. While it didn’t

give me much guidance, it certainly gave me a lot of

freedom. I was the spokesman and continued to work

in the Plans Section until we left Tokyo to join the

invasion forces headed for Korea. I think this was

around 5 September, about 10 days before we landed

at Inch’on. During the early days of the war we were

looking everywhere we could throughout the Pacific

Theater and throughout the Army for troops to send

to Korea to stabilize the situation.

General Douglas

MacArthur discusses the military

situation in Korea

with Ambassador

John Muccio (left).

Maj. Gen. Edward

Almond is at right

U.S. Army photo
Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Lieutenant Colonel Peter C. Hyzer 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

1 4

hen news of the North Korean invasion

reached Japan, Colonel Hyzer was given command

of the 3d Engineer Combat Battalion of the 24th

Infantry Division and rushed to Korea. In savage

fighting from Taejon southeast into the Pusan Perimeter, the 24th Division fought a retrograde action,

meter by meter, buying time until the 25th Infantry

Division and the 1st Cavalry Division could arrive

from Japan.

From MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) I went to Japan in 1949. I had to leave my family

behind. There was no concurrent travel at that time so

they came over about six months later.

Once in Japan, I went to general headquarters

(GHQ) in Tokyo and I said, “I want to be a combat engineer officer. I want to go down south and have a

combat battalion or a combat group, or maybe a construction group, to learn to use some of this new technology that I’ve learned in civil school.” They said, “Okay;

we’ll send you down to Yokohama to Eighth Army.”

I went down to Eighth Army, and Pat Strong—

Pascal Strong—was the Army Engineer. He was a colonel then and a brigadier general later. He said, “Well,

yeah, I know. You want to go down with a troop

unit. Fine. Meantime, we need you right here in headquarters.” So, I stayed in headquarters in the Operations Division.

Getting into the Action

I was there for less than a year. One morning at 0300

the phone rang. The North Koreans had attacked

just the day before and Pat Strong was on the phone.

He said, “Pete, you’ve been wanting to get down with

a combat unit so you’re on your way. You be on a train

that leaves the station at 0900 and go to Kyushu.

You’re going to take over the 3d Engineer Battalion of

the 24th Division.”

As American and South Korean forces

retreated, engineers prepared bridges

for demolition to halt the North Korean

advance Engineer School, 71-19-28

W
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 1 5

It was the middle of the night. I threw on my

fatigue clothes and put everything I had in a footlocker and a suitcase. I grabbed a couple of engineer

field manuals. I’d never been with engineer troops so

I didn’t know what all that stuff was about.

On the train going down, I read those engineer

field manuals all the way. I had them pegged from

cover to cover, practically, as far as I could go. The

battalion was on its way to Korea. By the time I got

there one company had already gone over attached

to one of the infantry regiments. We got on board

the ship about the 4th of July. That was how we

celebrated the 4th of July on an LST (landing ship,

tank). One of the companies in headquarters went

over to Pusan, and I was in Pusan for a couple of days.

When I went over to Pusan, I was about to get

on the train to go up to Taejon, along with most of

my troops, and who should I run into but Mike

[Jon H. Michaelis], coming out of the headquarters

building in Pusan. Mike Michaelis and I were together

in the Philippines, and we’d been together at Fort

Ord. I used to run into him once in a while in

Europe, and we were together in G-1 (Personnel Section) back in the War Department. When I went

to Yokohama, he was there in the G-3 section. He was

about to come over and take command of the 27th

Infantry, one of the regiments of another division [25th

Infantry Division].

Engineers destroy a bridge over the Han River, 18 July 1950 Engineer School, 71-19-42
Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Lieutenant Colonel Peter C. Hyzer 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

1 6

So, we were somewhat together all the way through

Korea as well. I was with the 24th Division, while he

later became assistant division commander of the

25th Division.

I got on the train and went up to Taejon, where

we were in the midst of a pretty rough battle. Company A was up there with the 21st Infantry working

its way back in a retrograde movement, destroying

bridges, etc.

I was brand new with this outfit. It was a bunch of

guys that for the last few years had been back in garrison

in southern Kyushu. They’d been on the roads out in

the boondocks and they’d gotten some pretty rough combat and engineering experience. Gee, they were terrific.

There wasn’t anything that that outfit couldn’t do.

When we found out that they were going to Korea

they rounded up every piece of engineering equipment

that was on the island of Kyushu. Unfortunately, we

lost most of it when we got over to Korea because other

people stole it from us. They loaded everything in the

way of engineering supplies and equipment that they

could on these LSTs. We had normal weapons and

were pretty good with them

I found that the officers and the men were

very innovative. They didn’t have much to use. Somehow we managed to get explosives here and there.

We begged, borrowed, or stole them from somewhere.

I don’t know where. I think they took every block of

TNT (trinitrotoluene explosive) that was on the island

of Kyushu.

We were the engineers in Korea for the first

month or two, until somebody else finally got over

there. Since I didn’t know the unit, I spent daylight

hours driving in my jeep. I’d get back after dark and

find out what was going on in the rest of the division

area. I’d lay out the work for the next day, get a few

hours sleep, and then take off again.

Intense Fighting at Taejon, 18-20 July 1950

We had a very rough time and we lost an awful lot of

men too. This was the worst part of the whole thing. At

Taejon, we lost almost all the working element of Company C. They were there with Maj. Gen. William F.

Dean, who was captured at Taejon. Some of our guys

got out. Sgt. George D. Libby of Company C won the

Medal of Honor for defending some wounded men.

He was killed in his truck as he was trying to protect

these people getting out of Taejon.

 In those days we were mostly repairing roads. Korea was virtually roadless. They had a few dirt roads. The

main highways were gravel roads. When you got off of

those, there were mostly rice-paddy cart tracks and

trails over the mountains. We were trying to support the

infantry with communications so they could get their

supplies and get their stuff out of there as they pulled

back. We were mostly blowing bridges in those days

We were mostly blowing

bridges in those days and

planting mines. That was

about all we had time to

do. One of the company

commanders I remember

was out in front of our lines

blowing a bridge. He had a

jeepload of dynamite, and

finally a sniper got him....
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 1 7

A soldier checking the fuse of a land

mine in the Chunan area, 7 July 1950

Engineer School, 119-11-31
Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Lieutenant Colonel Peter C. Hyzer 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

1 8

and planting mines. That was about all we had time to

do. One of the company commanders I remember was

out in front of our lines blowing a bridge. He had a

jeepload of dynamite, and finally a sniper got him and

blew up the jeep. He was a terrific young officer, out of

the Class of ’45 or ’46.

Two other divisions came up and relieved us. [The

25th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division landed in

Korea, 10-18 July, and deployed by 22 July to support

the battered 24th Division.] We went over on the east

coast for a week or two. I reconstituted Company C

out of the other companies. They still had their mess

and supply people and company headquarters. Capt.

Wert, the Company C commander, was killed at

Taejon. We worked on the roads along the east coast of

Korea in the P’ohang area for the week or two we

were there.

In addition to working on roads, most of that

time we spent licking our wounds and trying to reconstitute units that had been wiped out. We were still

quite understrength, but we got a few replacements

and a few Koreans to come in and help us. We seemed

to have Koreans with us all the time. I don’t know

where we got them all but finally we had more Korean

army soldiers than we had Americans in our battalion.

I did not lose any of my engineers to the infantry.

As a matter of fact, it was the other way around. Engineers were in very short supply. I had a lot of infantry

officers assigned to me and I made engineers out of

them. Some of them turned out to be pretty good

engineers. Of course, we weren’t doing any great esoteric engineering feats. We were strictly regular engineers, building roads and demolitions.

Now, we’d been there not more than a week

or so when we were pulled back and a division [23d

Infantry, 2d Infantry Division] moved in—I think

Ch’angnyong rings a bell, south of Taegu. The division

had this sector, but the division was chewed up worse

than the 3d Engineers were. The 31st Infantry was

virtually wiped out at Taejon. The other units had

fought hard up north of Taejon.

Two other divisions were over there by that time

[1st Cavalry Division and 25th Division]. The engineers were given a 15-mile front along the Naktong

River just south of Taegu, which was half of the division sector. The infantry regiments were so decimated

that there wasn’t any choice but to put us in. It was

sort of ironic, in a way. But as I say, we had some infantry officers.

I remember one of these guys from one of the

companies; he was crazy. He would swim across the

Naktong River in broad daylight hanging onto a log

or something and scout out all the enemy positions.

Somehow he managed to talk to some of the natives

who were hiding underground over there and come back

and tell us what was going on.

 We were still quite understrength, but we got a few

replacements and a few

Koreans to come in and

help us. We seemed to have

Koreans with us all the time.

I don’t know where we got

them all but finally we had

more Korean army soldiers

than we had Americans

in our battalion.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 1 9

I sent quite a few patrols. Pretty soon the Koreans

never really bothered us at all. We’d get a little sniper

fire once in a while and sometimes some artillery, but

not very much.

My guys felt really puffed up because we were

practically cut off in the rear, but somehow we were

managing to hang on. Seoul City Sue, the North

Korean propagandist, said that the 3d Engineer “Division,” the largest and best division that the Americans

had, was holding that sector along the Naktong River.

Well, she was all we had at 2100. The guys would

turn on their radios and listen to what was going on.

Seoul City Sue was our principal news source.

We didn’t lose too many men there, although we

lost quite a few out of Company B. When we sent

them on a patrol to the north hill they were ambushed

and had a hard time getting back. I lost the company

commander of Company B in that one. I lost my

driver and my radio operator too, because they were

there. Some of us managed to get back.

We were so busy up there. The so-called TASK

FORCE HYZER provided more intelligence on the

enemy than anything else. We were renowned all the

way back through Eighth Army and the Office, Chief

of Engineers, which was a good thing for the 3d Engineers, really.

I can’t recall what assets I had on the Naktong

now. We had a task force that included the 3d Engineers, augmented with quite

a few Koreans. I’m not sure

whether I had all my companies or not. I had several

other attachments—an antitank platoon, possibly a

couple of tanks, and some

artillery in support.

In late August we were

relieved by a classmate of

mine, Skeldon [Lt. Col.

James H., 38th Infantry, 2d

Division]. I believe he later

became a major general. The

day after we pulled out and

he took over, the North Koreans attacked in force and

really gave them hell. Oh,

they had an awful time and lost a lot of people. Their

intelligence knew we were pulling out and the new operator was coming in. They took advantage of it and

attacked the day after we pulled out, so we were lucky.

We were finally brought off to the rear there,

pulled out of the line. We didn’t go very far. We resupplied and got reorganized for a couple of days. By

that time they’d had the landing at Inch’on, so we were

getting ready to attack again. The Koreans were afraid

of getting cut off, so the pressure on us decreased.

A convoy waits to be ferried

across the Kumho-gang

River Engineer School, 30-25-6
2 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

Lieutenant Johnson describes conditions in

Korea during his initial assignment in 1948-49 before the war, his transfer to Hawaii, and his return to

combat in the summer of 1950. During the breakout

from the Pusan Perimeter he encountered enemy

tanks. One was hiding in a building given away by a

telltale bulge. Johnson and his squad leader grabbed

their bazooka, stuck it through the window of the

building, and destroyed the tank at point-blank

range. Reporting to the commander of the 21st Infantry Regiment, which was

coming up the road and

preparing to pass through

the 5th Regimental Combat

Team, Johnson said, “We’ve

been playing tic-tac-toe with

two tanks. We got ours. On

the hill are two more, and

they’re yours.”

When I went to Korea in

1948 as a lieutenant, I was assigned to the 13th Engineer

Combat Battalion, 7th Infantry Division. At that time, the

7th Division was in the northern part of South Korea along

the 38th Parallel. The 13th Engineers had their battalion headquarters at Camp Sabingo, on the outskirts of

Seoul near the Han River. The battalion did a lot of

the traditional combat engineering functions, such as

maintaining the roads, building outposts up along the

38th, and supporting the infantry battalions that

were occupying those positions. We were repairing

bridges, building bridges, and so forth. We cleared road

slides, put in perimeter fences around infantry battalions, and dug prepared emplacements. We prepositioned

explosives to blow a bridge or blow the road.

Even in those days, before the Korean War began,

it was pretty hairy up on the 38th Parallel. They were

getting mortared from the North Koreans in those

days. North Koreans came across the line and tried

to ambush people.

In October 1948, the 7th Division was pulled

out and sent back to Japan. They left an RCT for rear

guard protection, the 32d RCT. We stayed in Korea as

the 32d RCT until 1 January 1949. Then, the 32d

RCT was transferred to Japan on paper, and the elements remaining in Korea were redesignated as the 5th

RCT. We were redesignated the 72d Engineer Combat Company. That’s how we became the 5th RCT.

Finally, the Russians pulled out of North Korea and

Harry Truman said we also were to pull out. So, we

left in early summer and were transferred to Schofield

Barracks in Hawaii.

In the fall of 1948, soldiers of Company B, 13th Engineer Battalion,

posed with local children outside of Kapyong Johnson Collection
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 2 1

The War Begins

The Korean War began 25

June 1950 and we were alerted

about 1 July. I’d only been

married six months. We were

loaded aboard ship around the

15th. By that time we had received a lot of fillers from the

442d [RCT, a Hawaiian-based

infantry unit].

We landed at Pusan at

the end of July. By that time,

the UN forces had been driven

back almost to the Naktong

River. We had our equipment

with us. It was the luck of the

draw that I was put in charge

of the loading. I had to live

aboard ship in Honolulu,

maybe two or three days before anybody else did. We got

off-loaded in Pusan and went into a schoolyard outside

of Pusan that we used as a cantonment and marshaling

area. I was sent out to look for engineering construction

materials such as timber. I came back and found that

somebody had scarfed up one of my squads to run ammunition to the 27th [Wolfhound] Regiment, which

was then commanded by Lt. Col. Jon H. Michaelis.

Running Ammo to

the 27th Infantry

The 24th Division by that

time had been chewed up

pretty badly. They were located

generally north and west of

Pusan. We were down in the

Masan area. When I found out

that my squad was taken, I

went to the regimental S-3

[Operations and Training Officer], a major by the name of

Gordon Owens. I was a 1st

lieutenant by this time, and I

blew my stack and said, “Who

took my squad?” He said,

“Well, we needed them to run

ammunition up to the 27th.”

I told him, “Not without me.”

He said, “I don’t want you taking them.” I said, “I’m going

to take them if it’s my people. Nobody is going to take

my people.” He said, “All right, you have to go see Col.

Ordway” [Godwin L., CO, 5th RCT]. When I went to

see Col. Ordway I said, “They have taken one of my

squads, they have taken my trucks, and I’m going with

them.” He said, “All right” so we loaded up with ammunition. It took, I think, three ammo trucks and my jeep.

Pfc. Walter Graba of the 116th Engineers

RG 111, SC-366520

When we got back,

I told Col. Ordway,

“When the regiment

moves, take the high

ground. Don’t go down

those valleys because

that’s where the

ambushes are.”

We didn’t know it

at the time but we

were running into one

hell of a buzz saw.

2 1
2 2 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

The trucks and drivers were from other units—the

squad and jeep were mine. We ran through about five

North Korean roadblocks. We just put down a base

of fire and went through and brought the ammo to

Col. Michaelis and the 27th.

Michaelis was located north and west of Pusan

toward Masan. [Masan is less than 30 miles westnorthwest of Pusan harbor]. We were above Masan. The

1st Battalion, 29th Infantry had been up that road

before, two days before, and they were wiped out.

They got wiped out because they went up piecemeal.

They didn’t go up as an organized unit. Then they

threw the 27th in. The 27th was apparently cut off

and couldn’t get the ammunition. We took the ammunition up. The truck drivers did not belong to me. On

the way back we got into a pretty good firefight.

One driver apparently got excited when they started

shooting. He pushed the accelerator, lost control of

the truck, and the truck rolled down the mountain.

I had a number of men killed, plus four or five badly

wounded.

I was in the jeep. When I saw what had happened we went back, finally secured the area and got the

troops out, but I lost top-notch people. The squad

leader was a fellow by the name of Cpl. Torres. He was

outstanding. Before he died, he turned to one of the

men and said, “Take care of Lieutenant Johnson.”

To this day that clutches me up. When we got back,

I told Col. Ordway, “When the regiment moves, take

the high ground. Don’t go down those valleys because

that’s where the ambushes are.” We didn’t know it at the

time but we were running into one hell of a buzz saw.

TASK FORCE KEAN was 7-12 August. Named

for the CO, 25th Division, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean,

TASK FORCE KEAN was the first American counterattack. The objective was elimination of enemy forces

behind the front lines between Masan and the Nam

River. We landed in Korea on 31 July. Within the first

few hours we went into the staging area by a schoolhouse. We stayed there the first two or three days, since

we were offloading our equipment and getting it

ready. During that time, we ran the ammo to the 27th.

Regimental headquarters was still in the Pusan area in

the vicinity of the schoolyard. In fact, I believe Col.

Ordway’s office was in the school building.

After we ran that ammunition up, the RCT

moved onto the front line. This was before TASK

FORCE KEAN. Things were still very fluid. On our

approach march I remember being on the road and getting shelled. The Triple Nickel [555th Field Artillery

Battalion] was already in place. Then we got into position. I believe that TASK FORCE KEAN was the first

organized offensive UN engagement. Up to that time,

and I am speaking as a 1st lieutenant, UN forces

were being kicked back into the general area of the

Naktong perimeter.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 2 3

There were other meeting engagements, but no

organized offensive action. The 1st Battalion, 29th

Infantry, had been sent up the same road towards

Chinju. They got clobbered—lost a lot. I can’t remember if the Naktong ran through Chinju [Chinju, 27

miles due west of Masan, is on the Nam River, which

links with the Naktong River to the northeast]. We were

told that TASK FORCE KEAN was to straighten out

the Naktong defensive line. Masan was a pretty goodsized port, so if we could control all of that area, at least

the southern flank would be tied in. The 5th Marine

Regiment landed after we did, and they came up the

road on our left flank. At that time our 1st Battalion

was commanded by a Lt. Col. John Jones.

Later, Lt. Col. T.B. Roelofs, a pretty competent

guy, took over the battalion. I was the 1st Platoon leader,

and as a result I traditionally worked with the 1st Battalion. The 2d Platoon worked with the 2d Battalion and

the 3d Platoon with the 3d Battalion. Throckmorton

had the 2d Battalion and I think Heckemeyer had

the 3d Battalion. I believe Heckemeyer and Throckmorton were classmates at West Point.

So TASK FORCE KEAN jumped off. The 1st Battalion was to lead off the attack, and the 2d Battalion

was off to the side and a little bit behind.

We were in a line of battalions looking for enemy

supplies. My platoon, which was with the 1st Battalion,

was up front. We started to find a lot of pre-stocked

ammo hidden in peanut fields. The North Koreans

had pre-stocked it and when we attacked it became

uncovered.

At that time the road was not mined because

they didn’t know we were coming. We attacked and

then we started running into the buzz saw of a number

of North Korean units. I guess you could classify it as

a meeting engagement in the vicinity of Kogan-ni

on the way to Chinju. When I went up north from

Kogan-ni in a jeep, I saw two North Korean tanks. I

came back maybe 300-400 yards, maybe a kilometer,

An engineer from the 39th Engineer

Battalion arms an anti-personnel mine

RG 111, SC-366476
2 4 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

and I ran into one whale of a lot of ammunition hidden

in a peanut or soybean field. I blew the ammo in place. I

was going up to look for anything I could use as construction material—timbers, and that kind of stuff. We

didn’t really have much construction material and I

thought I could tear down some old buildings, or huts,

and get some timber out of them. I came back and reported those tanks to the battalion commander, but nothing was really done about it at that time.

The next day we got clobbered from that direction. They called the place “Bloody Gulch” [soldiers’

name for the pass around Sobuk-san]. I believe that the

3d Battalion had already gone through the pass leading

to Chinju. We had a hell of a fight back in the valley

before the pass over the mountains. I remember the night

before I had pulled my platoon off the road in a small

area occupied by a 155-mm artillery battery. Practically

the entire RCT was jammed in the small valley, all but

the 3d Battalion. We had pulled off the road when it was

getting dark. I had my jeep and the three squad trucks

with pole trailers. I had one pole trailer loaded with a ton

of dynamite, and on another pole trailer I had a lot of

M-6 anti-tank mines as well as barbed wire, and so on.

I pulled up into the 155-mm battery area behind

their guns. By then it was dark. One of the battery officers asked me what we had in the trailers. I said, “dynamite.” He wanted me to get out of there right away but

we had no place to go. We were in a small valley surrounded by mountains. We went up the valley road and

then up the foothills through the pass to Chinju. About

0300 or 0400 we began to receive small arms fire from

the hills. The North Koreans were shooting directly at

us and were so close the muzzle blasts looked like a bunch

of fireflies.

The 1st Battalion of the 35th [Infantry Regiment]

was supposed to provide lateral security for the road. By

the same token the 24th, which was the black unit, was

supposed to have taken the hills, but they didn’t. The

35th was actually north of this set of hills and was part

of the drive on Chinju. In between us was the 24th, allegedly. That night my jeep was stolen. Four days later

we caught a soldier from the 24th with the jeep. The

24th was supposed to be on our right flank and they

weren’t. They failed to take the high ground and our

flank was open.

 The next morning about 0400 their attack began.

Well, we had rifles and we had 2.36-inch rocket launchers. The first couple of days we were there they sent over

a 3.5-inch rocket launcher training team while we were

in the schoolyard. The team came over to instruct us on

the 3.5. The team leader was a lieutenant by the name of

Bob Parr, who had been an upperclassman in my cadet

company, the Class of ’45. The team came over from the

Infantry school. I don’t believe that we received any 3.5s

then but we needed them. The 2.36s were bouncing off

those T-34s like ping-pong balls. I don’t remember if we
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 2 5

had armor with us on TASK FORCE KEAN.

Everybody was oriented towards attacking with

TASK FORCE KEAN. Ordway, the commander, was

oriented towards success. He was going to attack. The

night before we went into the valley, the regimental CP

was at the base of a hill at the entrance to the valley. The

hill really commanded the entrance to the valley. I was

told to occupy the hill and secure it for the evening because the regimental headquarters

was going to be at the foot of the

hill. I got up there and had two

squads up on top and had the hill

secured. After dark, I was ordered to

move off the hill and to secure the

valley around the CP. That was

2200 or 2300.

Nobody replaced me on the

hill. When we got down we were

exhausted. My platoon sergeant,

Sgt. Parrish, was with me. I had two

squads, and I put them out along

the rice paddies to cover the trails.

I was so tired I told Sgt. Parrish,

“I’m going to sleep right on this

trail because if anybody comes

across they are going to have to

trip over me.” It was pitch black

and, you know, somebody did! A

North Korean tripped over me. He was coming down

the valley. I think he was just a scout.

The next morning about 0500 I was told to get

back up on the hill. We had a hell of a fight getting up

on the hill—hell of a fight. The reason they were concerned about the hill then was because a classmate of

mine, Al Van Petten, who had the 3d Platoon of our

company, was supposed to take ammunition further up

We were up front when

things began to happen.

First, a concussion

grenade came flying in.

I dropped alongside a

rock. Copeland disappeared. The grass in

front of me was chopped

by machine gun fire.

It wasn’t ours. I started

to back up, but it was

being chopped behind

me too.

The soldier on the left holds a 3.5-inch bazooka; the soldier on the right holds the

smaller 2.36-inch bazooka it replaced.
2 6 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

the road to the 3d Battalion. He got ambushed in the

little town just outside of that hill and lost a couple of

people including a squad leader by the name of

Newcomb, who was opened up, as if by can opener, with

a burp gun. Al was in his jeep when he saw a grenade

coming. He caught it in the air and threw it back, but it

didn’t quite clear and blew off one of his fingers. About

that time Wally Veaudry, another classmate, the assistant regimental S-3, was blown out of a truck going into

the valley. Then they started getting concerned about

the hill.

I was told to go back up on the hill, but I had to

report to Col. Ordway first. I went over and reported.

He said, “Go up and take that hill.” “Yes, Sir.” I brought

the two squads up and we got up there about daybreak.

I was out front with one of the assistant squad leaders by

the name of Copeland, a top-notch guy. We were way

up front when things began to happen. First, a concussion grenade came flying in. I dropped down alongside a

rock. Copeland had disappeared. Then, the grass in front

of me was being chopped by machine gun fire. It wasn’t

ours. I started to back up, but it was being chopped behind me too. That rock saved me.

I shouted for Copeland, “Where are you?!” He responded. I threw two grenades and started yelling at the

platoon to “hose down” the area—you know, start firing. They yelled back that they couldn’t see anything. I

yelled, “Fire at everything!” They started to hose down

the sides of the hill and Copeland jumped up and ran

back. He plopped down along side of me. At that

moment—it was funny—he had a girlfriend in Hawaii

and he was AWOL (absent without leave) before we

got on the ship. He wasn’t going to come back. He was

flat going to stay with his girlfriend, and I finally got

word to him that he better damn sure come back. He

did and he had told me that his girlfriend was going

to be praying for him. When he flopped down along

side of me, he looked at me and said, “Lieutenant, you

reckon she’s praying for me?” Well, we took the hill and

got it back. That morning, we moved into the valley.

Historically, it was a meeting engagement of

a large force of North Korean units against TASK

FORCE KEAN. The 3d Battalion of the 5th RCT got

through the pass. The 1st Battalion was holding the

right side of the pass. The artillery was down there in

the valley along with the 72d Engineers, the 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, and the 155-mm battery. I had my jeep

and three trucks on the road. The regimental S-2 [Intelligence Officer], Maj. Aden Renz, pulled his jeep out

in front of me and said he had to get the regimental CP

set up. I let him out on the road. When I got further

up on the road they blew out all of my tires.

That night I was in between the trails of the

155-mm battery, sleeping under my truck, down in

the valley in Chindong-ni. It was just about dawn

when the attack came. They laid down a base of fire

I shouted for Copeland,

“Where are you?!” He

responded. I threw two

grenades and started

yelling at the platoon to

“hose down” the area—you

know, start firing. They

yelled back that they

couldn’t see anything. I

yelled, “Fire at everything!”
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 2 7

and the muzzle flashes were like watching fireflies on

all the hills around us. The only hill that I guess fire

wasn’t coming from was the hill on the right side of the

pass. That was a cut through the mountain. I remember

the valley going around this S curve and then through

the pass. The 1st Battalion had that part of the hill.

I lost a classmate by the name of Stan Crosby up

there, Company B of the 5th. Company A was up there

and they were getting clobbered. They didn’t have the

whole hill. It was half and half. To the right flank of the

hill and down into the valley was all North Korean. We

had nobody up there. That was where, I believe, the 24th

was supposed to have been. We were getting fire from

all of those hills, on the right side and then behind us.

Vehicles were assembling on the road, but they

were not moving because of trouble at the pass. About

dawn we were starting to move and I pulled all my trucks

and my jeep up on the road and out from around the

artillery. Then it happened. It was like a curtain went up

at a play and the production started. In this instant all

hell broke loose. We received fire from all directions.

By that time the North Koreans had gotten into

position. When dawn broke they could see what they

were shooting at and they really lowered the boom.

Of course, we were not just sitting there. I had my

radio operator with me. He had the platoon radio, an

SCR 300, on his back with a long whip antenna on

it. The antenna was easily identified. It seemed that we

were getting a lot of the fire. I suspected it was because

of the antenna. I told the operator to get that damn

radio out of there—it was an aiming stake on us. Then

I started shooting off to the left side of the road, which

was suddenly heating up. When I saw flares come up

from the left side of the road I really started shooting.

At that time I was leaning on the jeep and a remarkable thing happened. A guy by the name of Bradley,

who was the warrant officer in our company, the maintenance officer, grabbed me and slammed me down on

Naval aviation provided

desperately needed closeair support during the early

days of the war. Here,

ground crewmen check

rockets mounted on a

Marine F4U Cosair

RG 129, 129-A130426
2 8 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

the ground. He did so just as a burp gun opened up

on me. I literally sat on the bullets and said, “Mind

your own business.” He started laughing. That broke

some of the tension but he obviously saved me.

About that time the flying parson came over, Dean

Hess. He was a colonel, a pilot, but also a parson—a

preacher. He was in charge of training the South

Korean air force, around the Masan area. He was flying

an AT-6, the single-wing training aircraft. He flew

over us and he saw what was happening. He had

some rockets, and I believe he had .50-calibers. He flew

in circles around and over the pass. He would let go a

rocket and then he’d come back and fire a few rounds

on the machine gun. We had a regimental Tactical

Air Controller who had gone through the pass with

his control jeep. He apparently came back and was

operating from the pass areas. He and Col. Hess were

both yelling, “Mayday!” for other aircraft to come

in. Eventually, some Marine Corps’ F4Us [propellerdriven “Corsair” fighter-bombers] came to help.

In the meantime, even though he was low on

ammo, he circled and dove in like he was going to strafe.

One time he’d strafe, and next time he’d throw something out like his lunch pail. They thought it was a

bomb and they’d all duck. Then we got a few more vehicles through the pass. He did that with the thermos

bottle, boots, and then he would mix it up with some

ammunition. He would fake it and it was really effective. I believe he stayed up there for a half to threequarters of an hour until the F4Us came in to give

us support. Were I to say who helped saved the 5th

Infantry, the 5th RCT, I’d give more credit to Dean

Hess than anybody. Later he was on “This is Your Life.”

We finally got through the pass. Remarkably, I believe

I was the only one wounded in my platoon during that

entire action. It was a superficial wound that hurt

my dignity more than anything else. Luckily, it caught

me in the leg and just went through flesh, no bones.

The operation apparently got called back. The

3d Battalion was ordered back but they were almost

into Chinju. We came back by a circular route. A few

got through going back the way we came, and that

was by necessity. Wayne Hauck, one of my classmates,

an artilleryman, had been shot through the throat.

Another artillery classmate, Bob Koch, who later became

a brigadier in the Army, grabbed him, pulled him under

a concrete bridge, and sat there with his thumb on his

jugular vein for about four hours. Then they threw him

on one of the 155-mm battery’s half-track prime movers. To my knowledge, that was the only vehicle that

got out going the other way. That action saved his life.

They pulled Wayne out, and I believe treated him on

the hospital ship Hope, which was in the Masan harbor.

They then quickly air-evacuated him to Tripler in

Hawaii. Very few of us came out the way we went in.

Once we got through the pass things calmed

About dawn we were starting

to move, and I pulled all my

trucks and my jeep up on the

road and out from around the

artillery. Then it happened. It

was like a curtain went up at

a play and the production

started. In this instant all hell

broke loose. We received fire

from all directions.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 2 9

down and we moved back into roughly the original

position around Mt. Sobuk-san. We then were assigned

to that position and it stabilized the line. The reason the

position was taken was because Sobuk-san is the dominant feature of the terrain around Kogan-ni, off to the

southeast of Pongam-ni. We stayed there until we

moved to the Waegwan area in late August.

I was up around Sobuk-san doing what an engineer platoon leader does, taking mines up on the

mountain, putting in mines between little draws, and

sometimes physically taking an infantry position with

my platoon. We became pretty original in our fighting.

We even took headlights from a destroyed truck, put

them on a rod, and tied ropes to them so that we

could move the headlights around. We hooked them to

a battery in a foxhole. When we’d hear something,

we’d turn the lights on. The North Koreans didn’t know

what was going on. How did we get a vehicle on top of

the mountain? There was also a destroyer down in

the harbor that fired star shells for us and gave us artillery support.

Most of the attacks were banzai-type at night.

I remember one attack on Company A under Henry

Emerson, another classmate. One morning after a

banzai attack they found forty North Korean bodies

in front of one platoon. They just kept coming, but we

held Sobuk-san. It had not been occupied when we got

up there. Company A was on the left side, Company B

was right on top of Sobuk-san, and Company C was off

to the right down the draw. What I tried to do was to

tie the companies together by cutting a road with a

bulldozer up almost to Company C on the reverse slope

of the hill. In a small valley to the left of Company A

was the 3d Battalion.

Hank Emerson of Company A asked that we

place anti-personnel mines on the ridgeline covering

his front. He occupied the top of a steep hill above the

battalion headquarters. Between his position and Company B was a saddle over which the North Koreans

could infiltrate. We carried the mines up the steep hill

and started putting the mines in. I thought our action

The remains of North Korean troops killed near Waegwan,

September 1950 RG 111, SC-349306

Most of the attacks were

banzai-type at night....One

morning after a banzai attack

they found forty North Korean

bodies in front of one platoon.

They just kept coming, but

we held Sobuk-san.

2 9
3 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

had been coordinated with everyone. Since we were

in front of Company A, Company C across the valley

could see us. They thought the North Koreans were

out in front of Company A, so they called in artillery.

I went back to Hank and said, “You guys are

shooting at me.” He said, “No, that’s not us.” I said, “It’s

coming from back here; it’s not coming from out

there. You get that squared away and I’ll go down and

put mines in behind your flank,” because he had been

attacked from there too (between his position and the

3d Battalion). So we went down there, and we were

putting in mines and trip flares. Apparently, people

from the 3d Battalion saw us and they started opening

up on us with their .50-calibers. I went back to Hank

and said, “When you get this straightened out, I’ll be

back.” It was funny, since, again, we were fortunate

that nobody was hit. It was just lack of coordination.

We were continuously getting hit by the North

Koreans and really had no good maps of the area for

artillery adjustment. Col. Throckmorton told me to

get on top and sketch the terrain in front of Company

B. I went up Sobuk-san, the highest peak in the area,

and tried to sketch the terrain out front for artillery

fire missions. It was reproduced for defensive artillery

fire missions and general control.

Col. Ordway was relieved because of Bloody

Gulch. He was a heck of a nice guy. He went on and

became an IG (inspector general). Col. John L. Throckmorton became the regimental commander.

Things were really touch-and-go in the fighting.

We really had no reserves. Many nights I sat in the

CP with Col. Throckmorton waiting to be committed

as the “regimental reserve” with my platoon. The other

engineer platoons also were used as the regimental reserve. John L. Throckmorton was really super. I could

never say enough good about him. He would shake

his head when things looked really bad and say, “I don’t

want to use you. I don’t want to commit you.” Of course,

Second Lt. John

Kane, 65th Engineer

Battalion, removes

a Chinese box mine

RG 111, SC-357543
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 3 1

I was on his team and I didn’t want to be committed

either. Nothing was worse than going out in the

dark not knowing where you were going and not

being able to reconnoiter. He never panicked. It was

really an interesting study for me to watch that lieutenant colonel operate.

We were under attack every night and we were

banzaied. There would be a lot of North Korean bodies

on this slope in front of us. We weren’t being ignored

down there. Whether or not we were being pushed or

punished as much as the 35th or 24th, I don’t know.

David Carlisle [a colleague of 1st Lt. Charles

Bussey] has written a lot about the 24th. He was one

of my cadets when I was a first classman. Carlisle was

a smart guy—became an engineer. There were two

black cadets who came in with the Class of ’50—David

Carlisle and the other was Green. My company, the

6th New Cadet Company, was the company that got

both of them. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell

from New York kept tabs on how they were treated

and how they did. He used to come up twice a month

to see if they were getting hazed or being treated any

differently. They weren’t. I knew Carlisle and Green as

well as an upperclassman could know two plebes. Carlisle

became an engineer and was assigned to Ft. Belvoir [Virginia] when I ran an OCS (officer candidate school) company. I used to see him frequently at Belvoir, but I don’t

know whatever happened to him. [David Carlisle became instrumental in seeking a reappraisal of the 24th

Infantry’s performance in Korea. One of the 25 Division’s

three regiments, the segregated 24th Infantry, was rumored, fairly or unfairly, to have “bugged out” in the

face of the enemy. In late September 1950, the division

commander, Maj. Gen. William B. Dean, requested that

Eighth Army disband the regiment as unreliable. The

controversy had one salutary effect—it forced the Army

to reexamine the overall policy of using segregated units.

For more on the 24th Infantry’s performance in Korea

Two soldiers remove a

North Korean anti-tank

mine from a riverbank,

21 September 1950

Engineer School, 119-12-2
3 2 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

and on the segregated army in Korea, see the U.S. Army

Center of Military History’s Black Soldier, White Army:

The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea (1996); and Charles

Bussey’s Firefight at Yechon: Courage and Racism in the

Korean War (1991).]

My recollection is that the 24th did break. That’s

my recollection. I know that Col. Throckmorton was

concerned that his right flank was not stable. He moved

units around to try to absorb anything that might happen. We were in the Sobuk-san area about a month and

then we got pulled out. Who backfilled us, I don’t know

[the 27th Infantry Regiment]. Then we moved up to

the Naktong to Taegu and attacked north to Waegwan.

We were attached to the 24th. We crossed the Naktong

just south of two bridges, which had been destroyed.

Breakout Across the Naktong

I had a bet with our first sergeant, Sgt. Loeffler, who was

the 1st sergeant of the 72d. Sgt. Loeffler kept asking

me, “What the hell is going to happen?” I said, “Well,

we’re going to break out and attack the north.” He said,

“How?” And I said, “We have got to cross the Naktong.”

He said, “When?” I said, “Well, we will cross the Naktong

when MacArthur attacks Inch’on.” We weren’t getting

our replacements either because they were being scarfed

off someplace. I told him, “We’re going to have an amphibious landing probably at Inch’on.” He said, “When?”

And I said, “The 15th of September.” It obviously was a

wild guess, but I was serious. He said, “I betcha.” I said,

“What do you mean you bet me?” He said, “I’ll bet you

10 bucks.” I said, “I don’t have 10 bucks to bet.” He

said, “I bet you a dollar.” And I said, “All right, I’ll bet

you a dollar.” He paid me a dollar on the 16th.

 On the 15th we attacked across the Naktong [the

5th RCT was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, 14

Sep 50]. A classmate, Kenny Hatch, led the 72d’s 2d

Platoon, and I had the 1st Platoon. The 24th Division

had attacked during the day, and they must have lost a

lot of their people in the river assault process. We attacked at night. We crossed by the Waegwan Bridge that

had been blown. [The 1st Cavalry Division had destroyed

the permanent bridge at Waegwan in August and the

North Koreans had not repaired it].

The 3d Engineers manned the assault boats across

the river at night. I was in the first boat with part of a

squad and the rest of the platoon followed. We were going to get on the other side to clear some mines. My

boat hit what we thought was the opposite shore. We all

piled out and ran inland only to find ourselves back in

the water. In the darkness they had dropped us on an

island in the middle of the river. I yelled for the boats to

come back and get us across. Well, we finally got across.

Finally, my two squads were across plus the platoon sergeant. We ran into mines on the road. Clearing

mines with a mine detector at night is tedious and time

consuming. I mean, hell, we would have been doing it

The 3d Engineers manned the

assault boats across the river

at night....My boat hit what

we thought was the opposite

shore. We all piled out and

ran inland only to find ourselves back in the water. In

the darkness they had

dropped us on an island in

the middle of the river.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 3 3

Soldiers from the 65th Engineers

repair a bypass on the road to

Chonju, 27 September 1950

Engineer School, 93-56-1
3 4 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

yet if I had to do it that way. So what we did, we’d find a

mine and then just throw it off the side of the road. They

were wooden box mines. Finally, we got up to the hill

through which the road had been cut. At the hill the

road turned 90 degrees—perpendicular to the river.

By now the night was pitch black.

The infantry was attacking on both sides of the

road and had secured the hill. Fighting continued, primarily on the left side of the road. On the right side

there was just a little “chocolate drop” kind of hill. The

road was cutting through the ridgeline, almost parallel

to the river, until the hill, then it took off north away

from the river. Kenny Hatch, who had the Second Platoon, 72d, was now up with me. It was night, 2200 or

2300. We were getting ready to look for more mines or

do what we could as engineers when all hell broke loose.

There were two North Korean T-34 tanks down

on the other side of the hill. They had come up the road

apparently not knowing we had crossed the river. We

heard their engines and tracks clanking. One of the squads

from Company A led by a Sgt. Lyon went down with a

2.36-inch bazooka. They stopped the tanks but they

didn’t knock them out. I believe they scared them and

probably knocked the tracks off of one because after they

bounced some rounds off our hill, it sounded like one

tank was pulling the other back up the road. We couldn’t

see anything because it was so dark. Anyhow, Sgt. Lyon

came charging back on our side of the cut. He said he

got within 20 feet of the first tank and said he knew

he blew the tread off it. Those two rounds were all the

bazooka ammo that we had with us. None of our

vehicles were on our side of the river as yet.

At the same time, up on the hills on the left side of

the road, there was a hell of a firefight. We didn’t know

what to do. We didn’t know where anybody was. Ken

Hatch and I both had a squad or two with us, but when

the firefight took place we didn’t know where anyone

was. We started digging in on the reverse slope of the

chocolate drop hill. Unknown to us at the time one of

the lieutenants from the Class of ’49, John Hayes, caught

Members of the 3d Engineer Battalion

ferrying a jeep across the Naktong River

Engineer School, 30-25-100
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 3 5 3 5

a concussion grenade right in the face and it blinded

him. John and I had been together at Lafayette College.

The fight went on all night long. By the next morning

things had quieted down and we (the 5th) resumed the

movement up the road toward Kumch’on, South Korea.

During the night, the 3d Engineers had emplaced a ferry

near the blown bridges and our vehicles started coming

over. My jeep and trailer arrived early that morning.

I had some tools on the jeep trailer, a pioneer set,

another mine detector. Col. Roelofs, the battalion commander, came back and said, “We ran into more mines.

Get up front.” I said, “Yes, Sir” and went up front. The

Koreans had buried the wooden box mines, maybe a

hundred of them, right on the road. Under those circumstances, the mine detector wasn’t necessary since we

could easily see where the mines had been buried. Removing them was a different problem. You are supposed

to dig around the things, carefully remove the dirt, check

for booby traps, remove the fuse, and so on. Another

technique is to put a rope on the mine, get off to the

side, and pull it out with the rope. I did all of that for the

first one, but it took so long that I just cleared the dirt

off the tops, opened the pressure plate, took the fuse

out, and threw the mine off to the side of the road. I

mean, in those days we had to move. We didn’t have time

for all that. I simply didn’t believe that the enemy had

enough time to booby trap each mine so I just threw

them off the road. Obviously, it worked.

 We got up to a blown concrete bridge-culvert. We

didn’t have any dozers over yet but we had to build a

bypass around the bridge. I guess the bridge had been

hit by air. We did build the bypass using picks and “D”

handled shovels—hand labor.

The 24th was driving into Kumch’on. The 5th was

leading the attack [9-14 Oct 50] for the 24th Division.

About that time they started the system where one RCT

would attack all day.

Then another RCT from the division would pass

through and attack. If all went well, that meant we would

fight one day and rest two. The 21st Infantry was to

leapfrog us and attack the next day. I ran into some more

mines, so Col. Roelofs said, “Well, get rid of these mines

and rejoin the battalion.” When we got up to a small

town between Waegwan and Kumch’on, the road went

straight through the town and another road went off of

it perpendicular to the right. I didn’t know where the

damn regiment went. There was no trace of the 5th. What

happened is that the 5th went into the town, took the

road to the right, and let the 21st bypass or attack

through. I got up to the town with one squad and

my jeep and didn’t see anybody.

When I turned around and looked down the

road behind me I saw the 21st coming up the road.

The road went right through rice paddies. The road was

built up, of course, by fill through the paddies. The

21st was marching in a column of twos. They had a

At the same time, up

on the hills on the left

side of the road, there

was a hell of a firefight.

We didn’t know what

to do. We didn’t know

where anybody was.
3 6 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

few vehicles, not many, because the ferry still wasn’t

operating effectively. Anyhow, I was standing at the road

junction in this little village talking to the squad leader

when the building we were standing by exploded. A

tank, T-34, came out and turned, facing its gun down

the road toward the 21st. We were so close to it the

North Koreans didn’t see us. It let a couple of rounds

go at the infantry. Most of those villages had walls right

up to the road, and there was a six-foot wall right

there at the corner. I jumped over that wall and didn’t

touch it—cleared that thing like you wouldn’t

believe! My squad leader ran through the hole that the

tank made coming out. We met on the other side.

The jeep had been parked on the side road close

to the wall but the jeep trailer was hanging out in the

roadway exposed to the direct line of the tank. The

squad leader and I were pulling, trying to get the

trailer out of the way so the tank couldn’t see it. In the

meantime, we got under the trailer tarp and tried to

get the rocket launcher out. I looked down that

road, which had just been loaded with 21st infantrymen. When the tank fired that first round, or the second, there wasn’t a soldier to be seen. I don’t know

what swallowed them up, but that whole line of infantry was gone. They were down.

 I wanted to climb on top of the tank and drop

something down the turret. Instead, the tank backed

up just as fast as it could go to the next little bridge.

It had to turn to go down a bypass and was going so fast

it flipped over on its top. I never saw this happen

before but the tank crew scrambled out of an escape

hatch on the bottom of the tank and took off.

A short distance up the road there was a little

schoolhouse. The building had a bulge. It was another

tank, which had been driven into the building. So we

stuck the 2.36-inch through the window and blew it.

The 5th went up to the town and turned right

for the 21st to pass through. I looked up on the side

of the hills outside the town and saw two more T-34s.

An American convoy

passes a disabled

North Korean T-34

tank near the

Naktong River

RG 111, SC-355124
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 3 7

I figured it wasn’t prudent to go looking for the 5th under those conditions, so I took the squad and the

jeep back down to the 21st. I met the regimental commander, who was coming up. He asked, “What the

hell is going on up there?” I said, “Sir, I don’t know what

happened to the 5th. I think they went up there

and turned to the right, but I don’t know. We had just

been playing tic-tac-toe with two tanks. We got ours.

On the hill are two more, and they are yours.” I can talk

about these things because they’re funny now.

He wasn’t happy because he claimed the 5th had

left him with a bag of worms that he had to overcome

at the point of the leapfrog or pass-through. I went

back closer to the ferry site where I met the rest of my

platoon. I had the platoon bed down since we’d been

going for three days—no sleep, little food. I decided

to go back to the company CP, which was on the

Waegwan side of the river, to get food, ammo, and

mail. So I went back over on the ferry with my jeep

and met the company commander. I told him that I

wanted food, ammo, and I wanted the mail.

Well, I got food. I think they were 10-in-1 rations,

which I had never seen before. We only had C rations.

Anyhow, I got those and the mail and I went back up

to the ferry site. It was now dark. While we were in

line waiting at the ferry site to get across, I fell asleep

sitting in the front seat waiting for the ferry to pick us

up. The next thing I knew my jeep driver, Cpl. Wilkins,

was in the ditch and pulling on me. “Lieutenant, get in

the ditch!” I said, “What for?” He yelled, “We’re getting

shelled!” There was an 88-mm or something across the

river that was firing at the ferry site. The rounds were

missing the jeep by only a couple of feet and exploding

against the riverbank. I was so damn tired. In war you

get so tired you don’t care. I said, “Okay.” He later told

me that I took my poncho, put it over my head, and

fell back asleep.

We got back over the river and the next day we

leapfrogged the 21st. They had taken out those two

tanks. We were now, I think, getting close to Kumch’on,

South Korea. They returned the favor and left us a

bunch of tanks as we leapfrogged them.

I found the 5th the next day. They had been out

to the right as I had thought. They hadn’t left signs, not

even tracks on the road, because there were no vehicles

at that time.

After Inch’on the whole enemy front collapsed,

about 17 September. The 5th attacked, leapfrogging

the 21st. I was still an engineer and the 1st Platoon

leader. My three trucks and my jeep were across the

river, and we were going toward Kumch’on. I was in a

riverbed just before we went up over a rise on the road

going towards Kumch’on. Col. Roelofs came back in

the riverbed where the temporary battalion CP was.

He said they had run into more mines and I had to

go up and get them. By that time we now had tanks

The rounds were missing

the jeep by only a couple

of feet and exploding

against the riverbank.

I was so damn tired.

In war you get so tired

you don’t care. I said,

“Okay.” He later told

me that I took my poncho,

put it over my head, and

fell back asleep.
3 8 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

from the 72d Tank Company, 5th RCT, and two of

them were up on the road.

My jeep driver, Wilkins, and I got the jeep up on

the road. We were lined up with one tank, an M4A3, I

believe, then my jeep, one more tank, two of my trucks,

two more tanks, and my last truck. We were the lead

element of the attack. When we ran into the mines, I

got out in front of the tanks to start clearing them.

A platoon sergeant from Company B of the 5th, Sgt.

Suga, plus a few of his troops were with me. I found the

mines, picked them up and threw them off to the side of

the road, and we continued the attack. It started getting

dark, but we continued going up the road with our

small group in front.

All of a sudden a North Korean machine-gun just

off on the left side of the road opened up. I jumped off

the right side of the road and part way down the

road embankment. The road was built on fill through

the rice paddies. Suga jumped off to the left side of

the road and within seconds he came jumping back to

our side. When he leaped off, he landed right on the

enemy machine-gun—we were that close. I threw a

grenade and about that time the tank behind me, the

lead tank, opened up and sprayed our side of the road.

One of Suga’s soldiers had his head laid up against

my thigh. When that tank let go it blew that poor

boy’s head off and Suga also got wounded, not badly,

from our tank. The bullet just grazed my right leg

enough to sting, but I got so damn mad that I stood up

and went back to the tank. I got the outside telephone

and said, “You son-of-a-bitch, if you fire one more round

on that side of the road, I will personally blow you to

kingdom come!” When the firefight started, our own

tank was buttoned up and reacted by firing to the front.

Well, things calmed down. The machine gun was

eliminated and it must have been the only thing there.

I was wounded in the right leg but was able to walk,

fortunately. Later that night the Company B commander,

Kermit Young, was badly wounded and evacuated.

Shortly afterward it became daylight and I pulled my

platoon off to the side. The 5th continued attacking, and they ran into a hell of a firefight from the hill

Soldiers sweeping the

road for mines before

an advancing M-4 tank

Engineer School, 119-13-1
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 3 9

They [the North Koreans]

weren’t that anxious

to surrender. They were

primarily trying to get

north. I suspect, though,

that if we had really put a

block out there, they would

have come in rather than

be killed. Things that they

could see, such as napalm,

flamethrowers, and so on,

would cause them to stop,

but they didn’t seem to

fear rifle fire.

Wounded North Korean

prisoners captured during

the drive north to the Naktong

River, 18 September 1950

RG 111, SC-361779

The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 3 9
4 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

line to the left of the road. To my knowledge it was

the first time we ran into grazing fire. The North Koreans were not on the ridgelines. They were on the lower

slopes so that they weren’t getting plunging fire but

instead grazing fire. It was pretty effective machine

gun fire, and they hit Kermit Young plus a couple

more officers in the company.

Becoming an Infantry Company Commander

Later, I got a call from Col. Throckmorton. His call

sign was Danger Six. My call sign was Dynamite One,

which is a good call sign. He said, “Dynamite One, this

is Danger Six. I want you to assume command of the

unit you have been supporting,” which was Company

B. That was how I became an infantry company commander. I then became an infantryman. I had been

wounded twice up to that point. It seems that we had

been working all day and fighting most nights. We

were exhausted. When I became an infantryman, I could

sleep all day long and then fight at night.

That night the regiment had been trying to take

this hill, trying to go up toward Kumch’on. It was a

tough fight. I told Col. Roelofs I wanted to take it my

way. I wanted to envelop it because I suspected there

was nothing really off the road on the enemy flank.

I thought it was all concentrated on the road leading

to Kumch’on. He said, “All right. Go ahead.” I told him

how I was going to do it and that I’d keep him informed

of my position. I took the company and we went all

the way around to where they were. We used the reverse

slopes so they couldn’t see us from the road. I had the

whole company lined up on the reverse slope of the

ridgeline behind them.

After we got the company on line I called for

both artillery and the 4.2-inch mortars on two target

areas. I knew where the North Koreans were, even though

I couldn’t see them, since I could tell where the fire

was coming from. I had the Triple Nickel fire for effect

on the left area and the 4.2-inch mortars at the right

area; then, I switched the two, so we really saturated

the target area. We lifted the artillery and went over

An artillery crew

awaits the signal

to fire on the enemy,

25 July, 1950

RG 111, SC-344383
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 4 1

the top. One of the 72d’s tank platoon leaders, Keith

Whitham, who had been an usher at my wedding, was

in the valley below and saw us come over the top. He

thought we were North Koreans and let fly at us with

their 76-mm tank cannon. When those rounds hit

we all jumped back on the reverse slope and I radioed

a flash message: “FLASH, FLASH, I am receiving

high-velocity fire, and I believe it’s from our tanks.”

Col. Roelofs, fortunately, was down by the tanks.

He ran up and yelled at Whitham, “Goddamnit, you’re

firing at Johnson and Company B!” Keith apparently

said, “He looks like a North Korean to me.”

The next day, the enemy opposition just evaporated and they began retreating north. I really don’t

know why. We just didn’t have the people to pick them

up, so we bypassed them. Our battalion was ordered

to move east of where we were and put in blocking

positions in a valley, which ran north/south. The companies were separated by considerable distance, about

10 miles to the next unit. The 555th did provide general support to each of us. Our job was to just keep

the North Koreans going north. If they came in we

would pick them up.

I put the company out in defensive positions occupying high ground to the approach routes coming

up the valley. As I said, we had field artillery support,

and we had our own 60-mm mortars. We fired mortar

flares, but the round would work maybe one-tenth of

the time. We sat on the hills and watched long

columns of North Koreans moving north on the other

side of the valley. They were obviously going back

home. Every once and a while some would walk into us.

A few surrendered. I vividly remember one who

did. He had been badly wounded. I believe he had

been hit by white phosphorus or napalm. The back of

his head was almost gone and maggots were growing

in his wound. I had put roadblocks out on the approach

routes and one of those called me when that guy came

in. I went down there and saw him. My people were

wondering what we should do with him. I said, “Put

him on a jeep and take him to an aid station.” They

said, “Lieutenant, we’re going to blow his brains out.”

They felt that he was in that bad of a condition. Whether

or not he survived, I don’t know, but we took him to

an aid station. A few of their wounded did come in,

plus stragglers in threes and fours, but the masses were

moving in the foothills on the other side of the valley.

They weren’t that anxious to surrender. They

were primarily trying to get north. I suspect, though,

that if we had really put a block out there, they would

have come in rather than be killed. Things that they

could see, such as napalm, flamethrowers, and so on,

would cause them to stop, but they didn’t seem to fear

rifle fire. They couldn’t see the bullets. I must admit

that the first couple of months I didn’t think I’d get

hit either. It’s the survival attitude, just the philosophy

I had been wounded twice

up to that point. It seems

that we had been working

all day and fighting most

nights. We were exhausted.

When I became an infantryman, I could sleep all day

long and then fight at night.
4 2 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 72d Engineer Combat Company

you have to have. Training does that for you.

The situation changed so fast. What those tanks

were doing down there was getting ready to go on the

attack, to cross the Naktong and to go into Pusan and

to take South Korea. All of a sudden things reversed.

The North Korean tanks were surprised and were

caught. They really couldn’t move much off the roads

because of the extensive rice paddies.

 When we were going toward Waegwan we had

real problems keeping the roads through the paddies

open. We simply couldn’t get the fill material to fill

the failed spots in the road. I blew a great big tall brick

chimney to get the bricks out of it to use as fill. In that

case it was the only thing we had that could get us

across the doggone rice paddies. Col. Emerson Itschner

was brought into my CP by Capt. Gayhart. He was

coming in as the new IX Corps Engineer. He said he’d

like to go up to see the bridge at Waegwan. At that

time it was in the 1st Cavalry area.

I said, “Well, Sir, you know that the road on this

side parallels the river and it’s pretty hairy. It runs

down by the river for about three kilometers.” “Oh?” he

said, “I want to go see it.” I said, “All right.” So he got in

the front seat of the jeep, I got in the back, and Wilkins

drove us. I said, “Now Wilkins, when you get over

this rise, floor it.” Itschner said, “Why?” I said, “Because

we’re going to get shot at going along the river.” He said,

“You think so?” I said, “Yes, Sir. I made that trip many

times, and they always fire their 88s from across the

river.” We really flew up that road. Sure as hell, those

high-velocity guns were tracking us trying to get us.

Col. Itschner never forgot that.

When I was a TAC (tactical) officer at West

Point, Col. Itschner came up just to talk to the cadets

who were graduating and being commissioned in the

Corps of Engineers. He was Chief of Civil Works or

something. Since I was the only engineer tactical officer,

I was included in the reception at Round Pound. I

went over to him and said, “You remember the ride

we had on the road going to Waegwan?” He smiled and

said he certainly did.

A combat engineer is part infantry and part

engineer. The interrelationship of combat engineering

and civil engineering is inseparable. I contend the best

engineer has to be the guy out in front for one reason.

Whatever he does or fails to do, engineers who come

behind him have to either correct the deficiencies or

build on what was done. That guy has got to have a damn

good foundation to know what is good, what is smart,

and what is dumb. I’ve seen that so many times. People

do things in combat engineering on the spur of the

moment that are stupid. Other people come along and

they build, and build, and build on those stupid

things. Pretty soon the whole thing has got to be torn

down. That’s why I say that the Army must have the

best combat engineers possible. You get them by proA combat engineer is part

infantry and part engineer.

The interrelationship of

combat engineering and civil

engineering is inseparable.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 4 3

viding good engineering training and experience in

peacetime as well as providing tactical training.

I had just become an infantry company commander, Company B, 5th Infantry, as we broke out of

the Pusan Perimeter, crossed the Naktong River, and

liberated the town of Kumch’on in South Korea. Other

elements of the 24th division were liberating nearby

towns, as I recall. We were leapfrogging. The regiment

would fight one day, consolidate what we had, and

then pull off to the flank. The next regiment, the

21st, would take over and fight a day. The third member of the three units of the 24th Division was the

27th British Brigade. The British brigade would then

attack for a day while the 21st pulled off the side

and rested. On the fourth day, the 5th would come

back and attack. We were relaxing for two days and

fighting for one.

Everything as far as the North Koreans were

concerned was going to hell-in-a-handbasket. They

were disintegrating. We took Kumch’on, South Korea,

and the next day we did nothing. About the third day

there appeared to be nothing in front of us. That was

when our battalion was sent to the north and east of

Kumch’on and we were put in blocking positions. Our

orders were to block them from getting onto the

roads. If they did, they could have set up and ambushed some friendly force coming up the road. But they

were staying in the mountains and walking up the

trails. I guess they were abandoning an awful lot of the

equipment. We did pick up a few prisoners and some

of their wounded, who we put on a truck to take to

an aid station or POW (prisoner of war) compound.

That went on for three or four days and then we

moved. We didn’t really get into combat for quite a

while after that because of this leapfrog philosophy

and the fact that the front had just disintegrated. We

moved north and took an assembly area north of Seoul

up by Kaesong, south of the 38th Parallel. We initially

walked, but then we got on a motor convoy through

Seoul to near Kaesong.

Rice paddies

outside of a

small Korean

village

RG 111, SC-344537
4 4 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson 24th Infantry Division

Brigadier General Davidson describes the

interview he had with General MacArthur upon

Davidson’s arrival in Japan, his assignment to build

a defensive line around the Pusan Perimeter, and his

subsequent assignment to the 24th Infantry Division.

When the North Koreans attacked south on 25

June 1950 I was chief of staff to [Lt. Gen. Albert] Al C.

Wedemeyer [Sixth Army commander at The Presidio,

California]. My wife’s a Catholic and I’m a Protestant.

She had gone to church—early

church—and the rest of us

were sitting around the pool. On

the way back her job was to

bring back the Sunday paper.

When we opened the paper,

we read the account of the invasion. Little did I realize that

six weeks later I was going to

be over there too.

We followed the course

of the conflict. Col. Anderson,

my exec then, and I would walk

from the engineer office up the

hill to The Presidio to our quarters. We’d walk up the hill together and discuss the war.

As the North Koreans advanced so rapidly, the obvious

thing seemed to us was to have some sort of amphibious

landing behind the North Korean lines. We wondered

whether or not that type of action would be taken. Of

course, we didn’t discuss as far north as Inch’on, but

that seemed to us the logical thing to do because they’d

gotten such a jump on us.

The 2d Division was going over there early from

Seattle and we had to POM them. The major occupation for me, as chief of staff, was to be sure that everything was done properly and that we got all the supplies

and equipment to them so that they could load and

get going. I didn’t realize then that I was going to beat

them over there.

I first found out I was going about 10 days or

two weeks before I left. I left either the very end of

July or the very first of August and arrived over there

about 4 August. General Douglas MacArthur had a policy

that every general officer who was on his way to Korea

would report to him before going to Korea. I landed

at the airport in Tokyo, was taken down to Yokohama,

and put in a hotel. I was told that General MacArthur

was away and wouldn’t be back for a few days. I was to

wait there on call and report to him when he arrived and

could see me. So I spent two or three days down there.

Finally, his headquarters staff called me and I reported to him. In his usual way he was very friendly.

He had a great capacity, when he saw an individual, for

A South Korean soldier looks over the

railroad yards in Pusan RG 111, SC-349449
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 4 5

making him think that he was the one person he wanted

to see at that time. He had a very fine, friendly ability in

that regard. He greeted me, and, of course, every private

conversation turned, in a reasonable degree, to Army

football [Brig. Gen. Davidson had been head football

coach at the U.S. Military Academy, 1933-38]. Then

he said he didn’t know what job Lt. Gen. Walton H.

Walker had lined up for me. I was assigned to Gen.

Walker’s headquarters and he made the assignments from

there. MacArthur outlined the situation in very general

terms, wished me luck, and that was it. I guess I was

there about 10 or 15 minutes. He was the same friendly

person he had been when I reported to him as a lieutenant, and he exhibited the same degree of friendliness

when I reported to him as a brigadier general.

I went over as a brigadier general. I never lost my

rank after I first got it in Sicily. I went over there as an

infantryman. Gen. Walker said, “I want you to lay out a

defensive line around Pusan in the event we have to evacuate the peninsula.” I made my reconnaissance first despite the time lag of getting the supplies over, because I

hadn’t seen Korea before—hadn’t seen that terrain.

First, I made a map of reconnaissance to see what

the problem was. That may have taken a day or so. Then

I got a hold of a jeep and went over as much of the ground

as I could. I don’t think I got an airplane then because,

as I remember, there weren’t any. It really was with a

map reconnaissance and a limited vehicle ground reconnaissance that I got my feel for the terrain and laid out

what I thought was a proper trace for a defensive line. As

I went over the terrain I looked at it and one thing that

impressed me greatly, in the line where I felt the positions should go, was the shallowness of the soil, and the

rock. To dig placements through that rock, in the time

and the number we had to, was almost impossible. The

only recourse, as I saw it, was to build up instead of going down—new sandbags. I remember the first supply list I put in. I

asked for an ungodly number of

sandbags. When they were unloaded

on the dock there were a mountain

of them. They called that “Davidson’s

Folly,” at least some wags did, but

they didn’t last too long.

I was told to make this reconnaissance as fast as I could, three or

four days. Then I had to come back

and report to Gen. Walker’s chief of

staff—Lev Allen [Maj. Gen. Leven

C.]. He seemed to think it was a

pretty good idea. He said he would

present it to Gen. Walker at his first

opportunity, which he did later that

Gen. Walker said, “I want

you to lay out a defensive

line around Pusan in the

event we have to evacuate

the peninsula.”

4 5

Brig. Gen. Davidson discusses the

military situation with a British officer

Davidson Collection
4 6 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson 24th Infantry Division

night. Gen. Walker said, “No, it’s got to go on this line,”

which was the line that General MacArthur had drawn

with his finger across the map.

I thought it was unsound. In the first place I

thought it was too long. The kind of perimeter we wanted

had to be defended with a force of steadily diminishing size, you see, and a line that was so long would be

difficult to defend with all the troops we had then.

It would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, to defend as the force became smaller. I still thought

my line was sound but, of course, I was in no position

to say no.

I was instructed to go down to Pusan and to construct this line along the trace that General MacArthur

had picked out from an airplane on one of his visits. I

don’t think he made a detailed reconnaissance or a map

study, certainly not to the degree that I had, although

mine only took place over 72 hours.

He sent me back to Pusan, and I flew down in an

L-4 with the base section. They gave me a little room. I

started to work that Sunday when I got there. I don’t

think I ever felt lower in my life because they had absolutely nothing to work with. I was all by myself and doing all the planning and so on. There was nothing in the

way of supplies to speak of. It was going to take time to

get the supplies. There were no troops or civilian organizations to work with, to do the job. It looked like an

unplayable lie. I was really low. Anyway, I laid out the

defensive line and figured out the sectors and the amount

of supplies for each sector. Then I added them all up,

made my supply list, and sent it over to Japan. The big

items were those damn sandbags. [The DAVIDSON

LINE began at Sodong-ni, approximately eight miles

north of Ulsan and extended to northeast of Miryang. It

then curved southeast of Muan-ni, crossed the Naktong,

and ended at Masan.]

I started what I could with whatever personnel I

could dig up, which was pretty much of a ragtag and

didn’t amount to anything. I hardly got started. I was

just lucky as hell that they never even had to go back

there because they wouldn’t have found the damn thing.

What little was done wasn’t worth a damn anyway, so

that petered out.

We were able to hold the Naktong perimeter when

that developed. The 24th Division was the first division

over there and they were pretty decimated. Bill Dean,

the commanding general, had been captured; the deputy

commander had gone home again because of stomach

trouble; and so Johnny Church, an infantryman, was

assigned to command the 24th Division. They had

been taken out of the line and were in a rest area in

an orchard behind the perimeter, resting and recuperating and reorganizing because they had just introduced

Koreans into our units. They put so many Koreans in

each part to beef it up and give it close to the standard

number of people.

I started to work that Sunday

when I got there. I don’t

think I ever felt lower in my

life because they had absolutely

nothing to work with....There was

nothing in the way of supplies....

There were no troops or civilian

organizations....It looked like an

unplayable lie. I was really low.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 4 7

I joined that division about 31 August. I was the

assistant division commander (ADC). We were in reserve. One day we got an order to relieve the Marine

division, which was down south. Gen. Church sent

me ahead of the division to meet with their G-3 and

arrange for our taking over the positions they were

holding along the Naktong River.

I did that one night, and the next day there was a

breakthrough on the east coast of Korea near a town called

P’ohang-dong. They called the Marine division and said,

“Sequence off. You have to continue your position and

the 24th Division has a job to do over on the east coast.”

I had my jeep and my driver, so we took off toward

P’ohang-dong to the corps headquarters [ROK I Corps].

In the meantime our division came over and we

physically located the divisions in the corps area. After

our division got over there the clear penetration developed at P’ohang-dong, so on 9 September 1950 Gen.

Church sent me with a regimental task force over

to P’ohang-dong to plug the hole. That was my first

operation over there. We had a successful operation

and rejoined the division.

Soldiers of the 14th Engineer

Battalion place a barbed wire

entanglement on the banks of the

Naktong River, 10 August 1950

Engineer School, Korea 011
4 8 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

Lieutenant Trayers describes his graduation

from the U.S. Military Academy and his branch selection to the Corps of Engineers. Rushed to Korea as a

replacement, he did not attend the Engineer Basic

Course before reporting for duty. He received his indoctrination to combat on the Pusan Perimeter.

Mounting casualties soon found him as a temporary

company commander. Later he helped install and

remove a minefield.

At West Point, cadets could choose only one of

five branches: Infantry, Artillery, Armor, Engineer,

and Signal Corps. These were considered at that time

the five combat branches. We went into an assembly

room and there was a blackboard in the front on

which were written the number of vacancies available

in each of the branches. The sum of all of the vacancies

added up to the number of cadets who were graduating

from West Point, minus the 25 percent who were

going into the Air Force. You chose a branch based

on your academic standing.

One officer had the roster of our academic standing and the other officer was in front of the blackboard with a piece of chalk. The one officer with the

roll called out, “William Bradford DeGraf,” the number one graduate in our class. Bill DeGraf stood up and

said, “Infantry.” He had been an infantry lieutenant

before he went to West Point. The officer changed

the number of vacancies in the infantry by minus one.

Then the officer with the roll called the second person

to graduate, “Charles Ozro Eshelman.” Charlie Eshelman stood up and said “Engineer.” With that the number of engineer vacancies was changed from 69 to 68.

The third person called was “James Mason Thompson.”

He chose engineers, as did Robert Maris Wilson who

graduated fourth in our class. After Wilson made his

selection, 66 engineer vacancies were left. A large number of the people who graduated with high academic

standings chose the engineers. Finally, they got around

to “James Leo Trayers.” I stood up and said, “Engineers.”

They changed the number from three to two, meaning

that only two vacancies were left in the engineers.

The person who was sitting beside me during

the selection of the branches was Warren Littlefield.

Warren was undecided about which branch to choose.

Even as he was standing up to announce the branch he

was going to choose, he was saying, “Armor, Engineers,

Armor, Engineers.” When he stood up, he said, “Armor,”

and he went into the armor branch.

The graduates of the Military Academy Class of

1950 did not go to their Basic Course and, as a result,

had no branch training before going to Korea. Warren

had no training in armor. One time, when his patrol

was attacking, it came under heavy mortar fire. Not

realizing the safest place to be would have been to
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 4 9

remain in the tank, he got out and was running to

seek cover under a bridge when he was killed by an

incoming mortar round.

I selected the engineers because I was always

fascinated with building things, such as highways,

bridges, and buildings. I remember when I was a plebe

going around to visit [making mandatory calls as they

were called then], one of the upper classmen asked

me what branch I was going to select; I said I was

going to choose the engineers. He said, “Why do you

want to go into the engineers?” I said, “I like to build

things.” He said, “Why don’t you get an erector set?” I

thought that was kind of humorous.

I was commissioned on 2 June. We graduated on

6 June, four days later. The reason we were commissioned on 2 June was because the Naval Academy was

commissioned on the second. Graduates of the Naval

Academy and the Military Academy would both go

into the Air Force, and the Army did not want the

Naval Academy graduates to have the seniority of

four days commissioned service over the graduates of

the Military Academy.

After we chose our branches, the 69 engineers

went into another large room where they followed the

same selection procedure—one officer with the roster,

one with the piece of chalk. On the blackboard were

the vacancies by theater for the engineers.

The name of the ranking engineer selectee, “Charles

Ozro Eshelman,” was called. He stood up and I believe

he said, “Europe.” The Europe and CONUS (continental United States) slots were soon filled. When it

was my turn the only vacancies left were in the Far

East Command, so I was ranked as going to the Far

East. When I got to the Far East Command I was

going to get further orders.

I took my authorized leave of 60 days, 6 June

to about 6 August. I landed in Korea sometime between 15-20 August at Pusan. As we were going through

the replacement channel I noticed that the bleeding wounded were being returned to Korea. Soldiers

Two wounded soldiers

of the 5th Regimental

Combat Team receive

medical care at a Mobile

Army Surgical Hospital

RG 111, SC-351944
5 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

who were in the replacement stream had bandages with

blood showing. While chatting with a couple of them

they explained that they had been wounded in Korea

and were on their way back. I had thought they kept the

bleeding wounded in the hospital.

I was in Pusan for a couple of days and then I was

given orders to the 1st Cavalry Division, which was in

Korea at that time. Eddy West, a classmate of mine from

West Point, and I made the journey to Korea together,

and we both went into the G-1 of the 1st Cavalry Division together. The only records that we had with us were

our I.D. cards, a copy of our orders, and our Form-66.

The Flip of a Coin

The 1st Cavalry was on line in the Pusan perimeter, on

the Naktong River. The G-1 looked at the back of our

Form-66 and the single line entry read, “Graduate,

USMA.” He said, “You haven’t been to your Basic

Course?” We said, “No.” He said, “Well, then you’re as

qualified to be an infantry officer as you are an engineer.” So he reached into his pocket and he took out a

50-cent piece. He said, “You call it. If you get it right,

you go to the engineers, otherwise we’ll assign you to

the infantry.” He flipped the coin in the air and it came

down on his wrist. I think Eddy said, “Heads,” and it

was heads, so he said, “You both go to the engineers.”

That was how we were assigned to the engineers. Eddy

West and I, being in the 1st Cavalry Division, were assigned to the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion. Eddy was

assigned to A Company and I was assigned to C Company. The company commander of Company C was

Capt. Alvin Siegal.

The commanding officer of the 8th Engineers at

that time was Lt. Col. William C. Holley; the executive

officer was Russell J. Wilson; the S-1 (Adjutant) was Capt.

John A. Maxson; the S-2 (Intelligence Officer) was Capt.

Samuel H. Yoast; the S-3 (Operations and Training Officer) was Maj. Glade S. Witwer; and the S-4 (Supply

Officer) was Capt. Harvey C. Lewis.

Within a day or two I was reassigned to D Company. The company commander was Lt. Thomas

Kennedy and the platoon leaders were Walter H.

Radschlag, Richard O. Eiler, and Tom T. Jones [USMA,

’48]. I was the fourth lieutenant. I was assigned as assistant platoon leader to Lt. Eiler because Lt. Kennedy realized that I hadn’t been to the Basic Course. I was there

for training.

It seemed to have been battalion policy that supplies were replenished either by swapping or stealing. Lt.

Eiler and his platoon were known as “Ali Baba and the

Forty Thieves” because they were so successful in resupplying. I also remember Lt. Eiler taking me fishing one

time; he took a half-pound block of TNT and threw it

in the lake. About 50 fish floated to the top. That

was the first time I’d ever seen that. Coming from a big

city—Boston—I didn’t do much fishing.

“You haven’t been to your

Basic Course?” We said,

“No.” He said, “Well, then

you’re as qualified to be an

infantry officer as you are

an engineer.” So he reached

into his pocket and he took

out a 50-cent piece. He

said, “You call it. If you

get it right, you go to the

engineers, otherwise we’ll

assign you to the infantry.”
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 5 1

Firefight at Hill 902 and the

City of Ka-san, 4-5 September 1950

An engineer battalion has four companies, A, B, C, and

D. We were organized into regimental combat teams.

Company A supported the 5th Infantry, Company B

supported the 7th Calvary, and Company C supported

the 8th Calvary. Company D, which was backup for A,

B, and C, served as reserve and handled the overflow

requirements levied on the battalion.

Because it was the last uncommitted unit in the

division, Company D was ordered to make a coordinated attack with Company E of the 8th Cavalry on

Hill 902, on which was the walled city of Ka-san. Kasan was not actually a city, but a section of wall along

the crest of Hill 902, 10 miles north of Taegu. The 3,000-

foot mountain afforded observation south through

Eighth Army positions into Taegu itself.

We loaded up in the trucks one rainy, foggy afternoon [3 Sep 50] and drove down the road. We saw

wounded South Korean soldiers coming back, but

because of the time and the weather, and having no

coordination with E Company, we returned to the

company bivouac area at about 1900.

I was designated by Lt. Kennedy to

act as liaison officer with the 8th

Cavalry. He told me to go over to

the CP, introduce myself, and spend

the night.

I went over and let the 8th

Cavalry know that I was representing Lt. Kennedy, and if they

had anything for him I would be

happy to take it back. I put my

tent and sleeping bag outside the

Two soldiers of the 27th Infantry

Regiment fire on North Korean

positions, 4 September 1950

RG 111, SC-347752

Later the trucks left the

schoolyard. They were

traveling quickly because

they were being tracked

down the road by 120-mm

mortar fire. The trucks were

going too fast, particularly

since they had flat tires.

One driver lost control of his

truck and it spilled down

into the ravine....

5 1
5 2 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

CP and spent the night. Early the next morning I returned to D Company, which was loading up. We

drove to the Hill 902. At the base of the hill was a

schoolyard. Lt. Kennedy told me, “You’re in charge of

the trains. Park all of the trucks loaded with ammunition, rations, and water in the schoolyard.” We were

told that this was going to be a coordinated attack and

to secure the top of the hill; there were estimated to

be 75 North Korean guerrillas on that hill [enemy

strength near Ka-san was closer to 800 on 4 Sep; it consisted of a North Korean regular army unit reinforced

with 120-mm mortars].

The three platoons and Lt. Kennedy attacked up

the hill. I stayed with the trucks in the schoolyard. The

trucks and I came under heavy 120-mm mortar fire for

the whole day. Mortars landed in the schoolyard and blew

out the tires on the trucks and punctured their radiators.

Later in the afternoon I was directed to return the trucks

to the battalion CP area. I was to remain at the battalion

advance CP where Col. Holley had been all day directing artillery fire on the hill.

Later the trucks left the schoolyard. They were traveling quickly because they were being tracked down the

road by 120-mm mortar fire. The trucks were going too

fast, particularly since they had flat tires. One driver lost

control of his truck and it spilled down into the ravine.

The other trucks slowed down then and were able to

proceed out safely.

It was dark now and rainy. I went up to the CP

area where Col. Holley was. He said, “I want you to go

to the E Company commander and tell him to attack.” I

said, “Yes, Sir” and started walking down the road. It

was so dark I couldn’t see the road in front of me. I was

whistling so that nobody would shoot me, because I was

advancing into the E Company perimeter from the outside. Somebody yelled, “Halt!” I quickly stopped and

explained who I was.

Somebody came out to meet me, and, by God, if it

wasn’t an ex-classmate from West Point whose name was

Lt. Robert Wood, who later earned numerous decorations for bravery during the war. We recognized one another. He took me safely through the lines and delivered

me to the company commander. I explained to the

company commander what Col. Holley wanted. He

said, “Yes, tomorrow.” With my mission accomplished

I reported back to Col. Holley, but he had gone. The

I&R (Intelligence and Reconnaissance) platoon from

the 7th Cavalry had set up a perimeter around this

little CP (command post) area where we were, and

provided security for us during the night.

On the afternoon of 4 September, D Company

secured the top of the hill. Later we learned that the

North Koreans surrounding the hill had opened their

lines to let the engineers through, and then closed their

lines and cut D Company off. On 5 September, Capt.

Yoast arrived and said that he had Korean laborers

They put a grenade in his

hand, pulled the pin, and

said, “If the Koreans come,

you know what to do.”
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 5 3

and supplies to deliver to D Company. He had trucks,

ammunition, rations, and water, and was going to resupply D Company on top of the hill.

We had maybe forty Koreans, all loaded down with

supplies, starting up the hill. It was a winding, torturous

path, if there was a path at all. The hill was steep and the

brush and trees were thick. I was policing the end of the

column, making sure that everybody in front of me was

moving up the hill. We were being shot at with small

arms fire and with mortars. I noticed as I was going along

this one soldier wasn’t taking cover at all. He was just

walking along, standing straight up. I said to him, “Soldier, you ought to take some cover. You may get shot.”

He said, “Okay.” I continued ducking from rock to

rock, and then I heard somebody call “Medic! ” The

soldier whom I had just spoken to had been shot and

was down on the ground.

I went over to him, praying to the Lord that there

wouldn’t be blood, and opened up his fatigue jacket to

see where the wound was. The bullet hit a pencil, was

deflected downward, and then entered his chest. It was

starting to swell, but there was no blood. The bullet had

traveled a long distance so it was well spent by the time

it hit the soldier. I figured that the bullet had at the most

broken a couple of ribs. I got two soldiers to return the

injured man to the battalion CP area, cautioning them

to be very careful. If the bullet did break some ribs, I

didn’t want the ribs to puncture a lung.

This young boy wears an A-frame pack

similar to those used by porters to carry

ammunition and supplies RG 111, SC-344541
5 4 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

There were a number of Koreans in front of me

moving in and out of the trees because we were being

shot at continuously. I could not see farther than a few

Koreans in front of me because of the terrain. We stopped

to take cover from incoming fire for several minutes. The

column ahead of me was not moving. I walked to the

front of the few Koreans I could see, looked ahead, and

saw that no one else was to be seen. I decided that since

I did not know where I was going, that it was time to

return to the advance battalion CP. I don’t know exactly

what time of day it was, but it was late in the afternoon.

It was a good decision because when I arrived in the battalion advance CP, I was told that the company had been

ordered to withdraw.

As we were going up the hill, Lts. Kennedy and

Radschlag, both of whom had been wounded, were

being taken down the road to the aide station. Remnants of the company started coming back and began

assembling in the company area. The North Koreans

captured Tom Jones. Lt. Eiler, who was a platoon leader,

was running with Sgt. Manelsky, and one other

sergeant to escape from the North Koreans. They came

to a stone wall. Manelsky and the sergeant jumped

over the wall. Lt. Eiler leaned on the wall. The sergeants were exhorting him to jump over the wall.

He said, “I’ve got to rest...I’ve got to rest.” While he was

leaning on the wall the inside of his thigh was shot

out with .51-caliber machine-gun bullet. He was

severely wounded and was losing a lot of blood. The

sergeants took him down over the other side of the

wall, put a tourniquet on his wound, and carried him

to a nearby shed.

They said, “We’re going to get a wagon from one

of the houses here and we’ll come back to get you.”

They put a grenade in his hand, pulled the pin, and

said, “If the Koreans come, you know what to do.”

Then they went to get the cart. By the time they

had found the cart and returned, the Koreans had

come down and captured Lt. Eiler. It was discovered

later that he must still have been alive and had not

detonated the grenade; his hands were bound with

wire and his body was burned.

It was during this engagement that Pvt. Melvin

Brown of our company distinguished himself for

bravery. During the fighting around Ka-san he killed

a number of North Korean soldiers with his rifle and

grenades, and when he had run out of ammunition he

continued to protect the company’s retreat with his

entrenching tool. When they recovered Brown’s body

they found the bodies of 20 North Korean soldiers

scattered around his position. For his heroism Pvt.

Brown was awarded the Medal of Honor.

I returned to the battalion CP and found that I

was the only officer left in the company. First Sgt.

Kopper told me that the battalion commander wanted

to talk to me. I went over to the radio and he gave

“I knew he was in the thick

of fighting by the sound of his

letter,” Mrs. Trayers said. “It

didn’t make me feel a bit

good, but as long as he’s

safe, I’m a happy mother.”

— Boston Traveler, October 6, 1950
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 5 55 5

me the microphone. I picked it up and said, “Colonel

Holley, this is Lieutenant Trayers.” Sgt. Kopper leaned

over and said, “You’ve got to push the button.” Being

left handed, I had the microphone in my left hand and

the button wasn’t in the right place to push. So, while

I was talking I wasn’t being received. So I pushed the

microphone button down and repeated the same

thing. “Colonel. Holley, this is Lieutenant Trayers.” I

immediately got chewed out over the radio because

I wasn’t using proper radio procedure. I should have

said, “Sandbag Six, this is Sandbag Dog Six, over.”

Col. Holley explained to me that he wanted me

to move the company out and gave the coordinates in

code. I assured him that we would do it. I asked Sgt.

Kopper, “How do you move the company out?” He

said, “Well, first give me the coordinates.” I gave him

the coded coordinates and he deciphered the code and

showed me a map where the company was going to go. I

asked again, “Sergeant, how do I move the company out?”

He said, “Just tell me.” So, I said, “Sergeant. Kopper,

move the company out.” By God, in 30 minutes tents

were struck, trucks were loaded, engines were turning

over, and the company was lined up and ready to go.

He said, “Lieutenant, I would suggest that you tell

me to proceed onto the area so I can outline where the

people are going to go.” I then told the 1st sergeant to

proceed to the designated area in advance of the column

and to lie out the bivouac area. He then gave me the

A reporter from the Boston Traveler filed this account

of 2d Lt. Trayers’s activities in Korea Trayers Collection

map with the road that went to that area. As we

were driving down the road, I said to myself, “Boy, this

being an officer is pretty good. I just tell the sergeants

what to do and they get it done.” We went to the new

company bivouac area where Col. Holley, in his infinite wisdom, sent down a senior lieutenant to command the company.
5 6 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

Installing and Removing a Minefield

We were still in the Pusan perimeter. The next mission

that I received was to put in a minefield. The minefield was to be placed where the terrain was admirably

suited for the installation of mines. On the left side of

the road there was a deep cut, which together with

the high vertical embankment on the right side of the

road channeled all enemy tanks and vehicles down to

the roadbed. Sgt. Manelsky, who was the platoon sergeant, took the platoon out to put in the minefield.

He outlined the way the minefield would go in. He

suggested that we put in several rows of anti-tank

mines, staggered so that the entire width of the road

was covered.

I looked in the FM 5-34 [field manual] that I carried in the pocket of my fatigues. It told you everything

you had to know about minefields. It discussed taking

accurate measurements between the mines and establishing an accurate azimuth and distance to the right rear

reference point, and establishing an accurate azimuth to

the topographic marker. The manual also specified that

it was the responsibility of the lieutenant in charge to

take the measurements.

As things were progressing I was up in the minefield

measuring the distances between the mines. Sgt.

Manelsky came over and said, “Lieutenant, I think it

would be better if you were to go over there and sit down

and watch what we’re doing.” I said, “Why is that?” He

said, “Well, the men are afraid you’ll get hurt.” I said, “I

looked in the FM and I’m supposed to do this.” He said,

“I’ll take the measurements for you. But more importantly, they’re afraid with you in the minefield they’re going

to get hurt.” I agreed to take a position to the rear and

allowed the platoon sergeant to take the measurements,

install the mines, and then check the measurements after the minefield was installed.

A little while later Sgt. Manelsky came over and

said, “Lieutenant, shall we booby-trap the mines?” I

said, “Tell me about booby-traps.” He said, “The kind

we would put in is a pressure-release type, which

means that if the enemy were to pick the mine up

and didn’t know it was booby trapped, it would set off

the mine.” I said, “How do you do it?” He said, “Well,

we put the mine in on a solid base and tunnel in

from the back of the mine. After the mine is in position, we carefully remove the pin, and then we cover

it over.” I said, “I think we ought to do it because

the North Koreans are coming down, taking our mines,

and using them against us.”

That was my second order. My first was to move

the company out. The second one was to booby-trap

the minefields. After the mission was completed I

prepared a minefield report and turned it into the

battalion S-2.

A few days later, I was given the mission to remove the same minefield. We went out in the afterBefore we got the order to

remove the minefield, a

North Korean truck, one that

was loaded with ammunition

and had some soldiers on it,

hit the minefield and blew up.

Now the minefield pattern

was disturbed and strewn

with truck fragments and

covered with dirt. We didn’t

know which mines had

detonated and which ones

had not detonated.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 5 7

Engineer School, 119-11-34

Engineer School, 119-11-3

Engineers from the 25th Infantry

Division unload and emplace

anti-tank mines along a reference tape, August 1950
5 8 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

noon to take the minefield out. One of the fundamental

rules after installing a minefield is that it should be

under your observation and covered by friendly fire.

Unfortunately, in this case the minefield was covered

by enemy fire. They had a machine gun that was laid

right over the minefield, and so every time we went

out there they’d fire the machine gun. I decided that

we couldn’t remove the minefield in daylight and

that we’d have to go up and take it out under the cover

of darkness.

Before we got the order to remove the minefield,

a North Korean truck, one that was loaded with ammunition and had some soldiers on it, hit the minefield and blew up. Now the minefield pattern was

disturbed and strewn with truck fragments and covered with dirt. We didn’t know which mines had detonated and which ones had not detonated. It was not

necessary that a vehicle go over a mine to detonate

it because if the mine was within a certain distance

of the explosion, it would explode by sympathetic

detonation.

After the explosion the minefield was covered with

body and vehicle parts. Having seen the minefield that

afternoon I decided to use a net made of primer cord

and half-pound blocks of TNT. We took a strand of

primer cord, maybe 30 feet long, and at every foot we

tied on a half-pound block of TNT. We made enough of

these strands of primer cord and TNT to form a grid

such that every foot, north and south, and east and

west, there was a half-pound block of TNT. When

we exploded all of this primer cord and TNT simultaneously, it would cause the explosion of any mines in

the minefield.

That evening, under cover of darkness, we went

up to do that. I took up the first strand of TNT and

stretched it across the minefield. A soldier could step

on an anti-tank mine and it wouldn’t explode because

the pounds-per-square-inch of a person is less than

the pounds-per-square-inch of a tank. That was why I

could walk in the minefield and stretch my strand of

primer cord across it. Sgt. Paul Chambers went up with

the second strand of primer cord and he laid it in the

minefield one foot apart from the first one. Then it was

Sgt. Cyrus Whitby’s turn to go up. He laid his strand

out. While he was in the minefield, the enemy lobbed

in some mortar shells and killed him in the minefield.

We went up and recovered his body.

The next night we added some explosives to the

minefield and blew up the primer cord that we had

already placed in the minefield. I was sure that the

right-hand side of the minefield was clear, but the

left-hand side was not. I reported this to the tank company commander.

The next day the 1st Cavalry Division moved up

a Waegwan road, which was the road we had cleared the

night before. The road had a curve in it a bit past the
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 5 9

minefield. Because he was lining up his vehicle to navigate the oncoming turn, the first tank through the

minefield didn’t stay far enough to the right. As it

went through the minefield it hit a mine, blew a track,

and coasted forward until it came to a stop in front of

the minefield.

The disabled tank now was blocking the route

of attack so that the rest of the tanks couldn’t get by.

By the time they had removed the tank from the

road the day was well spent. The division commander

called off the attack for that day. The next day the

division was ready to make its attack again and the

tank company went through the minefield without

any trouble. The lead tank went about 50 yards past

our minefield and hit another mine.

What happened was that during the night the

North Koreans had come down and put a mine or

two in the road in front of my minefield. The company commander of the infantry unit that was securing the position said that his soldiers heard digging but

they didn’t know what the digging was. Now another

tank was blocking the route of advance. That tank

was pushed off to the side of the road and the attack

continued north. So much for minefields, minefield

reports, and booby trapping.

Engineers check a disabled tank for booby traps,

and the area around it for mines Engineer School, 116-13-1
6 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea,

Captain Farnum describes the efforts to man, equip,

and train his unit, the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion (ECB), for deployment overseas. Soon after

their arrival in Korea, the 2d ECB moved up into

the line. In late August and early September the battalion was deployed as infantry during the heavy

fighting around the Naktong perimeter. The battalion played a vital role in stabilizing the

perimeter and suffered heavy casualties in

the process.

I arrived at Fort Lewis to join the

23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, in December 1948. After getting my Regular Army

commission in the Corps of Engineers in late

March 1950, I was transferred to the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, and my first assignment there was as the assistant S-2.

When the North Koreans invaded

South Korea on 25 June 1950, I had

been in the 2d Engineers less than three

months. The 2d Division was alerted for

POM, and right off the bat it was a question of determining who was going to

stay in the division. Certain officers had

career development considerations that

would take priority. By and large everybody was alerted and we went on a high state of readiness to get all of our TO&E (Table of Organization and

Equipment) up to snuff and get our fillers in.

We were short a lot of people. I really don’t know

the percentages but, to fill us, it took considerable effort.

On 3 July, I became the S-1; therefore, it was my responsibility to make sure we had all the officers that

we were authorized, and all the sergeants and enlisted

personnel.

For days we had telephone communications with

Fort Belvoir on a standby basis of maybe eight hours

a day. They were assisting us in locating specialists

in different fields, getting equipment that we were

authorized and didn’t have, getting some of our more

obsolete equipment transferred out, and getting new

equipment in.

We immediately filled our Company A to full

strength. Any shortages of equipment were met by

transfer from the other line companies or other units

at Fort Lewis not alerted so that Company A could

depart with the 9th Infantry, our first element to head

for Korea. After Company A was fully equipped and

manned in less than one week, we worked on Company

B, and then Company C.

Officers such as a Harold Curry, whom I replaced

as the adjutant and S-1, stayed there for a while helping with the requisitions that we had to process. He

was scheduled to go to school for career development.

Capt. Lawrence Farnum on his way

to Korea, late summer, 1950

Farnum Collection
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 6 1

We had to get those people out of the organization

and other people in so we could deploy to Korea.

We had phone contacts with so many different

places it is hard to account for, but a battalion needs

clerk-typists, finance people, and the whole gamut of

capabilities. It seemed as if we were dealing with

Forts Benning, Knox, and about every base that had

any kind of a training mission all over the entire U.S. to

fill this one division that was going to be deployed to

Japan and Korea.

We succeeded in filling our TO&E. Much of our

equipment needed to be replaced. Old World War II

equipment needed to be turned in, and replacement

trucks, jeeps—everything that you can think of—procured to replace it. We expedited one company at a time

to meet the schedule that was set, having the 9th RCT

leave first, followed by the 23d, and the 38th, then remainder of the division and divisional elements.

We accomplished it all on a very short schedule.

Prior to our due date to arrive in Japan, things in Korea

had deteriorated to the point that while the ships

were on the high seas, the orders were changed. All elements of the 2d Division went straight into Korea.

Concerning our readiness in 1950 to get the 2d

Infantry Division—one of our front-line divisions—on

board ship with the full TO&E took major resources

across our country to send people in as fillers, then to

train people to operate small items like the new 3.5-inch

anti-tank bazooka. We had to obtain this weapon then

get our people trained. There were these types of problems—last-minute qualifications on the range, and all

of the things that suddenly should have been done

yesterday. You needed to do them, and yet you needed

to sail on a ship within a week’s time.

To the best of my knowledge the division did

a fine job of getting the first RCT off, fully equipped

and manned, in about a week’s time. The ships came

in; we loaded them and sent them on their way. The

Destined for Korea, U.S.

troops prepare to board

troop transports at the

San Francisco Port of

Embarkation, 1950

USNI, 343163
6 2 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

next RCT followed about a week later, and so on

down the line.

We had a very limited number of Regular Army

officers in the battalion. I think, perhaps, I was the only

one, until Lt. Col. Alarick Zacherle was transferred

from division headquarters to the battalion once we

were in Korea. I think we were the only two Regular

Army types at that time.

Zacherle had been in the 2d Battalion at Fort Lewis,

I believe, as the S-3, as a major. He had been transferred

to division headquarters, and his job at first was secretary of the general staff. I’m sure that as soon as we were

deployed to Korea, Col. Zacherle wanted to be with

the battalion, and not at division headquarters.

Our battalion commander, Lt. Col. McEachern,

flew to Japan with the assistant division commander

and a group of the division

staff very early on, as soon as

we were alerted. It was thought,

originally, that we would be

going into Japan to replace

some of the units there that

were being deployed to Korea, so he was not with us

during the hubbub and

furor of being deployed.

The division arrived in

country as regimental combat teams and our Companies A, B, and C were attached

to the three regiments. Upon arrival, the 9th RCT was

placed into the line, and our engineers were used as

needed. The same was true of B and C. As soon as the

entire battalion arrived, the companies basically reverted

to battalion control and were placed in direct support

of the regiments.

Heavy Officer Casualties

We had only been in Korea a very brief time when the

battalion was called upon to go in the line as infantry,

to plug a particular salient point where the North Koreans were threatening the integrity of the Naktong perimeter line. Our Company D was on a particular

hill. During that single operation they lost their company commander, killed in action; another lieutenant,

platoon leader, killed in action; two more platoon

leaders, wounded. Lt. Lee Beahler was the sole remaining officer. The company was very successful in plugging the line and stopping the North Korean advance

at that time. Lt. Beahler received the Distinguished

Service Cross, and the engineers, Company D in particular, were credited by Eighth Army as probably

being a key element in maintaining the Naktong perimeter. If that particular penetration had gone through,

we could very well have lost our foothold in Korea.

For at least a week’s period, 31 August-12 September, the engineer battalion was utilized as infantry.

Members of the 2d Engineer Combat

Battalion pose for a photograph near the

Naktong River. Front row, left to right:

Capt. Farnum and Lt. Bergner. Back row:

Lt. Harris, Lt. Brighton, and W.O. Meeks

Farnum Collection
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 6 3

Our assignments would be as a reserve element of one

of our infantry regiments to be in a blocking position.

We just happened to be in a position in the defense

of Yongsan, which was one of the key towns in that

area where there was a deep penetration by the North

Koreans coming from the west. Our line companies had

suffered sufficient casualties, so we assigned several of

the H&S (Headquarters and Service) officers over to the

line companies. In Company D, alone, all the officers,

save Lt. Beahler, were either killed or wounded. We

obviously had heavy losses within the other companies

because one of our H&S officers, Joe Cox, who was

normally the battalion motor officer, was assigned to

one of the line companies. John Bergner, who was the

leader of our bridge section, also was assigned to one of

the companies, as well as Lt. Lehman and W.O. Falls.

In that particular action we lost Capt. Reeves, CO of

Company C, who was killed in action, Lt. Matoni,

and Lt. Forste. At least nine other officers were wounded and evacuated.

In early September, our battalion commander was

relieved by the assistant division commander. The reason given at the time was lack of leadership and the

ability to utilize his engineers as infantry. At that time,

Maj. Fry assumed the command of the battalion, and

Col. McEachern went to our division rear.

We came off the role of infantry about 17 September and started working on the roads. This coincided

with the landings of other U.S. forces in the Inch’on

area. Due to this maneuver on the part of the U.S. forces,

the North Koreans were in a position to be cut off completely in the south. Basically, they went into a full retreat to the north.

We continued to lose some officers in that period.

I know that Lt. Reed, who was commanding Company

A, was wounded, and a couple of our officers had to be

evacuated for combat fatigue. At the time, we referred to

them as having gone “psycho.” This was more an aftermath of them having seen their friends killed or wounded

while serving as infantry in the defense of Yongsan. A

fair number of people had been evacuated to Japan, and

among them were Lt. Wilson, who also had combat fatigue; Lt. Webb, who was wounded and evacuated; and

out of Company C, Lt. Jalicour, wounded. Out of Company D, Lt. Nichols was wounded and evacuated; Lt.

Donahue, also wounded and evacuated; and out of our

H&S Company, Lt. Burr was wounded and evacuated.

Living out of very limited facilities with no place

to dry off your feet, change your socks, and do things

like that, we lost some of our people due to blistered

feet, and basically a jungle rot that came with having

your feet wet all day and night from walking through

the rice paddies.

With the North Koreans in retreat it seemed

obvious that the 2d Division and all the forces in

Eighth Army down in the Naktong area would proceed

6 3

We had only been in Korea

a very brief time when the

battalion was called upon

to go in the line as

infantry...where the North

Koreans were threatening the integrity of the

Naktong perimeter line....

If that particular penetration had gone through,

we could very well have

lost our foothold in Korea.
6 4 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

north towards Seoul. The Naktong was a sizable barrier

to motorized transport in our area and varied in width

from 250 to 500 feet. It was a meandering river, sometimes going north and south and other times east and

west. As the operations officer at that time, I made a

reconnaissance, along with our bridge platoon leader,

John Bergner, for a site to put in our bridge across the

Naktong.

During that period in the war effort, we received

no replacements that I can remember. About the same

time, some of the people who were enlisted members of

the battalion and held a reserve commission were recalled

to active duty. Among them was Bob Green who was

recalled. He was our operations sergeant, and he was recalled as a 1st lieutenant. He was assigned out to one of

the line companies. We gave a couple of field commissions to some of our sergeants at that time. Two I remember because they were at headquarters—one was

Sgt. Hatfield and the other sergeant was Jim Malone.

With the relief of Col. McEachern, we were expecting Maj. Zacherle to be assigned to the battalion.

He had been with the battalion back at Fort Lewis but

was now serving in the division headquarters. He was a

Regular Army engineer officer.

On 21 September, Maj. Carl Price, who was our

S-3, was shot in the leg and evacuated to Japan. Capt.

Anderson was evacuated as sick to Japan. We had a

problem with some bouts of encephalitis B, which

was a rather serious malady to the Americans and required fast evacuation to Japan. Some of them were

fatalities from that disease.

Maj. Zacherle reported to the battalion on 23

September. Charlie Fry, who was then the battalion

commander, ranked Maj. Zacherle as a major.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 6 5

Engineers build a Bailey bridge across the Naktong River

at Waegwan, 1 October 1950 Engineer School, 42-10-206
6 6 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

he following essay is excerpted and reprinted,

frogs [track-switching devices], and rail necessary to deactivate the Sangju rail yard. The fourth, and final, mission was to destroy the three southern spans

of the bridge across the Kum River to include the

south abutment. I was to report to the division engineer upon completion of these missions.

We selected a site on the MSR where we could

blow an inside curve with no possibility for bypassing

and little possibility for combat-quality repair. A Lt.

Zandis from the infantry was designated to be the last

and final contact person; his arrival at the demolition

site would signal that all elements and individuals of

the regiment would have evacuated their combat

sectors. This would be my authority to blow the crater.

Lt. Zandis was due at the crater site at 0400.

He was on time. He assured me that all 24th

Infantry personnel had cleared the area and that I could

blow the crater at any time.

It had taken 10 hours to place nearly 1,500 pounds

of TNT deep into the mountainside. Zandis had a

cup of coffee as dawn crept over the barren hills.

I looked down the long empty back road, and then

walked over to the site of the crater with the generator,

or “hellbox,” in my pocket. I connected the box to the

electrical blasting wire after “proving” the circuit with

the galvanometer. “Fire in the hole! Fire in the hole! Fire

in the hole!” I vigorously twisted the T-handle on the

generator and the whole world blew up in a cloud of

T

with permission from Firefight at Yechon: Courage

& Racism in the Korean War, by Lieutenant Colonel

Charles Bussey, with permission of the University of

Nebraska Press © 1991 by Charles M. Bussey. The

77th Engineer Combat Company (ECC) was a separate African American company assigned to the 25th

Infantry Division to provide engineer support to the

all-black 24th Infantry Regiment. It was not part of

the white 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, which

provided support to the rest of the division. The 77th

had an authorized strength of five officers and 153

enlisted men, but most of the time had more than

200 men, since most African American combat engineers in the Pacific were assigned to it.

Retreat from Sangju

The 77th ECC was given a series of missions to protect

elements of the 25th Division, which were moving back

from the Sangju area into the Pusan perimeter. Our first

mission was to blow a crater in the main supply route

(MSR) to the north that would preclude passage of tanks;

the selection of the site was optional. The second mission was to perform a rearguard action at the crater for

12 hours. The third mission was to destroy the throughput capability of rail traffic and demolish all switches,
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 6 7

rocks, dust, and cordite. It was the crack of doom! I

felt a surge of elation as we awaited the settling of a virtual cloud of dust. I wanted to inspect our handiwork.

When I arrived back at the crater, day was breaking. Nobody was to be seen on the back road. I prepared

to send most units to Sangju and beyond and to man

the roadblock with one of Lt. Chester Lenon’s squads

across the arroyo.

High above me on a cliff overlooking the crater a

soldier yelled down, “Sir, you just blew up two men in

that blast. They were coming up the road when you blew

it. They were on the edge of the crater. See their shoes

and belts and carbines? That’s them laying against the

bank, down there about a hundred yards.”

I looked, but there was a slight bend in the road

that blocked my vision. That is how the two people

had been able to move up to the site of the crater without my seeing them. I could feel the gates of Leavenworth

clanging shut on me. With a couple of my officers,

I hurriedly climbed the hill, skirted the bend, and

descended to the victims of the blast.

The sun was casting long horizontal rays over

our heads as we climbed down the hillside. At the

level of the back road I was looking into the eyes of

my dear friend Capt. William Jackson. He wasn’t

focusing well but he knew it was me. So he asked, “Tryin’

to kill me, Hoss?”

“God, no, Jackson. But it was still too dark to see

you, and Zandis was my contact. He

got here about a half-hour ago. He was

supposed to be the last man out.”

“Well, it was a typical snafu. We

had a short firefight as we were disengaging. I think I’ve got a concussion.

My eyesight comes and goes. You may

have done me a big favor, homeboy.

Five thousand men and their vehicles

and equipment were supposed to pass

this point. Two men late ain’t too

bad. Sorry I’m one of them though.”

I looked over at Jackson’s companion, a Lt. Morgan, who was silently crying. He looked at me as if

I was the personification of death. I

had been, nearly. I sent for some

stretchers to carry the two of them back over the hills.

Jackson asked me, “Where’s my shoes, my web equipment, and my carbine?”

“Don’t ask me how, but all your stuff is about

two feet from the edge of the crater. I’m glad you

weren’t one step farther to the east or you’d be dead

and I’d be on the short end of a court martial.”

Jackson and Morgan both had concussions and

were evacuated back to Japan, but not for long. Personnel were in short supply. Injured personnel were

returned from the hospital to the combat zone as soon

Left to right: Lt. David Carlisle,

Lt. Collins Whitacker, and Cpl.

Paul Witt of the 77th Engineers

probe for a booby trap under

a mine RG 111, 348837

6 7
6 8 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

as possible. So both of them were back to duty in about

two weeks.

Crater Fight, 29 July 1950

I had done the first part of the mission by blowing the

crater. Now I had to secure it for 12 hours. First, it was

about time for breakfast and the food went down well.

After breakfast, I carved up the company mission among

the platoons. When all was well, the company, minus

the squad remaining with me, fired up their engines and

motored down the road to the city of Sangju.

During the proceeding day and night we had

prepared foxholes. We moved into them as the morning began to heat up. It was yet another day when

the temperature was going to climb to 110 degrees F.

by noon. We waited and waited. We had been issued

3.5-inch bazookas, which were touted to be tank

killers—real effective hell busters, the living end. I

believed it all. I was manning one along with Cpl.

Jerome Barnwell.

The enemy came. They moved cautiously up the

road and our boredom ceased. Adrenaline began to

tighten us up. First, there was a squad or so of infantry

on the road. Then came a small Russian-built tank.

The temperature grew hotter, and the enemy task

force came closer. As mortal combat deliberately comes

closer and closer, an attitude of dead seriousness overtakes the protagonists. A pain rises out of one’s spine,

tightness grows between one’s shoulder blades, and the

stark reality of imminent death intrudes on one’s consciousness. The question of fight or flight arises. But there

was no possibility of flight. A sense of patriotism takes

control. It justifies whatever killing is to ensue—the possibility of one’s own demise or the probability of the

enemy’s. “America, America, land that I love.” Nothing

else matters except the killing—powerful, glorious,

bloody, overpowering killing.

We hunkered down in our foxholes and the enemy

drew ever closer. The game plan provided for no firing

of small arms or automatic weapons until the bazooka

had eviscerated the tank. We waited and waited still

more amid the ever-mounting tension, and the adrenaline flowed, charging our bodies higher and higher and

still higher.

The enemy infantry arrived at the crater. Animated

conversation and gesticulation took place. After sizing

up the situation they began to survey the terrain. We

were hunkered well down into our foxholes and were

not observed. So the enemy squad leader radioed to the

tank. It lumbered up the grade to the point of impasse—

literally and figuratively. The tank could not negotiate

the crater.

The tank crawled right to the edge of the crater. I

was tight as a cat on a rail fence. I touched the trigger of

the bazooka as the sighting hairs steadied right on the

guts of the tank. Blam! While the missile was still in flight,

As mortal combat deliberately

comes closer and closer, an

attitude of dead seriousness

overtakes the protagonists.

A pain rises out of one’s spine,

tightness grows between one’s

shoulder blades, and the stark

reality of imminent death intrudes on one’s consciousness.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 6 9

Cpl. Barnwell reloaded. As soon as he touched my helmet, I fired a second round. Double hell broke loose.

There was no doubt that two direct hits had

knocked out the tank. Through smoke and dust my men

had begun firing. They were chewing up the startled

enemy infantry all around the tank. Some who weren’t

hit managed to rush to the cover of the tank itself. Although it had lost its tracks, it was still intact. But the

tank was not dead. Ponderously, that giant 89-mm gun

started to swing onto our bearing. Blam! I fired a third

missile. It exploded in virtually the same armored spot

as my first two.

Suddenly Cpl. Barnwell yelled, “Look behind us,

sir!” I jerked my head around. Up the hill to our rear

a huge gray-white arrow had been gouged out of the

dirt by the bazooka’s backblast. It pointed directly into

our foxhole. Goddamn, I thought.

The snout of the 89-mm tank gun stopped dead

on us. Ka-whump! The whole world moved at the first

impact and kept on, registering 10s on the Richter scale,

through a total of forty-seven rounds. I shivered as I

counted the rounds.

Scared, we hunkered more and more deeply into

the foxhole as frantically we tried to prove that a mansize object could shrink through sheer willpower into

an infinitesimal point. We were trapped, shivering, and

that bastard across the arroyo was trying to dig us out

or to eliminate us altogether. Dust and cordite began

choking us to death. I managed only enough awareness

of our predicament to continue counting each successive earth-shattering ka-whump! I kept saying over and

over, “Damn, Bussey, you screwed up again!”

First, I had trusted our ordnance people’s assessment of the enemy weapon. Second, I had overlooked entirely the backblast characteristics of my own

weapon. Third, I had been overly eager to engage the

tank. After all, it couldn’t go anywhere or do anything.

I should simply have left it alone. Finally, I should

never have emerged from my mother’s womb.

At some point the enemy tank’s machine

gun opened up on my troops. They had continued to

fire on the enemy infantry. The tank gun finally

slowed its cyclic rate of firing. Either it was overheating, or the crew was running out of ammo. Finally it

stopped—almost.

I looked over at Barnwell. His eyes were red. His

face was totally begrimed in tanish, grayish dust. I had

to laugh. Looking at me he also laughed. Owlishly, we

blinked. Tears cleansed our eye sockets. We both rose

up a little to assess our situation. Unfortunately, the

tank was ready to resume.

Ka-whump! There was hardly any time between

the gun’s report and the shell’s explosion beneath our

foxhole. The sun had kept doing its thing, and it became stiflingly hot as we approached midday. Shaking,

grimy, disgusted...the corporal and I shared a K ration.
7 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

We stayed well down in our hole for fear we couldn’t

duck fast enough the next time. We had reached an impasse. Stalemated, we waited in the stifling noonday.

Fortunately—through pure happenstance—I had

spaced our foxholes so that we had extended coverage

of the MSR. We covered 1,000 yards or so of the road

and bordering hillsides. When a company-size enemy

force came into view, we could let them advance into

extreme BAR (Browning automatic rifle) range but no

farther. Fortunately, also, two of our foxholes were out

of view of the crippled tank.

Seemingly, only darkness would afford us a means

of safe escape. By 1600

I would have fulfilled

my assigned mission

and we would be free

to leave. In tactical language, we would be

able to disengage from

the enemy. If, that is,

he would permit us to

do so.

The day wore

hard on us, but not as

hard on us as on the

tank crew. We kept

them bottled up tight.

No matter how many

tank ports might be open, there was very little ventilation. That enemy endured a very hot and long afternoon.

Time passed—1600 came and went. About 1630

the sun had declined to an angle that brought some respite from the burning, blistering heat. The barren hills

began to lose some heat, and it became slightly less miserable. The corporal and I shared a C ration. We drank

the last of our water. A thought came to mind: I didn’t

need to be here at all. After all, I was the boss of the 77th

ECC and, as such, I could have, and perhaps should have,

been in Sangju in some shady place. Any of my lieutenants could have handled this roadblock just as well and

probably better. But I was a slave to my convictions. One

of them was never to send my men into a situation I

would not go into myself. So, at this time, at this place,

here is where I belong and here is where I should be.

Rain of Stones, 30 July 1950

No matter the hazard, if one works at an occupation or

chore long enough there’s a strong tendency to become a

little careless on occasion. We were moving back into

the Pusan perimeter, withdrawing from Sangju. Division sent down a demolition plan and made the explosives available to carry it off. We burned the rice warehouses at Sangju and destroyed the switches and frogs in

the rail-marshaling yard. Theoretically we were denying

the productive systems to the enemy. This was farcical in

the extreme because the enemy had no trains or rolling

Engineers use 120 pounds of explosives,

placed on the top of the pier and the

inside of each beam, to destroy this

railroad bridge RG 111, SC-359427
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 7 1

stock of any kind, and if they acquired any, our Air Force

would’ve had a field day with it. Ours was not to reason

why! Systematically we accomplished the demolition

plan—burning and destroying as we retreated.

We practiced the engineer school guidance on

demolition techniques with strong emphasis on safety. I

always carried the generator, so there could never be an

accidental firing. All charges were prepared both for electrical firing and for fuse firing. On those rare and dangerous occasions when the electrical firing failed, we

waited the prescribed period, gingerly lit the fuse, and

then ran as though pursued by the devil to be out of

harm’s way when the demolition exploded. It was exacting and dangerous work.

We fired bridges, dams, electrical transmission stations, and railroads—everything in the demolition plan.

Any equipment or installation that could be beneficial

to the enemy had to be destroyed. It all went well—until

our last target.

The countryside was peaceful. The rice paddies

were green. The weather was hot and dry as we prepared our last bridge for destruction. The 2d Platoon

placed the charges three spans out: deck, pier, pier,

deck, and abutment. The rest of the company, except

for the security element, swam and luxuriated in the

slow current of the Kum River, which was wide, shallow,

and warm at that point. We leisurely inhaled the cans

of beer that the American people deigned to allow us

over the violent objection of the Women’s Christian

Temperance Union, and other do-gooder outfits.

When the charges were all placed and wired, we

ate the evening meal and got the trucks up on the road

heading south. Sgt. Woods and I went back to the

bridge to set off the charges. Sgt. Woods was a favorite

of mine. I guess it was because I understood him so well.

He came from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and he was a

hell-for-leather guy. He gave the impression of not giving a damn, but in reality he cared. He loved a challenge, and he was strong, tough, and ghetto smart. There

was nothing he didn’t know about equipment operation

and field engineering. He was rare. I had served with

him in the 74th Engineer Battalion in the States. He

was not very popular there because he was considered

to be a know-it-all, and he was. I had no problem with

him because he was a top-flight soldier. He was also reliable and loyal. Whenever there was anything difficult,

dangerous, or urgent, he came to mind. So I was glad

he and I were working together on this demolition job.

When we got back to the bridge site, I connected

the action wire, which ended close to the abutment

charge. We played out the reel of wire after getting a

positive reading on my galvanometer. I paced off the

distance as the wire played out: exactly 100 yards. I

made a rapid calculation, which indicated that for the

amount of TNT in the abutment, the minimum safe

distance was 180 yards. But there was no more action

I didn’t need to be here at

all....Any of my lieutenants

could have handled this roadblock just as well and probably

better. But I was a slave to

my convictions. One of them

was never to send my men

into a situation I would not

go into myself. So, at this

time, at this place, here

is where I belong and here

is where I should be.
7 2 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

wire and I was in a hurry. Sunset was nearing and

what the hell? I looked at Woods. He shrugged his shoulders, and like a damned fool, I abandoned caution,

cleared, and connected the hellbox.

“Fire in the hole! Fire in the hole! Fire in the hole!”

With a twist of the little black handle the whole

world erupted. We started to run away from the bridge,

but looking up I could see that the sky was full of

boulders—some as large as jeeps. They landed all around

us with sickening thuds. It was a rain of stones and

I twitched as they landed around us. I knew that a

rock the size of my fist could be lethal, and lo and behold it was raining boulders of two-ton size! They were

burying themselves in the turf around us. I gazed upward all the while, ostensibly to duck away from stones

that might have endangered us. Finally, the gigantic

stones stopped falling, and only gravel and dust remained.

Woods and I looked at each other, silently acknowledging our stupidity, but most of all our good fortune at

being alive.

I placed my life in jeopardy through my stupidity; I did the same to my sergeant. For that, there is no

forgiveness.

The Pusan Perimeter, 1-19

August 1950, Haman, Korea

During August 1950, I took part in some of the most

vicious fighting of the war. We were defending the southern part of the Pusan perimeter. It was a period of constant combat and work for the 77th ECC.

As the North Koreans advanced in July 1950,

the U.S. and ROK forces were forced to retreat to

the southeast to form a defensive position around the

port of Pusan. This was truly a last stand. If the U.S.

forces were forced to evacuate Pusan, the North Koreans

would win. Pusan was a big port and the second largest

city in South Korea. It had to be held.

Initially, we fought in the south-central part of

the country near Sangju, but on 31 July 1950 the

25th Infantry Division was shifted suddenly to a new

defensive sector in the southwest near Masan in order

to stabilize the defensive position securing Pusan against

a new NKPA (North Korean People’s Army) threat

from the west. The NKPA forces had broken through

in the west and were threatening to outflank the UN

forces in the south. The 24th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division, was already fighting in the area but

losing ground steadily. In a brilliant move, the 25th

Infantry Division moved 150 miles in two days just in

time to hold the line.

The 24th Infantry Regiment was deployed on

Subok-san, an imposing piece of high ground running

across the corridor leading from Chinju through

Masan and into Pusan. The enemy needed that high

ground, which was its stumbling block on the way to

“Fire in the hole! Fire in the

hole! Fire in the hole!” With a

twist of the little black handle

the whole world erupted. We

started to run away from the

bridge, but looking up I could

see that the sky was full of

boulders—some as large as

jeeps. They landed all around

us with sickening thuds.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 7 3 7 3

Troops of the 24th

Infantry Regiment move

toward the front line,

18 July 1950

RG 111, SC-343967
7 4 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

Pusan. Subok-san was a steep, treeless mountain. The

terrain was rugged. Vehicles were confined to the roads,

which were poor. The temperature was 110 degrees F.

The tactical plans were inept and poorly suited to the

terrain. Barrier and field fortification material was in

limited supply and often simply not available. Our personnel were not conditioned to cope with the harsh

terrain, the heat, and the shortage of water for bathing

and drinking.

Shortly after the 24th RCT closed in on the

southern end of the Pusan perimeter our first regimental commander, Col. Horton V. White, was sent

back to Japan. I liked Col. White. He had always been

a fair man, and he was a good commander, but he was

50 years old and Korea was not a place for a man of

his age. Col. White was an intelligence officer who had

previously worked for Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby,

Douglas MacArthur’s G-2, so he went back to Tokyo.

Col. White was replaced on 6 August 1950 by Col.

Arthur S. Champeny. Col. Champeny was 57 when he

assumed command; he was four years older than the

25th Division Commander, Maj. Gen. William B.

Kean. I found Col. Champeny to be biased...and totally inefficient. The regiment did not do well under

his command.

During the defense of the Pusan perimeter, the

24th Infantry lost its position only once when they

evacuated Subok-san under heavy pressure from the

enemy and with a lack of reinforcement by friendly

troops. On this occasion, the regiment withdrew under

the supervision of its white officers, who must accept a

large part of the responsibility for the performance

of the troops. It is inconsistent to attribute only the

defeats of the 24th Infantry Regiment to its black

troops. Officers accept the glory of success; they must

also bear the onus of defeat.

Gradually, the Pusan perimeter became stronger. More UN troops arrived, and the gaps were

filled. The line became better reinforced and took

on aspects of trench warfare. Small attacks regained

some ground from the North Koreans. The line stabilized. The North Koreans still pressed the attack, however, and the fighting was fierce. The issue remained

in doubt until our amphibious landing at Inch’on

took the North Koreans by surprise and cut their

supply lines. Our job during this period was holding

the line.

Naktong River Bridge, 6 August 1950,

Near Masan, Korea

The war was becoming a habit and, God, what a grisly

habit. We were a generation of ghosts. We had never

had an opportunity to build, to create, or to structure.

We went from college directly to combat, from Sunday

school to slaughtering shed. We were blessed, I suppose,

to have had a five-year interlude of peace—long enough
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 7 5

to sire two or three children, many of who were to

mature fatherless.

We were quartered in a schoolhouse in Masan.

We’d been there for several days. The regiment and

division were in and around the town also. We weren’t

doing much and we needed the time for maintenance

of equipment. We’d been mighty busy, first at

Yech’on, then at Sangju, and then during the withdrawal into the Pusan perimeter. So maintenance it

was. Early in the morning on 6 August, a message

came in for a platoon-sized recon up to the bridge

on the Naktong River. “More instructions after

arriving.”

Platoon-sized reconnaissance always interested

me, so I decided to add my jeep to the small convoy

carrying Lt. Lenon’s platoon. We left about 0930.

The trip to the bridge was uneventful and I called

and reported this to division. The G-2 type responded that a battalion-sized North Korean unit was

approaching and was about two miles from the

bridge. He instructed us, “Hold at all cost. Deny the

bridge to the enemy until relieved.” This didn’t worry

me much because it was still in the forenoon and

denying the bridge wasn’t difficult, even with only

one platoon.

I could see the elements of the enemy battalion

moving toward us. Thousands of refugees were on the

road in advance of the battalion. It was always the

same. When the enemy moved, the civilian populace scurried before them. There were thousands of

white-clad women, carrying suckling children on their

hips and huge bundles of household goods on their

heads. Once in a while one of the women would have a

radio in the bundle to advise the enemy of our strength,

weapons, locations, and general disposition. We were

wise to that and the few men we left with our meager

trains were to look for women using radios. If any

were found they were summarily shot. No radios on this

occasion, however.

There were numerous foxholes on the bank

facing the oncoming battalion. The plain was flat.

The riverbanks were 20 to 30 feet higher than the

Thousands of refugees were

on the road in advance of

the battalion. It was always

the same. When the enemy

moved, the civilian populace scurried before them.

Soldiers of the 5th RCT

fire on North Korean

positions near Taejon

RG 111, SC-349347
7 6 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

plain and roadbed. The enemy approached. We waited. And waited. The troops became antsy.

It’s better after the firefight starts because once

you’re in action you function with a certain amount of

automatic reflexes. I planned to let the battalion’s

point come to within 600 yards. Six hundred yards

is good killing range where there’s no cover, and it was

far enough away, under those conditions, to make the

enemy pay dearly for any advance. I knew we’d kill

his point and make it impossible for him to advance

in the daylight.

Engineer Road, 14 August 1950,

Haman, Korea

Upon arriving at our new location in the southern part

of the Pusan perimeter, I made a reconnaissance of the

area and started a program to improve the roads, culverts, and bridges. The work kept the troops occupied

and ensured the 24th RCT of clear passage on the MSR

and auxiliary roads and trails. We stayed busy. I established priorities for work to be done in infrastructure,

field fortifications, and other engineer works.

When I had gone over all of the 24th RCT area,

I assigned a high priority to developing an access

road to eliminate the bottleneck where the MSR

dead-ended in front of the 24th RCT command post.

The MSR ran for about three miles southeast from

the town of Haman, and if the enemy ever cut that

road, there was no way the troops could leave their

positions by vehicle.

I discovered a trail about 14 feet wide that led off

eastward from the MSR. The track indicated that it was

used by farmers with their ox-drawn carts. The trail led

up to a row of low hills and ended at a shale hogback,

which precluded passage by vehicles. As the main roadwork wound down, we went to work vigorously on

the trail, while another crew worked on the hogback.

It was hard work because the shale was too hard to

move, even with our bulldozer. I posted daily reports of

our progress on the regimental situation map. Removal

of the hogback would allow the trail to extend uninterrupted for several miles and finally rejoin the MSR.

This would give the RCT another vehicle road to get

supplies in or to move out.

I was concerned about the RCT being hemmed

in with no roadway out of the Battle Mountain area.

The 6th North Korean Infantry Division was exerting

extreme pressure on the RCT, and the pressure seemed

to be increasing from night to night. Our work on

the trail intensified, and eventually we removed

enough of the overburden to place a large demolition

charge deep enough to remove the shale or at least

to loosen it up.

I was a bit concerned. Shales and slates are difficult

to blow because they’re stratified, or layered. The spaces

between the layers often contain water and fine silts that
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 7 77 7

cushion the effects of a demolition shock, dampening

the explosion so that it’s ineffective. Not so this time.

After careful preparation we blew the obstruction. We

blew it well, leaving only a lot of loose rock, which

the dozer could handle.

Shortly after the big blow, a jeep rushed up to

the demolition site, and a very excited colonel got out.

It was the new regimental commander, Col. Champeny.

When he saw me, the old man puffed up the hill

shaking his finger at me.

He coughed, “I thought that noise was artillery.

What are you doing? I told you we didn’t need another

road.”

I advised the colonel that this was just a training

project and that the notice of the blow was on his situation map and had been for two days.

Col. Champeny took a long, mean look at me

and said, “I’m unhappy with you. You just do things

the way you want.”

I replied, “Sir, I serve the regiment well.”

I was careful not to become contumacious,

because it was easy to do with him. His face had become florid, and he turned and went down the hill.

Fortunately, he had not told me not to open the road.

His parting remark was, “I don’t know what we’ll ever

need it for.”

I beckoned for the troops to continue their work.

It was my duty to maintain and construct roads in my

area of responsibility. I always did that, and it was always

good for the regiment that I did. I, too, hoped that the

infantry would never need that narrow, slightly improved

dirt strip that we named “Engineer Road,” but it was

available if and when.

I announced that the road was completed at the

next regimental staff meeting and Col. Champeny

glared at me in his ugliest manner. He advised his

commanders and staff that the road was of no significance, and it would neither be needed nor used. He

was wrong. Engineer Road proved to be invaluable in

the fighting for Battle Mountain.

Engineers of the

77th Combat

Engineer Battalion

lay a single-apron

barbed wire fence

RG 111, SC-359427
7 8 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

Battle Mountain, 18 August

1950, Near Haman, Korea

Pound for pound the North Korean soldier was as good as any in the world.

He was wily and tough. He was tremendously motivated and probably the

best mortarman on the planet. The

North Korean was trained to a razor’s

edge. Through the glasses I once

watched an NKPA soldier dig a foxhole. He dug into the hillside with a

crude half-shovel, deposited the soil

into a large kerchief, and then moved

away a few yards where he meticulously

redistributed the soil and gravel. When

he was finished, it was barely visible.

The NKPA soldier was arrogant,

confident, and highly capable. He was

at home in the heat, the dust, and on

the barren mountainsides.

For some reason our northern enemy wanted

possession of Hill 625, which became known appropriately as “Battle Mountain.” NKPA units attacked the

hill nearly every other night, and on the odd night

the 24th Infantry Regiment took the mountain back.

It was dirty, bloody, and hot.

The 24th Infantry Regiment lost and regained

that hill for nearly 45 days. They had no baths, very little

drinking water, and seldom did they have clean clothes.

Sunset provided the only respite from the hell-fire of the

sun. It was a stinking conflict, with numerous changes

of commanders at battalion and company level. It was

impossible for the troops to identify with their officers

or vice versa.

On the other hand, there were some dedicated

and highly competent officers who led their men brilliantly, officers who respected the troops and were respected in return. Such an officer was Capt. Laurence

Corcoran, the commander of Company C.

Larry Corcoran was a good-sized man with determination showing in his hard blue eyes. He was blond

and strong, and he knew his business—a no-nonsense

type of man. I had last seen him back at Gifu, a light

year ago, and I noticed that he had lost a lot of weight.

The same was true for most of us.

Larry mentioned his need for installation of

mines, barbed wire, and trip flares. I knew he needed

those items to help solidify his position. I could have

provided the engineer support, except that I normally

performed my activity at the request of the regimental

plans and operations officer. However, I arranged to

wire in Larry’s Charlie Company anyway.

We set out a concentrated minefield, interspersed

with trip flares, and anti-personnel mines to include

bouncing betties. Lord, it was hot up on that hill—

hotter than the hinges to the door of hell. It was slow

A North Korean prisoner awaits

transportation to a POW camp RG

111, SC-347027
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 7 9

and difficult carrying mines and rolls of wire up those

hills, particularly in that heat.

The troops were neither trained nor conditioned

to function efficiently in the prevailing high temperature and humidity or in the rough terrain. It was

particularly difficult for American soldiers to occupy

hilltop positions where food, water, ammo, barbed

wire, and other heavy items of equipment had to be

manhandled. Somehow it had to be done; the stuff

had to be transported and installed. There had been a

time when regiment tables of organization and equipment called for mules, but modern technology won

out over common sense. Accordingly, beasts of burden

were no longer authorized, whereas soldiers were authorized to be beasts of burden. So, enterprising soldiers

used cows or other indigenous transportation devices

whenever possible.

When the regiment occupied Battle Mountain and

its environs, the engineer commander was directed to

round up and corral all the livestock the natives had left

behind in their flight from their homes when the enemy

came near. We rounded up cattle, pigs, and chickens.

We corralled the animals where pasturage and water were

available. Then I got a bright idea.

I realized that in many other parts of the world

cattle were beasts of burden. Why not in Korea? Why

not use the beefsteaks to carry significant loads up hills?

One cow could carry the load of four or five soldiers

without griping or bellyaching. I had two A-frames

secured together and hung over the backs of the cows.

We found that if we used the rings in their noses that

the cattle wouldn’t resist doing our bidding. We led

the burdened animals up to the mountaintop positions. I’m sure that the animal lovers from home would

take a dim view of the use to which we’d put the beasts,

but in combat only the soldier is significant. From

that day onward I expanded the use of the animals. They

were used to transport all of our field fortifications,

water, and ammunition to the line companies of the

24th Infantry Regiment.

The field fortifications stopped the enemy from

storming Company C’s positions. The anti-personnel

mines interspersed in the barbed wire wounded or

killed NKPA soldiers who came crawling with great

caution or recklessly hurtling through the wire. The

riflemen and machine gunners did their slaughtering

under the eerie light of the trip flares. It became extremely difficult for the NKPA to dislodge the GIs from that

hill. Our enemies paid an awesome price for every inch

of Battle Mountain. That was probably the most expensive real estate in the world.

However, on 22 August 1950 things turned from

bad to worse on Battle Mountain when a hellfire 120-

mm mortar round came in. The big mortar round exploded about 40 feet above the deck with a ka-whump!

Lt. Mathis and four good soldiers of the 24th were cut

Lord, it was hot up on that

hill....It was slow and difficult

carrying mines and rolls

of wire up those hills,

particularly in that heat.
8 0 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 1

First Lieutenant Charles M. Bussey 77th Engineer Combat Company

down. With Mathis down, Larry Corcoran was the

only officer left for duty in Company C until 30 August.

Those were hard days and hard nights.

The casualty rate was devastating, and the replacements were kids, most of them 18 to 20 years of age

without combat experience. Most of the replacements

were not infantrymen. They came from the technical

services: signal corps, ordnance, medical, whatever. The

lack of combat training rendered the replacements

less than fully effective.

The Army’s personnel assignment and utilization

policy specified only that replacements to the 24th

Infantry Regiment be Negroes. It didn’t matter if they

were properly trained or were qualified in the proper

skills. It only mattered that they were black. That policy

guaranteed the weakening of the 24th RCT.

Immediately following the loss of Mathis came

the loss of Lt. Anthes and another officer from Company E. These losses left a terrible leadership hole in

the 1st and 2d battalions. The shortage of experienced

junior officers, together with the rapid turnover of senior officers, really created a hole in the main line of

resistance (MLR).

Wounded men who were ambulatory were of

necessity returned to their units, often too soon—before

their wounds were healed properly. That created a

terrible morale problem, which militated against organizational efficiency.

In spite of all the negatives, however, Capt.

Corcoran and a few other fine company-grade officers

hung on, as is the hallmark of infantry officers and noncommissioned officers. One night Larry Corcoran lost

his position when the NKPA overwhelmed him. He

yielded, regrouped, counterattacked, and retook his

position—all without the knowledge of battalion or

regimental headquarters. For his outstanding leadership

at Battle Mountain, Capt. Larry Corcoran was awarded

the Silver Star medal.

The troops complained bitterly about the presence of decaying enemy bodies in front of their positions in that withering, rotting environment. The regimental commander ordered the engineers to obtain

quicklime and provide it to the line units immediately.

The lime was used to decompose the enemy bodies.

What had been bodies a few days ago were reduced to

a few long bones, some rags, and some grease spots. It

was grisly business but it satisfied the troops. It also

was demeaning to those fallen soldiers.

On the night of 31 August—1 September, the

6th North Korean Infantry Division attacked in force

and moved the 24th Infantry Regiment off Hill 625.

Col. Champeny was one of the first people to leave

through the cut we had blown to create Engineer Road.

He was followed by at least two of his infantry battalions. The road Col. Champeny had derided had saved

him and his troops.
The Pusan Perimeter June–September 1950 8 1

Later, the regiment came back to take Battle

Mountain by way of Engineer Road. One battalion of

the 27th Infantry Regiment reinforced the 24th RCT

in retaking the hill. The NKPA suffered great losses

from our counterattack. There were no more mass attacks by the North Koreans on Hill 625 after the

night of 31 August 1950. We paid a price also. Over

500 American casualties were suffered on Battle Mountain during the month of August 1950.

Once Hill 625 was properly fortified and we had

a tight grip on it the mountain was never lost again.

Superb duty performance by a few officers and some

valiant enlisted men made it possible to retain our

positions until the Army broke out of the Pusan

perimeter in mid-September 1950. We held because of

some tough NCOs and a handful of dedicated officers—

Capt. Larry Corcoran of Company C; Capt. Charles

Piedra of Heavy Weapons Company, 1st Battalion; Capt.

Roger Walden of Company F, 2d Battalion; and Capt.

Mike Keiler of Heavy Mortar Company. All of these

fine officers contributed to making good things happen

in spite of the very transient leadership at regimental,

battalion, and company levels.

The great pity of it all was that so many good men

had to die needlessly because the U.S. Army refused to

send qualified white combat soldiers as replacements to

a black infantry regiment, even in desperate combat.

Battle Mountain was certainly one of the most

fought over and exchanged pieces of real estate in the

annals of American military history. Pork Chop Hill,

later on in the Korean War, and Hamburger Hill in the

Vietnam War, also were scenes of intense combat. There

is no use arguing over which was the hardest—they all

were hard.

Men of the 77th Engineer Combat

Company use explosives to try and

dislodge enemy troops taking cover

along the banks of the Hantan River

Engineer School, 148-16-1

The Inch’on Landing

September 1950

Marines storm over the seawall Chapter 2 at Inch’on, 15 September 1950

RG 127, 127-GK-2341-A3191

83
84 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

The Inch’on

 Landing
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 85

Introduction

Chapter 2

General Douglas MacArthur’s long-range plan

for Korea called for an amphibious landing behind the

North Korean lines to coincide with a breakout offensive from the Pusan Perimeter. He selected his Chief of

Staff, Far East Command, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, to lead the newly activated X Corps in a landing

on the west coast at Inch’on, the port city for Seoul. The

objectives were the South Korean capital itself, and the

communication routes over which enemy troops and

supplies moved south. MacArthur chose Inch’on because

he knew the difficult tides there might lead the North

Koreans to expect an attack elsewhere. The plan called

for two U.S. divisions—the 1st Marine Division and

the 7th Infantry Division—to make the landing, while

the Eighth Army, supported by UN aircraft, launched

a counteroffensive along the Naktong River.

When presented with MacArthur’s initiative, some

members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were skeptical

that such a landing could be carried out at Inch’on. Army

Chief of Staff, General Lawton J. Collins, was reticent,

but willing to defer to MacArthur. Representatives of

the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps expressed more serious reservations. MacArthur considered alternative sites,

but kept coming back to his original objective. He was

convinced that only an Inch’on landing would conclusively sever the enemy’s supply lines.

Aerial sorties against the enemy-held harbor began

on 4 September 1950. American and British cruisers and

destroyers took up the attack on 13 September, dueling

with the North Korean batteries on Wolmi, an island

controlling the entrance to Inch’on Harbor. In the early

darkness of 15 September, the first troops went ashore

on Wolmi-do. Marines took the island in less than two

hours. In the afternoon, when the tide came in again,

the Marines climbed over the seawall and took the city.

The 1st Marine Division, with four battalions of

Korean Marines, pressed toward Kimpo Airfield, the Han

River, and Seoul. The 7th Division headed south toward

Suwon. On the fourth day of the battle, elements of the

5th Marines captured Kimpo, the largest airfield in Korea, and a major UN objective. The Marines then captured Seoul and, on 29 September, MacArthur welcomed

President Syngman Rhee back to his capital.

At the same time the amphibious assault took place

at Inch’on, the Eighth Army began its breakout [16-22

Sept.] from the Pusan beachhead. The main thrust

fell to the newly-formed I Corps [Maj. Gen. Frank W.

Milburn, commanding] in the center of the Perimeter
86 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

line. I Corps consisted of the 24th Infantry and 1st

Cavalry Divisions, the 5th RCT, the British 27th Infantry Brigade, and the ROK 1st Division. The planned

offensive called for the 1st Cavalry Division and the

5th RCT to seize a bridgehead across the Naktong

River near Waegwan. The 24th Division, along with

the 2d Infantry Division, was to attempt a crossing

below Waegwan, while the ROK 1st Division was to

cross above the city. The forces in the center were to

spearhead the thrust northward toward the X Corps at

Inch’on. Given the shortage of engineer troops and

bridging equipment available to Eighth Army, the

planned Naktong crossings were ambitious. The engineers did their best, as when the 2d ECB constructed

a floating bridge to replace the Changnyong-Ch’ogye

highway bridge’s two destroyed spans.

Eighth Army commanders anticipated that news

of the Inch’on landing would have a demoralizing effect

on the enemy, while bolstering the spirits of the AmeriThe breakout, which began slowly on 16 September,

rapidly gained momentum. Days of hard fighting followed.

UN troops had the numerical advantage, and with the

help of artillery and air support, were able to dislodge

the North Korean forces. By 23 September the enemy

was in full retreat and the cordon around the Pusan

Perimeter had collapsed.
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 87

cans. Accordingly, the Eighth Army offensive was scheduled for the day after the Inch’on amphibious assault.

The news of the successful landing did indeed reach the

American soldiers with the desired effect, although it

appears that poor communications kept the North Koreans ignorant for a few days of the X Corps landing.

The enemy resisted stubbornly at first, but as the

news of Inch’on spread, North Korea’s forces moved

northward with sudden zeal. To elude MacArthur’s trap,

many North Korean soldiers took off their military

uniforms and changed into civilian clothes to become

guerrillas behind UN lines. Nevertheless, by the end of

September, the enemy lost effective control of nearly all

territory south of Seoul.

Engineers played a vital role in the Inch’on invasion, one that began in the planning phase of the Inch’on

operation. Lt. Col. Edward L. Rowny participated in

the initial planning for the invasion as a member of

MacArthur’s staff. He was then appointed X Corps

Engineer and participated in the actual operation.

First Lt. Claude Roberts, Jr., of the 2d Engineer

Special Brigade, took part in the landing. The brigade

made the amphibious landing of troops and equipment, ferried Marines across the Han River, and assisted

in the repair of the damaged locks.

Another engineer unit involved in the Inch’on

planning was the 19th Engineer Combat Group (ECG),

with Maj. John Elder as S-2. The 19th went ashore on

D-day. Its primary mission was to support the assault

crossing and to support the Marines in their drive to

the Han River.

Lt. Col. Evan S. Pickett was the commander of

the 73d ECB at Fort Hood, Texas, when the war started.

He brought the 73d to Korea and landed at Inch’on

on D-day. His unit supported the Marines in their

drive to the Han River by clearing destroyed tanks

and vehicles from the road, searching for snipers, and

maintaining the MSR. Upon reaching the Han River,

the 73d ECB supported the Marine crossing using

assault boats. The battalion also supported the Marines

during its move to Uijongbu on the north side of

Seoul before it turned around and road marched to

Pusan where it loaded on LSTs and went up the east

coast, landing at Wonson.

First Lt. Maurice D. Roush came in with the 13th

ECB, 7th Infantry Division, on D+2. The battalion

built and maintained roads and bridges in support of

the 7th Division.
88 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

L ooking for a way to stem the North Korean

advance and relieve pressure on the besieged Pusan

perimeter, Colonel Rowny and his colleagues in the

Far East Command’s planning section proposed a daring plan—an amphibious landing behind enemy

lines. General MacArthur quickly embraced the concept, but he proposed a more ambitious target, the

port of Inch’on—100 kilometers behind enemy lines

and directly opposite the fallen Korean capital, Seoul.

The Decision on Inch’on

Within the FECOM staff there were, broadly speaking,

two schools of thought. One school of thought, the prevailing one, was that we should pull our troops back into

a perimeter at Pusan and evacuate them to Japan. The

second school of thought, the one held by my boss, Col.

Armstrong, was that we could land an amphibious force

in Korea instead of evacuating our forces. He believed,

and we in the Plans Section concurred, that once we

evacuated Korea there would be very little opportunity

to go back. Accordingly, we began thinking along these

lines in mid-July. It took that much time to determine

what was happening in Korea and how seriously the situation would deteriorate before we could stop the enemy.

Around the first of August we planned an amphibious

force to outflank the North Koreans and thus save us

from having to evacuate our troops.

Once we got the okay from our boss, three of us

worked up an invasion plan. One was Col. James

Landrum, who was a distinguished war hero who had

been seriously wounded in the Pacific War. He retired to

Hawaii as a major general. The second was Col. Lynn

Smith, who became a brigadier general before the end of

the Korean War. Smith was a very bright officer and a

practical one—I’ve lost track of him. And I was the third.

It’s interesting that when we developed our plans,

all of us had the same idea of landing on the west coast

General Douglas MacArthur boards the U.S.S. Mt.

McKinley after touring Inch’on, 16 September 1950

RG 111, SC-348600
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 89

behind the enemy’s front lines. One of my fellow planners, I think it was Smith, thought we should land at the

“hinge,” the front line itself. The other, Landrum,

thought we should land farther up, about 10 kilometers

behind the front line. My idea was to penetrate

deep, about 25 kilometers beyond the front line. Col.

Armstrong decided not to make the decision himself,

but had us present our plans directly to General Douglas

MacArthur.

General MacArthur listened carefully to the first

plan of hitting at the hinge. It was the classic solution.

He then listened to the plan of landing farther up the

coast. By the time he got to me I was trembling. I thought

MacArthur might not consider me bold but simply foolish for recommending we land so deep. MacArthur, however, surprised us all. He went to the charts, picked up a

grease pencil, and drew a big arrow more than 100 kilometers up the west coast opposite Seoul. “One should

land as close as possible to the objective, and the objective is the capital,” he said. “You’re all too timid. You’re

pusillanimous. You should think boldly and decisively.”

He said he had learned from the Pacific War that the

best way to produce results was by island-hopping. So,

why not terrain-hop? “Land at Inch’on,” he said, “have

you considered that?”

“Yes, General, we thought of it briefly,” I said. “But

we decided there were several good reasons against it.

First, it is very close to Seoul and the enemy would

certainly be defending the capital in great force.

Second, it was the most difficult of all areas for a landing

because the tides are so great. Inch’on has a 31-foot

tide—the second largest tidal area in the world. We

would have difficulty getting a force on land, and it

would be hard to support them once they got there.”

MacArthur simply said, “Go for the throat; Seoul

is the objective. And as for the tides,” he said, “don’t take

counsel of your fears. Physical obstacles can be overcome

by good planning, strong nerves, and will power.” We

went back to our office and developed the plan to land

at Inch’on.

But the plan was far from having the approval of

Washington. In the first place, the Pentagon thought it

might be better to evacuate our troops from Pusan. They

thought a Dunkirk back to Japan was the best solution.

However, if there was to be an amphibious landing, they

thought that the worst place to land was Inch’on.

General MacArthur invited the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to Tokyo to discuss the plan. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley,

did not attend. After we had presented it to the chiefs,

the Air Force chief spoke first. He thought it was unnecessary to land troops amphibiously. “Given sufficient

priority,” he said, “the enemy’s supply lines could be so

heavily bombarded that he would have to pull back.”

The Chief of Naval Operations was next. “A 31-

foot tide,” he said, “makes an amphibious landing

MacArthur simply said,

“Go for the throat; Seoul

is the objective. And as for

the tides,” he said, “don’t

take counsel of your fears.

Physical obstacles can be

overcome by good planning,

strong nerves, and will

power.”
90 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

infeasible. We could not get sufficient troops in before

the tide turned,” he said, “and the troops ashore would

be driven back into the sea. Besides,” he said, “the area is

heavily protected with powerful sea mines and underwater obstacles.”

The Chief of Staff, United States Army, General

J. Lawton Collins, thought we were planning to land

where the enemy would defend most strongly—Seoul,

but he was quiet. He knew MacArthur well and hesitated to take him on.

Then General MacArthur took the floor. Crisply

and elegantly, often citing examples from the Peloponnesian Wars and other classic battles, MacArthur

began to charm the chiefs. His lecture to them was a tour

de force. After he finished, the chairman said that he

and the chiefs would “have to take this back home

and study it.” Several days later General MacArthur

received a message from the joint chiefs saying that if

he thought the operation was essential and would succeed, he should proceed with plans to land at Inch’on.

 After reading the chief ’s message, General

MacArthur called us into his office. MacArthur placed

his arm around my shoulders and said, “Colonel Rowny,

Inch’on shall go down in history as the 22d Great Battle

of the World.” From my West Point studies I knew

there had been 18. My mind wandered for a second—

where were the other three? But I soon came back to

earth as MacArthur pumped my hand. Feeling about

eight feet tall I went home and told my wife what

MacArthur had said. “I believe he can put on his trousers two legs at a time,” I said.

The three of us worked on the landing up the coast.

I know I was personally quite busy because I had to brief

the press every day. I had problems with the press, but

nothing to compare with the problems of today’s world.

Today, the press are much more demanding and much

more insistent that they need to know details. They speculate upon and criticize everything in sight. They editorialize more today than they did back then, when they

were content simply to report the news. Every day I had

some minor crisis or another in dealing with the press.

But overall, it went fairly well and I had a rather good

rapport with reporters.

Several of the reporters got wind of the fact that

we were working on an amphibious plan and questioned

me about it. I told them it was nothing I could comment upon. Off the record I told them they were correct

but appealed to them not to tip off the enemy. The press

corps kept the secret and did not telegraph our plan to

the enemy. I was pleased that no leaks occurred.

Once General MacArthur got the chiefs’ approval

for the landing at Inch’on, we got down to serious planning on the details, of which there were many. We had

to alert the troops, assemble the ships and supplies, and

do it all in a big hurry. It was not an easy task because the

troops, ships, and supplies had to come from all over the

MacArthur placed his arm

around my shoulders and

said, “Colonel Rowny,

Inch’on shall go down in

history as the 22d Great

Battle of the World.”
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 91

Pacific Theater and even the United States.

General MacArthur called the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 June. He approved

MacArthur’s request that the 24th Infantry Division be

dispatched to Korea immediately to reinforce the troops

there. The division was the first unit that had been

brought to some degree of readiness after the occupation forces were pulled out of the provinces and cities of

Japan. We were thankful we had at least one division to

move to Korea at the beginning of the war.

It was located at one of the training camps, Camp

Zama. Maj. Gen. Almond kept pushing Lt. Gen. Walton

H. Walker, the Eighth Army commander, to train a regimental combat team and get them in shape for combat.

Walker believed there was no real urgency; he did not

want to make extraordinary demands on the training

establishment or the troops. But Almond kept pushing

and complained to MacArthur that Walker wasn’t vigorous enough. MacArthur called Walker in and said, “Look,

when Almond tells you to do something, he speaks for

me.” From then on, there was no love lost between Walker

and Almond. When the plans were being drawn up for

the Inch’on invasion, Almond insisted—and MacArthur

approved—that the X Corps, which Almond would command, not report through Walker, but directly to General MacArthur. In addition, Almond was to continue as

MacArthur’s chief of staff. X Corps was to be a separate

force and not a unit under Eighth Army.

I’m not certain that MacArthur lost faith in Walker’s

ability, but the fact that MacArthur backed Almond was

undoubtedly a blow to Walker’s morale. MacArthur obviously believed that Almond was on the right track. He

approved Almond’s ideas that we had better get the U.S.

out of being occupation troops and begin training them

for combat. Our troops in Japan were in unbelievably

bad shape physically, mentally, and morally. Many U.S.

soldiers had Japanese live-in girlfriends and there were

hundreds of Japanese-American babies. The troops had

become lazy and fat. Pulling them back into training

camps was long overdue.

General Douglas

MacArthur and

Lt. Gen. Walton

Walker, the Eighth

Army commander,

in Korea,

26 July 1950

RG 111, SC-344430
92 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

But to get back to Walker—if MacArthur had lost

confidence in him, he would have relieved him. You will

recall that MacArthur was a man of strong loyalties and

believed that Walker was loyal to him. Still, a gulf opened

up between Walker and Almond, and when push came

to shove, MacArthur backed Almond.

I learned I would be the engineer for the Inch’on

landing the day after MacArthur got final approval from

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the plan. I was notified that

I would be the corps engineer for the X Corps operation. Although still a lieutenant colonel, I would have all

the privileges and authority of a brigadier general.

There were many problems involved in getting

the troops together, putting them on ships, and getting

them moving in a short period of time. The first favorable date for a landing was 15 September 1950. If we

failed to meet that date we would have to wait a considerable length of time for the next favorable set of tides.

By then the weather would be freezing and the troops

in the south of Korea overrun. We had to make the 15

September date.

Another problem we had to resolve was whether

to have the troops hit the beach from small assault

boats or from LSTs. The troop ships would have to stay

several miles away because of the tides. This meant that

small boats would have a long way to come—two or

three miles—and the troops would be subject to enemy

fire. On the other hand, if we landed troops by beaching LSTs, they would be vulnerable to North Korean

counterattacks until the next high tide. We spent a lot

of time and effort trying to figure out from aerial

photographs whether or not we could repair the damaged locks of the harbor basin. We decided it was unfeasible—that it was too far for the troops to come in

on small landing craft. In the end, we decided to take

a chance on landing the troops directly from LSTs.

We knew that once they beached, the LSTs would be

stuck for 12 hours until the next tide. This turned out

to be the best plan. We were lucky.

We also spent a lot of time trying to figure out

As it turned out, the

North Koreans did not

think to turn off the fresh

water and it continued to

flow. All our prior planning

proved unnecessary; we

never needed our tankertransported water at all.

Hard aground on

Inch’on’s Yellow

Beach, an LCM

(foreground) and LST

are stranded by the

receding tide

RG 111, SC-348829
The Inch’on Landing September 1950

how to bring in a large supply of fresh water. We learned

from intelligence sources that the whole area between

Inch’on and the Han River received its fresh water

supply from Seoul through a single pipeline. The North

Koreans could simply turn off the water at Seoul and

dry us up. There were no deep wells in the area, and the

shallow wells produced only brackish and contaminated water. Accordingly, we spent a lot of time trying to

procure tankers to take in fresh water. But the only tankers available in the Pacific Theater were vessels that

had transported oil. After three steam cleanings, the tankers were tested and the water was still covered with oil

slicks. We knew it would make our troops sick. The

dilemma was whether to count on trying to treat

brackish water that was highly contaminated with dangerous bacteria or to take in fresh water that contained

some oil and would therefore nauseate the troops. As it

turned out, the North Koreans did not think to turn

off the fresh water and it continued to flow. All our prior

planning proved unnecessary; we never needed our

tanker-transported water at all.

Another major problem was to assemble enough

floating bridging to span the Han River, which in the

vicinity of Seoul was a mile wide. It took every piece of

floating bridging in the Pacific Theater to span the Han

River. Even then, there were three different types of

bridges involved. We had to plan on setting up forge

shops after the landing to manufacture connectors that

allowed these bridges

to link up with one

another.

We were faced

with still other problems. One was to assemble enough explosives, such as the snakes

we had used to clear

minefields in World

War II, against the eventuality that we had to clear

underwater obstacles to reach the beach. Intelligence

reports held that the entire area at Inch’on was full of

mines and underwater obstacles. Fortunately, these

reports were highly exaggerated and we faced an easier

problem than we had expected.

Marine amtracs

and DUKW carry

the 5th Marine

Regiment (left)

and members of

the 7th Infantry

Division across

the Han River,

September 1950

93

RG 111, SC-349166

RG 111, SC-349039
94 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

We also were fortunate that the enemy resistance

we expected was grossly overestimated. This made

those of us who planned the invasion happy because

MacArthur’s idea was to have the planners go in on the

first wave. In retrospect, this had the desired effect.

It caused us to think carefully about the safety of our

troops knowing that we would be the first troops to

hit the beach.

While we proceeded to plan the Inch’on invasion

we assembled our staffs. I was somewhat amused to pick

up a lieutenant on my personal staff because I was now

an acting brigadier general. I also was assigned a full colonel as my deputy and two other full colonels to command engineer groups. Maj. Gen. Ruffner, then an

Army general in Hawaii, was named Chief of Staff,

X Corps. Because Ruffner had worked closely with

the Marine Corps, it was natural that we would take

charge of planning for the landing. He brought with

him Col. Tom Forney, a highly capable Marine Corps

officer who was an expert on loading ships for amphibious operations. He also knew a great deal about

the organization and capabilities of Marine Corps

units. This was very useful since I knew little about the

Marine Corps.

Another problem we anticipated was the strong

current of the Han River, which was in excess of eight

feet per second. We doubted that we could make the

river crossing in the little plastic boats the Army used for

this purpose. This turned out to be the case. Accordingly, we planned on using the powerful amtracs (amphibious tractor) of the Marines for the river crossing.

One of the curious and entirely unexpected problems we faced was that the Marines assigned to us had

no prior training in river crossings. They knew how to

assault a beach, but they complained they didn’t know

how to make a river crossing. I had to convince them

that the two types of operations were closely related. Two

or three days after we landed at Inch’on I conducted

classes at the Kimpo Airfield for the Marines who were

scheduled to make the river crossing. In the end we turned

over half of the Marines’ amtracs, and a Marine driver

for each, to the 7th Division. The 7th Division, which

had been trained in river crossings, made the main crossing of the Han River; the Marines made a secondary

crossing downstream.

Immediately after landing at Inch’on, a rift occurred

that continued to widen between Gen. Almond and Maj.

Gen. Oliver Smith, the commander of the 1st Marine

Division. Following Marine Corps doctrine, Smith believed it necessary to “tuck up his tail” and get everything in good shape before moving inland from the beach.

Almond didn’t give a fig for Marine Corps doctrine. He

believed that when you’ve got the enemy on the run,

you should continue to push him and not let up. The

tension between Almond and Smith was further exacerbated when Almond jumped the chain of command and
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 95

dealt directly with Smith’s regimental commanders. The

Marines had very good regimental commanders who

seemed to enjoy dealing directly with Almond. One was

Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, a highly decorated Marine

who had two Navy Crosses. Another was “Big Foot”

Brown, an artilleryman who preferred to be a foot soldier. The third, whose name I don’t recall, also was very

good. After being shot in the leg, this officer continued

to command the regiment while on crutches.

Almond would pop in on the regimental commanders at the front and give them direct instructions,

sending information copies of his instructions back

to the division commander. This naturally infuriated

Gen. Smith.

Remarkably, the invasion itself was carried out

smoothly. The diversionary force that landed at the island of Wolmi also came off well. The troops debarked

at Inch’on against light resistance and quickly established

a beachhead. The next day, a North Korean tank column started down from Seoul toward Inch’on. The Air

Force performed magnificently. They swooped down and

with several passes knocked out the tanks. Enemy resistance was light. Almond kept pushing the Marines to

move rapidly, pushing them to capture the near side

of the Han quickly. He told the regimental commanders, “Get going and capture the river bank. Don’t let

the North Koreans build up a force south of the Han.”

At the same time Gen. Smith was trying to slow the
96 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

Marines down. He felt they should wait until all

their supporting artillery and ammunition was ashore.

Fortunately, the regimental commanders listened to Almond and not to Smith.

The Marines arrived at the south bank of the Han

four or five days after the landing. Once the enemy tank

column had been knocked out, there was not much enemy resistance. Gen. Smith continued to try to slow down

the Marines. He warned that they would run into stiff

resistance when crossing the Han. He said they would

need artillery support and lots of ammunition to get to

the north bank of the Han.

Almond said, “We’ll solve that problem when and

if we have to. If we need fire support, we’ll use mortars

and call on the Air Force. The Air Force has done well,

and if the weather holds, we can count on close air support to substitute for artillery.”

Smith’s philosophy was like Field Marshal Bernard

Montgomery’s “tidying up the battlefield.” It was a repeat of the classical problem: Patton’s lightning thrust

versus Montgomery’s rolling masses.

It’s curious that in the midst of battle one remembers the more ludicrous incidents. On the third day after the landing, we were on a hill in sight of the Han

River. Gen. Almond was talking to Col. Chesty Puller.

There were only a handful of North Koreans south of

the Han River, and sporadic small arms fire was coming

in on the hill. Col. Puller, who you will recall had two

Navy Crosses, was crouched down quite low while Almond was standing up straight.

Almond said, “Chesty, why are you cringing down

there?” Puller said, “I’m not cringing; I’m just playing it

safe. By unnecessarily standing up, you’re drawing fire in

on us. I don’t know why you feel you have to stand up.”

Almond said, “Don’t worry; we’re pretty much out of

range. What’s coming in are spent bullets.” Puller said,

“General, I lost a brother to one of those spent bullets.”

Finally, Almond knelt down. He said, “I want to present

you with a Silver Star for your gallantry in action. Now

stand up and salute me while we get a photo of me pinning the medal on you.”

Puller stood up but snatched the Silver Star medal

and stuffed it in his pocket. “Thanks General, that’s damn

decent of you. You can dispense with reading the citation,” he said. “I can read that later.” As soon as the photo

was taken he pulled Gen. Almond down with him. “Let’s

be sensible,” he said, “and talk over things in a foxhole.”

Reluctantly, Almond crawled into the foxhole with Puller.

I conducted classes for the Marines at this location

on how to make a river crossing. But, by this time, the

7th Division had come ashore. We turned over many of

the Marines’ amtracs to them for the main crossing.

One regimental combat team went south to block

the North Koreans who had been cut off, in the event

they would turn around and attack our rear. The rest of

the 7th Division was used in the river crossing.
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 97

My main problem was assembling the bridging and

making sure it would all fit together. Unfortunately, we

had lost about one-third of our bridging in a storm

several days before the landing at Inch’on. To make up

this shortage the Air Force flew in bridging from the

U.S. We assembled about a third of the bridge upstream

on the near bank and then wheeled it out into the river.

We brought additional segments from the rear until the

bridge reached the far side. Fortunately, we had brought

in a number of 60-inch searchlights so we could work

around the clock. One of our officers, a very fine engineer colonel, had developed the 60-inch searchlights

for use in World War II. He commanded one of the

two engineer groups assigned to me.

The 19th Engineer Group commander [Frank H.

Forney, USMA, 1929] was the one who had developed

the searchlights. He was killed later up north. The

other engineer group commander, Col. Leigh Fairbanks,

was from the Class of ’37. His unit may have been the

8224th ECG, but I don’t recall precisely.

Both colonels were good officers and very fine commanders. This caused me some embarrassment because

even though I was acting in the capacity of a brigadier

general as corps engineer, I was only a lieutenant colonel. Moreover, I had previously served under Fairbanks.

However, we got along fine; he bore me no resentment.

The other colonel, the one who was killed, also took the

rank problem in good grace.

General MacArthur wanted the bridge in place by

25 September. He wanted to ride into Seoul, with

Syngman Rhee sitting beside him, to celebrate the date

Syngman Rhee had become President of Korea.

MacArthur wanted to show that we had established a

solid link between Inch’on and Seoul.

We had a great deal of difficulty meeting

MacArthur’s timetable. A squall blew up and knocked

out part of the bridge some 12 hours before MacArthur

was due to cross. Since there were no spare parts we

had to straighten out pieces of the bent bridging in the

forges we had set up. We made the deadline with less

than an hour to spare. MacArthur landed at Kimpo

Airfield and rode across the bridge in a jeep. Looking

at the bridge one would have thought it had been in

place for a long time, not for less than an hour. I recall

General Douglas

MacArthur

crosses the

Han River on

his way from

Kimpo Airfield

to Seoul

RG 111, SC-349331

I recall writing to my wife

that we encountered so many

difficulties getting that bridge

in place I wished MacArthur

really could walk on water.
98 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

writing to my wife that we encountered so many difficulties getting that bridge in place I wished MacArthur

really could walk on water. MacArthur, with Rhee

beside him, rode over the bridge without incident.

Seoul was in American hands, but not solidly. The

1st Marine Division crossed the Han west of the city

limits and the 7th Division occupied the hills northeast

of Seoul. Except for a few pockets of resistance, the enemy had been pretty well cleared out. The small pockets

of enemy left behind were not organized and fired mostly

in self-defense. The sporadic small arms fire did not

interfere with the ceremony that MacArthur and Rhee

had later that day.

The engineering troops assigned to me performed

extremely well. With a few exceptions, we had first-class

leaders and soldiers. One poor lieutenant colonel, seeing

his troops killed while working under fire, cracked up

under the strain. He couldn’t understand why we had to

push so fast to construct the bridge.

“Why build the bridge under fire?” he argued.

“Why not wait until the infantry has cleaned out the

enemy pockets of resistance and then finish building the

bridge?” But we were under orders to finish the bridge

before noon on 25 September. MacArthur had attached

a great deal of importance to the symbolic significance

of that date.

Although all units performed well, there was one

National Guard battalion from Alabama that did exceptionally well. There had been some discussion at headquarters over whether or not a National Guard engineer

battalion could hold its own in competition with Regular Army units. But the National Guard battalion assigned to me was absolutely superb. It caused many

officers to change their minds about the performance of

National Guard units.

The X Corps staff had made prior plans to follow

up the capture of Seoul with an amphibious landing on

the east coast. However, our movement into Seoul went

so quickly that it took several days to regroup and prepare for the next stage. We were not looking at the situation politically but only from a military point of view.

While the 38th Parallel came in for a great deal of

discussion later on, it did not have much impact on

our planning at the time. The basic question to be decided was whether we should introduce more forces

through Inch’on and move to the north, or whether it

would be better to go around to the other side where

the enemy was weaker and move north from there.

The decision was to move to the east and then proceed

north from there.
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 99

South Korea’s President Syngman Rhee, (second from left), General Douglas MacArthur, and U.S. Ambassador to South Korea,

John Muccio, confer following a ceremony that returned the capital of the Korean Republic to its president RG 111, SC-349340

“Mr. President:

By the grace of a merciful Providence, our

forces fighting under the standard of the

greatest hope and inspiration of mankind,

the United Nations, have liberated this

ancient capital city of Korea.”

Speech by General Douglas MacArthur, 29 September 1950
100 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

Lieutenant Roberts describes his assignment

to the 2d Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) and its

preparation for assignment from Washington state to

Korea. The 2d ESB landed both the 1st Marine and

the 7th Infantry Divisions at Inch’on and operated

the port until October 1950. Lieutenant Roberts describes the unit’s redeployment for another combat

landing on the east coast, and recalls his adventures

on the Han River—rescuing stranded personnel and

retrieving runaway bridges.

In August 1950 I was assigned to the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EB & SR), 2d Engineer

Special Brigade (ESB) at Fort Worden, Washington. It

was a four-day trip from Birmingham to Fort Worden,

and the first person I met was Lt. Carl Baswell, who was

the brigade adjutant. He was my real introduction to

the troop side of the Army.

The TO&E strength of the 2d ESB was 8,400 officers and men. We had a little over 1,200. Instead of

three regiments, we had part of one consisting of a Headquarters Company, two shore companies, and one boat

company. It also had Company A, 562d Engineer Base

Maintenance Battalion and the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company.

On 8 July 1950 the 2d ESB was alerted for movement to the Far East Command. Inspections of TO&E

equipment were immediately held to determine serviceability of equipment and to determine any shortages.

Requisitions were placed through normal supply channels to replace worn-out equipment and to secure all

missing items or equipment. Special requirements were

developed for an amphibious operation and requisitions

were placed through normal supply channels to equip

the regiment with essential Class IV items.

Special ordnance teams inspected all weapons to

ensure serviceability and repairs were made to all weapons as the need was revealed. Ordnance replaced all ordnance trucks with reconditioned vehicles, except for organic dump trucks, which were not available within the

time limits. The 3.5-inch bazookas were procured and

issued to the organization by post ordnance. Replacement was made of Company B machine guns and each

First Sgt. Patty Flynn and

Lt. Bernie Sevel, E Company, 532 EB & SR

Roberts Collection
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 101

line company was supplied with two additional .50-caliber heavy machine guns. Basic loads of ammunition were

supplied to the regiment from post ordnance.

Engineer heavy equipment and the engineer sets

were inspected by a special team from the Office of the

Chief of Engineers and Sharpe General Depot. Equipment declared unserviceable was replaced and shipped

to the port of embarkation for shipment to overseas destination on available shipping.

Training had to be done on a staggered schedule to

allow for concurrent preparations of the regiment for

shipment. This was one handicap that was not easily

overcome and resulted in a small percentage of the command missing some training.

Throughout the entire period of preparation, training was conducted to familiarize all enlisted men in the

regiment with their basic weapon and the automatic

weapons.

The job of “paper loading” the shipping of the entire brigade was delegated to regiment. Company B of

the regiment had the peculiar problem of loading their

assigned personnel and equipment on some six or seven

ships so as to accommodate their boats.

After receipt of permanent change of station (PCS)

orders, all personnel records were screened. Enlisted men

whose terms of enlistment were about due to expire, those

who had requests for discharge under the Career Compensation Act, and those with requests for discharge for

compassionate reasons, were transferred out of the organization. Requisitions were prepared for replacements

and fillers for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men

up to and including TO&E authorizations. Prior to

embarkation, all officer and warrant officer vacancies were

filled, but about 23 percent of the enlisted strength were

still short.

On 3 August 1950 the regiment embarked from

Fort Worden, Washington, for Camp McGill, Honshu,

Japan, on the USNS Breckinridge. The regimental CP

was closed out at Fort Worden and opened immediately

afloat. On 4 August, Lt. Col. E.C. Adams was assigned

Spools of barbed wire,

each 80 rods long,

at the Yokohama

Engineer Depot, Japan

RG 111, SC-356677
102 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

and assumed command. Lt. Col. A.A. Valente, the former

commander, was appointed executive officer.

Preparation for shipboard training began: military stevedoring, familiarization firing of .50-caliber

machine guns and 20-mm guns, semaphore and visual

light signal training, and basic indoctrination of the

3.5-inch bazooka.

We landed in Japan on 14 August and went to

Camp McGill near Yokosuka, a U.S. naval base, and

started preparing for Korea. I was given the task of taking 40 trucks to the Yokohama Engineer Depot and

picking up barbed wire, pierced steel plank, burlap, and

other engineer supplies.

Amphibious Training for Inch’on

A training program was prepared and used insofar as

work commitments would allow: specialist training,

primarily communications personnel and heavy equipment operators; officers indoctrination course conducted by the S-3, 2d ESB for officers without previous

amphibious experience; training in infantry squad,

platoon, and company tactics; swimming instruction

and training; boat operation, navigation, and formation

runs for all boat crews; stevedore training; and familiarization training with the 3.5-inch rocket launcher.

On 5 September 1950 a general order was published organizing a Provisional Shore Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Valente, and a Provisional Boat

Battalion, commanded by Maj. L.E. Chambers, as units

of the 532d EB & SR.

The only available plan of the city of Inch’on was

not adequate for our needs and a new map was prepared

from aerial photos. This map was of a scale of 1:5,000

and was of sufficient size to allow the locating of tentative unit areas and other valuable data. An adequate supply of other maps of the objective area were received

and distributed prior to embarkation.

Based on the tactical plan, the 1st Marine Division

Shore Party would provide the initial logistical support

for the assault elements, and all shore party operations

would revert to Army Shore Party control on order. Zones

of responsibility were selected. The 1st Marine Division

Shore Party was assigned the operation of Green and Red

Beaches. The Army Shore Party was assigned the operation of Yellow Beach and the Tidal Basin, which constituted the inner harbor of Inch’on.

Assignment of areas of responsibility among units

of the Provisional Shore Battalion, in order to carry out

the mission of control over beach operations and the repair of marine facilities, was initially as follows: Company D—the control and operation of Fanny and Carol

Beaches to include Baker and Charlie Piers; 50th Engineer Port Construction Company—the area from Able

Pier to the Tidal Basin, the north side of the Tidal Basin,

and the marine facilities repair work; E Company—the

remainder of the Tidal Basin and Betty Beach.
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 103

The Medical Detachment accomplished required immunizations

of all personnel through the use of

“shot teams” that went to the company areas on prearranged schedules, thereby reducing to a minimum the time lost from training and

other activities.

The regimental CP was closed

out at Camp McGill on 5 September

1950 and immediately established

aboard the Q-075 [an LST].

Upon assignment of the 2d ESB

under Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Twitty, to

the X Corps task force for the Inch’on

operation, regimental planning was

conducted concurrently with that of

the brigade and higher headquarters. Such action was

essential due to the limited time available. The regimental mission as stated in the brigade FO (forward observers) was:

Phase I. Assume responsibility and control

of landing areas including Green Beach on

Wolmi-do and Red Beach at Inch’on, extending south along waterfront to include the tidal

basin. These areas will be developed to permit the movement of a minimum of 3,000

tons bulk cargo ashore daily to temporary

dumps by D+15. In addition to operation of

beach, will be responsible for movement of

supplies to initial beach dumps operated by

brigade service elements. Phase II. Will close

beach dumps to receipt on order; will be responsible for the continuing development of

beach unloading areas outlined in Phase I to

facilitate the movement of a minimum of

3,000 tons bulk cargo across the beach daily

by D+15 to D+45.

Landing beaches and

tidal basin at Inch’on
104 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

The operation involved unusual physical obstacles

to amphibious operation in the form of a 30-foot tidal

range coupled with muddy beaches incapable of supporting traffic. Plans to counter this involved discharge

of lighters at hard surfaced quay points during high tide,

or from craft “dried out” at these points. Initial dispositions were based on the assumption that the tidal

basin, which lighters could enter at all tides, would not

be available immediately since blocking of the lock

channel leading thereto seemed an easy and certain

action on the part of the enemy.

The Landings

All Army units assigned and attached to the regiment

moved to the objective area via LST, arriving on D-day,

and standing by for landing on D+1. All craft concerned

were ordered into Betty Beach, adjoining the tidal basin

on the morning tide of D+1 after the regimental reconnaissance team that had landed with the Marines on

Red Beach had reported the lock channel clear and

Betty Beach usable. This departure from the planned

landing over Red Beach was to expedite movement to,

and exploitation of, the tidal basin.

A slow response on the part of LST operators

resulted in certain LSTs not making it in on the tide,

and as a result the order of landing was essentially reversed. The 50th Engineer Port Construction Company

was landed on the tide without difficulty. Company

D’s LST grounded short of shore and personnel only

were able to land over some 150 yards of footlogs

after their crafts had dried out. When it was seen that

the LST carrying regimental headquarters, shore battalion headquarters and Company E, was not going to

make the tide, command and communication elements

of the two headquarters proceeded to the tidal basin

via LCVP (landing craft, vehicle personnel) and took

charge of operations. The 50th Port Construction Company, despite lack of training and experience in this type

of mission, very effectively operated Betty Beach and

initiated cargo discharge by crane at quay-side in the

Lt. Roberts outside of

the BOQ (bachelor

officer’s quarters) at

Wolmi-do, Inch’on

Roberts Collection
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 105

tidal basin as cranes became available from their LST.

Fifty LCM (landing craft, mechanized) loads of cargo

were called for at 1500 and successful discharge proceeded. Company D personnel with a dozer borrowed

from the 50th Port proceeded to occupy and operate

beaches for the ramp discharge of vehicles from LST and

other craft in the area assigned by field order. After a

second craft control failure on the next tide, Company

E finally beached on D+2 and immediately relieved the

50th Port on Betty Beach, and manned additional cargo

discharge points in the tidal basin to greatly increase

its capacity.

Cargo operations in the basin were concurrently

augmented by the advent of cranes, with operators, from

the 1st Marine Division Shore Battalion. Civilian labor

was assembled rapidly by brigade personnel who landed

with the 50th Port Company and was, in fact, used to

lay the foot logs on which Company D personnel came

ashore. The importance and significance of early and

ample availability of civilian personnel cannot be over

stressed. It is a safe estimate that in cargo operations

in the tidal basin, a crane teamed with two engineer

soldiers and all the civilians they could supervise was

the equivalent of a shore platoon in typical operations

over a surf beach.

Availability and dispositions of attached units, other

than the 50th Port Construction Company, varied

greatly from the plan as set forth in the field order.

Elements of the 73d ECB, mounted in the first LST to

beach on Opal Beach, unloaded themselves on the

beach on D+2 and pioneered the operation of that

beach. The potentialities of that beach as an LST landing had been recognized only after arrival in the area,

and at that time it was sorely needed to offset the loss of

Red and Green Beaches due to the passing of the spring

tides. This unit, again untrained in such a mission, operated very creditably with the assistance of an experienced

shore operations officer provided from the regimental

staff. When the 1st Marine Shore Battalion closed Red

and Green Beaches on D+5, after spending only 24 hours

under regimental control, they were displaced forward

on a river-crossing mission. The same was true of the

Cargo is loaded

from a Victory ship

to a waiting DUKW

in Inch’on harbor

RG 111, SC-370363
106 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

Marine DUKW (amphibious truck) company that had

been counted upon for tonnage on the order of 1,000

tons per day. These actions reduced the regiment’s potential operating force by virtually half. As partial compensation, the 104th Naval Construction Battalion was

placed under regimental control for the operation of Opal

Beach, thus relieving the 73d ECB for essential engineer

work in the area. The latter unit immediately undertook

the construction of a DUKW ramp on Wolmi Island

and the construction of a 30-foot road along the badly

damaged one-way shelf trail to that point. The 73d

also repaired MSR damages throughout the town of

Inch’on and cleared debris. On D+10 they were displaced forward on a river-crossing mission.

During the initial phase of the operation, all landing craft were under the operational control of the Navy.

To alleviate the shortage of Navy boat crews, crews were

furnished from Company B of the regiment and operated Navy craft under control of Navy Beach Group #1.

[The organic boats of the regiment had been left with

the rear echelon to be shipped in turn.] Subsequent requirements requested by X Corps for the Han River

crossing were met so that by D+11 the regiment had

furnished crews for two power utility boats and 12

LCVPs for use by the 1st Marine Division in the river

crossing. This operational requirement seriously reduced the number of operational landing craft available

for lighterage during the later phase when control of

landing craft passed from the Navy to the regiment.

Anticipating the return of the Marine DUKWs,

eight DUKWs from regimental units were placed in pioneer operation at the Wolmi-do DUKW point. They

discharged between 200 and 300 tons per day from

an ammunition ship, and by this small but persistent

operation the entire block-loaded ship was discharged.

These facts serve to illustrate the magnitude of the loss

of service of the 85 Marine DUKWs.

On D+11, control and operation of the Navy boat

unit craft passed to the regiment, and was delegated to

the Boat Battalion. On D+13 the duties of the Navy

beachmaster unit passed to the regiment. These duties

included the beaching and retracting of LSTs, LSMs

(landing ships, medium), and LSUs (landing ships, utility) on all beaches; provision of pilotage for ships entering the inner harbor or tidal basin; maintenance of ranges,

aids to navigation; and the operation of the communications center at Charlie Pier, the nerve center for all

ship-to-shore communications. The additional load

posed by these duties severely taxed the regimental resources in personnel. This was especially true for communications personnel, particularly radio operators.

 During this period of changeover in boat operations, it became evident that the heavy demand for boat

crews for the river-crossing mission seriously cut down

the number of LCMs available for lighterage. To prevent

any slowing in cargo discharge—plus the fact that con-
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 107

tinued work on the lock gates had placed them in operable condition—it was decided to attempt locking in a

5,000-ton Japanese freighter loaded with POL (petroleum/oils/lubricants). This was attempted at high tide

on D+10 and was successfully carried out. Subsequently,

a total of five such ships were locked in and out of the

basin during and up to the time that control passed to

the 14th Transportation Port. Operational responsibility for lock control was vested in the regiment and delegated to the shore battalion. By further research and

with the aid of an electrical engineer furnished from

Headquarters, Far East Command, Engineer Section,

electrical control of the locks was restored on D+20,

replacing the hand operation, which, although satisfactory, was relatively slow.

With the arrival of 76 Japanese power barges on

2 October 1950, plans were made for their immediate

use as lighters. By 6 October, a total of 93 barges were

available and in use. The use of these barges required a

separate system of control due to language difficulties.

This was overcome by the employment of numerous Japanese-speaking Korean interpreters and the use of a fast

powerboat for shagging purposes. Radio contact was

maintained between the shag boat, the boat control station, and the regimental operations section on Charlie

Pier. Through the use of these voice radios, rapid dispatch and control of lighters in the outer harbor and

shipside was maintained.

During the crucial period from D+1 to D+20,

during which elements of the 1st Marine Division and

the entire 7th Division and corps units were landing

and rapidly displacing inland, enviable records of tonnage landed were achieved. Basically, this was achieved

by leadership and foremanship on the part of every

engineer soldier in directing civilian labor. Cranes were

key items of equipment ashore, while the availability

of ample lighterage was the key feature on the water

side, with pre-disposition of ships, platoons, and hatch

gangs a very significant factor. Cargo net supply was

touch and go—there was never enough. Concurrently,

units and vehicles were landed ahead of schedule. Key

to this success was the use of LSTs for ferry service

from larger ships to shore.

Destroyed by the

retreating North

Koreans, the

Inch’on tidal

basin gates were

repaired by the

50th Engineer

Port Construction

Company

Roberts Collection
108 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

On D+11, the 14th Transportation Port Battalion,

consisting of the battalion headquarters and one port

company with a superb complement of dock equipment, was ashore and attached to the regiment. The

battalion staff was integrated with the shore battalion

and regimental staffs, both to provide relief and to

afford the port unit staff an opportunity to assume

overall operational responsibility against the day when

the regiment would be displaced. The 155th Port

Company was assigned a major sector in the tidal

basin [south side], and its specialized equipment

[forklifts, etc.,] effectively utilized throughout the

basin area. A second port company, the 153d, arrived

on D+26. It was used for relief of the 155th in its

sector and to provide increased demands for hatch

crew supervision.

On D+24, out loading of the 1st Marine Division

and certain corps troops was initiated. Out loading of

20,545 tons of bulk supplies was completed in eight

days, well ahead of schedule, using facilities on one side

and one end of the tidal basin. Tonnage in the lighterage pipeline continued to be discharged in limited

quantities despite the “no priority” on discharge. Out

loading of vehicles and equipment and personnel in

the Company D sector progressed well, using LSTs

again for ferrying to APA (attack transport) and AKAs

(attack cargo ship). An unfortunate upset in the plan

and schedule from the viewpoint of the shore party, and

those concerned with resuming discharge, occurred

when all LSTs and most LSUs were combat loaded with

their final loads prior to completion of their ferrying

mission. This suddenly dropped the mission of out

loading some 11,100 vehicles [33 percent of the total

initially involved] in the lap of the shore party units

and facilities otherwise designed and available for

cargo handling. However, the 11,100 vehicles were out

loaded, using ramps to LSUs and LCMs and 30-

ton floating cranes from dockside to various craft, as

available, in eight days. During this period, the regiment

was relieved from discharge operations, but continued

in charge of out loading.

Immediately upon completion of the out loading

of corps vehicles and using the same dock facilities, the

regiment initiated the out loading of impedimenta and

vehicles of the 2d ESB, including the regiment itself.

The process was slow due to the lack of lighterage and

the lift rate on the number of ships receiving the material, which was limited. It was, in the final phases, an

interesting process of attrition. The regiment loaded everybody who didn’t load themselves. Just at dark on 21

October 1950, an LCM operated by port personnel

bearing brigade, regimental, and battalion command and

staff personnel, the commander and a detachment of

Company E, company commander, and a lately relieved

group of boat crews from B Company, locked out of

the basin and boarded the USNS Eltinge in the stream.

I went ashore on 15

September 1950, D-day,

for a reconnaissance of

the tidal basin. I have

never seen a place so

battered in all my life. My

first night ashore I was

kept awake by the firing

of the battleship Missouri.
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 109

The need for mobile-mounted radio communications for control purposes was critical within the regiment. The number of authorized SCR-300 radios, however, was inadequate to support a division landing.

Impressions Ashore

I went ashore on 15 September 1950, D-day, for a reconnaissance of the tidal basin. I have never seen a place

so battered in all my life. My first night ashore I was

kept awake by the firing of the battleship Missouri. The

place we selected to bed down for the night was adjacent

to a large tank of molasses that had been punctured

by the battleship fire. Molasses was all over the ground

and it had become putrefied and smelled horrible.

For an amphibious assault the landing went

well. All units were under strength. In the 5th Marine

Regiment, the first time many had fired their rifles was

off the stern decks of the ships as we went in. The

7th Infantry Division also was at Inch’on. Some do not

give them credit for even being there. The 7th Infantry

proceeded forward towards Seoul, and we stayed and

operated the beach.

Some thought MacArthur was crazy for landing at Inch’on because of the 30-foot deferential in

tides. The tidal basin, with its lock, had been built to

take care of the deferential in tides. Unfortunately, the

lock was destroyed so we could not bring ships into the

basin for unloading. We used Company B’s LCMs and

DUKWs for hauling cargo from ship to shore. We

worked there while the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company was rebuilding the lock gates. We worked

12 hours on and 12 hours off. The port operated 24

hours a day. As the 2d ESB, we landed the troops, supplies, and we handled the combat cargo and ammunition. Company B was the Boat Company. We had 20

two and one-half-ton DUKWs. The DUKWs could

get the ammo off of the ships, then bring it over to

the shore, and take it to the ammunition dump.

Now, the regiment was trained to operate the

ship’s gear also, but in this case we didn’t because the

Engineers of the

532d EB & SR

transfer 155 mm

artillery shells from

a DUKW to a waiting

railroad car

RG 111, SC-370368
110 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

merchant marines were doing that. Well, a lot of us

cleaned debris out of the streets, but our primary role

there, mostly, was ensuring that the cargo got from

the boats up to the depots. And there would be some

cargo. The units that had come in that had not taken

all of their gear with them when they landed would

come down and pick it up, but it was pretty much of

a port operation at that time.

I was on a competitive tour and had served my

time in Company E. Then I was assigned to Company

B, the boat company. We had 56 LCMs and a DUKW

platoon. Well, I guess I was lucky because it was my

lot to be the DUKW platoon commander.

One day I was told to take my DUKWs and go

up to the Han River. We moved by road to the vicinity

of the Han River. There we lightered [moved] parts of

the 7th Infantry Division assault forces across the Han

River where they could proceed on into Seoul. Then

we returned to Inch’on and settled down strictly into

the shore party and boat operations. Things became

fairly routine. We did get a plane flying over every

night—we called him Bed-Check Charlie.

The brigade was given a number of specific

missions. I was involved in at least two of these. The

first was the evacuation of an AA (anti-aircraft artillery)

battalion left stranded by floodwaters of the Han River

at Seoul, and the second was the salvaging of a bridge

that had broken loose in the Han River and floated

out to the Yellow Sea.

Capt. Bob Croad assigned the first mission to

my platoon and, as it turned out, I ended up with

both jobs. For the first mission I took the company

“flak” boat and four LCMs. The flak boat was an LCM

modified to provide crew quarters. It had a 40-mm

gun mounted forward with a twin-fifty on the after

deck. Things went well. We departed Inch’on and

passed through the Yellow Sea to the mouth of the Han

River. Halfway up the Han we anchored for the night.

When we were underway

I received a radio communication that a 276-

foot treadway bridge

had broken loose in the Han

and was headed for the

Yellow Sea. Our job was to

bring it back to Inch’on.

Engineers raise

an LCM sunken

in the Han River

Roberts Collection
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 111

When we got up the next morning we were surrounded

by dry land. At that point the Han was still affected by

tidal action. When the tide came in we moved on. A

lesson learned, or so I thought. We reached the Seoul

area and moved all of the AA personnel and equipment to dry land. While in this area we had to pass

through an area where a steel bridge had been dropped

into the river. My flak boat got too close to the fallen

bridge and a hole was ripped into the side. Fortunately,

we were close to shore. Only the stern of the boat was

under water. Capt. Bob Croad, bless him, a former

salvage officer in the 85th Engineer Boat Company in

the Philippines, raised and repaired the flak boat. Remember the “Lesson Learned”? While we were fixing

the flak boat, my other four crews had beached their

LCMs and were enjoying the sun. They didn’t realize

that this was floodwater, not tidal action. I ended up

with four LCMs beached 1,000 feet from water. Bob

Croad helped get them back to the water.

With the flak boat repaired and the four LCMs

back in the water, my crew headed back down the Han

River for Inch’on. When we were underway I received a

radio communication that a 276-foot treadway bridge

had broken loose in the Han and was headed for the

Yellow Sea. Our job was to bring it back to Inch’on. We

found the bridge shortly after we passed the mouth of

the Han. We lashed it to the four LCMs and beached

it on Wolmi-do at Inch’on.

Engineers from the

532d EB & SR rescue

a runaway treadway

bridge Roberts Collection

Upon withdrawal from port operations at

Inch’on, the 532d EB & SR, along with all other elements of the 2d ESB, embarked on seagoing vessels.

Our mission was to proceed to Wonsan to pioneer the

operations in that port before landing the 7th Infantry

Division there.
112 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Major John H. Elder, Jr. 19th Engineer Combat Group

M ajor Elder describes his combat group’s

of a C-54 on top of ammo crates over to Haneda and I

reported into Eighth Army Rear, Far East Command, in

Tokyo.

Planning and Execution

The task force for the Inch’on landing was being put

together. I was reassigned then from the district engineer office in Okinawa to the S-2 in the 19th Group,

which had come over by ship from Fort Campbell. I didn’t

see the group except to report to the commander. I joined

a planning group for the Inch’on landing working in

Tokyo. When I joined the planning group, the planning

was fairly well along. I took some part in several areas.

Our main concern, our main mission, was to represent

group headquarters in coordinating the operations once

they began. It was not TASK FORCE ALLEN; it was

TASK FORCE X-RAY. It became X Corps when it sailed.

There was a building assigned to TASK FORCE

X-RAY and some ancillary activities of Far East Command Headquarters. Almond, who was the deputy

Far East commander, also was commander of TASK

FORCE X-RAY and later X Corps. He kept both hats for

a while and he ran the planning operation. Ed Rowny

was engineer of the X Corps. I’ve served with him a number of times since and have a very high regard for him.

Ed transferred to the infantry, retired as a lieutenant

general, and headed the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) talks in Geneva.

planning for the Inch’on amphibious assault and their

road and bridge building and repair in support of the

Marines’ crossing of the Han River.

When I got out of school [Engineer Officer Advanced Course] I was on orders to an engineer district in

Okinawa. While I was at the school, we left our young

second son with my parents in Richmond, Virginia. We

had taken leave to Florida with our older son. Then the

Korean War broke out.

I went back home to check in and was instructed

to comply with my orders to report to Camp Stoneman. Dick Hennessey, who had graduated with me,

and I went out together on the train to Camp Stoneman, which is just out of San Francisco in Pittsburg,

California. There we met up with Wal Holgrete and

Willie Neff. After we arrived, we sat there for three or

four weeks. The Korean War had really begun. There

was total priority for 2d lieutenants of Infantry, Artillery, and Engineers because the casualties were high. Field

grade officers were a drag on the market. Eventually, at

the end of July, we asked someone to get us the hell out

and get us to work someplace. So, we were told to go by

train up to Camp McCord, Seattle, Washington. The

four of us managed to get a C-54 out of McCord Air

Force Base hauling 155-mm ammo to Korea. We’d got

orders cut to a replacement unit, so we rode in the back
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 113

I didn’t have any impressions of MacArthur. I never

saw MacArthur in Japan, although I saw him later in

Korea. My impressions would be no more valuable

than any other layman’s.

I guess you have to have the

feeling that he was rather

remote from the war. You

reach that conclusion primarily through the performance

of Ridgway, who relieved

him, who did it just the other

way. Ridgway was a soldier’s

general on the ground.

One of the things we

were concerned about in

our planning was the water

supply. There was great

doubt about whether you

could get enough water for

the troops. The Marines

took ashore a desalinization

unit, which I think was experimental. They set it up on

the beach. Of course, we later

found there was more than

enough water. If we had known more about Korea we

probably would not have spent our efforts to create

a fresh water supply.

 Our concerns about insufficient bridging, on

the other hand, were well founded. We just didn’t

have any bridging to speak of apart from an M-4.

The balance of the bridging was allocated to

Eighth Army along with

the Marines to the south,

and they needed it.

We went ashore on

D-day, 15 September

1950. The group commander, two enlisted

people, and I went to

Inch’on with the 1st Marine Division, which made

the landing. Until the

group headquarters came

ashore, we went to the

headquarters of the 2d

Special Brigade, which

had established itself in

Inch’on, and stayed with

them for a couple of days.

Our group commander

was Col. Frank Forney,

who was killed in Korea a little later. Almond required Forney or myself to attend all of the Corps headquarters briefings. As soon as we got our units ashore,

Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway arrives for a conference with

South Korean President Syngman Rhee, February 1951

RG 111, SC-357172
114 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Major John H. Elder, Jr. 19th Engineer Combat Group

we established our own headquarters and moved up

to Yongdungp’o.

We expected more opposition than we encountered in that area. We thought it would be a tough

fight, but the operation went much faster when we

got ashore. Getting established ashore was more of a

Marine problem than it was X Corps. It was X Corps

probably overall, but specifically a Marine problem.

Since the tides in Korea are horrendous, they’d selected the day of the spring tide for the landing. That

was done so that you could get ashore on LSTs and the

like. As it turned out, the LSTs beached on D-day couldn’t

get off for a month because after the spring tide all

other tides were less, and we couldn’t get them back

out of there.

As I recall, the tide range on D-day was 32 feet—

something like the Bay of Fundy. There were miles

and miles of mud flats when the tide was out. An

island called Wolmi lies just offshore connected by a

causeway to the mainland. Initially, the assault force

landed in landing craft on Wolmi-do, but several

LSTs were brought in behind Wolmi-do and beached

and that was an initial source of supply. Shipping in

peacetime in Inch’on you went into the tidal basin

at high tide, loaded and unloaded, and came back

out again at high tide. The basin was not usable on

D-day. We left Inch’on within two or three days and

focused on Seoul.

Crossing the Han

We supported the Marines on two crossings of the

Han—one down at Kimpo. We built a couple of rafts

with one of our battalions, did some approach roadwork, and supported a regiment of the 7th Division

east of Yongdungp’o. But our bigger mission during

that period was to get a bridge across the Han River

over which MacArthur and Syngman Rhee could ride

for the grand reentry into Seoul. We didn’t have enough

bridging in the task force to do that. In fact, we didn’t

have enough bridging to build more than two rafts

for the crossing site at Seoul. Almond arranged to have

some aluminum balk bridge flown into Kimpo. It

was an M-4 bridge, which then was a new bridge none

of us had ever seen. We received that as it came in and

put it in the water in Seoul as fast as we could to get to

the opposite shore. Initially it was a couple of rafts.

Then we put the rafts together to start the bridge.

We came out of that operation with a depot in Tokyo

being depleted and still 200 feet short of the far bank

of the river.

This was the same site where the North Koreans

tried to build a rail bridge. They were unsuccessful,

and so were we in our try to make it a vehicle bridge.

Tidal changes were horrendous and so were the velocities on the outgoing tide. We had put one rail crossing

over the river and piled sandbags in the river to make

piers. I’ll have visions the rest of my life of standing

Tidal changes were

horrendous and so were

the velocities on the

outgoing tide. We had put

one rail crossing over the

river and piled sandbags in

the river to make piers. I’ll

have visions the rest of my

life of standing on those

piers and watching 80 pound

sandbags hit that current

and just disappear....
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 115

on those piers and watching 80-pound sandbags hit

that current and just disappear, going horizontal at a

high rate of speed.

We put together railroad rails and tied them up with

wire. Those were the stringers. But span links could only

be the length of the rail, which I think was 39 feet. So,

we were really trying to build a dam. It was a nightmare.

We were going to try drive piling in the river and even

looked at the possibility of using corrugated U-shaped

sheet piling for treadways to get jeeps across to get

MacArthur and Syngman Rhee into Seoul. It was kind

of a ridiculous thing, but X Corps pressured us to get

them across in a vehicle for a triumphal entry.

About that time a linkup was made with the Eighth

Army coming up from the south. Eighth Army came forward with some treadway bridge. There was simply no

way to take treadway bridging and match it up

with what we had. About that time we found a Navy

floating ponton causeway sunk on the side of the river

at Yongdungpo, which had been machine gunned and

fairly badly torn up. We pulled it up and caulked the

holes. Then, we put it in the gap of the bridges we had.

We took 24 feet of treadway and made an expedient

ramp from the M-4 to the causeway section. Finally,

we had a bridge across Han River over which you could

drive a jeep, but it only lasted three days. The third day

a crane operator took a crane across. He hit the causeway section off-center and the whole thing flipped.

Engineers assemble

a ponton bridge near

Waegwan, Korea,

22 September 1950

Engineer School, 42-5-86

We could see the crane in the bottom of the Han River.

By that time there had been enough treadway bridge

brought up from Eighth Army. We were able to take the

M-4 out, and we put a treadway bridge across.

I probably overstated the triumphal entry into

Seoul, which we talked about a lot. Certainly, a

bridge was needed to keep on going north and to

get Seoul cleaned up. The town was still being fought

for, and North Koreans were still scattered all over

the place.
116 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

Colonel Pickett recalls how the 73d Engineer

off. The commander and each of the crewmembers on

these LSTs were Japanese. The only requirement was that

the captain of the ship had to be able to speak and read

English. Each day they gave me about five envelopes,

and each day I’d give him one and it’d tell him a different longitude and latitude to go to. These boats were

scattered all over the sea of Japan so it wouldn’t look like

a great, huge, convoy going into one particular place

and tip the enemy off. We were under radio silence. The

last day, all of these boats ended up just off Inch’on.

The Marines made the initial assault on Wolmi

Island, and then, as I recall, we went in on Red Beach.

They had Marine landing parties there with the signals.

In the middle of the night we went in at the highest tide

of the year. We immediately started off-loading, getting

our stuff together, and began helping support the 1st

Marine Division going towards Seoul.

There were snipers in Inch’on. I was told, “We want

you to clean all of the snipers out of Inch’on.” I got two

or three companies together, went to ordnance and

picked up 300 sawed-off Winchester Model 12 riot

guns—shotguns. They gave us case after case of doubleO buckshot ammunition in brass shells. We loaded

those things up, spread everybody out about 50 yards

apart, and walked through the whole town. We shot into

every shack and house and cleaned them out. Then we

turned those guns in. That took about a day-and-a-half.

I kept one of the guns and used it later to shoot pheasCombat Battalion was alerted and transported to

Korea in support of the Marines at Inch’on. He then

describes clearing snipers in Inch’on and supporting

the Marines’ crossing of the Han River in their drive

on Seoul.

I was up at Pine Valley, Utah, camping and fishing, and each day I would turn on my radio. On 25 June

1950 it said the Korean War had started. Although I

still had two weeks left on my leave, I got my wife out

of the tent and said, “We’re going back to Texas. The

war has started, and I know darn well that we’ll be one

of the first to be called.”

We jumped into the car and went back to Fort

Hood, Texas. Soon as I got there, they said, “The general wants to see you.” I went up to the 2d Armored

Division Headquarters. The general called me “Traveling Pickett,” because we’d just come back from maneuvers. He said, “Traveling Pickett, your outfit’s been alerted

to go to Korea. Get them together and go start packing

up,” which we did. We left by train and went to Camp

Stoneman, California. From there we loaded on troop

ships and went to Japan. My wife took our daughter,

closed the house, and went to Utah.

As soon as we got to Sasebo, Japan, I found out

that we were going to be in on the Inch’on landing. We

got our equipment together, loaded on LSTs, and took

There were snipers in Inch’on.

I was told, “We want you to

clean all of the snipers out of

Inch’on.” I got two or three

companies together...spread

everybody out about 50

yards apart, and walked

through the whole town. We

shot into every shack and

house and cleaned them out.

Then we turned those guns in.
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 117

ants, then turned it back in. While we were there, we

also set up water points and helped with stockpiling in

the depot.

The thing that really saved us on the Inch’on

landing was that we had a carrier with us with fighter

planes—Corsairs [Marine Corps F4U fighter-bombers].

Apparently there’d been a big concentration of North

Korean tanks, Russian T-34 tanks, in the Seoul area.

There was only about one real good road going from

Seoul to Inch’on. Both sides of the road were covered

with rice paddies. Of course, tanks don’t go very well in

three-foot deep muck in rice paddies. All of these tanks

started coming out of Seoul, going like hell for the

beachhead at Inch’on. These Corsairs had rockets on

them, and they knocked out every damn tank along

that road. It was littered with burned-out tanks. The

Corsairs really saved us. If those tanks had gotten into

the Inch’on area, we’d have really been in trouble.

I remember we were unloading the LSTs and

here comes one of these Corsairs, trailing smoke. He

ditched it right along side of our boat and it sank immediately. The Navy put a boat over. I said, “Oh, gosh this

guy’s going to...” and he pops up in a life jacket and

they picked him up.

In addition to that, there’d been some ammunition dumps south of Seoul. The Corsairs had hit these

ammunition dumps and set them on fire. They did a

good job. That made the job a lot easier for us. Of course,

one of our jobs, as soon as we got our equipment off,

was to go up with our dozers and start clearing the

road. We had to push the burned out tanks, trucks,

and anything else off the road into the rice paddies

and repair any damage to the road. It was our MSR,

of course.

We got up to the south bank of the Han River, and

I got a call from the 1st Marine Division. I was supposed

to support the 1st Marine Regiment, led by “Chesty”

Puller, crossing the Han River. I went up that night

and I saw him. He was in a CP just under the levee of

United Nations

forces fighting in

the streets of Seoul,

20 September 1950

RG 111, SC-351392
118 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

the Han River. He said, “How many assault boats do

you have?” I think I had 15 or 20, and he had armored

amtrac that carries infantry— “alligators.”

He was going to make the initial assault in those.

We had these assault boats ready with a crew in each one

of them to paddle across. For two nights, before the

morning attack across the Han, the battleship Missouri

came in the Inch’on harbor and fired 200 rounds a

night of 16-inch battleship artillery into Seoul. When

we got into Seoul it was heavily damaged with these big

16-inch shells. They weigh 2,300 pounds apiece. From

the south bank of the Han you’d see this big flash off

on the west. You could hear these things coming over.

They sounded like a freight train. Seoul was all on fire.

They would take two or three blocks at a time with

these big shells. So, we got through Seoul, and we just

kept going north.

We went with the 1st Marine Division and supported its crossing of the Han River in assault boats. After

we got to the other side, we followed them right on into

Seoul and things were going well. Of course, the North

Koreans were really on the run by then. So, north of

Seoul, up around Uijongbu, we were pulled out. We

made a motor march with all of our equipment back

to Pusan to get on LSTs. We went up the eastern coast

and made the landing at Wonsan.

The Wonsan landing occurred about the time we

got up to Seoul. As I recall, there was a big attack in the

Pusan perimeter. The North Koreans came streaming

up north. It took them about a week or so before they

could get themselves out of there.

The communication amongst the North Koreans

was bad. As the people came north, they ran into a

lot of Koreans that didn’t know there’d been an

Inch’on landing. Finally the word got around and they

started to get back north as fast as they could, mainly,

I think, not along the western coast, but along the eastern coast. So, the North Koreans pulled back and we

didn’t have any trouble getting south toward Pusan

with our equipment.

Engineer Equipment

The LSTs have quite a ramp on them, and we were

issued these 20-ton hydraulic-operated front-loading

trailers, which weren’t worth the powder to blow them

to heck. In my operations report I mentioned them practically every Monday. They weren’t worth a damn. What

we needed was a rear-loading trailer. You had to take

your truck tractor out from under the trailer, let it down,

and get the dozer off. Then, you were between the two

on a narrow road and it was just impossible. Anyway,

they had hydraulic brakes on them and the fill plug

on this hydraulic operation hung down below the

frame. As we went over the ramp it sheared that plug off

so it locked all of the wheels right in the unloading

gate of the LST. We couldn’tmove it. So, we went to
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 119

the Marines and borrowed a tank. We put it on the front

and put the bulldozer on the back, and just pulled

the thing out through the doors of the LST. It ripped all

of the tires off because the brakes were locked. We

just pulled it off to the side and left it. They were a

junk piece of equipment and were a handicap everywhere

we went.

Most of our equipment was good, except for one

other piece of engineer equipment that wasn’t worth

a damn. I finally got authority to turn it in. It was

called a blast-driven earth rod. It had about an inchand-a-half, like, a drill bit, and it was about eight feet

high. On top of that it had a big steel cup about

four inches in diameter and about 15 inches high.

You would go to ordnance and never be able to find

the explosive charges for them. You couldn’t use TNT

in them. That would just shatter the tube. It was a

fast-burning powder cartridge, and it was just like

black powder. You’d put this powdered explosive in the

tub, set the fuse afire, and get the hell out of there.

You’d have this big blast, and it was supposed to drive

this rod into the ground instead of having to drill a hole

with your air compressor. The only thing it worked

in was mud. You could have taken the rod and done it

by hand. That was a piece of junk. Every platoon had

this great big box with all of these rods. It had a tip on

it that came off when you pulled the rod back out.

This tip stayed in the ground. You couldn’t drop it off

of your equipment list. You had to pay for the thing.

We did everything we could to try to use that piece of

equipment. Finally I got hold of the Corps engineer

and I said, “This is the biggest piece of junk!” He

said, “Go turn the darn thing in.” It helped getting

rid of stuff like that.

An engineer uses a

bulldozer to repair

a road damaged by

retreating enemy

troops

RG 111, SC-363823

119
120 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 2

First Lieutenant Maurice D. Roush 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

After graduating from West Point in June

lieutenant who didn’t even understand the bumper

numbering system and give him the vehicle assembly

station. But it worked.

I think a lot of officers—particularly the junior

officers—were afraid it would be over before they got a

chance to fight. That shows you how wrong you can be.

I was concerned about that. There was enough of the

trained experienced cadre left over from World War II

that we were able to handle the embarkation, the debarkation, and the tremendous logistical operation associated with something like that with relative ease. In retrospect, it was extremely smooth. I don’t know how it could

have been that smooth. I was impressed.

The NCOs (non-commissioned officers) and older

officers really knew their way around. In the 1960s, and

later, I took part in some similar operations in which

we didn’t have that experience pool, and it made a big

difference—a big difference.

The Inch’on landing was very orderly. I was on a

class C-3 ship, a rather large one, troop ship. I was a

platoon leader and led a platoon of combat engineers in

the 7th Infantry Division. We went over the side of the

big ship on cargo nets, down onto the deck of an LST.

The LST was run in and beached in the early morning

hours and we then proceeded inland on foot. We came

in about day two—D+2. D-day was 15 September. We

marched inland. I remember that the roads were 12 to

14 inches deep in what I could best describe as talcum

1950, Maurice Roush traveled to Japan and, in September, landed at Inch’on. Prior to his arrival in Korea, the young lieutenant worried that the war was

going to be over before he got a chance to fight. Looking back, Roush commented, “That shows you how

wrong you can be.”

Before leaving the U.S. Military Academy we had

been given our options of where we would like to go,

and I picked Japan. We graduated 8 June 1950 and on

25 June the North Koreans invaded South Korea. When

I reported to Camp Stoneman, California, to go to Japan, it was pretty obvious by then that I actually would

be going to Korea.

I got to Japan the latter part of August and joined

the 7th Infantry Division, which was then bivouacked

at Camp Fuji at the base of Mount Fujiama, Japan. About

two weeks subsequent to that we embarked on ships and

started north for the Inch’on landing.

I was selected to manage a regimental vehicle assembly station in Yokohama. One third of all the tanks,

guns, and trucks in the entire 7th Infantry Division came

to this station, parked there, and I dispatched them down

to the boats.

I didn’t know what I was doing. I didn’t sleep

for 72 hours. It was one of the worst possible selections

they could have made, to take a green, young, 2d

Certainly, during most of my

time in Korea, what we did

more than anything else was

work on roads....I once stood

and watched a three-quarterton truck disappear right in

the middle of a road into

the mud. All that was left

were some bubbles.
The Inch’on Landing September 1950 121

powder. It was the dry time of the year and the trucks

and tanks had churned the roads up—just eaten them

into nothing but powder. You would step and your

foot would go down deep in it. There was dust all over

the place—I’ve never seen dust like that.

Eventually, after about four or five miles, we were

able to get off the road, cross rice paddies on dikes, and

finally arrive in a bivouac site. It took about three or

four days to get the company all back together. My little

platoon was attached to an infantry battalion, and it took

some time to get back together. Our vehicles and all of

our gear married up with us about the second day we

were in. We didn’t have to live off our packs for very long

at all. It was an extremely efficient logistical operation.

The 7th Infantry Division was there to help cut off

the North Koreans that were down south on the Naktong

perimeter. Of course, the combat engineer battalion in a

division supports the infantry, the artillery, and everybody else, and also acts as infantry.

We got into the fighting at Seoul, Korea, and did

quite a bit of it. We were shot at and shot at other people.

Certainly, during most of my time in Korea, what we did

more than anything else was work on roads because that

was the critical thing in Korea. They had almost no roads.

At times the roads would just completely disappear. I once

stood and watched a three-quarter-ton truck disappear

right in the middle of a road into the mud. All that was

left were some bubbles.

At one time, I worked with nothing but an entrenching tool and a pick right alongside the rest of my

men on narrow mountain roads, trying to make them

wide enough so a jeep with a trailer could get by. I have

built—fabricated out of nothing but scrap—aerial tramways where we couldn’t build roads; moving men and

materials and bringing back casualties were the most difficult things in Korea, because the roads were almost

nonexistent. They couldn’t take the heavy stuff we

were putting on them.

While I was there we never got to pave any

roads. We just put rock on the roads so that the roads

wouldn’t disappear. We also built a lot of bridges. We

built them, Mother Nature washed them out, we built

them again.

Men of the 31st

Infantry Regiment

and 13th Engineer

Battalion evacuate

a wounded soldier

using an aerial

tramway

Engineer School,

148-16-164
122

RG 111, SC-394142

RG 111, SC-394143

RG 111, SC-394145

I • I "t I .. ,. 

I • I 

"1'1~' 

:ll 

U!IM~~~hl._,~ ... ·l11 
September– December 1950

Chapter 3

North to the Yalu

A Marine column pauses during the withdrawal

from Changjin (Chosin) to the sea

RG 127, 127-GK-234F-A4854

123
North to the Yalu Engineers of the 2d Infantry Division construct

a bypass to enable heavy equipment to cross

the Hwang-gang River, 25 September 1950

Engineer School, 41-0-09
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 125

Introduction

Chapter 3

Introduction

During the first half of September 1950, enemy

forces threatening the Pusan Perimeter suffered heavy

losses. Later interrogations revealed that North Korean

morale had collapsed. Their supply lines for replacements

and materiel had been stretched to the breaking point

and were under constant UN air attack. Meanwhile, UN

strength within the perimeter continued to build. By midSeptember, approximately 140,000 U.S. Eighth Army

[I Corps, 1st Cavalry Division, and 2d, 24th, and 25th

Infantry Divisions], British, and ROK forces were facing perhaps 70,000 demoralized North Koreans.

On 15 September, X Corps landed at Inch’on, near

Seoul. The closely timed [16-22 September] Eighth Army

breakout from the Pusan Perimeter found the 2d ECB

laboring to construct floating bridges over the Naktong

for the march northward. Fighting to break the enemy

cordon was surprisingly sharp. The Inch’on landing

threatened to cut the North Koreans off from the rear,

and Eighth Army’s breakout was coordinated to have

maximum psychological impact. The news from Inch’on

did not have the desired effect immediately because enemy communications were so disrupted. By 23 September, however, the North Korean retreat became a rout.

The UN forces, more road-bound than the retreating enemy, still moved rapidly northward. The ROK I

Corps moved up the east coast toward the 38th Parallel.

The ROK II Corps advanced north through central Korea, while the U.S. I and IX Corps advanced across the

peninsula from east to west, overwhelming rear guard

elements. In their panic to escape northward, North

Koreans abandoned arms and equipment. Tanks and artillery littered the highways as the enemy south of the

38th Parallel ceased to exist as an organized army. Army

engineers bridged the Kum River, where the bridges had

been destroyed just two months earlier by the 3d ECB

during the earlier retreat south. Eighth Army recaptured

Seoul by the end of September 1950.

The policy issue now arose of whether or not to

pursue North Korean forces across the 38th Parallel.

Syngman Rhee announced on 19 September that, with

or without UN help, he would continue north. On 27

September, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur

a directive outlining his advance across the dividing line

with the objective of unifying all of Korea under President Rhee. At the UN, India opposed crossing the 38th

Parallel fearing that China and the Soviet Union might
126 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

enter the war. The United States contended that the

North Korean war potential had to be eliminated. Most

of the UN delegates felt that MacArthur had sufficient

authority under the 27 June 1950 Security Council Resolution to go north. On 7 October the General Assembly

of the UN approved the crossing of the 38th Parallel

by MacArthur.

The South Koreans had already crossed the line

when the UN advance began in October. The UN

rate of advance averaged 10 miles a day. On 19 October

the 1st Cavalry Division and ROK 1st Infantry Division entered P’yongyang, the North Korean capital.

The X Corps made a second amphibious landing at

Wonson on the east coast, and the U.S. 7th Division

landed at Iwon, 178 miles farther north. Because of

the mountains that split Korea from north to south,

two distinct major commands conducted the operation: Gen. Walker’s Eighth Army in the west, and Gen.

Almond’s X Corps in the east.

UN morale was high. MacArthur hoped that the

swift advances of the two forces would restore peace to

all of Korea before winter. In reality, because of political

and strategic considerations beyond the scope of this

volume, the war was about to enter a terrible new phase.

On 26 October, ROK 7th Regiment troops had reached

the Yalu River, firing on North Korean soldiers fleeing

across the river into Manchuria. The day before, however, soldiers of the 2d Regiment, ROK 6th Division,

had been ambushed by a significant Chinese force, perhaps 30 miles inside Korean territory. In fact, largely

undetected by UN intelligence, four Chinese armies,

each with three divisions—some 130,000 men—were

positioning themselves for a massive intervention.

MacArthur’s intelligence officers were inclined to minimize the threat. Chinese leaders were reluctant to enter

the Korean Conflict, yet they grew more apprehensive

as UN forces closed on China’s national frontier. Moreover, despite Chinese reticence, recent evidence demonstrates how strongly Joseph Stalin urged the Chinese

leadership to intervene, promising crucial aid from

the Soviet Union.

By 1 November, intelligence identified elements

of one Chinese division south of the Changjin (Chosin)

Reservoir. Within 10 days, units of 11 more Chinese

divisions appeared in the forward area. Little action

occurred during the first weeks of November, and

the Eighth Army and X Corps advanced slowly, while

temperatures dipped below freezing.

The conflict entered a new phase during the fourth

week of November. Elements of the 7th Division occupied the town of Hyesanjin across the Yalu River from

Manchuria. ROK troops had reached the Chinese border at Ch’osan nearly a month earlier, but had been forced

back. In late November, MacArthur announced a new

major offensive to end the war. At first, the offensive

met no serious enemy opposition.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 127

On 25 November 1950 hostile troops struck back

hard. The ROK II Corps on the right flank of Eighth

Army disintegrated. Only two days later a second enemy force hit the U.S. X Corps. Two Chinese communist field armies became part of the action and quickly

snatched the initiative from the UN Command. In human waves, the Chinese swarmed over the forward units

of the Eighth Army. The fighting was hand-to-hand all

along the Ch’ongch’on River. The Eighth Army rapidly

moved south while at the same time fighting delaying

actions. It abandoned the city of P’yongyang on 5 December. By the middle of December, the Eighth Army

had withdrawn below the 38th Parallel and formed a

defensive perimeter north and east of Seoul.

During the attack north and the return south,

September-December 1950, engineers maintained the

roads and provided important bridge building and

repair support for the infantry.

When the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter

occurred, Col. Hyzer’s 3d ECB supported the 24th Infantry Division’s crossing of the Naktong by providing

assault boats for the troop crossing. At Waegwan, the

11th ECB built a treadway bridge and the 3d put in

the approaches to it. The 3d continued providing engineer backing of the division up to the Yalu, assisting a

British brigade along the way by building and repairing

bridges where needed. When the Chinese crossed the

Yalu, the 3d moved south of the Han River keeping the

MSR open along the way so that the troops could

be supported logistically.

The 19th ECG generally supported as infantry

during the move south from the Yalu in November

and December until the 1st Cavalry Division, the 25th

Infantry Division, and the 5th RCT, could attack

north. The engineers then reverted back to roadwork:

maintenance of roads and, in a number of instances,

cutting new roads and putting in bypasses. As the

group moved south it destroyed bridges and roads. On

4 January 1951 they dismantled the last M-2 floating

bridge in the retreat from Seoul. Maj. Elder took over

the group when Col. Forney was ambushed on a road

and killed.

First Lt. James Johnson describes his intense participation in infantry operations in North Korea as commanding officer of Company B, 5th RCT, and his

subsequent assignment to the 3d ECB, 24th Infantry

Division.

Col. Emerson Itschner, I Corps Engineer, notes that

some engineer work by I Corps units included floating

bridge work for roads and railroads on the way north

and some airfield work for small planes. On the way

back south some 20 different military targets were

demolished in P’yongyang.

Capt. Walter S. Medding recalls the rapid advance

of the 14th ECB north from the Pusan perimeter after

the Inch’on invasion, the Chinese intervention, and the
128 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

fall back to below Seoul, destroying anything of use

as they went.

Col. Miles M. Dawson was assigned to the

Yokohama Engineer Depot, Sagami, Japan, 1950-53. The

depot collected material from all over the Far East, consolidating and repairing equipment for Korea, especially

Bailey bridges and cranes. Besides rehabilitation and

collection of material for engineers in Korea, he purchased large quantities of lumber from the Philippines

and shipped it by the boatload to Korea for bridgebuilding projects.

Capt. Lawrence B. Farnum discusses the common

practice of using engineers as infantry, noting that the

engineers, although well prepared as infantry, were always ill equipped for that mission. He describes the

Chinese entry into the war and the circumstances leading to the attack on the 2d ECB and the subsequent loss

of much of the battalion. He then recounts his walk

through the hills, leading about 150 troops under safety

of darkness to American lines about 40 or 50 miles away.

Farnum recounts the rebuilding of the battalion under

his direction as battalion commander for 10 days, and

the arrival of the new commander, Maj. Edmund

H. Leavey.

Second Lt. James L. Trayers describes his engineer

experiences on the drive north from the Pusan Perimeter in South Korea to Unsan, North Korea, building

and blowing bridges along the way.

Capt. Delbert M. Fowler describes his assignment

to IX Corps and the trip to Korea. He was then assigned

to the supply section in the Office of the Engineer, IX

Corps, and subsequently assigned as officer in charge

of map distribution in IX Corps.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 129

•1718 

R M NT s. I 

NORTH KOREAN PEOPLES 

PUJON 

(FUSEN) 

RESERVOIR 

I 

.I 

/ 8 ROKCAP 

l II 

/ '1745 ~ 

ADVANCE OF UNITED NATIONS 

COMMAND FORCES 

20-24 October 1950 

--, .,. U NC FRONT L.INE EVENING,20 OcT 

II I I I II I I I I II I UNC POSITIONS REACHED BY EVENING, 24 OcT 

--- LIMITS OF NKPA CONCE NTRATION AREA (APPROX) 

~ 

XXX * ARMY, CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES 

HIGH GROUND ABOVE 500 METERS 

*Equlvolenf of o U.S. corps 

20 ?!0 MIL.ES I I 

?J'o KIL.OMETERS 
130 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Lieutenant Colonel Peter C. Hyzer 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

Colonel Hyzer describes the actions of the 3d

Engineer Combat Battalion (ECB) in the breakout

from the Pusan Perimeter, the crossing of the Naktong

River, and the dash northward. Once Chinese forces

entered the conflict in November 1950, Colonel Hyzer

found himself moving south again.

We had a crossing of the Naktong River in September 1950. Our division [24th Infantry Division] was

given a sector down south of Waegwan, somewhere

down in the Taegu area. We got very short notice of the

planned Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. We had one or two trailer loads of assault boats

sent by Eighth Army.

We went around to the infantry regiments with

teams to teach them how to run an assault boat. We

taught them how you crossed the river in an assault boat,

which I don’t think most of these people knew much

about, probably including our engineers, although we

knew a little bit about it because it was our business.

We had to build a ford across a river [a tributary of

the Naktong River, the Kumho, arching around Taegu].

This was a submerged ford. It was a mess [21st Infantry

discovered (18 Sep 50) that I Corps engineers had not

bridged the Kumho as planned. Third ECB engineers

were called upon to sandbag the underwater bridge

that the 5th RCT had already used so that large vehicles

could cross]. We bypassed the tanks, and they could

rate about four feet of water, so they would go around.

The thing wouldn’t carry jeeps. You had to tow jeeps

across. We got a ferry operating a little later.

Culvert pipes underneath this thing were built up

with rice bags—sandbags, but they were made out of

rice straw instead of burlap. We formed a dam there,

and the river was about three-feet deep. Most of the vehicles, except jeeps, could forge through it. Every now

and then one would get stuck and you’d have to pull it

out with winches.

That was the MSR for the division to go into this

attack across the Naktong River. Now, can you imagine

Soldiers of the 24th Infantry

Division cross the Kumho River

using a ferry and underwater

bridge, 18 September 1950

RG 111, SC-348667
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 131

a worse mess-up logistically than that—trying to move

a whole division into position to attack across a river on

an assault crossing where the river crossing was very

badly opposed? The North Koreans were all over there,

ready for us.

The attack was supposed to take place at dusk, but

we didn’t even have any assault boats by dusk. The troops

weren’t there—they kept moving all night. Finally, sometime during the night, we got the assault boats and put

them up into place. This was a little north of the area

that we had defended, so I wasn’t too well acquainted

with the area. Somehow we managed to get the boats up

there and take off in the assault across the river. The report was that we were losing a lot of our Koreans. They

were in Company C, which was supporting the 19th or

21st Infantry. We were crossing one of these Korean regiments. What happened was these Koreans didn’t know

much English, but they knew they were in Company C.

It so happens we were crossing the first battalion of this

regiment, including Company C. The infantry platoon

leaders would jump out of these boats and say, “Okay,

Company C, let’s go.” All these Koreans would grab their

rifles and away they’d go. They were deserting our ranks.

All they knew was, “Let’s go Company C,” so away they

went. We lost quite a few of them that day. We got most

of them back, or replacements for them.

I got a Purple Heart, but I got it strictly by fluke. I

had been down at the beach with this crossing—lots of

artillery, lots of small-arms firing. I’d gone back to the

rear because they said I was wanted on the telephone.

So, I went back along a road, back behind some trees.

The regimental commander wanted to see me down at

division headquarters right away. They had another problem that they wanted taken care of. My exec was up at

this crossing and the 19th Infantry was going to cross

later that evening down below.

Anyway, I was walking down this road and all of a

sudden, whammo, right in the ankle, this thing hit me.

I looked down and blood was coming out of my ankle.

This damn bullet was down in there. It was a spent bullet. I picked up the bullet, put it in my pocket, and went

back to my division CP. The doctor put some iodine and

a band-aid on it. About a month later the division commander pinned a Purple Heart on me. All the guys who

had been through all this hell, and some of them were

really badly wounded, and here I got a Purple Heart for

a spent bullet. I had that bullet for years afterwards.

I always carried it in my pocket until I finally lost it.

We got the division across under considerable opposition. We were moved up to Waegwan and a corps

battalion put in a treadway bridge up there [the 11th

ECB, starting on 20 September 1950, worked for 36

hours straight and completed the bridge with the aid

of the 55th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company]. Fortunately, we didn’t have to build that bridge. The 11th

had an awful time with it. They didn’t have the right

131

Our problem was that

the engineers were

being stretched out over

hundreds of miles of

road, trying to get the

division forward, and

trying to keep getting

the supplies to them.

There were no roads....
132 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Lieutenant Colonel Peter C. Hyzer 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

parts for it. The bridge was an old rusty one with all its

parts bent and everything.

We were charged with building the approaches to

it, which we did. I didn’t like the approaches. One of the

problems they had with building the bridge was that the

approaches were much too steep. They were in too much

of a hurry to get down, and they were not thorough

enough in doing the groundwork.

We eventually got across and, from then on, we

took off like a bat out of hell, right up north, following

the North Koreans. We didn’t really have very much

opposition. Our problem was that the engineers were

being stretched out over hundreds of miles of road, trying to get the division forward, and trying to keep getting the supplies to them. There were no roads—and

what roads there were, particularly down where we were,

had been destroyed when we pulled back.

The Koreans had never bothered to repair most

of them. We had blown all the bridges. Fortunately, in

many areas, it was dry season so we could build bypasses around them by going down through the riverbeds and back up the other side. We were just leapfrogging constantly. We went up through Seoul. Things

were moving so fast. We were at Uijongbu, just north of

Seoul, for several days on the way north, then we took

off again up toward the Imjin and through P’yongyang.

I remember going through the river at P’yongyang

but I didn’t stay there very long. I went up to Anju and

Sinanju along the Ch’ongch’on River. We got some resistance there when we were busy crossing it.

We also were supporting the British [27th Infantry Brigade]. By that time I had some tank dozers. My

tank dozer platoon commander was a very energetic

guy. The men really leaned on those tanks. They were in

action all the time doing demolition work, or helping

the infantry up in the front line. The British got hold of

that tank dozer platoon of mine and they didn’t want

to let go of it. They wanted to hang onto that outfit

because it really helped them in combat and helped

them get through.

We kept right on up, and we were headed up on a

split road to the Yalu River. One went up to Sinuiju on

the Yalu, and the other went up through Kusong from

Chongju, which is right close to the Yalu. There was

one company on each road supporting the infantry

that were up those roads.

Makeshift Bridge and Culverts

In the meantime, I learned to use some of my engineering education. This was the first time I really got to use

it very technically. The Taeryong River went through

Pakch’on. We found some Japanese trusses there, and I

said, “Let’s build a bridge out of that stuff across this

river.” The tanks could ford across and we managed to

get some Brockway trucks across. I took those trusses

and measured them. I didn’t know how strong the steel
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 133

was because it was Japanese steel. I got an old

field manual and my

slide rule out. I designed

that bridge by myself because I couldn’t find anybody else at battalion

headquarters who knew

how to do the structure

work. I had just been to

MIT a year or so before.

Designing bridges was

one of the courses we

had. So, I designed that

bridge and we put it together. We built several trusses

and we also built a causeway.

We welded together 55-gallon drums and made

culverts. We rolled up sandbags and got lots of sand and

gravel. We confined the river to that small span and put

those trusses across. That bridge eventually carried all

the tanks and trucks for the division. It was one of those

little things that you come up with. The span was probably 50/60 feet. We named it the Wirt Bridge—the

Captain Wirt Bridge—in honor of Captain Wirt, Company C, who’d been killed at Taejon. Company C built

it and we named the bridge after him.

We got up to where the infantry could see the Yalu

River. I was up the road quite a ways with my CP down

in a farmer’s barnyard.

We had the “old farmer”

on the old farm with

his funny hat and long

moustache, about 15

miles south of the Yalu.

All of a sudden I

got a radio message to

get our outfit back in a

hurry. We went back to

Pakch’on where we built

that bridge. The division

CP was back there and

I reported to Maj. Gen.

John H. Church. I think Gen. Church was still the

area commander then. Later on, Lt. Gen. Blackshear

Morrison Bryan came in—Blackshear Bryan who had

been at West Point when I was a cadet and later was

superintendent at West Point. He was a very fine guy

and we got along great.

Well, the Chinese had crossed the Yalu and

were outfighting us. The defense perimeter was from

Pakch’on to just north of the Ch’ongch’on River, and

we went back and forth there for a while.

In the meantime, we were getting these flimsy editions of Newsweek and Time magazines about the awful

situation in Korea—how the Chinese were going to

drive us into the sea. Well, we were up just 50 miles

Using 55-gallon drums as culverts, the 378th Engineers construct

a bridge over the Pukhan River RG 111, SC-364793
134 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Lieutenant Colonel Peter C. Hyzer 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

from the Yalu River and we didn’t think things were

quite that bad. But the Marines in the meantime had

taken a real rough shellacking over in Hungnam and

the Changjin (Chosin). The units to our right, the Koreans and the 2d Division, were having a real rough

time. Finally, the Chinese outflanked us and we had to

pull back. This was nearly Thanksgiving and we were

up north of Anju. Oh boy, it was cold.

I used to get mad because I had all those friends

back at P’yongyang at Eighth Army headquarters, and

they all had parkas, overcoats, and mittens. We didn’t

have a damn thing up there! Hell, we were just shivering

in the foxholes, wrapping blankets around us, and sleeping bags, trying to keep warm. It was terrible. That was

even worse than the Tennessee maneuver area. But we

were being told that we were going to be the first outfit

out of Korea and would be home by Christmas, so, not

to worry about the winter clothes. We figured we could

put up with a little cold weather.

 When the Chinese attacked, things were very hectic. I remember the division was supposed to withdraw

down a certain road. I jumped in an airplane to reconnoiter that road, to see whether it had bridges and

whether it was passable—to get an idea from the air at

least. This was an area we had bypassed going north. As

our airplane would fly over, the North Koreans would

be shooting at us. They would shoot holes in the wings,

but fortunately they never hit us, except for the wings.

They had tank traps all the way down that road—

minefields, barbed wire, everything you could imagine.

I went back to division headquarters, wherever it was,

and told them the division wasn’t going to withdraw on

that road. Now, it could fight down that road, but the

mainland Chinese were coming around the flank very

rapidly. The division was forced to come down on the

main road that we had then, which was down through

P’yongyang.

Saved by a Compass

I had just gotten a new compass in my jeep and I had

trouble with it. It was a tank compass, a very fancy one.

It had all these little metal rods that you put in and take

out to adjust it. Well, I had gotten it adjusted all right,

but I still had problems with it. The whole battalion was

on the road pulling back. We came to this little town

and the bridge was out, so we bypassed there. When we

had come north a month or so earlier, MPs (military

police) told us which way to go and there were signs. We

were heading out into the countryside. I had two or three

companies, and I was back in the middle of the column

somewhere. Of course the roads were narrow. You

couldn’t pass very well. I looked at my compass, which

had a luminous dial. It was turned northeast. We were

supposed to be going southwest. “This damn compass

has gone haywire again. This damn thing—I shouldn’t

even bother with it!”

We didn’t dare turn over a

prisoner to the Koreans because they would just torture

him to death. This was standard practice. You figure if you

got captured the same thing

was going to happen to you.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 135

There was a little light with a CP sign down around

the side of the road. I asked a sentry out there, “What

outfit is this?” He said, “This is the forward CP of the

1st Battalion” or something-or-another. “I don’t know

where your convoy is going but the Chinese are a mile

down that road you’re on.” Well, I got on the radio right

quick to the company commanders and said, “Stop, turn

around.” How we got turned around among those

rice paddies I don’t know. We got the whole battalion

turned around and we went back into this town. I found

out that somebody had removed the signs. We got back

on our road, but that compass sure saved our necks in

that particular situation.

I spent Christmas down on the Han River, but the

divisions kept bouncing back and forth. The one time

they sent the whole battalion back to the rear, except for

one company. We were preparing fortifications for

them below the Han. We spent a week or so there, working on the road net into this very hilly area. We were

building roads so the infantry could get in and get

supplies. We were putting up barbed wire and minefields while the rest of the division was up north. This

was their fallback position.

Company C was bivouacked back in this fairly secure area. Right next to them was a Turkish battalion,

which had gotten pretty badly mauled up north. The

Turks were real fighters, but they’d gotten hurt and lost a

lot of men. They were pretty tough. Fortunately, most

of the troops were out working. One day the Turks

decided to have a little maneuver so they attacked right

through the middle of the Company C bivouac area

using live ammunition. Scared the hell out of the whole

Company C. Of course, the fact that they’d kill a

couple of guys didn’t really matter to them. The Koreans

were the same way. I found this out early in the war.

Aside from marking the forward edge of UN lines, the sign

warned drivers they were under enemy observation

RG 111, SC-416204

I used to get mad because

I had all those friends back

at P’yongyang at Eighth

Army headquarters, and

they all had parkas, overcoats, and mittens. We

didn’t have a damn thing up

there! Hell, we were just

shivering in the foxholes,

wrapping blankets around

us, and sleeping bags,

trying to keep warm.

135
136 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Lieutenant Colonel Peter C. Hyzer 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

We didn’t dare turn over a prisoner to the Koreans because they would just torture him to death. This was

standard practice. You figure if you got captured the same

thing was going to happen to you.

We were up north in Anju and Sinanju. I had my

tank dozer platoon supporting the British on the attack

up toward the Yalu River. The rest of my battalion

was stretched for a hundred miles back towards Seoul.

We went back past P’yongyang. The corps’ group, combat group [Col. Frank H. Forney, USMA 1929], came

up here and finally we had some corps here. He was

up here trying to support a division in combat with

his corps troops. I was trying to keep division supply

roads open so we could get our ammunition and food

up to the troops.

Our assistant division commander at that time

was Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, USMA 1927. He

had been an engineer officer, but he was one of these

guys who had transferred to the infantry—awfully smart

guy. He went back to the corps commander and told

him it was time to stop their foolishness and get the corps

troops out of our division area and let us do our job.

So, finally they did. Later, this group commander was

killed in his jeep up in this same area in a Chinese

attack. He got off the road a little too far and got killed

by sniper fire soon after this incident.

The corps engineer wanted me to take over that

group. I said, “Uh-uh. I got more troops than you do

with my Koreans, and I got a better job than you do,

and I’m going to stay right there.” I never got my group

and I’m glad I didn’t. We went back and forth down in

this area around Seoul, mostly building roads.

We’d use any kind of expedient we could get. Several of the outfits that had tank dozers dropped their

dozer blades by the side of the road so they could fight as

tanks. If we needed more tank dozers we went back and

picked up the blades. We would find a beat-up tank somewhere and put the blade on and use it. I used to send

patrols out on our front lines because they might have a

transmission, or a truck, that they needed. They couldn’t

get it any other way.

We had weapons that weren’t authorized for

engineers. We had recoilless rifles, ammunition, and

material that we’d scrounged here and there from the

infantry. I had a superb supply outfit. At this time in the

war, Dan Harvey, a regular officer and a very fine guy,

was my supply officer. But it was very frustrating. You’d

send a convoy of trucks back to the rear to get some

squared lumber to build a bridge or something that

was very important to the division and corps MSR.

They’d spend several days going around to various

supply points and come back empty, so we’d fell a bunch

of trees and make logs. It was a lot more work, and you

got a much worse product.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 137

Officers and men of the 62nd Engineers stand in front

of the first train to cross the railroad bridge they

built across the Han River in Seoul, 19 October 1950

Engineer School, 210-13-15
138 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Major John H. Elder, Jr. 19th Engineer Combat Group

Despite Major Elder’s warnings that the Chinese were massing troops south of the Yalu River,

China’s entry into the war caught UN forces by surprise. The engineer officer eloquently describes the

shock and confusion of the Chinese onslaught. “The

shepherd’s horns, bugles, and these great masses of dark

figures...in the night appeared around you, behind

you. You were scared and didn’t think you could kill

them. They [the UN forces] really believed they [the

Chinese] were supernatural.”

After Seoul had been secured and Eighth Army had

linked up with X Corps, Eighth Army continued the

attack north on the west coast. Almond’s X Corps withdrew, went around, and made landings on the east coast

of Korea. We remained with I Corps going north. The

advance from Seoul into North Korea was quite fast. We

went through P’yongyang to Sinanju and Anju on the

Ch’ongch’on River.

At that point, the 24th Infantry Division north of

the river was counterattacked by what later turned out

to be Chinese forces. Two of the regiments were fairly

badly mauled and withdrew back across the river. Brig.

Gen. Frank A. Allen, Jr., was assistant division commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. Two of its regiments

were north in the attack. He was put in charge of the

task force to secure the river line. TASK FORCE ALLEN

was composed of Gen. Allen, who was the task force

commander, using our group headquarters; the 5th Infantry, which at that time was an independent regimental combat team; and some other units. Our group at

that time had two battalions and they became a part of

the task force. We had a tank battalion that came from

the 24th Division. We occupied the eastern end of the

line at Kunu-ri; we were along the river with the river

valley to the northeast. The 24th withdrew through TASK

FORCE ALLEN and was reconstituted and put back together. This initial phase was early in November 1950.

That was the withdrawal in which TASK FORCE ALLEN

was constituted. Our group served as infantry for a

week to 10 days until the 1st Cavalry Division, the 25th

Infantry Division, and the 5th RCT attacked north.

 We reverted then to a supporting mission. We did

some mining, which wasn’t a major problem. The roads

were narrow, dirt, and not designed to handle the kind

of traffic we were putting there. In a number of cases we

had to cut a new road or bypass down through the paddy

fields. It was mostly dozer work. Our group commander

was Frank H. Forney, USMA 1929, who was later killed.

He was probably the most totally fearless man I’d ever

meet. During our period in Seoul, Forney, at one time,

with a party of two people, crossed the Han River in a

jeep. They got across on a ferry to make a reconnaissance and they went through some mines. A battalion

commander who was with him, Col. Hubbard, was injured and evacuated. This occurred in Col. Chesty Puller’s
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 139

sector. He was not part of the jeep recon. Chesty

Puller, who commanded the 1st Marines, and later

retired as the deputy commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, had ordered Forney to quit being a hero

and quit exposing himself on the riverbank because

he was drawing fire on the 1st Marines. During

the attack north, Col. Forney was probably the

leading American to go over a good piece of North

Korea. He preceded the infantry at times. Col.

Forney had a high sense of mission and was

totally courageous.

When we had gone north into Sinanju,

the bridge over the Ch’ongch’on was blown. We

heard reports that another bridge existed further up the

river at Anju. Col. Forney, Maj. Davis, who was our S-3,

Capt. Besing, who commanded one of the line companies in the 11th Engineers, and I [the executive officer]

motored up in a couple of jeeps to about 10 miles east

of Sinanju. Sure enough, we found a sandbag bridge

across the river and we crossed. Besing, Davis, and I in

one jeep stopped and took the charges off the bridge,

which had been prepared for demolition. Col. Forney

and his jeep driver continued on the north side of the

river, back down the river to a point about opposite the

British crossing. They came under considerable North

Korean fire and later rejoined us.

The British 27th Infantry Brigade later made a

crossing, which was a comedy in itself. The British crossed

in assault boats at high tide. The first wave got across—

about a rifle company. They were greeted on the far shore

by a bunch of Koreans in white suits with tubas and

clarinets. These Koreans were local people—happy to

see somebody, happy to be liberated. When the assault

boats returned to pick up the second wave the tide went

out. The second wave spent the next 24 hours in the

middle of the river 500 yards from either shore in the

mud flats. It was good that that particular crossing was

not opposed.

The critical focus of the war on the west coast for a

time was TASK FORCE ALLEN. I had contact with Maj.

Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, the chief of staff, in Tokyo,

Men of the 65th

Engineer Combat

Battalion reinforce

a muddy road on

the north bank

of the Han River

Engineer School, 93-63-12
140 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Major John H. Elder, Jr. 19th Engineer Combat Group

Inch’on, and Seoul, but my principal exposure to general

officers was when we were TASK FORCE ALLEN. It was

normal for all the senior commanders—Lt. Gen. Walton

H. Walker, Eighth Army commander; Maj. Gen. Frank

W. Milburn, who was I Corps commander; Maj. Gen.

Hobart R. Gay of the 1st Cavalry; I can’t remember who

commanded the 2d Division then—to assemble at one

command post for their daily briefings and to make their

plans for the next phase of the operation. I saw a lot of

them, as assistant chief of staff of the task force, and did

most of the briefing.

Gen. Walker had a son who commanded one of the

battalions of the 19th Infantry, which had been overrun

north of the river. Walker was in a very difficult position.

He was under great stress as a commander, but also under

great personal stress because his son was missing. I’d often thought that you should never put a commander in

that position, that kind of dual stress. The stress showed

on him. Gen. Milburn, I think, made the decisions.

I think Walker was working under so much pressure—

shock, really—he simply wasn’t performing, not in a

normal decisive way in which he usually operated.

Retreat to the South

We had a brief quiet period in November and then the

attack resumed. During that period we had a couple of

aircraft that flew a lot of reconnaissance. I flew four or

five hours, I think, every day through that month. I’ll

never forget the massive Chinese concentration south

of the Yalu River. It was there, no question about it.

The attack should have been no surprise. I don’t care

what history says. We saw it. We reported it.

I was flying in a little Piper Cub-type plane, an

L-5. North of Anju, about 30 miles up the road,

two roads turned off to the northwest. We used to fly up

the southern one of those two roads, and then slip over

the ridge and down the other road. We were going over

that ridge one day with no altitude to speak of, and, my

God, there were tanks, artillery, and troops. I guess we

saw two divisions on the road. In a matter of minutes

they totally disappeared off the road and under cover.

We made these reports every day that we went out

but I guess nobody really believed it.

That was the IX Corps. When the attack occurred,

around Thanksgiving, the whole atmosphere in the infantry troops, in the corps, was just unbelievable. The

River and the Gauntlet [S.L.A. Marshall, The River and

the Gauntlet, N.Y. (1962)] gives you a little of that, but

some people, I think, literally, believed that the Chinese

were supernatural.

The shepherds’ horns, bugles, and these great

masses of dark figures in the dark, and the night appeared

around you—behind you. You were scared and didn’t

think you could kill them. They really believed they

were supernatural. In a sense it was a defeated army.

It couldn’t contend with what it was running into. It

Gen. Walker had a son

who commanded one of the

battalions of the 19th Infantry,

which had been overrun north

of the river. Walker was in

a very difficult position.

He was under great stress

as a commander, but also

under great personal stress

because his son was missing.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 141 141

was split up into three columns that were not mutually supporting, and each one took different routes. Each

one had been tactically defeated and was falling back.

I really don’t know about the east coast. We had

really made no lasting contact over there. Some of our

people were with them,

but no contact. I guess that

fleeting contact was made

between the 65th Infantry Puerto Rican Regiment

from the east coast and

one of the regiments of

the 1st Cavalry.

The objective of

these three unconnected

elements was to occupy

North Korea close on the

Yalu River, X Corps on the

right, and on the east coast,

I and IX Corps on the

west coast.

The center was made of ROK forces. They had

been fairly badly beaten in the south. They didn’t have

much in the way of communications and weren’t very

well armed. They couldn’t very well be supported. That

was where the attack was first and most successful. We

knew things were really going to hell-in-a-handbasket.

We had had some demolitions put in along the

river east of Anju and Kunu-ri and we had about two

ROK divisions come back through that roadblock,

badly beaten by very heavy forces from the northeast.

In that same day we had three columns in the I and

the IX Corps, one going west towards the mouth of

Yalu, one going somewhat

northwest, and one going

due north. All of them

were heavily attacked and

hurt. That day I flew over

the element going northwest to the Yalu toward

Sinuiju and I probably

saw the furthest point of

advance. I saw a tank

platoon attack a heavy

infantry force about 10

or 15 miles short of the

Yalu. At that time we received very heavy antiaircraft fire from a point

further up the road. We were just about out of fuel so

we had to return to corps.

That night corps directed a withdrawal further

to the south. That was the commencement of the

withdrawal back into South Korea. These are the days

so well written up in The River and the Gauntlet. Our

group had two choices of withdrawal routes. We were

I’ll never forget the massive

Chinese concentration south

of the Yalu River. It was

there, no question about it.

The attack should have been

no surprise. I don’t care

what history says. We saw

it. We reported it.

An aircraft mechanic refuels an L-5E observation aircraft

RG 111, SC-356532
142 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Major John H. Elder, Jr. 19th Engineer Combat Group

located just east of Anju along the river. In the 25- or

30-mile sector there was a road on the east that ran

down from the river due south from Kunu-ri to the

Taedong River near Sunan.

Near Anju was another road that we had opened

that was a very poor trail also leading to Sunan. We could

have withdrawn along either of these two ways. We knew

that the ROKs had collapsed to the east, and we knew

that there had been heavy fighting in the two valleys

in the east. Col. Forney had gotten up in the morning

with his jeep driver and he said, “Well, I think I’ll go

down to the east road with the 2d Division. You bring

the headquarters. I guess the east road will be more

crowded, so take the center road.”

I left the headquarters and took the center road.

We got down to the intersection about 20 miles to the

south at Sunan. That night we set up headquarters. Two

battalions were executing demolition and with-drawing

in support of the divisions in reasonably good order.

Much of the 2d Division was lost on the east road. Col.

Forney never showed up at headquarters. We understood

later that he and the Chinese arrived on a hill on that

road at about the same time and he was killed. The next

few weeks ran together in a blur. It was a very confused

period. Communication was very poor.

We had two battalions commanded by lieutenant

colonels. When Col. Forney didn’t arrive that night, I

went to corps because our communications weren’t working. I reported that Forney was missing and probably

dead. Corps said, “Well, let’s wait 24 hours and in the

meantime you run the group.” In another 24 hours

Forney still was missing, so Col. W.N. Thomas, Jr.,

corps engineer, called the commanders and me back to

The bridge at Chunchon was dedicated to the memory

of Col. F.H. Forney, former Commanding Officer of the

19th Engineer Combat Group Engineer School, 210-13-4
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 143

corps. He said, “I recognize that I can’t do this, but I

want you, John,” he was talking to me, “to command

the group.” I was a major then. And he said,

“I’ve cleared this with Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, IX

Corps commander, and these are Gen. Coulter’s orders.

Are there any questions about these commands?” There

were none.

He didn’t want to pull these lieutenant colonels

out of their units because both of them were officers

who had been involved in civilian-type construction in

World War II and had been put into troop command

just before the Korean War with no combat troop command experience. On the other hand, I had been in troop

command and with infantry units in World War II, and

had worked for the commander (the corps engineer,

Col. Thomas). He knew me. I knew him. He had confidence in me and knew how I reacted. I think those

were the considerations. That situation existed until we

got back into South Korea.

Apparently, the Eighth Army Engineer asked

the corps constantly to accept one or two people to

command the group, and the corps just simply refused.

That standoff continued for some time. It continued until

we got back south of the 38th Parallel, until about

the time we withdrew back across the Han River. Then

we got a bona fide commander and I became exec again.

I think we all understood the situation and accepted

it. The two battalion commanders were very satisfied

for me to lead. I tried to be reasonable and to make

them understand the kind of things that they had to

do. I think they appreciated it because they had not

had troop combat experience.

IX Corps was on the east of Eighth Army withdrawing from P’yongyang along a road that ran into

the Iron Triangle not too far north of the 38th. The

Chinese got ahead of them and had several corps in

what later became known as the Iron Triangle. We had

to fight our way further south. The IX Corps sideslipped over onto the coast road behind the I Corps and

withdrew. Then it went back east into a defensive position south of the 38th, with its back to the Han River.

IX Corps was east of Seoul. I Corps was astride

Seoul. We were just a little west of the intersection of the

Han and the Pukhan River. Brig. Gen. Davidson, the

assistant division commander for the 24th Division and

a former engineer, was put in charge of the withdrawal

operation across the Han where we were. We prepared

for demolition the wreckage of a civilian bridge, which

had been opened up as a foot and jeep bridge, and also

installed a treadway bridge across the ice and prepared

it for demolition. Davidson commanded the crossing

operation. We sat on the bank of the Han River for a

week to 10 days until the decision was made to withdraw further south. We executed the demolition of

the bridges and went back 50 or 60 miles to somewhere south of Ch’ongju.

Forney never showed up at

headquarters. We understood

later that he and the Chinese

arrived on a hill on that road

at about the same time and

he was killed. The next few

weeks ran together in a blur.
144 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Major John H. Elder, Jr. 19th Engineer Combat Group

Sometime in that general period Lt. Gen. Walton

Walker was killed and Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway

took over the army and performed probably the most

superb job of large unit leadership I’ve ever seen. Our

army, at that point, was a defeated army. There was

no question about it. The orientation for troops and everybody was how fast can we go south and get out of

Korea. In a matter of a week, by personal example and

appearance, Ridgway really turned the Army around.

It thought about going north again.

Engineer School, 41-5-107

RG 111, SC-35669

RG 111, SC-356266

After the last UN forces withdrew to the south bank of the

Han River, the 14th Engineers went to work, dismantling

much of the pontoon bridge and destroying the remainder,

4 January 1951
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 145

INTERVENE THE CHIN_f~f WEST 

IN November 1950 

25 October - I s £vENoNG. ~·ocr ROK POSITION • 

811111JISH A~O lfiONS. (V(NING.t HOIJ 

U S •NO ROK POS CK 25 OCT ·I NOV .. 0 ROK orr• All$ 0' U.S. OCT·!NOY , CCf OTrACK , U 

.=::::::c> A.,5 o c•' 29 ocr 

¥ 

~ CCF •o• ollo vt soo " "u• ~rc;w c•ouNO AIO 
146 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 5th Regimental Combat Team

Lieutenant Johnson describes his role as commanding officer of an infantry company moving into

North Korea with the 5th Regimental Combat Team

(RCT) finally returning to engineering duty with the

3d Engineer Combat Battalion.

At that time, late autumn 1950, the civilian populace appeared happy to see us. After we pulled up by

Kaesong, just shy of the 38th Parallel, we waited for a

week or two because they hadn’t made the decision to

cross into North Korea. During that time we worked on

equipment and weapons and re-outfitted. Eventually

the decision was made to go across the 38th. There

wasn’t much opposition. We went up the west side

of North Korea along a peninsula called the Ongjin

Peninsula. Part of the Ongjin Peninsula was in North

Korea and part in South Korea. The 38th Parallel had

cut it in half. As a result, there was no land access from

South Korea.

Right at the apex of the ocean, where the peninsula mainland of North Korea came up, there was the

town of Haeju. I was ordered to go and clean weapons

out of the town. The town was laid out in such a manner

that it was like a pie cut into three sections. At the center

of the pie was the town hall and the police station.

I established the company command post (CP) outside

the town hall and gave one of the three sections of

the town to each of my three platoon leaders. I kept the

weapons platoon people in the center around the city

hall and the police station.

Our mission was to clear the town of weapons. We

were instructed to knock on each door or do whatever

you could to get the attention of the homeowner and

ask, “Do you have any weapons?” If the answer was, “No,”

then we went to the next house. We did not search.

We had enough interpreters. Each platoon at

that time had one, and I had two in the company headquarters. They were supplied by the Korean government. They were allegedly not to be drafted or pressed

into any of the other services. They had to prove that

Members of the

84th Engineer

Construction

Battalion change

the oil and clean

the filters on an

air compressor

RG 111, SC-379254
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 147

they could speak good or passable English and that

they were interpreters for the United States.

I had a jeep driver by the name of Rosy. He wandered around our CP the day we searched. When he

came back he was ashen. He had gone up into the police

station, a two-story structure, concrete building, where

they had a big assembly hall. It looked like a basketball

court. What he saw there made him come back. He said,

“Sir, you have to come with me. You have to see something that’s awful.” I said, “Right now?” And he said,

“Yes, Sir. You have to come right now.” I went with him.

The 1st Sergeant also came with me. We went into the

police station, upstairs, and into the auditorium. There

were probably a couple hundred people, all maimed. They

had broken arms, broken legs, and blood was all over

the place—just about all ages, from the young to the

elderly. There were men and women; some women had

crushed breasts. It was incredible. I told the interpreter

to find out how this happened. He asked and said, “Follow me. Let me show you.” We went back into a room

off of the auditorium. There was a North Korean civilian who apparently had elevated himself to the police

chief of the town when everything broke apart as far as

North Koreans were concerned. He was allegedly an anticommunist. He was sitting on a stool and in front of

him, kneeling on the floor, was the person being interrogated. Along side of the person being interrogated was

another Korean with a club in his hand. The anticommunist police chief would ask a question. The person

on the floor would answer. If the police chief didn’t

like the answer, the guy with the club was energized

and would clobber the hell out of the guy, either on the

back of the head or some other place. He swung the

club and he would bring it down on the arm or something. When the chief got the answer he wanted, the

individual would be hauled back to the auditorium.

I relieved the police chief and his henchmen on

the spot. I directed that the people be taken out of the

building and marched up to a POW compound, which

was being established in a big Catholic church on the

South Korean

refugees cheer

troops of the

24th Infantry

Division as they

enter Taejon

RG 111, SC-349428

147
148 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 5th Regimental Combat Team

outskirts of town. The long line of people finally came

out of the building and they were marched up the road

guarded by North Korean, allegedly anticommunist,

guards. Rather than turning left toward the church,

they turned right. I jumped in the jeep and I went up

there. I asked what they were doing and told them

the direction of the church and the POW compound.

Apparently, the guards were going to take them down

to the riverbed and shoot them. They believed that if

these people had survived under the North Koreans

they were obviously communist.

Later, after the Chinese intervention, we were

again moving south. As we

went through little towns

you could see clusters of

people who were crying.

They were deeply concerned that we were leaving them. Now the tables

would be turned again.

They were rightfully concerned. How did the people

regard us? Did they cooperate? Yes, they didn’t

have any choice. Korea

wasn’t like Vietnam. We

knew where the front line

was. We didn’t have many people ambushing or shooting us in the back.

They didn’t really know how to take us. All of a

sudden they had nobody telling them what to do, and

I’m sure up to that point they had been told we were

the bad guys. Kim Il Sung had been filling them full

of whatever, and the natural reaction was to stay very

subdued. They didn’t cheer, or holler, or yell, or anything else.

As we broke out of the Naktong perimeter and

went north, most of the civilians were either underground or had already gone

south. There would be long,

long lines of refugees going

out, and presumably they

were all South Koreans.

They were trying to get out,

particularly when we were

down in the Naktong River

area. When we broke out

and went up towards Kumchon, they had already gone

south and had gone by us

long before. I don’t recollect

people standing, cheering,

and throwing roses at us.

One of the interesting

things I saw, I thought

To compensate for personnel shortages, Korean soldiers were

integrated into U.S. Army engineer units KOR 555
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 149

about later in life when I became the Director of Munitions Production. When we went into P’yongyang, we

went over a long concrete causeway elevated above the

rice paddies and the tidal flats of the river. The tide was

out in that particular area and there were thousands of

bomb craters all around that bridge but none on the

bridge. With all the carpet bombing that bridge hadn’t

been hit. It might have been hit once or twice, but it

certainly was not destroyed. Today, one or two of our

smart bombs would have knocked it out. It was interesting to me to see the ineffectiveness of our bombing

in that instance. When the Air Force carpet-bombed

just before we crossed the Naktong by Waegwan, the

B-29s came over and they obliterated the hill mass on

the north side of the Naktong. The North Koreans had

a lot of high velocity weapons there—88s. When they

hit that area, they wiped it out. Hitting a line target in

those days was not that easy or successful.

The city was hit, but it wasn’t anywhere nearly

as destroyed as Seoul. I had been stationed on the outskirts of Seoul back in ’48-’49, and it was a bustling

city. When I went through it on our way north, everything was just wiped out—the railroad yards, the railroad station. There wasn’t very much standing because

of bombing by both sides.

We started getting replacement personnel from the

Koreans. In fact, our battalion was the first battalion

to get KATUSAs (Korean Augmentation to the United

States Army). At that time the company-authorized

strength was 212 personnel. I was down to about 120-

130, and so we were going to get Korean fillers. Our

regimental commander, John Throckmorton, and

battalion commander, Tom Roelofs, decided we were

not going to just bring them in. We would have a training program in a rear area. They had some modest

training, but we trained them intensively for two weeks

and then had a graduation. We graduated the ones

who looked like they could handle themselves, who

understood the training, and could react to the English

being spoken.

About one third of the Koreans that we received

graduated. We had about 100—one third we put into

the company, interspersed them, say, one per squad.

Then the next week we had another graduation. The last

week, we had the third graduation. By the time all of

them were integrated into the company to bring us

back up roughly to our 212, they were operating as a

team with the Americans, rather than Koreans here

and Americans there. We had some problems regarding

food. We couldn’t feed them all-American food—or

C-rations. They wanted rice and fish heads. So, we

established one section of the mess hall that boiled

rice. They made rice but, if they wanted, they could

also eat the American food.

We were loaded with KATUSAs. Once they

were integrated in the company that way they really

Later, after the Chinese intervention, we were again moving

south. As we went through little

towns you could see clusters of

people who were crying. They

were deeply concerned that we

were leaving them. Now the

tables would be turned again.
150 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 5th Regimental Combat Team

did a masterful job. The biggest problem, of course, was

language communication, but they began to pick it up

and at least understood the basic language requirements.

It was easier during the daylight hours for them to understand because they could see. At night they couldn’t

see so they had to interpret and hope it was right. We

also had more interpreters available. The KATUSAs did

a hell of a good job. They really came through quite well.

Up to that time, we had the good fortune of having time

to train them because we weren’t heavily engaged.

We were leapfrogging up. In those days we walked

some, but we also had movement by convoy. They would

get one outfit moved up and then they would bring another outfit up. When we got up to Sinanju and Anju

we were still with the British 27th Infantry Brigade. They

turned to the west and went along the coast. The closer

we got to the Yalu River the tougher it became. It was

like pushing against a spring—when the coils get tighter,

the resistance against the spring is harder and harder.

The 1st Cavalry Division came up and got clobbered. The British 27th Infantry Brigade was out in front

of us and we followed them. The British had erected a

big sign, “The 27th British Brigade wishes the 5th RCT

good hunting.” They had cut off to our left, I remember,

and then we went north. We got up to Taech’on. When

we got up that road going north we were the right flank

of the 24th Division. The 5th had taken one battalion,

the 3d Battalion, and they were going to slip them around

to the right. We went up to the valley road, the 2d

Battalion following the 3d Battalion. They moved us

off to the left. There was a “chocolate drop” [looking]

hill right in the middle of the valley where we were going. When we got up to the base of that chocolate drop

hill all hell broke loose. We really got clobbered and

within minutes we had a half a dozen killed. It was

from the ridgeline to our front. I couldn’t call it an

ambush; we weren’t covered from all sides. It was from

the front and we just ran into opposition.

I guess what led into it was a two-jeep reconnaissance patrol that went out. When they passed the chocolate drop hill the road started to bend around the hill

leading through a pass in the ridgeline. The little chocolate drop was dominated by the ridge. The men in the

two recon jeeps went a little past the hill, got hit, and

all were killed. I believe Hank Emerson’s company,

Company A, was sent to move along to our left. We

were ordered to attack, take the chocolate drop, and

then attack that ridgeline. I believe the 1st Battalion

was sent around to the left to get behind the enemy who

was holding up the 3d Battalion. We moved up on that

chocolate drop and got up on top. We went over the

military crest of the hill and immediately received

intense small arms fire from the ridge to our front. Everything was like hornets stinging.

We pulled back to the reverse of the hill and then

we brought artillery down on the ridge. We set up a base

The closer we got to the

Yalu River the tougher it

became. It was like pushing against a spring—when

the coils get tighter, the

resistance against the

spring is harder and harder.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 151

of fire and really hit the ridgeline, which was not that far

away—400-500 yards. We just hosed down the area and

then dug in. The 2d Battalion went around our right

flank on the main road. They got around the right flank.

When we attacked the next morning and got up on the

ridgeline, we saw almost 50 bodies up there, all lined up

in a neat line. They hadn’t all been killed there, but the

enemy had stacked them up on one part of the hill.

My interpreter said, “They are mongoloid.” I said,

“They are what?” He said, “They are mongoloid. They

are Chinese.” They had new clothes and brand new shoes.

The soles of their shoes were almost like hobnail boots.

It was obviously a different group of people. There were

no wounded and my company didn’t take any prisoners.

I don’t think anybody else did either, unless maybe the

2d Battalion, when they went around the right side and

picked up prisoners. That was the first time we ran into

Chinese. I think probably the 8th Cavalry got clobbered

first up by Unsan, and later the 5th Cavalry got badly

hit at Kunu-ri [28 Nov 50].

Cold, but Alive

General Douglas MacArthur had said we would be home

by Thanksgiving and Eighth Army believed him. They

did not requisition all the clothing needed so our company had half of the clothing we needed—overcoats,

sleeping bags, and so on. It probably was good that we

did have only half. When we would put two guys in a

foxhole, one would have an overcoat and he’d be on

guard, and the other one would be in the sleeping bag.

When we went north the second time, it turned cold

during that month interval. We had been going for

days. The troops were exhausted. We all were. We only

had half the overcoats and half the sleeping bags, so for

the most part, half of the company was awake, cold,

but awake. Another unit of the 24th was further to our

left flank and they got wiped out one night. Nobody

saw or heard the Chinese come in until they were overrun. The Chinese shot them all in their holes, left the

bodies right where they were, and then walked off.

Chinese prisoners

captured by the

1st Republic of

Korea Division

RG 111, SC-357170

When we attacked the

next morning and got

up on the ridgeline,

we saw almost 50

bodies up there, all

lined up in a neat line.
152 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 5th Regimental Combat Team

The men had all been asleep. Whether they all had

sleeping bags, I’m not sure. One of the biggest jobs

was keeping the troops awake at night and on guard.

It was cold, really cold, so I believe it was fortuitous

that we only had half of our outer clothing.

We had plenty of ammunition. When we first

landed way back in July/August, we did not have enough

ammunition. But by this time we had 3.5-inch bazookas, rocket launchers, and recoilless rifles. We had a lot

of SP artillery—self-propelled artillery—that had come

in. About this time we were pretty well equipped, with

the exception of clothes.

When they issued those pile-type hats with the

earflaps, it was interpreted as a signal to dispose of the

steel pot. I don’t think it was overconfidence necessarily.

When you have something warm around your head and

your ears, it substitutes for protection. Lt. Col. John L.

Throckmorton was insistent that we wear our steel hat.

Some of the companies didn’t wear them before he

tramped down on us. The steel pot was cumbersome,

you know. It wasn’t too long before the command emphasized that the pot went on top of that parka-type hat.

You can wear both—put the flaps down and keep your

ears warm.

Close Air Support

After the Chinese came across the Yalu, the 1st Cavalry

got hit and so did the 2d Division. My unit, the 5th

RCT, was ordered to set up blocking positions to

hold the road open from Kunu-ri. For our blocking

position, my company was on top of a hill, which was

on a ridge of a series of hills. Our hill was smaller

than the one Hank Emerson was on, which was on

the higher part of the ridgeline. We were connected directly and covering the valley. We were blocking the

Chinese from coming down the ridgeline. We were to

protect the valley for the people coming south. There

were a lot of air attacks on the upper part of the ridgeline, and I believe there was a Korean division up there

blocking in front of us. Two South Korean F-51 aircraft

came over and circled our positions. Those days we

used the panel system where each day a colored panel

was displayed to show the air corps where the friendly

ground units were.

Hank and I both had our companies on the

ridgeline. We had dug foxholes, but they weren’t deep.

We were down maybe a foot and a half—just slit trenches.

When the F-51s came in we had put our panels out to

let them know who and where we were. One of Hank’s

machine gunners saw the planes and thought, “They

don’t look too friendly to me. I’m going to give them a

burst and scare them off.” He fired a burst of that machine gun and all hell broke loose. That pilot fired two

rockets, and then Company A started yelling, “MAYDAY!,” on the radio to alert headquarters that we were

being fired on by friendly aircraft.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 153

I jumped out to be sure that the panel was in plain

view. My first sergeant, Sgt. Loeffler, was in the foxhole

next to me. I was yelling at everyone not to fire at the

aircraft, that they were friendly aircraft. They would pass

over Hank’s position and fire a blast, and then they’d

make a turn and come over us on their return trip. When

they got over Hank, Sgt. Loeffler jumped out of his

hole, grabbed the red panel

and rolled it up. I said,

“What the hell are you doing?” He said, “They are

firing at all the panels.”

I said, “No, they’re not!”

I had to grab the panel,

run out, and throw it out

again. We did this about

three or four times.

During the 10 minutes of strafing we were

all yelling, “MAYDAY!”

They finally went away.

Remarkably, not a person

was hit and they had really hosed down Hank’s area.

That was the last time his machine gunner ever fired

at another friendly aircraft. We blocked in that position for three or four days and then went east of

P’yongyang, going south. Eventually, we went to just

north of Seoul.

General Matthew B. Ridgway Takes Command

It was at the time Lt. Gen. Walker was killed. I had a

jeep that did not have a windshield, and at that time

driving down the road in a vehicle without a windshield was bad news. It was so cold, and without a

windshield the wind made it that much colder. I was

riding down the road when I happened to see this

jeep off to the side of the

ditch. There was nobody

around and I said to myself, “Ah! I got my windshield.” I jumped out of

the jeep, went over and

looked at it. There was

a three-star plate on the

front of the jeep. When I

saw that, I said, “That’s not

my windshield!” I guess we

got there almost a halfhour after he was killed.

Nobody was around the

jeep. Eventually, I found

a windshield, but it was a South Korean Army windshield in an old Korean hut. Ironically, it had two

stars on it.

Gen. Walker was the commander during the initial operation, the defense of the Naktong Perimeter,

and it was a case of cutting and patching. We did things

We did things like run

bulldozers on a reverse

side of a hill to make the

bad guys think we had

tanks over there. We

did that in desperation.

We think it worked....

Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, commander 8th Army, confers

with his officers RG 111, SC-357542

153
154 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 5th Regimental Combat Team

like run bulldozers on a reverse side of a hill to make

the bad guys think we had tanks over there. We did

that in desperation. We think it worked; at least it was

successful. We really didn’t have much equipment, but

we were piece-mealing units in. We were trying to hold

our fingers in the dike to keep these bridgeheads

from breaking up.

Under those conditions, you blow things in front

of you and do what you can to conserve your forces or

concentrate them when you need them. Remember

what happened when the locks at Inch’on were blown

during the first withdrawal? The guy who blew the

tidal locks did such a thorough job that it was damn

near impossible to rebuild them. He had the good fortune of being assigned to the engineer brigade that

had to go in and rehabilitate the locks. He was the guy

in charge of rebuilding them. Gen. Twitty was the commander of that engineer brigade. Two engineers from

the Class of ’46, Smith and McCullum, had been in the

advanced course with me at [Fort] Belvoir and were

part of that regiment. They talked about the major

work that had to be done to repair the locks and impressed me with the pitfalls of over destruction, particularly if you have to go back and use the facility.

Now, let me put this in perspective too. When we

had been way up north we had been euphoric with our

victory, as it were. We’re now getting out or we’re getting

kicked back. We simply didn’t get information on what

was happening. The intelligence coming down to the

troops was non-existent. We just didn’t get any info or

news. We just knew that we were coming south and we

had run into some pretty good firefights. The morale

was not good. The morale was at best, poor. Our euphoric feeling sort of eroded, and the closer we got to

what we thought would be evacuation, the higher the

morale went. The further we got back down towards

Inch’on, or Pusan, to get on a boat, the better we felt.

When Gen. Walker was killed, Ridgway came in. I

remember we were north of Seoul. We might have been

around the Uijongbu area. When Ridgway came in, he

was briefed by the British 27th Infantry Brigade. The

27th Brigade was something else. They thought the 5th

Infantry was the finest fighting unit they had ever seen,

and we thought they were the finest. Gen. Ridgway went

to get a briefing from the British, and they briefed him

on the retrograde plans. The word came out that Ridgway

said, “I’m not interested in your plans for withdrawal.

Where are your plans to attack?” I think that statement

filtered out through the Eighth Army and certainly

through our organization. The morale started going up.

Engineers as Infantry

When we got to Korea, about 10 of my classmates and

I were assigned to the 5th Infantry. They were getting

company commands and being promoted to captain. I

was the ranking guy in our class in the 5th RCT. There

Gen. Ridgway went to get

a briefing from the British,

and they briefed him on

the retrograde plans. The

word came out that

Ridgway said, “I’m not

interested in your plans

for withdrawal. Where are

your plans to attack?”
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 155

were three of us in the engineer company—Hatch, Van

Petten, and I. There was just absolutely no way we were

going to get promoted in that separate company because

we would never be made a company commander unless

the company commander was relieved or evacuated, neither of which was going to happen.

Col. Throckmorton had wanted us to become infantrymen because he needed them, but he wanted us to

get promoted to captain. I was ordered to take over the

Company B of the 5th. Kenny Hatch, about the same

time, took over the heavy weapons company of the 3d

Battalion. I was asked if I wanted to take over a heavy

weapons company, and I said, “I don’t know much about

it.” Although I knew a lot about heavy weapons, I told

Col. Throckmorton I would be more comfortable as an

infantry line company commander, and I got it. To be

promoted, one had to be in command for 30 days.

I took over on about 18 September, and 30 days later

they forwarded the recommendations for promotion

to Eighth Army, Far East Command.

About that time, a boat with officers recalled to

active duty arrived in Japan. On that boat were 700 to

800 captains. Immediately, the command had an

excess of captains in the theater and so the authority to

promote was stopped. In addition to that, I had been

recommended for award of the Combat Infantry

Badge. In order to get the Combat Infantry Badge you

had to be detailed to the infantry. In other words, the

orders had to be issued that you were an infantryman.

Well, those papers came back sometime in December,

(1) not promoted, and (2) ineligible to receive the

Combat Infantry Badge.

I was a little disgusted, of course. When Col.

Throckmorton stopped to see how things were going

I told him that the two recommendations had both

been disapproved. He said, “Oh, what do you think?” I

said, “Well, if they are not going to promote me as an

infantryman I might as well go back and be an engineer. Furthermore, they are not even giving me a ComBritish and Belgian

officers board a tank

to travel to forward

positions

RG 111, SC-375436
156 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant James A. Johnson 5th Regimental Combat Team

bat Infantry Badge.” Well, he really got ticked off

but that was the rule. He said, “Well, what do you

want to do?” And I said, “I may as well go back to

the engineers.”

With the 3d Engineer Combat Battalion

He knew Lt. Col. Peter C. Hyzer, who was the battalion

commander of the 3d Engineers and, I guess, he talked

to him. Shortly after Christmas, I was transferred to the

3d ECB. When I got to the 3d Engineers I was a first

assistant S-3, and then they made me the company commander of H&S Company.

They resubmitted my promotion from there. I

guess Col. Throckmorton resubmitted my Combat

Infantry Badge. About a month later, my promotion

came through based on my time in the infantry, and

my Combat Infantry Badge came through by order of

General MacArthur.

As the company commander of the H&S Company, 3d Engineer Battalion, I also had the only platoon of armored tank dozers in Korea. They had a blade

in front of the M4A1 tank. They were tanks, yes. We

had five of them in the platoon. The platoon leader was

a Lt. Greenwell. I had the pleasure of watching those

tank dozers being used and seeing how effective they were

in combat engineering. I think that experience stood me

in good stead when I commanded [Fort] Belvoir. I really

fought for the combat engineer vehicle. How should

tanks supporting engineer missions be used—blades in

front of tanks, rollers for anti-mine, or what? All of that

was pretty well formulated in my mind as we planned

tank dozer support for engineers in combat.

When they had the airborne drop in Korea by the

187th, the first two vehicles in the link-up unit were

two of my tanks. The value of those things was truly

apparent in that kind of an airborne and ground linkup operation.

The engineer battalion was well equipped in

those days. We had the D-7 bulldozer, which isn’t all

that powerful a piece of equipment. We had the two

and one-half-ton trucks, which are certainly not the

5-tons or the 10-tons that we have today. And we had

the pioneer equipment in the squads. Fundamentally,

the combat engineer was well equipped to support

the division but needed backup from corps engineers

to do the job.

At that time we didn’t do much mine clearing.

They didn’t get behind us to put mines in. We might

not have been able to put the mines in, but we didn’t

clear any mines. In those days, the general philosophy

was to mark a minefield and leave it on record. Again,

my personal involvement in that type of activity was

greatly limited because of the fact that I commanded

the H&S Company. My mission was bivouac, security

of the headquarters, communications, support of the

headquarters by logistics, food, and so on, bedding

As the company commander

of the H&S Company, 3d

Engineer Battalion, I also

had the only platoon of

armored tank dozers in

Korea....I had the pleasure

of watching these tank

dozers being used and

seeing how effective they

were in combat engineering.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 157

down the staff, and protection of the staff. That’s what

the headquarters commander does, and that was what

I did for the next four or five months.

Now, the Chinese began one more offensive before I left Korea. It was a spring offensive and began on

22 April 1951. I remember that we were going north.

When we would get into a position, the battalion commander, Peter Hyzer, would put us right up at the front.

We would be bivouacked a half mile from the front, and

that was where he put our CP. We pulled the unit in,

and then it took four, five, or six days for the front to be

pushed further away on the other side. I thought he was

almost putting us in to plug the front with the headquarters company, which was not really the mission of

the headquarters company.

I didn’t get involved in any more combat before

I was rotated. I was in the first group of those to be

rotated and left out of Pusan on an LST for Sasebo,

Japan. They processed us there for a few days, and then

we were shipped out on two boats; one went to Seattle,

and one to San Francisco. I was on the first into

San Francisco. From there I had orders for Fort Belvoir

and the 6th Engineer Officer Advanced Course. However, they were just beginning to gather officers to

teach at the engineer OCS and I was pulled off orders

and assigned to the OCS.

A tank dozer

clears a road

in western Korea

Engineer School, 92-62-6
158 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Major Harold R. Parfitt 2d Engineer Construction Group

ajor Parfitt describes his assignment with

that had to flow forward as quickly as we anticipated the

troops would move up the peninsula. But we realized

there was in existence a very good railway net. It had

been left behind as a legacy of the Japanese occupation

of Korea. Early on it was decided to stress repair of the

railway system. Indeed, that was the emphasis and the

focus of my attention during almost all of my time

with the 2d ECG, although I was involved in other

aspects of MSR repair.

It should be noted that the 8th Army had arranged

for skilled Koreans to work on the rail system. We understood that they were to repair tracks and obtain and

operate the essential railroad equipment. We did not

have much contact with them but all reports of their

work were complimentary.

As we moved quickly to the north we accomplished considerable road and bridge repair as well as minor

railway crossing repair. A few tunnels also had been

damaged and were in need of repair. Each situation

was a little different and required some ingenuity.

At the same time, the 62d engineers came in at

Inchon during the later phases of the assault landing and

moved inland to the Han River near Seoul. There they

bypassed a large damaged bridge and began to build an

entirely new crossing at low level, using stringers or sandbag piers. They called it a “shoofly” bridge. I was not

familiar with the name and was not sure of its derivation. Nevertheless, the terminology stuck. Shortly thereM

the 2d Engineer Construction Group as they design

and rebuild the railroad from the Pusan Perimeter

to P’yongyang, and survey the line further to the

Yalu River.

In September 1950, when I was initiating the design for repairing bridges near the Pusan Perimeter, we

didn’t even have a construction battalion. However,

shortly thereafter the 84th came aboard and they were

prepared to accomplish work based on plans issued

from group headquarters. Fortunately, troops who had

made the withdrawal from Seoul provided us with a

wealth of important information, thus we were somewhat prepared for what we would experience when

the breakout was made.

The nearby bridges had a span of about a couple

hundred feet; however, the damaged portion was significantly less. In the case of the highway bridge we

chose to go with a timber trestle structure part of the

way and to finish the closure with a Bailey bridge.

For the railway bridge we decided to build a timber

trestle foundation—drive-in the piles, cap the piles,

put a trestle on top, and then use some big 24-inch

I-beams that were available in the area to span the

gap between these trestles.

It was apparent to all concerned that the road net

would be inadequate to take the material and supplies

Our soldiers worked for 12

hours a day, closing the rail

line to traffic, and then for

12 hours they would use it.

During this period the bridge

was only completely out

for three days, primarily

because of extremely

bad weather conditions.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 159

after the 2d ECG arrived at the Han River and took

over command of the 62d.

At this time it was obvious that heavy tides and

storms would jeopardize the bridge unless the sandbag piers were reinforced. This was done mainly

by driving piles at appropriate locations. Our soldiers

worked for 12 hours a day, closing the rail line to

traffic, and then for 12 hours they would use it. During this period the bridge was only completely out

for three days, primarily because of extremely bad

weather conditions.

Our next major project was the building of a shoofly

bridge over the Imjin River. This was the first such structure built by the 2d ECG. The basic design was to divert

the rail line and take it down grade to a new site near the

old location. Piles were then driven through templates,

capped, and then trestles built up, and 24-inch I-beams

were used as stringers. We moved out across the river,

one trestle after another, and then tied back moving

uphill to the original rail line.

By late November I had been promoted to major

and our road construction had proceeded to P’yongyang

where the 62d was in the process of building a bridge.

While there I observed some Korean railroad workers

nearby and they informed me that they were exploring

the possibility of using the spur rail line from Chinnampo north to P’yongyang. For obvious reasons this

plan never materialized.

At that time my attention had turned to moving

north across country, with a survey crew, to the vicinity

of Sinanju, which was the next major crossing before the

Yalu. The day after Thanksgiving we drove out but before long we became aware of large numbers of Koreans

moving swiftly to the south. Immediately we turned back

and headed towards the nearest roadway. We saw that

large military forces were heading south and they informed us that a major Chinese attack had commenced

and they had orders to withdraw. Before long we were

back with the 62d in P’yongyang. They had already prepared their partially completed bridge for demolition.

This completed, the bridge was turned over to Corps

troops and we headed south.

Soldiers of the 62nd

Engineer Battalion use

sandbags to reinforce

a temporary rail bridge

over the Han River,

31 October 1950

Engineer School, 42-2-117
160 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Colonel Emerson C. Itschner I Corps Engineer

From his perspective as the I Corps Engineer,

Colonel Itschner describes the Eighth Army drive

north to the Yalu and the “bugout” coming back

south. During the drive north Itschner recalls that his

engineers were hampered by poorly maintained, leftover World War II equipment. “There’s no use sending equipment to a war,” the engineer officer said,

“unless it’s in perfect shape.”

In July 1950, shortly after the war started, I got

tapped to go over to Korea as engineer of I Corps, called

“Eye” Corps. I was in Seattle as district engineer at the

time, and it came as a great surprise to me. I went over

there after about a week’s training at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, where we went through combat courses—firing over

our heads, crawling through barbed wire, and all that. I

went to Tokyo for a briefing and then to Pusan for a

night. I arrived in Taegu to find that the enemy was right

on the hills surrounding the north end of the town, and

things were in very, very bad shape. That was as far south

as they got in that area.

Breakout North Toward the Yalu

Taegu is east of the center. We had come up by train

from the port of Pusan on the coast. We stayed there

about a week or so and found that the plan had been

developed to counterattack and drive the enemy north.

During the early part of that operation the Inch’on

landing would occur. Our first operation of any importance to engineers or anybody was to cross the

Naktong River, which is quite a large river, but shallow.

There’d be a lot of bars at that time of the year, but in

the earlier summer, during the flood period, it could

be quite deep; the floods are very high there. The rest of

the year it’s rather low.

Our engineer part of the operation was to build a

small bridge across a tributary to get to the main banks

of the river and then build a bridge across. We had a

bridge company plus a combat battalion to provide

the labor force. The small bridge was no great project.

Our main problem was getting through the extremely

dense military traffic to get up to the bridge site. There

was a ford, which our forces had been using, but the

intense traffic over the ford wore down the sand bottom

and the sandbags that had been put down, so it wasn’t

very satisfactory.

This was a short bridge, approximately 80-feet

long. The Naktong River was several hundred feet

wide. We got there and started to build the bridge. The

enemy had been driven off of the bank on the far side,

but they weren’t very far away. In making the reconnaissance before they were driven back far, I came up to the

site where the bridge was to go at the end of this road.

There’d never been a bridge at this site before, but the

natives could ford it during most of the year. They might

have used a ferry, perhaps, during high water.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 161

I got down on this big sandbar, as the river had

receded, and saw an engineer captain down in a foxhole

with sandbags built around it. He had been there for

some time, apparently, and the foxhole had probably been

used during the initial fighting. I was about to get after

the captain for not being out doing his job, whatever it

was, when we had a

shell from a tank, an

88, screech by right

next to the jeep. I

jumped down in the

foxhole with him, and

my driver was there

before I was! Then we

waited a while; I told

the driver that he’d

better get the jeep and

go back, which he was

anxious to do. He was

fired at once or twice.

I got up after he had

cleared and ran as fast as I could and WHAM! A shell,

an 88, went screaming by me. Fortunately, they were

very poor shots. I think they fired three or four at me,

and I was dropping down each time. The British brigade

was up on the hill; it was their particular sector. They

thanked me for helping them locate the tank!

Well, we built the bridge. We were supposed to

have it finished by 0700, having worked on it all night.

I’ve never experienced so much trouble building a

floating bridge. When we’d try to join the treads, some

of the connections were bent. Probably, they had been

bent when they left Japan. They were bent so badly that

many of the tongues would not mesh together and we

had a terrible time.

We’d have to reject

the damaged section and then build

another float of,

say, two segments

of 12-feet long

each, 24-four feet

of float, or maybe

36, and try to

push them or pull

them together. We

finally ended up

taking an awful

risk and having

roughly 100 feet of bridge connected like a raft along

the bank but separate from the bridge itself. We tried

to get that on out into the river and connect

it up, to save time, because otherwise you were limited

to working in one place at the end of the bridge.

In our method we could work at several places and

combine the rafts. After terrific effort and delaying the

I was about to get after the

captain for not being out

doing his job, whatever it

was, when we had a shell

from a tank, an 88, screech

by right next to the jeep.

I jumped down in the foxhole

with him, and my driver was

there before I was!

Engineers pull the last section of an M-4 ponton bridge in place over

the Naktong River, 22 September 1950 Engineer School, 42-5-100
162 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Colonel Emerson C. Itschner I Corps Engineer

entire advance of the division by two hours, we did

finally get the bridge assembled.

There was no enemy fire but the commanding general was stamping his feet. He was really angry at the

engineers for delaying this operation. I don’t blame him.

The trouble was, at the time we weren’t prepared. The

equipment was not in good shape. We tried to rectify it.

It got so we were pretty good at putting bridges together

much, much faster than we did that time. Our favorite

trick on these shallow rivers as we went forward was to

build a little island out of sandbags every here and there

where the river got shallower. Native sandbags made of

rice straw, maybe two or three times the size of American sandbags, were very plentiful. We’d just pile those in

until we had a little island over the shallow parts, and in

that way we didn’t use so much bridging because the

bridging was awfully short. It was always treadway bridging that we built. The division combat battalions did

have a little Bailey bridging. We would have preferred to

have Bailey bridging but all we had was the treadway.

It was material that I’m sure hadn’t been touched

since world War II, but how it got all that battered up I

don’t know. I’m sure it was not done when the bridge

was in place. It must have been done in depots, or

dropped, or something. But it was in very bad shape and

very difficult to put together. It’s not an easy bridge to

put together anyway in that respect. It has two treads

with a space between them. A jeep will not track on the

two treads, it’s too narrow a gauge, and so we filled in

the intermediate space with lumber.

There isn’t much native wood in Korea. We had to

import almost all of it. Korea was logged off centuries

ago. Timber would grow there well but they had consumed it. It’s a barren country in that respect and that

lack of wood caused trouble.

 After we got that bridge across, our troops went

on. The objective was to cut off the North Koreans as

much as possible because they were in full retreat. We

went on up to the next largest river, the Yesong, which

was beyond Panmunjom—that little village where they

later had the peace talks. Our troops wanted to cross in a

great hurry. They wanted to get tanks across, go north

along the river on the other side and cut off the enemy

from their remaining tank elements to prevent their

getting across farther to the north. Although the river

was too wide for a bridge, at this point near the Yellow

Sea, with the amount of bridging we had, we did

build some ferries.

Our work was frequently in advance of the columns as they moved north. They always had patrols and

some troops out in front, not very many, but some. In

this case, we didn’t have any vehicles out there—just foot

soldiers had gotten across. We built two ferries at that

point and we unloaded two motor launches, each of

which had two engines in it. It was World War II equipment and the engines were very much worn. One of the
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 163 163

Soldiers of the 84th

Engineer Battalion push

a segment of a ponton

bridge in place using

a powerboat

Engineer School, 42-5-114

engines in one of the boats we knew wouldn’t work at

all. Neither engine in the other boat would work, either.

So, we had one engine out of four that would work.

We launched this boat that we thought had one

good engine and it started to ferry across with a tank on

it. It got about a quarter of the way across and the engine conked out. This was in the middle of the afternoon. We wanted so much to get this column across.

With the tidal current going the way it was the boat

drifted out to the Yellow Sea and was gone for the night.

The next morning I got up in an airplane and flew over,

hoping to see them someplace along the line. Sure

enough, there they were on the river going back up at a

fair rate of speed. I thought they had gotten the engine

going. As it turned out, they never got the engine going

but the tide was carrying them back.

Here they were going upstream. I then got on the

ground and got back to the site. They said, “Oh, they

went by here a little while ago but couldn’t make a landing.” Well, they got up the river quite a distance and

they got into a fight with the North Koreans, taking

shelter in back of the tank. As usual, nobody was hit,

I guess on either side, but certainly not on our side. Back

on down they came and made a landing at the point

from which they had departed 20 hours before.

It was important to have operable motors in those

boats! If they had worked, tanks might have been able

to cut off some of these enemy columns. We could have

really devastated those columns if we had gotten our tanks

on that side of the river. We couldn’t because we didn’t

have the proper equipment. I think the generals of the

divisions realized that at that time; at first, they thought

it was maybe inexperience of the engineers. They began

to realize it was poor equipment.

Apparently, those boats had been used all that time

in Japan for duck hunting, fishing, and that sort of thing.

They were just worn out. There’s no use sending equipment to a war unless it’s in perfect shape. Well, things

began to improve and the people back in Tokyo began

to realize our problems.
164 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Colonel Emerson C. Itschner I Corps Engineer

Col. Paschal N. Strong was the Eighth Army Engineer, an extremely competent officer. In addition to being a splendid engineer, he was quite a writer. Remember the series they used to have, “Jack Armstrong, the

All-America Boy”? He was the author of that. He finally

sold it, but he was the author of it for a number of years.

He was very, very versatile, as well as a competent person. He got things changed and we got equipment that

would do the job. Later we had too little equipment,

much too little, but it was good, operable equipment.

We went on north again. As we’d cross a big river,

we’d build our little islands and use what bridging we

could. In some cases, we’d go on back and pull up a bridge

and let people ford. We’d pull it up so we’d have the

bridge for the forward area. In the attack on P’yongyang,

they called on our troops to build a bridge real fast

across the Taedong, upstream where it was quite a bit

narrower, near the airfield, to enable a jeep column to

get in and try to rescue American prisoners being held

in a tunnel. They got up there, but it was too late to

save most of them. They were machine gunned in the

tunnel. Some of them escaped. I actually talked to

one man who had just gotten out of there and was fortunate enough not to be hit by bullets in that tunnel.

 We then kept on going. It was almost entirely

bridge work all the way up—floating bridges. We did

a little bit of airfield work, small airstrips, so planes

could land. We did some repair work on the field at

Seoul. Later, on the way back up again next spring we

did more work to repair bomb damage. The North

Koreans didn’t have much in the way of bombers, just

regular planes. We were bombed at the bridge site by

North Koreans. What they were doing was dropping

mortar shells out of a little plane. The bombs landed

several hundred yards away; they caused us no trouble.

They knew where the bridge was but they were very inaccurate. I never saw a Russian fighter there. In fact,

I can’t really say that I ever saw a single North Korean

airplane, but I did in this case hear the plane.

“Bugout” South?

One night the rear guard, which was British at that

time, got across the bridge and then we were to take up

that bridge. We had to salvage the bridge after the last

troops got past. There wasn’t any particular danger

because the enemy was probably 40 miles beyond. They

couldn’t keep up with us because they moved on foot

primarily and we used vehicles.

I was standing at this bridge one night and the

British rear guard commander, Brigadier Brody, a splendid fellow whom I got to know well, came across the

bridge in his Land Rover. I didn’t know who it was, and

I motioned to him to use the tread on one side because

the wooden fill-in between the two treads had a gap

just large enough to bind a jeep tire if the driver rode on

the other tread. His driver paid no attention. Sure

An engineer engaged in

demolition faced twin

problems: destroying

too soon and destroying too late. How did

you determine the right

moment for demolition?
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 165

enough, he drove into this slot and came to a terrifically

sudden stop. He was stuck on the bridge right at a

time when the rear guard needed to get across in a hurry.

My comment to him was, and I shouted it out not knowing who he was, “If people would only do what they’re

told!” He said, “That’s right!”

This happened during the crossing of the Taedong

River at P’yongyang, the North Korean capital, when

we were evacuating P’yongyang. He apologized. We had

a wrecker there and we lifted the Land Rover up. It wasn’t

too bad. After that he became a great friend of mine.

An engineer engaged in demolition faced twin

problems: destroying too soon and destroying too late.

How did you determine the right moment for demolition? It was very difficult and you couldn’t always guess

it. You had to be awfully careful to preserve every bit of

bridging. On the way back on the Imjin River, which is

pretty close to the present line of demarcation between

North and South Korea in some areas, we saved the bridge

entirely at night. Because of a very winding steep hill

on the friendly side of the river, we removed the bridge

and took many of the parts back on the enemy side

of the river. After our last troops had gone, we went

about 6, 7, or 8 miles on the enemy side, parallel to the

river, and then back across a railroad bridge we

had decked over a semi-permanent bridge. We reconnoitered the route very thoroughly beforehand to

make sure we knew where we were going. We weren’t

the least bit concerned. Today I would be, but at that

time we knew very well the enemy must have been 40

miles back and there was no fear of getting attacked.

We did this all at night and we came back across

this railroad bridge, which we then blew early in the

morning. We had quite an interesting incident there.

There was what they called the Korean Youth Movement, an organization of young Koreans who were

friendly to our side. A Korean officer came up to me and

said there were about 5,000 of them (the number included their families) with carts and every possession

they could carry, and they wanted to cross the river.

A stream of refugees

leave their homes after

receiving evacuation

orders from the South

Korean Army

Truman Library, 67-7417
166 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Colonel Emerson C. Itschner I Corps Engineer

Should they be allowed to cross? I didn’t know anything about it. I asked the Korean commander, who said,

“Well, they’re friendly to us.” I said, “Well, okay. We’ll

let them across and caution them to keep on the road so

they don’t get shot.” This was at night. So cross they did,

and I was down there to make sure they got across. One

or two carts, usually pushed by women with all their

household possessions, got caught between the railroad

rail and the wood decking. I personally lifted out one

wheel of a cart and pushed the thing on and this Korean

woman smiled and said, “Thank you,” in perfect English. Those were the only words she knew in English, I

guess, and it was very gratifying. Anyway, we cautioned

them to stay on the road. After they came across and we

got the last troops across we blew the bridge. It was a

semi-permanent bridge, one we could not have salvaged.

In the demolition of P’yongyang we had about

20 different military targets. No problem. We just

had our details go to these various places and they

did the demolition with bridge explosives. I wasn’t too

happy that we were assigned that because it was just buildings, but anyway we did. The only problem we had at

P’yongyang was that on one of the details a sergeant and

some men couldn’t get their truck started and had to

walk back. They destroyed the truck and we didn’t see

them for a day or two. When they finally showed up

that relieved a lot of anxiety. They walked all the way

back, but they didn’t have any trouble, and none from

sniping by local people.

When I stood in one of the quartermaster depots

there I saw an awful lot of foodstuffs just a few hours

before we were leaving. We didn’t destroy that. We

couldn’t. We didn’t have the means. Lots of Korean

women were standing around hoping we’d leave and I

was tempted to just tell them, “Come on in.” It would

be better to let them have it anyway than the North

Korean or Chinese armies. We could have shown them

After the last UN forces withdrew from Seoul, Lt. Gen Matthew Ridgway

(front row, left) and Col. Emerson Itschner (front row, center) gave the order

to dismantle the bridge and destroy those sections that could not be quickly

removed, 4 January 1951 Engineer School, 42-6-56
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 167

ENEMY THIRD PHASE 

OFFENSIVE 

THE OPENING EFFORT 

26 Dec 1950-1 Jan 1951 

---Eighth Army Frontline, 26 Dec 

-----Planned Delaying Lines 

---1}11-~ North Korean Attacks, 26-30 Dec 

---t)..~ u.s. and ROK Attacks, 30-31 Dec 

=-===i> Chinese Attacks, 31 Dec-1 Jan D High Ground Above 1000 Feet 

30 MILES 
168 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Colonel Emerson C. Itschner I Corps Engineer

which ones were the best ones from

their standpoint, but we didn’t. I’m sure

they came in right after I left.

One of the greatest problems we

had in demolitions was at Seoul. As

we left Seoul for the second time it

was shortly after New Year’s Day,

1951. It was cold, well below freezing. The river was frozen over to a

large extent. To keep the floating

bridge in service we had to break

the ice to keep it floating properly. There also was a railroad

bridge that was semi permanent,

which had been planked over so

you could use it for road traffic

too. We waited until we knew

we had to leave. Just a few rearguard Koreans were on the Seoul side

of the river. We had orders to remove the bridge and

then to blow the other bridge. We just had to use our

judgment about when because unless you were right there

you couldn’t tell. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway came up

and saw what we were doing. He was newly in command of the army. We started to pull out the bridge,

which is pretty slow work. We got some of it out when

the division commander, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean,

became extremely worried, and with good reason. The

British had lost a complete battalion, the Gloucester

Battalion, the night before. Gen. Dean knew very well

that things would be rough with the coming of another

night. So he gave me a direct order to blow the bridge. I

hated to do it and it took us quite a bit of time to get the

explosives placed because we weren’t prepared to do that.

In the meantime we took out some more of it, but we

did blow perhaps a third of it. It was a hard thing to do.

This was an M-4 bridge, not a treadway—a different

type of bridge, a very useful type, quite expensive—much

better than the treadway, with aluminum balks constituting the solid deck.

Although we dismantled much of it, I would have

preferred to have salvaged all of it. As it was, we got more

than half of it; then we had to leave so we blew it up.

Prior to that we blew up the railroad bridge. The British

were assigned that mission. They insisted on a written

order, which I was glad enough to give them. They

blew that bridge up. I went over to see; it was nearby. It

was a perfect job of demolition. When we came back

there a few months later, lo and behold the North

Koreans had salvaged all the decking they could—

the aluminum balks. They were all piled up nicely,

all ready for us. All we lost, really, was the part we actually destroyed by explosives. Most of the boats were

beyond repair, but a few of them weren’t.

Officers weren’t talking about Operation Bugout

in those days, but that was what everybody called it

Pfc. Frank Bonvilla of the

14th Engineers prepares to

set demolition charges on

the remaining ponton bridge

crossing the Han River at

Seoul, 4 January 1951

RG 111, SC-355558
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 169 169

Built by the 62nd

Engineers just three

months before, this

railroad bridge over

the Han River is

shown before and

after it was destroyed

by engineers during the

evacuation of Seoul,

4 January 1951

RG 111, SC-355563

and SC355565

over there. The engineers were magnificent, really magnificent. They weren’t afraid to be right up at the front.

They did their work extremely well. They worked infinitely long hours, without sleep, getting two meals a day

part of that time, because that was all they could supply.

We got plenty to eat, but at two meals a day instead

of the usual three. Things were rough.

For a time, we thought we were going to have to

go back to the Pusan perimeter and maybe get out of

Korea entirely. We reconnoitered roads to the rear and

found two roads I Corps could use, which come somewhat from the west into Pusan. We had to bridge several

river crossings by improvising. We also had to leapfrog our bridging by taking it up as we left each river

and moving it forward. If we had lost our motor equipment that would have been disastrous, so we had to

save our bridging.

Actually, the “bugout” wasn’t chaotic. As far as

I Corps was concerned it was leisurely. We had plenty

of time. On the east coast, and in the center with the

Koreans, it was chaotic. The reason we pulled out from

back of the Ch’ongch’on was because the Koreans caved

in to our east. We knew very well that there was a big

gap, and the enemy was down 30 or even 40 miles to

our rear in that sector, so we had to pull out. I’m not at

all sure we shouldn’t have stayed someplace where we

had access to the sea, like P’yongyang. There was a port

serving the P’yongyang area where we might have stayed.
170 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Colonel Emerson C. Itschner I Corps Engineer

Later, there were just hordes and hordes of Chinese. Our corps knew they were there long before the

publicity about it. We didn’t know how many, but we

knew there was an awful lot of them.

In our corps we captured roughly 25 Chinese, not

North Koreans, and every one of them said he was a

cook. That was what they were told to say, but we didn’t

think they had that many cooks and that our chances

were that good of catching all cooks! Our units jokingly

said they were going to try them out, but nobody really

wanted to eat their food anyway. So they didn’t. These

Chinese were awfully young looking people, just young

boys. Good fighters, they always attacked at night. They’d

generally sound the bugle when they attacked. There

was one floating bridge in the IX Corps area, just to the

east of Seoul, where they experienced that. They heard

this bugle at night. There never was an attack, but everybody knew what the bugle call meant. Our engineer

unit did not salvage that bridge as a result.

The engineers were magnificent, really magnificent.

They weren’t afraid to be

right up at the front. They

did their work extremely

well. They worked infinitely

long hours, without sleep,

getting two meals a day

part of that time, because

that was all they could

supply....Things were rough.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 North to the Yalu September–December 1950 171 171

Spanning the Imjin River, the “Freedom Gate Bridge”

was built by the 84th Engineer Construction Battalion

to replace the original bridge destroyed earlier in the

war, March 1952 RG 111, SC-410709
172 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant Walter S. Medding 14th Engineer Combat Battalion

First Lieutenant Medding describes the rapid advance of the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion north

from the Pusan Perimeter, after Inch’on. He recalls

the Chinese intervention and the UN fall back to below Seoul, after destroying everything of use, including the torching of Kim Il Sung’s residence.

Advance and Retreat of the

14th Engineer Combat Battalion

The Inch’on landing took place on 15 September, and

I Corps, to which we were assigned, went on the offensive on 16 September. Breaking out of the Naktong perimeter, the 14th Engineers undertook a number of engineer missions. One of these, about 19-20 September, was the construction of a sandbag causeway and a

60-foot fixed treadway trestle bridge. The treadway

trestle bridge replaced a sandbag causeway with culverts on a crossing of the Kumho River. In addition,

the battalion built a floating treadway bridge across

the Naktong River in support of the 24th Division.

During much of this period, Company A provided

engineer direct support to the 1st ROK Division.

Eighth Army and I Corps advanced slowly

until about 20 September when an M4 ferry was

built on the Naktong. After that date, the Eighth

Army advance to the Han River and Seoul was

fairly rapid. During this period, the 14th primarily engaged in road maintenance activities. I don’t remember any specific bridge construction during this

period, but there may have been something. A number

of small bridges had been demolished. These were bypassed whenever possible. We may have built a Bailey or

a fixed treadway, but there was not much standard

bridging equipment available at that time.

During the first few days of October, the 14th

moved to Choch’iwon, Suwon, and then Seoul. About 6

October the attack toward the 38th Parallel got underway. When I Corps units reached the Imjin River they

were supported in the crossing by the 14th Engineers

with ferries, and later with an M4/M4 A2 floating bridge,

completed on 11 October. The advance was very rapid.

Many existing highway bridges had been destroyed or

badly damaged by explosives, but, for the most part, the

14th performed either minor repairs or established bypasses to permit the rapid advance to continue. At least

two Bailey bridges were built. About 12 October, Company A was again attached to the 1st ROK Division.

This support was provided almost continuously for

many months because the 1st ROK Division had no

organic engineer troops.

These types of activities continued until Eighth

Army reached P’yongyang and I Corps reached the

Ch’ongch’on River in the vicinity of Sinanju. During

much of this time, the 14th was supported by the 72d

Engineer Company, 5th RCT. Part of the time, the 14th

First Lt. Walter Medding

Medding Collection
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 173

was attached to the 19th Engineer Group, commanded

by Col. Frank Forney. Battalion units reached P’yongyang

by about 20 October. Company A participated in the

1st ROK Division assault crossing of the Taedong River.

Companies B and C repaired several bridges in the area.

One of the most interesting things noted during

the advance to P’yongyang and beyond was that classification of existing bridges, mostly concrete T-beam or

slab bridges, resulted in under classification. We were

still using WWII bridge classification cards. On several

occasions a bridge was classified as only class 35, but

while building a bypass, class 50 tanks or other heavy

vehicles would cross the bridge. Usually, during the advance, destroyed bridges were replaced by Bailey or fixedtreadway bridges. There may have been one or two fixedtimber trestle bridges built but I can’t remember any.

 The 14th went through P’yongyang to the AnjuSinanju area during the advance. Road maintenance was

a very big effort at all times. In fact, there were frequent

occasions when the battalion had more than 100 miles

of road maintenance responsibility. In early November

the battalion had several periods when defensive missions were assigned. At one time, Companies B and C

both were attached to the 5th RCT for operations.

When the Chinese entered the war, Company A

was still with the 1st ROK Division. On the day of the

Chinese attack, I was in Anju looking at a sawmill to see

if we could use it to cut bridge timber. (We often were in

need of lumber for bridges. We had collected dunnage

from LSTs in Pohang, mostly 1 by 10- or 1 by 12-inch

planks. One thing we used this lumber for was laminated decking). A local resident told me that he had

seen a Chinese soldier in Anju the previous day. When

I returned to battalion headquarters for lunch the battalion had been alerted and I was sent to P’yongyang

to reconnoiter potential floating bridge sites. I found

several suitable locations. Early the next morning I started

back toward Sinanju but met the 14th headquarters

coming south.

Over the next few days, the 14th prepared for the

withdrawal from P’yongyang. Our efforts were mainly

preparation of demolition targets. Virtually everything

of any use to the North Koreans and Chinese that we

couldn’t take south would be destroyed. This included

buildings, damaged weapons, the airfield, power stations,

vehicles badly in need of repair, and bridges. We destroyed more than 30 targets in P’yongyang. As they were

executed I sat at a road intersection south of the river

while all platoon commanders reported the completion

of their targets to me. One target was Kim Il Sung’s

residence, which was destroyed by putting a 55-gallon

drum of napalm in the basement and igniting it!

We then continued the withdrawal to and through

Seoul, and south to Anyang-Ni and then to Ch’ongju.

We destroyed all highway bridges and dismantled

floating bridges along the Seoul-Suwon MSR.

Over the next few days, the

14th prepared for the withdrawal from P’yongyang. Our

efforts were mainly preparation

of demolition targets. Virtually

everything of any use to the

North Koreans and Chinese

that we couldn’t take south

would be destroyed.
174 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

First Lieutenant Walter S. Medding 14th Engineer Combat Battalion

Officers of the 14th Engineer Battalion. Lt. Medding is in the back row, second from right Medding Collection
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 175

RG 111, SC-355225

As UN forces withdrew

from Pyongyang, thousands

of North Koreans began to

flee south. Crossing the

Taedong River was difficult—

some refugees climbed over

a partially destroyed bridge,

while others, often carrying

small children or aging

relatives, waded across

the icy river

RG 111, SC-355229

RG 111, SC-355230
176 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Colonel Miles M. Dawson Yokohama Engineer Depot Operations

E ngineer operations in Korea, whether carving out new roads, off loading equipment at seaports,

or building bridges, required specialized equipment.

Much of that material was collected from bases

throughout the Pacific and rushed to engineer depots

in Japan. There the incoming material was inspected,

repaired, and sent to units in Korea.

I joined the Far East Command and became commanding officer of the engineer depot at Yokohama in

September 1950. The Yokohama Engineer Depot was

organized right after the occupation of Japan. The Korean War increased its activities and that was the reason

I was ordered there. I commanded the whole depot and

stayed until July 1953.

A large proportion of the supply was made from

items that were leftover from World War II, many of

which were rehabilitated. This rehabilitation had been

going on since 1946, because there was some feeling

that there might be a confrontation with Russia. The

Army was stockpiling equipment in preparation for

any contingency.

When I arrived in September 1950 the depot was

still expanding. It had expanded considerably. The main

problem was personnel. I solved that by contacting the

headquarters people who were assigning personnel, and

by taking the assignment of officers of any branch. I received many infantry, field artillery, and other service

officers, as well as engineers. Now that requires training,

but we had enough officers and civilians who could train

these new officers.

The main reason these officers were sent over was

they were going into combat units in Korea. They were

happy to stay in Japan—it was a fairly safe place—rather

than be assigned to a combat unit in Korea. I don’t think

they were particularly avoiding it, but they were just as

happy to be assigned someplace else. By 1950, Japan was

a much more pleasant assignment than Korea.

Initially, I wasn’t very enthusiastic about being reassigned over there. An officer who knew me was the

engineer of the Japan Logistics Command and he asked

for me specifically. He knew I had supply experience.

Although I wasn’t excited with the assignment at first, I

became enthused with the work and the challenges it

gave me, and I enjoyed it very much.

As far as the Japanese were concerned, they hadn’t

changed any. They were still friendly, industrious, hardworking people. As I have said before, it was hard to

understand how they could have been what they were

during World War II.

There were shipping problems, and I was able to

solve some of them. For instance, the Bailey bridge

needed to be made up of hundreds of items. By experimentation, we devised a box whereby we could put a

complete bridge in two boxes, each weighing about 10

tons apiece. Each box contained a definite unit of

Practically no new equipment was sent from the

United States. It was all

equipment that was leftover

from World War II that was

sent up from New Guinea,

Australia, the Philippines,

and various islands.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 177

bridge, so that if you had a whole box, you could at

least build that much bridge. Before, if you lost a few

boxes, you lost a whole bridge. It worked fine. The only

thing the unit had to do was to be sure to have a crane

for lifting the box off and onto a truck or tractor until

it got to the point of use and they could dismantle the

box. Our engineer units had a crane and they liked

this arrangement very much.

Practically no new equipment was sent from the

United States. It was all equipment that was left over

from World War II that was sent up from New Guinea,

Australia, the Philippines, and various islands. We processed the equipment so that it wouldn’t rust or become

damaged while it was sitting in the depot in Korea or in

Japan, waiting to be used. We actually improved on the

processing that had been done in World War II. Besides

rebuilding equipment, our work at the depot involved

redoing the processing and actually removing rust and

corrosion. Some of the items had never been used, for

example, tractors and hand tools—saws, chisels, and

screws. They just needed a rust removal and, sometimes,

repainting. Of course as the rust progressed it extended

the damage to functioning equipment and limited the

repairs that could be made. If the engine crankshaft

was rusted, and the piston was rusted, you would have

to replace it.

Demand for the bridging equipment in Korea

was greater than in the island hopping of World War II.

There weren’t many streams to be bridged in going

up the chain of Pacific islands. Most of the operations

were merely getting ashore in a boat, until we got to

the island of Luzon, in the Philippines, where they

required some bridging.

During the war we actually increased the stock of

bridge parts. All of the remains

of the bridging that were left

down in New Guinea and

Australia were shipped up to

Japan and just dumped. They

were in many, many boxes.

We found in inventorying it

that some of it was missing

and we never did know

what happened to it. We

had to get bolts and certain parts made in Japan.

We made these parts on our own

equipment or we contracted it out.

Essentially, my supply work in Korea was rehabilitation and collection, rather than bringing in

new stuff. The one exception was lumber. Very little

lumber was shipped from the United States. When

we got lumber, for instance, we purchased it in the

Philippines and it was shipped by the boatload to

Japan and Korea.

Treads for a Bailey bridge

are loaded on a barge at

the Yokohama Engineer

Depot, 28 January 1951

RG 111, SC-356681
178 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

Following the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion’s

advance northward, in late November the intervention of Chinese troops forced the UN troops to retreat

south. The withdrawal was chaotic, and after it became clear that the Chinese had blocked their escape

route and would soon overrun the units trapped on

the road, Captain Farnum led 150 men on an 18-

hour trek, much of it through enemy territory, to safety.

Forward to the Town of Chonju

After breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter, the battalion

had moved forward to a small town called Chonju. At

that time I had turned over the responsibilities of the

S-1 and S-2 and was the

battalion S-3, but I know

I went forward with the

new S-1, who was Bob

Nehrling, to find billets

farther north.

We found a small

agricultural college on the

outskirts of Chonju and

selected that for our battalion CP. The weather was

good. It was cold at night,

but we had beautiful, sunshiny days. During this

period Lt. Caldwell, at headquarters, was wounded and

evacuated. Lts. Nehrling and Beahler were promoted to

captain. About the same time, the 1st of October, our

division rear moved from Miryang over to the westcoast port of Kunsan.

Early in October things were very quiet as far

as the engineer battalion was concerned. We were

working on the roads. Maj. Fry was the battalion commander. Col. McEachern was back at division rear

waiting to go before a reclassification board.

The roads in this area, provided the weather was

good, were not a particular problem. We were working

at keeping drainage open and putting additional rock

and gravel onto the road surface. Our heavy vehicles

put a great deal more strain on these all-weather roads

than the light traffic for which the roads were designed.

By and large we were widening the roads to ensure easy

passage of two-way traffic where feasible. Drivers had

to be very careful of oncoming vehicles because the

roads generally were substandard and their widths were

not adequate to take normal traffic of military size.

The assistant division commander who had relieved

our battalion commander, Col. McEachern, was Brig.

Gen. Joseph S. Bradley. He is the one who had to place

the charges against Col. McEachern for lack of leadership ability.

Capt. Robbins, assigned to the battalion, had

not lived up to our expectations of him during the

Using hand tools, soldiers of the 65th

Engineer Battalion work to fill holes in

the road near Hagammyond, Korea

Engineer School, Korea 86
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 179

Naktong perimeter experience. Maj. Fry put him up

for reclassification action, or elimination from service,

due to lack of ability.

Around 7 October, while we were still located at

Chonju, I went forward through Seoul to check the

bridges across the Han River, to see what was needed

for the IX Corps to enter that area. While on that

recon I made contact with the engineer section of

both X Corps and I Corps. Fortunately, between the

two engineer sections and the Eighth Army engineers,

we were able to get them to put in additional bridges

for the IX Corps. Sufficient Eighth Army engineers

were there to maintain the bridges so we didn’t have to

pull our own bridging section from the Naktong and

move it forward at that time.

About the same period of time, early October, I

was serving as both the S-3 and the S-1, but Capt.

Nehrling, who was the H&S Company commander, was

moved into the S-1 slot. Joe Cox, who was the motor

transportation officer, moved into the H&S Company

commander slot. They were both promoted to captain.

At this time I was the S-3, Nehrling was the S-1, and Joe

Cox had become the H&S Company commander. Lt.

Leamon became the communications officer, and Lt.

Appenfelder became our liaison officer.

We were now in the Seoul area. Seoul was a virtual

mess—refugees by the thousands. It was difficult to find

space to get the entire battalion together but we did find

an area. It was the first time the entire battalion was

together with all of our elements since mid-July when

we had arrived in Korea. We actually were billeted

about five miles south of Seoul in what had been the 1st

Replacement Depot at Yongdungp’o. The division was

in I Corps reserve.

 We had sent one of our line companies farther

north to work on some roads. It was very quiet, as far

as operations were concerned, but the engineers had

plenty of roadwork to do. Mid-October it started to

rain both day and night. With the rain the roadwork

Soldiers of the 77th Infantry

Division use a tank to pull

American and Korean Army

vehicles from the mud; spring

rains quickly turned narrow

dirt roads into quagmires

RG 111, SC-362455
180 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

became very intense and movement of our heavy loads

became a problem and a challenge.

On 22 October, Maj. Carl Price returned to the

battalion from Japan. Since the only field grade spot for

him was the S-3, I became the assistant S-3 and Carl

returned to his old job; however, the relationship between Maj. Price and Maj. Fry was such that Maj. Fry

would not accept him as the operations officer. On two

or three different attempts, Price was assigned to civil

affairs to remain in one of the villages as a civil affairs

officer. He would be gone for maybe a week or 10 days,

and then be back to the battalion.

Along about this time Col. McEachern appeared

before the reclassification board and no action was

taken. He was then assigned from our division to 3d

Logistics (log) Command in Pusan.

Capt. Robbins, who had been before a reclassification board, also was transferred to the log command

in his grade as captain.

Moving North, October-November 1950

On 31 October 1950 Capt. Nehrling and I went

north to locate a new area near Sariwon. The area had

been heavily destroyed so we looked at several facilities

in the P’yongyang area. Due to the damage and the number of other U.S. forces settling into the P’yongyang

area, we couldn’t find an area to take all of our heavy

equipment and provide an adequate facility for us.

We finally relocated in a town south of P’yongyang

called Choe Yong. We found a nice private girls high

school, which was not in use, and used that as the battalion billet.

We only got to spend about three days in our

nice billets in Choe Yong in early November and

then moved on up to P’yongyang. We stayed there only

one night, and then moved on to Sunch’on, which is

about 40 miles north of P’yongyang. A couple of our

line companies were some 30 miles farther north.

The weather was still quite good during the day,

getting very cold at night. We found a silk farm in the

Sunch’on area for a battalion CP, with ample space to

park all of our heavy equipment, and set up.

At this time the Eighth Army engineer had asked

me to write a paper on the use of engineers as infantry.

Essentially, what I wanted to put forth in that paper was

the fact that the engineers, although well qualified to

exhibit their bravery and their ingenuity as intelligent

engineers, when used in the line as infantry, did not

have the same capability the infantry units had. We didn’t

have mortars. We didn’t have the proper communications facilities to call in mortar fire or artillery support.

Our radios were fixed, mounted in our vehicles, while

the infantry carried their communications with them.

They had all this support that we could not call upon

when we were employed as infantry.

In the first week of November most of the battal-

...engineers, although well

qualified to exhibit their

bravery and their ingenuity

as intelligent engineers,

when used in the line as

infantry, did not have the

same capability the infantry

units had. We didn’t have

mortars. We didn’t have the

proper communications

facilities to call in mortar

fire or artillery support.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 181

ion was together in Sunch’on and ready to head north.

The way the corps wanted to lay out sectors heading

straight north, we didn’t particularly have an MSR. There

weren’t enough existing roads to serve each division so

that they would have an MSR. I was given the job to

locate feasible routes within our division sector to

move the division forward.

I did most of this reconnaissance by L-5 aircraft.

IX Corps assigned me an aircraft on a daily basis. After a

few days I was given my choice of pilots who would fly

down through the valleys and give me a look at small

streams that we would have to ford, or cross. The first

couple of weeks of November I spent a great deal of my

time on aerial reconnaissance for the advance of our division and the different regimental sectors.

Since I was not occupying a proper TO&E position, Maj. Fry offered me the command of Companies

A or D, or H&S Company. I would have taken Company B if it had been available, but a good friend, Capt.

Frank White, who was an excellent company commander,

commanded it. My good friend Joe Cox was doing very

well with H&S. Although Company A was commanded

by Lt. Smith, I really was somewhat hesitant to command the company that normally was in support of the

9th Infantry. Honestly, my personal preferences of the

regiments we had at that time was the 23d, which I had

been with for about a year and a half, then the 38th,

where I had many friends. I just didn’t have the social

contact and desire to be actively engaged with the 9th.

Capt. Kahaniak, a very fine officer, commanded

Company D at that time. I believe Capt. Kahaniak is

still alive, and, if so, he would be one of only three of our

officers who are still alive who were prisoners of the

Chinese for some 33 months.

On 11 November the weather was good and we

were directed to move up to Kunu-ri. The food up until

that time had been very good, but as our supply lines

extended in November we reverted to B rations.

Men of the

9th Regimental

Combat Team and

2d Engineer Battalion

are served breakfast

RG 111, SC-362314
182 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

On 15 November the battalion was located at

Kunu-ri in a cotton patch. The weather was cold, below

zero at night. We were in tents. The battalion had received no winter clothing as of that date. We were rather

jealous when we would see some members of the 3d Log

Command, or others who had their winter uniforms,

but none of the front line troops in the 2d Division had

received anything up to that time. There was no enemy

in sight. We were able to keep quite comfortable in

our CP tents.

The S-3 section, if not really busy because of operations, turned out the reports and all the directions for

the following day, as well as the write-ups of what happened on each particular day. The S-3 section was always busy, usually until at least midnight every night,

putting out the orders for the following day, getting all

the reports in, and making a historical record of what we

had done.

The battalion was basically working on roads at

the time. Usually, the bridges, where they existed, were

concrete affairs and very narrow. None of the bridges

would really accommodate passing trucks for MSR

purposes. In some cases we bypassed the bridges and just

put a detour around them. Other times, we widened

the bridge with timber trestle so that we could have

two-way traffic on the MSR.

On 19 November the entire battalion was together except for Company C, which was over about

40 miles east of Kunu-ri. I was continuing to make

aerial reconnaissance on a daily basis for our division,

for different routes to continue north.

The Chinese Attack the 2d

Engineer Combat Battalion

I moved back to the S-2 position and had Lt. Jim Welcher

as my assistant. I used him as a reconnaissance officer

and he was constantly on the road or in an aircraft looking at the terrain for movement. He made some of the

earliest reports on sightings of large numbers of enemy

troops coming into our area.

We reported these to division. On at least a couple

of occasions I recall taking Jim Welcher with me and

going to division to discuss it with the division G-2

and G-3. I know that I was present when they had

some radio discussion with higher headquarters, both

corps and army, and the reports back were that the enemy forces could not be as numerous or as heavy as we

were reporting.

Some of these reports came back from Japan, which

I’m sure were based upon aerial sightings along the border and such things. All the way through to the end of

November our reports of enemy activity were countered

by our division staff who were receiving information

from higher headquarters that the forces could not be

large enough to bother the division.

At this time Turkish troops were assigned to the

All the way through to the end

of November our reports of

enemy activity were countered

by our division staff who were

receiving information from

higher headquarters that the

forces could not be large

enough to bother the division.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 183

division. The first time I met up with some of them there

was a heavy traffic snarl up on one of the roads. I went

up to see if I could assist. The people who were having

all the problems didn’t speak English. We found them to

be particularly fine troops and great to have around, but

it was my first realization that there was a real language

problem in having Turkish, French, and Netherlands

[later on] troops with our division.

About 27 November the battalion was committed

as infantry in the vicinity of Kunu-ri. We were given

certain areas to hold. Our battalion CP area was hit

at night. A couple of our companies were overrun at

night up on a hill and we lost the hill.

The following day we had no communication with

the companies and so I told Col. Zacherle that I intended

to go up to where the companies had been to find out

why we were out of contact with them. Col. Zacherle

had taken over the battalion sometime after the middle

of November. Col. Zacherle had come out on the DA

promotion list, moved from junior major to a lieutenant

colonel on the Regular Army DA promotion list, and

took over as the battalion commander. It seems as if

he was battalion commander for a lot longer than that,

because so much happened in those few days.

Probably the stupidest thing in my 13 months in

Korea was to charge up this hill where our companies

had been to find out what had happened. Charlie Fry,

who had reverted from commanding down to being the

XO, said he was going with me. Jim Welcher said, “I’m

coming along too.” We took about four sergeants and

the three of us went charging up the hillside about as

fast as we could walk. We got to the brow of the hill and

found the company commander had been killed in action (KIA). The only sign of our troops was a few dead

bodies. Companies A and B had been assigned to hold

that particular hill. The captain whom we identified as

being KIA, whose body was out in the open, was Capt.

Frank Smith. About that time it didn’t take an overly

intelligent person to say, “We’re in an area that we don’t

control at all and there must be an awful lot of enemy

forces in and around us.”

Attacked while building

a raft on the Han

River, soldiers of the

14th Engineer Combat

Battalion return fire

RG 111, SC-361277
184 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

We started back down the

hill. The Chinese, who had taken

the hill from our companies, were

in their shallow foxholes and, in

some cases, apparently covered by

some of our own troops who had

been killed. They fired a few shots

at us as we went running down the

hill as fast as our legs would take

us. We didn’t take any effort at

evasion or return fire. Just knowing that the Chinese held the hill

and that we had no living elements

of our company up on the hill was

enough.

We got back down to our battalion CP area safely. Jim Welcher

had taken the time to take the billfold from the company commander

containing pictures of his wife and

children, the kind that most of us

carried. It was one of those memories that stay very clear

in your mind. They certainly could have killed all

seven of us with absolutely no problem but we were not

a threat to them. They didn’t choose to make a big issue

of our making a recon up there to the top of the hill.

When the Communist forces hit our 9th Regiment

fairly severely, the engineer battalion was placed on line

as part of the 3d Battalion, 9th

Infantry. The night of the 27th

our particular area was attacked,

and Companies A and B lost

many of their people as KIA.

The next day all the units

were ordered to pull back towards

Sunch’on. With all of our elements we moved back to an area

called Kujang-dong and Kunu-ri.

The division ordered all units in

the division to proceed towards

Sunch’on.

A battle order was issued

with the order of march. The 9th

Infantry was to lead through the

roadblock, which had been established by the Chinese forces south

of Kunu-ri, to be followed by the

38th. Interspersed with them

was the division provost, MPs, the

72d Tank, our antiaircraft types, and then to be followed

by the 503d Artillery, which was a 155 outfit, and then

the 38th Field Artillery 105s. Last were the engineers.

Within the engineer battalion, our order of withdrawal

was to be our Company D, followed by the battalion

staff, Headquarters and Service Company, and then

Companies A, B, and C.

Jim Welcher had taken the

time to take the billfold

from the company commander containing pictures

of his wife and children, the

kind that most of us carried. It was one of those

memories that stay very

clear in your mind.

Capt. Farnum carried this photograph of his wife

Jeanne and his children, l-r, Donna, Jeffrey, and

Joan, with him all the time he was in Korea. It

was, he said, “my inspiration to come home.”

Farnum Collection
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 185

At this same time many things happened in just

a two-day period that are important to the history of the

2d Engineers. On the morning of 29 November some

others from the battalion and I had gone west from the

Kunu-ri area to Anju, and then south, proving that

the road was open and there was no enemy fire on it.

Our recon element also had patrolled as far as they

could south of Kunu-ri to check the road and reported

back heavy fire on the road. Certain elements of the 9th

had already been hit by mortar fire along that section of

road, which was causing not only a deterioration of the

road surface itself, but also problems and blockages by

some of our damaged equipment.

I reported our reconnaissance to division and asked

permission to move our heavy equipment, and what we

would consider our trains, out by the western route going through Anju. That was going through another corps

area. I talked to Lt. Col. Holden, who was the division

G-3. We remained while he asked permission by radio,

not only from 2d Division personnel, but also from someone down at IX Corps. The answer was that the roadblock could not be as strong as we were reporting and

that the division should be able to clear it and come out

on the IX Corps MSR, which was straight south from

Kunu-ri, and not go through the adjoining corps’ area

[I Corps] through Anju.

That same morning division received permission

from I Corps to remove the division administrative

personnel and division trains that were with them out

through Anju and down to the south. So some of our

elements from division headquarters did move out in

that direction on the morning of the 29th.

 I felt that our engineering equipment, such as

dozers, which we had to move on low boys, certainly

didn’t need to be with the combat forces. We ought to

have been able to withdraw them on the road that we

knew from our reconnaissance to be open and capable

of taking all of our loads. Those are some of the heaviest loads of the division to go over roads and bridges.

Division basically tried to get us that permission, but

our directives were to go straight south.

On 30 November I was at division CP and

asked for a change in the decision. We were continuing

to patrol the road to Anju and south. We reported

that it was still open and requested that we take our

equipment out that way. The response was the same

as yesterday’s—the answer was no. They said, “Well,

we’ve got to go now,” because the 9th was making

what efforts they could to clear the roadblock and

to move their equipment through. The division headquarters personnel had already moved their administrative trains out the day before through Anju, their

vehicles interspersed with military police vehicles

of the division, and certain firepower from some of

our tanks from the 72d, and started south to run the

roadblock.
186 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

In subsequent years this was known as “The Gauntlet.” It was estimated at the time to be about six miles

long. The enemy held all of the high ground overlooking the road going through a narrow defile. Our infantry troops from both the 9th and the 38th had been unable to clear the enemy forces from the high ground.

The 23d Infantry [Regiment] had the assigned

mission of being the rear guard, the rear holding force,

for the withdrawal of the division. They were, in turn, to

follow the 2d Engineer Battalion down our IX Corps

MSR, which ran straight south from Kunu-ri.

When the division staff headed south, I left the

division CP to go back and report to Col. Zacherle and

Maj. Fry that they hadn’t accepted our request to go out

by way of Anju, or taken any of our equipment out by

the alternate route. The last thing I tried to ask them was

how long we were to remain deployed on the hills protecting this particular valley. I was unable to get any direction from division staff, mainly the division G-3, who

I still to this day have a great deal of admiration for. He

was a lieutenant colonel carrying a tremendous load and

responsibility. He definitely tried to get authority. This

basin was overlooked by a series of steep hills, practically

at Kunu-ri, and north of Kunu-ri.

Our division headquarters was minus their administrative sections, which had pulled out on the 29th. The

503d Field Artillery was in a bivouac area, with their

guns really pointing 360 degrees, and the 38th Field

Artillery of 105s, and the engineer battalion.

On the 30th, after failing to get authority from division to move any of our equipment out through Anju,

I went back to our battalion area and told them to wait

for the artillery battalions to get on the road, and then to

follow them down IX Corps’ MSR through Kunu-ri, the

fire block being approximately six miles south of Kunu-ri.

We waited on the hill all that afternoon with no

particular action by the enemy. We still felt that we controlled the days and they controlled the nights, except

that in the fire block area, where they held the high

ground, it was obvious why our division was having a

terrible time getting through it.

Late in the afternoon, but prior to dark, we intercepted a radio message not addressed to us. We were on

the same net, but we heard the message from the 23d

that they were breaking contact with the Communist

Chinese Forces (CCF) and withdrawing west to Anju

and then going south. By this time the road had cleared

sufficiently so that the 503d Field Artillery was on the

road heading south. The 38th Field Artillery and our

Company D of engineers had most of their vehicles on

the road behind the 38th. We had sent all of our drivers,

administrative type people, cooks, and whatnot, down

to get on the vehicles, get on the road, and proceed as

far south as they could.

We had people in our headquarters’ vehicles, H&S

Company, A, B, and C, who were to follow in that

When we got up into the 503d

area we found something that

looked like Dante’s Inferno.

One of the large ammo supply

trucks of the 503d was on

fire....and the 155-mm shells

were cooking off and exploding.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 187

In a scene that was indicative of the gale force winds and

sub-zero temperatures that American forces encountered,

Marines move south, December 1950 RG 127-GK-234J-A5370
188 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

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North to the Yalu September–December 1950 189

Your notes

indicate to make

the map a full

bleed. Since this is

vertical, I can’t do

that without

cropping A LOT of

information out.

This is my solution

for now.

order. I know that there was not enough road space to

get Company C’s vehicles out of their bivouac area and

onto the road, and probably no room even for portions

of A’s and B’s vehicles.

It wasn’t a single column of vehicles. We used every inch of road space—at some places, three vehicles

abreast, at other places, two. By 0730, or even earlier,

the column was not moving at all.

I notified Col. Zacherle that I was going to

walk forward along the road to see whether there

was anything that we could do to assist in breaking the

absolute gridlock of vehicles. Lt. John Bergner went

with me.

Our column of vehicles stretched for three to five

miles along the road. As we walked forward, of course,

we walked past our Company D, through the 38th Field

[Artillery], and were up into the area of the road that

was occupied by the 503d.

By the time we got up there the Chinese forces,

which were primarily to the east of the road at the section that we were on, were blowing bugles and flashing

lights. These were their command and control-type

mechanisms to precede a massive assault.

When we got up into the 503d area we found

something that looked like Dante’s Inferno. One of the

large ammo supply trucks of the 503d was on fire. It

was a gasoline, petroleum-type fire, and the 155-mm

shells were cooking off and exploding.
190 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

The road was completely blocked with vehicles.

There wasn’t any room along the sides to push them off

into a ditch. It appeared to be an absolute physical block

of the road. There were no alternate routes that we could

bring a bulldozer up and try to put a road alongside,

because this was mountainous terrain. It was a narrow

defile, and it was plugged.

John and I then started back towards the 2d Engineer vehicles. Every vehicle had been sitting there for

some time not able to move. There were the drivers and

a certain number of personnel in each vehicle. Most of

the people hadn’t had a great deal of sleep in the past

week, and it was about as cold as you can imagine. Many

of the troops were bundled or, if they had their sleeping

bags with them, they were in their sleeping bags with

their clothes on, trying to stay warm and get some rest.

We wanted to make sure that nobody was left in the

vehicles asleep, wrapped in a sleeping bag.

John and I rapped on each vehicle and directed all

the people to grab their weapons, vacate the vehicle, hit

the ditch, and expect an attack within moments. These

were not 2d Battalion people. They were artillery, the

first group being 503d Artillery people. We got back and

through the 38th Field Artillery Battalion doing the same

thing. Their officers were out giving the same orders.

Although we didn’t ask them to follow us, some of

those people followed John and me rather than staying

in that particular area, which obviously was going to

be an area soon to be hit by the Chinese forces. You

could feel it. You could feel the attack. There was a

strange garlic odor that would permeate an area and

it was strong.

We got back to the 2d Engineer Battalion vehicles,

with Company D in the lead. We got all the way through

Company D, telling everybody to get out of their vehicles and take a defensive posture, into the H&S Company area. At that time the Chinese attack started in earnest. Massive numbers of ground troops attacked the

vehicles, and my recollection is that the bulk of them

came from the east.

I got back as far as my own vehicle, which was

occupied by my driver Cpl. Merrill Philips, who survived the whole episode and is currently living in Grand

Junction, Colorado. In the vehicle with him was Sgt.

Cook, our sergeant major for the 2d ECB.

They accompanied me, along with a group of others, many of them belonging to the S-1 section. We got

up onto some high ground. I made a very short attempt

at locating the battalion and the other battalion staff

members, such as Col. Zacherle and Maj. Fry, but particularly Capt. Nehrling, because many of the troops that

were right in that area were from his section.

I didn’t find him or receive any response. I had

made a decision quite consciously a couple of days before that if we couldn’t get our equipment out we would

head due south. I had given maps to different platoon

By the time we got up

there the Chinese

forces, which were

primarily to the east of

the road at the section

that we were on, were

blowing bugles and

flashing lights. These

were their command

and control-type

mechanisms to precede

a massive assault.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 191

leaders and company commanders with my view of

the direction they should go to reach the Sunch’on

area, which we knew was to be the regrouping area for

Eighth Army.

A Long Walk in the Dark

I don’t recall enough about the stars now, but at that

time I was more interested in the stars. There was an

evening star that was due south of Kunu-ri. I had told

people to take a bearing on that star and to head due

south, basically up until 2330 or 2400, at which time

the star would be moving out of the sector that you

wanted to follow. Then you had to revert to locating

the North Star, and heading south.

The Chinese attacked in waves. The first wave had

hit the road and the vehicle area. Then there seemed to

be a lull and mass confusion. During that period I

asked the people around me to follow me. I seemed to

be the accepted leader and the self-appointed one.

The first wave came at 1930 or 2000. It was dark.

There was a moon, not a full moon, perhaps, but it was

a clear, bright night. I certainly knew from my hike up

the road that the road itself was not a good route to

take. So, I led the people off to the east of the MSR

and headed south on trails.

There were a lot of paths in Korea because the

mode of transportation from village to village and

field to field often wasn’t along the road. The Koreans

walked the shortest distance to the next village. It was

not hard to find a trail going in the general direction.

We had only gone a short distance when we came

to a cluster of houses. I wouldn’t call it a village, particularly, but there would be a group of houses with fields

around them, a lot of cotton and grain fields. You’d go

some distance and there would be another cluster of

houses. The farmers who owned and farmed the land

lived in mud and straw houses. Their heat was a very

low fire built so that the smoke went underneath the

floor—a marvelous way to heat a house.

The only time that I was scared

throughout that night was when a dog

barked very loudly in this first cluster

of houses. An American can’t quite

shoot a dog, but if I could have gotten

my hands on him I would have

throttled him. It seemed like the entire world must have responded to

that barking dog.

We went through single file,

the troops following me. We walked

without stopping. We could hear

mortar and gunfire to our right and

to our rear. After about one hour

of walking we came to some valley where we received a challenge

to our movement. The challenge

Wounded in the leg,

Pfc. Edward Wilson,

24th Infantry, 25th

Infantry Division,

waits to be evacuated

RG 111, SC-358355
192 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

was in a language that I did not recognize. I have no idea

whether it was Chinese, North Korean, South Korean,

or even possibly one of the UN forces that were serving

in that same area. We called back that we were Americans. With that an automatic weapon fired at us and

we returned the fire. The weapon fell silent. I have no

idea, nor did we send anyone to try to find out, what the

challenge was. We altered our course and went further

to the east, rather than continuing on the trail that

we were on. In the valleys everything was cultivated, so

there was always a trail going generally the direction

you wanted to go.

We continued generally southeast, south-southeast,

and I really didn’t know how many people were following me. When I stopped the column I had them all just

stop in place. It was a single-file Indian-style operation.

I then walked back along the column until I reached

John Bergner, whom I had asked to bring up the rear.

You remember the amusing things. We had received

a PX Red Cross ration, which came along with the

Thanksgiving food in late November. Amongst that was

a tremendous amount of Lifesavers candy. They were

the packages—and I can remember them so well—of

the multi-flavored Lifesavers. They weren’t the most

popular things with the troops, obviously, but there

were just a lot of them. On the 30th, I had filled all of

the pockets of my officer’s overcoat, my pants, and my

jacket inside, with Lifesavers. I really have never liked

water and normally relied upon lemon drops and hard

candy to quench my thirst whenever I was out all day

long in the field. I went along with these Lifesavers and

gave each person one Lifesaver until I got back to John.

He made some flippant remark like, “My God, I’m

doing all this work for you, bringing up the rear, and

all you give me is one lousy Lifesaver?” With that, why,

my spirits went up.

On one of these stops I can remember John saying, “Larry, look! There’s thousands of Chinese. The

whole field is alive with them and they’re all coming

this way!”

I said, “John, you’re hallucinating. Those are old

dead bushes waving in a cotton field, or they’re old

stocks of grain.” He may have been right and I may

have been wrong, but it was my choice to believe that

we didn’t see anybody.

I would go up to the front of the column and

we would move out and go approximately 45 minutes

to an hour. Then I would stop and go back along the

column. I then realized that out of the people who

were following me, a small percentage were 2d Engineers.

They were mostly artillery people.

The column was about company size. Some of

the reports say that I came out with 300 people. I think

it was probably closer to 150. Out of that, maybe a

third were 2d Engineer people.

They were all just individuals to me. I didn’t know
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 193

whether they were officers, sergeants,

or privates. Up close to me at the

front of the column there was an

NCO from the 2d Engineers, and

also Capt. Paul Jones.

Jones came up two times and

pointed out heavy enemy troop

concentrations. We were walking

in the valleys, but they were usually up on the hillside, not

going over the tops of the hills but

traveling along the trails to their

houses and villages. I felt that

Paul was hallucinating but perhaps I chose not to see enemy.

We came to a group of houses where

there was a granite quarry. Now, I’m a graduate mining

engineer and had worked in open pit mines. I knew that

the main access would be across the bottom of the quarry,

but that there also would be a trail directly along the face

of the quarry going over the top of the hill. I chose to

take the trail along where they would do the drilling to

blast out the rock. We went across to the other side of

this fairly good-sized hill. We got to the other side and I

stopped the column. I went back to the end of the column and John Bergner was not there.

I thought, “We’re not going any farther without

John because I don’t know where the split in the column

comes.” I asked four men to

volunteer to go with me and

we continued back the route

we had come. At a fair distance we found John. He was

on his left knee with his right

foot in front of him. He was

leaning his head against his

carbine and he was sound

asleep. His right foot was between 6 inches to a foot from

the vertical drop of the quarry,

which I would estimate was

probably an 80-foot sheer drop

to the bottom. It was very easy

to see him. The moon was quite

high at that time. I went up and took his hand gently

and led him away from the precipice; that was the

last time he went to sleep that night!

When I got back to the head of the column we

continued our hike. By this time we were getting into

the wee hours, probably 0200 or 0300. I felt

that we had to be a long way away from the CCF, not

that we really were. But we were beginning to feel

quite safe.

Along about 0400 we met our only other challenge

and roadblock. It came as rather startling. We were challenged in a foreign tongue—Chinese, North Korean,

At a fair distance we found

John. He was on his left

knee with his right foot in

front of him. He was leaning

his head against his carbine

and he was sound asleep.

His right foot was between

6 inches to a foot from the

vertical drop of the quarry,

which I would estimate was

probably an 80-foot sheer

drop to the bottom.

Col. Larry Farnum and Col. John

Bergner in Carmel, California, 1996

Farnum Collection
194 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

South Korean—something other than English. We

hollered back in English that we were Americans and

we were fired upon.

We hadn’t taken protective cover. We hadn’t

dropped to the ground. We were probably pretty damned

tired. At that time Sgt. Mankowski, who had always been

quite close to me in the lead of the column, was hit in

both legs. He was the only one hit. We returned some

fire and the shooting stopped.

We called but we didn’t make a real effort to find

out what had happened or who it was. They weren’t firing at us anymore. We took Sgt. Mankowski over to a

hillside to the west of the route we were taking down. It

was a slope of one of their

steep hills with a fair number of trees on it. He, of

course, said to go on. I

asked for some volunteers

and left four men and a

fair amount of ammunition with them. I told

them that we would

send a patrol out as

soon as we could.

Those were the

only men we left.

Fortunately, those men got back

before the rest of us finished our walk. As far as I know,

that was my only wounded throughout the entire

hike, which was someplace between 30 and 50 miles,

a good 18 hours of steady pressing on.

We walked a few more hours. Shortly after daylight, about 0600-0630, a small U.S. aircraft liaison

type, an L-5, flew over and dropped a message to us

that we were coming into the 5th Cavalry area, that we

were approaching their lines and were safe. He circled

for a while, and then landed in a valley off to our right

front, near a streambed. He was from the 5th Cavalry

and had room for one passenger.

Well, we looked around to see who was the

most seriously hurt or impaired that we might have

with us. A Turkish captain had a couple of serious

bullet wounds in him and he hadn’t made a complaint

all night. We put him in the aircraft and told the

pilot about Sgt. Mankowski and the men we had left

on the hillside. He either radioed that back or went

back and reported to the cavalry. The cavalry sent out a

tank patrol and brought those men back. They all

made it through.

The pilot asked us whether we needed transport

to get our people back. We wanted to walk on rather

than wait for trucks to come and get us. Everybody was

in the mood to continue walking south just as rapidly

as we could.

Eventually, one truck came by and the driver said,

“Hey, I can take the people down.” We put a certain

After landing on the road, an

L-5 aircraft is parked to keep

the road clear for traffic

Engineer School, 11-20-22
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 195

number aboard, but the main group walked until we

were in a defensive perimeter of the 5th Cavalry. We

continued to walk until lunchtime, about 1300. Then

we were into the cavalry unit areas where we were given

something to eat.

After that, there were sufficient vehicles to get us

further to the south and into the Sunch’on area. Second

Division elements were forming, bivouacking, and

looking for others. From there we continued a hasty

withdrawal.

Some people say we shot our way out. The people

in the division, who wrote up the Silver Star for me,

describe in the citation how we were attacking up the

hill and attacking through some different blocks. My

personal recollection is basically a friendly darkness of

night that provided us an opportunity to get together

in groups, decide which way we were going to go, and

head that way.

Mine was not a mission to attack anybody, but to

get the people who were following me safely down to

Sunch’on. I don’t recall firing my weapon one time. I

was carrying a carbine. Other than the two very brief

firefights when we were challenged, I don’t recall a

threat to our life and limb.

When we got back to the division area, Paul

Jones, who was the next ranking officer, a captain, junior to me, remembered the hike differently. He thought

we lost a large number of people. We would talk about

it and he would say, “The Chinese were reaching out

and grabbing and people were disappearing.” If we lost

people along the road it was because a few may have

been too tired to carry on and chose to crawl into a

bush and go to sleep, but I really don’t know of any.

I prefer to think that we didn’t lose a person who started

out with us.

It was a long column of people walking single file.

There were many places where, passing a deserted house,

someone could have chosen not to go any further. But I

had my rear guard in John Bergner. I think the men continued to walk in that single file. Most of them probably

didn’t know there were more than five or six people with

them. All they could see were two or three people ahead

of them and they knew that a couple of people were behind them. I know they were dead tired.

The other clear memory is one of those lighthearted ones. When it turned light, around 0600, about the

time the aircraft came over, it felt like we were safe and

it was all over and I halted the column. I walked back

along it, trying to be the glib company commander, saying, “How are you?” and “It’s been a good hike,” and

“Did you get enough exercise?”

Two soldiers particularly stood out in my memory.

They were black, and one was in the lead carrying the

base plate for a .50-caliber machine gun. He had several

bandoliers of .50-caliber shells across his shoulders. I

don’t know the weight of the base plate for the heavy

Some people say we shot

our way out....My personal

recollection is basically a

friendly darkness of night that

provided us an opportunity to

get together in groups, decide

which way we were going to

go, and head that way.
196 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

.50-caliber, but it’s heavy as hell! I said, “Well, you’ve

carried that all night? Great job! Where’s the weapon?”

“My buddy right behind me has it,” he said. I looked

at the fellow behind him. He wasn’t carrying a thing.

His eyes were great big and round and white. He was

shaking his head, back and forth, mouthing, “No, no.

Don’t tell him.” He was praying to me, with his eyes. I

realized that at some point along the line he had laid

down the .50-caliber. Well, I went along with him very

rapidly and told the fellow who was carrying the base

plate, “That’s all right. We’re safe now. You can put it

down.” He said, “Oh, no. I’ve got to keep this.” And we

said, “No. Everything’s all right now. I’ve told your buddy

we’re leaving the .50-caliber here for the 5th Cavalry to

pick up.” I don’t think he ever knew—I hope he never

knew—that his good friend who was carrying the

.50-caliber hadn’t had the .50-caliber for probably several hours. But I guess those are the things that, being in

service, are so precious to you. I’ll always carry in my

mind’s memory the looks on those two faces.

We got back down to the cavalry lines. I never heard

from the artillery battalion people who had come out

with me—not that I expected to. Everybody was terribly

busy for the next month getting re-equipped and

retrained to become combat effective again.

On 1 December the division was declared combat

noneffective, a sad thing for any division to go through.

All of our efforts were to get back to the division rear

area and to find our own units. I was probably the ranking person to come out from the 2d Engineers.

When we did get back to our division rear area

some of our elements were there. Our bridge platoon

had not been with us. Some of the people from Dog

Company hadn’t been with us up forward. We had our

division rear personnel, mail clerks, and people like that.

On 1 December our battalion strength was approximately 250, but probably close to 200 of those were in

some other area, and not with us at Kunu-ri to make the

long trek home. The battalion strength that had stood at

Kunu-ri was approximately 900 people.

As soon as we got back to division rear, medical

personnel looked us over. The doctor wanted to evacuate all of us to Japan. All the men who were with me

agreed when I said, “Not on your life. We’ve got too

much to do here.”

The reason the doctor recommended evacuation

was that everybody had some form of frostbite. I had

frozen toes, a couple of frozen fingers, and some spots

on my face that were frostbitten. We made a deal with

the medics that we would have a battalion/company

formation daily to look at the frostbite, to ensure that

people were doing what they asked us to do in the way

of some creams and salves that they gave us. They told

us what to look for in making sure that black streaks

didn’t start going up your foot or leg, or up your arm,

and that the spots on noses and faces didn’t get too

The doctor wanted to

evacuate all of us to Japan.

All the men who were with

me agreed when I said, “Not

on your life. We’ve got too

much to do here.”
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 197

serious. So, we had almost an amusing time, an interplay of all ranks, at 1400 each day, where we would

meet in a large room to take off our shoes and socks,

check each other, exercise our toes, massage the places,

and put on the salve.

I assumed command of the battalion on 1 December and with the help of the people who had been at

division rear, our mail clerks and people like that, we

put on a battalion formation. We spread out the companies, H&S Company and the battalion staff, leaving place

for all the people who were missing. [2d Div. War Diary

for Nov 1950 shows the 2d ECB with an authorized

strength of 977, with casualties of 561 (15-30 Nov 1950),

and with an actual strength on 1 Dec 1950 of 266 men.]

It was a very moving time. I tried to stand in the position that I should stand in as the S-2 as if Col. Zacherle

was there. [Col. Farnum was battalion commander

for nearly 2 weeks, until the new commander, Maj.

Edmund H. Leavey, arrived]. Our division rear personnel, who had the roster, called off the names of all those

people who were missing and the ones who were there.

This was basically done with the help of our clerks who

were back at division rear. They knew all of our names,

got our mail up to us, and knew who our family members were. In this past year [1997], as I’ve gotten back

into meeting with some of the people of the 2d Engineers, I’ve been told how much this meant to those

people who were not with us up at Kunu-ri.

Then we retreated further, back to areas to try to

regroup. Our only trucks that we had in quantity were

our Brockway trucks, which were loaded with our floating bridge. I believe we unloaded a couple of those just

to carry people and the supplies we were able to get.

During this period some of the people who had

come out showed absolutely great ingenuity in getting

supplies. As we were falling back rapidly, quartermaster-type units in the P’yongyang area were in the

process of destroying all this equipment, tanks and

vehicles, so that it wouldn’t fall into the hands of the

Chinese. We were in great need of the very vehicles

that they were destroying.

197

We got some of our

supplies at gunpoint

because the person

who was assigned to

burn the supplies was

afraid to turn them over

to us. They were burning

clothing and rations that

we didn’t have.

Although riddled by enemy gunfire, this ambulance

continued to carry casualties suffered during

the withdrawal from Changjin (Chosin)

RG 127, 127-N-A5461
198 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

It seems infeasible, and it must be wrong, but

the Army is a big organization. When people are told to

destroy all of their supplies before they leave the area,

that is their mission.

We got some of our supplies at gunpoint because

the person who was assigned to burn the supplies

was afraid to turn them over to us. They were burning

clothing and rations that we didn’t have. I don’t personally remember reaching an area where they were destroying vehicles, which we needed so badly, but some

of my people did. They were able to get some vehicles

to help us in our movement back.

As soon as we got back to the Sunch’on area my

driver told me that we liberated a jeep ambulance that

I used as my vehicle. It was a particularly good vehicle

to have because it had a heater in the back.

When we got back to the Yongdungp’o area we

were going to be in position for a few days. Maj. Gen.

Robert B. McClure had taken over as the commanding

general of the 2d Division. He was only with us about

one month. During that time he was very kind to me

as a captain, and a member of the Corps of Engineers,

and said that he was perfectly satisfied with me being

his division engineer. It was nice to hear and I appreciated it. I knew at the same time that Eighth Army

was doing everything in its power to get us restaffed

with qualified engineers. As a matter of fact, the Eighth

Army Engineer had contacted me that he was getting a

couple of majors who were coming out of Eighth

Army in Japan. Gen. McClure said, “We don’t need

them. I’ve got a battalion commander.” Those were

things you liked to remember.

I contacted Col. Sawin at Eighth Army. He had

been my Professor of Military Science (PMS) at college.

He was a help in breaking loose some of our early

replacement officers who came from Japan.

I made a trip down to 3d Logistics Command in

Pusan and found Col. McEachern, our ex-battalion

commander. He assisted in making up the necessary

requisitions for all the equipment that we needed. That

ran the gamut from weapons to trenching tools, shovels,

vehicles, and engineer items of all sorts and descriptions.

It was through his efforts that we were able to, within

a matter of a week, have a couple of our companies ready

to support if called upon and to get back to some engineering work.

Our headquarters and our H&S Company were

sorely stressed to fend for themselves. It took some time

to get engineering equipment, such as dozers, lowboys,

that sort of thing, back into our hands to where we

could say we’re ready to do our job.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 199

Heavy snow fails to stop men of the 2nd Engineer

Combat Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, as

they survey for supply routes RG 111, SC-387034

North to the Yalu September–December 1950 199
200 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

ieutenant Trayers describes the 1st Cavalry

were there. When he turned to go back up to the topside

of the bridge, one of the Koreans fired at him with a .45-

caliber pistol. The bullet entered his back, came out

through his chest, and nicked his chin. Georgeff was

not seriously wounded but he required hospitalization.

I went to B Company to replace Georgeff and took

over his platoon. The company commander at that

time was Merlin W. Anderson who was in the Class of

’47 at the Military Academy. He was the company commander of Company F-2

at West Point, and I was

in Company G-2 at West

Point, so I knew who he

was having seen him at

many of the cadet formations. Donald S. Aines

was the maintenance,

supply, and transportation (MS&T) officer. Lt.

Bull Durham was one of

the platoon leaders, and

Ronald A. Severson was

the other platoon leader.

I had the second platoon.

I was very fortunate working for Merlin W. Anderson because he provided me with the instruction that

I did not get in the basic course. Anytime that I was

working on a project, he would give me guidance as to

Division’s drive north from the Pusan Perimeter to

L

Unsan in North Korea. Having never attended the

Engineer Basic Course, Lieutenant Trayers found himself alternately building and blowing bridges and considering the advantages of “going by the book.”

By now we had pushed on farther and gone north.

On 12 October the reconnaissance officer was wounded,

so I was assigned from

Company D to H&SC,

and became the reconnaissance officer. On 22 October Lt. Karl K. Georgeff

was wounded, and I was

reassigned from reconnaissance officer to platoon

leader of the 2d Platoon in

Company B. I had that assignment for most of the

rest of my tour in Korea.

Georgeff was inspecting the capacity of the

bridges, specifically the

ability of the bridges to carry tanks. He went underneath

this one bridge to inspect the strength of the stringers

and a group of Koreans were huddled together there. He

took no notice of them other than to realize that they

Second Lt. James Trayers Trayers Collection
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 201

the best way to attack the project and what was expected

when it was done. Even now I remember some of his

words of wisdom. He paraphrased and made things

very simple like, “Get the water off and the rock on,”

and “Put angular rocks in square holes.” He had many

sayings and he really provided me with basic course

training.

I was part of the regimental combat team and did

the usual things that a combat engineer platoon does. I

installed many, many mines, both antipersonnel and

antitank, much barbed wire, both single and double

apron, and concertina, and I had a large section of

roads for road maintenance.

I cleared fields of fire, put in culverts, revetments,

built a bridge or two, and did a lot of demolition work.

At one location I had orders to build a bridge. We

had built many bridges with typical vertical piers and

the bridge coming flat across the top. On this mission I

thought that it would be instructional, because the terrain was suitable, if my platoon built an A-frame bridge.

That is, one with the piers, which instead of being vertical they were joined at the top to form an A, and the

deck would come across the center of the piers such that

the profile was in the shape of an A.

I discussed my plan with my platoon sergeant, Sgt.

Joseph Gonzales. He said, “I don’t know if that’s such a

good idea, lieutenant. The men are familiar with building the regular timber trestle bridge. This is different.” I

countered with, “Well, it would be good for training.”

He said, “The men not only don’t need training, they

don’t like it.” I said, “Okay, Sergeant Gonzales, we’ll build

the regular kind of bridge.” That was another lesson that

I learned. Let the men do what they do best. Don’t start

changing it.

Sgt. Gonzales rotated home and it was my job to

pick someone to take his place as the platoon sergeant. I

picked one of the sergeants who had been a squad leader.

His name was Sgt. James E. Schwarz. Schwarz didn’t have

201

Soldiers of the 2d

Engineer Battalion

construct a timber

trestle bridge across

the Taedong River

at Sunchon, 12

November 1950

Engineer School, 42-1-283
202 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Second Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

as much time as squad leader as did my other squad leaders, but in my opinion he displayed potential. By the

time he got promoted to master sergeant he was only

about 20 years old.

The next job that I had to do was to blow a bridge.

This is when we were withdrawing to the south. Capt.

Anderson and I went to visit the S-3 of the 7th Cavalry.

Capt. Anderson asked, “Why are we blowing the bridge?”

and the officer from the 7th Cavalry replied, “Because

the field manual says that in a withdrawal you destroy

the bridges.”

Capt. Anderson gave me the mission. I explained

that while I understood the nature of the explosives, I

hadn’t really had any experience in blowing up a bridge.

He said that I should take Sgt. Richard A. Henry with

me because he knew all about explosives.

I explained to Sgt. Henry what we were going

to do and I asked him how much explosive we should

use. He advised me that it was not his job to estimate

how much explosive would be needed—he said that

was the lieutenant’s job. I said, “If we take a trailer load

that ought to be enough.” The bridge to be destroyed

was a box-girder railroad bridge. So I directed that

we take 10 cases of C-3 explosive, which would fit in a

jeep trailer.

Sgt. Henry, my driver Haney, and I drove some

distance in front of the front lines to the bridge site. This

bridge turned out to be a very, very important bridge

because it was on one of the main railroad lines in the

Iron Triangle in the Ch’orwon area.

After we arrived at the bridge site Sgt. Henry,

Haney, and I placed all 10 boxes of explosives in the

space between the box-girders where they came together

on the top of the pier. The space was just wide enough

to put a case of explosives in. On one side we put five

cases, and on the other side we put the other five cases.

We put a 10-minute fuse with a blasting cap in order to

give us time to get out of there. Haney and I drove one

mile north on the road, and Sgt. Henry ran as far as

he could in the other direction. I heard that thing go.

Even a mile north I remember there were pieces of

steel from the bridge flying over our heads.

I went back and we had done our job. We had

demolished the bridge. About five feet of the pier had

been destroyed and two box girders had been knocked

off the pier. It wasn’t really the right thing to do because

shortly thereafter we attacked north and the bridge was

back in our sector again. It was made with boxedgirders and installed by the Japanese. We had the Japanese fabricate new girders. The bridge was out of action

for an extended time.

By late November we were as far north as we were

going to go. We had Thanksgiving dinner just south of

the city of Unsan. One of the other divisions replaced

the 1st Cavalry Division in the line and we moved back

to the Chinnamp’o area where my platoon built an

We put a 10-minute fuse

with a blasting cap in order

to give us time to get out of

there. Haney and I drove one

mile north on the road, and

Sgt. Henry ran as far as he

could in the other direction.

I heard that thing go. Even a

mile north I remember there

were pieces of steel from the

bridge flying over our heads.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 203

airstrip. One of the other platoons was taking mines

out of the harbor. The story was that we were going to

go home by Christmas; however the Chinese attacked

in late November and pushed the UN forces south

across the 38th parallel. When we crossed the 38th

Parallel on the way north there was a sign that said, “You

are now crossing the 38th Parallel, compliments of

the 7th Cavalry Regiment.” Later, when we were withdrawing, someone had written on the back of the sign to

be seen as we traveled south, “You are now crossing

the 38th Parallel compliments of the 1st Communist

Chinese Field Army.”

Engineers place satchel charges

on a railroad bridge near

Pyongyang prior to demolishing it

RG 111, SC-355302
204 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Delbert M. Fowler IX Corps Engineer Section

aptain Fowler describes his assignment to

Tiger Airlines to Korea, landing in Pusan in August 1950.

We unloaded off the plane and immediately loaded

onto trucks. The thing I remember most about Korea

from those days was the dust and the mud. All of the

roads we were traveling were unpaved and the dust

was 4 to 6 inches deep. The dust literally boiled up

behind our truck. All the people in the back of that

truck were covered with dust and it was almost impossible to breathe.

We traveled west from Pusan on the train as far as it

could go, and that was a blown railroad bridge. We then

got out of the train and reloaded on more trucks. These

were essentially three-quarter-ton trucks. We traveled the

dusty roads all of the way to a place near Chonju and

that’s where we found what represented itself as IX

Corps headquarters.

Although we came in with essentially a corps

headquarters fully staffed, one was already in place.

Apparently, General MacArthur had applied for this

corps to be present for the invasion of Inch’on. When

it became clear that it was not going to get there in time,

he activated one of his own. He took I Corps and they

became the invasion corps at Inch’on.

IX Corps then took over the other units in Korea.

X Corps was not in Korea at that time, so it was just I

Corps and IX Corps. IX Corps took over the remnant

units from the Pusan Perimeter, mainly the 24th and

25th Divisions.

C

supply operations, Engineer Section, IX Corps. Subsequently assigned as IX Corps officer in charge of

map distribution, he learned that “distribution” sometimes meant hurling burlap bags full of maps out

of C-119s.

I received orders to Texas A&M, reported in May

1950, and managed to finish the summer semester before I left. In August 1950 I was assigned to IX Corps,

which was preparing to leave for Korea. They were assembling in Fort Sheridan, Illinois, and I had only two

days notice to get there. One day I came home and told

my wife, “We have got to pack our bags.” She said,

“Why?” I said, “Well, I am going to Fort Sheridan and

to Korea. Where would you like to go?” She said, “I guess

I might as well go home,” which was her parent’s home

in Freehold, New Jersey. The next day the movers came,

and the day after that the household goods were gone.

The following day she got on an airplane and flew to

New Jersey, while I got in our car and drove to Fort

Sheridan, Illinois.

IX Corps headquarters stayed at Fort Sheridan

about two weeks. During that time I got about five days

off. I drove the car back to New Jersey so it would have a

home while I was gone. Then I went back to Fort

Sheridan, and our IX Corps headquarters flew on Flying
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 205

Map Distribution, IX Corps

I was assigned as a map supply officer. I said to myself,

“What qualifies me to be a map supply officer and

what the hell does one do?” Well, I found out pretty

quickly when I got there what one did. I could only

conclude that I was assigned as map supply officer

because I had that short tour as supply officer in Austria

and not a lot of first lieutenants were running with

supply officer experience.

My boss was the IX Corps Engineer, Col. William

N. Thomas, Jr. I’d just as soon forget his name. He was a

Thomason Act officer. He really despised all West Point

graduates and that included me. The Thomason Act

was a source for officers in the twenties and thirties.

It was like OCS or ROTC.

The corps commander was Lt. Gen. John B.

Coulter. After a couple of months I began to ask my boss

for a transfer to an engineer company. This corps headquarters was all right, but not for a career. Well, he would

have no part of it. Every time I’d ask him he just got

madder, so I stopped asking and waited for one of

us to leave. He finally left at the end of the year.

Col. Gerald Galloway replaced him. Galloway was

altogether different. He was a good supervisor, an intelligent person and very thoughtful. He hadn’t been there

very long when I asked him for an assignment to a company. By this time I was a captain. I went over as a first

lieutenant, but everybody had been promoted on the

Department of Army order to captain. He said, “No,

you just stay around here and I’ll see that you are a

major before you go home.” The GHQ in Tokyo could

promote officers in the field, at least through the grade

of major, so I stayed on [Capt. Fowler was promoted

to major, 15 Feb 1952].

So, I served as a map supply officer. I’ll tell you

about a few of my experiences and observations. The

map production depot was in Yokohama, Japan. The

plates they had to produce maps from in those days

were very rudimentary. Most maps were black and

white; there wasn’t any color initially, and they were

not very accurate. I think they were really old Japanese

maps. But, as time went on they got better.

The 3d Division

Engineer Section,

12 April 1951

RG 111, SC-365018
206 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Delbert M. Fowler IX Corps Engineer Section

A division or another corps unit would call me

and request maps. They typically wanted 1/25,000 scale

maps. If you were ever an infantryman you know that

is what you’ve got to have. That is the only scale of a

map that shows you the detail that an infantryman

needs. If you are in a retrograde action, as we were in a

lot of those months in 1950-51, then you could move

through and off of a 1/25,000 scale map in half a day, so

you needed a good supply of maps if you were going

to have that kind. Many of the units had to live with a

1/250,000 scale map. You could spend a month or so

on one of those. They are good, but they don’t give

you any detail on the ground. They just show you

some relative locations.

My line of supply was to call Eighth Army in

Seoul, or during the time we were in North Korea,

P’yongyang. Any time our troops moved, I had to call

one of those two locations and put in my requisition

for maps. I had to use my own imagination to secondguess where the divisions and other units would be two

days from then, or a week from then, and try to order

what they might need at that time. In recent years I

have come to tell people that planning is the essential

thing in life. Those who plan get ahead. The other

expression is even better—we don’t plan to fail; we

fail to plan. As a map supply officer I learned what it

was to plan. If I did not plan ahead, I did not end up

with the right kind of maps.

Sometimes the maps came to IX Corps by L-5 aircraft, which was a little comparable to today’s O-1. It

was a single-wing, two-seater aircraft, and it would not

carry an awful lot of maps. A two and one-half-ton

truck also hauled maps overland. IX Corps, during much

of this time, was several hundred miles from either

P’yongyang or Seoul, so the maps usually had to come

in by truck.

The division or other units usually came in and

picked up the maps. In a few instances during the retrograde action from North Korea back to South Korea,

they were so far afield that they could not get back to

our headquarters. Sometimes we had three corps headquarters. We had a main, an advance, and a rear, and the

map supply would be at one of those three locations. In

more than one instance we loaded maps in the back of a

C-119, commonly referred to as a “flying boxcar.” It had

the clamshell doors on the back. We would load the maps

in those thin burlap bags, which was all we had. We did

not have any air drop bags or material or even pallets.

We would just put them in burlap bags and fly low

over the drop zone near the division headquarters. I stood

in the back and kicked them out of the back door.

We hoped that some of them got to the people who

needed them. Some of them got to the ground in a

bunch, while others were scattered.

When IX Corps landed at Pusan, the Inch’on landing had already taken place so we moved north to Seoul.

In recent years I have come

to tell people that planning

is the essential thing in life.

Those who plan get ahead.

The other expression is

even better—we don’t plan

to fail; we fail to plan.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 207

IX Corps headquarters started out with one trucking company and built it up to a battalion, then later to a couple

of battalions. Initially, there were so few trucks that

moving a corps headquarters took second priority to

shuttling some of the infantry units. It was not altogether

a smooth move, but we got there all the same.

Everybody in headquarters lived in tents. People

from World War II would ask, “Why didn’t you occupy

buildings for your offices and headquarters?” The answer

was very simple—there weren’t any except in Seoul,

Inch’on, and a few places like that. Where we were the

only buildings were the really crude ones that the Koreans

lived in, and you wouldn’t want to use those for offices.

For 19 months I slept in a squad tent and I worked

in a tent that was smaller than a squad tent. Initially, we

had Coleman lanterns for light. We finally got enough

generators that we had electricity and electric lights. During the worst of all of the winters, pot-bellied stoves and

diesel fuel provided heat. This was a far cry from what

even the troops in World War II had been accustomed

to. If anything, the Korean War was noted for the rugged

and rough conditions.

We got as far north as Kunu-ri. It’s not much of

anything except a place name on the map. The divisions

that IX Corps had at that time were the 1st Cavalry

Division and the 2d Infantry Division. The 1st Cavalry

Division said they dipped their sabers in the Yalu. Well,

they had no sooner done so than the Chinese got after

Engineers place explosive charges to demolish a damaged bridge on the Naktong River

Engineer School, 71-19-37
208 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 3

Captain Delbert M. Fowler IX Corps Engineer Section

them. Once that started, the 1st Cavalry was in a full retrograde and all other units were being hit pretty heavily too.

The corps headquarters itself got to Kunu-ri. When

the retrograde started, we started withdrawing through

P’yongyang. As soon as Eighth Army got out of P’yongyang,

they told us in IX Corps that all of their maps in the map

depot were now ours. We assembled a group of enlisted

men and started burning those maps as quickly as we could.

We took a few with us, but not many because those maps

were very heavy items. We did not have the transportation

either to load or move them.

 One of the last things that engineer units did leaving P’yongyang was to blow the floating bridge over the

Taedong River. It was the last bridge on the route back.

Until you have blown a floating bridge you don’t know

what trouble is. They are not the easiest things to destroy.

From there we motored in two and one-half-ton

trucks south until we leap-frogged either the rear, advance,

or main headquarters CP. The primary problem was communications. If you did not have a pretty good-sized hill

nearby that you could put a microwave tower on then

you couldn’t really count on communications.

The IX Corps unit that got hit the hardest in that

whole episode was the 2d Infantry Division. The 2d Division sector went up a valley and right up the side of a group

of mountains and headed up north. I don’t know whether

they could have ever gotten to the Yalu River the way they

started or not. The Chinese had infiltrated along the ridges.

Since they did not have trucks they were not bound to the

roads. American troops were road-bound by choice, particularly when they started retrograde action. They wanted

to get out and to get out fast. The Chinese got behind

them and cut the road. Only one regiment of the 2d Division got out as a regiment. I think that was the 23d Infantry commanded by Brig. Gen. Peploe, who may have been

a colonel then. [23d Infantry’s commander was Col. Paul

L. Freeman. Col. George B. Peploe commanded the 38th

Infantry, but was promoted to brigadier general when he

transferred to IX Corps to became chief of staff.]

We moved from Seoul south towards Taegu.

About that time a change in command of Eighth Army

took place too. Gen. Walton Walker, who commanded

the Eighth Army during the really tough part of the

breakout of the Pusan perimeter and the advance to

P’yongyang and Kunu-ri and back again, was killed in

a vehicle accident at Christmas of 1950. Gen. Matthew

Ridgway of XVIII Airborne Corps fame in Europe

came in to head Eighth Army. The morale of Eighth

Army was terribly low, and the rumor was, among all the

troops, that MacArthur intended to evacuate Eighth

Army from Korea. Ridgway got the Eighth Army reorganized and started a gradual advance. That was good for

troop morale.

The need for maps grew less and less because

we stopped moving 50 to 100 miles a day and we

became pretty stabilized.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 209

Officers of the 11th Engineer Battalion discuss the

construction of a ponton bridge, 2 December 1950

RG 111, SC-354075
I • I 

!t~~ 

11 
October– December 1950

Chapter 4

The East Coast Landing and Retreat

Soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division stand on

the banks of the frozen Yalu River at Hyesanjin,

North Korea, 23 November 1950

RG 111, SC-363308

211
Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

After landing at Iwon, the 7th Infantry Division

fought its way north, and on 21 November 1950 it

occupied the village of Hyesanjin on the south bank

of the Yalu River. Looking across the frozen river into

Manchuria, the American soldiers could see Chinese

army units in the neighboring village. Hyesanjin was

the high water mark of the X Corps’ advance, and on

25 November the Chinese hurled two field armies

against the UN forces, prompting General Douglas

MacArthur to withdraw X Corps south to the Port

of Hungnam.

The East

Coast

Landing

and Retreat

212
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 213

Introduction

Chapter 4

Introduction

MacArthur withdrew X Corps after its Inch’on

landing and capture of Seoul and sent it to the east coast

of Korea where it made an unopposed amphibious landing at Wonsan. The 1st Marine Division landed on 26

October and the 3d Infantry Division landed on 5 November. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division landed at Iwon

178 miles farther north on 29 October. Because of the

mountains that split Korea from north to south, two

distinct major commands now conducted operations into

North Korea: Gen. Walker’s Eighth Army in the west

and Gen. Almond’s X Corps in the east.

By 1 November, intelligence identified elements

of a Chinese division south of the Changjin (Chosin)

Reservoir. Within 10 days, parts of 11 more Chinese divisions appeared in the forward area.

The conflict entered a new phase in the fourth week

of November. Elements of the 7th Division occupied

the town of Hyesanjin across the Yalu River from Manchuria. ROK troops had reached the Chinese border at

Ch’osan in the Eighth Army area nearly a month earlier

but had been forced back. On 24 November, MacArthur

announced a new major offensive to end the war. Although no serious enemy opposition appeared on that

first day, on 25 November hostile troops struck hard at

the ROK II Corps on the right flank of Eighth Army.

Two days later, a second enemy force hit the U.S. 1st

Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions. Gen. Almond’s corps,

which had penetrated deep into northeast Korea, withdrew nearly 60 miles southward to the industrial city

of Hamhung and its port, Hungnam on the coast.

Because of the massive size of the attacking force,

General MacArthur decided to transfer X Corps to South

Korea. Here, the corps would establish a defensive line

just south of the 38th Parallel to reinforce the Eighth

Army against the expected Chinese winter offensive. The

evacuation required 193 vessels and began on 11 December. It took two weeks. The X Corps established a

perimeter around Hungnam to allow the Navy to carry

out its formidable task of evacuating all troops and a

large number of civilians. Army engineer units destroyed

all usable buildings, bridges, rail lines, and railroad equipment. During the days before Christmas 1950, the defenses enclosed only a small beachhead filled with dirtencrusted soldiers and civilians. On Christmas Eve the

rear guard of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division climbed into

waiting aircraft and left.

 The harbor of Hungnam had been an excellent

port; by the time the engineers finished, virtually noth-
214 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

ing stood. The Navy moved X Corps with its three divisions—the 1st Marine Division, the 3d Infantry Division, and the 7th Infantry Division—south of the parallel where they went into Eighth Army reserve. Once

again, the North Koreans controlled all of North Korea,

albeit this time with the help of two Communist Chinese field armies.

During the movement south, Lt. Col. Edward L.

Rowny’s X Corps Engineers built an airstrip to evacuate

Marines from their defensive perimeter at Hagaru-ri. Subzero temperatures caused equipment to malfunction, and

frozen terrain made grading more difficult than normal,

but all casualties [4,300] were safely evacuated. Another

evacuation strip was built further south at Kot’o-ri

to take out additional evacuees [750] when the Hagaruri strip was closed around 4 December. When the

Chinese destroyed the bridge just south of Kot’o-ri,

cutting off the Americans’ escape, Maj. Al Wilder,

X Corps Engineers’ office, devised a plan whereby the

Air Force would parachute-drop a bridge from a C-119

at Kot’o-ri. It was then put over the chasm by the 58th

Engineer Treadway Bridge (ETB) Company and the

1st Marine Engineer Battalion, and allowed for the pullback of troops from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir

to Hungnam.

The 2d ESB at first planned to land at Wonsan,

but mines in the harbor forced them to land at Iwon

instead, putting the 7th Infantry Division ashore. The

brigade then moved to Hungnam, where it operated

the port. First Lt. Claude L. Roberts, Jr., assisted in the

landing at Iwon and at Hungnam, before becoming involved in TASK FORCE DOG, to open an escape route

from Hagaru-ri to Hungnam. He describes in detail the

men and materiel put ashore at Iwon. He spent part of

his time giving fire support to the Marines and engineers at the Kot’o-ri airfield in order to evacuate wounded

personnel. Once that was completed, TASK FORCE

DOG moved back to Hungnam, fighting off Chinese

most of the way.

First Lt. Maurice D. Roush was with the 13th ECB,

7th Infantry Division. He notes he had never seen it as

Because of the massive size

of the attacking force, General MacArthur decided to

transfer X Corps to South

Korea. Here, the corps would

establish a defensive line just

south of the 38th Parallel

to reinforce the Eighth

Army against the expected

Chinese winter offensive.

Engineers destroy a

railroad bridge near

Hamhung to slow the

enemy advance

Engineer School, 71-19-8
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 215

cold as it was in North Korea—a recurrent theme in

several of the interviews. In the pullback from the

Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, the 13th Engineers built

fortifications and destroyed a 1,200-foot-long concrete

highway bridge between Hamhung and Hungnam, and

a railroad bridge parallel to it.

The 73d ECB landed at Wonsan by the 2d ESB

and motor marched from Wonsan to Hungnam. X Corps

assigned Lt. Col. Evan S. Pickett, the 73d commander,

the mission of maintaining and improving the MSR from

Hungnam to Chinhung-ni. It also maintained a narrowgauge railroad that ran parallel to the MSR. When the

Chinese cut the road, the battalion provided infantry

support to the Marine division. Company A, 73rd Engineers, provided the engineer support to TASK FORCE

DOG and attacked north on the MSR toward the 1st

Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division to provide an escape route for the two divisions. The battalion

then provided perimeter defense at Hungnam until

evacuated on 18 December 1950.

First Lt. Charles T. Williams, 73d ECB, notes the

shortages of engineers in the units of the 8224th Construction Group and gives substantial credit to the

KATUSA program that filled out the engineer units and

allowed those units to accomplish their missions. Williams gives high marks to the National Guard battalions

in his engineer group and describes the generally successful efforts to racially integrate the group.

The crew of the U.S.S. Begor watches as engineers destroy the

port facilities at Hungnam, 28 December 1950 RG 80, 80-G-424297
216 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

Colonel Rowny describes parachuting a bridge

from a C-119 “flying boxcar” to help Marines retreat

from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. He also discusses why, when road building, they tried to avoid

rice paddies, seeking instead the solid rock foundations that the mountains offered.

After the Inch’on landing and the capture of Seoul,

we planned but did not make an amphibious landing on

the east coast. Initially, the Marine amphibious force

sat offshore from Hamhung because the waters were

heavily mined. Meanwhile, the South Korean 3d Division pursued the North Koreans as they retreated up the

east coast and secured Hamhung. I flew into the city

from Seoul with an advance contingent of X Corps

headquarters. We operated out of its headquarters well

before the Marines came ashore.

Because the mine clearing took several weeks, part

of the 1st Marine Division came in by helicopter from

its transports. The remainder of the division landed administratively once the mines were cleared. The 7th U.S.

Division arrived on the east coast by air from Kimpo.

The 3d ROK Division, the best unit of the South

Korean Army, was attached to the X Corps.

As soon as the U.S. 1st Marine Division and 7th

Infantry Division closed in on Hamhung, Gen. Almond

sent reconnaissance forces north to the Yalu River.

These advance reconnaissance forces were largely unopposed. I rode up to the Yalu in a jeep with the chief of

staff, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner. What surprised me

was that the river was not an obstacle. It was only a hundred yards or so wide and was completely frozen over.

The terrain becomes much more rugged once you

move north of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir and

stays rugged up to the Yalu. The reservoir is on a plateau

several thousand feet above sea level.

We had heard rumors through the X Corps’ own

intelligence network that the Chinese were in North

Korea. Our confidence in Eighth Army intelligence

was so low that X Corps set up an intelligence net on

its own. On 22 November we captured several Chinese.

This made it now certain that the Chinese were in

North Korea.

However, we had difficulty convincing Eighth

Army that there were Chinese in North Korea. Eighth

Army intelligence officers said they didn’t have any evidence to that effect. Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby,

the Far East Command G-2, flew to X Corps headquarters to determine for himself whether or not the

soldiers we captured were Chinese. I remember Willoughby saying to me, “They’re not Chinese; they’re

North Koreans.”

“I’m certain they’re Chinese,” I said. I told him I

was no anthropologist, but the epicanthic fold of their

eyes proved that the prisoners were Chinese and not

North Koreans.

When the Chinese

struck they did so in

their classical manner.

They blew bugles and

whistles, beat metal

drums, and yelled as

they attacked at night.

They struck terror in the

hearts of our soldiers

who were not used to

this type of warfare.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 217

“Don’t give me that scientific nonsense,” he said.

Willoughby remained skeptical up until the time the

Chinese hit us in force on 27 November. Only then did

he become convinced that the Chinese had moved south

of the Yalu.

When the Chinese struck they did so in their classical manner. They blew bugles and whistles, beat metal

drums, and yelled as they attacked at night. They struck

terror in the hearts of our soldiers who were not used to

this type of warfare. The Chinese went directly for our

logistical supply bases, our artillery, and our tank parks.

They hit us where it would do the most damage, that is,

our firepower and logistical support.

The Chinese ambushed an artillery battalion of the

7th Division, killing many of its men and burning its

artillery pieces and vehicles. They blew up the division’s

artillery ammo dump leaving it in shambles.

Immediately after the Chinese struck, the decision

was made to pull back into defensive perimeters and

then move south and east toward Hamhung. The 7th

Division rolled up into defensive positions rather quickly. The Marines were more dispersed and moved

more slowly. By the time the Marines formed a perimeter, a bridge across the chasm at Kot’o-ri near the

Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir had been blown. The

Marines finally gathered into a defensive perimeter on

the Chosin plateau but were cut off from evacuating

to the south.
Aerial view of the Changjin (Chosin)

Reservoir penstocks in the Funchilin Pass,

with a close-up of the damaged bridge

RG 127, 127-GK-234J-A130504

RG 127, 127-GK-234J-A5376
219

With the repaired bridge in the background, Marines resume their march

south toward Hungnam

RG 127, 127-GK-234J-A5408
220 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

Getting the Wounded out of Hagaru-ri by Air

We were faced with two major engineering problems:

building a runway and bridging the chasm. First, we

needed to build an airstrip within the Marine perimeter

so we could evacuate the many casualties caused by enemy gunfire, frostbite, and extreme cold. Although there

was a fairly flat piece of ground within the perimeter

for a runway, it needed smoothing out. The six percent

slope on the runway was manageable. The Marines

had several pieces of engineering equipment with

them, but it was very difficult keeping the equipment

operating in the extreme cold, which hovered between

30 and 20 degrees below zero. Because the ground was

frozen to quite a depth, we set off explosive charges

to loosen up the ground to bulldoze the strip. We also

erected warming tents—large tents with space heaters

in them—at each end of the field. In this way the operators who were running the equipment, and the equipment itself, would warm up between passes as the

dozers smoothed the airstrip.

 The theory was good, but in practice it didn’t work

very well. The warmed-up dozer blades melted the moisture in the earth and caused the dirt to stick to the blades.

We solved this problem by applying ski wax—dropped

in by air from Japan—to the blades. When the dozer

and grader blades were waxed, the dirt did not stick to

the metal. Some press wag accused me of having ski wax

air dropped into Korea so we could enjoy skiing on the

slopes! The warming tents we set up came under fire.

The Chinese moved in close to the perimeter,

lobbed in some mortar shells and then disappeared. By

the time a patrol would locate the base from which the

mortar shells were fired, the Chinese were gone. They

would then set up another base and hit us again.

When the wind blew up, which it did sporadically,

the temperature dropped another 10 or 20 degrees. Fortunately, the winters in North Korea were quite dry, and

if there was snow, it was very light and powdery, more

like dust than snow. When the wind blew, it formed

clouds of dry snow and dirt that were like dust storms.

Nevertheless, after a great deal of hard work we

were able to construct a fairly decent airfield. With a

number of courageous pilots flying the planes we were

able to airlift all of the casualties. With this problem

solved, Col. Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller was able to organize an effective defensive perimeter.

Then we tackled the second major engineering

challenge—bridging the chasm [a 16-foot chasm in the

road cut into a steep slope, 3.5 miles south of Kot’o-ri.

It blocked the Marines’ movement south from the

Changin (Chosin) Reservoir]. I put the question of how

to get across the chasm to my engineer staff back in

Hungnam. The best suggestion came from an engineer officer, Maj. Al Wilder, who had been my battalion

executive in World War II. He had the idea of bolting together some rigid frame bridging and dropping it
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 221

from a C-119 [cargo plane, the “flying boxcar”] into the

perimeter. By cantilevering the bridge over a fulcrum, it

would bridge the chasm.

We quickly worked out the engineering aspects of

the plan. The main problem was to find an Air Force

pilot who was courageous enough to drop the bridge.

Most of the pilots we talked to said it couldn’t be done.

If a bridge was dropped from a C-119, they said it would

be impossible to keep the aircraft under control. Fortunately, we found one pilot who said it could be done. To

test the concept we dropped a bridge south of Hungnam.

The pilot was able to keep the aircraft under control;

however, the parachutes didn’t open properly and the

bridge wound up in a big pile of wrecked and bent steel.

With more careful rigging we believed we could correct

that problem. The next day we actually dropped the

bridge successfully into the southern portion of the perimeter. The bridge was assembled and put together by

our X Corps engineers [58th Engineer Treadway Bridge

Company]. They rigged it and loaded it into the aircraft. After the bridge was dropped into the perimeter,

Marine engineers pushed it across the gap. I personally

talked to Col. Puller, the commander who thought it

was a good idea and approved the plan. The Marines

laid down a barrage of small arms fire at the narrowest

part of the chasm where we had planned to place the

bridge. While the Marines kept up the barrage, engineers manhandled the bridge and spanned the chasm.

The Marines were then able to come out in an orderly

fashion, fighting a rear guard action as they evacuated

the perimeter. They sent out patrols to the right and left

as soon as they crossed the bridge to protect their flanks.

It was a professionally executed military operation.

After they withdrew to Hungnam, the Marines embarked on evacuation boats, which took them out to the

troop transports. The 7th Infantry Division followed. I

stayed back with an engineer detachment to assure that

there was maximum destruction to the port and to destroy whatever supplies we were unable to evacuate. We

wanted to make certain that

nothing of any value was left

in the hands of the Chinese.

I was put in charge of

planning and executing

the evacuation of supplies.

We got out most of the

supplies. I was also put in

charge of setting explosive

charges to damage the

port, so it could not be

used by the Chinese

without a good deal of

work. When the explosive charges went off it

was a rather spectacular sight. I think the

Lt. Col. Edward Rowny

receives the Legion

of Merit from Maj.

Gen. Edward Almond,

commander, X Corps,

in Hungnam, 14

December 1950

RG 111, SC-355069

221
222 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny X Corps Engineer

job was well done. The evacuation was carried out in an

orderly fashion. The perimeter was kept intact and we

didn’t suffer any real interference with the work of evacuating the supplies and setting the explosive charges. It

was all done in an efficient and professional manner. The

Chinese struck us with hit-and-run attacks, but there

were no concerted attacks. While we were subjected to

sporadic attacks, there was no big push to cut us off or to

drive us into the sea.

The X Corps staff evacuated to a command ship

and landed well to the south on the east coast of Korea.

Since I was in charge of the final evacuation, I was one

of the last persons to leave. The boat in which I was to

leave blew up and sank. One of the soldiers lit a cigarette

and set a stack of mortar charges on fire. The charges

exploded and the boat sank in a matter of minutes. This

left us stranded ashore. Luckily, a U.S. plane was hovering above. We had no way of communicating with the

plane so we spelled out “HELP! U.S. TROOPS” with

powdered milk on the runway. The plane landed, picked

us up, and took us back to Japan. We landed at Tachikawa

on Christmas Eve.

I stayed in Japan just three days. My family, who

was in Tokyo, was surprised to see me and glad to have

me home for Christmas. Gen. Almond was worried

about me. When I didn’t come out to the command ship

he thought I might have gone down with the boat that

sank. When he learned I was okay he sent me a message:

“Fine, be back at X Corps headquarters on 27 December.” I caught a plane at Tachikawa and got back to X

Corps headquarters on time.

Thoughts on the KATUSA Program

The KATUSA program was a good one and it helped us

considerably; however, we only used the KATSUAs intermittently and in small numbers before our evacuation of Hungnam. We made much greater use of them

when we started going north again in 1951. At one time

X Corps had more than 7,000 KATUSAs. They worked

alongside our engineers to build roads, repair railroads,

and otherwise help out the logistical efforts. They also

manhandled supplies and ammunition.

There were no particular problems; they were

easy to deal with. The KATUSAs learned quickly and

worked hard. We screened them and put those who

were more mechanically adept to work at first maintaining, and then operating, equipment. Some of them

made excellent equipment operators. Many KATUSAs

who maintained our equipment believed that if the

equipment looked good it would work well. As a result,

they polished the vehicles but didn’t pick up the hoods

and look at the oil levels. We had to teach them to

change the oil and use grease guns. After that the

vehicles not only looked good but also ran well. We

also used KATUSAs to manhandle supplies, at which

they performed well. One KATUSA could put 100
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 223

pounds of supplies on an A-frame and walk right up the

side of a mountain. For one attack, I recall using 500

KATUSAs as a human supply chain.

We also used KATUSAs to carve out roads on the

sides of mountains. We tried to avoid disrupting the

rice paddies that had been terraced over centuries with

much care. In general, we tried to do as little damage

as possible to Korean ecology. We had an unlimited

supply of dynamite and taught KATUSAs how to

drill and emplace explosive charges. Building roads

by cutting into the side of mountains had another

advantage. The rice paddies in the flat lands required

enormous amounts of rock to act as a foundation, whereas

a road carved out of the side of a mountain had a natural

rock foundation. Moreover, building roads on the

sides of mountains left us lots of rock to lay down foundations for roads on the flat ground. Accordingly,

we carved out roads on the sides of mountains whenever possible.

When X Corps began to move north again, I remained a corps engineer for only a week or so longer.

Shortly after I returned to Korea, the corps G-4 was

killed. For the next six months or so I was the X Corps

logistician. After that, when my one-year tour was

up, I volunteered for a second year and joined the 2d

Infantry Division.

Students in the crane operator’s course, ROK Army Engineer Training

School, gather around their instructor RG 111, SC-367752
224 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

Withdrawing from Inch’on, the 2d Engineer

Special Brigade out loaded troops and moved to

Korea’s east coast for a projected landing at Wonsan and Iwon. After off loading the 7th Infantry Division at Iwon, Lieutenant Roberts and the brigade

moved to Hungnam for more loading and unloading of equipment.

After withdrawing from port operations at Inch’on,

the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EB&SR),

along with all other elements of the 2d ESB, embarked

on seagoing vessels and proceeded to Wonsan. The mission was to pioneer operations in that port and to land

the 7th Infantry Division there. A 50-ton crane barge

was assigned to the brigade, and its prime use was for

boat maintenance. It could lift our LCMs [at times

identified as landing craft, medium] out of the water

where they could be repaired on the barge. Directives

for the operation contained very little detail since the

situation at the time was fluid. A small rear echelon of

one officer and 10 enlisted men were left in Inch’on to

assist in the maintenance of Navy LCMs left at that

port. These men later rejoined the unit via LSTs that

also carried a small number of heavy vehicles left with

the brigade rear detachment.

On 18 October 1950 the executive officer of the

shore battalion, and the signal and surveying officers from

the regimental staff, proceeded via air to Wonsan with a

small brigade reconnaissance party. Prior to sailing from

Inch’on this group had been directed to give brief radio

reports and to reconnoiter at the Port of Hungnam.

All personnel boarded the USNS Eltinge on 21

October 1950. The Eltinge and ships carrying equipment

remained at anchor off Inch’on until they sailed for

Wonsan on 26 October 1950. The brigade commander

left the ship shortly before it sailed and proceeded to

Wonsan by air. The somewhat prolonged stay aboard

ship served well as a rest and recuperation period for the

troops who had been working shifts of 12 and more

hours per day for many weeks. Food and accommodations aboard the Eltinge were excellent. No training or

duties other than for administration of the ship were

assigned. Morale and discipline were of a high order.

Because of the fluid tactical situation, and the discovery that the harbor at Wonsan was heavily mined,

alternate plans were considered for landing at Hungnam

and operating that port. I traveled by ship to Iwon. Some

of the guys traveled by rail, and the crane barge was towed

up there. For some unknown reason they took it into

Wonsan harbor where it hit a floating mine. We had Lt.

Bill Mordacai from the Citadel and four other men on

there. Bill and one of the other fellows were killed. Bill

was knocked off of the barge and we never found him.

Bill was a roommate of Gen. Caroll LeTellier and the

only officer casualty we had. He attended the Engineer

Officer Basic Course with me at Fort Belvoir [Virginia].
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 225

Upon arrival at the entrance to the swept channel

into Wonsan, at about 0800 on 29 October 1950, the

ships received new orders to proceed to the beach area

near Iwon, 65 air miles northeast of Hungnam. At

the same time a message from the brigade commander

aboard the USS Eldorado was received via the ship’s

radio. It stated that the unit was to proceed to the

Iwon area, put ashore only necessary personnel and equipment to land the 7th Division, and upon completion

of that mission, reembark and return to Hungnam.

In view of the port operations mission for which

the unit had embarked, the mission posed quite a problem. The unit was not combat loaded, nor did it have

any specialized Class IV engineer material for operations

over a sandy surf beach. Determination of what elements

and equipment to disembark was made more difficult

by a lack of information on what was to be discharged

over the beach. News reports had indicated that at least

part of the division had gone ashore at Wonsan. Also, in

view of the planned reembarkation and return to
226 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

Hungnam, it could be inferred that perhaps only combat elements of the division were to be landed over the

Iwon beaches; therefore, it was tentatively planned to

send ashore only the shore battalion with a limited

complement of dozers and equipment, selected by viewing ships’ loading plans to determine accessibility.

At 1215, 29 October 1950, the ships steamed into

the swept channel leading to the Iwon beaches where

naval control vessels passed anchorage instructions.

While proceeding to anchorage it could be seen that the

naval command ship Eldorado was present and that

eight LSTs were discharging vehicles on the beach. When

the Eltinge anchored, the brigade commander came

aboard and approved tentative plans for the force to be

used ashore, including the plan that the shore party

troops would continue to billet aboard the Eltinge, changing work shifts by lighter. In addition to the eight

LSTs there were three LSUs and 10 LCMs available

for lighterage in the area.

During the course of the evening the shore battalion and its first shift were proceeding via LST to pick up

their initial complement of equipment from the Luxembourg Victory. Further contacts with the staff aboard the

Eldorado revealed that the mission involved unloading

the 7th Division reinforced with 20,491 personnel, 9,685

tons of bulk cargo, and 4,659 vehicles mounted on 42

ships. Plans were immediately changed and orders issued at 2100, 30 October 1950, to debark all brigade

and regimental personnel and equipment from the Eltinge

at 0700 the following morning and to debark essentially

all equipment from the other ships concerned.

While the beach had excellent seaward characteristics, we found upon landing that the very steep washed

area and the sand area back to the lateral road were not

passable to wheeled vehicles. The sand was of very

uniform grain size—approximately 20 mesh being the

dominant size. Wet areas did not attain increased

supporting power, and surf action immediately swept

away material dozed out to meet ramps of landing

craft. Even DUKWs could not exit without tow. As

a result of the administrative loading of regimental

equipment, essential items came ashore slowly. None of

the vitally needed matting was available.

Fortunately, the early priority was on vehicles, and

their landing could proceed—though awkwardly—by

utilizing available dozers as tow machines. An attempt

at handling heavy cargo without appropriate crane base

preparation resulted in the crane tipping seaward and

demolishing its boom. During the period before proper

landing points and exit roads could be built, spot observations logically led many to question the efficiency of

the regimental effort and the ultimate outcome of the

landing operation.

During the night that regimental personnel landed,

heavy swells in the anchorage area had begun to hamper

the leading of lighters alongside ships. At 0947 the folSome bright soldier came

up with the solution to

stabilizing the roadbeds

and other areas—straw rice

bags filled with sand.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 227

lowing morning a combination of swells and surf on

the beach caused all discharge operations to cease for 10

hours. From the shore party’s point of view, perhaps, this

was fortunate because that period allowed full application of personnel and equipment to the construction of

useable landing points and

exit roads. Action had been

underway from the beginning to procure local materials for stabilizing roads

and wash areas. Very limited quantities of piercedsteel plank had been

brought ashore in division

loaded LSTs and used in

varied fashions in their discharge. This material was

salvaged, straightened, and

re-laid. We found the best

method of laying it was

upside down with the

end points staggered. Some

poles of corduroy size were available in a lumberyard

in the village of Kunsen. They were used but did not

provide a durable, satisfactory surface.

Some bright soldier came up with the solution to

stabilizing the roadbeds and other areas—straw rice bags

filled with sand. They worked great. Adequate supplies

of rice bags were located and hauled to the site concurrently with assembly of sufficient Korean labor

to make their filling and placement proceed at a satisfactory rate. Roads and hammerheads built of one or

more layers were excellent, both as to stability and durability under wheeled

traffic. Five thousand

burlap sandbags ordered

for airdrop arrived on 1

November 1950. While

they were useful for the

job of rapidly “trimming” the ramp area on

beached craft, they could

not compete with the

rice bags for surfacing

major areas—even if

they had been available

in time and quantity.

With facilities established and Korean

labor recruited, operations resumed at 1730 on 31 October 1950 when clear

weather and seas presented a different scene. Vehicles

could roll ashore as rapidly as they could be processed

over the ramps. Time at the beach spent in discharging vehicle-laden LSTs was consistently a fractional portion of the time spent at shipside taking loads. From

Engineers use rice bags to stabilize the roadbed near

a ponton bridge RG 111, SC-349361
228 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

this time on the principal deterrent to operations was

the fact that weather and sea conditions made the loading of lighters, particularly LSTs alongside ships, very

difficult and resulted in some shutdowns and considerable damage to LSTs and ships.

The need for shore party “rank” and aggressiveness

on the beach was repeatedly evidenced. Craft loads of

vehicles coming ashore frequently represented a heterogeneous collection from different units. They needed to

be organized and pushed by shore party officers to rapidly get drivers on vehicles, motors warmed up, trailers

coupled, and dead vehicles taken in tow. During several

days of loading and water movement, individual drivers

and some units in this type of unopposed landing tended

to slack off and were slow in realizing that they must

resume the character of a fast breaking land unit

when their landing craft beached. Those units that

came ashore more or less intact, and whose officers

had given thought to the problem of an expeditious

landing, came ashore very promptly. The record for

discharging a given LST was 84 vehicles in 20 minutes

from the time the craft beached.

When we used North Koreans as laborers on

the beach they didn’t steal a thing, as opposed to our

experience at Inch’on, where the South Koreans stole

everything. I guess they would get their heads chopped

off if they did something like that under the communist regime.

Handling bulk cargo from LSTs and LSUs proceeded well, using the same roadways and landing points

that were developed for vehicles. Working areas at the

water’s edge were surfaced, first as hammerheads, and

later the surfaces from adjacent slots were joined to

form loops. A good, tough brown clay was available

within a mile of the beach, and when a power shovel

became available it was possible to stabilize the beach

sand by placing a two- to four-inch layer of clay over it.

Cranes were used only for heavy lifts from LSUs. All

possible cargo from these crafts were hand loaded into

trucks backed in over their ramps or carried by coolie

lines to temporary piles on the beach. Considerable

temporary piling was required because of the shortages

of trucks and the lack of a fully manned dump organization to clear them rapidly.

 The handling of cargo from LSTs is a laborious

process that can be aided little by the use of normal machinery. It is virtually impossible to handle heavy lifts

from them at any satisfactory rate. This is most unfortunate since this craft, with its large carrying capacity, shallow draft, and ability to beach, could be as revolutionary

an asset in amphibious cargo operations as it is for vehicles and personnel. I believe that LSTs could be modified to provide a light gantry crane to deliver cargo over

the bow in nets or on pallets.

 On 6 November 1950 an LST completely loaded

with a total of 5,572 barrels of POL arrived for discharge.

The record for discharging a given LST was

84 vehicles in 20

minutes from the time

the craft beached.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 229 229

After the bow was lightened by discharge of one LSUload via marrying up in the stream, the LST was beached

and the POL drums were rolled ashore by native labor.

This procedure is quite practical; in fact, 5,162 drums

[902 tons] were discharged in 31 hours.

The efforts of Company B, the boat company, were

most effective in this operation despite the fact that 32

percent of its strength was committed to rear echelons

in Japan, Inch’on, and Wonsan. At naval request, on 31

October 1950, Company B crews were placed on the 10

LCMs working the area. Two Q-boats were operated;

one on night patrol for the Navy to accost and investigate strange small craft picked up on naval radar systems. As an unusual feature, 20 SLOE (special list of

equipment) DUKWs arrived on shipping and were issued to Company B for operation in addition to eight

DUKWs of Companies D and E, and two DUKWs from

Company A, 562 EB (Engineer Boat) Battalion. The

naval command readily consented to anchor selected

ships in the more sheltered Yoke anchorage area of

Yellow Beach. An efficient DUKW circuit, hauling

directly to nearby dumps, was quickly established and

the DUKWs produced a very significant percentage

of the tonnage discharged. The 30 DUKWs, with a minimum number out for maintenance, brought ashore

as much as 416 tons per day and landed a total of

1,472 tons during the operation. Company B lacked

personnel to provide a second man on each DUKW

of “DUKW Riders,” so additional

personnel were provided, first on

loan from an artillery unit, and later

by a pool of light vehicle drivers from

brigade and regimental headquarters

companies.

Only Green Beach was considered and initially operated. Planning had been hastily done largely

by naval authorities prior to arrival

of the 2d ESB units in the area.

Early regimental reconnaissance

had revealed the desirability of

opening Yellow Beach, and such

action was recommended to the

naval command shortly after

arrival. The beach was opened

some 24 hours later, on 2 November 1950. Green Beach was assigned to Company E,

since it was in the direction of their sector on Green

Beach, and since developments were showing that

waterside characteristics of the Company D sector of

Green Beach were somewhat better for beaching LSTs.

All LCMs were routed to Yellow Beach, where the

sand was firm and conditions for cargo discharge were

virtually ideal. In the later phases a limited number of

LSUs carrying cargo were discharged at Yellow Beach.

The DUKW exit and control points were established

Soldiers use cargo nets to

transfer supplies from a

transport ship to a waiting

DUKW RG 111, SC-383938
230 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

on a separate sector of Yellow Beach, and required

no service from the shore company since the beach

was quite stable.

By 9 November 1950 the landing of the 7th Division and supporting elements was virtually complete and

plans were underway for movement of 2d ESB units to

Hungnam. Based on a tentative plan for continued

resupply of the 7th Division over the Iwon Beach, a

rear detachment was designated consisting of one

officer from brigade headquarters and 27 enlisted men

from regimental elements.

Plans were initially drawn for movement by LST,

which was the preferred method of movement. Shortly

before time for movement it became known that all LSTs

were to return to their bases expeditiously for provisioning and repair. It then developed that the brigade units

were to move by rail and road. Road characteristics were

such that only two and one-half-ton and lighter vehicles

could go by road. Plans were so drawn. They were necessarily somewhat tentative since tunnel clearances and the

availability of rail cars were not firmly established. Rail

transportation control and operation in the area were

still in the pioneer stage. The local naval command was

very helpful at this point and granted authority to utilize

an LSD (landing ship, dock) for the water movement of

a substantial portion of the vehicles and equipment. These

items were to be loaded into available LSU and LCM

for transport aboard the LST. All the way through, the

movement plans were set up on a priority of units basis

and held flexible. Except for the forward echelon of

brigade headquarters, regimental units moved first,

with Company H leading. The movement by rail,

road, and water was executed without incident, and all

major elements of the regiment closed at Hungnam on

15 November 1950.

From Iwon to Hungnam

We had operated at Iwon for a little over 30 days. After

Iwon, we moved to Hungnam. I was reassigned from

Company B to Company A of the 562d Engineer Boat

Maintenance Battalion under the command of Capt.

Steve Farr.

Upon completion of operations at Iwon, Korea,

the 532d EB&SR, along with other elements of the 2d

ESB, began movements to the Port of Hungnam, which

was to be operated as the principal port for support of

the X Corps. Company E road elements, together

with advance representatives of the regimental headquarters, arrived at Hungnam on 13 November 1950.

Principal remaining elements, moving by road, rail,

and water, closed at Hungnam the next day. As units

and equipment arrived, immediate dispositions were

made to effect development of the port to full or required capacity. Eleven days after first elements of the

unit arrived we achieved a daily cargo discharge record

of 5,442 tons.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 231

The fact that the

waterside facilities at

Hungnam had been designed for specialized

industrial cargo handling, together with the

state of complete wreckage of the vast industrial

area that hemmed it in,

caused major problems

in debris clearance and

quayside development.

Consequently, Company D was given a primary mission of area

development with a secondary mission of operating an LST and lighterage beach

of limited capacity. Two key projects were undertaken:

first, the development of an LST beach in the “badlands”

waste and rubble area on the waterfront northeast of Pier

No. 4, with a connecting road back along Pier No. 4 to

the other piers; and then, the filling of the railroad tracks

on Pier No. 1 to permit truck access along that principal

pier. A heavy steel gantry crane, which had fallen on Pier

No.1, had to be cut up and removed to allow full access

to the two outer berths on Pier No. 1. The access road

along Pier No. 4 constituted an initial operating space

and permitted a ship to be worked from that pier. Clearance was rapidly expanded from the road

back into the badlands

to provide a very satisfactory, wide, and unrestricted area for the

discharge and storage

of drum POL in transit, where the profitable technique of hand

rolling barrels could be

employed.

Other regimental projects in road

maintenance and improvement were undertaken as rapidly as possible, always with a view to

ensuring convenient access and egress for port clearance.

A very satisfactory sign-posted traffic circuit evolved.

Lighterage operations were available in the discharge of cargo but were limited to the utilization of

DUKWs and a small number of LCMs for the discharge

of ammunition ships and for other suitable priority cargo.

Ammunition ships were not permitted alongside piers.

The draft of one POL ship required that it be lightened

before berthing. As at Iwon, Company B operated all

31 available DUKWs. Their employment was most

effective since ammunition was being delivered to a

A jeep and trailer are loaded into an LST Engineer School, 30-10-20

It soon became apparent

that with the lack of

trucks, the factor

controlling the tonnage

handled through the port

would be the availability

of railroad cars....
232 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

railhead near the harbor, but not accessible to the piers.

A total of 46 LCMs were delivered to Company B by

various shipping. This included the eight boats that

had been on hand at Iwon, 16 that had been shipped

from Inch’on to Wonsan, and 22 rebuilt boats sent

from Japan. During discharge operations, only 10 boats

could be crewed and operated concurrently with fullscale DUKW operations because of the limited number of operating personnel.

After the sixth day of operations a Japanese contract group of 1,061 personnel arrived in the area and

provided hatch crews. They remained billeted aboard a

mother ship, the Shinano-Maru. Their administration,

disposition, and supervision presented a variety of problems, but overall, they served effectively. The quality of

their winch operators was mediocre, but improved with

experience. The wear and tear on ship’s gear was higher

than when military operators were provided. The mother

ship was given pier space, since the majority of ships to

be worked were at pier side, and since the arrangement

for hatch crew disposition had to be simple to be efficient. The presence of an alert Japanese-speaking NCO

in the regimental staff was invaluable in the management of the Japanese personnel. There was a command

restriction against using North Korean personnel as labor aboard ships, and, considering the meager strength

of the available troop units, the Japanese crews were a

critical and essential element of the port force.

Korean dock laborers were available in desired

quantities for day shifts. The numbers available at night

were quite variable, and generally not up to requirements.

The accumulation and general disposition or breakdown of labor for all elements of the brigade was handled

by the regimental S-4, since the regiment was the major

user of native labor.

Railroad was the principal method of clearing cargo

from the port. Double tracks on Pier No. 1 served four

of the better berths, and trains could be loaded directly

from ships. Korean railroad workers, under brigade direction, carried out railroad repair and construction.

Track extensions were later laid to Piers No. 3 and 4, the

former in time to render useful service in the discharge

of a ship. It soon became apparent that with the lack of

trucks, the factor controlling the tonnage handled

through the port would be the availability of railroad

cars, or rather, the ability of depot operating forces to

clear and return them. After the ninth day of the operation, and after demonstrating a port capacity of 5,442

tons, a situation developed wherein a preponderant percentage of available rolling stock was loaded and awaited

discharge at dumps or on railroad sidings. An insignificant trickle of empty cars was returning to the port. Some

augmentation of truck service was undertaken to clear

priority cargo, but the capacity of the depot system to

absorb supplies had obviously been exceeded. We were

ordered to discontinue the discharge of ships except for
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 233

ammunition, POL, and selected items in quantities.

The port was operating at a rate well below capacity

during this time.

Kot’o-ri

One day I walked into the orderly room and Capt. Steve

Farr said, “What are you doing?” Well, I gave the wrong

answer, “Nothing.” He said “Good. They need you over

at X Corps Headquarters. They’ve got some sort of job

for you and a couple of other guys.”

That night we reported to Lt. Col. W.C. Winston,

commanding officer, 52d TC Battalion. Col. Winston

told us that we were to be part of the traffic regulating

setup that was to control traffic on the MSR from the

beach at Hungnam to the front. Lt. Col. John U.D. Page

was to supervise the traffic regulating system. The plan

was to have two officers and a few enlisted men at strategic spots along the MSR; Capt. Clarence Whorman and

I picked Kot’o-ri. Cpl. Bill Epps, from Anniston, Alabama, was our driver.

At 0500 the next morning we proceeded in a

convoy of 10 jeeps until all of the checkpoints had

been established, except the one at Kot’o-ri and the

one at Hagaru-ri. We had an uneventful trip from

Hungnam up to Kot’o-ri. When we arrived there we

ran into the 1st Marine Regiment commanded by

Col. “Chesty” Puller. Along with the Marines were

elements of the 52d Truck Battalion, the 185th ECB,

the 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, and

British commandos.

We were informed that we could proceed no farther because the MSR forward had been severed by

Chinese Communist forces. In fact, the Marine officer

giving the information seemed quite amazed that we

had gotten through from the south, because at that time

the entire area was completely surrounded by enemy

units. We were quite concerned about a radio relay

station that we had passed along the way into Kot’o-ri.

We borrowed a tent from the Marines to put up

on the southern edge of the camp. We had the tent

Troops watch as close

air support pounds

enemy positions

south of Hungaru-ri,

6 December 1950

RG 127, 127-GK-234F-A5440
234 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

almost up when a Marine tank captain informed us that

intelligence had reported a possible Chinese attack from

the south and that our tent was in the line of fire of his

tank company. My jeep driver, Cpl. Epps, and I gave up

on the tent. In a half-destroyed building we found some

men from the 7th Infantry Division with a stove! Upon

talking to these men we learned that they were all from

air sections of the various regiments of the 7th.

We sat around the fire talking and I learned

that these men were trained to operate airfields for

small L-type planes. Sometime around midnight it

seemed as if all hell had broken loose. The Chinese

had hit us on our northern flank. After about a 25-

minute firefight, the firing subsided and the night was

quiet again.

As each day went by the Navy medics, with the

Marines, were pressed harder and harder for hospital space

and supplies. This was due to the increasing number of

casualties and the fact that the helicopters evacuating

the wounded were inadequate in number. Helicopters

also made excellent targets in the ascent and descent

for the enemy snipers in the hills.

I was told that Lt. Col. Edward L. Rowny, X Corps

Engineer, directed that an airstrip be constructed at

Kot’o-ri. Years later he confirmed this in a conversation

with me. Upon its completion by the 185th Engineer

Battalion (Company C), the airstrip was 100 feet wide

and 2,000 feet long. I was placed in charge of operating

the airstrip along with my adopted guys from the

7th Division.

The airstrip was put into operation on or about 3

December, and from that time until it was shut down it

was almost always under sniper fire. At the outset, only

the small liaison planes were brought in. Later, however,

we had Navy and Marine aircraft, and then finally Air

Force C-47s were able to land. The “L-type” planes

carried one or two wounded, and the C-47s could accommodate up to 40 wounded. All in all, about 750

wounded UN soldiers were evacuated from the airstrip.

Among the more famous visitors to the airstrip were

Generals Almond, Shephard, and Barr, and also Marguerite Higgins, war correspondent from the New York

Herald Tribune. One time Maggie Higgins came; I heard

a lot of vehicles coming down the road to the airfield.

Col. Puller got out of one and said, “Lt. Roberts, I want

you to put this woman on an airplane and don’t ever let

her come in here again.” She was not a favorite of his.

It snowed off and on during the entire evacuation

of the wounded. On one occasion, a C-47 had made a

particularly dangerous landing on the snow, and the pilot requested that we try to clear some of the snow off.

We called on the engineers and they sent over a grader.

As the operator made the first pass over the strip, a sniper

shot him in the neck. Everyone cleared off the airstrip

and we took up a line of fire along the railroad fill

that ran down one side of the strip.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 235

On 9 December, elements of the 7th Marines, with

the 7th Infantry Division protecting their flank, passed

through us on their way to Hungnam from Hagaru-ri.

We were to follow them down the hill. When the convoy formed, we were on the tail end. Col. Puller placed

Col. Page there so that he could help with the control.

One small group formed behind Col. Page’s jeep.

Before we left we received direct orders that we were

to stop for nothing. If a vehicle broke down we were

to push it off to the side, destroy it, and proceed. The

entire withdrawal was based on a rapid movement

down the hill.

The trip down the hill, however, was made at a

snail’s pace and consisted of one ambush after another.

We would ride for a while, then we’d get out and walk. It

was so cold that it was almost impossible to sit in a jeep

for any length of time. Walking was the only way we

kept our feet from freezing.

There was intermittent communist rifle and machine-gun fire from each side of our narrow escape route

down the mountains. Some distance south of Kot’o-ri

the Chinese had destroyed the penstock bridge at

Changjin Power Plant Number 1. This was the bridge

over which we had to pass if we hoped to save our equipment. Without this bridge we would have to abandon

our transport, and wounded, and cut across the enemyheld mountains. Fortunately, thanks to X Corps, the Air

Force had dropped six spans of steel treadway bridge to

us. This bridge was assembled over the gap. We moved

without any further incident to Hungnam.

Evacuation

The advent of large enemy forces in North Korea was

becoming apparent—bringing about general reverses for

the UN forces. On 9 December 1950, instructions were

received for using the port for evacuation. Prior planning had been made against this contingency. A layout
236 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

of assembly areas and “slotting” areas had been prepared

and furnished to brigade headquarters. Clearance and

leveling of additional assembly and parking areas in the

general area behind the LST beach was completed as rapidly as possible. We recognized the shortage of slings and

spreaders for loading vehicles on ships, and their manufacture was immediately undertaken in the Company E

motor ship. Company D was given a unit mission of

operating a “gear locker” and fabricating required chocking material.

So, we evacuated. It became an amphibious landing turnabout. We began moving out and loading ships.

Some large Danish or Norwegian locomotive ships were

brought in to evacuate the tanks. You could see the boom

on these ships swing down to pick up a tank and watch

the ship list. To my knowledge, we evacuated all the

equipment. That was in December. Some of my guys

were involved in blowing up parts of the port.

During this operation, harbor master duties falling to the regiment were of an unusual scope. Early action was taken to verify pier-side depths and approachchannel conditions. Six berths with drafts capable of taking Victory ships not too heavily loaded were immediately available, and a seventh, on Pier No. 4, was quickly

made usable by the Navy’s removal of two sunken

Korean power mines prior to initiation of port operations by this unit. Since the movement into the area was

an administrative one, naval representation ashore was

small, consisting of a beach master detachment of

about 12, displaced after a few days by a fleet activities

detachment, and an officer representative from MASTS

(Military Air/Sea Transport Service). Two naval tugs remained in the port, and initially a naval officer worked

jointly with the regimental boat operations officer in the

berthing of ships. Soon, however, the entire matter of

piloting and berthing ocean-going ships fell to the regimental boat operations officer whose qualifications in

ship handling were invaluable to the operation. Pilot

service was rendered for 258 movements of oceangoing vessels in and about the restricted harbor.

A number of unusual measures were taken to expedite out loading that involved accepting risks and attendant difficulties. Piloting of ships from the outer anchorage at night became very difficult after this area

became full of naval and cargo vessels. With the anchorage full, passing between and around ships made these

movements extremely hazardous as the outside ships

were anchored on the minefield safety line. Docking

ships in high winds at night with very little light on the

docks, and in congested berths, also was a dangerous

operation. Although the damage to ships and piers was

nil, it taxed the ability of all concerned. When it became

necessary to nest ships to expedite out loading, the

absence of fenders aboard ships made the docking approach and docking difficult and hazardous. The nested

ships were worked on the outboard side by lighterage,

So, we evacuated. It became an amphibious landing

turnabout. We began moving

out and loading ships. Some

large Danish or Norwegian

locomotive ships were

brought in to evacuate the

tanks. You could see the

boom on these ships swing

down to pick up a tank and

watch the ship list.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 237

which resulted in a highly congested water traffic problem. The banking of LSUs and LCMs alongside the outboard ship added to the problem of docking vessels. Because of this, it frequently became necessary to move a

450-foot ship sideways into a 500-foot space, instead of

the safe and conventional way of an angle approach. The

docking of LSTs bow at Dock No. 4 also resulted in a

complicated docking problem. During this period, high

winds made it necessary to kedge all ships in between

the LSTs to prevent serious damage to other ships and/

or docks. During the evacuation period, 9-24 December 1950, the harbor and docking pilot handled 163

ship movements.

Since additional operating units were attached to

the brigade to facilitate development and control of the

evacuation facilities, the regimental mission was narrowed

to the out loading of ocean-going ships at pier side. The

LST beach was turned over by Company D to an element of the 1st Marine Division Shore Party, and Company D was given charge of ship loading at three berths

on Piers No. 3 and 4. Company E retained charge of

four berths on Pier No. 1.

The evacuation period was one of intense pressure.

It was critically important that maximum utilization

be made of all available pier space, and that all ships

work at a maximum rate throughout the 24-hour day. It

soon became apparent that the supply of civilian labor

was becoming disrupted by the deteriorating situation.

We requested through

brigade headquarters

that the loading unit or

service provide 40 dock

workers per shift. This

procedure was established but required close

follow up to ensure its

implementation.

 Each division, as

well as corps, established

embarkation control officers in the dock area and provided a source for direct

contact in implementing a loading plan once a ship

had been assigned by corps control. In order to facilitate contact at regimental level and the unit loading

each ship, and in order to quickly ascertain “slack” that

might require action at regimental or higher level, an

officer reporting directly to S-3 was on duty aboard each

ship at all times. Officers were made available for this

duty by discontinuing all staff functions not critical to

the immediate problem, by use of Headquarters Company and medical administrative officers, and by the loan

of four officers from brigade staff and special troops.

These officers were assigned in pairs to a given berth.

They rendered spot reports on any deficiencies and turned

in journal sheets and notes at three-hour intervals on

percent completion. In addition, they generally assisted

Equipment waiting to be loaded

on ships as UN forces prepare

to withdraw from Hungnam,

11 December 1950 RG 111, SC-355022
238 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

responsible companies in solving problems that arose

on the ships.

Principal recurrent difficulties encountered during the out loading included apparent slowness of assigned elements in getting material and work parties

at the dock once a ship was berthed, failure on the part

of ships to open hatches and rig gear as requested

prior to berthing, and delays due to damaged winches

or rigging.

 The first of these difficulties was usually most

apparent during the loading of the first one or two

ships of a given division or element, and the pace improved as their control office gained experience with the

system. The second-mentioned difficulty stemmed

both from a lack of personal contact and follow up by

naval boarding officers, and from occasional failure on

the part of ships’ masters to respond to requests or to

work their crews at odd hours to open hatches and rig

gear. The advance rigging asked for, based on average

requirements for unit loading, consisted of the two jumbos on the hatches so equipped, and standard double

rigging on the other three hatches. As to delays from

damaged ships’ gear, a number of the ships were newly

out of “mothballs” and had deteriorated wire or winch

machinery. Even on the better-maintained ships there

was considerable breakage by the unskilled Japanese

winch operators handling the Navy lifts. Also, many unit

vehicles were overloaded.

Many ships’ masters were authorized to work their

crewmembers as winch operators, both to provide improved operation on heavy lift gear and to alleviate a

shortage of winch operators in the local forces. Action

had been taken early in the out-loading phase to screen

engineer units for potential winch operators, and these

personnel were quickly given on-the-job training and

used to supplement the force of Japanese operators.

The matter of loading the special heavy lift ships

Men and equipment of the 1st Marine Division are loaded aboard

ships in Hungnam, 14 December 1950 RG 111, SC-355244
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 239

of the Bel Jeanne-type is worthy of comment. Three such

ships were loaded with tanks and heavy engineer equipment. Loading rates were distressingly slow under the

circumstances due to the inherently cumbersome makeup of the very heavy lift rigging. These ships should not

be used for such an urgent mission when LSTs can possibly be made available. One such ship was loaded with

new railroad cars, which had just been off loaded in the

area. Twelve railroad cars were loaded on Victory ships,

six per ship, and at a much faster rate.

Loading of unit vehicles, impedimenta, and ordnance vehicle stocks constituted the preponderant mission in terms of ships loaded, but the evacuation of POL,

rations, Class II & IV, and ammunition was the laborious feature of the operation. Initial indications were that

some 5,000 barrels of POL were to be out loaded; in the

final analysis, approximately 30,000 barrels were out

loaded. Ammunition out loading was undertaken late in

the evacuation process with a similar initial low estimate

of the amount to be handled. Much was loaded out by

LST under other than regimental supervision. In the final effort, a Victory ship was brought to pier side, and

its loading with 1,000 tons of ammunition comprised

the last special problem under regimental supervision.

Loading of this ship, one of the last merchant vessels in

the harbor, was carried out until it was called out by the

Navy at 2300 on the last night of operations in the

Hungnam area.

During the evacuation phase, the detailed dispatch

of LCMs, along with LSUs, was turned over to the special operational group established by brigade for control

of the lighterage beaches. The demand for LCM service

was moderate in view of the availability of LSUs and the

dominant use of alongside facilities for loading ships.

DUWKs continued out loading ammunition to a ship

in the stream until they were phased out on the last day.

Evacuation of casualties was a moderate problem

for the regimental medical detachment up to the time

that UN forces encountered overwhelming numbers

of the enemy. Following that, the flow of casualties

was heavy, and the medical detachment established

noteworthy records in their evacuation activity. As

many as 941 casualties were evacuated to sea in a twentyfour-hour period.

Phasing out of the regiment required careful planning to ensure that administrative personnel, vehicles,

and impedimenta were cleared as early as possible, and

that operational elements were held intact until they had

rendered their last possible service. We determined that

certain bulk impedimenta, administrative vehicles, and

heavy equipment in each company, were not required

for the specialized evacuation mission. We further determined that the Headquarters Company, less all enlisted

personnel of the S-3 Section and selected personnel in

S-1, S-2, and S-4, Communications Platoon, and Medical Detachment, would best be evacuated in advance of
240 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts, Jr. 2d Engineer Special Brigade

the final withdrawal. These elements, including minimum guard personnel from lettered companies, were

all placed under the charge of the Headquarters Company commander and phased out on shipping assigned

to brigade for such a purpose six days preceding the

day of final withdrawal.

At 2300, 23 December 1950, with the final tactical withdrawal scheduled for the following morning, the

loading of large ships at dockside completed, and final

operating equipment loaded aboard an LST standing by

on the beach, Company E and the final group of regimental headquarters personnel embarked on craft and

went aboard the Sultan and the LSD Ft. Marion in the

stream. Company B had loaded LCMs and DUKWs

aboard that vessel during the late afternoon and evening.

Company D, scheduled for movement on the LST carrying final operating equipment of all companies, remained on shore and assisted in a final effort on out

loading ammunition on LSTs nearby until about 0600,

24 December 1950. The withdrawal of their ship from

the beach completed the successful withdrawal of all elements of the regiment and concluded its part in this

unusual operation.

Only two officer replacements were received during these operations and the regiment as a whole continued to operate at about 20 percent under its limited

peacetime TO&E authorization. The inadequacy in the

size and strength of the unit was felt, particularly during

the evacuation phase when it was necessary to use service units to augment the shore force. The shortage of

personnel in existing units was accented by the fact

that the unit held 21 amphibious trucks and a number

of pieces of engineer equipment, all of which were considered essential to the operation. The provision of

operating personnel on this equipment could only

serve to curtail personnel available for other essential purposes, including maintenance. As at Inch’on and Iwon,

the tonnage records achieved were attributable largely

to the availability of civilian labor. Also, the existence

of ample dockside capacity precluded the derivation

of any relation between the records achieved and the

theoretical capability of the unit at its normal beach

operations mission.

Organizationally, the lack of an H&SC was most

noticeable. The Headquarters Company lacked the service elements normal to a regiment, and the absence of

the H&SC of the shore battalion emphasized the void.

Capabilities for central shop work, the pooling of certain items of heavy equipment, and the conduct of organizational maintenance at other than company level were

lacking. A further organizational deficiency existed in

that whereas personnel strength of units had been reduced to form a peacetime organization, the corresponding tables of equipment had not been reduced to take

into account the loss of operational or specialist personnel. Early publication and adoption of revised full-
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 241

strength TO&E—particularly for the shore battalion and

regimental Headquarters & Headquarters Company—

would have greatly enhanced the unit’s capabilities and

regularized its supply and maintenance procedures.

We evacuated Hungnam. We went into Ulsan

where we had a small beach operation for a short period

of time. Then we returned to Inch’on where we picked

up where we had left off. While we were gone the 50th

Engineer Port Construction Company had replaced the

lock gates. It made the cargo-handling situation a lot

easier since we could bring all the boats into the tidal

basin, close the locks, and the water would rise. Then we

could work almost from the LCM right onto the dock.

The first time we were in Inch’on we had to put 30

feet of extra line on all our cranes so they could pick up

the cargo. In Inch’on it became pretty much routine

port operation. I was in the boat company again.

I got a Bronze Star. Chesty Puller recommended

me for the Silver Star, but it was not approved.

Supplies to

be evacuated

from Hungnam,

11 December 1950

RG 111, SC-355021
242 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Maurice D. Roush 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

ieutenant Roush describes the bitterly cold

trucks, which were going over land with all our tools. I

told him that I’d probably just be a millstone around his

neck until my trucks arrived, because we weren’t much

good without our tools. My platoon waited for the trucks.

About three days later the trucks came, along with the

company commander and headquarters. The other two

platoons had not yet surfaced.

We were normally with the 31st Infantry, one of

the regiments that was caught in the Changjin (Chosin)

Reservoir. At the time that the Chinese came across

we were up near the Yalu. We didn’t know they had

come across. No one told us. We started a retrograde

movement back to Hamhung, which is right near the

coast. My platoon at that point had again been attached

out to an infantry battalion, and we went from where

we had been, up north, down to Hamhung in a train

with open gondolas.

Then we started up into the Changjin (Chosin)

Reservoir and went through an extremely narrow, deep

canyon. That canyon must have been 400-feet deep and

no more than 100-feet wide at its widest, nothing but

basalt and granite. One place there was sort of a niche

chiseled out of the side of the wall. It held a small reservoir town and had been built during World War II.

We stayed there overnight with a platoon of Marine engineers. The next morning we tried to go on all

the way into the reservoir but were stopped by the

Marines in Kot’o-ri. They turned us around and said

L

Korean winter of 1950-51, and the lack of adequate

winter clothing. “We got into one of the worst winter

situations I’ve ever seen. I’ve never been so cold, and I

come from Wyoming!” He also recounts the tragic fate

of Korean civilians caught between the Chinese and

American forces.

From Inch’on, after the fighting there quieted

down, we went down to Pusan, got on ships, and made

another amphibious landing, this time at Iwon and

Wonsan, on the east coast of North Korea. About the

time we landed we were given trigger-finger mittens

and some hats with earflaps. That was the extent of

winter gear. We still had our blanket sleeping bags.

We didn’t have good parkas or good footgear. We

got into one of the worst winter situations I’ve ever seen.

I’ve never seen it so cold—and I come from Wyoming!

Up in North Korea on the plateau, up near the Yalu

River, it’s extremely cold. In that area my company stayed

in an old schoolhouse that happened to have a wood

stove in it, which was very helpful. I don’t know how

the infantry got by. I know they had a lot of frostbite

and many people froze.

The infantry battalion commander was able to

round up some trucks in Hamhung and said he was going on up into the place called the Changjin (Chosin)

Reservoir. I could go with him, or I could wait for my
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 243 243

we had to get out as fast as we could. We were able to

get out but we were one of the last elements to do so.

Some of the troops got out and some of them didn’t.

We were extremely fortunate. We then proceeded to help

the people who were not as fortunate as they came out.

We took care of them—built tent cities and that sort of

thing. One of our platoons was decimated. I think only

two people got out. Lt. Wescott, the commander, was an

Irishman and quite proper Bostonian. He was a hell of a

fine person, but he didn’t make it. I heard that a couple

of his people and he actually charged a platoon of Chinese soldiers and were killed outright.

We spent some time building fortifications at

Hamhung, using about 500 to 600 volunteer North

Korean people. The North Korean people were extremely

friendly. One day I was going out in a three-quarter-ton

truck to build some bridges before the bottom fell out.

Apparently, some water got in the gas and the carburetor

and it froze up. We were out in the middle of nowhere,

and an old North Korean came trotting out of his house

wearing the white clothing that they wear—good for

summer, terrible for winter—carrying a brazier with

boiled potatoes on it for us. Knowing what I know now,

I realize it represented probably two to three weeks of

food for his family, but he gave it to us. Like idiots, we

didn’t eat it. We should have, even if we didn’t want it

because we had just had breakfast. It was one of the most

grand and generous things I’ve ever seen.

The Futility of War

These people turned out en masse to help us build fortifications. They had absolutely no love for their administration and they worked tirelessly without pay for watery rice. We didn’t know how to cook rice. They just

kept working for us.

 I planned the demolition and blew up a reinforced

concrete highway bridge, 1,200-feet long, between

Hamhung and Hungnam, and a railroad bridge on huge

circular concrete piers that paralleled it. We spent some

time preparing the fortifications. At the same time we

Korean laborers

repair a forward

runway for use

by Air Force

transports

Engineer School,

13-13-140
244 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Maurice D. Roush 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

prepared the bridges for demolition. With the sky

getting dark, I waited until late in the afternoon for

the last reconnaissance vehicle to come across that

bridge so I could blow it up—one of the eeriest and

loneliest things I have ever done. No American forces

were around, except my company commander and

me. After the last vehicle came across, and he gave us

permission, we blew the bridges using three tons of

demolition. You could feel it. It shook you a mile away

when it went up. We went back the next morning and

With the sky getting dark,

I waited until late in the

afternoon for the last

reconnaissance vehicle to

come across that bridge so

I could blow it up—one of

the eeriest and loneliest

things I have ever done.

took a look at it. Our forces had moved back up and

were defending along the river line.

 A pitiful thing happened there. About 150 Koreans were trapped between the Chinese forces and our

forces. They were just going back and forth across this

little river valley, going through the water, cold as

cold could be. The infantry told me that the Chinese

had infiltrated them and we weren’t to let them through

us. They’d go back toward the Chinese and the Chinese would shoot a few of them. They’d come back

toward us and the same thing would happen. Those

people may have perished. There was no damn good

reason for it, except that it was war. It demonstrates the

futility of war. After that, we got on a boat and went

to Pusan.

First Lt. Maurice Roush leaves Korea aboard

a landing craft, December 1950 Roush collection
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 245

With demolition charges in place, the last UN troops withdrew over

the bridge and 13th Engineers destroyed the span 15 minutes later.

Although the destroyed bridge slowed the Chinese advance, in

the days that followed, refugees continued to cross the riverbed.

The destroyed railroad bridge is in the background Roush collection
246 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

fter the landing at Wonsan, the battalion

to put it in first-class condition, so the X Corps could

use it as a supply train.

While we were at Chinhung-ni one night we heard

a lot of artillery fire. There was an infantry company of

Marines and a battery of 105-mm Marine howitzers at

Chinhung-ni. While I was talking to the Marines the

Chinese came in, and I was assigned to hold the west

side of the perimeter of this little town. We were all dug

in and fire was coming in all around the perimeter.

Fortunately, it was not very accurate.

I was wired in to the Marine artillery switchboard

listening to the conversation. There was contact all around

the perimeter. The road had been cut ahead of and behind us. This Marine infantry commander was telling

the artillery commander, “Lower your fire, lower your

fire! You’re shooting over them. You’re shooting over

them.” He said, “You’ve got to lower your fire.” The

artillery commander gave a classic comeback, “I can’t

lower my fire anymore. The shell splinters are wounding

my gun crews now.” That was pretty close support!

Road Work

The biggest part of our job was widening and improving the roads, which were mostly one-lane, ox cart

roads. Widening them involved a lot of dozer and

grader work. We found these big rockslides and we

set up quarries. We put our power shovels and frontloading scoop mobiles in these rockslides and hauled

A

traveled north to Hamhung where it worked feverishly to improve the narrow, one-lane roads that constituted the MSR. Later, after the Chinese entered the

war, the battalion fought its way south and was evacuated through the Port of Hungnam.

We left Seoul and went south to Pusan on a motor

march. The first part of October we got back to the east

coast, loaded on LSTs, and made the landing at Wonsan.

The Marines were coming in there, and we were attached

to X Corps in support of the 1st Marine Division.

Then we made a motor march from Wonsan to

Hungnam. Just north of Hungnam we were doing engineer operations and the Marines were moving north.

We got orders on Thanksgiving Day to go up the road

towards the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. I put out an

advanced battalion CP, and I moved to Chinhung-ni—

just north of Sudong. It was right down in the bottom

of a canyon. That road was very narrow going from

Chinhung-ni to Kot’o-ri, to Hagaru-ri going on north.

We had the MSR from Hungnam to Chinhungni—about 42 miles. The 185th ECB had it from

Chinhung-ni to Kot’o-ri; then the divisional engineers

had it from Kot’o-ri to up around the reservoirs.

A narrow gauge railroad there was in pretty good

condition. They gave me the job of checking it to see

that the tracks were all intact, to make any repairs, and

“Lower your fire, lower

your fire! You’re shooting

over them. You’re shooting

over them.” He said,

“You’ve got to lower your

fire.” The artillery commander gave a classic

comeback, “I can’t lower

my fire anymore. The shell

splinters are wounding my

gun crews now.”
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 247

Engineers collect rock

in a stone quarry

RG 111, SC-393504

rock as fast as we could to hard-surface these roads

and to make them two-way.

Winter was starting. We had a lot of work to do on

snow removal and sanding the roads because those mountain passes were terrible. Starting up from Sudong to

Chinhung-ni was where it really got steep. We were widening those roads and cutting off sides of hills so that

tanks and trucks could move up. The roads didn’t have

much stone on them, so if we got any moisture these big

vehicles would mire down.

The frozen road would frost heave. As the vehicles

went over it the frost heaves would just turn the road to

mush. We were hauling thousands of tons of stone to

put on these roads. Then we’d take the bulldozer back

and forth on the stone to spread it out and push it in

with the dozer tracks to get some stability in the road.

The troops were doing a pretty good job. In those

areas there were very few mines or booby-traps to hinder

us; the enemy had been chased out so fast. Some bridges

were blown, but primarily we had to widen these really

pitiful roads up in those canyons. Of course, the Chinese took the high ground. Our people were mostly down

in the valleys, which wasn’t a good position.

When the Chinese came in, everything changed.

The road behind us and the road ahead of us were both

cut. You could hardly move. They would surround these

cut-off units. They did a lot of hit-and-run tactics. They’d

come in on you at night and then be back in the hills in

the daytime. Travel on the

roads was pretty hazardous.

When all of this hit,

the 1st Marine Division

and the 7th Infantry Division at the Changjin

(Chosin) Reservoir, and

the 3d Division all got cut

off. The bridge was blown

south of the reservoir.

That was when they came

in and dropped this

treadway bridge by parachute, and the engineers [the 58th ETBC] put it in place

to open the road up.

When we got the orders to withdraw back to the

port of Hungnam there was an outfit called TASK

FORCE DOG. My Company A was the engineer element of TASK FORCE DOG. We attacked up the hill

with some Marines. The biggest part of the 1st Marine

Division, plus the 7th Division and the 3d Division, attacked down the hill to make contact with TASK FORCE

DOG to open the road up and see that they got back.

When Company A was designated as part of

TASK FORCE DOG trying to clear the road to help

the Marines coming down from Kot’o-ri, the company

commander’s name was Capt. Albert Bray. They ran into

a lot of roadblocks put there by the Chinese. Some of
248 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

the larger rocks had been rolled down so you couldn’t

get vehicles through.

Company A removed some explosive charges

on the road that hadn’t been set off, but I don’t think

they ran into any mines. They were under fire part of

the time from the surrounding hills. They cleared

the road of obstacles so vehicles coming down the hill

could pass. Many vehicles were carrying a lot of dead

and wounded.

A couple of individual awards were issued, but they

didn’t get any unit award like the Presidential Citation

that some of the Marines got for their work there. We

had a Lt. Reed who received the Silver Star for helping the Marines at Kot’o-ri.

Retreat from Chinhung-ni to Hungnam

After we opened the road for the Marines, my unit returned to the battalion. My forward headquarters was in

Chinhung-ni with Company A, so Company A went up

the hill from there and they came back. As they came

back down the hill the main body of all the troops pulled

back. They fought a rear-guard action to keep the Chinese off of their backs. So we pulled out with the rest of

them and moved on back down into Hungnam port.

We slowly pulled back to a big perimeter around

the port of Hungnam, about an eight-mile perimeter.

The first thing they did was get the heavy equipment—

the artillery in particular—onto the boats. They had

pulled some destroyers and a cruiser into the port, and

they used these ships as floating artillery.

They put out FOs, and they had radio contact

back to the ships. My FOs did an outstanding job. In

addition to keeping the Chinese and North Koreans at

bay with gunfire, they kept our whole perimeter lit at

night with the parachute flares. Along our perimeter

we could see any movement. That was really good because we were dug in and they were up there trying to

move. This was when they’d really get plastered.

The Navy did an outstanding job protecting us with

their fire from the ships. I remember going to Corps

Headquarters for a briefing on the situation and Gen.

Almond asked these commanders, “How long can you

hold out?” One of them said, “Three days.” One of them

said, “Maybe we can hold out a week.” Another said,

“10 days.” I remember Gen. Almond saying, “Well, you’re

either going to hold out for two weeks or die here on

the beach because we’ve got every boat in the Pacific

Ocean coming to pick us up. You’re going to have to

hold out for probably two weeks until they get here to

get everybody out.” Everybody dug in and really did

the job. We pulled back into an eight-mile perimeter

around Hungnam, waiting for ships to come from all

over the Pacific to pick us up.

When a lot of those ships arrived they were loaded

with everything that you could imagine—and they

dumped it. They dumped a lot of their cargo in the harWhen a lot of those ships

arrived they were loaded

with everything that you

could imagine—and they

dumped it. They dumped

a lot of their cargo in the

harbor or in the ocean.

One ship, which was

loaded with pineapples

from Hawaii, just dumped

everything in order to

take all of the troops and

our equipment aboard.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 249

bor or in the ocean. One ship, which was loaded with

pineapples from Hawaii, just dumped everything in order to take all of the troops and our equipment aboard.

At the end they allowed nearly 100,000 civilians

to get on the ships. These people were afraid of the communists. As we started pulling out these people were

begging to get aboard. The commanders of these ships

allowed them to get on board. They were on the deck

and it was bitter cold—20 degrees below zero. They took

these refugees out of that perimeter and brought them

back to Pusan.

We left on 18 December 1950. The first ones out

were the ROK troops. They were afraid that as things

started to get bad these people would panic. Then they

took the people out who had the biggest part of the

fighting. Next, they shipped out most of the Marines

and the artillery, because they were using naval gunfire

for artillery. The 7th Infantry Division left after the

Marines, and the 3d Division was last. North Korean refugees wait at the habor at Hungnam to be evacuated. U.S. and

South Korean warships, along with commercial vessels, evacuated tens of thousands

of civilians in the bitter cold RG 80, USN 424093
250 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Charles T. Williams 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

ieutenant Williams thought he was going to

Although several people in the class did get emergency orders to report back to their units, I was able to

finish that course and drive on up to Fort Belvoir expecting to start the Advanced Class. The course started

that fall, but the minute I walked on the post and reported in they had a set of telegraphic orders for me to

report to the Seattle Port of Embarkation for immediate

assignment out to Japan, and onwards to some unit going into the Korean War. I didn’t have many days to wind

up my stateside affairs, perhaps a week or so. I had a

brand new Chevrolet convertible and I was debating what

to do with it. In the end, I put it up on blocks, and it was

waiting for me 18 months later when I finally got home.

That was the sort of thing that I had to cope with.

I went out to the Far East as a casual replacement.

I went to a replacement center in Japan and was assigned

to the rear detachment of the 73d ECB, whose forward

elements had already gone into the Inch’on landing

area in Korea. The rear detachment was rounding up

supplies and other items that they thought would

be useful. I became involved in that activity with the

idea that we would be going over to Korea to join the

unit in a few weeks.

My job for those first few weeks was to see what

we could get for the battalion out of the depot stocks

that were available to us in Japan. Although the weather

was still warm, my battalion commander had been in

Korea before and knew the winters got cold. We put in

L

the Engineer Officers Advanced Class but the North

Korean invasion instead brought him to Asia as a casual replacement. He praises the National Guard units

in his engineer group and describes the relatively

smooth racial integration of the unit.

When graduation from the University of California came in June 1950, the Korean War had not yet

started. I was sitting during those spring months with a

set of orders to report to the Engineer Officers Advanced

Class (EOAC), which would have started at Fort Belvoir

[Virginia] in September 1950. Therefore, I was concerned

about what would happen to me during that summer,

considering that the academics at the University of California would end around 10 June and this EOAC course

wouldn’t start until September. I had visions of being

ordered to summer reserve training with two-week

active duty types. I took this occasion to write the Chief

of Engineers office and say, “I don’t know whether you’ve

noticed, but I have this gap here. My suggestion for filling this gap is for me to go down to Fort Benning, Georgia, and take airborne training.” Much to my surprise

they wired back within about a week saying, “We have a

quota for you in a class that starts so-and-so. Get on

your horse and get there.” That was exactly what I did.

While I was at Fort Benning, Georgia, in the airborne

school, the Korean War started.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 251

enough requisitions for parkas, Arctic parkas, for every

man in the battalion. We gathered these together. When

we went over a few weeks later we had some cold weather

gear, which most of the Army that moved over from Japan to Korea did not have. There just weren’t sufficient

stocks to outfit the whole expeditionary force.

I did not stay long in Japan. That rear detachment

went on over around the middle of October and I joined

my company, which was the Company C of the 73d

ECB, just south of Seoul. The U.S. forces had crossed

the Han River at Seoul and by this time were north of

there. We were working on the roads leading up to that

area. The 73d was a unit that had Negro enlisted men

and noncommissioned officers and white officers. It was

very much like the one

I’d been in on Guam except this was a combat

engineer battalion; therefore, it did not have the

construction equipment

that the one had on

Guam [the 93d ECB].

The next higher

unit was the 19th ECG.

Shortly after I arrived in

Korea and was assigned

as a platoon leader in

Company C, the unit

went down to Pusan and out loaded into LSTs and

other ships to be part of the X Corps operation landing

on the northeast coast of the Korean peninsula. At that

time we came under the control of a provisional engineer group headquarters that had been organized in

Japan, and I quote here, “for the occupation of Northeast Korea.” It was the 8224th ECG. That group headquarters, which lasted through my time in Korea—

perhaps a year or two longer, was the engineer combat

support group of the U.S. X Corps. It was, in effect, an

engineer control headquarters for a labor and lineof-communications construction workforce that probably amounted to 10,000 to 12,000 people at its peak

period—mostly Koreans.

When I arrived at

the unit forward, once

the battalion joined up

together, it was not up

to full strength. Only a

trickle of U.S. casuals

came in against the requisitions, just as I had

come. We participated in a program that

started in those dark

days of the early part of

the Korean War called

the KATUSA Program.

Often, in those early days,

it was all sign language.

If we were all going to go

and clear out a culvert so

it would drain, we would

pick up shovels, hand

them out to the KATUSA

soldiers, and motion for

them to follow us.

Korean laborers level a roadway Engineer School, 92-64-1
252 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 4

First Lieutenant Charles T. Williams 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

Whereas we might normally have an organizational

structure calling for 12 or 13 individuals in an engineer

squad, under this program we might have had four

Americans and seven Koreans.

Those Korean soldiers were put into U.S. Army

uniforms and were simply given to us to use. We tried to

get somebody who could act as an interpreter so that at

least one person in each company, and then later maybe

one in each platoon, could tell these people in their own

language what to do. Often, in those early days, it was

all sign language. If we were all going to go and clear out

a culvert so it would drain, we would pick up shovels,

hand them out to the KATUSA soldiers and motion for

them to follow us. It was about the best we could do.

That was how the U.S. engineer forces were brought

up to any kind of reasonable working strength.

When Company C of the 185th ECB [a sister battalion in this same group with us] landed there were 24

Americans in it. Every man in the company, including

the company commander, drove a vehicle off the LST

onto the shore. There were as many vehicles as there were

people. Obviously, a unit like that had no real capability

of doing communications work unless you augmented

it rather quickly.

In October 1950, the 7th U.S. Division and the

1st Marine Division landed on the east coast of North

Korea and were headed up toward the Yalu River. We

were placed in support of them on those very long mountainous lines of communication leading up toward the

Yalu River. It began to get very cold very early in the year

in that mountain area, and those divisions ran into a lot

of trouble with the initial onslaught of the Chinese forces.

In the end we were all sitting in the out loading

perimeter around the Hungnam Harbor. My organization was given orders to blow up supplies that were obviously not going to be out loaded, to deny them to the

enemy. My company was fairly late in the evacuation. I

don’t mean the bullets were being fired at us as we got on

the boats, but there weren’t many people behind us when

we left the beach. We went back down to Pusan by LST

and then very quickly came up the center of the peninsula to where the lines had stabilized—not far from the

38th Parallel. We were in the middle of the country by

late January 1951. For almost a year, the 8224th with its

battalions stayed and dealt with that mountain country

in the center of the peninsula in support of the U.S. and

Korean divisions of the U.S. X Corps.

Two of the battalions—the 185th and mine—were

Regular Army battalions. Of course, replacements—

draftees—were coming into them, based on our shortages. When you start talking about regular units now

(i.e., in 1985), you’re thinking of people with Regular

Army volunteerism. But that didn’t apply then. The

enlisted men were draftees. These were line units of

the U.S. Army that existed before the war and were

brought into the war.
The East Coast Landing and Retreat October–December 1950 253 253

Lt. Emmett Proctor, 1343d

Engineer Combat Battalion,

points to the location of his

hometown. At left is Lt. Gen.

Edward Almond, commander,

X Corps, who dedicated

the bridge

RG 111, SC-371851

National Guard Units and Racial Integration

Two other battalions joined the group sometime in

the spring of 1951 [116th and the 1343d ECB], one

was an Alabama National Guard battalion [1343d] called

to the colors for the Korean War. The other was a similar

battalion [the 116th] from Idaho. Both were allwhite units. When it came time to integrate the units,

sometime around the fall of 1952, we had one black

battalion of the Regular Army, one white battalion of

the Regular Army, and two white National Guard units,

one of which was full of Alabamians. We put onequarter blacks into that unit and into the other Regular

Army battalion. We took one quarter of each of the

three white battalions’ individuals and put them into

the formerly black battalion. We had a big three-way

switch. Some of the biggest arguments were over the

best cooks, irrespective of what race they were, as

to whether they would stay on in one unit or go to another. Those nationalized National Guard battalions took this in surprisingly good grace. As individuals, both black and white soldiers earned rotation

points and, in end, they all rotated home at about

the same time.

The National Guard battalions were very effective

units. One reason was because everybody knew everybody else. Many of them had served in World War II,

and enough time had elapsed that, as a coherent unit,

they all knew each other well.

I was in Korea around 17 months, and I spent

about five months of it in the 73d Engineer Battalion.

Then I was pulled up to the group S-3 section, and I did

a sequence of duties there as a reconnaissance officer,

assistant S-3, engineering officer, and so on.
I • I ... r t L _, 

1 

__:_: I ~ 

Jtl; 
January– July 1951

Chapter 5

Ridgway Takes Command

Engineers push heavy sills into place as

they build a bridge in the rain, 1951

RG 111, SC-365621

255
256 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Ridgway

Takes

 Command
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 257

Introduction

Chapter 5

S hortly after the Chinese attacked the UN forces

and began pushing south, the Eighth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, died when his jeep collided with an ROK Army truck. Immediately after the

accident, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, on the Department of the Army’s staff as deputy chief of staff for

operations and administration, assumed command of

the Eighth Army.

When he arrived, Ridgway found that American

soldiers’ morale was poor. He determined his first

action would be to stop the Chinese attack, falling

back where necessary, then execute a series of attacks to

push the line back to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel.

Before he began his offensive he assigned X Corps to

the Eighth Army. For the first time since the corps landed at Inch’on, the Eighth Army commander controlled

all UN ground troops in Korea. This force numbered

about 365,000 men.

Gen. Ridgway established a defense line along the

38th Parallel. On New Year’s Eve the Chinese attacked

along the entire front with four field armies. Ridgway

ordered UN forces to pull back to the south bank of the

frozen Han River. As the Chinese pressed the attack,

Ridgway continued his withdrawal to keep his units

intact and to achieve “maximum punishment, maximum delay.”

The Chinese suffered heavy casualties. On 20 January, Ridgway decided to exploit the situation with

brief but violent counteractions. He followed these on

25 January with a still larger operation, Operation Thunderbolt, a reconnaissance in force of one U.S. division

and one ROK regiment from each corps. UN forces advanced cautiously against light opposition. By 30 January 1951 resistance stiffened and the enemy began counterattacks. The Chinese resisted the UN drive vigorously

until 9 February, and then abruptly they gave way. The

Eighth Army took Kimpo airfield, near Seoul, without

opposition.

Meanwhile, Ridgway planned another attack

called Operation Roundup that began on 5 February.

The Chinese responded by attacking in strength against

the South Koreans on the night of 11-12 February.

On 13 February, the Chinese drove against the left

hinge of X Corps at Chip’yong-ni. For three days the

Americans defended the road junction at Chip’yong-ni

against assaults, but by 19 February the initiative passed

back into UN hands.

On 21 February, Ridgway established a general
258 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Because of the massive size

of the attacking force, General MacArthur decided to

transfer X Corps to South

Korea. Here, the corps would

establish a defensive line just

south of the 38th Parallel to

reinforce the Eighth Army

against the expected Chinese

winter offensive.

advance called Operation Killer, undertaken by both the

U.S. IX and X Corps. Unusually warm and wet weather

throughout much of the operation turned the American

offensive into a plodding affair and permitted many of

the Chinese to escape northward. Operation Killer’s

physical objectives were attained with little more than a

delaying action on the part of the enemy, but the broader objective of destroying a large enemy force eluded

the Americans. The entire Eighth Army front stabilized

by 1 March.

The UN forces continued the offensive north with

Operation Ripper, 6-31 March. By the time Operation

Ripper concluded at the end of the month, Ridgway’s

forces had fought their way back to the 38th Parallel.

On 5 April, Ridgway followed Ripper with Operation

Rugged, a general advance toward a new 115-mile objective line along a commanding ground north of the

38th Parallel. From there, UN forces would press the

attack still further.

Meanwhile, several major changes in command

took place. A new IX Corps commander, Maj. Gen.

William M. Hoge, had arrived on 5 March. On 11 April,

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway replaced General Douglas

MacArthur, who had been relieved by President Truman

for insubordination, and Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet,

commanding the Second Army, took over Eighth Army.

By the end of April, enemy activity increased and

UN forces prepared for the expected enemy spring offensive. The attack came on 22 April, but by 20 May,

UN troops had stopped the Chinese drive. Gen. Van

Fleet began a new offensive on 18 May and the enemy

pulled back. By mid-June, the Eighth Army had largely

attained its objectives of Operation Pile Driver, while at

the UN a different type of offensive began. Voices in

many circles began defining a UN “victory” as a return

to the status quo ante bellum, with Korea once again

divided by the 38th Parallel.

When Ridgway took command of Eighth Army,

one of his first actions was to take Brig. Gen. Garrison

Davidson out of the 24th Infantry Division and place

him in charge of building another defensive line around

Pusan. This time, Davidson had more time to do the

work and could plan the line as he wished. Once that

line was started he was asked to build a defensive line

north of Seoul in the I Corps area. When he finished

that assignment he became the acting commander of

KMAG until rotation out six weeks later.

During the offensive north with the 7th Infantry

Division, Lt. Maurice D. Roush, 13th ECB, spent much

of his time building bridges. He describes dealing with

the Chinese spring offensive in 1951.

Capt. Charles T. Williams, 8224th ECG, lists the

units in his group and points out that most of the problems in returning north were water related—bridging

and flooding. Supplies were needed for the front line

and constant maintenance was required to keep the roads
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 259

from washing out. There was some enemy infiltration

resulting in a few casualties and some men were lost

clearing minefields.

Maj. Harold R. Parfitt, 2d ECG, notes that the

group moved back toward Seoul again, repairing the

rail line one more time. It also built three bridges over

the Han.

Lt. Col. Evan S. Pickett’s 73d ECB moved to Pusan

in December 1950 and started north again, widening

the narrow Korean roads, making bypasses and, in general, keeping the roads open.

Col. Paschal N. Strong was the Eighth Army Engineer during the first year of the Korean War. His major

engineering concern was in bridging rivers and keeping the bridges in during flooding.

Col. Emerson C. Itschner, I Corps Engineer, describes a joint bridge-building operation with the

Chinese at Panmunjom.

Maj. Lawrence B. Farnum describes 2d ECB activity after Maj. Leavey came in and took over the battalion. Leavey volunteered the battalion to do engineer

work while building up to strength. They built bridges,

repaired roads, and cleared minefields. In one instance,

a Korean woman was killed in a minefield. Farnum rescued the woman’s baby by going into the minefield and

bringing the woman’s body out along with the baby.

First Lt. George Stukhart describes arriving in

Korea with the 93d Engineer Battalion. He tells about

building an airfield complex and repairing buildings

just north of Pusan. He then moved to the 2d ECB,

where one of his big problems involved finding and

disarming mines.

Capt. Walter S. Medding describes the 14th

ECB’s bridge-building activities in the spring and summer of 1951, which were extensive. He notes that the

battalion also was involved in road maintenance and

mine clearing.

Lt. Col. Harry D. Hoskins, Jr., describes his time

in Korea as Supply and Maintenance Officer, Base Section, Eighth Army, December 1950-August 1951, and

the various problems he experienced, such as a lack of

inventory of equipment and the resulting non-responsiveness of the supply system to using units. He also

gives us a remarkable picture of the “black market”

system as it existed in Base Section, Korea.

First Lt. James L. Trayers describes his assignment

to Company B, 8th Engineers, and his responsibilities

in that unit. He describes building a sand bag bridge,

making concertinas, and clearing minefields. He also

talks about his regimental commander, Col. Dan

Gilmer, USMA 1932, who he describes as a real gogetter. Trayers left the unit for the engineer school just

before the unit left Korea for Honshu, Japan.
260 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson The Davidson Line

Brigadier General Davidson details his second

opportunity to build a defensive line around Pusan,

contrasting it with his first proposed line. He also comments on the North Koreans’ skill at camouflaging

their foxholes.

Lt. Gen., soon-to-be General, Matthew B. Ridgway

had taken over command from Lt. Gen. Walton H.

Walker. It looked like there might be an evacuation

from Korea so Gen. Ridgway took me out of the

24th Division in January 1951 and sent me south to

build, again, a defensive line around Pusan. But this

time the decision of the location site was up to me.

I went back pretty much to the line I had originally

recommended. It was a shorter line, about 50 miles

long, and I went to work on the defensive line there.

This time I got some support. I had Korean troop units

to work with plus some Americans and American

supervisors. I had combat-experienced officers to command sectors. I divided the whole thing into sectors

and turned a sector over to each American officer who

supervised the construction in that area. The Koreans

were damn good at their field fortifications once we

taught them. That line was a good line. When the evacuation didn’t develop they had me go ahead and finish

it anyway, or at least carry it through to its first phase.

As the line finally evolved, it would have taken something to puncture it.

Several things were interesting in connection with

the construction process. When those Koreans had

been instructed and organized they became masters at

making field fortifications. I laid out the trace of the

line, which was about 50 miles long, and then we sent

the units out to start. I started personally to go over

the whole line from the right flank or the center. I went

onto the ground to see how the individual fortifications

were laid out and reviewed the whole thing physically.

I ran into some funny situations. One was where a

Korean outfit had been given a sector to defend on a

hill. We instructed them about fields of fire and made

sure they had ample field supply. They took everything

off the hill. You’d go over on the other side, look back up

there, and see the front line was right on the edge of the

trees. It was a terrible job. We had to correct that by a

little selective land clearing.

We’d go along, and I’d approve the location, say, of

a machine gun emplacement. I had to do this in great

detail myself until I trained the people. Then my subordinates did it. They located the individual emplacements and it had to be done in a hurry. They’d go and

say, “Now, you put a machine gun emplacement right

here,” you see. We’d have them draw the design for the

emplacement and showed them how to build it. We’d

mark all the mortar emplacements; put stakes in the

ground tied with little red pieces of cloth so they would

be readily visible to the troops when they came to do the

The line we built around

Pusan was a good one...well

camouflaged. There’s a real

art to field fortifications....

It’s not just a matter of

throwing a few logs or things

together. The definitive location is extremely important.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 261 261

Perched high on a rocky outcrop, this U.S.

outpost reflects Korea’s mountainous terrain

RG 306, 53-10494
262 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson The Davidson Line

construction work. As soon as our people left those spots

at night the Koreans would come out and steal those

little wooden stakes. That was money in the bank for

them even though the stakes were small. They didn’t see

that much wood for their fires. It would take them hours

up in the woods to get that much wood to burn. We had

trouble with that.

I discovered that in the ridgelines, where we had to

build emplacements, we forgot to tell the Koreans what

that stake represented, whether it was a middle or the

forward corner or the back corner, or what. The officers

I had helped me locate each one, and the governing factor was the field of fire. They had intended the stake to

be the forward location stake of the emplacement. Some

of the men expected the stake to be the center of the

emplacement. When the Koreans came along they built

the emplacement so that the stake was the aiming stake

for the emplacement—maybe moved it back three to

five feet. When you went down in that thing and put

the machine gun in, because of the terrain there was

about a 10-foot field of fire. We had to make that

clear. They got very, very accomplished at it. They could

make those emplacements so you were very close to

them yet not be able to see them.

The line that we finally built around Pusan was a

good one. It was well camouflaged. There’s a real art to

field fortifications. It’s not just a matter of throwing a

few logs or things together. The definitive location is

extremely important. As I said, moving the emplacement

four or five feet forward or backwards changed the whole

field of fire. In the case of the mortars that didn’t mean

so much but it was very important with machine guns.

You just can’t do it haphazardly; you have to be certain

of what you’re doing.

 In Korea, I was at an area where there’d just been a

fight a few hours before. I was standing within a few feet

of a North Korean foxhole and didn’t see it. They were

circular, like a manhole in the street, and they’d weave

these mats and just put them in. The holes were built so

they could fire from them when they stood up. They

could squat in them, use this mat made from the grass

around them, and pull it over them like a manhole cover.

Unless you looked sharply you couldn’t detect them.

I don’t think we gave enough attention to that.

During that time the Chinese were attacking and

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn had I Corps north of Seoul.

His CP was in Uijongbu. He asked for me to be sent up

there to supervise the construction of a defensive line

north of Seoul. He anticipated that they were going to

be driven back and he wanted to find a line north of

Seoul to stand on. I left my line around Pusan and

went to Uijongbu. I laid out that line for the I Corps.

I went to Gen. Milburn after I’d laid it out and said,

“Now, you can work from now to eternity on a defensive line. You always keep improving it. It’s an endless

proposition. I’ve laid out this line with its construction,
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 263

carried out in at least three phases. Nothing was picked

out of the air but I made a rough estimate.” I said, “Now,

this is the date the first phase will be completed. We

hope to complete the first phase by this date. And then

we’ll go to the second date.” Just by happenstance and

coincidence the date I picked for the completion of the

first phase was the night the Chinese attacked, and they

stopped them there. I pointed out that the first phase

was the minimum we needed to stop the earliest attack.

When my job with the defensive line was finished,

I went to Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army

commander, and asked him what the prospects were

General Douglas MacArthur

and President Harry Truman

meet for the first time at

Wake Island, 15 October 1950

RG 111, SC-34915-S
264 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson The Davidson Line

for my next assignment, because I couldn’t get back to

the 24th Division—they already had an assistant division commander. He said there were no prospects for

anything that I was interested in so I just let nature take

its course and they sent me home.

Working with the Korean

Military Advisory Group (KMAG)

For about a month or so, until I got my orders, I was

acting commander of a KMAG. Frank Farrell, who had

headed that program, had done a superb job from the

start. He was really bushed when they sent him home. I

was appointed acting commander. I remember Lev Allen

was insistent that they put the word “acting” in front of

it because he said, “I don’t want to have you assigned as

commander of KMAG. The records would show that

you were appointed commander and then relieved in

about five or six weeks. It would look bad on your record,”

he said. “We’ll make that clearly ‘acting’ so there will be

no connotation of that.” I was in that capacity for a time

and I had an office in Taegu right next to Chung IlKwon, who was the senior military man on the Korean

side. He later became the chairman of their joint chiefs

of staff and served as president of the country for a while.

The principle duty of the acting chief of the KMAG

was to supervise the training of the Koreans. The Koreans were responsible for the actual training. By the time

I left in 1951 the Koreans were doing nicely.

The Change of Command

General Douglas MacArthur’s removal in April 1951

came out of the blue. When I was working on the defensive line I had gone down to headquarters in Pusan in a

jeep. The driver tuned the radio into the station that

broadcasted the news periodically and I heard about it

on the street in Pusan. It was a complete surprise.

The immediate result of Ridgway’s assumption of

command was the feeling of a tighter rein. It was a more

positive direction. Gen. Walker operated without all

the intelligence information he should have had. I don’t

think he was as intimately informed as he should have

been, through no fault of his own. I don’t think he had

the information, the overall picture, and the resources

that were available to Ridgway. I thought Ridgway was

able to take a more positive hold on the reins because

he had more information about the overall strength,

capacity, and availability of Army resources.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 265 265

Soldiers of the 2d Engineer Battalion

disarm a mine, January 1951

RG 111, SC-362313
266 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

First Lieutenant Maurice D. Roush 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

Lieutenant Roush recalls going north with the

7th Infantry Division and encountering the Chinese

spring offensive, 1951. After advancing 20 miles, the

Chinese outran their supply lines and their troops

began “surrendering in droves.”

From Pusan, we made our way north to around

Chechon on an unheated train in the dead of winter. We

then prepared a company encampment and started licking our wounds, trying to rebuild our company and get

back into fighting shape. That was how we got through

the Christmas holidays. In the beginning of the next year,

in January-February, the whole [7th] division started back

up north, fighting as we went. That was a very critical

time for the engineers.

The roads were okay; because they were frozen they

were solid. Getting across the streams, though, was really tough. We did a lot of bridge building and spent a

lot of time in icy water. It gave me a great appreciation

for the American soldier. He sure put up with a lot.

Finally the spring came and all hell broke loose.

The Chinese hit us with their spring offensive and we

rolled back about 20 miles and then stopped. They had

outrun their supply lines. It became a turkey shoot.

Literally, when it was over, I am convinced there was

nothing between us and the Yalu. Apparently the Chinese reached a breaking point and there were no North

Korean soldiers to speak of.

The Chinese began surrendering in droves. I’ve

never seen anything like it. At one point, I would take

a bulldozer on a lowboy along with a tank column

and go out as much as 15 miles in front of our lines.

We took the bulldozer so we could fill in holes that

might have been blown in the road. I was in front of

our lines three or four miles in the evening with a bulldozer. Nobody was there but us, a squad of engineers,

and we were not troubled. There just wasn’t any resistance in front of us.

I recall quite clearly the day that we were stopped.

I was with Col. William J. McCaffrey [USMA 1939],

who commanded the 31st Infantry, and he had two

battalions advancing up two sides of the valley—one

on each mountain on either side. He was called by

the division commander on his radio and told to

stop his people. He refused and said, “I’ll stop if you

come here and tell me to.” Maj. Gen. Claude B.

Ferenbaugh [USMA 1919] arrived in a chopper about

30 minutes later and said, “Stop.” Col. McCaffrey,

however, had lost radio contact so the general went

after one battalion and I went after the other and we

stopped them.

That time President Harry Truman stopped us.

Once again, we entered into a confusing period of operations. The Chinese had time to rebuild their forces.

Then things just simmered along from that point forward and it was the winding down of the war.

Finally spring came and

all hell broke loose. The

Chinese hit us with their

spring offensive...we rolled

back about 20 miles...

then stopped. They had

outrun their supply lines.

It became a turkey shoot.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 267

“We did a lot of bridge building and spent

a lot of time in icy water. It gave me a

great appreciation for the American

soldier. He sure put up with a lot.”

Engineers build a trestle bridge

Engineer School, Korea-072

267
268 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Captain Charles T. Williams 8224th Engineer Construction Group

Our major problems were that we were dealing

with a very underdeveloped country with a very restrictive road net, and yet we were a mechanized

army with mechanized supply levels required in the

forward areas.” Captain Williams describes his

duties as a road reconnaissance officer.

A reconnaissance officer is somebody who goes

out and looks to see what the existing conditions are.

We began to try to get the roads ready for the monsoon season. Korea has quite a monsoon season. The winters tend to be very dry, and one can pretty much ford

everything except the major rivers like the Han and

Imjin. But, starting around the third week in June, for

about the next six or seven weeks, there are often torrential rains, and even relatively dry stream crossings suddenly might contain 8 or 10 feet of very turbulent water.

The original roads, primarily built by the Japanese

occupiers after they took over Korea in 1910, had

concrete reinforced bridges, usually with about 20- or

25-foot spans, single or multiple spans as needed by the

site. Many of these bridges had been blown out of existence. We were replacing a number of them, some with

Bailey bridges, some with timber bridges—trying to get

ready for what we knew was coming up in the spring

summer rains. The main problems were water related.

My organization was far enough behind the lines

that we did not get either artillery fire or much in the

way of sniping—just a very few incidents with infiltrators. We suffered practically no casualties. We lost a

few while clearing minefields when we advanced and

took over ground. The enemy or our own forces had

mined and not recorded the locations properly.

Our major problems were that we were dealing with

a very underdeveloped country with a very restrictive road

net, and yet we were a mechanized army with mechanized supply levels required in the forward areas. It was

pretty much straightforward pioneer-type work.

 I was promoted to captain, which was another reason for my going up on the group staff. There were four

American engineer battalions and a number of separate

companies, such as a light equipment company [630th

Engineer Light Equipment Company], a ponton bridge

company [58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company],

a fixed bridge company, and an engineer dump truck

company. We also had two or three ROK Army engineer combat battalions assigned to us. We had large numbers of Korean Service Corps (KSC), which at that time

were basically used to “chogey” (i.e., carry on one’s back)

the A-frames with ammunition and those supplies up

the hills. A number of those smaller units were organized into KSC regiments, which might be 2 or 3,000

strong. They were assigned to us to provide our hand

labor. They were fed from U.S. supplies, provided

with hand tools from our depots, and their work

assignments were coordinated by the 8224th.

“

...there are often torrential

rains, and even relatively

dry stream crossings

suddenly might contain

8 or 10 feet of very

turbulent water.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 269

The depth of American involvement with that kind

of a system in a work force of 12,000 did not go very far

down. One of the problems that it made for the engineer battalions back home, wherein our people returned,

was that American soldiers in Korea didn’t do as much

in the way of physical work, except of course skilled work

by mechanics. American soldiers hardly had to pick up a

shovel; there were always plenty of Koreans around.

When they got back to units in the States, where the full

squad was American, shovels still had to be picked up

Men of the 185th Combat

Battalion stand watch over

a bridge damaged by floodwaters on the Soyang River,

May 1951 RG 111, SC-369385

and used, but in their minds they had graduated to a

step above this.

The Korean War was the only war in which I actually saw service in the theater of operations. My life

was not in danger 99 percent of the time; therefore,

I think it was not too dissimilar to serving in peacetime

engineer troop units, under virtually continuous maneuver conditions.
270 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Major Harold R. Parfitt 2d Engineer Construction Group

M ajor Parfitt recalls repairing roads, rail- Although crossing plans were quickly prepared,

Army headquarters made a decision to assign someone

else to do the construction of the high-level bridges.

Nevertheless, the group was to continue work on the

shoofly across the Han.

About this time a rotation policy was initiated and

units began to lose experienced officers and men. Coincidently, I was seeking to get assigned to an engineer

battalion in a combat division to fill out my career experience. I had never been with a division although I had

considerable combat service in World War II. Fortunately

an opening developed in the 8th Engineers, 1st Cavalry

Division, and I was sent up for an interview with the

commanding general to see if I would be acceptable.

Happily, Maj. Gen. Charles Palmer, commander of the

1st Cavalry Division, interviewed me and approved my

assignment as Assistant Division Engineer. I reported

for duty on 2 April 1951.

roads, and bridges.

The 2d Group came back through Seoul about

mid-December. We kept on moving south as the front

line came back. Our area of responsibility kept moving

toward Taegu. Our mission was heavily oriented to improving the crossings for the retrograde movement, and

then preparing them for demolition so that follow-on

troops could blow them up if they found it necessary.

We did this up until late January 1951 during which

time I was assigned as the S-3 of the 84th ECB.

When the line held and a counter offensive was

initiated, I was back with the 2d ECG headquarters. We

began moving back up the corridor we had been on,

enroute to Seoul, checking and repairing roads and railroads that had been damaged. Along the way the 62d

was diverted out onto a spur line from Chochiwon toward Chongju. The 2d Engineers together with the 82d

arrived in the Seoul area about 7 March 1951.

The mission given to the group was related to three

crossings over the Han. One was the low-level shoofly

bridge, and we were to prepare plans for repair of two

high-level bridges. We were getting closer to the rainy

season but there still was a feeling we could repair the

shoofly quickly and get an effective use of it—maybe a

month or two before the rains got us.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 271

Soldiers of the 55th Engineer Treadway Bridge

Company begin construction of a floating bridge

at the Han River Engineer School, 42-5-84
272 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

olonel Pickett describes his battalion’s con-

 When we got back to Pusan we were there just a

short time. We were told to get rations and ammunition and go north up the MSR until we got to the front.

The Chinese by that time were coming south and we

were going north. I think the front was near Andong

in the Ch’ongju area. That’s above Taejon. It was the

middle of the winter so we did snow clearance and sanded icy roads. Mostly we spent our time widening, graveling, and making bypasses on the very narrow Korean

roads in this mountainous area. There were very few

mines or booby traps in our work areas. It was primarily

road and bridgework.

 At one time X Corps was setting up a defensive

line. We had some of our troops helping to construct barbed wire entanglements. They called it the

KANSAS LINE, and these double and triple barbed

wire fences with gun emplacements ran from the Sea of

Japan to the Yellow Sea, clear across Korea, about 60 to

100 miles.

Another big job was the Chech’on Railroad

Station. We were going to put a big quartermaster and

ordnance ammunition dump and supply point there.

One of the railcars that was full of ammunition blew

up. We had one sergeant seriously injured and several

others injured. The explosion had scattered ammunition all over the railroad yard. We spent quite a

lot of time cleaning that up and then getting gravel

in, hard surfacing the area where they could stack

C

stant battle with Korea’s roads—sanding, clearing

snow, and widening. He also shares his impressions of

General Matthew Ridgway, and of the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program.

Our outfit left Hungnam on 18 December 1950

and went to Pusan. I’d lost a lot of my heavy equipment

from different sorts of operations. We had five different

kinds of cranes and dozers. Getting spare parts was

difficult so we had a lot of deadlined equipment.

Soldiers of the 13th

Engineer Combat Battalion

work to widen a road

RG 111, SC-359630
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 273

boxes of supplies and 55-gallon oil barrels for their

POL dump.

We built our L-5 or L-19 strip next to headquarters and corps asked that we find a suitable place for the

corps’ airstrip. We put it alongside of our own airstrip

and built it so corps could have their airplanes there. We

had used some pierced-steel planking but we didn’t use

any there. You use it when the ground is really soft and

you’ve got bigger planes. The ground at that time was

frozen solid and all we did was lightly gravel it. We once

used pierced-steel plank at Kimpo Airfield and interlocked it. Then we pinned it to the ground and it worked

pretty well.

We set up our headquarters down there and began

working on the roads in the area. During the spring, we

started to work on the roads that had frost heaves. As

soon as it started to thaw these roads just turned into a

sea of mud. As the vehicles went over them the top would

break and mud would ooze up through them. We opened

up several gravel quarries and got crushers going. We

crushed rock, hauled it night and day on these roads,

and put on a heavy coat. With a grader and a dozer we’d

level it out. Then we’d run back and forth on it with one

of these D-7 Caterpillar tractors. That would push the

rock back into the mud until it would just stop going

down, and it stabilized.

We started moving north in May. We had slowly

come up from Andong, Yongju, Chech’on, to Wonju,

up to Hoengsong. We were building the big Hoensong

River bridge in May, the first part of the month.

Impressions of General Ridgway

Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway was a soldier’s soldier. He always wore a pair of suspenders like a backpack and he had

two grenades tied on it. He was always at the front. The

troops were pulling back in a lot of areas. When Ridgway

came in a lot of people called him “Wrongway Ridgway”

because he turned everybody around and said, “We’re

going to take this ground and we’re going to hold it.”

Some people thought things were kind of hopeless

but Ridgway was right. He got some good morale going

with the troops and started setting up some defensive

lines instead of pulling back every time you got hit.

I think he did an outstanding job.

He was right up there at the infantry regimental

CPs all of the time with the troops. He would go right

among the troops. Gen. Walker spent most of his time

in the rear areas. He wasn’t as aggressive as Ridgway.

Ridgway talked to the soldiers, mingled with the infantry commanders, and saw that they got the right

amount of support. He did an excellent job.

The last big North Korean and Chinese offensive

was in June. X Corps got 10 two and one-half-ton trucks

from every unit to haul artillery ammunition. Maj. Gen.

Edward M. Almond said, “We’re going to haul all of this

artillery ammunition. We’re going to put it in dumps.

When Ridgway came

in a lot of people

called him “Wrongway

Ridgway” because

he turned everybody

around and said,

“We’re going to take

this ground and we’re

going to hold it.”
274 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

When they hit us hard we’re going to trade a little ground

but we’re going to saturate them with artillery. Rather

than lose these guns we’ll burn the damn barrels out.”

We hauled artillery ammunition and placed it in

these delaying positions where the corps artillery officer

told us to put it. We stacked hundreds and hundreds of

tons of ammunition. When the Chinese hit, the infantry didn’t run. They kept a line and the artillery just

kept saturating the area. Maybe we fell back 20 miles,

but the Chinese absolutely ran out of steam. There

was practically nothing left

of them.

Then the infantry turned

around and with the tanks

went back north. When we

went back up there that whole

area for miles was littered with

dead Chinese, and dead horses

that they used to transport a

lot of their equipment. This

was May and it was getting hot

and most of these dead soldiers

were still in the padded uniforms from winter.

Along in May and June

the front had stabilized and

Ridgway stopped the people

from retreating. We had put in

this defensive line. The Chinese’s back had pretty well

been broken. Although one thing had given us a bunch

of trouble—Koreans were free to move everywhere. You

didn’t know who were enemy and who weren’t. Ridgway

moved every Korean out of the front line area. We put

them about 10 miles back and wouldn’t let a one be up

there unless in uniform. This way nobody was passing

information to the enemy. Nobody was sabotaging. Every Korean you saw who wasn’t in uniform was suspect.

The line was stabilized and I think at that time people

really started thinking that they

had the thing won.

Lt. Gen. Ridgway left and

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet

came in. Corps was put under

Eighth Army, and the 8224th

ECG was attached to X Corps.

Van Fleet was very similar to

Ridgway; he was a good commander. Things had stabilized

by then.

In that period the Chinese

figured that they couldn’t run us

Gen. Almond said,

“When they hit us hard

we’re going to trade a

little ground but we’re

going to saturate them

with artillery. Rather than

lose these guns we’ll burn

the damn barrels out.”

Lt. Gen. William Hoge, commander, IX Corps, congratulates

the 62d Engineer Construction

Battalion upon the completion

of the Forney Bridge, August

1951 Engineer School, 210-13-9
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 275

off the end of the peninsula. That was when they started

rumors that they wanted to have peace talks, stabilize the

line, and all of this kind of bologna. A big part of stabilizing the front and coming out as well as we did was Gen.

Ridgway’s command and leadership. Up until that time,

every time we got a lot of pressure, people were pulling

back and a lot of the commanders were saying things

like, “You know, we shouldn’t even be here.”

The Bridge at Hoensong

We built a bridge at Hoensong, across the Hoensong

River. The Twinnan River Bridge at Hoensong was 600-

700 feet long, a concrete and steel reinforced bridge

with about 10 bents under it. Several spans of it had

been blown. Those spans that we could jack up and

crib under, put new bents under, repair and use, we did.

We put in 24-inch I-beams so that the bridge would

carry 50-ton capacity traffic. My Company C, under

Capt. Snyder—who was a really good engineer—built

the bridge.

After it was completed Gen. Almond, the X Corps

commander, and Col. Leigh Fairbanks, X Corps engineer, came for a ribbon-cutting ceremony. Col. Walsh,

the 8224d commander was there. We called that the

Frank H. Forney Bridge. Col. Forney, the previous

commander, had been killed in an ambush in North

Korea. After Gen. Almond cut the ribbon and made his

speech he got in his jeep. He told me to get in the jeep

with him and we drove across the bridge. I thought

highly of that general, both in Italy and then in Korea.

Building the bridge was a big project taking about

a month and a half. It required welding of those steel

I-beams, doing a lot of cribbing with railroad ties, concrete work, and crane work, to lift the steel I-beam

spans up. That was the biggest job we had.

Capt. Snyder in Company C invented a 55-gallon

dump bucket that you could pick up with a crane. We

would put it under the cement mixers on the ground and

then the crane would lift these 55 gallons of concrete. It

would weigh about a ton. We would pour it into these

forms that we had for concrete bents. We’d put bolts

in the concrete and let the concrete cure for about

21 days so it wouldn’t start cracking.

New Uses for Artillery Powder Bags

I’ve always liked demolitions and powder and dynamite.

Every time the artillery fired they usually had four

powder bags. Depending on the range they’d throw

away two or three of these powder bags. They were not

salvageable. They’d throw them in a pile and after the

fire mission was over they would burn them. I’d seen

this time and time again.

We were doing a lot of quarry work so I took my

S-3 and went down to one of these artillery outfits.

I said, “I want to experiment with this powder. Can I

have some of these powder bags?” He said, “Hell, we’ll

We stacked hundreds of

tons of ammunition....the

artillery just kept saturating the area. Maybe we

fell back 20 miles, but

the Chinese absolutely

ran out of steam. There

was practically nothing

left of them.
276 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

give you a ton of it.” It was smokeless powder. The

pieces were about the size of your little finger, about an

inch long, and had holes in them. I took a lot of that

powder. At that time we were drilling into solid rock

with our wagon drills, maybe 18 feet for some of

our powder holes. I got some of my demolition people

and said, “I want you to fill these holes full of this

smokeless powder up to about a foot from the top. It just

burns unless you compress it.” I said, “What we want

to do is take either TNT, dynamite, or composition C,

and fill in the last foot on top of that powder. Then put

your primer in it.”

We tried it. When we detonated it this terrific explosion on top compressed it, setting it afire at the same

time. That worked perfectly for blasting quarry work. It

didn’t cost the government five cents, except for the primer

and the TNT on top of it, because we were using artillery

powder that they would have thrown away. I wrote the

thing up and sent it to the Chief of Engineers’ office. I

don’t think anybody else had ever done that. We must

have used hundreds of pounds of that powder in our rock

quarry work.

Ditches, Culverts, and Bridges

We were primarily working on the MSR by widening,

graveling, and doing lots of drainage work on the roads.

We’d go to the local police and they would round up

civilian men for us. We’d put them in tents and feed

them and use them as laborers. But, because of the

food it was difficult to keep them. Very often during the

night a hundred would run off. Sometimes I’d have 500

one day, and 1,000 the next, and then only 800. Along

toward the end, when we got better housing and better

food for them, the retention rate improved. We had

hundreds of civilians out on the road primarily doing

drainage work because, starting in June, and going

through August and September, you’d get the monsoon

rains. In those periods, within a week, sometimes, we

got 15 inches of rain.

Starting in June, and

going through August and

September, you’d get the

monsoon rains. In those

periods, within a week,

sometimes, we got

15 inches of rain.

U.S. and Korean engineers construct a timber culvert

during the construction of a new road, October 1951

Engineer School, Korea-081
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 277

First, you built the road and crowned it so the water would run off of the sides. From the center of the

road to the edge of the road, on a two-way road, you

would get from a three- to four-inch difference in elevation, so the water would run laterally off of the road.

Then these people in the ditches along the road with

picks and shovels would make a trapezoidal ditch.

We made a template that was just a trapezoid. The man

in charge would go along and tell them, “You’ve got to

dig it like this.” We dug those drainage ditches along

the side, and then we were sure to get the water to an

area where it would run away from the road. If the

water had to cross the road we would put culverts in.

The engineer manual at the time called for the trapezoidal ditch as the best type of drainage. It worked well

because we had all of this hand labor to dress it that way.

If you were making a drainage ditch with a grader, the

grader operator went along with his blade and bladed it

out. Or the dozer pushed aside the earth. But we had

thousands of hours of hand labor. When the monsoon

started I gave orders to patrol the roads constantly. Where

we’d made cuts on side hills there would be slides, which

filled up your drainage. The water would rush across and

cut your roads. Night and day we had people patrolling

the roads, keeping debris from clogging the culverts and

keeping any slides from blocking the drainage. We weren’t

interrupted by washouts because our patrols spent 24-

hours-a-day on patrol.

Culverts had to be widened. The engineer dump

had a good stock of corrugated iron culvert. When they

didn’t have one big enough we used timber. What we

would do is make a box culvert out of timber, maybe

five feet square, reinforce it really well, and bury it. So,

if we didn’t have a big enough culvert quite often we

constructed it.

The Hoensong River was like some of those rivers

in Africa. It was a half-mile wide and six inches deep.

The Marine engineer combat battalion had gone in there

with this bridge and constructed culverts in the river.

They used many hundreds of 55-gallon oil drums. They

put a piece of primer cord on the top and the bottom of

each drum and set it off. The primer cord blew the tops

and bottoms out. They took all of these and laid them

end-to-end to make culverts. They had 48 individual

culverts to take water on the south side of this bridge

that we rebuilt. During the winter these improvised

culverts made out of 55-gallon drums, and covered

with dirt, took the traffic. That was an MSR. The monsoons weren’t there yet so it was adequate at the time.

When we completed the bridge the first part of June

the monsoons hit. The monsoons washed out all of

those culverts.

In one of the railroad yards we found some great

big steam boilers, about half-inch thick steel, that looked

like they’d been used for high-pressure gas or something.

We cut the ends out of those and used them for culverts.
278 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

They were about 40 feet long. We used everything we

could find, and most items worked really well. We needed

anything to keep the road open. The roads, especially in

the mountains, were terrible.

Before the war somebody from the government

would tell the Korean civilians, “Well, now, you live in

this town, and you take care of the road halfway to the

town on this side and halfway to the next town on the

other.” A few times a year they’d get a lot of hand labor

out there and they would chop at the road and fill the

ruts. Very few vehicles used them. If anybody wanted to

go anywhere they rode the train. The local traffic was

primarily horse or ox carts. The roads and the bridges,

whatever bridges they had, were very inadequate for

military traffic.

If we needed to put in bridges in a hurry we used

Bailey bridges. When things quieted down we replaced

them with wooden bridges. We were getting timber in

from the Philippines. The engineer dump had 12-by12 teak and mahogany beams, if you can believe that.

That kind of timber today would cost $1,000 apiece.

Some of these were 20- to 40-feet long. The most gorgeous timber you ever saw. That was what we were

using to build bridges.

We would make our bents and our stringers out of

those 12-by-12 timbers. We would take two-by-sixes

and two-by-eights, stand them on end with a two-inch

spacer between, and use them for a deck. They would

drain really well. On top of that we would nail the twoby-eights flat for treads the width of a tank tread, about

three feet wide on one side and three feet wide on the

other side, on top of those two-by-eights standing on

end. That made a real good bridge decking. It would

hold 60-ton loads. We made a good bridge. I would

imagine some of those things could still be standing.

Using KATUSA Troops for Engineer Work

Two companies of KATUSAs were attached to us. Ultimately, we had 1,600 KATUSAs working for us. I

assigned a lieutenant and an interpreter to each company. I was assigned two Korean first lieutenants who

stayed at my headquarters. On a daily basis they went

down with those troops and our S-3 would tell them

what was required of them. They would be the liaison

back and forth. They spoke good English and they

had uniforms. They were first lieutenants, Korean Army.

If you wanted to send some information to the people

running the civilians they helped all the way around;

they did a good job.

When we first received them, the KATUSA troops

were untrained and inadequate for engineer work. I

put that in my reports. They had no coordination

for running bulldozers and graders or running our

hydraulic equipment. They were good at hand labor

but they were very poor with mechanical equipment.

But, as time went on, we found that they learned to
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 279

operate the mechanical equipment fairly quickly.

The first things they learned to use quite well were all of

the air tools on the compressors. You had air circular

saws, air chain saws, jackhammers for drilling holes, and

air hammers for pounding spikes. They caught on to

that really quickly.

They were slower yet with the running of dozers

and graders, but they finally learned to do that. Within

a month or so they seemed to be able to learn the other

mechanical equipment. From their background and

upbringing, I suppose, they were unfamiliar with mechanical equipment, but they caught on to it pretty

quickly and did some good projects. They were doing

what we were doing. In the end they were well qualified

and seemed to contribute a lot to our mission, which

at that time was primarily road drainage, culvert construction, road widening, some blasting, rock quarry

work, and graveling.

Roadwork Equipment

We didn’t have any trouble finding rock over there.

We had lots of rock. There were hills and rockslides

all over the place. If the rocks weren’t larger than two

inches in diameter we would put a shovel in the pit and

start loading the dump trucks. If the rocks were larger

than that, we would put them in a crusher, start crushing, and dump the gravel in the trucks. Then we’d haul

it onto the roads and spread it out. We would walk it in

with the bulldozer so it would push on down in the

dirt and give us a good hard base surface.

We had a great deal of trouble with our trucks. We

were forever breaking springs on our two and one-halfton dump trucks, travelling fully loaded over those terrible roads. We couldn’t get replacements. At any one

time we’d have 10 to 15 trucks out of operation because

it was very difficult getting spare parts.

We had four or five Quickway cranes and each of

them had a different kind of motor. One set of spare

parts wouldn’t fit all, and we were always trying to get

spare parts. In my reports that went to Washington, I

said many times they should mount those darn cranes

on regular truck chassis rather than Quickway chassis

with some bogus type of motor that you couldn’t get

spare parts for. We needed to have a truck chassis with a

Korean workers repair a

section of a washed-out road

Engineer School, 93-63-1
280 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Evan S. Pickett 73d Engineer Combat Battalion

crane on it where the motor in the crane was the same as

the motor in the truck so we could get spare parts for

both. But we’d have five cranes, and they’d have different

kinds of motors in the cranes, and different kinds in the

trucks, and we could never get spare parts.

The 512th Engineer Dump Truck Company was

camped near us. I was able to go through group headquarters to get a platoon of their trucks so that really

helped. It was a black outfit, like mine was. They got

along well. A very competent black first lieutenant commanded it. They gave us a great deal of support on trucking. We needed their support because 80 or 90 percent of

our effort was hauling stuff to keep those roads in operation for the corps.

Better Food: Better Morale

The front line stabilized and we were able to improve our

living conditions. When you were settled down and

the weather wasn’t so blasted cold your cooks could do

a better job.

About that time one thing General Ridgway did

was to improve our food. He put the heat on the Eighth

Army, and the Department of the Army, and we started

getting fresh rations.

Our food improved 100 percent. Instead of having

Spam and powdered eggs, we started getting some fresh

beef and very often some fresh pork and turkey—things

we’d never seen in Korea before. Along with that you got

improvement in morale. Ridgway said, “Unless you’re in

the front line as an infantryman, in a hole, and they can’t

get some hot food to you, you can’t eat C-rations.”

Even some of the infantry regimental headquarters,

and some of those who were back behind where they were

out of fire, set up kitchens with hot food. They had these

big insulated containers that they’d take up to the front

and give the men hot food if they weren’t under intense

fire. Those people were eating some fresh rations for a

change, which really helped. General Ridgway should

receive all of the credit for it. We never had fresh

rations before then—he really did the job.

On 18 August I left. Three or four trucks were with

me. It had been raining like the dickens. About 20 miles

south of the CP a big landslide blocked the road to the

replacement depot. I was riding in the lead truck. I dismounted everybody in Class A uniforms. We started picking up rocks and rolling big boulders off of the road by

hand so we could get through. We cleaned a path through

this rockslide and got to the replacement depot.

I went from Pusan to Sasebo, Japan, to the replacement depot there. It was a rotation center, the 29th Replacement Depot. We were there for a short period of

time until they put us on a boat and we came back to

Camp Stoneman, California. From Stoneman everybody

got on a different train to go in a different direction. After a short vacation I moved my wife and child to my

next assignment at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 281

Men of the 13th Combat Engineer Battalion

repair a road damaged by retreating North

Korean forces RG 111, SC-361232
282 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Colonel Paschal N. Strong, Jr. Eighth Army Engineer

Colonel Strong recalls there were some 25,000

engineers in Korea, and shares his motto—“Any engineer can build a bridge if he has all the stuff he needs.

It takes a REAL engineer to build one when he doesn’t

have it.” He describes the need for high-level bridges

to avoid Korea’s floods, and, as Eighth Army Engineer, he characterizes his dealings with Lieutenant

General Van Fleet and General Ridgway.

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet was the Eighth Army

commander in the spring of 1951 when I used quite a

few of my engineer troops to build high-level bridges

over the main streams. Up to that time we had low-level

bridges over the main streams. Van Fleet said to me one

day, “Strong, why are you spending so much of your

time and effort on these high-level bridges when you

don’t need them?” I said, “General, I had a study made

of the floods in this country.” I requested a flood expert

through Washington. One came and made a study. I

wasn’t talking through my hat.

I said, “When the floods come all those low-level

bridges are going to be out. If you don’t have a few of

these high-level bridges, one at least behind each corps,

the troops are going to be isolated.” Well,” he said, “I’m

not worried about the floods.” I said to him, “Well, general, that’s not your job. That’s my job to worry about

the floods.” He laughed and said, “Okay, go ahead.”

I was very lucky in having three Army commanders who accepted my judgment and didn’t try to make

me do things that were absolutely impossible.

Shortly before Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker was

killed we were way up in North Korea, not too far

from the Yalu River. Then the Chinese struck. The Korean divisions gave way and we had to fall back to prevent the Chinese from flanking us. Walker had a conference with his staff and I was present. He said he had

not been able to receive any orders or directives from

MacArthur’s headquarters. He had to make up his

mind what his main objective was. He decided that it

Maj. Gen. Lee Chong Chan,

ROK Army, presents a

commendation to Col.

Paschal Strong

RG 111, SC-382855
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 283

was to maintain the physical integrity of Eighth Army,

being the only military command we had in the Far East.

He said, “I am prepared to give up any real estate

in Korea I have to, to make sure that Eighth Army is

not destroyed.” I will never forget when he said that.

He was a very able commander. He had to decide

whether he would risk Eighth Army by letting all the

Chinese come in behind him and cut off our routes to

Pusan. That is why he planned to withdraw whenever necessary.

General Matthew B. Ridgway came in after Lt.

Gen. Walker was killed in a jeep accident. Walker had

planned to evacuate Seoul. I knew that Ridgway would

want to defend it. As soon as Walker was killed, and

I heard that Ridgway was coming, I immediately took

steps to get barbed wire and all defense material—

picks and whatnot, and Korean labor—to work on my

best concept of a defense line.

When Ridgway came our main headquarters was

60 miles from the front. I was up at Seoul. I was the

only section commander who was up there with those

advance troops. Ridgway came up to the advance headquarters and found my staff and me working there.

He was at West Point, a tactical officer, when I was a

cadet. He said, “Strong, I am going to defend Seoul as

long as I can. Meet me at 0800 and we will make a

Shortly before Lt. Gen.

Walton H. Walker was

killed, he said, “I am

prepared to give up any

real estate in Korea

I have to, to make sure

that Eighth Army is

not destroyed.”

Yoju Bridge, August 1951

Engineer School, 41-1-129
284 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Colonel Paschal N. Strong, Jr. Eighth Army Engineer

reconnaissance of the area and pick out the parts we

want to defend.”

I met him at 0800 and we went over the ground.

Fortunately, the terrain was such that it was pretty obvious where the defense lines would be. The ones he selected I had pretty well already selected. The next morning I got a call from him to go out again to look things

over. Many places we went he found engineer troops

coming up with wire and labor. He wanted to know

how I could get them up so quickly. I couldn’t tell him

that this mission had been planned a week ahead of time

and that we were just coming up now after a week’s

delay. From that time on Ridgway trusted my judgment

all the way through. Van Fleet did too.

I was very fortunate to have had Army commanders who if I said a thing could not be done, accepted it.

Sometimes it was pretty “iffy” if it could be done or not.

We were only half a jump ahead of the sheriff, but we

did stay that half-jump ahead.

I knew Ridgway would defend Seoul because of

his record in Europe as commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Because the Korean division broke on our

flanks and endangered the railroad behind us, eventually we had to evacuate Seoul. In the spring we started

back again and recaptured it.

I knew that Ridgway would try to hold it and he

did. We held it through New Year’s Day. The river froze

and our bridges froze in the river. We had a hell of a time

maintaining them against the floating ice, or when the

tides came in, but we did. We completed the evacuation

leaving our bridges behind us. When we returned in the

spring we found the Chinese had neatly stacked them up

on the banks.

The floods came. There was always a conflict between an engineer of a unit and the commander of a

unit when a flood was imminent. The engineer wants to

get the floating bridges up before the flood’s high water

hits, whereas the tactical man will want to keep them in

place as long as possible for tactical reasons. He has the

say-so. Just as we expected the commanders kept the

floating bridges in too long. Soon all of our floating

bridges were careening down in the flood out to sea.

That was where the high-level bridges came into play.

I am a great admirer of General Douglas

MacArthur. I know something about him. When I was a

cadet, he was superintendent. I think he would have been

a complete failure working with the British and the Allies in Europe, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower would

have been a complete failure in the Far East. Eisenhower

was a great conciliator—maybe that’s not quite the

word but—he knew how to work with other people.

MacArthur could only work with and by himself. In Japan, MacArthur was just the man to take charge of Japan because the Japanese expected a god. They expected

an emperor to take command, and he was an emperor

figure. MacArthur would never have gotten along with

I can’t emphasize too much

the importance of indoctrinating your engineer unit

commanders with one

reality—the necessity for

using native methods with

native labor and native

material, in the absence of

the materials they are

supposed to have....
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 285

Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, and Eisenhower

would not have presented the god-like figure to the

Japanese that MacArthur did.

From my experience, the best regimental commanders for heavy construction work were contractors

who had been doing that work and who were commissioned in the reserves. I found them better for that

purpose than the West Point graduates because the

West Point graduates hadn’t had the practical experience in heavy construction that the contractors had.

West Pointers also were a bit too worried about the

spit-and-polish, sometimes at the expense of their

construction activities.

I can’t emphasize too much the importance of indoctrinating your engineer unit commanders with one

reality—the necessity for using native methods with native labor and native material, in the absence of the materials they are supposed to have according to the book.

When every new engineer unit came through Korea, I

sent the commanding officer and some of his staff on an

inspection trip to see how the Koreans handled concrete

structures without concrete machinery and how they built

pilings without pile drivers. That gave them an appreciation of what they could do with Korean labor.

My motto was that any engineer can build a bridge

if he has all the stuff he needs. It takes a real engineer to

build one when he doesn’t have it. We had 25,000 engineers of all sorts in Korea. Engineer units are attached to

the Army; some are a battalion attached to a division, or

a regiment or group attached to the corps. Then there are

heavy construction groups attached to the Army. Well, I

requested and received permission to have all the ones

attached to the Army placed under my direct command.

I could always exercise the authority of the commanding

general. I found it better when they knew that I was their

commander when writing their efficiency reports.

Generally a staff officer doesn’t exercise command,

but I found that in Europe and in Korea it worked out

much better for the units attached to a high command to

be under the command of the engineer. Other people might

disagree with me. That’s my theory and it worked out very

well. I didn’t have to issue orders through the commanding general, which meant through his chief of staff. I could

issue orders directly to the Army engineer units.

Korean workers

repair an airfield

to enable it to handle

heavy transport aircraft

Engineer School, 13-14-6

285
286 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Colonel Emerson C. Itschner Engineering with the Chinese at Kaesong

Colonel Itschner describes a meeting between

One of our soldiers had a

Polaroid camera, which

at the time was brand

new. He wanted to take

pictures of the Chinese

but they wouldn’t let him.

shovels. That was their bridge equipment. They came

on the other side of the river and we were on ours.

We put out a little boat.

One of our soldiers had a Polaroid camera, which

at that time was brand new. He wanted to take pictures

of the Chinese but they wouldn’t let him. The Chinese appeared to be surprised and concerned. He took

pictures of our own people and held them up. They

were amazed to see those pictures taken and developed

instantly. The first thing you know they were all lining up wanting their pictures taken—to send to mama

back in Canton or wherever their home was. He did

take a number and passed them around until he ran

out of film. They were pleased to get them; that helped

ease the tensions.

It had been a tense situation until that time. They

had axes and we didn’t have any arms. They outnumbered us as they always did. That photo session relieved

the situation and we all worked together very well. They

provided a lot of the labor on that trestle. They got their

axes out and they worked on that. They had rough timbers and some of them were used to cover large holes

in the deck on their side. We built the bridge without

incident and it was useful for the peace talks.

Chinese and American forces on building a bridge at

the site of the Peace Talks.

I had an opportunity to cooperate with a Chinese

engineer unit while rebuilding a bridge. The peace talks

were at Kaesong and this bridge was very close to

Panmunjom. The river was on the route between our

line at the Imjin River and Kaesong. We were given orders to go up there without arms and build this bridge

so our delegates could get to the peace talks.

I didn’t think much about it at the time. We had

become pretty hardened and kept in close touch with

the fighting. I wasn’t apprehensive at all. I hoped the

orders were right—that they had gotten it all cleared. I

went along in my jeep ahead of this unit and got to the

bridge. Nobody was there.

This bridge had a gap of maybe 60 feet, with a

demolished pier in between. Soon our treadway bridge

company came up, looked over the situation, and immediately started to unload the treads. We could put

three treads together and get a jeep across a 30-foot

gap without any support in between, but with a 60-

foot gap they had to build a trestle. About the time

we were just starting to assemble our bridge sections we

could see a column coming down the road on foot.

They were Chinese. Each pair of men was carrying a

small log, or they had axes and saws, and they also had
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 287

While building a bridge, men of

the 8th Engineer Battalion lower

a culvert into place RG 111, SC-368678
288 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Major Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

Following the November 1950 Chinese assault

They had not been active in a reserve unit. They might

carry an MOS (military occupational specialty) that

had no bearing on any background or interest that they

might have. Some were excellent; some were worthless.

Generally speaking, the officers who came from

Japan were a much better qualified and motivated

group. But the resources in Japan were being stressed to

provide fillers. You got whomever was sent. You interviewed them and you tried to figure out where you

could use them best, based upon their background and

maybe their interests.

Maj. Leavey chose to run the battalion from the

division CP in his role as the division engineer. That

was contrary to how we had operated and to what I

thought would be the normal operation. We were not

that far from the division CP. By staying at division, he

ran the battalion with the view that I, as his S-3, would

be in charge of all operations.

I appreciated Maj. Leavey’s trust. The situation was

a little difficult in that Leavey would not trust Maj. Farley,

the XO, to make a decision in his absence if it pertained

to any operational matter. They were both West Pointers; Leavey was Class of ’42, and Farley was Class of ’43.

Those were short classes so there probably was little difference in their rank.

Ed Leavey looked to Farley to run the administrative matters of the battalion—the S-4, kitchens, and battalion rear. I felt it must have been rather hard on Farley

across the Ch’ongh’on River, the 2d Engineer Combat

Battalion (ECB) was heavily engaged. The battalion

suffered 561 battle casualties and lost almost all of

its equipment during 2d Infantry Division’s retreat.

The 2d ECB’s condition in December was truly bleak.

Major Farnum describes efforts to reconstitute it as

an effective force.

The Chinese continued to the south and we continued to fall back. Prior to Majors Edmond Leavey and

Clare Farley reporting in, I’d moved the elements of the

battalion back to Yongdungp’o. We were back there by 5

December. At that time we had just a few vehicles and

we were using our Brockway trucks to move our people

around. Still, we felt we had to keep the bridge close

enough to them, and, if called upon to provide it, we

would be able to do so. At one time for the entire battalion we had one jeep and a few trucks. We didn’t have

lots of time to get re-equipped and get ready.

Col. Paschal Strong, Eighth Army Engineer, contacted me and told me when Majors Leavey and Farley

would be arriving. Maj. Leavey, the ranking officer,

came in on 10 December 1950 and took over as the

battalion commander the following day. Maj. Farley

became the executive officer.

The first officers that we received as fillers were

virtually all recallees from the inactive [standby] reserve.

We were busy from

the word go. We

took whatever assets

we had and tried to

get one company

fully equipped....
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 289

not to be involved in our day-to-day road work and bridge

building, which are the heart and blood of an engineer

battalion’s job.

When Maj. Leavey arrived, the 2d Infantry Division was still classified as combat noneffective. We had a

large training mission to accomplish, getting people in,

integrating them into the outfit, and preparing them so

they knew what they were doing on roadwork, bridge

building, or other engineer tasks.

While we were re-equipping and getting in our

personnel, Leavey volunteered his battalion to do a lot

of engineering tasks for the corp. In the first days I resented this, feeling that our personnel had gone through

quite a bit and were still limping around on frostbitten

feet. Much later on I realized his approach was the best

that it possibly could have been.

We were busy from the word go. We took whatever assets we had and tried to get one company fully

equipped, and then one platoon out of each of the other

companies to where we could have motor transport to

get them out to the roads to do the work.

Although our division was in reserve, we took on

the responsibility of the MSR work, which normally

would have been a corps, or Army, function, and maintained all the roads that were in our division sector where

we were in reserve. We even built a couple of bridges for

Army in that period.

A couple of these were Bailey bridges and some

were timber trestles. The best training actually is to build

a bridge that was going to be used by the vehicles of

Eighth Army. It took a long time for me to appreciate

the added tasks when all my friends in the 23d Infantry,

and other people we knew within division, were, I suppose, sitting around on their duffs.

The bridges were mostly small. We were replacing

small, concrete bridges that we had blown, whether it

was coming back the first time, coming back the second

time, or whenever. We had destroyed practically everything that had been built along the roads, so it was a

question of replacing those with something that was

serviceable and wide enough for the military traffic.

Soldiers of the 13th

Combat Engineer

Battalion repair a

bridge destroyed

by U.S. air power

RG 111, SC-359632
290 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Major Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

It was my first experience with Bailey bridges. I’d

never had any training in

them. The handbook was

a marvelous help for any engineer needing to look up the

classifications for what you

want to span. The directions

of what to order and how to

put it together were excellent.

We were like little boys playing with Tinker Toys.

I don’t know that we

had any supporting Armytype engineer forces who were

sitting on their duffs because

we were doing this but it was

good training and it kept us

all busy. For the first few months we still continued

to have our little get-togethers in the middle of the

afternoon, to take off our shoes and socks to check

everybody, to make sure that nobody was getting gangrene from black toes. As an aside, my middle toes on

my right foot still don’t have the proper sense or feeling

in them. For many years after I returned from Korea I’d

all of a sudden be positive that my foot was bleeding

and that my toes were down there just soaking in blood.

I’d take off my shoes and socks and look and they

were perfectly all right. That

probably went on for 20

years. When we got back to

skiing I’d get that same

sensation again in the early

ski boots. Now, with the

modern equipment, my feet

never get cold. They just

tingle a little bit. It was

a common ailment that virtually all of us, who had

been in the north, came back

with. For some of us it lingered, in different degrees,

throughout life.

Yongdungp’o was a

decent area to try to reequip. Gen. Christiansen,

the GHQ Engineer, and Col. Strong, the Eighth Army

Engineer, came to call on 14 December. They promised

all the help that they could push from their respective

headquarters in the way of personnel and equipment.

By 20 December we had our line companies sufficiently reestablished, in personnel and equipment, to move

out a couple of our companies in support. By Christmastime we had received more than 250 replacements.

We were still short on vehicles and engineer-type

heavy equipment.

It was my first experience

with Bailey bridges....

The directions of what to

order and how to put it

together were excellent.

We were like little boys

playing with Tinker Toys.

Soldiers of the ROK 117th Engineer Battalion build

a Bailey Bridge RG 111, SC-451511
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 291

It was almost like Santa Claus coming—on Christmas Day we received 35 trucks. We received our Christmas mail about the end of December. By that time we

had certain reports back on some of our people. More

than 200 of them were known to have surrendered in

the Kunu-ri area. They were in two groups of about 100

each. Many small groups were spotted from the air surrendering to the Communist forces. Much of my time,

after I wrote the operation reports and made the assignments for the next day, I was involved in writing to the

wives of the many people we had lost at Kunu-ri.

Early in January 1951, in the area of Yoju, we were

back in the engineer business in support of our own units,

installing a floating bridge and a ford across the Han

River. Division asked me to personally be in charge of

the bridge and ford area. I had Company D working on

it, with a little help from a couple of the other line companies because we really were only capable of fielding

about one platoon out of the company.

On 9-10 January the battalion was located at

Ch’ungju. I was the S-3 at that time and we were doing

normal engineer work for the division. We installed

our floating bridge and a ford across the Han River in

our division sector. The latter part of January we moved

to Wonju. At that time we had better than 200 miles

of road to maintain in our division sector. By early

February we had received much of our replacement

heavy equipment and we were actually building airstrips in each of our regimental areas. The weather was

cold but very clear.

On 7 February a Korean lad who had been working with some of our 2d Engineer Battalion personnel as

a “house boy,” and who had been taken prisoner along

with our people at Kunu-ri, came by our headquarters.

He had been released and returned to find us. He reported firsthand to us that no clothing was taken from

our POWs, only their weapons, bayonets, and flashlights, and that they were all fed what corn and rice

was available. He identified some of our officers and

among them was a W.O. Lackner, who had been an assistant S-4. No one had known what had happened to

Maj. Gen. Edward M.

Almond made the

statement that he didn’t

have to worry where he

assigned the 2d Division

because their engineers

could ‘build a road and

maintain it anywhere.’

291

In the midst of the

spring thaw, engineers

lay dirt and rocks over

a corduroy road to

enable supplies to

reach the mess hall

Engineer School, 13-14-1
292 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Major Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

him. He was able to tell us for sure that Lackner was a

POW in a group of about 350 U.S. POWs. A relatively

smaller number of American soldiers were killed in action at Kunu-ri, compared to the number MIA (missing

in action). I used that information to give some solace

to the wives in my continued letter writing and asked

them to share it amongst themselves.

By mid-February we thought things were going

much better again. We were still at Wonju on 11 February but our UN forces were back up in Seoul and our

forward forces had moved east. At that time the 2d Division was assigned to X Corps, and X Corps over in

the east section faced most of the CCF (Communist

Chinese Forces).

The CCF losses were considered to be very high

due to our artillery and continued air strikes, or at least

we assumed they were very high. I’m not too sure how

accurate those evaluations were. I believe that our

sweeping artillery fire and associated artillery reports

of the Chinese losses were much truer than the estimates of damage and people killed by our heavy Air

Force bombardment attacks. Although we knew their

losses continued to be high, we also knew that they

were still strong in numbers.

On 11 February we moved from Wonju to

Hoengsong. Spring was coming and that meant the thawing of the roads. The MSR—which had been quite

good—all of a sudden turned to a sea of mud. We had to

resort to corduroying the MSR in many places, plus

putting on as much gravel as we could possibly obtain.

When Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commander

of X Corps, came by we were really fighting a sea of mud

to keep the roads open. He made the statement that the

2d Engineers can put their division through anyplace;

he didn’t have to worry where he assigned the 2d

Division because their engineers could ‘build a road

and maintain it anywhere.’ I’m sure he had seen many of

our roads going through virgin territory from the air.

They probably looked pretty good from there even

when they became muddy, but from our viewpoint, on

the ground, it was a sea of mud. It was a nice feeling

that a corps commander would come by and say that

about the engineers in one of his divisions.

We did receive some fine people as replacements. I

want to comment on the fellow who became our S-2.

His name was Botkin—I don’t remember his first name

yet we lived in the same tent for some time. In December he reported in and I know that by the spring he had

not yet been to bed. He never changed his clothes from

when he reported in. He was a fine worker all day long.

He sat by the tent stove and tended it all night—not

that it needed tending, it was oil or kerosene. As I would

waken and look up from my sleeping bag he would

say, “They’re coming tonight, Larry. They’re coming tonight.” He was a fine S-2. During the daytime he would

go anyplace on reconnaissance with no hesitation.

The mines placed by the

enemy along those roads

were mostly wooden box

mines. The mine detectors

did not pick them up. The

only way of locating them

was by probing with bayonets. It was the old hunt

and peck method, by hand.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 293

Although it may sound as if he was afraid, he showed

no fear personally.

Most of the battalion was still in the Wonju area

on 19 February. There had been a heavy CCF attack in

February but the engineers were not committed. Our

forces considered the CCF losses to be absolutely staggering. Although our losses had been relatively sizable,

our stand in February 1951 by the 23d Infantry at

Chip’yong-ni was outstanding. I don’t know that we knew

exactly where we were by names. We knew what hill we

were on, and what hill the CCF and we were fighting

for. They were all numbered based on elevations. The

papers had to pick up something catchy and so they called

it the battle of Chip’yong-ni in which the 23d Infantry

made a good showing for themselves and the 2d Division. We supported the action with engineer work tasks

and by serving as a reserve force for the 23d Infantry.

On 16 March we were located at Yudong-ni. Someone had received an Associated Press photo of some

POWs. It showed a column of people from the 2d Division. In that photo many of us recognized both Zacherle

and Fry. If I’m not mistaken, in the particular column as

shown in the photo, Zacherle was number eight in the

line and Charlie Fry was behind him. About that time

I’d had word that Chaplain Wayne Burdue had been

killed. When I checked that out with the chaplains in

country I found out that the report was due to an error

in the chaplains republishing a list of chaplains where

Captains Farnum (left)

and Botkin. Botkin

was a replacement

officer who joined

the battalion in

December 1950

Farnum Collection

Burdue was shown as KIA when he was actually MIA

and in a prison camp up along the Yalu. Chaplain Burdue

subsequently did die in prison camp.

In March the division had some action in the

Hoensong area. Most of the action pertained to the 38th

Infantry and to the artillery supporting them. The

weather was beautiful and spring was arriving along with

spring flowers. On 20 March the division was moving

north on a limited advance. The spring thaws really hit
294 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Major Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

us and the roads were virtually impassable. The 23d Infantry, in division reserve, was placed under the supervision of the engineer battalion to work on the roads. We

also hired Korean laborers; we had better than 500 Korean laborers plus some ROK engineer units working on

our roads. We expected another 800 laborers to be delivered to us the following day for roadwork.

This created a rather heavy administrative load

on H&S (Health and Services) Company to set up

field kitchens and feed more than a thousand Koreans

who were working on the roads. The laborers just

showed up and we had Korean supervisors who paid

them. We gave them a certain amount of food and

they seemed much happier eating with our people than

cooking their own rice. All of a sudden we had an engineer battalion with a total maximum strength of 900

people supervising an entire infantry regiment, plus 1,500

Korean civilians and some ROK engineer units all working on our division roads. It was an all-out effort to

maintain our mobility.

The road in our particular sector was strictly a dirt

road that had insufficient rock base to make it a yearround MSR. Many of our division field artillery units

supported us by working on the roads. Some of our artillery units had contests with each other regarding how

many yards of roadwork they could do versus the others.

There was great competition between our 503d Artillery, which was our division’s heavy artillery, and a

heavy artillery unit attached from Eighth Army. They

were both black units and they did absolutely outstanding jobs in their assigned sectors.

Our mission was to stay with them and check for

mines all along the roads to make sure that, because of

mines, we didn’t lose any of this wonderful support we

were getting. Although we used the mine detectors, we

didn’t have much confidence in them. The mines placed

by the enemy along those roads were mostly wooden

box mines. The mine detectors did not pick them up.

The only way of locating them was by probing with bayonets. It was the old hunt and peck method, by hand, and

Korean engineers

build timber piers

for a new bridge,

February 1951

RG 111, SC-358000
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 295

I think we were very successful. We found many of them.

I don’t recall losing any of our vehicles when we were

clearing the roads at this time.

The Baby in the Minefield

Anti-personnel mines had been placed by our forces, the

North Koreans, and the Chinese. Many of these were

in the small Korean villages. These were not really

villages but just farmhouses along the roads. As the

refugees came back to their villages, and tried to get

back in their own homes, sometimes these homes had

been booby-trapped. Civilians—the children, or the

wives and mothers—were often wounded and maimed,

which was very hard to take.

One day we were told at the battalion CP that a

Korean mother with a small child on her back was

down in the midst of a mine-field. We searched but

found no records of a minefield in that area. Our S-2

and S-3 sections made every effort to contact all the

other divisional units, and anybody who had passed

through, for information on this minefield. It was very

hard to amass a reasonable file on what had been put

in, by whom, and why.

Lt. James Welcher, my assistant S-3, and I went

up to where one of our line companies was holding

guard around the minefield where the wounded Korean

lady was. Many engineers volunteered to go in and

bring her out. One thing you remember about being

in the service is that you don’t ask or direct somebody

to do something you wouldn’t do yourself.

Since I was the ranking person there I asked Jim

Welcher to back me up and follow me through as closely

as he could and still stay a safe distance behind. I entered

the minefield and reached the woman but she was dead.

The baby was crying. It just seemed to be impossible to

get the baby separated from the mother the way she had

the baby tied to her clothing. I carefully pulled her back

along the route I had come in, then Jim took her legs

and we carried them out. I think Korean children are

among the most beautiful in the world and this baby

was no exception—except it was crying.

One thing you remember

about being in the service

is that you don’t ask or

direct somebody to do

something you wouldn’t

do yourself.

An American

soldier poses

with Korean

children in

Hungnam

Weygand Collection
296 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Major Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

We were not too far from a village. Some locals

came down and were standing around watching us get

the body out of the minefield. One of the Koreans was a

doctor who spoke a bit of English and he offered to take

the child. That is one of the remembrances of war that

stays with you forever. You can forget where you were,

what you’d eaten, what you were doing, but these special

times stand out, and they’re always there.

On 28 March, I was called to division headquarters where they presented me with the Silver Star for attacks through enemy lines during the Kunu-ri period.

I’m sure Capt. Jones and others at division staff had some

input into it. Although I can’t really subscribe to the citation as written, I did thankfully receive it.

My recommendation for promotion to major had

been knocking around Eighth Army and various places

for months on end. The division commander looked into

it and said, “Give me all that paperwork,” and he carried

it personally to Eighth Army. Ultimately, he was successful. My promotion to major came through with the

date of rank 17 April.

On 10 April the 23d Infantry Regiment was on

line and we were supporting them with two of our companies, Companies A and B. Maj. Farley, much to his

enjoyment, got to go to the 23d to coordinate the engineer support. He was very happy finally to get into some

of the operational elements. My assistant, S-3 Jim

Welcher, went on R&R to Japan and we started our first

rotation of people back to the states. Based upon the

point system I was the top eligible captain in the battalion for rotation, but I really had no desire to rotate

until all of our original personnel were gone.

On 11 April, the engineer battalion was in the

Hongch’on-Ch’unch’on area and we were erecting two

Bailey bridges. At this time we received word that General MacArthur had been relieved of command. We all

felt that the relief of General MacArthur was quite a blow.

On 13 April, we received our first quota for our

battalion to rotate some of our personnel. Our quota

was for two officers and 30 enlisted men to be rotated.

Since some of our replacement officers that we had received after the Kunu-ri incident had come from Japan,

they actually had more time in theater than any of our

original group. Our first rotatees, therefore, were replacements that we had received either in December or early

in 1951.

We wondered just how the rotation system was

really going to work. Most of the replacements we received were either brand-spanking new young second

lieutenants, or people recalled from the Inactive Reserve

who had not been with a unit since World War II

for any training and had no desire to have been recalled

for Korea.

I was still writing letters to many of the wives of

our missing personnel who had been captured in the

Kunu-ri area. I wrote Col. Zacherle up for the Distin-
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 297

On their way to a second tour of duty in Korea, soldiers

of the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion wait to leave their

troop transport RG 111, SC-412166 297
298 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Major Lawrence B. Farnum 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

guished Service Medal for his part in our very successful crossing of the Naktong. It was quite an engineering feat to put in a bridge across a major river with

the limited amount of bridging we had. I’ve never been

sure whether Col. Zacherle was recognized with that

citation or not.

There were rumors that were supported by some

reports from returning POWs that our Maj. Price and

W.O. Falls were presumed to be working in a coal mine

near Kunu-ri. Maj. Price, as I recall, did have some experience with underground mining prior to his service in

the military. I’m not too sure what came of that. Neither

of them came back from their POW days.

The communist offensive late in April hadn’t hurt

the 2d Division. What it did was put us back on Class

B-type rations, rather than Class A. We were back to

eating canned beef and gravy. At that particular time

our H&S mess was very poor and we certainly missed

the old company commander, Joe Cox, who had always,

even under the most difficult of circumstances, been

able to run a mess hall that you were happy to go to.

During this period we were camped on the

Naechon. It was a good location and we had a swimming hole. We built a floating bridge on the Soyang River

and the bridge was right on the 38th Parallel. On 27

May we had heavy rain and on Memorial Day it rained

some two inches. The Soyang River, at the place we had

our floating bridge, rose 32 inches in a matter of hours,

so it was a real challenge to keep the bridge intact.

 We saw our rotation program come to a screeching halt. Certifying that we had qualified replacements

was a very difficult thing to do when no one really knew

the capabilities of the people who were assigned to us.

By the end of May we were receiving considerable corps engineer support. They were taking over the

MSR work to our rear and we were strictly within

the division area. The rotation picture once again was

very grim.

Soldiers of the 1437th

Treadway Bridge

Company install a

floating bridge

Engineer School, 42-5-118
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 299

In mid-June, the 2d Division was in reserve; however, when the division is in reserve, that doesn’t mean

any rest for the engineers. Edmond Leavey, by this

time a lieutenant colonel, volunteered our battalion to

corps, saying we could do any tasks they wanted

done, so we continued to do engineer work, mainly

fixing and widening small bridges, to bring the MSR

up to the width that we wanted.

About this time we heard over the radio more than

once, Lt. Col. Zacherle reading a letter to his wife, Peg.

In his letter he mentioned many of our officers and

others who were with him as POWs so that we knew

they were alive. At that time we couldn’t say they were

‘well,’ but they were ‘alive.’

I’d received a letter from my wife asking about a

second lieutenant from the 2d Engineers who someone

had met in Tacoma. He had been wounded at the time

of Kunu-ri. He had returned to the states and was

commissioned. After looking into it I decided that this

was Sgt. Joseph Mentkowski, who was the sergeant

wounded in the early morning hours of 1 December.

We had left him and a tank patrol had picked him up.

Our paths never crossed after that. He had been in

the hospital in Japan for almost six months from early

December until mid-May in 1951.

On 20 July I received my orders and was due to

leave on rotation. I expected to be in Japan by the end of

July. On 21 July I received the Legion of Merit from

GHQ in Japan. It was a big surprise to me, to my battalion commander, and to many in the division. It

covered the period I served as the battalion commander,

1-10 December 1950, and was for the resupplying and

returning of the battalion to an engineering capability

within that short period. Brig. Gen. George C. Stewart,

our assistant division commander, presented it. The

following day I received the Bronze Star, kind of a

formality as you’re leaving the division after having

done a good job.

On 23 July I headed for division rear, Pusan,

Japan, and then home. All of the original crew, save

one, had preceded me. The one remaining was Capt.

Paul Jones, then serving as the battalion S-3. Col.

Leavey was trying to have him promoted to major

prior to being rotated. I don’t believe it was a successful extension.
300 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

First Lieutenant George Stukhart, Jr. 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

platoon officer with the 2d Engineer ComI got orders to go to the 2d Division when it was in

the area near the Punch Bowl, so off I went.

The first assignment I had was to Company A of

the 2d Engineers. Company A supported the 9th Infantry. The first assignments were putting in defensive positions. Not long after that we were taken off the line. We

went back and moved over to another position. We were

in reserve a short time. Then we were put into the line

west of our original position and started moving back

north. That involved more offensive-type operations—

putting in bridges and clearing roads and mines. The

one thing I recall the most was clearing mines off roads.

We cleared mines by probing. The SCR-625 didn’t

work very well. They could pick the nails up in the shoe

mines, but most of the mines were made of wood. We

used them, but metallic detectors were not very efficient

[see “The Portable SCR-625 Mine Detector” in Builders

and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II, Barry

Fowle, ed.]. Probing was maybe 80-90 percent efficient—

unfortunately not 100 percent. We thought we had

cleared a strip of road, or a field, then somebody would

lose a leg or a jeep would blow up. It was very disturbing

to us when we would declare the road clear and somebody would go up there in a jeep and get blown up.

Considerable pressure was on us to get the areas cleared.

The enemy was far more efficient in putting those things

in than we were in getting them out. You couldn’t tell at

all where they were. The mines could have been on the

A

bat Battalion, Lieutenant Stukhart recalls clearing

mines, mines, and more mines, often by probing since

the SCR-625 mine detector was unreliable for enemy

box mines.

When I hit Camp Stoneman, California, the Korean War had broken out. A number of us hoped to go

straight on to Korea, but they said, “No, your orders are

to the 76th Engineer Battalion, Okinawa.” The day we

arrived in Okinawa the 76th was leaving. Until October

1950 they had us overseeing construction projects and

doing little, minor jobs. Around that time, GHQ in Tokyo decided to take the 93d Engineer Battalion out of

Guam, bring it to Okinawa, and staff it with people.

We were all assigned to the 93d Engineer Battalion and

went on to Korea from there.

We were engaged in building an airfield complex north of Pusan. I had a platoon there and our units

were rather scattered around. I ended up supporting

the 2d Logistical Command and also doing some jobs

around Pusan. Until April or May 1951 we were building, making repairs, and helping to construct the depot

outside of Pusan.

Several of us wanted to get in a combat unit. In

May 1951 we were still around the Pusan area but I transferred to the 2d Division. I did this by directly dealing

with a person in the 2d Division whom I met in Pusan.

Probing was maybe 80-90

percent efficient—unfortunately not 100 percent. We

thought we had cleared a

strip of road, or a field, then

somebody would lose a leg

or a jeep would blow up.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 301

shoulders or in the

middle of the road.

There was no rhyme

or reason to where

they were.

We lost a number of our own people

through their use of

two mines, one on top

of another. We cleared

one out and then a

second one would go

off. Or, they would

have a second one in

a remote location.

When you pulled one out, it would set off the other one.

They used ingenious schemes like that.

We operated in a series of narrow valleys. The infantry were up on the hill. I recall some of the battles,

watching the infantry trying to take those hills. We were

down in the valleys trying to clear them out and repair

the bridges so that they could get close support. The armor units were normally not able to come to their help

until we cleared the area. In the meantime the infantry

were in a very exposed position up on a lot of the hills.

They had air and artillery support, but there was some

very tough fighting up in those mountains.

The roads were pretty narrow so we did some road

widening. Except for

the armored engineer

dozer there wasn’t really too much need for

engineer equipment.

That was fairly effective because it was not

affected by most of the

smaller mines. It had

to be one heck of a

large mine to take out

that type of vehicle.

On several occasions

our platoon went out

with the armored engineer vehicles and cleared a bypass—off the road down

into a streambed, for the armored units to get through.

A lot of our work was done at night because we

were under artillery fire most of the time during the day.

The enemy could see us from where they were.

The infantry dug in their own positions. We had

one major project putting in a road up a very steep hill.

We had to do a lot of blasting to get that road through.

This was after I’d taken over Company C, which was in

support of the 38th Infantry Regiment. The 38th Infantry was in a rather exposed position so we had to put a

road in up that mountainside. They actually needed to

come back down that road to get out because they had a

Engineers probe for mines using bayonets Medding Collection

The guys in our company

loved what they were doing.

We could hardly understand

the mentality of stateside

soldiers or people who

complained about being in

war. These guys really were

enthusiastic about what

they were doing.
302 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

First Lieutenant George Stukhart, Jr. 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

lot of trucks up in their forward position. We had to

help them get out; we had to keep our equipment there.

The commander of the 38th, Col. Ed Rowny, commended us after they got out. He called us up and said

he thought it was quite a remarkable thing that we were

able to keep that road open. Although it was raining very

hard we managed to keep it open.

We had a lot of maintenance problems. Unfortunately we had to cannibalize a lot. Most of our trucks

eventually were cannibalized to keep the remaining

ones running. Maybe on a fleet of 15 to 20 trucks, a

third would be running. You couldn’t get the parts support you needed to keep them running so you cannibalized. You had to leave a lot of vehicles inoperable. These

were mostly World War II vehicles.

They sent us the Tournadozer, a wheeled dozer with

big rubber wheels built by LeTourneau. They sent it over

to Korea for us to evaluate. We didn’t think very much

of it and the Army never adopted it. It was very hard to

move around. You couldn’t have built that road up the

side of the mountain without a D-6 or a D-7. No rubber-tired vehicle would go up that incline. The wheeled

dozer might be good for building highways out here in

Bryan College Station, Texas, but it wasn’t very good

for mountains.

Our people were out doing demolitions to clear

the roads. That was always a very difficult thing because

of the slope of the hillside. We were not skilled enough

to be able to tell what would happen when we blasted

those slopes. On one or two occasions we had some

serious accidents. I don’t recall anybody being killed

while I was there, but the day after I left we had two guys

killed doing demolitions.

 The guys in our company loved what they were

doing. We could hardly understand the mentality of

stateside soldiers or people who complained about

being in war. These guys really were enthusiastic about

what they were doing. It didn’t matter what hour of

the night. We never got complaints about getting people

up to go out and do a job.

Engineers experiment

with a newly received

Tournadozer at

a facility near Seoul

RG 111, SC-378098
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 303 303

When I joined the battalion it had not been completely reconstituted after coming back down from the

Yalu River. A few veterans told stories about how they

got out, mostly by foot over the mountains. They told

stories of convoys getting blown up. Two lieutenants,

one in another company and one in my company, had

some very interesting stories to tell about how they escaped by foot. They couldn’t get out by vehicle. They

had to take off over the mountains, hide during the day,

and hoof it at night. There weren’t many survivors but I

remember these two fellows, Hunter and Crosley, very

well. They really told us stories about how the Chinese

would come past them but they managed to get away.

We did some bridge building in the 2d Division.

We built a couple of Baileys. The first real experience I

had under fire was trying to put a Bailey bridge in. As

we started this move back north, we put a Bailey bridge

in over a creek under constant fire. We’d have to stop

and go back and start again. We’d get hit, but we finally

got it in.

I remember the rain in Korea. The rains came in

late summer and they’d take out a great deal of what you

did. We had to replace that Bailey bridge we put in although the second time wasn’t as bad as the first.

The winter clothing was not very good but it was

getting better when I left. It didn’t affect us too much

because we normally were in a position where we could

stay warm. But the infantry had a tough time. The infantry were very exposed. I remember the winter coming on and how cold it got.

By the time I left in January 1952, things had fairly

well stabilized. About that time I remember once again

going back into reserve and going through training

exercises. I left the 2d Division and was assigned to the

11th Airborne Division, the 127th Airborne Engineer

Battalion at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

In the midst of a

battered Korean

village, soldiers

of the 25th Infantry

division huddle

around a small fire

RG 111, SC-368493
304 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Captain Walter S. Medding 14th Engineer Combat Battalion

Captain Medding describes the battalion’s

extensive bridge-building activities during the spring

and summer of 1951.

After the withdrawal and turn-around, our major

bridge-building efforts really got underway, mainly during the late winter and early spring of 1951. I Corps

assigned numbers to all of the bridges. Starting in

March, the 14th Engineers, with the 72d Company

attached, built 18 semi-permanent bridges, mostly

two-lane and multi-span. At one time the battalion

had 11 bridges under construction by only nine platoons.

For a while we had no equipment for pile driving so

that piers and abutments were founded on concrete

slab footings. By late spring, pile-driving equipment

was available and pile piers were used in most instances.

During May the battalion built a 480-foot Bailey

bridge with six 80-foot spans.

The materials available for bridge construction

consisted of 24-inch I-beams, 42-feet long, 18-inch wide

flange (WF) beams, about 20 feet long, eight-byeight- and six-by-six-inch timber, and two-inch and

three-inch lumber for bracing, decking, and abutment

walls. In addition, there was miscellaneous lumber for

decking, small steel angles, and channels for cross bracing and diaphragms. Portland cement, welding rods, and

welding equipment also was available. Most semipermanent bridges were two-lane, multi-span bridges

with 40-foot spans, using six 24-inch I-beams. Intermediate supports usually consisted of two bent piers, using

either eight-by-eight-inch timber or piling. Occasionally,

we designed laminated decking, using two-by-fouror two-by-six-inch lumber on edge, covered by longitudinal treads of two-by-twelve or three-by-twelve lumber.

Probably our most unique bridge was the BaytonEvans Bailey bridge built in June 1951 on the Hantan

River north of the 38th Parallel. The site included 1-1/4

existing spans of haunched concrete T-beams and five

unfinished spans. The Japanese started but never completed the bridge, except for piers and abutments and

the 1-1/4 span. Center-to-center spacing of the piers

was approximately 98 feet, and the distance from the deck

to the pier tops was about 10 feet. The 1/4 span was a

cantilever with a supporting lip for an intermediate simple

span. The top of the lip was about 45 inches below deck

level. The Chinese or North Koreans had built an existing one-lane bypass bridge at low level over the river.

There was considerable confusion about how to

build the high-level bridge. It was believed that the best

solution was to use Bailey bridging in some way. The

confusion resulted from the fact that the Bailey is built

in multiples of 10 feet. A meeting was held at group

headquarters to discuss the problem. Although I had

designed most of the bridges previously built by the

battalion, I remained outside in an adjacent room at

the request of Col. Linden.

At one time the battalion

had 11 bridges under

construction by only nine

platoons. For a while we

had no equipment for pile

driving so that piers and

abutments were founded

on concrete slab footings.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 305 305

Dedication ceremony

for the newly completed

Bayton-Evans bridge

Medding Collection

The Bayton-Evans

bridge under

construction

Medding Collection

Built by the 14th Engineers, a

ponton bridge takes shape

while a ferry carries troops and

equipment across the river

Medding Collection
306 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Captain Walter S. Medding 14th Engineer Combat Battalion

 During my wait it occurred to me that we could

build a 480-foot continuous double-double Bailey

with the roadway on the upper story. It could be built

and launched from the end opposite the existing span

by demolishing the top of the existing far-shore abutment. It would be necessary to build grillages on top of

the existing piers with bearings and rocker beams. I interrupted the meeting and explained my solution,

which was immediately accepted. That is how the

bridge was built. Company B built it in about two weeks.

It took five days to jack it down onto its bearings.

The bridge was completed on 30 June 1951. When dedicated, an impressive group of people attended. We

named the bridge for Capt. Bayton-Evans of the British

55th Royal Engineers, who had been killed in action a

short time before, and with whom we had had many

close associations.

At about the same time, Company C built a

720-foot two-lane pile-bent bridge further downstream over the Hantan River. The last bridge I built

while I was there was an M2 treadway floating bridge,

also on the Hantan River. Because of an existing sandbag causeway and angled approach, the bridge was

built on a skew with the river. A large number of Chinese box mines in the area required extensive probing

clear them. Mine detectors would not pick them up.

They were discovered when a jeep hit one, but it only

flattened a tire!

For a time the 14th Engineers also had about 150

miles of road maintenance responsibility. During the

spring of 1951 we had a reserve ROK division attached

to the 14th for road maintenance work for about a

month. I visited them every day for two or three hours

to check their assigned area.

During the spring of 1951, DA (Department of

the Army) announced several promotions. We didn’t get

any battlefield promotions. In March, Lt. Col. Burcher

was promoted to colonel and reassigned to CONUS.

Maj. Linden was promoted to lieutenant colonel and

reassigned as battalion commander, 14th ECB. Capt.

Gass was promoted to major. Lt. Col. Linden temporarily assigned me as the battalion S-3, a position I held

for about a month. When Maj. Gass was assigned as S3, Capt. Kania was reassigned as S-2. Col. Linden departed for CONUS on 21 June, and Maj. Charles E.

Wright was assigned as battalion commander.

I left the 14th Engineers on 18 July 1951, exactly

one year after arriving. I returned to Tokyo where I served

on the post-treaty planning board, and then with the

Japan Construction Agency.
North to the Yalu September–December 1950 307

Soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division

return to their unit after purchasing

food in the neighboring village,

February 1951 RG 111, SC-357651
308 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. Base Secton, Eighth Army

s Supply and Maintenance Officer, Base

never get to be a division engineer. I’d get siphoned off

along the way somewhere, and I would contribute more

to the war effort working for him than I would over in

Korea.

I went over to Korea and up to 7th Infantry Division. After I was there about two hours I had to report

back to Eighth Army headquarters to Col. Baker, who

was the Eighth Army Engineer, and to Col. Gus Wyrick,

the Deputy Army Engineer. Gus Wyrick and I had been

at ICAF (Industrial College of the Armed Forces) together. They handed me an IG report that must have

been an inch-and-a-half thick. Why somebody wasn’t

court-martialed as a result of that report I’ll never know.

Somebody should have been fried as a result of the alleged malfeasance outlined in that IG report. I was assigned as the engineer supply and maintenance officer at

the base section to correct the situation.

Shortly after that I went to Pusan and didn’t report in for three days. I walked around and observed

what was going on. That was the damnedest mess I

had ever seen in my whole life. Then I reported in.

They accused me of going AWOL, of going to Japan,

or someplace, to keep from getting that assignment. But

I had a pretty good idea of what was going on by the

time I went in and accepted the responsibility for what

I was getting into.

They had this automatic supply arrangement. Anybody who had something they didn’t want just shipped

Section, Eighth Army, Korea, December 1950-August

A

1951, Colonel Hoskins describes the frustrations he

faced—a thriving black market and a chaotic and

unresponsive supply environment that left most

engineer equipment inoperable because of a shortage

of spare parts.

I was sent to Korea around Christmastime 1950.

The Corps of Engineers wrote in my orders that I had a

Department of the Army-directed 1331 (Combat Engineer MOS) because I wanted to go over and be a division engineer. When I got to the port they decided that

I had to be troop commander and take a shipload of

troops to the Far East.

When we got to Yokohama and were debarking all

of the troops, the aide of Maj. Gen. Walter L. Weible

came on board. He told me that Gen. Weible wanted to

have my orders changed and that I would go to work for

him. I said, “No, I would appreciate it if the general would

just leave the orders alone. I wanted to go to Korea and I

wanted to be a division engineer.” That was the only

opportunity I would have, and if I made it through after

my tour was up in Korea, I could come back and work

for the general if he still wanted me. The aide said,

“Okay,” he would go and talk to the general. He came

back and finally told me, “Yes,” the general was not going to interfere with me going to Korea, but that I would
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 309

55th Quartermaster Base Depot,

Pusan, 11 May 1952 RG 319, SC-400039
310 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. Base Secton, Eighth Army

it to Korea. They had ships in the harbor at Pusan that

had been there for five months loaded with engineer supplies. There was no way in God’s world they could be

unloaded. There was no place to put the stuff. Hell, I

didn’t know anything about the supply system. I knew

how to manufacture equipment, and I knew how to run

a plant, but I always had a sergeant or somebody who

did all of the supply requisitioning. I’d look around for

either a sergeant or somebody to be my S-4.

I looked at what my problems were and what my

resources were. After I surveyed my current situation I

went up and visited the three corps. That was where the

war was being fought. About 80 percent of the engineer

equipment was deadlined. Everywhere I went, everybody

was mad as hell. They’d heard that I had just arrived. I

said, “Look, I came up to find out what the score is. I’m

not sitting back there in some plush set-up. I’m trying to

find out what my problems are.” It worked out. I got the

support of a lot of fine people.

I soon realized all of this so-called automatic supply had to stop. The first thing I did was set up a requirements group. With a requirements group the theater

determines what they need. Nothing comes in except

what you ask for. You accept a lot of responsibility when

you do that. I set up the requirements group, and I knew

what the authorizations were for all of the units, those

on the authorization tables. Plus, I got a list from the

theater G-4 and from the different national services for

special authorizations that they had.

I soon found out what I was supposed to support—

the established consumption under combat conditions.

I ran all of these numbers off. Then I notified Tokyo to

stop automatic shipment. I sent a couple of ships back—

talk about ‘hitting the fan.’ The engineers and transportation went to Gen. Weible, and they—the engineers

particularly—wanted me fired. They were going to hang

me from the nearest yardarm.

Before he would do that, Gen. Weible sent a major

over to see me, one he had some confidence in, and said,

“Find out what the hell’s going on over there. I thought

Hoskins was supposed to be in a combat unit.” The major

came to see me. I went through the numbers with him

and told him what was happening. I took him down to

the port and to all of the other depot and maintenance

locations. They were trying to put everything through

Pusan. There was no way you could bring everything

through that one port and distribute engineer equipment

and supplies by the existing rail system.

I gave him the notes I had on what was happening

in the forward areas. I said, “You’re practically at a standstill. If there’d be any enemy breakthrough, you couldn’t

win this war, not with the condition that the equipment

is in.” He said, “Well, how are you going to solve it?” I

told him, “I’m going to set up a requirements division.

The next thing I want to do is run this thing like you

build automobiles.” He said, “How do you build autoWhy somebody wasn’t

court-martialed as a result

of that report I’ll never

know. Somebody should

have been fried as a result

of the alleged malfeasance

outlined in that IG report.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 311

mobiles?” The key to building automobiles is making

requirements that are geared to sales. You set up a movement control, which controls all materials and equipment, and the transportation system as well. I said, “I’ve

got to get a handle on it. I need to make sure that I can

get the ships loaded the way I want them, get the rail

system so I could control something on it, and get all of

the needed trucks, and even handle the air traffic.” He

said, “My God, how are you going to do that?” I said,

“I’ll work on it.”

I went to the transportation people, who were having all kinds of problems because there was no consistency in their movements. When I told them what I

was trying to do they said, “Let’s get on board.” I sent

instructions back to the States, Japan, and even the

Philippines, as to how ships would be loaded. When

one opened the hatch, stuff that was needed right

away would be taken right out and moved forward. Instead of trying to manhandle everything two or three

times, I would load it at dockside and send it as far forward as it could be taken. The transportation people

were happy because they could plan ahead about how

their equipment would be used.

I got the people up forward to receive their supplies for me. Hell, it was in their interest. By going to the

railhead or the truck stop and unloading the damn stuff

they got their supplies. Pretty soon, I wound up with

not just the engineer supply responsibilities, but a lot of

the other services’ supplies, because I was controlling

much of the transportation system.

Black Market Problems

When the theater IG came to see me after I was on the

job about a week he stood me at attention and told me

about all of the things that he expected me to do. I said,

“Well, what happened to all of these officers ahead of

me? When are you going to get after them?” He said,

“I’m talking to you. I want you to clean it up.”

Rations are unloaded

at Pier 3, Pusan habor

RG 111, SC-355011
312 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. Base Secton, Eighth Army

One of the big problems was the pilferage. We’re

not talking penny ante. One whole train disappeared.

That was when it got my attention. I went to the hospital and told the hospital commander that I was looking for six company-grade officers. I wanted men who

had been either with the FBI, Food and Drug Administration, or with a special undercover unit that used to

exist in New York. I said, “These officers are probably

in your hospital because they’ve been wounded but

not wounded badly enough to be shipped back to the

states.” He said, “We’ve got a bunch of them around,

but I don’t know what their backgrounds are. Man, they’re

a surly bunch. Many of them were wounded in World

War II and they’re back here in Korea. They are mad as

hell at the country and at the service.” I said, “You just

give me six of them.”

When those investigators arrived, let me tell you

they were a surly bunch. I told them I was going to take

their officer rank off of them and get them lost as enlisted men in the organization. I said, “There have to

be Americans involved in such a large-scale pilferage

operation, as well as Koreans, and there has to be somebody high up. I don’t give a damn who the hell they

are. I’m going to get them.” This one first lieutenant, a

little Italian guy, told me, “Man, I caught the biggest

fish in New York State one time and what did they do

to me? Instead of giving me a medal they sent me to

the garbage dump. I’ve heard this before.” I said, “Okay.

If I find out that you haven’t carried out what I’m telling you, I am giving each one of you orders in the face

of the enemy—I’ll throw the book at you.” So, they disappeared after we arranged how we’d keep in contact

with each other.

Some guerrilla units in the area occasionally would

hit one of the depots. I used that as an excuse to keep

one company on alert at all times. They would have to

sleep in their full field equipment with their weapons

and their hard hats and be prepared to move out on

very short notice. One supply point got hit regularly

so we sent the different companies out there to get a

little experience. They screwed up a bit at first, but

after that they did a little better.

One night I was alerted that they had the real kingfish involved in this operation. Did I really mean what I

said? I let them know I meant it. You follow through

and I’ll be here where you can get to me. Around 2200

one of the undercover officers came and said, “We’ve got

him. Break out the company and we will lead them to

the area we want surrounded.” We got the company out.

It was at night. We were under the cover of darkness. We went in and completely surrounded a particular area of Pusan. Nothing could move in or move out.

The company had fixed bayonets. We moved in and surrounded a big shed. I saw for the first time the original

chop shop. There was everything in there, not just engineer equipment. They could take a piece of equipment,

One of the big problems

was the pilferage. We’re

not talking penny ante.

One whole train disappeared. That was when it

got my attention.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 313 313

break it down, and disperse components and parts faster

through the underground system than we had any

idea. There were components of equipment we were

short of that had been showing up everywhere on the

Korean black market.

We had a top Korean official, an Army full colonel, a couple of other field-grade officers, and other

lesser ones, and a few Korean civilians. I put leg irons

and handcuffs on all of them. They shouted, screamed,

and accused me. The full colonel was going to have

me court-martialed and put away for good. So, I said,

“Start inventorying all of the evidence now. Get each

individual’s name, rank, and serial number.”

I called the local MP and I told

him who and what we had. I wanted

them to come in and give us a receipt

for the individuals and all of the evidence. He blew up and said he’d have

nothing to do with it. He called the

area commander and the area commander asked me who the hell was

I? I said, “I’m sorry. If you just give

me a letter saying that I’m relieved

of my specific responsibility to stop

pilfering in the depot, I can hand

your letter to the IG and they’ll

take it from here, but I have caught these people redhanded. So I want that signed letter first.” Well, he wasn’t

about to give such a letter.

I wound up going up the chain of command.

In fact, a man claiming to be the ambassador in Tokyo

called me later that evening and said I was creating an

international incident. I told him to call the IG and

to send me a letter that I was relieved of the responsibility the IG had given me. Otherwise, these individuals

were going to stay where I had them until I got that

letter, or somebody gave me a receipt for the evidence

and the individuals.

Not long after that the MPs came in. They gave

me receipts for all the evidence and the individuals. The

Americans were court-martialed and the Koreans had

Not long after that the

MPs came in. They gave

me receipts for all the

evidence and the individuals. The Americans were

court-martialed and the

Koreans had “fatal accidents.” You can break up

a black market operation

if you catch the “big fish.”

The engineer shop supervisor at the

Yokohoma Depot inspects a D-7

tractor during overhaul

RG 111, SC-427315
314 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. Base Secton, Eighth Army

“fatal accidents.” After that, I never had any trouble with

anything that moved, except the penny ante pilferage

that was going on all of the time. You can break up a

black market operation if you catch the “big fish.”

 After that I probably came close to being killed by

some of those who hadn’t been caught and resented what

I had done—there were sniper shots. I was unable to

travel in the same vehicle at predictable times. I never

rode in the sedan I was authorized; I never used it

anyway. I rode in trucks, jeeps, half-ton trucks—anything but an ox cart. I don’t know if it was by accident

or design but the IG inspected my operation and gave

me a superior. When I was given the assignment, the

Eighth Army Engineer had agreed if I got a superior

rating from the IG they would send me back to be a

division engineer.

Ellsworth I. Davis, a Corps of Engineers officer,

was a very good friend of mine. After I got sent to Pusan

and found out what a mess I had there I decided I better

find out what the situation was with the rest of the engineering organization in Korea. I went to the different

corps areas where most of the work was going on and to

the divisions. I soon found out that about 80 percent of

the engineer equipment was deadlined and they were

just cannibalizing it to try to keep some of the equipment going.

As a colonel of one of the combat groups, Ell Davis

supported me. He really got on the rest of the engineers.

I told him what I would like to do. I didn’t know if

I could sell it, but if I could get the right support I’d

see what I could do. I wanted to replace all of that

equipment, just get it out. Spring was coming and

they were going to lose all of the roads. There’d be no

supply lines for an awful lot of the army other than

rail, which only went up to the corps rear areas. They

really had no choice.

I got into a lot of haggling with the people in Japan. They said, “Oh, you’ll never get approval.” I was

sending ships back that I didn’t want, loaded with a lot

of supplies because we had enough of those supplies

in Korea to fight three wars. We didn’t need any more,

and yet the automatic supply system sent us more.

I knew that if I went up to the G-4 I’d get in an

argument, so I went to Gen. Weible. I said, “The situation over here is pretty desperate. If you want, send some

people over to Korea. Don’t return them on a three-day

deal where they could get credit for a month and then

go back to Japan. Let them get down in the mud and the

cold and find out what the situation is.” So he sent a

couple of his officers over and Ell Davis was one of

those who really helped me.

The agreement was that the operating units would

come to Inch’on and accept the equipment. We would

transfer the ownership of all of the new equipment, evacuate all of the rest of the deadlined equipment by rail

through Pusan, and we would set up repair lines in JaI tried to tell the general,

“Look, you’re playing with a

firebomb. I have to call the

chief of staff of the X Corps

and tell him what’s happened

here.” He said, “Go ahead.”

I did. I thought the end of the

phone line was going to melt.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 315

pan. The repair lines in Japan had no organization or

system because somebody said, “We need a few D-8s, or

some graders, or something.” No requirements had

been laid on it for a time-phased program to start

with. This was the fault of the units in Korea. They had

never stated their requirements.

Once they approved this exchange program we

evacuated all of the junk. We

used LSTs to bring the new engineer equipment into Inch’-

on. I sent a team up there and

we transferred the ownership

of it on site. They did all of the

paperwork right on the beach.

The units on their own, with

their own capabilities, moved

it across Korea to the different

locations where they had to

have it. We were close to the

point of a total breakdown at

that point. The mass transfer

of equipment came just in

time. It took about two months

to complete and the spring

thaws were about to start. Ell

Davis got all his counterparts

together and said, “Hey, somebody’s trying to help us. Let’s

get behind him. Get off of the dime yourself and

do something.”

 It could have been a total engineering disaster if

we hadn’t been able to pull that off. So much inoperable

equipment was for all practical purposes just junk.

Engineer construction and support capabilities were

practically nonexistent—it had gotten to that point.

Automatic supply from

Japan was all right for the first

30 days on a beachhead. After that, somebody ashore,

close to the situation, has to

assume the responsibility to

tell the supply people what

they need. I got shiploads of

barbed wire. Hell, I needed

barbed wire like I needed a

hole in the head. One ship had

been in the Pusan Harbor

for six months loaded with

barbed wire. We had enough

barbed wire to go back and

forth across the Korean peninsula about five or six times.

People in the automatic

supply operation sent in material. There was no supply

operation per se in Korea. The

There was no supply

operation per se in

Korea. The depots were

nothing but bone yards.

Salvaged vehicles being returned to the United States

RG 111, SC-399179
316 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. Base Secton, Eighth Army

depots were nothing but bone yards. The supplies and

equipment were shipped in and everybody around Korea

came in to get them. If you wanted a bottle of liquor, or

something of that sort, you could get it and haul it away.

There wasn’t any control.

The Corps of Engineers never put a regular officer

in the supply system who had any backbone. If you want

to get ahead in the Corps, go into civil works. We had a

Regular Army full colonel assigned to command the depot and he had absolutely no backbone. The guy spent

all of his time with his Korean girlfriend and he just let

the depot operate as a bone yard. He was one of those

we had to get out of there.

A brigadier general, head of one of the engineering

departments in one of the California colleges, was at brigade headquarters. He had a few operating troops, but

very few of them. Most of the engineering operations were

up north. When I saw that equipment was sitting in mud

and that there were no drains or fencing around anything

I asked him to give me some help. He told me that was

not his job; he had other more important things to do.

I said, “I can’t think of anything more important in

a logistical area than protecting the logistical system.” He

said, “Lieutenant colonel, it’s not for you to question a

brigadier general.” I said, “Yes, Sir.” Well, I knew I wasn’t

going to get anything from him. Later, I got a replacement for myself and took command of the depot and

maintenance operations.

I kept trying to tell this brigadier general that all of

the equipment belonged to the Eighth Army. We simply

could not barter equipment out. Some of my people were

bartering out generators and other items of that sort

for things that they wanted to make their own lives a

little more comfortable. We put an end to that. The general took a bulldozer one day and knocked down all

of the fences I had built and took what he wanted.

X Corps chief of staff called me and said they desperately needed a lot of this equipment. They would arrange for a special shipment by train to get up there to

the railhead as quickly as possible. I said, “Let me check

and make sure I have it all available. I will freeze it in

place. I’ll call you back and tell you what I can ship and

when I can expect the rest of the equipment that I’m

short.” I checked all of the equipment, gave him the information, and told him the rail car numbers. Damned

if this brigadier general didn’t come in and take some of

that equipment off of the rail cars as they were to be

pulled out. It was some of the D-8 angle dozers that

were very much needed up forward.

I tried to tell the brigadier general, “Look, you’re

playing with a firebomb. I have to call the chief of

staff of the X Corps and tell him what’s happened

here.” He said, “Go ahead.” So I did. I thought the

end of the phone line was going to melt.

Two officers—one was the G-4 and one from the

Corps Engineers’ office—came down by L-19s. We had

The next thing I knew

the brigadier general

was packing up and had

24 hours to clear the area.

He and his whole brigade

headquarters were returned

to the United States

and released from

military active duty.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 317

built a landing strip that the L-19s could land on near

the main depot there in Pusan. Those two planes came

barreling in. In the meantime the train had gone. They

wanted to know the numbers on the equipment. I gave

the information to them and told them what I knew

about the equipment. They went over and found the

equipment in this brigadier general’s motor pool on some

project that he decided he wanted to work on. They came

back and got on the phone back to the corps headquarters. The next thing I knew the brigadier general was

packing up and had 24 hours to clear the area. He and

his whole brigade headquarters were returned to the

United States and released from military active duty.

The “Papa-san System”

I organized between 5,000-6,000 Koreans. You’ve got to

remember, all males above 15 to 17 years of age wound

up in the ROK Army. They sent police sweeps through

an area, ROK Army sweeps, and they’d catch anybody

they could find and send them to the military. That was

how they got their recruits. I was left with the old men,

the old women, and small kids to do work. Most Orientals are damned good workers. The Koreans particularly

are good in doing stonework, in putting in drainage and

hard stands. You could build airfields by this method.

You could build roads. You could build all kinds of structures with them, but you must use the Korean culture,

which then was the “papa-san system.”

I organized what I called the “Sing Song Korean

Construction Company.” I had mostly young kids and

mamma- and papa-sans, but those people from the rice

paddies really understood drainage. They knew how to

make water flow. They knew how to build stone embankments and retaining walls. In a short time we had

good hardstands and good facilities in all the depots. The

troops were living in deplorable conditions and we got

that quickly straightened out. The morale improved.

Korean workers use hand tools

to excavate a storage facility

Engineer School, 11-30-7
318 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. Base Secton, Eighth Army

The papa-san is the chief honcho in the community, and he’s got his sub-papa-sans under him. If

you want to get anything done you deal through

the papa-san. He’s the big man who makes things happen. I rounded up five or six papa-sans in the community where we were and told them I wanted to

provide work for them. I had arranged through the

civil support area to get food. I could offer them so

much food a day for those who worked and did a

good job, as well as some pay. I insisted on stopping

all of the breaking of boxes and pilferage going on, but

I would take the scraps that we had and make bundles

of scrap wood. At the end of each week, those who

did a good job for the week would get a bundle of

firewood. Well, that was extremely appealing to

these people.

By using the Koreans, in very short order, I got a

hell of a lot of work done. They even did pile driving,

by what I called the “Sing Song pile driving” crew. They

worked with the local hemp rope and a great big wooden

block they had. God, OSHA (Occupational Safety and

Health Administration) would have had a heart attack

if they had seen the way these people worked. They’d

get the piling up, get some guides on it, and with a chant

and a daisy chain, they’d pull that driving block up. Then

they’d pull it down with a series of chants. It was amazing the amount of pilings that they could drive in a short

period of time.

One Man’s Trash is Another Man’s Treasure

I had very little to do with the supply system until

Korea. I don’t really know if the situation was typical.

I knew where depots were, and I’d visited them, but I

had never had the responsibility of having to deal with

the problems that existed. When you make something

run, you get all kinds of problems. Not only do you

have your men, you have all of the laborers you need

to use. You also have to deal with all of the pilferage

and black markets.

I contacted the local police. I told them this was

their country and I was trying to stop all of this pilferage. Their troops and ours were suffering because we

couldn’t get all of the equipment up there due to the

black market—would they help me? They said, “Yes,”

they’d help me. One day I got a call from the local police

chief and he said, “We have recovered a bunch of your

supplies. I want to see you.” I went to his compound

where he had all of this material. There were two piles.

He says, “One pile’s for me and one pile’s for you.” I

said, “I can’t go along with that. That’s U.S. Government property in that other pile. For me to agree to give

it to you I’d just be a part of the black market.” He said,

“I either get my cut or we don’t help you any more. You

can take it all now, but we don’t help you.”

I said, “What do you want that I have some control over that I can give you?” He said, “We would like

the garbage from all of your messes from all of the differ-
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 319

ent companies you have. There’s a big racket going on.”

I said, “What do you mean big racket?” He said, “Oh,

big pay, big pay off.” I said, “Okay, the garbage has to be

disposed of. I’ll make sure that the police can come in

and only the police can pick it up.” He said, “You tell all

mess sergeants and all of the company commanders.” I

called them all in, told them what was going to happen,

and said, “The police chief told me there was a big racket

going on with our garbage. My God, if I can pin it down,

I’ll hang some bodies just like I’ve hung a few other people

around here.” Some of them squirmed with that.

I said, “The garbage goes and there hadn’t better

be any hanky-panky on this damn thing. It’s going to go

to the police so I get the cooperation of the police in

breaking the back of the black market.” Then the pilferage was reduced down to the smaller type of stuff, but

material still got out.

In these countries, particularly in wartime, any

trash, garbage, kindling, or any kind of material, had

some kind of value and it meant something to somebody. It was part of their survival. You had to deal with

that. A lot of officers would say, “Let the sergeant take

care of that.” When they see that chance for extra money

some people cannot resist the temptation of being paid

off. They figured, “This is my chance. I can pick up a

bunch of money.”

Plenty of it was going on. When I left, I had cleaned

out an awful lot of it. I’m not even going to begin to say

that I cleaned out all of it because I didn’t have responsibility for all of it. What you wind up with in these base

sections is a base section commander who was an infantry colonel. Hell, he had as much chance as a snowball

in hell of getting command of an infantry regiment, or

any kind of an assignment of any significance up in the

combat area. He was a cast-off that they had to find an

assignment for.

When I would go up to Col. Baker and say, “Look,

I need more manpower down there,” he’d say, “If I give

you any more manpower I cannot control it. I did transSalvaged truck and

jeep engines waiting

to be shipped from

Mason, Korea, to

Japan, August 1951

RG 111, SC-379213
320 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. Base Secton, Eighth Army

fer some engineer troops down there and they made

MPs out of them.” I had to solve my problems myself.

The way I did was to change the approach to the problems. For example, the only way we improved the maintenance situation was through a rebuild program in

Japan, and by eliminating many thousands of small parts.

I decided we’d go to a major assemblage exchange. In

other words, if you had a problem with a fuel pump on

a diesel engine, we’d just replace the whole pump instead of trying to repair the damned thing. You had

to turn one in to me, which I then sent back to Japan

for repair, and we issued a good one.

That reduced the number of parts and made sense

too. The working conditions most of the time in the

field were pretty brutal. These mechanics were out there

trying to repair equipment when it was bitter cold, snowing, windy, or sleeting. Their cold hands were trying to

repair components or sub-assemblies. It was no wonder

that a lot of the maintenance concepts broke down the

way they did. If you gave them a replacement component it was easier to work with.

We soon found a significant improvement and

reduced the deadline rate. We’d say, “You give me an

old transmission, I’ll give you a new transmission. You

give me a gearbox and I’ll give you a gearbox. If you’ve

got a problem winch, we’ll replace the winch and send

it back. Let them repair it where they’ve got shops inside and warm.”

There were mountains of supplies. I’ve heard about

people going through the depots and picking over equipment to try to find what they needed. The divisions had

enough priority that if they lost a ’dozer we’d try to find

a complete replacement for it. When you got farther back

from the frontline, into corps’ units, then you ran into

other problems.

Generators were our biggest problem, simply because people would not maintain them. Certain pieces

of equipment are absolutely essential to military operations and a generator is one of them. You’ve got to be

able to communicate. You must have certain lights and a

certain amount of power so you could heat equipment.

We would run these generators. A blower is required to

start in bitter cold so that you can heat the light aircraft and the helicopters’ engines. You’ve got to have

some of this equipment—a blower, a heater—to get

those engines started in that cold weather.

We always had trouble with generators simply because all organizations assigned the last GI that came in

to take care of the generator. Nobody told him where the

dipstick was, or to check the level of the oil, or water, or

anything about maintenance. He knew it was going to

take diesel or gasoline, depending on the type of engine,

to keep it running. When it conked out, he’d say, “The

damned thing’s no good. Somebody didn’t do their job.”

The best engineer equipment in the Korean conflict was Caterpillar equipment. One reason is the interThat reduced the number

of parts and made sense

too. The working conditions most of the time in

the field were pretty

brutal. These mechanics

were out there, trying to

repair equipment when it

was bitter cold, snowing,

windy, or sleeting.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 321

changeability of the components on the grader or tractor. Some people liked the bulldozer, but I preferred the

angle dozer with a Hyster winch on it because it gave

you so much flexibility. You could get it into locations

by using a “dead man” to get it up to an elevated area

where you could go to work. If you had another one

down below you working you could marry up two sections of a road, or three or four sections of a road. If you

didn’t have the Hyster winch, you didn’t have the flexibility or maximum capability you needed. You couldn’t

angle that blade so that you could shove all of that material off on one side. With the bulldozer, you’ve got to

swing your track to clear the blade. A lot of people don’t

like the angle dozer because it’s got a longer blade. Nothing is perfect. I found the bulldozer’s best application

was digging sanitary fills.

You never know what you’re going into, or what

you’re going to be called on to do, so I preferred equipment with the winch flexibility and the angle blade. The

generators, the road graders, and the D-7 and D-8 angle

dozers were really the workhorses. The dump truck and

the truck-mounted bucket crane were vital for many

different types of projects.

 Korea was a bad situation in that you were constantly rotating all of your troops. You’d get men in, and

they’d leave about the time you got them trained. We’d

have to get it through their thick heads that, by god,

they’d better put the outriggers out on that track-mounted

crane before they ever started that engine up to move

that crane. If they didn’t, it was going to turn over. If

it didn’t kill them, it was going to wreck the crane to

where it’s no longer operable.

We had any number of individuals who were too

lazy—or they thought it was too cold and unpleasant—

to put the outriggers out. Those are the booms you’ve

got to put out on each side and you telescope them in

when you’re going down the road. You don’t dare use

that crane with the bucket in front of it, even for a lift,

if you don’t put those outriggers out. That provides the

stability to that truck because the truck has a high center

of gravity. That was a constant problem.

The constant rotating of individuals caused a lot of

the problems. In World War II, a person was in a unit

and he stayed with that unit until the war was over, unless he was wounded, or something happened to him.

Then somebody immediately behind replaced him, and

it was usually some understudy. You had some continuity. The man wasn’t always thinking about the day he was

going to go home and figuring out how he was going to

get out of doing something. That’s why I understand

in Operation Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf said,

“Absolutely no more. You come over here and you’re staying here until it’s over.” I’m sure that the commanding

generals who were involved in Operations Desert Shield/

Storm had been in Vietnam, where commanders had

the same rotation policies we dealt with in Korea.

Korea was a bad situation in that you were

constantly rotating all

of your troops. You’d

get men in, and they’d

leave about the time

you got them trained.
322 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

First Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

Lieutenant Trayers recalls the engineering

challenges he faced in the spring of 1951 while supporting 1st Cavalry Division operations south of

the Hwach’on Reservoir, just above the 38th Parallel.

He and his men built sandbag bridges, strung concertina wire, cleared mines, and maintained floating bridges.

One of the missions I had was to build a sandbag

bridge. We had no lumber supplies and we didn’t have

an air compressor for a while. We took the air compressor out to cut down some trees but it was parked on the

wrong side of the down-falling trees. A tree fell on the

compressor and put it out of commission.

Korean sandbags are about three times as large as

American sandbags. They are not made of hemp; they’re

made of rice straw. I had about 50 Koreans who were

permanently attached to my platoon to assist in doing

manual labor. With the available labor and sandbags I

decided to install a sandbag bridge.

As we constructed the sandbag bridge the channel

through which the water flowed became narrower. One

of the principles of hydrodynamics is that the cross-sectional area of the river multiplied by the velocity of the

water gives the quantity of the flowing water. If the area

of the flow is decreased, but the quantity of water remains the same, the velocity will increase. The smaller

the area the greater the velocity. In our bridge the gap

became too small, which caused the water to flow too

fast, and it washed the sandbags downstream as quickly

as we put them in the bridge. We hoped that when we

put in a sandbag bridge it would allow the water to flow

gradually over the top of the sandbags. It’s almost a

hidden bridge because you can’t see it. In this case the

velocity of this river was such that a sandbag bridge

was not appropriate; we had to put some culverts in

the middle of the bridge.

I sent a squad out to secure some materials to build

culverts to install in the bridge. The squad leader returned

Engineers use a

pneumatic chain saw

to clear trees from

along the MSR

RG 111, SC-383355
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 323

with a truck loaded with

railroad ties to build the

box culverts. We used a

crane to place the culverts into the river and

then put sandbags on

top of them. Everything

was going great. The

bridge was holding and

the water was flowing

through the culverts.

When we were

loading up to leave the

construction site I saw

a train in the distance

with someone standing

on the cowcatcher with a lantern. He was swinging this

lantern back and forth. Suddenly, instead of swinging it

side-to-side, he began moving it up and down and the

train stopped. Several people exited the train and came

up to the front of the engine and looked at the railroad

bed. I was not aware of what was going on until the

sergeant who had brought the railroad ties came over to

me and said, “We’d better get out of here. That’s where I

got the railroad ties.” We got out of there! The mostly

sandbag bridge worked. They brought in a railroad repair crew and they replaced the missing ties so everything was fine.

The Concertina

Wire Episode

Talking about a lack of

supplies, the engineer

battalion ran out of concertina wire so we had

to make our own. One

company in the engineer

battalion was given the

responsibility of making concertinas. Barbed

wire stakes were driven

into the ground in a

roughly four- or fivefoot circular pattern.

Then the wire, which on

the spools was used for single or double apron fences,

was stretched out around the stakes in the ground to

make concertina.

The battalion was putting pressure on the company commander, telling him that he wasn’t producing concertinas fast enough. He got up in front of the

company and said, “We’re going to produce more

concertinas, so tomorrow, the person who produces the

most concertinas is going to get a three-day pass to

Seoul along with the jeep.” The next day, everybody

worked their rear ends off. The one who produced the

most concertinas the next day was awarded, publicly, in

Everybody worked their

rear ends off. The one

who produced the most

concertinas the next day

was awarded, publicly, a

three-day pass to Seoul

along with the jeep.

The 120th Combat Battalion experiments with a new method for

replacing barbed wire while under fire RG 111, SC-410975
324 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

First Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

front of the company, a three-day pass to Seoul

along with the jeep. Although no one else in the company was able to produce as much concertina as the

winning soldier, the exercise increased the company’s

production of concertina such that it was able to produce enough for the entire division.

The 7th Calvary regimental commander was Dan

Gilmer [USMA 1932]. He was a controversial person

but a man whom I admired because he was a real gogetter. General Ridgway, who took over after Gen. Walker

was killed, made a flyover of the Army front and

complimented Gilmer with words to the effect that,

“If every unit had as much protection in front of it

as does the 7th Cavalry, we wouldn’t have to worry.”

I do believe that Col. Gilmer used to work 24 hours

a day. One time he went out in a jeep and inspected the

three battalions—actually four battalions, because a

Greek battalion was assigned to the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Col. Gilmer inspected each of the battalions in

the morning and gave the battalion commander a list of

the deficiencies that were to be corrected, and he told

the commander that he’d be back to inspect them

later that day.

After he had lunch, Col. Gilmer borrowed a helicopter from the division commander and hooked a loud

speaker up to it. He then went over and inspected each

of the battalions from the air. In one case, in spite of the

fact that he had given instructions that the barbed wire

was to be increased in front of that battalion’s sector, the

men were not working quickly enough. Gilmer flew the

helicopter over the battalion CP and talked into the

loud speaker. He had a few “words of wisdom” for the

battalion commander, from the helicopter, 45 feet

above the ground.

Organizing Engineering Support

When supporting the regimental combat team there’s

two ways to do it. The engineer company can either be

put in direct support of the regiment, or it can be attached to the regiment. Col. Gilmer wanted to have it

attached. That meant that the orders he gave were the

ones that were followed by the engineer company, rather

than having to go through the engineer battalion commander. He also felt that the equipment that was in support of the company was under his control.

In one instance the graders from battalion were out

maintaining the MSRs, contrary to instructions that had

been given to the company commander by Col. Gilmer.

Gilmer had said that the graders would be used to improve the roads to the medical clearing stations and to

the battalion CPs. When he called Capt. Georgeff to task,

Georgeff explained that the engineer battalion HQ said

that he was to maintain the MSRs. Gilmer then told

Georgeff, “Well, ask your battalion commander if he’d

like to have evening meal with me tonight and we can

talk about this.”

After he had lunch,

Col. Gilmer borrowed a

helicopter from the division

commander and hooked

a loud speaker up to it.

He then inspected each of

the battalions from the air.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 325 325

The battalion commander came and after a rather

hospitable supper was over, Col. Gilmer told him that

the equipment attached to or in direct support of the

7th Cavalry was his equipment and he would do with it

what he wanted. With that Col. Gilmore told the engineer battalion commander that if he didn’t like it they’d

both go see the division commander. Well, needless to

say, not much equipment was attached to the engineer

company after that because the company commander

lost control of it to the regimental commander.

Clearing Mines...the Hard Way

My platoon was given the mission of clearing mines from

the roadway. As we were driving down the road there

was a big sign that read, “Road and shoulders cleared of

mines.” Going down the roadway were the tire tracks of

a two and one-half-ton truck that had previously gone

down the road. I was leading my trucks down the road

and my jeep driver chose to put the wheels on his side of

the jeep in the left-hand truck tire track. That meant the

right wheels of the jeep were in between the two tire

tracks left by the truck. That didn’t make any difference

to me because the road sign said, “Cleared of mines.”

I was about 30 to 40 yards in front of my first two

and one-half-ton truck and I heard this large explosion.

I turned around just in time to see Sgt. Janus, the squad

leader, being blown out of the truck. The two and onehalf-ton truck had run over a mine in the right truck tire

track. If my driver had chosen to put the right wheels of

the jeep in that track I wouldn’t be giving you this interview. Remarkably, Sgt. Janus only suffered two punctured eardrums. Battalion headquarters later changed the

signs from “road and shoulders cleared of mines” to “road

and shoulders swept for mines,” which allowed for the

possibility that there still could be mines in the road.

Breaking Bridges to Save Them

The Hwach’on Reservoir was quite a large reservoir with

a lot of water in its pool. It had a gate system and the

Damaged face

of the dam at

the Hwach’on

Reservoir

Engineer School,

120-15-79
326 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 5

First Lieutenant James L. Trayers 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

Chinese were opening and closing the gates, which raised

and lowered the downstream river level. We had a number of floating bridges downstream on the river that

passed through the reservoir. The Chinese would open

the gates at random, allowing a large wave of water to

surge down the river, washing out the floating bridges.

We kept a light aircraft in the air all of the time

and when the Chinese opened the gates our airborne

observer could see the water moving downstream. He

would radio ahead and the engineers would “break” open

the bridges. They would take out the middle section connecting pins allowing the bridge to swing open, pushed

open by the force of the flowing river. After the wave of

water passed through the bridge opening, the engineers

would have to reconnect the two sides of the bridge and

replace the pins.

 Opening and re-connecting the bridges was a difficult, time-consuming process. We wanted to demolish

the reservoir gates in either the open or closed position

to prevent the enemy from releasing large quantities of

water downstream and disrupting our bridges.

The first attempt to destroy the gates was made by

the 7th Cavalry. It was unable to seize the gates because

of a lack of 105-mm howitzer support. In the second

unsuccessful attempt the 4th Ranger Company suffered

a significant number of casualties in its amphibious assault on the gates. The field-of-fire for the Chinese machine gunners was the tabletop-like surface of the reserI turned around just in

time to see Sgt. Janus,

the squad leader, being

blown out of the truck.

The two and one-half-ton

truck had run over a mine.

voir. The 7th Cavalry never did take the reservoir. I think

the Navy torpedoed the gates [30 Apr-1 May 51, Douglas AD Skyraiders from Air Group 19 knocked out the

dam’s gates and ended the enemy’s tactic of impeding

UN forces by selective flooding].

I was promoted to first lieutenant in November.

When the battalion commander promoted me I was

unshaven because my face was covered with impetigo. I

hadn’t had a bath in a number of days. I had lice, fleas,

and scabies. It was a rather bad situation but he promoted me anyway.

One evening Eddy West and I were sitting watching a movie in the open-air theater when we were directed to report to the S-1. We were told that we

were returning to the states the next day. We rotated

out of Korea in November and Eddy and I were assigned

to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Eddy went to OCS and I

to ERTC.
Ridgway Takes Command January–July 1951 327

Cpl. Thomas Younteris (left) and Pfc. Gilbert Garfield,

of the Engineer Combat Battalion, sweep the roads

for anti-tank mines RG 111, SC-361471
I • I •t L . .? 
July 1951–July 1953

Chapter 6

Active Defense

Pfc. Armando Lopez of the 8th engineers

arms an anti-tank mine, September 1951

RG 111, SC-379370

329
330 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

IOJuly- 310ctober 1951 

--- EIGHtH ARl.IY FROtH,IOJUL 

EIGHTH AltWY FRONT,31 OCT 

Order of Bt~llle QS of 31 Oct 

£Lf:VATIONS IN METERS 

0 100 500 1000 ANO ABOVE 

T I ' r I I ~ •,o .,, .. •LEs I' II I I I I 5 0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS 
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 331

On 23 June 1951 the Soviet delegate to the

UN, Yakov Malik, proposed cease-fire discussions between the two sides in the Korean conflict. Shortly thereafter a Chinese communist broadcast on Peking radio

indicated support for a truce. The ebb and flow of the

fighting had convinced all parties to the conflict that

stalemate was the likely outcome. Only Syngman Rhee,

his goal of a unified Korea under his control unfulfilled,

objected to an armistice.

President Harry Truman authorized General Matthew B. Ridgway to negotiate with the enemy generals.

On 10 July, talks began at Kaesong, about three miles

south of the 38th Parallel, between the opposing front

lines. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was the chief delegate

for the UN. Both sides agreed to continue hostilities until

they achieved a truce, but neither started any large-scale

offensives while the peace talks progressed. Artillery

fire and air strikes characterized the action. Eighth

Army regularly sent out combat patrols with offensive

action consisting chiefly of limited regimental or

battalion-sized attacks designed to seize more favorable

terrain, capture prisoners, and keep the enemy from

getting too close to UN lines. With the exception of

the flare-up in the fall of 1951 following the August

break-off of negotiations, this general pattern prevailed

until just before the signing of the truce in 1953.

Throughout the summer of 1951, continuous local fighting occurred. These actions were designed to

capture limited objectives. In general, the front lines

remained stable. Two notable exceptions were the UN

actions to disrupt communist communications and

supply lines in the Iron Triangle, and to reduce another

fortified enemy position in the Punchbowl. Late in

August 1951, when the truce talks broke down, Gen.

Van Fleet resumed the offensive, driving the enemy

back and straightening and shortening the UN front.

The successful advances of August-October gave the

UN forces the high ground along the entire front,

and possibly influenced the enemy to resume talks on

4 October.

As 1951 drew to a close, fighting tapered off into a

monotonous routine of patrol clashes, raids, and bitter

fighting for key outpost positions. By the end of the

year, a lull settled over the battlefield with both sides

deployed along defensive lines. Ground action was

limited throughout the winter but, in May 1952, the

enemy became bolder and activity increased in the

Ch’orwan area. In June the 45th Division’s Operation

Introduction

Chapter 6
332 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Counter, seeking to establish 11 patrol bases across the

division front, prompted the Chinese to counterattack.

The Chinese lost some 5,000 men before breaking off

the attack.

The deadlock continued into late June 1952 as

the conflict went into its third year. July began with a

series of small-scale attacks by both sides that continued

into the fall. In October, Chinese and North Korean

units, sometimes employing their notorious humanwave tactics, began a series of assaults against the

Eighth Army’s main line of resistance. More than 93,000

rounds of artillery fell on UN positions on 7 October

as the enemy tried to crack the line. After one 10-

day battle, UN forces counted more than 2,000 dead

Chinese in front of one position. In November, with

the coming of winter, enemy aggressiveness began to

decline. Most of the front remained relatively quiet, although some enemy attacks took place throughout

the rest of the year.

As 1953 began, activity along the entire front subsided. In February, Gen. Van Fleet retired and Lt. Gen.

Maxwell D. Taylor took over his command. In the

spring, the enemy renewed its assaults upon the Eighth

Army. Capt. Delbert M. Fowler describes his duties in

the Operations Office, IX Corps Engineer, managing

the floating bridges, roads, and aerial tramways. He also

expresses his feelings about the American and Korean

military personnel.

In the 1st Cavalry Division area, flooding destroyed

bridges and roads, and Lt. Col. Harold R. Parfitt’s 8th

Engineer Combat Battalion was busy restoring crossings,

fords, and bridging. Following the rains of summer, the

battalion improved the road network by building pioneer roads during the fall of 1951.

First Lt. Kenneth E. McIntyre, 802d Aviation Engineer Battalion, arrived in Korea with the battalion in

1951 from Okinawa. The battalion’s biggest problem was

in a shortage of certain supplies and spare parts. Nails

were in extremely short supply. He details how Korean

nationals were used in the construction work of airfields.

Initially, 2d Lt. Richard M. Wells was with the

378th Engineer Combat Battalion, IX Corps, in 1952.

A major project for his unit was putting the corps headquarters underground. The work consisted of drilling

into several hills and developing big underground

rooms in which the command post could move. Once

the tunnel work was finished, Wells took over a company in the battalion and began work on a road project.

In August 1951, Lt. Col. Harry D. Hoskins, Jr.,

who in a few months was able to convert the battalion

into an outstanding unit, relieved the 378th Engineer

Combat Battalion commander. Hoskins then moved

on to his original assignment with the 10th Engineer

Combat Battalion.

In the next excerpt, Col. Hoskins describes his nine

months in the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion, Febru-
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 333

ary-October 1952, working on the front lines putting in

roads and bridges and supporting the division on line.

First Lt. Floyd D. Wright details some of the

problems he faced with officer personnel when he first

arrived at Company A, 62d Engineer Construction

Battalion and also describes the work the company did

as its mission in the 24th Engineer Construction Group.

He further describes his assignment to the 573d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company, the last all-black Army

unit in Korea, with orders to integrate the company as

soon as possible. He notes some of the problems he encountered in the 573d, August 1952-March 1953, and

tells how he addressed them.

Lt. Col. Harrington W. Cochran, Jr., was in the

808th and 809th Engineer Aviation Battalions, 1952-

1953. He describes building and maintaining several

types of airfields and discusses the problems involved with

asphalt and pierced-steel plank runways. Later, when

moved to another unit, he began work on a 10,000-foot

concrete runway at K-8 (Kusan).

First Lt. George B. Gray, Jr., commanded the only

engineer port construction company in Korea (50th

Engineer Port Construction Company). Much of the

work involved installing submarine pipelines. That entailed using cranes on barges, a very difficult procedure

that could easily lead to capsizing the cranes and barges.

If anything sunk in the area, the 50th was the only unit

with divers to repair it. Few of the platoon leaders were

qualified divers, so Gray required all platoon leaders, as

well as unqualified enlisted replacements, to be qualified

by master divers.

First Lt. Richard M. Wells spent his last six months

in Korea as company commander, 72d Engineer Combat Company, 5th RCT. The 72d supported the 5th in

infantry operations. One of the unit’s biggest problems

was obtaining engineer replacements. The support

it provided to the 5th RCT was in emplacing minefields, building fortifications, and putting in roads to

the front line.

Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson discusses the

personalities of general officers with whom he had

contact during the Korean War. He closes his comments

on personalities by listing the three things he believes

that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur did

wrong in Korea.

First Lt. Joseph K. Bratton describes his tour with

the 13th Engineer Combat Battalion as Division Engineer Supply Officer. During the end of the fighting in

the spring and summer of 1953, and during the defensive period of 1953 to 1954, he notes some of the real

supply problems that engineers had in Korea. He describes how the engineers became “combat multipliers”

in Korea.
334 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Love 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

Colonel Love describes his tour as commanding officer, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, September 1951-August 1952, with emphasis on the

battalion’s role in Operation Touchdown. He also

discusses the crucial question of how engineers should

be used in a division—scattered throughout the

division’s regiments or kept together as a distinct

engineer battalion. The Korean War highlighted

that particular issue but did not resolve it.

I left the States by ship from Fort Mason, San

Francisco, California. We went to Japan where I was

assigned to Korea and then to the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion in September 1951.

When I arrived at the battalion they were not on

line. They were rebuilding and training. The unit was

not in bad shape. The old battalion commander, Lt. Col.

Ed Leavey, was still there but would leave in a day or

two. I stayed with the battalion and visited division

headquarters every day.

Since I was the engineer of the 2d Infantry

division commander, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, I

convinced him that I commanded the battalion. He

could look to me to get the most out of the troops

and to use them where they were needed. I didn’t want

them spread out. Often, one company was attached

to each of the regiments and you had a fourth one

that you could move around, but I didn’t like that

kind of operation.

I wanted to use the engineers’ efforts where I

thought they should go, rather than where an infantry

regimental commander might want to use them. The

assistant division commander was used to doing it

the old way, but I talked Gen. Young into letting me

do it my way. Although I was senior to the infantry

regimental commanders, it took some effort to make

that shift. I’m sure that Gen. Young was pleased with

the way we operated.

Engineers worked their

way up the gorge, but the

road was the most heavily

mined and cratered they

had ever encountered.

The battalion had mine

detectors but they were

inadequate. Many mines

were deeply buried.

Lt. Col. Robert Love

receives the Silver Star

from Maj. Gen. Robert

Young, commander of the

2d Infantry Division,

3 December 1951

RG 111, SC-390200
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 335

When I got to

the unit we were in

the planning stages

of Operation Touchdown. This was the

last real offensive of

the Korean War. The

idea was to break

through the enemy

lines and score a

touchdown—break

through to the enemy rear and destroy

him from the rear

forward.

The 23d Infantry had the hardest job because Heartbreak Ridge was

the 23d sector. The 9th was on the left, which wasn’t

as hard, and the 38th was in the center. Each regiment had a different nationality attached. The French

battalion was with the 23d. The 38th had the Dutch

battalion, and the 9th had the Thai battalion. The

French were far and away the best.

At the CP of the 38th Infantry, a forward CP was

set up to operate Companies A, C, and D. Company A,

reinforced with mine detector and demolition crews

from Company C, was to carry the burden of opening

the MSR as far as the point opposite the junction of

the Suip-ch’on and

the So-ch’on Rivers.

Company C was

to put its primary

effort into getting

tanks in the valley

running northwest

from Saegonbae

and, as Company A

opened the MSR

behind them, was to

repair and improve

the heavily-cratered

section around Saegonbae and pioneer

a road up the valley

toward the northwest. Company D was to maintain

and improve the MSR behind Company A until

Saegonbae was taken, and then sweep, clear, and repair

the road north toward Mundung-ni, and when it was

possible for tanks, mount a platoon to move forward

with the 72d Tank Battalion. Company B, working

alone in the Satae-ri valley, was to provide direct support to the 23d Infantry. Mine detector repair facilities

and a forward supply dump were to be established at

Company A. Extra engineer effort available in the early

stages of the operation were to be put on expanding and

improving the forward ammunition supply point in

Operation Touchdown

was by no means typical,

even of the fighting in

Korea. It does, however,

offer a dramatic example

of division teamwork and of

the varied tasks engineers

performed to overcome

enemy obstacles....

With the smoke of exploding artillery visible in the distance, infantry advance

over a road cut by the 2d Engineers Love Collection
336 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Love 2d Engineer Combat Battalion

the western valley and to pushing through the road

over Pass 558.

At 2100 on 5 October 1951, all regiments moved

out on Operation Touchdown. Engineers worked day

and night in the western valley. Engineers worked their

way up the gorge, but the road was the most heavily mined

and cratered they had ever encountered. The battalion

had mine detectors but they were inadequate. Many mines

were deeply buried. Most were wooden box mines with

plastic detonators. Widely spread shell fragments gave

innumerable false alarms.

Engineers used a substantial

pattern of explosives to clear

out enemy mines by induced

detonation. The enemy had

not followed any set pattern

in the placement of mines,

scattering them indiscriminately along all roads.

At dawn on 10 October, a tank dozer rounded

the last corner and completed filling the last crater.

The tank spearhead burst

into the valley, along with

a platoon of Company D,

to overcome whatever obstacles might be encountered in the open valley. With the breaking loose of the

72d Tank Battalion, the most spectacular part of the engineer task in Operation Touchdown was completed. The work

of the next six days, however, was just as important.

By 15 October, when the line was quiet, Companies A, C, and D had moved up into the valley north

of Kong-dong. Work in this period included 120

mines removed or blown in place; 35 culverts installed; areas of the 23d and 9th Infantry Regiments

swept and cleared; one cableway installed for the 23d

and three laid out for the

38th position on Ridges

636, 905, and 974; the airstrip extended 450 feet; a

water point established and

operated; and wire and

anti-personnel mines laid

in the 2d Recon and 72d

Tank Battalion areas.

Shortly after the

objectives were taken, the

7th Infantry Division relieved the 2d. The operation

was the last all-out offensive

before the resumption of

truce talks in 1951.

Operation Touchdown

was by no means typical,

Pfc. Gene Davidson, a member of the water purification

section, 453d Engineer Construction Battalion, tests the

chlorine level in the water supply RG 111, SC-371535
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 337

even of the fighting in

Korea. It does, however, offer a dramatic

example of division

teamwork and of the

varied tasks the engineers performed to

overcome enemy obstacles and to expedite

the division’s advance.

In this operation the engineers located and removed or

destroyed enemy antitank and antipersonnel mines; reduced natural and

man-made obstacles; constructed, repaired, maintained,

and worked roads and trails; constructed fords, fixed

bridges and culverts; constructed and assisted in the improvement of command posts, artillery positions, and

other installations; repaired and maintained landing

strips; provided engineer supply service; procured and

distributed maps; collected and disseminated engineer

intelligence; and prepared and executed the engineer

plan for the operation.

Prior planning is essential. Proper allocation and

use of the engineer effort is needed for there is never an

With a demolished bridge in the back-ground, a tank fords

a stream in the Piari Valley, October 1951 Love Collection

excess of engineer effort available. The

leapfrogging of Companies A, C, and D as

successive spearheads

of the engineer effort

boosted moral by providing fresh troops at

the fore, and equalizing labor, sacrifice,

and opportunity for

achievement.

Liberal use of

explosives in mine

clearance was the

only method that

would permit so

rapid an advance, and the expense was fully justified by

the elimination of personnel and equipment casualties.

The attack was over when we reached our objective.

We were relieved by the 7th Division and were allowed to

drop back and consolidate for the rest of the time that

I was there. I left Korea in August 1952 and went to

the Japan Construction Agency for two years.
338 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Captain Delbert M. Fowler IX Corps Engineer Section

Serving in the Operations Office, IX Corps engineer, Captain Fowler developed a varied perspective.

He discovered that an equipment maintenance system just “did not exist.” He came to believe that individual reservists were treated unfairly by the callup system used for the Korean War.

Rapidly Rising Rivers

I got the job of managing the floating bridges, and I

learned some interesting things. The Koreans had

stripped every mountain in Korea of vegetation and anything that would burn. Since there were no trees to speak

of, except in rare locations, during a hard rain the delay

between the rain on the top of a mountain and the river

below would sometimes be 15 to 30 minutes. To most

of us that was unbelievable since, in normal circumstances, when you have trees and vegetation, the delay

can be hours. Therefore, we quickly learned that we had

about 15 to 30 minutes to cut a floating bridge. It took

us awhile to learn how to do that. We didn’t know what

to do about those high waters to begin with. I Corps

lost a couple of bridges that floated out to the South

China Sea. Although our bridges never got quite that

far, they would go right on down the river and just break

apart. We finally discovered that the solution had to be

to designate one end of the bridge ahead of time to be

cut loose, and we knew which one that was. We cut the

anchor lines, coiled them, and actually floated that bridge

to shore on the other side. The high water passed, and

sometimes the water would pass in a couple of hours,

and we would put that bridge back in place.

We had a regiment come in and bivouac in a dry

riverbed one late afternoon. When they woke up the next

morning, everything was floating downstream. So, IX

Corps issued an order that no unit would bivouac in a

riverbed without first getting clearance from IX Corps

command headquarters. One of the people in the engineer section usually had the job of checking the site and

saying, “No you can’t bivouac there,” or “Yes, you can.”

Most people just didn’t understand how fast the water

could get to where they had pitched their tents.

Besides floating bridges, the engineer units also were

involved with Bailey bridges. There was a pretty sizable

pier placed under the bridge across the Pukhan River,

which led to the Hwach’on Reservoir. The Hwach’on

Reservoir turned out to be an exercise for engineer units,

too. It was a very high dam and it had movable gates.

For a long period of time, intelligence reported that the

water was building up behind that dam. We surmised by

this time that the Chinese, not the North Koreans, were

going to let that water accumulate behind that dam and

open those gates and float all of our floating bridges down

to the South China Sea.

We set about trying to figure out what to do about

that. We had aircraft attack the gates and try to blow

The main purpose of the

aerial tramways was to

get ammunition up to

the top of some of these

ridgelines and to bring back

casualties and anything else

that needed to come down.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 339

them out, but that didn’t work very well. We didn’t have

laser-guided bombs in those days and the circular error

probable of bombs and aircraft was pretty sizable. It

was finally decided—while we possessed the area of the

dam, we would either blow out the gates or remove

them. That was done and then we could forget about

that dam being the problem, as far as the water being

released to destroy all of our downstream bridges

[The dam gates were successfully attacked by air. See

1st Lt. James L. Trayers’s account of this action].

Roads and Aerial Tramways

The real problem, initially, with the roads in Korea was

that very few were paved. Maybe the road from Seoul to

Pusan was paved, but I don’t think any side roads were

paved. If they were, the pavement quickly disintegrated.

The trucks we had were World War II two-and-ahalf-ton trucks, not those 5-ton or 10-ton monsters we

have now. They did not operate on those back roads for

more than 24 hours before all four springs were broken.

If you have ever ridden in a two and one-half-ton truck

with no springs, you know it is awfully rough. It is essentially like riding in a wagon. There weren’t any springs

available. The U.S. Army gave the Japanese a contract

to manufacture springs. When we first started getting

these springs they were very bad; they would only last

a short while. Then they got better and better, and

finally the trucks had springs on them.

The main reason the springs broke was because

there were not enough units to maintain the roads.

The roads were literally all full of holes because of rain

and mud, and the pounding from incessant truck

travel. The engineer units had a tough job going from

one crisis to another on the MSR to try to keep the roads

in some form of repair. We had no asphalt plants. All we

had were some rock crushers, but not nearly enough.

We managed to put together some supply of crushed

rock. In other instances, soil and rock were used to try

A cable car built by

the 3d Engineers

RG 111, SC-386824

339
340 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Captain Delbert M. Fowler IX Corps Engineer Section

to keep the roads in passable condition. We adopted a

standard for the roads—to be built wide enough that

you could slope the shoulder so that rain would actually

move off the road and into a ditch. That helped.

The engineer units also began to build aerial tramways. The first one was built over in the X Corps sector,

since they had the toughest terrain at the time. By that

time a front of troops stretched all of the way across Korea,

which had not been the case in North Korea. In North

Korea you had I Corps on the left, IX Corps in the

middle. You had some Korean units, and way over on

the right flank you had X Corps, but the two flanks were

not connected. When we faced the Chinese this time

around there was a front all of the way across.

The main purpose of the aerial tramways was to

get ammunition up to the top of some of these ridgelines

and to bring back casualties and anything else that needed

to come down. Someone improvised one, drafted a set

of plans, and wrote down the instructions. When I got

that in IX Corps, we put together engineer circulars, or

engineer lessons learned. It showed what other units had

done and described how to do it. [During the Korean

War, three of Capt. Fowler’s articles on bridging appeared

in The Military Engineer: “Bridging the Han River,” 43,

No. 296, Part I (Nov-Dec 51): 414-16; “Bailey Bridge

Across the Pukhan,” 44, No. 298 (Mar-Apr 52): 86-87;

and “Expedient Aerial Tramways,” 44, No. 299 (MayJun 52): 198-201].

We did that in IX Corps, and in the other corps as

well, to tell engineer units how to build an aerial tramway and how to run it with a three-quarter-ton truck

engine or some other engine. They proved to be very

successful because for a number of months in 1952, and

later in 1953, the fighting was essentially static warfare.

Until a peace agreement was signed, the front didn’t

move very often. When it did, it was just a small advance and a small withdrawal.

Engineer units did at least three things: (1) they

had the unenviable task of trying to keep the MSRs open,

the roads and floating bridges installed, and the wooden

bridges, which they had installed, serviceable; (2) building and maintaining aerial tramways; and, (3) the old

standby, maintaining the water supply.

I got out to the battalions and groups every few

days, mostly at the work site though, rather than at the

unit. My main job in the engineer section at IX Corps

was to maintain a status map of the MSR and bridges. If

a G-2 or G-3 wanted to know the status of any of those

at any given time, they would come over and check. At

the same time we went to the G-3 operation’s tent periodically and brought them up to date on what, if anything, had happened to the MSR or the bridges.

The Missing Maintenance System?

In the beginning, maintenance was simply not being

performed systematically. Every two and one-halfEngineer units...had the

unenviable task of trying

to keep the MSRs open, the

roads and floating bridges

installed, and the wooden

bridges, which they had

installed, serviceable; building and maintaining aerial

tramways; and...maintaining

the water supply.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 341

ton truck in the U.S.

Army was running

with broken springs.

There just weren’t any

replacement springs.

It was not just a question of having some

parts in a warehouse

someplace. You have

got to have a system

that gets the parts

from the continental U.S. to Japan or Korea. Then, they

have to be sent to a repair center somewhere in the rear,

and from there to the unit.

That maintenance system in Korea just did not

exist. Everybody had to do his own maintenance. Cannibalizing was normal. That was the only way you could

get things running. Everybody knew the situation, so

nobody complained about it much at the time.

Reflections on the Personnel

The worst inequity during the whole Korean War was

the manner in which we treated reservists. When the

war started, the Engineer Replacement Training Center

(ERTC) didn’t exist. Nobody had facilities to train replacements. So, what did the Army do to provide replacements? They called up individual reservists, most

of whom, I think, were really inactive, not active, reservThat maintenance system

in Korea just did not exist.

Everybody had to do

his own maintenance.

Cannibalizing was normal.

That was the only way you

could get things running.

ists. They called them

up and shipped them

over as individual replacements in combat

units. That was not

what they had signed

up to do as reservists.

We should have found

a different solution. It

was very inequitable.

As far as the

quality of officers or noncommissioned officers was concerned, neither group did anything to leave a lasting

impression. They seemed to be well qualified. They

were as good as you could have expected at the time.

Many of them were not as professional as the ones in the

service today because we have an all-volunteer service

and have had for 20 years. We still had the draft in those

days. We had to rely on reserves recalled until the replacement stream started flowing. It was several months

after the Korean War started that that happened.

Everybody was always short of people in the units.

That was resolved by extending the year of service to 18

months. That really had an effect on morale. A year

goes by pretty fast for most people, but somehow, anything more than a year seems like too long. I spent 19

months in Korea. I left in May 1952. I did not ask to

be sent back.

A jeep powers a

tramway built by

the 2d Engineers

Engineer School, Korea 063
342 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Parfitt 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

Colonel Parfitt describes his experiences as

commander, 8th ECB, 1st Cavalry Division, as a

hectic time. The battalion built and maintained

roads, reinforced defensive positions, and in doing so

made widespread use of Korean laborers and local

materials.

When I joined the 8th Engineers on 2 April 1951

they were on the Hongchon River just southwest of

Hongchon. The 1st Cavalry Division, together with

the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade attached, was

moving aggressively, attacking north along the

Hongchon-Chunchon axis. Two bridges had just been

completed and our troops poured across the Soyang River.

Shortly thereafter, despite considerable mortar

and artillery fire, allied forces reached Line Kansas.

At this point [10 April] the division was scheduled to

go into EUSAK Reserve (Eighth United States Army in

Korea) and, less one regiment, moved 60 miles to establish new bivouac areas near Ilbi-ri, seven miles northeast

of Seoul. The 7th Cavalry remained behind in an attempt to capture the Hwachon Dam but was unsuccessful and two days later joined the division.

During this short period the engineers were fully

engaged and performing the usual tasks: mine detecting

and clearing teams accompanied the advancing soldiers,

the MSR (Hongchon-Chunchon) was widened for twoway traffic, road surfaces were improved, and drainage

ditches were cleared or constructed. Special attention was

given to repair and maintenance of the Soyang River

Bridge and approaches. Also, 100 Koreans were employed

to fill and place nearly 5,000 sandbags at weak spots

on highways.

The 1st Cavalry Division was moved back on line

23 April. The respite was all too short because the Chinese launched their spring offensive with great success.

By the end of the month the 5th and 8th Regiments

had taken up blocking positions on the outskirts of

Soldiers from

the 13th Engineers

repair a road

damaged by a

landslide

RG 111, SC-362324
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 343

Seoul on Line Golden and 7th Cavalry withdrew

into Seoul.

At this point the engineers worked diligently to

augment defenses on Line Golden. There was a race to

clear fields of fire, erect barbed wire entanglements,

and lay AP mines. Fortunately, the Chinese assault

ground to a halt five miles north of Seoul. They seemed

to be moving forces to the east.

Once again quiet reigned along the front as tank

patrols of the 1st Cavalry pushed about two miles north

of Uijongbu before being forced to halt by enemy fire.

Also, the 7th Cavalry, with Co. B of the engineers, set

up a patrol base two miles south of Uijongbu. Road

nets to these positions were improved by ditching,

grading, and spreading gravel.

On 17 May the Chinese opened a new offensive

attack and 1st Cavalry withdrew to Line Golden. However, within several days the enemy reverted to the defensive and U.S. forces counterattacked all along the

front. By 27 May 1st Cavalry troopers reached Line

Kansas, just short of the 38th parallel.

During June, efforts were directed to improving

an existing road net to all-weather, two-way standards.

Ditches were widened, deepened, and shaped; culverts

were emplaced to improve drainage; and rock was

stockpiled on the soft shoulders to be readily available

for emergency repair in the event of heavy rains.

Once this was accomplished, attention was turned to

establishing a network of lateral communication and

supply routes. Much blasting and cutting with dozers,

as well as ditching by a large force of Korean laborers,

was necessary.

Though road construction dominated, many other

projects were accomplished, such as mine detecting,

clearing and mine laying, airstrip construction, and

destruction of enemy positions within the 1st Cavalry

sector. While the combat units were throwing up hasty

fortifications on Line Wyoming, plans were made and initiated on a permanent defensive line south of the Hanton

River following the trace of Line Kansas.

About this time, training of replacements became more and more important. Each incoming group

was held for two days at H&S Company for a thorough

indoctrination. Though short, this program proved to

be invaluable.

One other item of interest was the fact that during

this period the 28th British Brigade and the 25th Canadian Brigade were under the operations control of the

1st Cavalry Division. The 8th Engineers were responsible for the operations of the engineer units working

with these brigades. Constant liaison was maintained

and heavy equipment and other support were provided

when necessary.

At the beginning of July, three patrol bases were

established in front of Line Wyoming. Engineer work

at the time mainly consisted of improving an already

...it had become obvious to me

that our soldiers...had little or

no experience with the Bailey

bridge....the one officer who

knew anything about Bailey

bridges was my exec., who had

been an instructor in Bailey

bridging at the Engineer School

during World War II. Thus,

as soon as possible, some

special training was given.
344 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Parfitt 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

good road net. In addition, normal mine clearing

missions were conducted. There was some indecision as

to whether mines should be laid. Finally, G-3 authorized

a limited number of anti-tank mines for the 16th

Recon sector on Line Wyoming. During a three-day

period the engineers emplaced these mines; however,

they were removed a week later when the division

moved back to Line Kansas.

As previously noted, early on a decision had been

made to divert considerable effort to Line Kansas. A road

net was constructed behind the line in the division sector and minefield sites were prepared. The roadwork was

particularly challenging and involved blazing roads

through virgin territory, scaling peaks up to 300 meters

high, while never exceeding a 20 percent grade.

At this time other personnel were engaged in

preparing minefield sites, to include everything but actual emplacement of mines. The “go ahead” was immediately given when the division returned to Line Kansas

on 16 July.

Later in the month a second order was received

requiring removal of all mines and concertina wire

from Line Golden. Little trouble was experienced with

AT (anti-tank) fields but anti-personnel mine removal

was a nerve-wracking job.

During a seven-day period much work was accomplished although three men were wounded. The operation was called to a close on 31 July as the 1st Cavalry

moved forward. Considerable effort was made to posting warning signs in Korean, Chinese, and English.

While the mine laying was in progress, work proceeded on the roads. A heavy rain midway through these

operations caused a juggling of assignments. Numerous

fords on the MSR became impassable—ditches and culverts were clogged. It took two days of concentrated effort to repair the damage. At the same time we were given

the job of constructing a bridge across the Sinchon River.

In view of heavy rains, a minimum span of 117 feet was

required. We had on hand 72 feet of dry span M-2 bridge,

and the remainder of the bridge was constructed with

two pile bents, a rock, and native timber crib.

The division headquarters were isolated at one

point because they were on the other side of a stream

from their MSR. The division commander reacted by

placing urgent demands on the engineers. He was cut

off by a raging stream, but only for a short time because

we used a small Bailey bridge to span the gap. Fortunately our mission was accomplished fast enough to satisfy him that we had done a good job. Since I had just

been assigned as battalion commander this was good

news to hear. Nevertheless, it had become obvious to

me that our soldiers, particularly new fillers, had little or

no experience with the Bailey bridge. In fact, we found

that besides myself, the one officer who knew anything

about Bailey bridges was my exec, who had been an

instructor in Bailey bridging at the Engineer School
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 345

during World War II. Thus, as soon as possible, some

special training was given.

Although the 1st Cavalry Division had been in reserve for 10 days, the engineers had worked extremely

hard during this time. Plans to rest a little were aborted

as the Chinese had moved uncomfortably close to Line

Wyoming and the division was called upon to

return to the front on

the last day of July.

The move to Line

Wyoming was completed

in the first days of August with the 1st Cavalry Division relieving

the 25th Infantry Division. At this time, mine

removal had ended on

Line Golden. The mines

and tactical wire removed were then used

to improve Line Wyoming. After some delay

the order was given to fortify Line Wyoming with antitank and anti-personnel minefields.

Early in August, a limited attack was launched but

the ground was too soft to support the armored vehicles.

They were abandoned and later in the month a tank

patrol, accompanied by a D-8 angle dozer, moved out,

reached the bogged tanks, and succeeded in digging out

the vehicles, enabling their recovery while covered by

small arms fire and mortars.

In the meantime, engineer operations had started

with a large backlog of work to be done due to the heavy

rains in the latter part of

July that washed out

roads, bridges, rafts, and

minefields. The Imjin

River and its tributaries,

the Hanton and Amichon rivers, had overflown their banks.

A second downpour of rain on 4 August

caused even more damage. Work that had been

accomplished now had

to be redone. Much of

the bridging as well as

rafts used in the major

crossings were damaged

or beyond repair and had to be replaced. Also, small

bridges on the MSR were washed out and needed prompt

replacement. Throughout the month bridging of many

types was under urgent construction. Assault boats and

rafts were heavily used as other work was in progress.

Native timber was used

as much as possible for

the construction of large

timber culverts and for

revetments. In reconstructing

fords, hand-placed rocks

were the best solution.

Korean laborers use A-frame packs to carry stone for the construction

of a revetment near Yonchon, July 1951 Engineer School, 93-66-6
346 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Parfitt 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

During this period, maintenance of roads required

almost 24-hour daily effort. In many cases the record

rains of the month succeeded in piercing the hard road

surface—this plus heavy traffic resulted in sub-grade

collapse. Runoff from the hills soon resulted in loss of

culverts and some bridges previously mentioned. Fords

were rendered inoperative.

Native timber was used as much as possible for

the construction of large timber culverts and for revetments. In reconstructing fords, hand-placed rocks

were the best solution.

Fortunately, there wasn’t heavy pressure along

the line at the time. The Chinese probably were

having the same kind of problems we were having,

although they were not as road bound as we were.

At that time, negotiations were in progress and there

was a feeling that things were going to be settled

at the negotiating table. While this was going on we

had our own hands full just keeping the roads and

crossings open in order to get the essentials up to

the troops.

Our efforts were fruitful as we followed the engineer adage “Get the rock on and the water off.” The

Koreans who were attached did all kinds of hard work.

They were digging out the ditches, trying to drain the

water, and hauling as much rock as they could get from

streambeds. During what I call the survival period of

August, we called upon more and more laborers from

the Korean population because equipment wasn’t all

that much help.

In September we had a continuation of operations

to restabilize and improve the road network, which, due

to the rains of August, still required major repair. New

roads connecting regimental MSRs to the division MSR

were a challenge since they involved establishing roads

above an elevation of 1,080 feet. The terrain was very

rocky and there was extensive use of graders and scrapers

as well as explosives.

Extension of operations to the west bank of the

Imjin River also necessitated construction of a resupply

road over high terrain. This was briefly held up until the

infantry secured the predominant terrain feature. At that

time 516 feet of footbridge was installed. This enabled

the 5th Cavalry to put a screen in front of the proposed

M-2 treadway bridge, which was to be constructed by

Corps engineers. Upon completion, our engineers moved

forward with dozers and other equipment and built a

road to connect the bridge site and the North Ferry.

As the Infantry advanced, work proceeded on

primary and secondary roads leading to various division positions. This involved the construction of three

bridges on the southern portion of the 7th Cavalry

Regiment MSR. An MSR from Line Wyoming to Line

Kansas also was developed. By the end of the month,

roads had been completed to the limit of the infantry

advanced positions.

Fortunately, there wasn’t

heavy pressure along

the line at the time.

The Chinese probably were

having the same kind of

problems we were having,

although they were not

as road bound as we were.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 347

That month we also completed field fortifications started

on Line Wyoming. This included

not only minefield and barbed

wire obstacles, but also such obstacles as an artificial lake, tank

obstacles, and various booby

traps. All minefields were enclosed with a barbed wire

fence and large white rectangular signs with lettering, “DANGER, MINES,” as well as

“MINES,” written in Korean

and Chinese. Noteworthy,

also, was that during this

period an airstrip had been

built for the division artillery in the vicinity of

Yonchon. Furthermore, nearby work had commenced on building a 40-ton ordnance loading ramp and

a ramp for ambulances to use at a medical clearing station.

Engineer operations for the month of October consisted primarily of supporting the 1st Cavalry Division

in Operation Commando during the seizure of Line

Jamestown. Prior to 3 October (D-day), I laid out a

proposed road network based on information compiled from ground reconnaissance in this sector during

previous operations, detailed map study, and personal

air reconnaissance. Then,

throughout the month the

battalion built, maintained,

and improved a large network of roads. Initially they

pushed forward directly behind the attacking elements,

and periodically, lateral connecting roads were installed

between them. About this time

I received the great news that

I had been promoted to lieutenant colonel.

For one short period Company D was committed as infantry. They occupied a blocking

position but did not become

engaged and soon returned to battalion control.

Our road construction was mostly accomplished

in very high terrain. Criteria concerning width of road

and grade limitations were very demanding. The demands on heavy equipment were enormous since they

were used day and night. Fortunately, we had an outstanding warrant officer who, together with a team of

technicians, did an outstanding job on maintenance.

Much of the work was accomplished in the field by

maintenance teams and, in other worst cases, equipment was taken to base camp.

Pvt. Alfred Vaughan of the

13th Engineers uses his

bayonet to probe for mines

RG 111, SC-363822
348 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Parfitt 8th Engineer Combat Battalion

As Operation Commando progressed, we encountered many minefields laid by the enemy in

front of their MLR. We had difficulty locating all the

mines because the wooden box-type mines had been

buried six or more inches below ground surface.

Sweeping the roads with mine detectors did not locate

them. Thus, on many occasions, the troops resorted

to hand probing. Since the enemy also tended to

camouflage their mines in rocky areas by laying

large slabs of rocks over the mines, we decided to

use pressure charges on all critical points [curves, defiles,

dips, and cuts].

In addition to all the mines, stockpiles of explosives also were found and destroyed. They included TNT, composition C-3, anti-tank grenades, and

bangalore torpedoes.

Defensive minefields for Line Jamestown were

started on 13 October. Many anti-personnel and antitank mines were laid up until our troops were relieved

on 20 November. This work was very dangerous and

many times conducted under harassing enemy mortar

and artillery fire.

Warning orders were issued to the 1st Cavalry

Division on 5 November to anticipate a reserve status

on or about 20 November. This required the establishment of close liaison with the relieving division to ensure all projects would be turned over to them. Our battalion mission continued until the 10th ECB relieved

us on 10 November 1951. At that time complete

records of all of our activities [minefields, roads, airfields,

etc.,] were given to them.

Each unit commander made prior reconnaissance

of the reserve area. The general area was located north

and east of Uijongbu. The next several days were spent

in its establishment. Furthermore, an intensive training

program was ordered into effect on 26 November and

continued until 16 December.

Within a day after being back in reserve I went

to division headquarters and was informed that the

1st Cavalry was being withdrawn to Japan. We were

going to be replaced by the 45th Division and the transfer was to be effected with a change of equipment.

The 45th was going to leave its equipment in Camp

Chitose, Japan, and we were to leave our equipment in

Korea, except for personal items and, for some strange

reason, the kitchen gear. Our dozers and heavy equipment had been worked pretty heavily so we made

every effort to put them in first class condition for the

45th Division.

Transfer of personnel of the 8th Engineers to

Camp Chitose, Hokkaido, began 5 December and was

completed on 23 December. I flew back to Japan in

the latter part of December and remained with the 1st

Cavalry until returning to the U.S. in April 1952.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 349

Base Camp belonging to Company C,

3d Engineer Combat Battalion, near

Mason, August 1952

RG 111, SC-412165
350 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Kenneth E. McIntyre 802d Aviation Engineer Battalion

Lieutenant McIntyre describes supply and

support conditions during airfield construction in

Korea, April 1951-January 1952. At times, his unit

had to barter with other units for basic materials,

especially nails.

I joined the 802d in the summer of 1950 on

Okinawa. The whole battalion moved to Korea in April

1951. I had never been with a unit that had moved

before, and I didn’t get involved with moving the equipment. The personnel went from Okinawa to Korea on a

Japanese hospital ship. The sleeping quarters were terrible. We were only on it for a

couple of days. I remember going

to the wardroom, which was gorgeous, sitting around very elegant

tables with nice lights and nice

furniture and being served

warmed cans of C-rations.

We had shortages of supplies and spare parts, but I wasn’t

as aware of them in Korea. I

knew whether or not we had a

grader available, but I didn’t

particularly focus on the supply problems. We were definitely short of some basic construction materials, such as

nails. We just could not get enough nails or some kinds

of lumber. We resorted to a barter system. I can remember loading up the goodies of one kind or another,

including booze, going off to the other engineer units

within 15/20 miles, and swapping what we had. A

good item we often had was air mattresses. We were

trading those for nails.

Later on, we really had the best of all trading material. The battalion was located in an old mill area. An ice

cream plant was there. About this time the Army was

making forced issues of the ingredients for ice cream. We

found somebody in one of the units who knew something about this so we started producing ice cream.

We had a certain amount of ingredients. Everybody else

was getting ingredients too, but they had no way to use

them. So we would trade, say, a gallon of ice cream for

three gallons worth of ingredients. When we started

building up a surplus, we started trading the ice cream

for whatever else we couldn’t get, like nails, and so on.

It was really ironic, using ice cream as a means of buying

supplies. I’m sure things got better, but I distinctly

remember swapping ice cream for nails.

We were also short of plumbing supplies. We went

up to Seoul and stripped an old locomotive factory of

pipe to get that.

I suspect that some of the supply problems were

the result of, as an Army unit with the Air Force, the Air

Force had no high-level office looking out for these sorts

First Lt. Kenneth McIntyre

McIntyre Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 351

of things. There was an engineer officer on the 5th Air

Force staff, but he was more interested in how construction was going. I don’t know whether the supplies were

coming from Army depots or from Air Force facilities.

The equipment was certainly Army equipment, and it

came in Army-type colors.

We had a problem with the asphalt. We certainly

did a lot of paving. All the asphalt came in 55-gallon

drums, and we had no easy way of getting it out of

there into the production machinery. It took forever to

do that and it caused a bottleneck.

It was autumn and it was getting cold. They wanted

to get this airfield finished for a number of reasons. They

were thinking about a cease-fire in late 1951 and they

were afraid that they wouldn’t have as much construction

completed as they’d wanted. Apparently, there was going

to be some freeze on what you could do, so we were under

great pressure to get the runways extended.

It was so cold there—we could cut these drums open

with axes and the stuff would handle just in chunks. We’d

throw them into the mixing machine, which had plenty

of heat, so they would melt quickly. We paved on frozen

ground, which is something you just don’t do. We thought

we could always go back and replace it. We had to have it

on the ground in case of a cease-fire. I don’t remember if

the paving lasted. It should not have, in theory.

We were attacked. Light planes—Bedcheck-Charlie

type of aircraft flew over and threw out mortar shells or

We paved on frozen

ground, which is something you just don’t do.

We thought we could

always go back and

replace it. We had to

have it on the ground

in case of a cease-fire.

small bombs. They could see us because we were working

at night and we had lights. The platoon had two minor

casualties. For the most part, however, it was more a nuisance than anything else.

We used a lot of Korean nationals. When we first

arrived, we needed to get the rice paddies drained. We

needed a very substantial ditch, maybe 12 feet deep and

50 feet wide—a big, big ditch, so somebody contracted with the foreman for this Korean group. We performed

the construction inspection on it. In a month’s time

they dug this ditch about a mile long. I don’t think we

could have dug it that quickly with heavy machinery.

This was in the middle of the war, and the Koreans

were hungry for food and hadn’t earned any money for

weeks, so they worked hard. Men pulled scrapers. A couple

of people would be pushing the scraper and some other

guys on top would be pulling it up. They ran it with

an iron fist, too. They were just as tough on control.

I was impressed then, and I still am.

The mill where the 802d

made ice cream

McIntyre Collection
352 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Kenneth E. McIntyre 802d Aviation Engineer Battalion

(Clockwise from upper

left) Lunch at the

officers mess, Suwan;

McIntyre in a foxhole

outside his quarters;

posing for pictures,

from left to right:

Harry Griffith, Kenneth

McIntyre, Ward

Wheaton, and George

Price; and McIntyre sits

with the Korean boy

who cleaned his

quarters

McIntyre Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 353

A continuous mix

asphalt plant, similar

to the one operated by

the 802d Engineers at

Suwon. McIntyre

recalled that his unit

assembled the plant

without any instructions and was “pleasantly surprised” when

it worked. It required

a crew of 8–10 people

to operate the plant

RG 111, SC-451583
354 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Second Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

Lieutenant Wells arrived in Korea eight months

after graduating from the Military Academy. He describes the personalities of the officers in his battalion, the various failures in leadership, and the absolute necessity of maintaining a sense of humor.

I received my assignment in the spring of 1951.

We first selected our branches, and then, within a day or

two, we selected our assignments. Anyone who asked

for Korea got it. Of course, a lot of people didn’t ask

for Korea, and they went elsewhere if they were high

enough in the class to rate going somewhere else.

Those going to Korea were assigned to the Basic

Course, followed by an assignment where we were supposed to improve in leadership and other skills. For me,

that was Fort Leonard Wood. I was there for about

three months in a basic infantry training unit.

I headed over to Korea in February of 1952, without any knowledge of where I was going to be assigned.

My good friend Anthony J. “Tony” Delano [USMA

1951] and I went to Seattle together. We had orders to

catch a flight on a military plane. We flew as far as

Shemya, Alaska. Because we were hitting headwinds,

they unloaded the four junior officers—two MP captains, Tony, and me. Then the plane took off and left

us. One large building contained everything on Shemya.

About once a year, it got clear enough to see Attu,

and that was the big event on Shemya. We went out to

look a couple of times, but it wasn’t clear enough during

our time there. The Aleutians in February are not a resort area. At the end of the four days, Tony and I were

able to hitch a ride on a Canadian mail plane, which

was barely heated. It was so bad on Shemya that it

was better to be leaving.

We arrived in Tokyo and took a train across Japan

to Sasebo. We were loaded on an old Japanese ship that

apparently had been used to transport livestock. You

First Lt. Richard Wells

Wells Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 355

could sit on the straw-covered deck, and there was

quite a bit of manure mixed in with the straw. That

us from Sasebo over to Pusan.

In Pusan we were given our orders. I was ordered

to the 378th Engineer Combat Battalion, which was a

corps combat battalion. My friend, Tony, was ordered

to the 2d Infantry Division. We got on a train heading

up to Seoul. This train had rigid platforms that you

slept on. It was well ventilated because the train had

been machine gunned extensively and you could look

right out through all the machine gun holes as you

traveled north.

We got up to Seoul and split up. I went to my

unit, which was over in IX Corps, pretty far up to the

east. They had just had a final push against the Chinese

and North Koreans and we were backing up that particular push. I joined the 378th Engineer Battalion, which

was a National Guard unit from North Carolina. All of

the officers in the battalion had a minimum rank of captain in World War II. They’d all joined the National

Guard out of patriotism and were really a very sharp

group. They were just as good an engineer unit as I’m

sure you’d ever find. They were in the process of phasing

out. The battalion commander, however, was weak, but

he was surrounded by very talented people who ran a

good battalion.

I was given a platoon that had been allowed to run

down—they hadn’t had a platoon leader for some time.

It was a platoon with no one in it. I was given a buck

sergeant, and, as the new trainees came in, we built our

platoon. Finally, I got a sergeant who had a little bit

more rank. When you talk about going to your first

unit and leaning on the experienced NCOs, there wasn’t

anyone for me to lean on. My buck sergeant had been

in just a few months and had been given the rank

because they needed to have some sergeants.

We were sitting in a very muddy area right on

the backside of the front lines. About the time that I

got to the unit the Marines bombed us. They came

over in a Corsair [F4U]. They machine gunned our

company area and dropped a bomb, which knocked

out a three-quarter-ton truck. We had one casualty in

the company—a man standing in the urinal at the time

dove into a foxhole without zipping up and scraped

himself a bit.

I learned that while close-air support can be very

devastating, it can also look worse than it is. I’m sure

that Marine pilot thought he had really raised havoc,

but he hadn’t done anything but knock out one truck.

Well, the other side of the hill was the front line and

he just hadn’t seen our panels. It was the kind of mistake that can happen. One should not hold it against

the pilot.

Then, my battalion went back a ways in the corps’

area. There was a need to develop protection for the IX

Corps headquarters against an enemy air attack. I’m

We got on a train heading

up to Seoul. This train

had rigid platforms that

you slept on. It was well

ventilated because the

train had been machine

gunned extensively....
356 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Second Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

not sure where the enemy air was supposed to come from.

They wanted to be sure that the protection was proof

against atomic weapons. My platoon was given the job

of getting the corps headquarters completely underground. The corps engineer was an outstanding officer,

Gerald Galloway, who later became a major general.

His advice to me when I showed up, a 2d lieutenant with my inexperienced platoon, was, “The one thing

you’ve got to remember to do is not lose your sense of

humor.” This was very good advice, but then he had to

give me some follow-on advice. Many officers around

that headquarters had a license plate on their jeep with

an insignia—full colonel or a one or two star. When

I got myself a license plate with a gold bar, Galloway

said with amusement, “Well, that’s carrying humor a

little too far.”

Tunneling

Our job was to tunnel under some hills and to develop

big underground rooms for the CP to go in. None of

us had ever seen a tunnel. Fortunately, we had one enlisted man who had served as a worker in a little mine

in West Virginia. He showed us how to go about shoring a tunnel and we got a manual that covered tunnel

construction. So in we went. We excavated from two

sides of the hill and the tunnels were supposed to link

up in the middle. This made for a very exciting time

until we lined up. It was a great job for building a platoon and an interesting experience to actually complete

these tunnels.

One of the “workers” on one of my shifts was a

Brig. Gen. Lawrence R. Dewey [USMA 1924]. He used

to like to work a drill. He would come in at odd hours of

the day and I’d find the general in there drilling. Dewey

was the IX corps’ chief of staff. Once I got a request

from the corps commander, whose name was Weyand, a

three star. He requested that we blast more quietly at

night. I didn’t really know how to blast more quietly!

You just kind of ignore requests like those.

Soldiers of the 3d

Engineer Combat

Battalion use a

wagon drill in

preparation for

blasting a hillside

Engineer School, 71-11-23
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 357

One experience tested my humor the most. When

I came walking around the side of the hill, I found a big

Swede in one of my squads strangling a captain. He had

him by the throat and he was shaking him. I broke up

this fight and I asked him, “What’s going on here? Why

are you doing this to the captain?”

The Swede said that this captain “called me some

very bad names.” Here I was as a 2d lieutenant trying to

officiate this thing and to find out where the problem

lay. I asked the captain, “Why did you call private soand-so these bad names?” He said he was sitting in his

tent in the Staff Judge Advocate section by his typewriter

when a huge beam came in through the side of the tent.

I think it was an eight-by-eight. This beam cleaned off

his desk and then it went back out through the tent. As

he was sitting there astounded, the eight-by-eight came

in again from another angle and took down the whole

tent; it fell on top of him, banging his head. He climbed

out from under this destroyed tent and he found this

private turning a truck around with these beams sticking out of the rear end. So, he called him a bad name

and he got strangled in the process. I was able to

break that up. Everyone apologized and we went back

to work. That was the reason that you had to follow

Col. Galloway’s advice and keep your sense of humor.

It was a National Guard unit but it was mostly

federalized. All the National Guard members left within

the first two or three weeks after I arrived. The unit was

made up of replacements, and most of the replacements

were reservists. There was one regular in the battalion,

Larry Crocker, in another company, who was a West

Point classmate. One other regular there was from

Norwich University. Everyone else was ROTC (Reserve

Officer Training Course); graduates who were just in

for their two years, or OCS types.

A Variety of Personalities

We got a battalion commander who was one of the

worst officers I think I’ve ever seen. When he came out

to a job site and stood there and glared you knew everything was perfect. If he found the slightest thing

wrong he would explode. The battalion exec had personal problems, whom one of the enlisted men tried to

kill later, unsuccessfully. The battalion staff essentially

did nothing, as far as I could tell at that point. I never

saw any of them. No one from the battalion ever tried

to come and find out if my platoon knew anything

about building tunnels, even though a three-star general

was interested in the outcome of the whole thing. These

were really rocky times, as you can imagine, but we completed the tunnels.

One close associate there was a friend of my

family named Warren Webster, from the Class of ’50.

He was with the infantry company that was supposed

to guard the corps headquarters. I saw quite a lot of

him before he volunteered to go to the front. When he

One close associate....

was with the infantry

company that was

supposed to guard

the corps headquarters....

When he got to the

front his unit was

overrun. They found

his body with his hands

tied up behind his back

with barbed wire, shot

through the head.
358 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Second Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

got to the front his unit was overrun. They found his

body with his hands tied up behind his back with

barbed wire, shot through the head. As I say, all in all,

it was a learning experience.

There was so much work to do that I found myself working more than 20 hours a day. I could see

I was really beginning to physically lose it. I’d heard

from my father about general officers and others having

nervous breakdowns in World War II and I decided,

“Hey, you’ve got to pace yourself.” So, I cut back to

around 16 hours a day. I had absolutely no help. The

NCOs were much less experienced. We were all learning on the job. However, we succeeded in building

these great big rooms underneath the ground.

I was still learning tact, as I still am today. One day

a major came around and went through the tunnels. He

was a very officious sort. There was one little room off

the commanding general’s room and he asked me, “Who’s

that room for?” I said, “Oh, that’s where they keep the

house boys.” He said, “What do you mean, the house

boys?” and I said, “You know, the aides.” Well, he turned

out to be the senior aide! Every once in a while I think

Col. Galloway probably heard about me.

I was in Company A. We started out with a captain with World War II experience, who was a very

nice fellow, but who was just totally out of his depth. So,

he just did nothing. I got together the platoon leaders,

who were ROTC or OCS types, and we had a platoon

There was so much work to

do that I found myself working over 20 hours a day.

I could see I was really

beginning to physically

lose it. I’d heard from my

father about general officers

and others having nervous

breakdowns in World War II

and I decided, “Hey, you’ve

got to pace yourself.”

Staff and mess tents at the headquarters of the 2d Engineer

Battalion, October 1951 Love Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 359

leader meeting every night where we planned the next

day’s activities for the whole company. When the captain came in, we’d tell him what was going to happen

and he’d say “Fine.”

I was on my tunnel job and the other platoons

were maintaining roads or doing things like that. I ran

the company, directing these lieutenants based on a

15- or 20-minute-a-day meeting. They relieved that

captain and they brought in an infantry captain

who had become an engineer because he had joined an

engineer unit someplace. He had been in the infantry

in World War II as a rifle company commander in

Europe and he had done very well.

The battalion commander was so bad that at

the end of about a month’s time, this former infantry

commander developed the shakes because he was constantly being harassed. He was trying hard but there

was absolutely no battalion leadership.

About the time I finished my tunnel job they had

another company, Company B, which had had several

company commanders in a short length of time, all relieved by the battalion commander. So, I was called in

by Colonel Jenkins. He said, “I’m going to make you

Company B commander. I know you’re going to fail.

Everyone else has, and I’m sure you will, but I want you

to go and do what you can with that company.”

I went to Company B and I found a relatively

good group of people who had just been abused. I got

the company together and told them exactly how things

were going to run in the future and how I wanted the

chain of command to work. People who did well were

going to be rewarded and people who did poorly were

going to get the stick.

We quickly shaped up Company B. We had

some good platoon leaders in the company. We got

in a first sergeant who was actually a tech sergeant,

but he had had some NCO experience. Shortly after

I arrived there, I was awarded a Bronze Star for my

work on the tunnel. It didn’t hurt any to see the new

man had been recognized. Warren Webster, the

fellow who later was killed, was there when I was awarded the medal.

We were on a road project for about a month

when my classmate, Larry Crocker, took over Company C, shortly after I took over Company B. Larry’s

experience in the 378th was different from mine,

but again, illustrative of the times. He had a separate

platoon. He was off doing a job, and doing it well,

I’m sure. Then, he was ordered to go to battalion

headquarters to do a job. He found that all of the

officers on the staff in battalion headquarters had

prostitutes they kept in their tents with them. So, Larry

refused to bring his platoon into the battalion area.

He camped outside. He said, “There will be no prostitutes here.” There was a lot of ranting and raving among

the incompetent staff but nothing happened and

We had to build miles

of road through the

middle of a totally

underdeveloped area.

We learned to walk our

bulldozers down the

tops of ridgelines and

to cable them down

to platforms we

had blasted.
360 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Second Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

Larry prevailed, which is the kind of thing you had to

do then. You just couldn’t take orders if they were

wrong; you had to do what was right.

A fellow by the name of Harry Hoskins had been

sent from the States to take over the 10th Engineer Battalion, 3d Division. The Pusan depot was in abysmal

condition and Harry was pulled out of the pipeline and

put in the Pusan depot where he spent several months

straightening things up. Then, once again he was ready

to head to the front, but the 378th Engineer Battalion

was in such horrible shape that he was put in as our

battalion commander.

He was a breath of fresh air. You won’t find a better

officer than he. When he came, everything immediately

started to shape up. He did not tolerate anything bad.

He came up through the amphibious engineers, and Gen.

Art Trudeau, who has now passed away, and Harry had a

little get together. Harry was one of the guys that he

brought in. Super guy. So, we went from night to day as

far as battalion headquarters went. He began to build up

the battalion with very little help. I don’t think he ever

got any first-class staff officers there but he brought in

some young officers. In those days, you didn’t rely on

someone with 10 years experience who knew his job.

You had to get someone who had enough initiative to

do what had to be done.

Our job was to build a road to support a rear line

that the UN forces could fall back to if they had to give

up the front line. We were building a road along the

rear side of the hill behind the defense line. Each company had a section of that road.

It was a very educational experience for me.

We had to build miles of road through the middle

of a totally underdeveloped area. We learned to walk

our bulldozers down the tops of ridgelines and

to cable them down to platforms we had blasted.

We had blasting going on along the entire length

of the road at the same time. The whole company

was broken up into small teams that were blasting or

doing something that had to do with building a road.

Harry Hoskins used to compare that to the Ledo

Road type of operation. It was a very exciting job, one

where you could really develop a very professional

organization.

One time, the group commander flew out and arrived unannounced at my company. I was out in the

field so he just went out unescorted and looked. As he

went along sections of the road, he talked to individual

squad leaders and assistant squad leaders who were

running various jobs. They all reported to him and

told him exactly what they were doing.

I think that Hoskins had just arrived about that

time. After the group commander had looked at my area

he went back and told Hoskins it was the best company

in the group. This was a long ways from our company’s

status about a month or so earlier. People had really

We weren’t getting the

things we needed through

normal channels, but we

were able to do a lot of

trading. For example,

I traded an extra

.45-caliber I had for a

two-and-a-half-ton truck.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 361

shaped up into a good organization. Of course, it was

good for me to have a pat on the back shortly after

the new battalion commander arrived.

I did one thing at the time that I didn’t think was

wrong. There was a depot back south that handled the

construction battalions down south, but not my battalion. We were having a difficult time getting enough explosives to keep this road going, as you can imagine. Although we were supposed to get our explosives through

battalion S-4, we weren’t getting a lot that way. I’d just

send convoys of trucks down south to that depot and we

would load up explosives and come back. This gave us

plenty of explosives. All the paperwork was correct and

the depot people knew exactly what units they were

supplying. They just didn’t know they weren’t supposed

to supply us.

When I later told that to Harry in Washington he

was a little shocked and said, “I never could figure out

how you built that road so fast.” I said, “Well one thing,

of course, was the advantage of having all of those

extra explosives.”

We had the IG come to the company for an inspection once when I was company commander. He

seriously injured his leg when he walked out behind

the company area to take a picture of something. He

fell into a foxhole, which was covered with branches,

and he landed in the midst of all of our hidden spare

parts. So he complained, “This is terrible. This company

has twice as many parts as they’re supposed to.” But nothing ever happened.

We weren’t getting the things we needed through

normal channels, but we were able to do a lot of trading.

For example, I traded an extra .45-caliber I had for a twoand-a-half-ton truck. I had a very good supply sergeant

and a very good mess sergeant, but you had to be out

there constantly scrounging, which was the word used

then to make sure that you had what you needed. When

I took over the company we were short all kinds of things.

I think the outgoing company commander might have

been stuck for them, but I vowed that wouldn’t happen

A fixed-trestle

bridge built by

the 10th Engineer

Combat Battalion

across the

Han River

Engineer School,

Korea 084

361
362 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Second Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

to me. I made sure the company had an extra allotment

of everything, which was the way we operated.

Because of the job, we were able to get augmented in dozers. We had a lot of Caterpillar D-7’s with

the angle blades, which were best for working on the

sides of hills. Each dozer had a winch on the back.

That was what we needed. At some times I had in my

company as many as 10 dozers spread along the road.

We had Cat-12 graders and we had some strange pieces

of equipment. For example, I had a grade-all and

a little hand-operated rock crusher. Koreans would

throw rocks in the crusher and produce a little rock for

the surface of some of our roads. Those were the major

pieces of equipment. But the main items, our bread

and butter, were the dozers. For companies that were

involved in road building and road maintenance, of

course, graders would be really important. Road maintenance was the job we least wanted to have. Luckily,

we were able to stay away from it most of the time.

My company location moved farther east into

a valley where they wanted to build a road up to the

top of a mountain where there was an Air Force

communications detachment. The detachment was

being supplied then by airdrops. We spent a couple of

months building this road up to the Air Force. This

was building straight uphill in very mountainous

terrain, through timber that you would hardly believe

for Korea—36-inch diameter trees, a couple of hundred

feet tall. It was an area where there just hadn’t been

any roads before.

About that time we switched battalion commanders. Harry Hoskins went on to the 10th Engineers; he

finally made it. We got in a new fellow who looked every

inch of a soldier, with a big barrel chest, a gruff voice,

and very official appearing. Underneath all of that he

was a total nonentity. I only saw him in my company

area twice. Once he flew over to visit us in this valley,

and later when we went to Ch’orwon he came out to my

company. He was one of these people who had been

in World War II. The battalion was good enough by

then that it got along pretty well without him.

We finished that job and then went over to

Ch’orwon to work on the road into Ch’orwon. This was

just on the edge between IX Corps and I Corps. The

river that runs through that area was crossed by a floating bridge and an old concrete arch bridge. Another engineer unit had replaced a blown span on the concrete

arch bridge with tactical bridging. My company area

was on one bank of that river. There had been a third

bridge crossing the river that a classmate of mine, George

Bicher, built. It was a Bailey bridge on Bailey piers. It

had a life span of about a week because about a 30-foot

wave of water came down the river from the north and

just left a crumpled mess where that bridge had been.

While we were building roads across the Ch’orwon

Valley I had a typical experience with the new battalion
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 363

commander. We had a very good group exec who was a

lieutenant colonel. He came out to my company along

with the battalion commander. We had just been in this

area for a couple of weeks. When the group exec went to

the mess tent and saw that we had a concrete floor he

said, “Dick, I’m surprised that you are wasting concrete

since you are only going to be here for a short time.”

I said, “Yes, sir.” My battalion commander who,

back at battalion headquarters, had given me an order to

put in the floor, stood there and said nothing. I was

chewed out briefly and that was the end of that. But that

was the mark of the man. He was good enough to give

orders but not good enough to back them up.

At that time Harry Hoskins was up commanding

the 10th Engineers in the 3d Division. Attached to the

3d Division was the 5th Regimental Combat Team. A

separate company of the RCT was the 72d Engineers

and they were about to lose their engineer company commander through normal rotation. Since they were attached to the 10th Engineers at that time, Harry got in

touch with me and asked me if I would like to take over

the company, which, of course, I was very eager to do.

They sent a message to group headquarters saying

that my presence was requested at the 5th RCT. The

group commander replied that I was not available since

I was essential to the battalion. I got all this through a

friend of mine, Homer Ambrose, who was on the group

staff at that time. Homer was one of the regular officers

from my Basic Course. Shortly thereafter the group got

a telegram from Maxwell Taylor saying that I would

move. He was then the Eighth Army commander. It was

not that Maxwell Taylor knew me from Adam, but when

the 5th RCT and the 3d Division wanted someone, they

didn’t wait around and wonder whether the group commander wanted to release him.

When I left the battalion we had accomplished a

tremendous amount during the time I was there; however, I went from being the best company commander

and a very valuable man to just being an average officer,

as reflected in my efficiency report. They couldn’t write

a bad efficiency report. It never would have gotten

through group. The report said, “This man did a very

good job with his company.” That was about it; one or

two lines. They weren’t saying anything derogatory;

they just were not recognizing that anything really

had been accomplished. Without any recognition at

all I just left. That’s not the way to get transferred. It

was not good for me. Nevertheless my transfer to the

5th RCT, a prestige unit, to handle a separate company,

was a real plum.
364 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

uring the winter of 1951-52 Colonel Hoskins

When I arrived, it was raining like hell. I went to

the battalion headquarters and checked in. The different floods they get in Korea are really bad, and they take

out all of the bridging every time they get these torrential rains. I called around to the company commanders

and asked, “I see in your company area of responsibility

you’ve got these bridges. How are they built?” They’d

describe how approaches were built out to where there

was a bridge. It became evident that the bridging gaps

were narrower than the span of the rivers.

So, I said, “What I want you to do is put some

canister explosive back from cribbing.” They built the

crib up to support the pier on each end of the bridge.

I said, “Back of the cribbing, I want you to blow out

the approaching roadway. When the water gets up to

where it starts putting any kind of pressure on the

bridge, you open the gap behind the bridge and relieve

the pressure on the bridge, because you create a wider

gap for the water to go through. You don’t lose the

bridge. Before you do that, on each side of that bridge I

want you to have dump trucks and a truck-mounted

crane so that just as soon as that water drops to where

it’s safe, I want to fill those holes in and restore traffic.

Do you understand?”

They thought that was terrible. They’d never done

anything like that. I said, “By God, you’re going to do it

now. This is the way it’s done down in Arizona, New

Mexico, and some parts of Texas. You don’t build a bridge

D

and the 378th ECB began carving a 55-mile lateral

road through the mountains in IX Corps’ area. The

working conditions were brutal. One night, in the

midst of a blizzard, he volunteered to guide a helicopter pilot to the top of a mountain to rescue one of his

injured men. Chastised for damaging a helicopter

during the rescue, Hoskins told his commanding officer “Colonel, every one of the men in that battalion

was watching. If I wasn’t willing to lay my life on the

line to go and save that man, why the hell should

they be going through what they are, day after day—

just because I’m pushing them?”

I was supposed to get a division engineer assignment. When I got up to IX Corps I reported in to

Col. Galloway, who knew me from the amphibious engineers. He said, “Oh, by the way, there’s going to be a

delay before you go to a division.” I said, “What the

hell do you mean a delay, colonel?” He said, “Well, there

are no lateral roads over the IX Corps. We want to

build a full defense line for all defending elements to

drop back to in case there’s a breakthrough in the present

position the Corps is occupying now.” I said, “That’s

55 miles across from corps boundary to corps boundary.” He said, “I’m going to give you a battalion and a

light equipment company to get the job done. We need

it last week.”
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 365

that’s going to take all of the water. You put dips on each

side of the road so the water can pass around the bridge.

You put a marker in the dips to indicate how deep the

water is and post the warning, ‘you don’t enter this dip

until the water drops.’” I said, “You’re going to use the

same principle here. We’re not going to lose all of these

damn bridges. It takes too long to replace them.”

Dick Wells, who commanded one of the companies and was a captain at that time, called in and almost

in a whisper says, “Colonel, the water’s up to the bridge.”

I replied, “Goddamn

it! Do you understand

English? What did I

tell you to do about

those bridges?” He answered, “Blow out the

approach.” I said, “If

you lose the bridge,

have your jeep packed

because you’re going

down the river with

the bridge. But let me

know when you’ve

blown them.”

I got the report

in that they had cut all

of the roads and the

water had dropped so

there wasn’t any pressure on the bridges. The cribbing

was staying in place. These floods were flash floods.

It wasn’t something that lasted 24 hours. The high water

may stay for 24 hours, but the crest was maybe for

four to five hours.

I called the MP and told him what I had done. It

hit the fan. He said only MPs change traffic patterns, no

damn engineer has the authority to do it. I said, “I’m sorry.

I did it. Do you want me to lose the bridges and then

tell you I’ll get the bridges rebuilt three weeks from

now? Which would you

rather have?” He didn’t

answer me. He hung

up on me.

In about four to

five hours, when the

crest had passed, the

water level started to

drop in the rivers. We

started filling in the

roadway. About noon

the next day I called the

Provost Marshal and

told him the traffic was

free to move through

the area. The other

battalions let some of

their bridges go.

A section of the Spoonbill Bridge is covered by flood waters of the

Imjin River, July 1953 Engineer School, 43-6-5
366 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

Col. Galloway came over to see me and asked,

“What the hell have you been doing, Hoskins?” I told

him. “Haven’t you ever been out in that part of the country and seen what happens? Why lose your bridges? These

are not tactical bridges in this area. These are fixed bridges.

The tactical bridges are farther up north.” He said, “I

hope to God they pulled those tactical bridges, because

there’s no way in the world you can hold them in this

kind of water.”

With the battalion moving to a new assignment,

the responsibility for the road net was given to the

other battalions in the group. We started to build

the lateral road across the 55-mile area. I took a helicopter and a bunch of small flour sacks to mark the

centerline of the road as I flew. I put an alidade in

the helicopter so I could get my angles. With the helicopter hovering as I went along, I put the lateral road

in first, marking where I wanted it to go with these

flour sacks.

Then, I brought in some Koreans and cleared the

centerline for the road. We put in three companies along

the centerline. We went up streambeds to where I could

get one in the middle and one on either end about halfway in from the middle company. We started cutting

the roadway in two directions for each company so that

we very quickly had the lateral two-lane road across

the 55-mile stretch built. It was strictly a pioneer cut

but I left one company behind to widen it out and

make certain it was a double-lane road so we could

get traffic across.

I’d been up to the 7th Division and the 3d Division. Every time someone raised his head he got it

knocked off. An infantry full colonel was in charge of

the new defense position project. The colonel wanted to

build a reverse slope defense because he said the engineers could not build the road network to organize the

high ground. I said, “Why the hell should we give up

the high ground when we own it now?” He said, “You

can’t build roads up there.” I said, “Don’t tell me what I

can do. Tell me how you want the defense area laid out.”

We ultimately met with Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, the

corps commander. He wanted the high ground and asked

if I could get the job done. I told him to give me the

requirements and let me figure out how to get it done.

He approved the high-ground approach. I laid out

the defense of that 55-mile area and planned how we

would deploy the artillery, the infantry, and the tanks

in the area.

The corps commander used to fly over this area

regularly watching every move we made. He’d get in his

helicopter and he’d hover, looking right down watching

these dozer crews work. We pulled an air compressor on

a two-and-a-half-ton truck up near the top. We’d use the

winches on the equipment and reel that cable out. We’d

put a “dead man” in and hook the cable to it. With a

combination of the winch and the bulldozer put in re-

“Why the hell should we give

up the high ground when

we own it now?” [the Col.]

said, “You can’t build roads

up there.” I said, “Don’t

tell me what I can do. Tell

me how you want the

defense area laid out.”
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 367

verse, we’d crawl up to where the “dead man” was. We’d

have a pad cleared away so we could secure the compressor or tractor until we ran the next cable up to where we

had a “dead man.” Then we repeated the process until

the equipment was where we wanted it.

That was how we got the tractors, bulldozers, and

compressors up to the different points where we wanted

them to work, so that we could connect that road up in

a hurry. Otherwise, if we were punching out on one

straight line in a linear fashion we would never get a

damned thing done. So, we were working in 14 directions. We’d work in one direction until we had to do

some demolition, and then we’d turn around and

go the other direction and work on it until we ran into

demolition. We’d work in two directions, simultaneously,

for each one of those seven dozers that were up there.

That was how the roads were built. That whole defense

position was built using that approach.

It was necessary to build supply and evacuation

roads from the lateral road up to each peak of high

ground. On one particular hill mass I had seven D-7s

working one above the other. I laid out the switchback

roads with flour bags. Then we went in and grubbed the

centerline the same way as we had the road going across

the corps. We used the same principle all the way

across the front for the supply and evacuation roads.

Our men and equipment worked in two directions to

speed up the construction.

Edward R. Morrow came to Korea to make a TV

program for Christmas. Somebody told him that his crew

ought to see all of these bulldozers stacked up on the

side of the hill working. He came up there to see us. We

had controls and signals so that the men wouldn’t knock

boulders and fill down on others as they were working.

He and his camera crew crawled up to some of these

work areas. One crew went all the way to the top.

The camera crews all wanted to get on the dozer

blades. These angle dozers were sweeping off the rocks

that we’d knocked loose. It was a rather precipitous drop.

One cameraman got out his flask, took a couple of swigs,

Snow was falling at

the time, and my men—

these poor devils—

were working up at

these elevated positions.

It was rough on these

troops. I was pushing

the living hell out of

them anyway.

367

A road built by the 8th Engineers shows the hairpin turns

needed to climb many of Korea’s steep hillsides

RG 111, SC-374167
368 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

and got on that dozer blade. He took his pictures as he

went out over the edge and came back to the States with

an hour-long show of the work we were doing.

When he got back to Washington, however, and

tried to clear some of the film to show it, it turned out

that this was the area that was presently occupied by the

American forces that were part of the Korean defense.

When the fighting stopped, the U.S. troops withdrew

from the position they had been occupying and dropped

back five to six miles. They now were occupying the

position that we built. The defensive position, of course,

had been improved one hell of a lot since then. The

Defense Department did not want him showing on TV

what was being done to stop a breakthrough in the

Ch’orwan Valley. We damn well got the high ground

that time. We were not sitting there looking up, with the

enemy firing down our tonsils.

Dramatic Rescue in a Blizzard

We had an incident one bitter-cold winter night. Snow

was falling at the time, and my men—these poor devils—were working up at these elevated positions. It was

rough on these troops. I was pushing the living hell out

of them anyway.

As I walked up to the group headquarters for a

meeting, Lt. Col. “Iron Mike” Miletich, the exec of the

group, came running out and said, “Harry, you’ve got a

very bad accident on the top of the hill.” He said, “The

MASH (Mobil Army Surgical Hospital) people will not

fly up there because of the weather. They’re begging for

somebody to come in and get the injured man out.

Your pilot says you know every foot of this area up there

and he’ll take you if you’ll go. I knew that you would

go, and he knew that you would go, so we’ve already

got the engine gassed up and warmed up. All you need

to do is get in the chopper sitting over there on the pad

and he’s ready to go.” I said, “Okay. We’ll get the man

out and then I have to come back down here because

I’ve got to see you about some other problems that

I’ve got.” He said, “Okay, we’ll be around.”

We took off and it was blinding snow and bitter,

bitter cold. We got about halfway up and over a minefield.

We approached the area where the men were working

from the front of the range, in other words, from the

enemy side not from our side. It was easier to get into

the area coming from that side because we could go

through a small saddle and turn around in the lee side

of the mountain. Then, he could land the helicopter

on an angle where I was told they were going to be.

Well, the damned rotors froze up on us and we had to

settle in the minefield. Mines were all over that area

but it was so cold the damn mines didn’t go off, or we

didn’t land on any.

The heat of the engine finally thawed out the

ice on the rotors so that the pilot was able to get the

pitch he needed. We took off, went back up through
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 369

the saddle, and came

around the side of the

hill. The wind was

blowing so hard it almost flipped that helicopter over. We sat it

down on an angle. The

pilot had yet to change

the batteries to get the

weight right so he

could strap the injured

man on the runner of

his landing gear.

We strapped the

injured man on a litter

on the runners of the

helicopter. We had him in a sleeping bag because there

was no litter rack on the helicopter that I had. I said,

“Bob, for God sake, be damned careful taking off in this

thing. I don’t want to lose two of you. These air currents

are very strong. I’ve flown enough so that I know the

problem of fighting these air currents. Give yourself some

latitude. Don’t just crank it up and try to get out of here

right away. Give yourself a little cushion.” He said, “Okay,

okay, colonel, we’ll make it all right. I’ve got no problem.” I told him, “You’ve got to get that engine cranked

up pretty soon because it is so cold you won’t be able to

get it fired up.”

The pilot said,

“No problem.” He finally got it going,

revved it up a little bit,

and they both lifted

off. The air currents

caught him and he

dropped down into

that valley. We couldn’t

see him with all of

that snow blowing the

way it was. We started

out about 1530. It

was getting around

1600-1630. I thought,

“Oh, my God, I’ve lost

two of them!” The pilot must have known I was worried. He came back up over where we were standing,

blinking his navigation lights to let me know he was

okay. Then he disappeared out through the saddle, went

back to the MASH, and landed the helicopter.

They checked the helicopter after he had landed

it and said, “Don’t fly this helicopter again. You have

racked this machine up to the point of destruction.”

He must have had the engine pulling maximum vacuum.

It sounded like he was going to blow the heads off

of that engine to get all of the power he could to control that chopper to get out of there. They left it at

We took off and it was

blinding snow and bitter,

bitter cold. We got

about halfway up and

over a minefield. Well,

the damned rotors froze

up on us and we had to

settle in the minefield.

Mines were all over

that area but it was

so cold the damn

mines didn’t go off.

A seriously wounded engineer is treated at the 121st Evacuation

Hospital RG 111, C6620
370 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 378th Engineer Combat Battalion

the landing pad at the hospital and hauled it away

by truck.

In order to get back, I had to walk back down

through the hill mass. I’d arranged for my jeep to pick

me up, and it was about 9 or 10 miles to where the

jeep was going to meet me. We had a lot of line crossers

in the area because the North Koreans would send

these line crossers to act as guerrillas. There’d probably

be about four or five, maybe a few more, well-armed

individuals. They would harass our troops, plus they

would go after the communication towers, carrier towers, and the towers that the Air Force used to guide their

planes as they went north and returned. I ran into one

bunch of line crossers. They opened fire on me and I

went down that mountain through the snow and blowing mess faster than I’ve ever moved in my life. The only

hope I had to get away from them was to disappear down

into the snow mass, because visibility was so poor. It

was getting dark, and the blowing snow made it possible

for me to get away.

I kept on walking. Finally I got to my jeep and

went back to the hospital to see how my man was getting along. I couldn’t get much information. The pilot

had been picked up and gone home. They told me the

helicopter was in sad shape and shouldn’t be flown. So I

went to group headquarters. I saw Mike and we went

over the problems that I had and finally got some decisions. I did not see Col. Ferony. I left and went back

to my own battalion CP.

The next day when Col. Ferony found out that

helicopter had been racked up the way it had and needed

major overhaul he was furious. He put in an Article 15

on me saying that I was guilty of wanton destruction of

government property. It went over to corps headquarters. It didn’t go to Col. Galloway. It went to Gen. Jenkins,

who was the corps commanding general. The chief of

staff at the corps had been at Fort McNair on the faculty

when I was there. We used to refer to him as “old yellow

legs.” He sent for me. I walked in; he was as formal as

hell. Gen. Jenkins was standing behind me while I was

standing there at attention.

The chief of staff was telling me how I had damaged government property without regard to its

Fitted with a litter for

carrying patients, a

helicopter takes off on

an evacuation mission

Engineer School, 21-72-8
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 371

value, and its importance, and all of that baloney.

He said, “What the hell were you doing up there flying

that damned helicopter?” I said, “I wasn’t flying it. I

went in to save one of my men.” I said, “Colonel, every

one of the men in that battalion was watching. If I

wasn’t willing to lay my life on the line to go and save

that man, why the hell should they be going through

what they are, day after day—just because I’m pushing

them? They knew I could go in and save his life.”

I said, “You can’t drive men. You have to lead them.

Sure, there’s a risk. I knew it was a risk. What worried

me more was that it might cost the life of my pilot. For

your information, I’ve already started drafting up the

papers. I want him to get a Distinguished Flying Cross.

That man did an incredible job. It took a tremendous

amount of courage and skill to do what he did and I was

there. The rest of you weren’t.” Gen. Jenkins kind of sauntered around. Finally, he looked at the chief of staff and

said, “You know, this is the best damned recommendation for a promotion that I’ve run into.” The chief of

staff said, “General, do I tear this damned thing up or

do I forward it?” First Gen. Jenkins said, “Tear it up.”

Then he said, “No, wait a minute. I’ll put my endorsement on it and send it forward.” I don’t know whatever happened to the Article 15. I never heard anything more about it. I never heard any more from Col.

Ferony, either.
372 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 10th Engineer Combat Battalion

n his nine months commanding the 10th EngiThe division commander came along about this

time and said, “What are you bellyaching about now?” I

said, “General, the people behind us have got the best

food in the world. We’re up here taking all of the hits.

Why can’t we get that same kind of food?” He said, “We

can’t get the better food up here because the reefers can’t

come up here and break it down. We don’t have reefers.”

I said, “General, if I solve that problem, can I make

a deal with you?” He informed me, “Lieutenant colonels

don’t make deals with major generals.” I said, “May I

state it differently? If I can figure out a way to solve

that problem, would you authorize me to feed my

men four meals a day?”

I continued, “These men are working all day, and

fighting at night. They need more in their bellies. Another thing, too, I know you’re going to get certain cuts

of beef. I know that the regimental commanders and

the division artillery commander are going to get their

cut. I want to be damn sure that I get enough for my

people and that they get to eat good food. The only way

it’s going to happen is if you tell the G-4 and he gets the

quartermaster up here to carry out your instructions.”

He said, “You figure it out; you tell me how to get it

done.” I said, “The IGs have got to stay away from me.”

The General said, “What do you want?”

“I can take some of these lowboys that we move

tractors on. There are enough of them around that are in

bad shape. I’ll fix them up to the point of where I can

I

neer Combat Battalion [February-October 1952],

Colonel Hoskins supported the 3d Infantry Division

during a period of static, or position, warfare. Rather

than keeping the battalion together, Hoskins sent one

company forward in direct support of each regiment.

He describes how they served as infantry at night

and as engineers during the day, as the units moved

back and forth near the 38th Parallel like a yo-yo.

“What we were trying to do was to survive—to kill

as many of the enemy as we could and save as many

of our own men. It wasn’t a case of pursuing the

enemy and destroying him....”

Better Food...and Champagne

I was able to get much better food for my men. Many

would fight as infantry at night and work during the

day as engineers. We were living on some pretty rough

field rations there for a while. Everybody behind us

was doing very well. One day I was sitting in the cold,

picking my beans out of the cold grease and bitching

about the food. My sergeant said, “Well, one way to heat

those little cans up was to siphon some gas out of your

jeep, put the gasoline in the sand, and use the sand as a

wick to heat up your cold beans.” I was sitting there

saying, “This is a hell of a way to do it. The people

behind us eat well.”

I said, “General, the

people behind us have got

the best food in the world.

We’re up here taking all of

the hits. Why can’t we get

that same kind of food?”

I continued, “These men

are working all day, and

fighting at night. They

need more in their bellies.”
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 373

The original DoD caption

read, “COLD IN KOREA?

Sure, but, so what, when

you throw a mess of bacon

and beans right on the hot

top of a gasoline drum stove,

make toast, and have

a hot cup of coffee!”

RG 127, 127-A4617
374 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 10th Engineer Combat Battalion

build a reefer. We’ve got enough sawdust, and enough

materials around here that I’ll build the reefers. When

the reefers come in from the rear, you don’t have to hold

the food more than a couple of days.” The general wanted

to know how we would provide the necessary refrigeration. I told him, “We don’t have to worry about that

until the summer time. It’s so damned cold up here now.

The food will freeze on sight.”

He said, “Okay, I’ll talk to the IG, and I’ll talk to

the G-4, and I’ll be back in touch with you.” I got my

men together, and said, “Okay, we’re going to get the job

done. Probably we need four of these lowboys, and we’ll

build reefer boxes lined with sawdust. Take a dozer back

there and cut some slots in the hills so that these reefers

will have some protection. We’ll put these lowboys in

there and that’s the way we’ll get it done.” In the American Army, a lot of men have a variety of skills. It’s amazing what you can get done, particularly when you start

talking about getting good food. The division commander came back to me and said, “Okay.”

We built those things. The company that was doing odd jobs in the rear worked on them, and some of

the maintenance people helped put these reefers together.

They used log saw dust and any other available material.

Sure enough, the division commander made good on

his commitment. He gave us the food for my men.

At Christmastime some of the French officers I

knew in Europe were not too far from us. They heard

that I was with the 3d. A couple of them came over to

look me up. It was getting close to Christmas and they

were saying they would sure like some American food. I

had them eat with me. At that time we were getting really good food. They said, “We wish we could eat like

this.” I don’t remember who it was but one of the officers spoke up and said, “Well, maybe we could make a

deal. I understand you’ve got a lot of champagne in your

outfit.” One French officer said, “Oh, we’ve got more

damn champagne than we know what to do with but we

don’t have this kind of food.”

I got my company commanders and my first

sergeants together and told them, “Look, maybe I can

make a deal so that we can take some of the turkeys

we will get, because we’re on a four-meal day, and I

can swap them for champagne. If anybody opens

their damn mouth about it I’m in deep trouble. We

can get some champagne for everybody for Christmas.” They said, “Oh, man, we’ll take care of that. If

anybody opens his mouth we’ll practically decapitate

him.” I said, “No, I don’t want to go that far, but

just button their lips.”

I got word to this French battalion commander,

and I told him that I might be able to make a deal with

him—turkey for champagne. At night, we swapped

a bunch of turkeys for champagne. It was bitter cold,

so we didn’t have any trouble keeping the champagne

iced. The champagne was passed around. I think

I got word to this French

battalion commander, and I

told him that I might be able

to make a deal with him—

turkey for champagne. At

night, we swapped a bunch

of turkeys for champagne.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 375

each man in the battalion got maybe a third of a bottle,

or something like that.

There’s always some jackass that can’t keep his

mouth shut. Someone had to brag, “Man, we not only

had Christmas turkey, but boy, we had champagne.” So,

word got out. The first thing I knew the division

commander came up to me. He said, “Hoskins, I understand you’ve got champagne in your outfit.” I said, “General, there’s no champagne in this outfit.” Of course,

at that point in time there was none. He said, “Let

me put it this way. It’s a damn poor officer that doesn’t

recognize that if he’s got champagne that at least

he’d give his division commander a bottle.” I said, “If

I can find any champagne, I assure you, I’ll get you

a bottle.” That was the end of it. I never brought

the subject up again. It was strictly verboten. You

were not supposed to have any alcoholic beverages

up there. But you’d be surprised what it does for the

morale of the men.

When the men started getting that new ration,

better food, the morale went up 200 percent. Warm food

in your belly, under those conditions, went a long way.

They just didn’t bring it forward far enough. The people

in the rear areas were living high on the hog, while we

were getting nothing. We were living on damned canned

rations. That’s one of the problems that happen in every

war, though. But with a little imagination, you’d be

surprised how you can solve those problems. I was very

fortunate and had some good people. If you’re not going

to go out and break the law, but you want to get a job

done, you get people like Dick Wells and others who

start coming forth with ideas about what they want to

do and how they want to improve the situation themselves. You don’t have to have all of the ideas yourself.

Mines...Our Mines and Theirs

We made a whole series of firetraps to be used in the

event the North Koreans got into the Ch’orwon Valley.

That was a wide area, so we needed to have a lot of people

or a lot of mines or something to stop them. You have to

have a series of interlocking firetraps to stop that kind of

an attack. At that time the North Koreans didn’t have

tanks. They were just waves, and waves, and waves of

manpower. You had to have mines, especially antipersonnel mines, to stop the manpower and any heavy

vehicles. Then all kinds of napalm were needed, so you

could drop it in quickly. You couldn’t be waiting around

because once there was a breakthrough they’d pour

in there in a hell of a hurry.

I never had any problems with the availability of

mines. That was an ordnance responsibility. We had

some experience; some of the NCOs had training with

lifting and placing mines and antipersonnel mines, but

it was something that you had to work on. You had to

conduct training yourself to make sure that your own

men weren’t going to blow themselves up.

...areas that we were

working in...had these Schu

mines all around....When

we were constructing the

new defense position, one

lieutenant followed my

footsteps....He tried to put

his feet exactly in my footprints, but he wound up

stepping on a Schu mine

that blew his leg off....
376 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 10th Engineer Combat Battalion

The North Koreans had those damn Schu mines.

It was like a little wooden box with a pressure detonator

on it. They were very hard to detect. I don’t know how

much C-3 was in there, but it was enough so that it’d

blow the better part of a leg off. They were everywhere.

A lot of the areas that we were working in, clear back

into the corps rear, had these Schu mines all around the

place. When we were constructing the new defense position, one lieutenant followed my footsteps as I went

through a particular area. He tried to put his feet exactly

in my footprints, but he wound up stepping on a Schu

mine that blew his leg off just above the knee. We had to

go back in and get him out. Of course, we didn’t know

whether we would set off any more Schu mines or not.

There was always a bunch of trash around so it was

easy to hide a Schu mine. The metal detector wasn’t worth

a damn for these mines. The best detector was the dog.

These scout dogs were originally used with somebody

on patrol. If the soldiers were a little nervous, the dog

would get noisy after a while. They’d make some noise

that would give the patrol away. We used to get those

dogs from the infantry and use them for checking out

mined areas. The dog would dig up a lot of other trash,

but he’d also locate the mines. As soon as a dog would

see disturbed earth he’d check it out. I never saw a dog

set off one of those things.

I’m sure what happened was the dog would press

down on it and smell. Apparently, it required more

The 3d Engineer

Battalion combined

drums of napalm and

81mm-mortar shells to

create a potent antipersonnel mine that

could be detonated

electronically. The first

image shows an

engineer placing the

napalm, the next shows

a test of the new device

Engineer School, 112-11-7

Engineer School, Korea 052
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 377

weight than the dog’s paw would put on it. The dog

would dig around and get it out. Of course, as soon as

we saw the dog had uncovered a Schu mine, more

people would go in, pick it up, and disarm it. Cleaning

up minefields is really dangerous work. People lose

their eyes and their hands and get other injuries. All

kinds of accidents happen from clearing mines.

We were in a static position. Your whole situation

is entirely different when you’re in a static position than

when you’re moving. When you’re moving you’ve got to

have special equipment with you all of the time. If you

go in, you’ve got to use it. We were concerned about

mines in the area where we were and about line crossers

who might put them in. You defended an area—particularly a large area like the Ch’orwon Valley—with

patrols, fields of fire, and with strong points. A hell of a

lot of open ground exists between those strong points.

People can slip in and out at night through those areas.

You catch some line crossers, but you don’t catch

all of them. That was why we ran into them when I tried

to get that soldier out. These line crossers had infiltrated

between strong points and had gotten through. It was

not like in World War I where you had a whole series of

trenches and everybody was connected up. You had to

tie all of the ground together with strong points and get

a lot of people who you know all around you. If you go

wandering around you’re liable to get nailed by a few of

those line crossers.

The 7th Division commander who preceded General Trudeau was an absolute nut on camouflage. They

brought tons and tons of camouflage up into that area.

Everything was camouflaged. There was no air observation. He was not in a position where higher ground in

front of him required all that camouflage.

Where we were in the 3d Division we had old

“Papa-San.” It was a good-sized mountain that looked

right down our throats. Every time we moved the enemy

would just sit with binoculars and check on us. EveryA truck travels along

a main supply route

camouflaged by the

13th Engineers. The

netting was intended

to keep the enemy from

observing the volume

of traffic, not to conceal

the road

Engineer School, 51-14-22
378 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Hoskins, Jr. 10th Engineer Combat Battalion

thing we did was observed across the whole division

front. Just on the edge of the Ch’orwon Valley in

that area over there in between the 7th Division and

us was the division that Pak commanded, you know,

Tiger-San. He was the one who later became president

of Korea.

On the right

side we had the

Capitol Division, an

ROK division, between I Corps and

us. The road net and

defense position I

had to put in gave us

the ability to tie together all the way

over to the I Corps

boundary from X

Corps. It would have

covered the CapROK division’s rear.

When they had to

pull back we had some of the positions ready.

The Koreans, whom they gave uniforms and assigned to the various units in the divisions, were called

KATUSAs. Some of them were assigned to me when we

were building the defense position, and I had them in

the 3d Division. These men were up against both a culture problem and an economic problem. The officer in

charge of the Koreans assigned to me in the 3d Division

had been a big national baseball hero. He had a lot of

prestige and strutted around instead of getting down and

taking care of his job. Finally, one night I called him

in. I said, “Look, word has come back to me that the

zone’s supplies and

food that we’re providing for you and

your men is getting

back to Seoul and being sold. So help me

God, if I ever get

proof that what I’m

hearing is correct

about you, let me tell

you, you’ll wind up

just like all of the Koreans do. I’m going to

turn you back to the

Korean Government.

I’m not going to get

involved with you. What they do is take you out and

shoot you because you lost face for the government.”

“Now,” I said, “This is exactly what I’m going to do.

I’m not going to fool with it. You train your men.

You make sure that they’re well fed. We have given

you the proper kind of clothing and equipment. I want

A jeep and trailer move across a temporary earthen bridge that is

being reinforced with sandbags Engineer School, 83-56-2

Cleaning up minefields is

really dangerous work.

People lose their eyes and

their hands and get other

injuries. All kinds of accidents

happen from clearing mines.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 379

to be darn sure that they have it. The first chance I have

in a few days I’m going to inspect your unit and make

sure they have all of that equipment. If they haven’t

got it, you better have a damned good explanation

where the hell it is.”

He winced a little bit. When I did check on them,

I don’t know whether he’d gotten it from someplace else

or not, but they had all of their equipment. There was

no question that some of the food did go back to Seoul

and get sold, but it stopped at that point. That was a real

problem. They called it the “kimchi run.” The kimchi

run is going back to the rear and selling the stuff on the

black market. It was a part of the reason that the black

market existed.

If he was involved in it, I never had any more

problems with him. I checked on him very closely. One

night, when the two of us were in a bunker together, we

were getting the usual shelling and workover from the

North Koreans. I was reading the Stars and Stripes and

the headlines were that a lieutenant governor, or somebody, was going to go to jail because of a political ripoff back in the States. This guy was a pretty well educated individual and could read English very well. He

looked at me and he said, “You Americans are a bunch

of hypocrites.”

I said, “What the hell do you mean we’re a bunch

of hypocrites?” He said, “Look, in America you’ve got

big kimchi run. We’ve only got little kimchi runs

over here.” Some of them read what the press had to

say about the political scandals and rake offs that were

going on back in the States. He couldn’t see why I

was bearing down on him the way I was. Every now

and then that would really stick in his craw, the fact

that he thought that I was working on two standards.

That does happen in these countries and Americans

have to recognize it.
380 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Floyd D. Wright 62d Engineer Construction Battalion

and 573d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company

hen recalled to active duty, Floyd Wright’s

ment to report for a physical examination for a recall

to active duty.

I called up the boss and told him. As it turned out

he was a lieutenant colonel, Corps of Engineers, in World

War II, and started his construction outfit when he got

out. He had received the same type of orders, but he was

on friendly terms with the senators and congressmen from

the state. He could afford to do what he did and that

was to throw the damn orders away and ignore them.

He told me to do the same thing. He said, “I’ve got a job

in a Marine barracks at Parris Island. I’ll put you down

there on defense work. You won’t have to go.” Somehow

or another that just didn’t sit right in my stomach.

I think his response to the situation exemplified

the general attitude toward the Korean War. He said, “If

they will stop calling this thing a police action, declare

war, and mobilize this country, I’ll gladly lock up my

business and go off to fight a war. If they’ll call it a

war the United States will get behind it. As long as

they’re going to call it a police action and just call up

a few people, I’m not about to throw away everything

that I’ve built up over the last few years.” Anyway, I

told him, “I think I’ll go with it.” It was a recall for two

years to go to Korea. He said, “Well, your job’s waiting.

I think you’re a damn fool, but your job is here for

you when you get back.”

I reported to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on 13 July 1951

and was assigned to the 94th Engineer Battalion, a demW

boss offered him a way to avoid service in Korea and

characterized him as a “damn fool” for not accepting

it. In August 1952, Wright assumed command of the

573d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company, the Army’s

last segregated unit in Korea. The young lieutenant

describes some of the challenges he faced after taking

command, and soon after he supervised the integration of the unit.

Upon graduation from Clemson, I went to work

with this construction company and was sent to Rutherford, North Carolina, to report to T.C. Reese, the superintendent, who had the job of building a five-story reinforced concrete hospital. I was supposed to be the engineer. The fellow who hired me told me that the last three

engineers that were sent to him lasted one week before

he ran them off of the job. That fact didn’t send me off

with too much enthusiasm, but as things turned out,

T.C. Reese and I got along very well.

Recalled to Active Duty

I worked there for one full year. The painters were backing out of the doors and the owner of the company had

come with a set of drawings for our new assignment—

another hospital about like this. They had won the contract and I would be the superintendent for that job. At

the same time I received orders from the War Depart-

“If they will stop calling this

thing a police action, declare

war, and mobilize this country,

I’ll gladly lock up my business

and go off to fight a war. If

they’ll call it a war, the United

States will get behind it.”
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 381

onstration unit of troops at Fort Belvoir. I was assigned

to the S-3 section. This was an all-black battalion. The

only white officers in it were the battalion commander

and myself. All of the company officers, company commanders, and platoon leaders were black officers. They

were demonstration troops and for me it was just a staging area before they shipped me to Korea.

I stayed there for about six months. I got a delay

enroute, moved the family back to Asheville, North Carolina, and went to Seattle, Washington. I caught a ship

and on 14 February 1952 I arrived in Pusan, Korea. They

moved me by rail up to Seoul and I was assigned as a

platoon leader to the 1st Platoon of Company A of the

62d ECB of the 24th ECG.

The 62d Engineer Battalion, with Company A, was

given the primary job of maintaining the MSR, which I

think was number 17 from Seoul up to Ch’unch’on. We

had attached to us the 128th Korean Service Corps Regiment—KATUSAs. They were wounded Korean soldiers,

or Korean men who were not fit for combat service.

They’d put them into these Korean Service Corps. They

were actually labor battalions. We had one of these battalions assigned to us to assist in our fieldwork.

After about six months, Company A was relieved

of all of its work in Ch’unch’on. In fact, except for my

platoon, the whole 62d was replaced by the 79th Engineers. My platoon was attached to an engineer aviation

battalion that had moved into Ch’unch’on with a mission of extending the runway. It was a propeller-driven

fighter plane runway. Jet fighters had just been introduced to the Korean War. Since they were coming over

at that time, the runway had to be extended.

We’d just finished this job when my platoon was

ordered back to Seoul. Company A was given the job of

building the first hemorrhagic fever hospital that was

constructed in Korea. They didn’t know what would cause

that disease but a soldier would break out in a rash and

run a temperature and the next day he would be dead.

After much research they finally found out that it was a

mite that they got from rats. Curiously, only soldiers in

the field came down with this. The ones in the village,

381

Engineers carry an

aluminum ponton to the

water’s edge, November

1952 Engineer School, 44-6-7
382 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Floyd D. Wright 62d Engineer Construction Battalion

and 573d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company

which had as many rats as out in the field, didn’t get

hemorrhagic fever.

Integrating the Last Segregated

Army Unit in Korea

Col. Eagle C. Klinke, the 24th Group commander, was

a brain. In fact, he designed many of the high-level bridges

that the group constructed in Korea, such as the Parker

Bridge.

Col. Klinke called me over to group headquarters

in August 1952 and told me that they had a ponton

bridge company there that was the last all-black army

unit in Korea. He had been given orders to integrate

that company as quickly as possible. I don’t know

why he asked me this question but he said, “You’re

from North Carolina, aren’t you Floyd?” And I said, “Yes.”

He said, “Well, I’m placing you in command of the

573d Ponton Bridge Company. The company commander is now under house arrest for selling government property to the Koreans. I’ll release him to your

custody to go over an inventory of the company

property.” He said, “The way it will work is that we

will scatter out the black soldiers in the 573d within

the white battalions within the group. Your company

will end up with about 12-13 percent black troops,

like all of the other units in Korea. The plan was to be

implemented in one day by the arrival of a convoy of

all white soldiers.

When the first convoy arrived it was only one truck

with two white men in the back of it. It took me about

three months to integrate that outfit. The group commander did tell me, “I’ll let you interview every master

sergeant that is assigned to the 24th Group and you can

pick out your 1st sergeant to help you do this.” In those

days, master sergeants all held the same rank and drew

the same pay. It didn’t matter if you were the 1st sergeant

of an infantry company or whether you were a master

sergeant in a division headquarters, you drew the same

pay and wore the same chevrons.

The worst job for a master sergeant is being the 1st

sergeant of a company. I interviewed several master sergeants before I found one that said, “Yes, I’d like to be

the 1st sergeant of this outfit.” And that was my criterion. I didn’t want a guy who didn’t want the job. He

would not have been any help at all. As it turned out, 1st

Sgt. Rubinstein told me that he had been a sergeant major

of three or four different battalions and he wanted to get

back to troops. I said, “Sergeant Rubinstein, you’ve got

the job.” He came over as the 1st sergeant for the company, but I had been there for about three weeks before I

got my own 1st sergeant.

The black 1st sergeant—who was there on the first

day I reported in—noticed that I wasn’t carrying a sidearm. He said, “Lieutenant, you’re not going to be walking around the company area without a sidearm, are you?”

I said, “What are you talking about, sergeant?” He said,

 “Lieutenant, you’re not going to

be walking around the company

area without a sidearm, are

you?”...At that point he opened

his field jacket where he had a

.45-caliber in a shoulder holster.

He said, “Well, in that case, sir,

I won’t let you out of my sight.”
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 383

“Well, I think it would be advisable if you carried a

weapon in the company area.” I looked at him and I

said, “Sergeant, I’ve been to a lot of outfits, and I’ll be

goddamned if I can run an outfit if I’ve got to carry a

gun when I walk through the company area.” At that

point he opened his field jacket where he had a .45-caliber in a shoulder holster. He said, “Well, in that case, sir,

I won’t let you out of my sight.”

I got this 1st sergeant, all the platoon sergeants,

and the platoon leaders together in a group. I started

talking about how I wanted to run things and what

was going to happen. This company was in a building

adjacent to group headquarters, which was about five

miles outside of Seoul in a place called Sing Kongdak,

where the engineering university of South Korea is

located. The 62d headquarters was also at this location.

Its companies were scattered around, but the group,

the 62d, and the 573d Ponton Bridge Company, all

were at this location.

Challenges and Successes

Up on the second floor of this building they had constructed a nightclub. It was equipped with bars where

you could order any kind of a mixed drink you wanted.

They had gambling tables where you could roll dice or

play cards. At each one of these tables a sergeant sat there

to keep law and order. Everybody would pile their money

in the middle of the table and start to gamble. The sergeant would pull out five bucks and stick it in his pocket.

That was his fee for keeping law and order. I asked the

1st Sergeant, “Is this open to every man in the company?” He answered, “Oh, no, sir. They have to pay a

10 dollar fee to join the club.”

I didn’t say a word that night. The next morning, I

called the 1st sergeant in and looked him straight in

the eye. I knew he was from the south some place from

the way he talked. I said, “Sergeant, do you know what

stove wood is?” He said, “Oh, yes, sir, I know what

stove wood is. We used to chop it up and use it to cook

all of our meals at home.” I said, “Yes, I did the same

thing when I was a kid. I always had to chop stove wood.

That was one of my chores that had to be done before

dark. You know that club that’s upstairs?” “Yes, sir.”

“I want you to make stove wood out of it, sergeant.”

He looked at me. He said, “sir?” I looked at him and

asked him again, “Sergeant, do you know what stove

wood is?” And he said, “Yes, sir.” And I said, “Well, by

God, that’s what I want. And I want it done today.”

I said, “That’s all. Go get busy.” He got a crew in

there. He tore that damn thing down, lock, stock, and

barrel. Then I said, “Now we’re going to build a facility

for the men in the company.” I don’t think that

Col. Klinke knew about the club because I don’t think

he got out of the office very much.

 In those days in Korea there wasn’t a damn

thing for the soldiers to do when they were not on duty
384 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Floyd D. Wright 62d Engineer Construction Battalion

and 573d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company

except to go to some house of ill repute in the village

or find some illegal whiskey or something to drink

some place. I told him, “We’ll build a place and we’ll

have a bar in it.” But I said, “There won’t be any drugs

or any fee to join. Every man in the company can go to

it. It will be like a day room, but in that situation in

Korea it would also be like a service club.” We constructed

a new club and opened it up to all the members of

the company.

When the Korean War started, the 573d had been

flown into Korea from Japan and landed in an Army

field near Seoul on the Han River. The bridge material

was also flown over and they constructed a bridge

across the Han River. That was the only bridge that the

outfit had ever constructed and that had been a couple

of years ago.

The ponton bridge company was the outfit that

had the bridge, the ponton, the balk, and the deck

mounted on the bridge trucks. The company hauled

it around and was supposed to install it with the help

of engineer combat battalions. Only three people in

that outfit had ever helped construct a bridge. Incidentally, in addition to bridge building, the 573d also

had the mission of operating this Engineer Supply

Point Number 5 in the same area where group headquarters was located.

 My mission was to construct a bridge if Eighth

Army ever needed one. We were the only ponton bridge

company in Eighth Army reserve, and we wouldn’t be

able to build a bridge if called upon to perform our mission, so I immediately started a training program. In a

draft army you can find all kinds of talent when you

start looking. I had a fellow who had a hobby of making

things out of wood. I had him construct a model of a

ponton bridge that this company had and was supposed

to be able to build.

I got a field manual that completely described

this bridge in detail. I sat down with this model

maker and had him construct a small-scale model of

the bridge that would fit on the top of a table. After

this was done, I gathered all of the NCOs and the

officers and we had training sessions in the day room

constructing this bridge using the model. Models

also were made of the rigging and all of the knots

that you’d need to construct the bridge—the square

knots, the bowline, and the knots any engineer soldier

should know. Very few of these people knew anything

about this.

We went through an intensive training program.

By this time fall had set in. To build a bridge I did the

same thing that we did in Plattsburgh Barracks in 1942.

We hauled that bridge down to the Han River, which

was frozen over. We’d put the pontons on the ice and

scooted them out. We built a floating bridge on the

ice over the Han River. Then we took it down and

hauled it back in. At least we had the outfit ready to

We hauled that bridge

down to the Han River,

which was frozen over.

We’d put the pontons

on the ice and scooted

them out. We built a

floating bridge on the

ice over the Han River.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 385

where they could construct that bridge if they were ever

called on to do so.

At this time they were still talking in Panmunjom, trying to get an armistice signed, or a ceasefire, but none of that had happened. I commanded this

company from August 1952 until I departed Korea on

9 March 1953. By that time we were completely integrated and were pretty much like other units.

Integration At Last

I don’t recall having any problems between blacks and

whites in the 573d when I was integrating the program.

This plan that the group commander gave me—that the

convoy would show up with white troops and load up

some black troops and send them—actually took about

three or four months to accomplish, not one day. For a

couple of months my company was about 50 percent

black and about 50 percent white.

By the time I left we were about 13 percent black

soldiers and the rest were white. As I mentioned, I had

constructed a company day room for everybody that

was closely policed. We had a Korean band in there

every Saturday night for a dance. In Korea at this time

there were absolutely no recreational facilities available for the troops so anything that they had had to

be provided by the company or the battalion commander.

Both the blacks and the whites went to this clubroom that I built for the 573d. I can’t remember ever

I told them that we were all

soldiers in the United States

Army and that was it. Period.

There was no difference

between men, regardless

of skin color. Everybody

was treated the same.

having any difficulties between the black troops and

the white troops.

When I got new people in, I called them into the

orderly room and explained to them what I expected

from them. I told them that we were all soldiers in the

United States Army and that was it. Period. There was

no difference between men, regardless of skin color.

Everybody was treated the same.

We didn’t have any major problems, such as a

riot, or a group of people trying to start fistfights. I

was proud of that outfit by the time I left. From there

I went to the Japan Construction Agency in Tokyo and

my commanding officer was Col. E.E. Kirkpatrick

and the deputy was Col. Robert Love.

Wooden model of a

ponton bridge built as a

training aid by the 573d

Ponton Bridge Company

Wright Collection
386 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harrington W. Cochran, Jr. 808th & 809th Engineer Aviation Battalions

olonel Cochran describes the problems and

Europe but I had spent three-and-a-half years in the Pacific. We wanted at least the chance to go see England or

Europe. I got my choice of an engineer aviation unit but

it was in Korea. I was assigned to Fifth Air Force, which

was the Air Force command in Korea, and to the 809th

Engineer Aviation Battalion.

That was in Ch’unch’on at K-47 Airfield, where

our battalion headquarters and one company were. It

was a big, heavy battalion of about 1,100 men and all

sorts of equipment. In the 809th I did not have concrete

augmentation. I had an asphalt augmentation, an asphalt

unit with 16 D-8 dozers. We had LeTourneau dozers;

that was the trade name. We had about 24 five-ton

dump trucks, rollers, scrapers, and compactors. We could

do just about anything. I had one company at Anyang, south of Seoul. That was 100 miles away and

that company was engaged in operating a huge quarry

to produce rock. We were tunneling into the mountain

there and going up the mountain to produce crushed

rock for concrete construction materials. I had another

company rebuilding the airstrip at Wonju.

I sent a company over to Kangnung, an airstrip

over on the east coast. It was an all-pierced steel-plank

runway used by the ROK Air Force, which had an

F-51 group [WW II-era P-51 Mustangs, redesignated

F-51s in Korea]. That runway had to be rebuilt and

we were not allowed to interfere with their operations.

I had to unbutton the strip surface at night, roll back

C

frustrations of airbase construction in Korea, July

1952-July 1953. Faced with a shortage of LeTourneau

dozers parts, he purchased parts from a commercial

dealer back in the States only to discover later that

the parts were stocked in Korea, but not on the inventory. He remembers one good lieutenant in his

battalion, John Conyers, who later became a Michigan Congressman and head of the Congressional

Black Caucus.

Ironically, I got ordered to Korea because I had

originally requested assignment to an engineer aviation

unit in England. In my entire career I had never been to

Lt. Col. Harrington Cochran, Jr.

Cochran Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 387

a section of it, rebuild, smooth out, and compact the

base. Then we had to roll the landing mat back, weld

it all back together, and have it operational by daylight

the next morning.

We did that night after night. That was a very hairy

operation. We frequently had problems with planes coming in. Something would go wrong and they would roll

off the runway and into our construction equipment.

We had to transport the equipment over the most

impossible roads. This mountain road was hanging from

the side of a cliff. To get some of our big flatbed trailers

with dozers and vans around those hairpin turns on that

mountainside was one of the scariest experiences I have

ever had. We had to hoist up the end of the trailer, tie it

up in the rocks above, and swing the trailers to get them

around corners. You can imagine how long it took us

to get this convoy over there, but that was what we did.

I joined the 809th in July, and about November or

December I got pulled out of the 809th and sent to be

executive officer of the 931st Engineer Group, which

was at Yongdungp’o. I was there for about four months.

A new mission was given to the engineers to build

a 10,000-foot concrete runway, dispersal area, and bomb

dump at Kunsan, which was on the west coast, south of

Seoul. A river went up to the port of Kunsan and it was

an area of coastal flats. There was at first PSP (pierced

steel plank), and then an asphalt runway was built. It

was K-8 and it was breaking up, so Fifth Air Force ordered an intersecting, 10,000-foot concrete runway right

out over rice paddies. It was the worst place in the world

to try and build airstrips, because there wasn’t any bottom in there—it was all muck. They ordered the 808th

Engineer Aviation Battalion to do the job, and I was sent

down to take over command of the 808th about January

To get some of our big flatbed

trailers with dozers and vans

around those hairpin turns on

that mountainside was one

of the scariest experiences

I have ever had. We had to

hoist up the end of the trailer,

tie it up in the rocks above,

and swing the trailers to get

them around corners.

Engineers and Korean laborers repair a runway covered

with pierced-steel planking Engineer School, 12-30-10
388 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harrington W. Cochran, Jr. 808th & 809th Engineer Aviation Battalions

1953. Meanwhile, the war up north was stagnated. At

the time they were going through the prisoner exchange

negotiations. Although battles were going on all the time

along the front, there were no major movements, north

or south.

Through contact with Gen. George Brown, and

with the A-3 of Fifth Air Force, I had an opportunity to

go up with Col. Ben LeBailly to Panmunjom. He was

the base commander or wing commander at K-8, which

was a B-26 base at Kunsan. They were the locomotive

killers—train killers. We stopped off in Seoul, got a helicopter, and flew up to Panmunjom. Adm. Turner Joy

greeted us and asked us what we wanted. We said we

would like to go observe the negotiation area with a view

to surveying it for a site for any future airfields in case a

truce was reached. We wanted to be able to construct an

airfield up there for our purposes on short notice. He

said, “Sure,” and gave us a car. We went up to the site at

Panmunjom. We were ushered into the negotiating room

and they sat us down at the table facing the North Koreans and Chinese advisers. The Chinese would whisper

into the ears of the North Koreans and tell them what to

say. This was the spring of 1953. I witnessed that operation for a day. It looked like the most frustrating thing in

the world to try and negotiate anything with them.

The prisoner exchange negotiations were underway. We were building facilities up there for the receipt

of the American prisoners, and the North Koreans were

building facilities for their prisoners. Col. LeBailly and

I got into this car and we drove north into the North

Korean camp. Artillery barrages on either side were going off within hearing distance. We were driving

into the North Korean zone to where they were building

their camps, and we drove alongside marching companies of North Korean soldiers. I got the ice-cold

feeling in the back of my neck that this was someplace

I wrote a check and bought

some LeTourneau discs, and

the lieutenant’s father sent

them to us via commercial

shipping to Korea. We

found out later there were

LeTourneau discs in the

engineer depot down in

Pusan. That was the biggest

problem we faced—getting

the right parts at the right

place and at the right time. A Korean stevedore carries supplies ashore at Inch’on

RG 111, SC-354173
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 389

that maybe we shouldn’t be. We got stares from them

but that was about all. It was very interesting that we

got to see what they were going to build. They were putting up a temporary encampment building to receive

and process all their prisoners.

Back at Kunsan, we made all the preparations and

began constructing the 10,000-foot concrete runway at

K-8. It was very frustrating as an engineer, both because

the Air Force ordered it to be built at absolute minimum

specifications and because we knew it wasn’t going to

last very long. They ordered us to use absolute minimum pavement thickness. Most of the reinforcing steel—

tempered steel, joint steel, whatever—had to be along

the neutral axis, because you were required to have two

inches of cover over the steel and they only wanted a

four- or five-inch pavement. It seemed ridiculous since

it was almost impossible to get good base material.

There just wasn’t any good rock around and we

had to produce all these fills across rice paddies. The

Koreans were in a state because we totally ruined their

rice growing area. The runway went right across all their

drainage canals and it really ruined them. It was a struggle.

Many thousands of tons of cement were being shipped

to me. The cement was coming in sacks by ship. It had

to be unloaded in Kunsan, manhandled, loaded on

boxcars, and shipped by rail 25 miles from the port of

Kunsan out to K-8. We built a very large warehouse to

receive all this. We had to build a concrete mixing plant

and manage all of the stuff to produce large

quantities of concrete.

To handle all these bags of cement we needed thousands of pallets, because you don’t stack bags very well,

you have to palletize them. I could not get the lumber to

build the pallets. We requisitioned, put in emergencies,

and everything else to acquire the lumber to build the

pallets. The cement started coming in before we could

get the lumber for the pallets. When the cement starts

coming you can’t stop it. We began loading this by

hand. We had to have every man in the battalion, cooks,

whatever, out there handling bags of cement, and we

hired to the limit.

We had Koreans, but they had put a limit on the

number of Koreans that you could hire. We were just up

to our necks in cement. There were a lot of broken bags,

and the worst thing I ever went through in my life was

trying to handle those thousands of bags of cement without proper pallets. When it got beyond our control in

the warehouse, we had to build bins, scrape up all the

broken bags, put them in bins, and handle the cement

with bucket loaders. Then, we hastily threw up an aircraft hangar and stored cement in there. We had cement

coming out of our ears.

That was the ugliest part of that job, but we

also had problems getting parts for some of our equipment. Most all of our LeTourneau dozers began

going down for brake discs and we couldn’t get any
390 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Lieutenant Colonel Harrington W. Cochran, Jr. 808th & 809th Engineer Aviation Battalions

on requisition. They always were back-ordered, and on

LeTourneau dozers we came almost to a 100-percent

deadline. The father of one of my officers was a

LeTourneau dealer in Texas. I wrote a check and bought

some LeTourneau discs, and the lieutenant’s father sent

them to us via commercial shipping to Korea. We got

some of our rigs off of deadline that way. We found out

later there were LeTourneau discs in the engineer depot

down in Pusan. Since they weren’t on the record, they

were no good to us. That was the biggest problem we

faced—getting the right parts at the right place and

at the right time.

I completed my tour for the Air Force. We were

assigned to the Air Force and it was a one-year tour.

The Army was an 18-month tour, but we were under

Air Force regulations. I had 1,200 men in the 808th.

Fifty-four were lieutenants—half were Air Force and half

were Army. Most of the Air Force officers were nonengineers. Out of 55 officers, I had a major, executive

officer, a captain as S-3, and 51 first and second lieutenants. All companies were commanded by lieutenants,

and in one case by a 2d lieutenant, because he was

the best qualified. A good many of them were not

engineers and had no engineer training.

Although I had no West Point graduates at the time,

I had some splendid boys. They were all good people

but some of them simply did not have engineer training,

so we did the best we could. One of my officers was

John Conyers, a young black lieutenant from Detroit,

Michigan. He was the head of the Black Caucus for a

long time and is very well known today as a senior

Congressman—good man.

I started on the runway, completed some of the

taxiways, and then I left long before it was completed.

I was ordered to Fort Leavenworth to the Command

and General Staff College.

Chinese POWs on

Koje-do Island spent

much of their time

building elaborate

religious icons out of

cement and mud

Shotwell Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 391

Engineers performed a wide variety of

specialized tasks during the Korean

War. Here soldiers of the 467th

Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon stand

by their equipment on the quay in

Pusan, April 1953 RG 111, SC-433610
392 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant George B. Gray, Jr. 50th Engineer Port Construction Company

ieutenant Gray was commander of the only

day, every time I see a sheet pile I have bad memories

because we didn’t have anybody in the platoon that knew

anything about it. It took us a good three weeks before

we could get any of them driven because they would all

twist and bend. You would have friction on one side but

not on the other. We tried everything—setting them all

up, interlocking them, and driving them this way and

that. We got the port built in about three or four months.

Then the company commander was leaving and I became the company commander. After that I could assign sheet pile driving to a platoon leader!

At that stage in my life I was young and confident enough that I figured I could probably take over

Eighth Army. If they only wanted to give me the 50th

Port Construction Company, well, I felt I was prepared.

Little did I know how little I knew until I got into

some real problems.

The bulk of the 50th was offshore. All the POL

came in by tankers and we had to put in offshore borings

with submarine pipelines out to the borings. I’d never

had experience with that either. One of the first things

I did was to get qualified as a hard-hat diver. I had a

diving section of about 20 people. About six or seven of

them were master divers. For diving, you have second

class, first class, and master. We worked all up and

down the coasts, and in all of the places that we had to

bring in POL. We put in the offshore anchorages and

ran pipelines out to them. Once again we didn’t have

L

Engineer port construction company in Korea. He describes how he had to train many of his own divers for

laying underwater pipeline and how he enjoyed his

experiences so much so that he extended his tour in

Korea for an additional six months.

I went to Korea in December 1952 and was sent

directly to the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company commanded by Kurt Amende.

The 50th Port Construction Company was the only port construction

company in Korea and, as such, it

had responsibility for all the ports.

When I first joined it the headquarters was in Pusan and it was part

of the 44th Engineer Group.

My first job was at Gazan,

an ammunition port that had exploded and was totally destroyed.

My job was to rebuild it—more

than 2,500 linear feet. I had

some very interesting pile-driving classes at Fort Belvoir, but

these were non-interlocking

timber piles and steel pile. The

first step was to drive steel interlocking sheet pile. To this

First Lt. George Gray

Gray Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 393

anybody who had ever floated a pipeline out so

we did it in numerous ways, but we succeeded.

I moved the company headquarters up

to Inch’on because the bulk of our work was

in the northern area. We even had work over

on the other coast directly across at Sak-a-ri.

Inch’on is a very interesting place because

of the 30-plus-foot tides. There were the tidal

basins that handled four small ships. All

the rest of it had to be done by offshore anchorages and then the materials were unloaded from the ship onto the barges and

were brought in. We had quite a bit of salvage work to do. If anything was sunk in

our area we were the only people around with divers

who did that work.

At various times we had a pipeline company attached to the 50th. Once we had two pipeline companies, and occasionally we would get a dump truck

company. The 388th Pipeline Company was attached

to us for most of the time I was company commander.

That was interesting because the company commander

of that company was senior to me; before I left I was a

lieutenant and he later became a captain.

We had the best food in Korea. If any of the ships

coming in had any difficulties whatsoever, we were the

only ones who had divers to look at and do the repair

work, so all the ships kept in good graces with us and

gave us free access to their food. A lot of people would

come visit us to take advantage of our good food. One

of those who showed up was an infantryman named

Gus Baxter. He became a regular attendant at our

meals. Finally, we let him move in with us—I don’t

remember why. I guess by this time we discovered

he was dating my wife’s cousin in Manny, Louisiana.

He switched his branch to engineer, came up to the

388th and took over the pipeline company.

As for equipment and supplies, what we didn’t

have we were able to get. We didn’t have any problems

because the Eighth Army engineer considered us one

of his assets.

At that stage in my life

I was young and confident enough that I figured

I could probably take over

Eighth Army. If they only

wanted to give me the 50th

Port Construction Company,

well, I felt I was prepared.

Lt. Gray preparing to

dive on a sunken dredge

Gray Collection
394 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant George B. Gray, Jr. 50th Engineer Port Construction Company

We had very heavy cranes and it

was hairy loading those cranes on the

barges in deep water and shipping them

from barge to barge. We had floating

cranes. We had J boats and LCMs and

barges powered by sea mules, which are

just very large diesel engines to drive the

propellers. Moving the stuff around was

impossible, except by barge. We got into

a lot of places where it wasn’t worth the

effort to try to get a crane in. I wanted

something to move it, so, the Eighth

Army engineer got me two tank retrievers with trailers. We also had dump

trucks assigned to us that weren’t on

the TO&E. The 50th was a very large

company with almost 500 people. In addition, we were

assigned Korean engineers. We were supposed to train

them so they would become the port construction company when we left.

Furthermore, we were always given authorizations

to hire very large numbers of Korean laborers. We must

have had 500 Korean laborers in Inch’on alone. When

we moved into any port, such as Kunsan, where we put

in more floating piers and pipelines, we hired several

hundred Korean workers to work with our soldiers.

The first thing that was impressive about the Koreans was how hard they worked. They are small people,

but a 55-gallon drum of fuel must weigh, what, 450

pounds? One little Korean, trotting along, would carry

one on an A-frame and load it on a ship or barge. I don’t

recall ever having any disciplinary problems with the

Koreans, either. I am sure the record is pretty complete

on what the 50th did. Unless someone looked at the

manpower available to the company, and the fact

that they had those Koreans, you probably wouldn’t

believe the amount of work that was accomplished.

The port construction company had two construction platoons, but they were very different platoons.

One had a marine section and a normal construction

For most of the rest

of us, our experience

with water was limited

to a rowboat or fishing

boat. I am sure we

made a lot of mistakes

but we finished all of

our projects.

Mooring anchors waiting to be placed at the offshore fuel terminals Gray Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 395

section, and then there was a diving section and two others. They were more marine and mechanical than normal construction. Our work should stop at the shore.

The troops we got were just regular troops from

any place, but we didn’t have any real difficulties. We

had very few courts martial and very little venereal disease. Any of the normal problems we just didn’t have,

but we had to work pretty hard. Most of the NCOs were

from the Regular Army, but the troops themselves were

mostly draftees.

The Army didn’t teach some of the skills needed so

we had to do some on-the-job training. The divers were

taught at Fort Lee, so we had trained divers, but since we

never got enough, we trained a lot of divers in the company ourselves. Master divers were authorized to qualify

people. They qualified me, and I required that all the

platoon leaders who supervised the divers also had to

become qualified.

We did not have a significant number of black

troops. We had a few, mostly truck drivers and equipment operators, but most of our carpenters and welders

were white. I don’t know if we just didn’t get our share of

blacks, but we simply took whomever they sent us.

None of the officers and very few enlisted people

came with any experience in marine work. A few people

came out of the company in California, at The Presidio,

where we had a full construction company for many,

many years. For most of the rest of us, our experience

with water was limited to a rowboat or fishing boat. I

am sure we made a lot of mistakes but we finished all of

our projects.

We took our orders from both the 44th Group and

from our customers. Eighth Army was not as vitally concerned with ports down in the southern part and most

of the way up the coast as they were with some ammunition ports and Inch’on. We got our assignments and support from the 44th Construction Group for all these

projects, and we had really good support from the Eighth

Army engineer on all the projects up in the north. If we

needed support in the south, he helped us there if he

could. Roy Kelley was deputy to Col. Willard White,

who was the group commander. He worked directly with

the Eighth Army engineer on all the work we did up

north. Between the Eighth Army engineer and Col.

Kelley, we did get good support.

We had a pretty high priority because the ports

had to function if a bottleneck in logistics was not going

to develop. When we had a problem it was always a

crash emergency. We always had some of these going on.

It was very interesting for me, traveling all over Korea,

trying to supervise all of it.

We had 22 officers in the company, of which

four were warrant officers. In Vietnam, none of the

port construction companies were near the size or structure of the 50th. Some skills obviously fall into the company properly, such as welding, carpentry, equipment

I used to think I could

operate anything.

I am sure that the real

equipment operators

in my companies were

always very amused

at my attempts to

be an equipment operator. Probably the best

lesson would have been,

“Stay the hell off the

equipment.”
396 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant George B. Gray, Jr. 50th Engineer Port Construction Company

operation, and so forth. Oddly enough, we didn’t

get Transportation Corps people assigned to the 50th.

We only got engineer troops, so I didn’t have any

boat operators.

An LCU is a pretty good-sized boat. We also used

LCMs, which makes about 12 knots. That was a pretty

tricky craft to operate. We trained our barge operators

right there in the company. The barges were made of

pontons welded together—a boat with panels. Navy

cubes, they called them. They were developed in World

War II. We could make them any size we wanted.

Operating a barge with those pontons—especially

with a crane on board, and doing heavy lifting—was

trickier than operating a boat. We had two or three

50-ton cranes we mounted on barges. We finally got

a floating crane with a Japanese crew assigned to us

from Japan, which was a big improvement. We also had

a tugboat assigned to us not too long before I left.

Up until that time we were just putting a regular

track crane on the barge, securing it to the barge, and

using it as a marine crane, which wasn’t the safest thing

to do. If you tried to move it the barge began tilting

and there was no stopping it—it was going to go. I

never lost one, but I came awfully close a few times.

I fancied myself as a crane operator in those days, but

I never operated one on the barge.

I used to think I could operate anything. I am

sure that the real equipment operators in my companies

were always very amused at my attempts to be an equipment operator. I didn’t try to do much. I just wanted to

show them that I knew how to operate the equipment.

Probably the best lesson would have been, “Stay the

hell off the equipment.” But how do you tell a second

lieutenant that?

I was promoted to first lieutenant and extended

for six months; I enjoyed my job that much. Surprisingly, my wife didn’t divorce me. Here I was, a brand

new first lieutenant, and I had that huge company with

all of that lovely heavy equipment and floating equipment and all those Koreans and everybody. I just couldn’t

tear myself away from it, so I extended for six months

to July 1954, and then I returned to the States.

MSgt. Melvin Alderman

of the 50th Engineer

Port Construction

Company slowly climbs

aboard the support

barge after a dive

RG 111, SC-451590
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 397

Capt. Morrison Clay leads the 546th

Engineer Fire Fighting Company to fight

a fire in Pusan RG 111, SC-356242

397
398 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 72d Engineer Combat Company

ieutenant Wells recalls his experiences as comofficers were infantry because they didn’t get many engineers into the 5th RCT. I had some engineer enlisted

people and I had a lot of infantry enlisted people. This

was controlled by what was available when they were

filling vacancies, but they were good people.

My TO&E was in question. Should we come under the corps or divisional TO&E? We got out the

TO&Es. We found that companies in divisional battalions were authorized four dozers, but companies in corps

battalions were authorized an extra 30 or 40 people.

So, we decided we were a divisional company for equipment and a corps company for people, an arrangement

we were able to get away with.

I found I didn’t have a single experienced dozer

operator for our four dozers so I went to the regiment

S-1. They went through their records and came up

with 12 people who had at least two years of civilian

experience operating dozers but were assigned to the

infantry units. I then had experienced dozer operators

coming out of my ears.

I had a very interesting experience when I first arrived in the company, which set the tone for things later.

We were located on the forward edge of a hill where we

could see the Chinese lines right from our area by just

gazing out of our tents. Our tents were not dug in. We

had foxholes for a few people, but not for very many. No

one had ever shot at that hill so that was where we were.

The first day I was the commander I said that we

L

pany commander, 72d Engineer Combat Company,

5th Regimental Combat Team, January-July 1953.

Under the duress of war, the young first lieutenant

remembered that he and his men learned quickly, for

“there’s nothing like practical experience....If you’re

willing to listen and learn, you can get to be pretty

good, pretty fast.”

The 5th RCT was a fascinating organization to join.

Col. Lester L. Wheeler, the regimental commander, had

been a tactical officer at West Point. He probably would

have been a real comer in the Army except he got what

they call “hemorrhagic fever” after he left the unit and

nearly died. I think that pretty well finished him.

It was interesting to get into a different organization like this. The RCT had three infantry battalions,

the triple nickel [555th] Artillery Battalion, and the 72d

Engineers. Within the 72d Engineers I had very different kinds of people than I had experienced before. I

had a first sergeant from the 82d Airborne who had

about 30 years experience. At this point I’d already

been a company commander for a year so it wasn’t that

I needed someone like that, but just having that kind

of talent was great.

All my platoon sergeants were very strong people.

I had one engineer officer, Max Howard, from the Class

of ’52, who was a real sharp officer. All the rest of my

About midnight we had

a time-on-target (TOT)

on the company area

that shredded all of

our tents but not a single

man was killed. After

that they decided that

maybe I wasn’t as

dumb as I looked.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 399 399

A bulldozer strips

and does rough

grading on a forward

airstrip designed to

accommodate reconnaissance, supply,

and evacuation aircraft

Engineer School, 11-13-5

would dig in all these tents and that we also would dig

foxholes for every man before we went to bed. That was

greeted with great groans, as you can imagine—‘this

damn new lieutenant who was the company commander.’

That day one artillery round went off down in the valley

about a thousand meters away and another artillery round

went off just opposite our company. Then there was

nothing more. I thought to myself, maybe they’re trying

to range in on this company—who knows?

We dug in and went to bed around 2200. You’ve

never heard such grumbling and mumbling. Even the

platoon leaders were having a hard time containing themselves. About midnight we had a time-on-target (TOT)

on the company area that shredded all of our tents but

not a single man was killed. After that they decided that

maybe I wasn’t as dumb as I looked. We then moved

behind a hill. The next night, with our shredded tents

behind a hill, everything was fine.

The 5th RCT and the 3d Division manned a section of the front line and three outposts: Tom, Dick,

and Harry. Our engineers were out there putting mines

on the front of these outposts and building fortifications.

We also were building roads to support the front line

positions so that you could bring people up to the positions without being too much out in the open. I was

able to use my road building experience to teach my

people, who hadn’t built many roads up to that time,

how to do that. When the enemy was about to overrun

Harry one night, we deployed as infantry and were prepared to counterattack the hill. Happily, the infantry was

able to hold on so we didn’t have to counterattack, but

we were ready to go in position for that. We had a mix of

the good combat engineer kinds of jobs.

The enemy then conducted an offensive over to

the east in X Corps, where an ROK division was knocked

out of the front line, so Eighth Army deployed the 5th

RCT over there. As an illustration of the capabilities of

the unit, we were given orders to deploy and an hour

later my company was on the road moving. We passed

the Turks going in the other direction. There were about
400 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 72d Engineer Combat Company

as many Turks in the ditch as there were on the road, but

fortunately we didn’t hit any of them. We got over to the

X Corps and found this big offensive underway.

One of our first jobs as engineers was to build a

road up the valley behind the front line positions. Since

the ROKs had lost all the old positions that had a road

network behind them, there was no road leading up the

valley to our positions. When I first got there I met with

the regimental commander and I also met with the battalion commander from a supporting corps engineer

battalion. The regimental commander had asked the

engineer battalion commander how long it would take

to build a road up there and he said it could be done in

a month’s time.

I came in—a brash, young first lieutenant at that

point. The regimental commander said, “How long will

it take you to put a road in here so we can get trucks

up?” I said, “Four days.” I got the big horselaugh. I didn’t

know why since I didn’t realize he had this other estimate. Four days later we had trucks going up there. We

did this by running dozers up and dropping them down

in position, blasting ahead of time and doing the whole

road simultaneously instead of just working slowly

from one end. If you had worked from one end it probably would have taken you a month.

I learned this on the job and immediately applied

it. That’s why you really can take a biology major

and make him into a very fine combat engineer company commander—if he’s got the initiative to do the

job. It’s just when he gets higher up that he begins to

have problems.

At the time I felt—and I’m typical of my contemporaries—that if they wanted to make me a battalion

commander, I was ready. I was cocky and had been able

to show that I could do these things. It probably was

very much like that during the war in Europe. If it had

been the European Theater and all the commanders

had been killed, one of my contemporaries or I would

have taken over and done a credible job. We had as

much experience as some of those battalion commanders had in Europe.

But it was a very narrow experience—combat engineering and support of an infantry division, doing all

the different kinds of things you have to do. Later, when

I was a battalion commander in Vietnam, I mentioned

to one of my company commanders that as a company

commander with 15 months in the Army under my belt,

I felt that I could handle a battalion. He laughed and

said, “There’s no way you could do what you’re doing

here with 15 months under your belt.” He might have

been right, but with the very limited role that you

had with a battalion, I was sure I could have handled it.

I’m sure a lot of other people would have done

equally well with that kind of experience, but the initiative comes from being given jobs and being allowed to

do them. You didn’t have any of this silly zero defects

I think zero defects

definitely went way overboard; it was a terrible

idea. Zero defects means

you never take a risk.

You hide behind it; you’re

so safe that you can’t do

anything wrong.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 401

Engineers clear a new supply

route to the front lines, 1951

RG 111, SC-379090 I 

-
402 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Richard M. Wells 72d Engineer Combat Company

thing. You made mistakes and learned from them. Then

you didn’t make the same mistakes again.

When I went to the 5th RCT we had an incident

with Max Howard, one of my engineer platoon leaders.

I sent him ahead with his platoon to do some blasting

and I heard these very loud noises—obviously he wasn’t

tamping his charges enough. In a good blast you hardly

hear anything but a rumble and all the rock moves. So, I

went up there and I told him, “Hey, this is not the way

to do it” and got him aside. He was really taken aback

but he never did that again—all of his blasts in the future were quiet and effective.

Well, under the zero defects, if I went up there and

said, “You’re relieved, Max. You don’t know how to blast”

that would have been stupid. You learn these things

quickly and you hopefully don’t make the same mistakes

too often. There’s nothing like practical experience. And

you can learn from people in your unit. A private, first

class, who saw something in civilian life, might say, “Hey,

why don’t you try this?” If you’re willing to listen and

learn you can get to be pretty good, pretty fast. I think

zero defects definitely went way overboard; it was a terrible idea. Zero defects means you never take a risk. You

hide behind it; you’re so safe that you can’t do anything

wrong. You might not accomplish anything but you’re

good and safe.

The 5th RCT was a very exciting experience for

me being a part of the combined arms teams. I learned a

lot in the other engineer battalion, but in the 5th RCT

I was a little king. I was the regimental engineer as a

first lieutenant. Later, I was amused in Vietnam when

they had majors doing that job.

We just got along great with the infantry and

they depended on us. One time in X Corps, when our

people were taking out mines, I heard a bunch of infantry saying, “Thank God we’re not engineers.” You

Men of the 13th

Engineer Combat

Battalion repair a

road damaged by

an enemy mine

near Changp’yong,

June 1951

RG 111, SC-369972
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 403

were right there with them all the way. You really felt

part of a team.

We moved back over to IX Corps again when

the war ended. We were told that the war was going

to end at midnight. The original instructions were,

since it was going to end at midnight, there would be

no more firing unless the other guy fired first. After

a little bit someone fired, and then the fire was returned. Both sides apparently thought that they might

as well use up all the ammunition. The place was

just like the 4th of July with explosions going all over

the place.

We were attached to the 45th Infantry Division

[a federalized National Guard division]. Our mission

after the cease-fire was to mark the southern limit of

the demilitarized zone, which was several hundred

meters wide. We would have Chinese over on the

other side marking their limit. While all the firing was

going on prior to the cease-fire, I got called over to see

the engineer battalion commander of the 45th Division.

He said, “All right, we’ve got this mission,” which I

already knew I had. “These are the sectors.” My sector

was about half as big as his battalion sector. He said,

“Now, I want this done right so I want you to go out

there and I don’t want anyone to sleep.” It was a threeday job. I told him, “That’s not the way I planned to

take on the job. My men will be allowed to get some

rest and they will complete on time.” He said, “You will

do it the way I told you to do it.” We did it our way

and we completed it on time.

When the war ended, the 5th RCT moved back

to a reserve position in the I Corps area. Since the

war was over I asked to be released to return to the

States. Max Howard took over command of the 72d.

Even though I liked the people, I had been in Korea

19 months. I had extended twice and I was ready to

go home.
404 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson Impressions

uring World War II, Lt. Gen. Walton

from the office end. He was a well-experienced staff

man and he ran a good shop.

I developed the greatest admiration for American

youth in that operation. One criticism that I would have

of General Douglas MacArthur’s tour of Japan was that

the training of his troops was insufficient. It was adequate,

but not what it should have been. These young men certainly weren’t in good physical shape. By that, I mean

they were flabby. These youngsters, then, living near the

fleshpots of Japan, were taken out of that atmosphere

where they were living high on the hog. They came over

to Korea and were introduced into combat without any

D

Walker was in the Third Army under Lt. Gen. George

S. Patton, Jr. My strongest impression about Gen.

Walker was that he tried to mimic Gen. Patton. He

certainly did a superb job in Korea with what he

had to do it with. Every day was a fire brigade, trying to put out a fire in a different place. He kept his

finger on the pulse personally by his personal reconnaissance and his close contact with his field commanders. I thought he did a great job.

One day Gen. Walker was driving past a South

Korean truck column. Some of the Koreans’ trucks

were British trucks with the right-hand drive. One of

these trucks forced Gen. Walker’s car off the road.

When the truck stopped ahead of him, Walker’s shorttempered aide jumped out, ran up, and opened the

left-hand door. He grabbed a South Korean in the

truck and socked him in the jaw—hit him off the seat

for driving like he had—but, he was the passenger. The

driver was on the other side. Walker’s driver drove like

hell. He’d get in that jeep and just go hell-bent-for-leather

up the road. Walker was on his way back from our headquarters just before Christmas 1950 when he had

that accident that killed him. He had just left the headquarters about a half-hour before.

Lev Allen was a good chief of staff. While Gen.

Walker was out in the field so much he ran the show

Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson

CEHO, Davidson File
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 405

physical preparation. They stood up, first under that hot,

humid summer, and then by winter, they were better

conditioned. The way they stood up under that bitter

winter of ’50-’51 was fantastic.

After a while I had a van that I slept in. It had a

little makeshift stove in it that depended on dripping oil

for its source of heat. Of course during the night that

stove would go out. Then the water in my canteen would

freeze in the van—it was that cold. Fortunately, I had a

sleeping bag that I slept in. When I’d go out to see the

troops in the daytime I can remember occasions when I

was on the top of a hill. That damn wind must have

been coming right out of the North Pole. I’d had a good

night’s sleep in reasonably comfortable circumstances;

then I’d visit the units on top of a hill. Here were these

GIs, sitting on the edge of their slit trenches, wearing

shirts in some cases, with heavy underwear under them,

reading comic books. I’d go up there, turn my back to

the wind, and try to stay there for a few minutes talking

to their platoon sergeants or company commanders. I

couldn’t take it much longer. I had to get off that damn

hill and get down behind protection. These youngsters

had been up there all night for nights on end. They turned

into very, very rugged individuals. I think the transition

they made—the way they stood up under the conditions

and the way they fought—was great.

The ROK army as a whole was terrible. We had

the best commander with us, Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup,

ROK 1st Division. He was a good commander, but the

troops were certainly unreliable to the nth degree. On

the other hand we had three ROK soldiers in the squad

who intermingled with the Americans and they did fine.

They trained with our troops, used our equipment, and

ate in our messes. They were assimilated easily.

When we first got them, they’d never seen that

volume of food as were in our messes. They’d get in

the mess line and go through it two or three times, as

often as they could. After they’d filled their bellies

up they’d go out on the field and “toss their cookies.”

The food was too plentiful and rich for them. After

a while they learned to tone it down a little bit. From

what I saw, they turned out to be good soldiers and

worked well with our troops.

My first combat experience with the division, except for P’ohangdong—which was a short operation, a

skirmish really—was after the breakout from the Naktong

perimeter. The North Koreans were on the run, so I didn’t

see too much of them from a combat point of view.

I tried to talk to some of the prisoners, but I didn’t

see the North Korean army in operation. I certainly

didn’t see them in their hey-day as they came down, but

they were more motivated than the South Koreans.

When we went north, hell-bent-for-leather, we sent

out these patrols and got our nose bloodied each time.

We didn’t know what the hell was up there. We’d been

pursuing these North Koreans as fast and as closely as

Here were these GIs,

sitting on the edge of

their slit trenches, wearing shirts with heavy

underwear reading comic

books. I’d go up there,

turn my back to the wind,

and try to stay there for a

few minutes talking to

their platoon sergeants

or company commanders.
406 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson Impressions

we could. They hadn’t given us any opposition to

speak of.

When we got back to the Ch’ongch’on River line I

was left with a task force [TASK FORCE DAVIDSON,

4 November 1950] to hold a bridgehead north of

the line in the event that the Eighth Army was sent

north a second time. We had quite a fight there one

night. The next morning I went out on the battlefield

and rode over the terrain. That was the first time I saw

a Chinese soldier. They made this attack and they’d

gotten the hell beaten out of them. Our troops did

a good job. The Chinese retreated just before dawn

and pulled way back. We were not in contact because

they left hurriedly and moved so fast. There were

bodies around the battlefield. They were well clothed,

with good quality, quilted clothing, and the men

were obviously well fed. The dead bodies on the field

gave the impression of a well-equipped, well-fed, and,

probably an efficient army. When the real fighting

later took place with the Chinese army, I was out of

the division.

After Walker’s death, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway

took over the Eighth Army and changed things greatly.

He did a superb job. He had an advantage over Gen.

Walker in that he came from Washington and knew the

circumstances in Washington. He knew more about the

availability of troops, the available supplies, and more

about the general situation. He was able to get more,

particularly heavy artillery units, over there with the necessary supplies. He turned the thing right around.

One day he came up to our headquarters right after he reported. He came unexpectedly and I was in my

tent or van. When I came to the meeting in my shirt,

but without a steel helmet, he sent me back to get my

helmet. Like Gen. Patton in North Africa, he wanted to

impress upon me the fact that it was a combat command

and he was ready for combat on all occasions. So, I went

back, got my helmet, and then joined the conference.

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet was a fine man, well

experienced, calm, and really a soldier’s soldier. He was a

superb combat commander [Eighth Army].

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn was a great corps

commander. He was a little guy but he was feisty. He

was very capable and personable. They called him

Shrimp Milburn because he was so small. Despite his

size he had been a quarterback at West Point and later

was a football coach, so we had a little extra community

of interest between us.

 I questioned what MacArthur did on three occasions. Number one, my proposed line for the Pusan defenses had been summarily turned down. I wasn’t used

to being turned down. Gen. Patton and Gen. Patch had

pretty consistently approved what I had done in previous situations. I had been able to think this through.

Whether Gen. Walker agreed with the line that General

MacArthur outlined, or whether he did it just because

They [the Chinese] made

this attack and they’d

gotten the hell beaten

out of them....There

were bodies around the

battlefield....The dead

bodies on the field gave

the impression of a wellequipped, well-fed, and,

probably an efficient army.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 407

Huddled against the cold,

Chinese prisoners are

guarded by the 7th

Marines, December 1950

RG 127, 127-GK-234J-A5377

General MacArthur had given him an order or a quasiorder to construct along those lines, I don’t know. I

thought the decision with respect to that line couldn’t be

supported because it was too long and the terrain wasn’t

as good. The communications were not as good as they

were in the line that I chose. If you’re going to execute an

interior defense with a small number of troops, you’ve

got to depend on your internal lines of communication.

Number two, I thought it was foolish to hold

us up when the Marines landed at Inch’on. They should

have let us keep the pressure on the North Koreans,

which he could have done either by sending the Marines

north, or by letting us go through them, giving us

their supplies. He had no control over stopping at the

38th Parallel.

The third thing, and the worst of all, was the organization after the X Corps came over from Japan. How a

man with General MacArthur’s intelligence, training, and

background could have permitted that kind of an organization I could never understand. I do not understand

it still to this day. Here you had three corps operating—

counting the Koreans there were more. His chief of staff,

Gen. Almond, commanded the easternmost corps, separated from the others by a mountain range. Although he

was corps commander in Korea, he retained his position

as chief of staff and was not put under Gen. Walker, or,

later, Gen. Ridgway. So, he was reporting to himself

from Korea back to Japan. The intelligence and the

information we got were coming that roundabout

way. Instead of having him under the Eighth Army in

Korea, he was operating to a degree as an independent

corps. How General MacArthur permitted Gen. Almond

to set up that kind of organization I really don’t understand. There wasn’t the unity of command, the cohesion, or the interchange of information that there

should have been.
408 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

ieutenant Bratton went to Korea with hopes

I believed Korea was important to my career. I probably thought so more then than I might in retrospect. I

had missed all combat in World War II, and if I wound

up missing all combat duty in the Korean War, I would

be lacking something in my professional background that

many of my contemporaries would have had. I felt that

this would have been disadvantageous.

I also felt at the time—a bit altruistically—that we

had been trained to go to war and here was a war going

on. I’d already spent most of it sitting over in Europe. I

certainly didn’t want to spend the rest of it sitting in Fort

Lewis, Washington. I was chomping at the bit. I remember several times calling the various offices and channels

that my papers had gone through to see where on earth

my transfer to Korea was. When it finally came through

I was very relieved, anxious to get on the way.

While I was still in Austria, we used to get periodic

reports describing the engineer activities in Korea. We

even got film clips. Some of the clips were engineer specific. Some were just general film clips of combat action

in Korea. They were very popular. They also were useful;

many of them illustrated points that I recognized readily

when I finally did get to Korea and was able to apply

some of those so-called lessons learned.

The trip to Korea was difficult. My ship sailed from

Seattle. I was assigned as the administrative officer on

the ship in charge of all the troop records. There were

about 2,000 troops on the ship. On our way to our port

L

of commanding a company, but was quickly appointed

engineer supply officer. He recalls how he spent much

of his time scrounging for badly needed heavy equipment and spare parts. Later his unit produced hundreds of pre-fabricated “kits” for tent platforms and

bunkers to improve living conditions for troops in

the field.

I was with the 70th Engineer Battalion in Austria

and reassigned directly to Korea from Europe. I was assigned to the 9th Engineer Combat Battalion at Fort

Lewis, Washington, along the way, and told to reapply

for Korea. I did that shortly after arriving at Fort Lewis

in August 1952. Some weeks later that was approved. I

was given orders to report in January 1953. That was

how long the procedure took. I signed out of the 9th

Engineers around Christmas 1952, went home for a short

leave, and reported back to Fort Lewis again before shipping to Korea.

I was glad to leave. Having volunteered for Korea

and watched from the sidelines, I was concerned that it

might play out completely before I’d get there. It was

kind of a selfish feeling I guess, but it made me anxious

to leave Fort Lewis and get on with getting to Korea,

rather than staying longer in an outfit that, from my

point of view, was not particularly beneficial from the

standpoint of training or learning.

Having volunteered for

Korea and watched from

the sidelines, I was

concerned that it might

play out completely

before I’d get there.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 409

Troops on the deck of an

LST, Inch’on RG 111, SC-355475

409

I 
410 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

of destination, Yokohama, Japan, an unfortunate thing

happened just off Midway Island in the Pacific. The main

reduction gear of the ship broke and we were dead in the

water and helpless. It could not be repaired at sea and we

had to be towed by a seagoing tug back to Pearl Harbor.

When we got back to Pearl Harbor they had diverted another ship. It was the Patch, a large troop ship,

which was already loaded and on its way to Korea. They

put all of us on the Patch, which meant double bunking

and all the other inconveniences that one puts up with

on a double-loaded ship. Twenty-four hours after we

got back to Pearl Harbor in our disabled ship we sailed

again on the Patch and went to Yokohama. We lost a

number of days because the towing operation from

somewhere near Midway Island back to Pearl was done

at a speed of only about three knots.

Eventually we got to Yokohama. We went from

there to Camp Drake, where we were given some initial

training. We reloaded back onto another ship at

Yokohama and sailed to Inch’on, where we disembarked.

It was only after we got to Inch’on, incidentally, that we

received orders to our units, in my case, the 13th Engineers, 7th Infantry Division. We stayed at Inch’on at a

replacement depot for about three days and then went

by train up to where the 7th Division was located.

I had no idea that I was going to the 7th. I had

requested a divisional combat battalion and that was what

I got, so I was happy. Part of our shipment went to the

2d Engineers in the 2d Division; the rest of us went

to the 13th Engineers.

When we went up to the 7th Division, I remember going up in a packet of 14 officers. I was the senior

one so I was the packet commander. I had 13 other lieutenants under my “command.”

We arrived at a time when the 7th Division was

engaged in heavy action. Most of the packet officers were

infantry lieutenants and they were immediately placed

into a combat situation. Several of them lost their lives

and others were wounded. Of the 14 officers, I was one

of two who was not wounded or killed in the next few

weeks. There was only one other engineer in the packet

of 14. He was assigned as a company commander in

the 13th Engineers and was rather severely wounded

only about a week after he arrived.

I stayed at division headquarters for two days for

orientation and a series of briefings and then went directly to the 13th Engineer Combat Battalion. When I

first arrived the battalion commander and the executive

officer interviewed me. Then, I had a short briefing at

each of the staff sections at battalion headquarters and

it was arranged for me to visit each of the companies.

I had hoped that I was going to be assigned again

as a company commander but that was not in the cards.

I was assigned as assistant S-4 with the thought that I

would be the battalion supply officer. The S-4 himself, a

senior captain, later major, was the Division Engineer

When we went up to the

7th Division, I remember

going up in a packet

of 14 officers....Of the

14 officers, I was one

of two who was not

wounded or killed in

the next few weeks.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 411

Even at the end of

my tour, we were still

writing airmail letters to

the manufacturer with

money orders to get

parts to keep our generators running. It was

a problem when I got

there in March 1953,

and it was a problem

when I left in May 1954.

Supply Officer. It didn’t work out exactly like that. I

eventually became the Division Engineer Supply Officer

when the other officer went home.

Initially, I was disappointed because it was my only

chance to command a company under combat conditions, but my request of the battalion commander was

politely turned down. I did visit each of the companies

in that orientation, which I guess took about two days,

and developed an idea where the companies were and

how they were operating. Our three companies, A, B,

and C, were in direct support of the three infantry regiments. Our fourth line company—what we called the

Dog Company, you’d call it Delta now—was in general

support of the whole division and we had a large

headquarters company.

The battalion commander was Earl Hickey, a senior lieutenant colonel. Later, I knew him after he’d been

promoted to full colonel—a man, incidentally, for whom

I had great respect in every way. He was a very strong

leader and a strong commander. He ran a very good battalion. Our executive officer was Fred Proctor, who later

had a successful career in the Corps of Engineers. I

thought he was outstanding. Our battalion S-3, or operations officer, was Col. Joe Jansen, with whom I’ve

maintained a friendship all through the years. He was

another excellent officer.

One of the officers in the battalion when I first

got there, who had been wounded and left the battalion shortly after I arrived, was my good friend Bucky

Harris, later Maj. Gen. Harris in the Corps of Engineers.

I had no experience with the DESO (Division

Engineer Supply Officer) as a function of the battalion

S-4; I’d never seen it function that way. The person assigned as S-4 of the engineer battalion was a supply

officer for engineer equipment for the entire division.

As such, I had a lot of responsibilities that transcended

anything I’d learned earlier about being a battalion

S-4. Each of the divisions over there operated in that

fashion, and that was the way the TO&E was drawn

up. Although I’d been in combat battalions in Europe

and the States, and they were division combat battalions, there was no real division in which to apply the

DESO concept.

I spent most of my time while I was in the 7th

Division overseeing the requisitioning and the receipt

and the distribution of engineer supplies. A lot of

that was what we used to call Class IV material, fortification material, and timbers to build bunkers. Later, after the war ended, I was heavily involved with the effort

to get the troops into some sort of shelter for that

first postwar winter. We manufactured many tent kits.

We sent all over the Pacific Theater to get Quonset

huts and prefabricated buildings and so forth. It was

a tremendous job. We were literally working at that

seven days a week, 16 to 18 hours a day through that

whole fall and winter of 1953.
412 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

This was different from anything I’d

ever done. I learned by doing. We got a lot of

support from the division G-4, and indeed,

support from the division chief of staff.

It became a very important thing for the

division in that first postwar winter to get

the troops out of the tents, bunkers, and

holes they’d been living in back at the base

camps. Ironically, I myself spent all that

winter in a tent. Fortunately, it was well

equipped with stoves.

For a while, it was difficult getting sufficient explosives. We were using lots of explosives of various kinds, and we went

through a period where that was a crunch.

Then, for a while we couldn’t get enough

bunker timber to build the bunkers that

were being installed in such large numbers

by the front-line troops.

There was a tremendous demand for sandbags. I

used to requisition them by the tens of thousands at a

time. Once or twice there was a shortage, and a great

scream of anguish would come up from people who

needed more sandbags and couldn’t get them.

By and large, although I mentioned exceptions,

normally I was able, by good planning and by going to a

number of different depots around the Korean peninsula, to supply the division with everything it wanted. I

don’t think we ever suffered in any significant way

operationally by a shortage of engineer materials.

We were always scrounging to get more equipment.

We were trying to get more bulldozers, and we wound

up with way more bulldozers than we were authorized.

We needed them to cut roads out of the hills and mountains along the front.

We had a lot of problems with keeping cranes running. Since I never could get two cranes of the same make

and model, getting spare parts for one crane didn’t help

Soldiers move a wooden tent frame into position at a camp outside

of Pusan RG 111, SC-350636
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 413

you when the other crane broke down. I became a great

advocate of buying standardized makes and models to

ease the maintenance problems over there. That applied

to a number of other types of equipment as well, but the

cranes gave us the biggest problem. We were using cranes

heavily, especially in off loading at the railhead all of the

timber and other supplies that would arrive. It was not

uncommon for a while in the fall of ’53 and the winter

of ’54 to receive a train car with 50 flat cars loaded

with heavy material to be unloaded. You had to have

cranes working around the clock to do that.

Generator Problems

One of the most annoying pieces of equipment that we

were responsible for were the generators, which provided

the electricity for lighting and other purposes through

the division area. There was a terrible problem getting

and maintaining enough generators. Here again, the

make and model thing was a very annoying factor. You’d

have parts on hand for one type of generator, but you’d

receive a different kind of generator. Keeping the generators in good repair as far as providing parts and doing

the mechanical work that had to be done on them was a

major problem.

When one of the large generators, those providing

light and power for division headquarters, went down

for any reason, you had tremendous pressure placed on

you to get that generator back up and running as quickly

as possible. For several weeks after the war ended it

seemed to me that the biggest problem we had in the

7th Division was generators. Someone should have realized that if you were shipping 5 kW generators to a particular division, you ought to ship all the same makes

and models and get the right parts there to keep them

running. A couple of models of small generators, 3 kW

and 5 kWs, performed very poorly. You’d issue a brand

new generator to a unit and a week later it would be

inoperable with no parts to fix it.

The engineer battalion was responsible for all

the generators in the division. It was the responsibility

of the supply officer. Why our battalion maintenance

officer didn’t play more of a role, I’m not really sure.

Although these difficulties with generators may sound

petty to you now, it seemed to me that as far as generators were concerned, the burden of the world fell on

my shoulders.

We improved by adopting certain procedures, and

by a lot of effort down at the supply depots to get parts

and to get generators that had some sort of a backup

supply. But I’ll tell you the truth—even at the end of my

tour, we were still writing airmail letters to the manufacturer with money orders to get parts to keep our generators running. It was a problem when I got there in March

1953, and it was a problem when I left in May 1954.

That puts a tremendous burden on a front-line

division. The only way you could run that job of divi-

...we were making tent

kits. These had nothing

to do with defensive

positions on the line.

It was an effort to get

the troops out of the

mud and the dirt....
414 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

sion engineer supply officer well would be to literally

work at it seven days and nights a week. Fortunately I

had some superb people. I had two or three NCOs who

were just absolutely marvelous. I always had an assistant

who was a lieutenant. I managed to get some good young

officers who’d served their time out in platoons, who

weren’t senior enough to command a company, so I’d

bring them in for their last three or four months and

make them assistant supply officers. They were frequently

the ones who wound up with the jeep at 0200 going

back to repair someone’s generator.

Prefabricated Kits

While the war was still going on, one of the most important aspects of the defensive positions in our division

area was the construction of a refurbished set of trenches

and bunkers for defensive purposes. The bunkers were

of a variety of types. There were fighting bunkers, observation bunkers, communications bunkers, and observation post bunkers.

We came up with the standard design in our division, which was made out of large timbers that were cut

to size and made into a kit. We called them bunker kits,

and it consisted of a large package of timber, drift pins,

and large nails to build the bunker when you got it out

on site. It was all banded up with steel bands. Any outfit—not just an engineer unit—an infantry unit, or an

artillery unit, could get one of these bunker kits, load it

on a truck, drive it as close as they could to where they

wanted to put it, unpack it and install it on site. We had

a very ingenious set of plans, which we guaranteed that

even an infantry squad would have no trouble understanding when assembling the bunker. By and large it

worked that way. We issued hundreds of these things.

We established a prefabrication yard back in our battalion CP area where these different types of bunker kits

were turned out en masse using large sawmill type operations. It was very successful.

At the same time we were doing that we were making tent kits. These had nothing to do with defensive

One of my biggest jobs as

Division Engineer Supply

Officer was running all

through Korea trying to find

more equipment....One had

to be very aggressive because everyone else was out

scrounging around looking for

the same types of things.

Bunkers built by

infantry units

operating in the

Punch Bowl area,

December 1952

Cochran Collection
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 415

Built to house

12 soldiers, this

pre-fabricated

bunker could be

assembled in

about an hour

Engineer School,

250-12-130

positions on the line. It was an effort to get the troops

out of the mud and the dirt, if not out of tents, by building what amounted to a floor and a framework for the

squad and parametal tents we were using. We turned

those out by the hundreds. Again, they would be issued

to the units that needed them. They would come and

pick them up, wrapped in bundles, with suitable little

diagrams on how to assemble them. That saved engineer

effort. A lot of non-engineers could take our simple plans

and the materials we gave them, and with a few hammers and crowbars and things, they could erect the tent

kit as well as we could have.

I think all of the divisions had some form of prefabricated kits because, at the time I was in Korea, the

front line had stabilized. There was great emphasis on

improving the defensive positions along that line, which

roughly paralleled what the demilitarized zone is today.

All the divisions came up with one plan or another, each

one a little bit different. We kept constantly revising our

kits as we got better ideas, and we’d get reports back from

the people using the bunkers that said, “Why don’t you

have a port here? Why don’t you make it one timber

higher here?”

There was some site adaptation, too. One prefab

kit would be purchased for each site, so there was some

modification and digging involved. Our bunker kit program was one of the more successful things that we did.

I don’t mean to imply that we simply turned these out

and gave them to the other units in the division to put

up. We did a lot of the erecting ourselves. An engineer

battalion in a division is always over stretched so it was

very helpful to have something that the other units

could assemble and use on their own.

The Defensive Period

We rarely saw anyone from Eighth Army. We frequently had teams in the division area, and we had a lot

of interchange with the staff of I Corps, which was
416 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

headquartered down in Seoul. I can only

recall one time that a senior team from

Eighth Army visited our battalion, or

even our division. There may have been

visits and contacts that I wasn’t aware of

at my relatively low level.

I Corps, on the other hand,

worked with us frequently and we saw

the corps commander and his staff often. In the case of our battalion, we did

a lot of work with the corps’ engineer,

his staff, and the troop units that were

part of the corps’ engineer outfits.

The TO&E allotment for equipment to an organic engineer battalion

in a division, such as the 13th Engineers,

certainly was inadequate for what we were doing in Korea. What we were able to do was get special authorizations for additional heavy equipment and equipment of

all kinds and sizes. Eventually, we had four or five times

as many bulldozers as the TO&E authorized us, as well

as a number of road graders, front loaders, and cranes.

When augmented with equipment, we had plenty

of it. If we’d been limited strictly to the TO&E, we

couldn’t have done the job. One of my biggest jobs as

Division Engineer Supply Officer was running all

through Korea trying to find more equipment. If you

discovered some available, it was a question of sending

something down to pick it up. One had to be very aggressive because everyone else was out scrounging around

looking for the same types of things.

I remember one day going back to one of the depots south of Seoul and finding eight brand new, unpacked D-8 angle dozers. Well, an angle dozer was worth

its weight in gold if you were cutting the roads around

the Korean hills. I was able to get four of those eight

because I was the discoverer. I never did know how long

they’d been there, perhaps a year or two. It was not

a place where we normally went, or a place that normally serviced our requisitions. Once we discovered

Equipment stored at an Engineer Depot, September 1952 Engineer School, 170-11-128
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 417

them we sent lowboys down, picked them up, and

had them working in the division in two or three days.

Although an Engineer Maintenance and Supply

Group in the Seoul area tried to do a good job, they

were swamped when it came to locating all of the available equipment. The war had been going on for three

years and in that time a lot of the equipment and

supplies had poured into Korea. Some of it was not

well-tracked by paper, especially in the earlier days when

the impetus was, “Get the stuff over there and we’ll

straighten it out later.”

We had no property accountability, as such, when

I first went over there. Very shortly after the hostilities

ended in July ’53, big efforts were made to establish

proper supply accountability. It was much easier to operate when there was no property accountability. You

got what you needed as best you could, even though

you couldn’t always get what you wanted. You got

the job done quickly and asked questions later. That

changed when the war ended. People were less apt to

do you favors than they had been while the hostilities

were still going on. Everybody became more conscious

of control and cost economy.

Troop Morale

A constant concern of the soldiers in our line companies

had to do with the system by which points were assigned

to give you credit for your tour in Korea. The number of

points accumulated governed when you could leave Korea. The system established different categories of work

depending on your locality, the danger you faced, the

amount of combat effort you put out, and so forth. It

assigned you a certain number of points per month. In

our divisional engineer battalion our soldiers received

three points per month. When you reached a certain total of points you could rotate home.

The infantrymen with whom our frontline soldiers

were working every day were getting four points a month.

Our troops were always disgruntled if they were up there

and felt they were facing the same dangers and hardships but were only getting three points. That remained

a morale problem; it was never changed. On the other

hand, some of the other outfits were only getting two

points a month and, in some cases, they encountered

similar dangers and difficulties. When a general rule is

established to cover many thousands of people there are

always some disparities.

I was always tremendously impressed with how well

the soldiers performed in Korea and with the sacrifices

they were willing to make under very difficult conditions—not just engineers, but all the soldiers over there.

There were gradations of living conditions. The

infantrymen up on one of the outpost hills in our division lived a completely different life and saw a completely

different Korea than the fellow back at division headquarters. He, in turn, lived a completely different life

The captain commanding

one of our companies had

to sell himself and his

engineer capabilities to

the regimental commander

who was typically a senior

infantry colonel. I was

always amazed at how well

our young guys did this.
418 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

and saw a completely different Korea than the fellow

down in the rear areas of Korea, the southern parts of

Korea and the depots and the supply systems.

It’s always that way in any theater. The burden

does not fall equally on all soldiers. It depends on

where you are and what unit you’re in. Our guys took

a lot of satisfaction in feeling that they were up front

doing the job, and they used to look, fairly or unfairly,

down somewhat on the people who never heard a gun

go off in Korea.

We were not augmented in personnel. The reararea roadwork was picked up by the corps engineers. We

could never have taken care of the entire division road

net. As far as working with the infantry regiments and

the other units of the division, we were adequately

manned and staffed.

It placed a great burden on our young company

commanders, because our Companies A, B, and C were

assigned to support each one of the infantry regiments.

Depending on how the regiment operated, and depending on the skill, personality, and leadership of the

engineer company commander, that worked extremely

well, or it had difficulties.

The captain commanding one of our companies

had to sell himself and his engineer capabilities to the

regimental commander who was typically a senior infantry colonel. I was always amazed at how well our young

guys did this. I had hoped to be one of these company

commanders myself when I went over there, but it didn’t

work out that way.

We were blessed with an excellent division engineer while the war was still going on, and another equally outstanding commander when the first one left

after the cease-fire. These men had seniority and were

qualified to explain engineer missions and the role of

the engineers. Each of them became a valuable adjunct

to the division staff and to the combat power of the

division as well.

We never used the term “combat multiplier” then,

but as I look back on it, I think a very good case could

have been made for its use. In fact, both of our battalion

commanders, near the end of their tours, became the

chief of staff of the division, which is very unusual. It

was recognition of the fact that the engineers had done a

lot of good work in that division and identified themselves as very capable people. The wartime commander

was Col. Earl Icke, and Col. Paul O’Neil succeeded him.

Both were very outstanding people.

I joined the division during a very difficult time

when they were actively involved in intense fighting on

a hill called Old Baldy [March 1953]. In April of 1953

the division was heavily engaged in the first battle of

Pork Chop Hill, which is the one in the movie, the one

most people think of.

In the first week of July 1953 the division was

heavily committed in a series of conflicts, the most promiIt was alternating freezing

and thawing, kind of

miserable weather. I lived

two Korean winters in

a tent and I found it

a terribly unpleasant way

to live. You tended to be

cold most of the time.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 419

nent of which was the second battle of Pork Chop Hill.

The division eventually was forced to withdraw from the

hill. That was a very costly battle. Ironically, just three

weeks later the cease-fire was signed.

Close to the time of the cease-fire, in about the

third week of July 1953, there was another hardfought battle on a hill called Westview [the next hill

to the southeast of Old Baldy]. An outstanding regimental commander, Col. Dolman, was the officer in charge

and did a magnificent job. The battle of Westview was

the last big battle fought by the division in the war.

It was only about a week or 10 days after that before

the cease-fire came.

Our division took quite a beating during that

last month of the war. Company A, commanded by

Capt. Jim Brettell, was the direct support company

for the 17th Infantry Regiment. It was a portion of

the 17th Infantry that was on Pork Chop Hill when

the very heavy onslaught around 1 July 1953 was made

against the hill. The regiment took heavy casualties

and our Company A took casualties. That was when

we had our Medal of Honor winner, one of our Company A soldiers [Cpl. Dan D. Schoonover, Company

A, 13th Engineers]. Jim Brettell, the A Company commander, was a hero in his own right. He was a man of

towering strength and great leadership. The regiment’s

great confidence in him was well placed. He was a very

valuable adjunct to them in their fight on that hill.

But, the division took heavy casualties. The 32d

Infantry Regiment relieved the 17th Infantry, because

the 17th had received so many casualties. The 32d

fought well, but also took casualties. Finally, it was no

longer profitable to continue defending the hill, so

we withdrew.

A series of outposts along our line marked the MLR.

Various units of the infantry regiments manned these

outposts as sort of a first line of defense. Typically, they

would take a lot of manpower, sometimes an entire

rifle company, beefed up with heavier weapons.

Some of them were isolated forward of the main

line. It was difficult to get to them, because you had to

go through what amounted to a “no man’s land.” There

was a pair of these called Arsenal and Erie, which the

17th Infantry manned. Brettell gave what engineer support was needed in these outposts, as well as providing

support to the main line. To get out there you had to go

along a trail—not a very safe thing to do, especially in

daylight in an unarmored vehicle. One would choose to

go in an armored personnel carrier or a tank if one had

to make the effort.

This particular day, however, the battalion commander, who you would have characterized as rather

“gung ho,” decided that he wanted to go out to outpost

Arsenal and he wanted the engineers to go with him.

Well, as luck would have it, I happened to be up working with Company A that day. Brettell said, “Come on.

I felt like a clay pigeon

going across a shooting

gallery range, watching

other clay pigeons being

picked off and wondering

when I was going to get

it. I was scared to death

but I was too proud

to acknowledge it.
420 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

Get in your jeep and follow us.” We took off with

three jeeps through this no man’s land.

Halfway out they began shooting at us using

mortars, mostly. It was a mighty scary trip. I felt like a

clay pigeon going across a shooting gallery range, watching other clay pigeons being picked off and wondering when I was going to get it. I was scared to death

but I was too proud to acknowledge it. So, I wrapped

my flak vest around me, pulled my helmet down, got in

the jeep and said, “Let’s go.” None of us were touched.

Maybe the fire wasn’t as close to us as I thought it

was, but I would say it was a rather foolhardy journey.

The battalion commander got his kicks. He was a very

outstanding man with a flare for leadership and he did a

great job with that battalion. Brettell was going to go

wherever that battalion commander went. Since I was

with Brettell I didn’t have a lot of choices. The terrible

thought that ran through my mind after I made the trip

out there was the realization that I had to come back

again. We came back in the same jeeps. The jeep drivers

thought we were crazy.

The armistice was signed, or the cease-fire as we

called it, on 27 July 1953. The troops had suffered in the

previous winters and the CG, Eighth Army, decided,

properly so, that a major priority immediately after the

cease-fire would be preparations for the next winter. One

of the ways of doing this was to get prefabricated buildings up into the division areas and the other areas where

we’d been living in tents the previous winter.

The prefab buildings we received came from all

over the Pacific Theater. Most of them had been left over

from World War II. The largest single shipment we got

into the 7th Division came from Okinawa, by rail up

from the port at Pusan. They were tropical, prefabricated

On 27 July 1953, General Mark Clark, UN Supreme Commander in the Far East, signed the armistice documents

that became effective three days later

RG 306, 306-53-10815

For one reason or another

the Korean War tends to

get forgotten. I guess it’s

because it was so much

smaller than World War II,

and then it was overshadowed later by Vietnam.

But the engineers did play

a key role in the Korean

activity. It was something

we can all be proud of

and it should be recorded.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 421

huts, designed for a tropical climate, and had been left

in Okinawa at the end of World War II. Eight years later,

in some condition of deterioration, they were picked up

and shipped up to put officers and soldiers in for a Korean winter.

As you can imagine they needed considerable repair. They needed a lot of extra parts and they needed

something done to winterize them. That was a big program for the division. We continued making tent kits

for the troops who were still going to have to spend another winter in tents. At least we could get them off

the ground onto a platform with A-frame tents with

special provisions for heating stoves. Many eventually

burned up, by the way.

Other types of buildings were being received

steadily all through the late summer and fall of 1953. By

the time the cold weather came in November ’53, the

division was semi-winterized, and the men were certainly

in a more comfortable state than they’d been in the

previous couple of years. It was a major effort that

kept our entire battalion busy.

We set up a system again where the units using the

prefab buildings would come to the engineer yards and

pick up the pieces they needed. Here we ran into more

trouble because the buildings were much more complicated than the bunker or tent kits. We had to give the

infantry, artillery units, and other units, considerably

more assistance. Theoretically, at least, our engineer soldiers knew more about setting up the buildings than the

other people did. In many cases, however, an engineer

soldier didn’t know the first thing about putting up a

tropical building and winterizing it.

I went all over Korea with the division G-4, Lt.

Col. Jack Wright, who later became a lieutenant general

and Comptroller of the Army. Col. Wright was a very

inspirational man and we worked out a good program

together. We’d get in a light aircraft and fly all over Korea trying to find the necessary parts and buildings. We

succeeded fairly well in doing what we had to do but it

was a big job.

The Korean winter where we were, north of Seoul

along the DMZ (demilitarized zone), was a moderately

severe winter, with a fair amount of snow and cold

weather, but it was nothing like the Korean winter at the

Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. We never got down to those

temperatures or had that much snow on the ground.

The climate was certainly a more severe climate than in

Washington, D.C., and more like you’d find in central

Pennsylvania or upstate New York. It was alternating

freezing and thawing, kind of miserable weather. I

lived two Korean winters in a tent and I found it a terribly unpleasant way to live. You tended to be cold

most of the time.

A big problem was finding clean, dry areas to do

maintenance on our trucks and our heavy engineer

equipment. By the time I left we had established a
422 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

series of maintenance parks where we were able to do

this under cover very well, with space heaters to heat

the space so that the maintenance could be done a little

more easily.

It was still quite primitive. How they’d gotten by

the first couple of years of the war without any of those

facilities was amazing. I’m sure maintenance suffered.

It’s hard to get a man who’s cold, wet, and miserable, to

go out in the mud and pull maintenance on a bulldozer.

It’s much easier if you’ve got a hard stand, a roof, and a

space heater.

Soldiers are remarkable people. They will improvise and carry on under considerable hardship and discomfort when they see the need for it. They really rise to

the occasion. Of course, when hostilities ceased, people

naturally began to think more about themselves and to

expect creature comforts.

I was assistant division engineer only for the last

60 days or so of my stay. That was during a period

when I was working with the division G-4 to find materials and buildings for the division. As assistant division

engineer my efforts were heavily slanted towards logistics and supply. One of the big challenges was to get the

materials we needed and to properly house them. I literally had two offices as assistant division engineer. I had a

desk at the battalion headquarters where I spent about a

third of the time, and I had a desk up in the division

G-4 office where I spent the rest of the time, when I

wasn’t off hunting things.

It was a lot of fun being assistant division engineer

because you got involved in virtually everything going

on in the entire division. You got to know the key people

in the division and I found it quite exhilarating. I enjoyed my last couple of months very much because it

was such a challenge. You’re going seven days and nights

a week trying to accomplish a job that you know you’re

not going to finish, but at least you want to get off to a

good start so the next guy can pick it up and carry it on.

At the time I left the division in April 1954, people were

Engineer supplies

stored on the pier

at Inch’on

RG 111, SC-354721
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 423

EL.I!'VATIONS IN 

0 100 ~00 

I 

"'ETERS 

SEA 

OF 

fOOO AND ABOVE 

I 

'P ~WII..ES 

'' KII..O ... ~TEAS 
424 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

beginning to plan for the next winter, along with redeployment, and shifting of stocks and supplies.

Lessons Learned

There was quite a program to bring back lessons learned.

We turned in a number of reports. I always sent reports

to the I Corps Engineer and to the Eighth Army Engineer. General Lewis J. Rumaggi, the Eighth Army Engineer for part of the time, was an outstanding man.

He was personally interested in unit histories and the

lessons learned.

While I was the supply officer in the 7th Division,

a team from OCE came over with a whole battery of

questionnaires and investigators, because they were

preparing a history of engineer operations. I never

did see the end result of that but we spent a fair amount

of time with them. We took them all over the division

area, gave them an eyeful and an earful, and provided a

lot of good material with which to write an engineer

history of Korea.

The transition from war to peace was a busy, confusing, and disruptive time. People were rotating home.

New people came in who’d not been there while the war

was on so they didn’t understand the history of things or

why we were doing things the way we were. It was a

good time to write lessons learned and a history. There’s

a very small window when you can capture a team of

people who were on the spot and understand what happened. When the cease-fire came, people began leaving.

The information that was available in the summer and

fall of ’53 was no longer available in one nice, contained

package by the spring and summer of ’54.

Both of our battalion commanders, Cols. Icke and

O’Neal, were very conscious of this. They were well aware

of a military history approach to things and they both

kept extensive ledgers of their own.

We had a very close-knit battalion, in the sense

that we gathered at least once a day, typically after the

evening meal. Pretty thorough reports were given; briefings were given on everyone’s activities for the day and

plans were made for the next day.

Our adjutant, who kept an ongoing ledger of the

battalion’s activities, wrote down a lot of these things. I

know they did the same thing in our S-3 shop. They had

an operations book, which noted all the principal activities of the battalion from day to day.

For one reason or another the Korean War tends

to get forgotten. I guess it’s because it was so much smaller

than World War II, and then it was overshadowed later

by Vietnam. But the engineers did play a key role in the

Korean activity. It was something we can all be proud of

and it should be recorded.

 When I went over to Korea in 1953, I had

four-and-a-half years of service, three of which had

been in Europe, and yet I don’t recall reading a single

thing that prepared me specifically for what I was

If the regiment knew how to

use the engineers, and if the

engineers were not bashful in

explaining their capabilities to

the tactical unit commanders,

they gained a great deal from

the engineers’ support.
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 425

Engineers build a ponton

bridge across the Imjim

River, June 1951

Engineer School, 42-5-111

425

Soldiers of the 3d

Engineer Combat

Battalion cross

the Han River on

an improvised ferry

RG 111, SC-359556

going to do in Korea. I did see some films of unit

actions in the early days of Korea, but at no point was

I ever given any piece of paper to read on the Korean

conflict by any of my organizations, or by OCE, or

by Headquarters DA, that would have prepared me.

I was simply sent over.

What’s available by way of lessons learned and

history is never sufficiently available to the people at

the time and place they need it. Of course it takes a

tremendous organizational effort, as well as some expense,

to bring the pertinent information to the right people

early on.

If I’d been smarter when I was getting ready to go

over to Korea and had called the right people or written

for the right materials, I am sure I could have gotten

some. But, in the rush to clear my company command

in Fort Lewis, Washington, take a short leave, and get

back to ship out to Korea, that fell through the cracks.

Much of what I did when I got to Korea I did not

anticipate. I had no thought of being a division engineer

supply officer, for example. Even if I had known the book

solution on being the DESO, I never would have thought

about tent kits, bunker kits, or all the other strange things

we wound up doing.

The overwhelming positive lesson I learned was

the great value of direct engineer support to the infantry

regiments. If the regiment knew how to use the engineers, and if the engineers were not bashful in explaining their capabilities to the tactical unit commanders,

they gained a great deal from the engineers’ support. I

was thrilled to see how well our companies worked with

the regiments. That was happening when I arrived and

it built up while the 7th Division stayed in Korea. That

was a tremendous lesson that I think not only engineers

learned, but everybody learned. Again, the word “combat multiplier” applies, although I don’t ever remember

that term being used at the time of the Korean War.

The engineers’ supply and maintenance system

did not operate as well as it should have, and there

were a lot of lessons to be learned on getting the right

mix and models of equipment to the right units. I’m
426 Remembering the Forgotten War Chapter 6

First Lieutenant Joseph K. Bratton 13th Engineer Combat Battalion

conscious of the problems with maintenance and

supply because I was involved in it so much, but it

was just a tough battle all the way through to get the

right things to the right people at the right time.

I was always impressed with the type of combat

leadership we had in the 7th Division, starting with

the division commander, Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau,

who was superb, right on down through the units.

And, that applied across-the-board, regardless of the

branch involved.

One disappointing lesson learned in Korea probably has been true of every combat operation in the

history of warfare. The lives led by those doing the fighting differed greatly from the lives of those who were back

in rear areas. It just didn’t seem fair. I was disappointed

that our leadership allowed such a disparity to exist.

Later, when I got to Vietnam, I found the same

thing. If I’d been in combat in World War II, I might

well have seen it there too. There’s a pervasive psychology that tends to build up the amenities for the rear area

troops, not necessarily at the expense of, but to a much

greater degree than anything that’s done for the forward

area troops who are, after all, the cutting edge of the

effort. This bothered me the whole time I was there. I

always returned from a visit to the rear area feeling sort

of uneasy and let down about this disparity.

One lesson that I learned was that the things that

we’d been taught at the basic school at Fort Belvoir, and

our basic military training, actually worked when applied properly in a field environment. There was no need

to go off for a lot of ad hoc solutions to problems. The

problems were all addressed in your training. If you just

recalled the right training and placed it into the situation you encountered, things we had been taught worked.

The methods of maintaining roads, building bridges,

putting in field fortification, and using demolitions and

explosives, all came right out of our basic background

and training that the Army had given us.

Engineers build

a ponton bridge

across the Imjim

River, June 1951

Engineer School, 42-5-111
Active Defense July 1951–July 1953 427

I’m not sure whether this would apply universally,

but the NCOs I encountered did a magnificent job. Our

senior NCOs, with very few exceptions, were World War

II people. About a third of the others were World War II

veterans. Even those who weren’t, I thought, did a fine

job. The ones I worked with were excellent. They were

capable of assuming considerable responsibility.

Another observation was the willingness of the

troops to make great sacrifices and to work extremely

hard, given decent leadership and guidance. All they had

to know was what to do. When they were given guidance and a job to do, they did it very well.

It was a draftee Army. There were Regular Army

people, but some of my finest soldiers were draftees who

had absolutely no plan to make the Army a career. That

would have been the farthest thing from their minds—

yet, they were there to do a job and when the pressure

was on those people rose to the occasion.

I was notified that I was going back to Fort Belvoir

in the late winter of ’53-’54. Although I went back to

take the Advanced Course, I left the Advanced Course

halfway through to revert to reserve status because of

family business matters. I left active duty in February

1955 and returned to active duty in November 1955.

Consequently, in 1957 I attended the Associate Advanced

Course, which I probably would have enjoyed more if

I hadn’t been to Korea. Some of the things taught

in the Advanced Course were very helpful, things that

I had not learned in Korea. Other things were troublesome to those of us who were back from the Korean

War, because they didn’t jibe completely with our personal experiences.

Of course, you have to look upon this with an open

mind. Your perspective depended on your experiences.

The fellows who were in the division, as I was, had totally different experiences than some of the people who

were back in the rear area engineer units, or on engineer

staffs, e.g., Eighth Army headquarters.

There were always some cantankerous students

in the Advanced Course who would try to shoot

down the instructor because, “...I was in Korea and

this is how it really was.” That was never a fair thing to

do because the Engineer School and the Army schools

taught the general case. There were always exceptions

where things were done differently or wouldn’t have

worked just that way. Some of the things I learned in

the Advanced Course I wish I’d known before I went

to Korea. But there was no substitute for being in the

Korean War for learning how a combined arms team

operates or how a division staff functions. I learned

a great deal from my Korean experiences.
I • I 

•, I .. ,. 

I • I ~· L' :I. I 

i1illi.IIIIU .. ~ ......... ,11 
429

Conclusion

Korean forces crossed the 38th

0, U.S. strategic planners were

he relatively minor role Korea

cymaking in Asia meant that

e area were focused instead on

s, Okinawa and Taiwan. All of

egarded the division of Korea

emporary expedient, and the

omeday, peacefully, the Soviet

North Korea) might dominate

es aside, official Washington

rth Korean invasion. Watching

lide into a backwater of the

ng; seeing South Korea fall to

te another. The initial Ameri

ured—air and naval actions

dditional materiel support for

owever, the fall of Seoul, less

nvasion, clearly demonstrated

ound forces.

r’s Eighth Army in Japan was

ajor ground commitment, but

sh out depleted regiments, or

nt. If the North Koreans were

of the essence. MacArthur sent

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean’s 24th Infantry Division,because the division was located near Japanese portsclosest to Korea. The division landed in Pusan inearly July. Two reinforced companies (TASK FORCE

SMITH) made the initial American contact with enemyforces and were badly bloodied. The war began toexact its terrible toll on the American soldier.

Lt. Col. Peter C. Hyzer’s 3d Engineer Combat

Battalion arrived on 5 July in support of the 24th Infantry Division. These men were the first engineers toenter combat, and they, like many other engineerswho followed, served as technicians and as infantry—builders and fighters.

During the four or five weeks following the Communist invasion, Americans fought a series of battles

against overwhelming odds, while retreating into a defensive perimeter around the Korean port of Pusan.During this retrograde action, the engineers often weresimultaneously blowing bridges and building them,clearing minefields and planting them, destroying portfacilities and establishing them. Then, there was theendless crush of refugees—always the refugees who,through no fault of their own, often seriously impededthe engineers’ operations. Whenever possible, the Army’sengineers helped ease the sufferings of these people.

In August-September 1950 the UN forces fought

a series of engagements along the defensive positions,all the while building up strength for an offensive
Remembering the Forgotten War

northward. During the North Korean sharp attacksagainst the Naktong River line, the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion fought stubbornly as infantry defendingits positions.

 In a bold stroke to seize the momentum, on 15

September 1950, MacArthur conducted a successful jointamphibious landing at Inch’on deep behind enemylines. Engineer units, including the 19th Engineer Combat Group, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, and the73d Engineer Construction Battalion went ashore atInch’on, assisting the Marines in the assault landingand in their crossing of the Han River, south and southwest of Seoul. The 13th Engineer Combat Battalion alsolanded to support the 7th Infantry Division with roadbuilding and bridging.

The closely timed Eighth Army breakout from

the Pusan Perimeter found the 2d Engineer CombatBattalion laboring to construct floating bridges overthe Naktong for the march northward. Soon thereafter,these engineers also had to bridge the Kum River, wherethe 3d Engineer Combat Battalion had destroyed thebridges in July during the earlier retreat south.

The North Korean forces, at the end of a long

supply line, were in retreat. The Inch’on landing threatened to cut them off from the rear, while unremittingAmerican air attacks made life hazardous. The UN forcesmoved northward and recaptured Seoul by the end ofSeptember 1950.

With the successful Inch’on landing and the

Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, theimmediate question was how far the UN forces shouldadvance. MacArthur advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) that all available Corps of Engineer troops wouldhave to concentrate on repairing the rail lines fromPusan to the 38th Parallel. Air operations had utterlydevastated the communications links on both sides ofthe Parallel. As Eighth Army approached a junctionwith X Corps’ forces near Seoul, officials in Washington(including the JCS) determined that MacArthur shouldpursue and destroy the North Korean forces. While theUN debated whether UN forces should cross the 38thParallel, MacArthur received presidential authority todo so.

Lt. Gen. Walton Walker’s Eighth Army attacked

north from Seoul, capturing the North Korean capitalof P’yongyang in October. The 3d Engineer CombatBattalion cleared the highway north to Sinanju, improving it as the main logistical road for Eighth Army’sprojected drive to the Manchurian border. This roadwork was often accompanied by mine removal, and theCommunists frequently used wooden box mines thatwere difficult to detect and dangerous to remove.

X Corps, under Maj. Gen. Edward Almond, was

extracted from Inch’on and moved by sea to Korea’snortheast coast. MacArthur, knowing the condition ofthe roads and shattered rail lines south to Pusan, recog-
431

N force could not be supplied

san. Wonsan would have to be

ned as a supply conduit. After

late October at Wonsan, which

K forces, X Corps joined the

the Yalu River. American troops

ng home for Christmas. It was

se Forces (CCF), having already

ght with ROK units near the

 units ambushed the 8th Cav

ry Division, near Unsan, as en

ntensified throughout Korea.

Yalu River bridges bombed for

he CCF entered the conflict in

rous phase of the Korean con

threats, the American and ROK

X Corps area. In mid-Novem

th Division, reached the Yalu,

ay UN forces were ordered to

rces opened a major offensive,

pecially 2d and 25th Infantry

ongch’on River in the west and

th Division in the east near the

voir. More often than not, the

o a series of company-sized en

eer Construction Battalion was

especially hard hit while fighting through Chinese roadblocks as the 2d Division disengaged and moved south.Gen. Walker, fearing envelopment from the east,struggled to save Eighth Army.

In the east, engineer units were instrumental in X

Corps’ evacuation from Hungnam. They kept the roadsto the North Korean port open for the 1st Marine Division, 3d Infantry Division, and 7th Division to reachthe coast, while erecting obstacles behind the Americanunits to slow any Communist pursuit. During theoutloading, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade operatedthe dock facilities. The 10th Engineer Combat Battalion and Navy demolition teams then destroyed the port,after the last American units—along with thousands ofcivilian refugees—departed on Christmas Eve 1950.

The Communist forces launched a major offensive across the 38th Parallel on New Year’s Day 1951,

recapturing Seoul in a matter of days. After regroupingalong the 37th Parallel, UN forces resumed the offensive, only to run into a severe Chinese counterattack atChip’yong-ni in early February. At Chip’yong-ni, menof the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion distinguished themselves fighting as infantry, by now a familiar scenario forengineers in Korea. UN forces retook Seoul in midMarch, more for its political and psychological effect thanfor its military value (apart from the Kimpo Airfield).The fate of the South Korean capital was indicative ofthe ebb and flow of the fighting. Between the initial
Remembering the Forgotten War

North Korean invasion in June 1950 and March 1951,Seoul changed hands four times and very nearly didso again during another Chinese offensive in April.

During their offensive of April-May 1951, the CCF

suffered heavy casualties. UN units once again drovenorth, reaching the 38th Parallel by mid-June, and movedinto defensive positions along the KANSAS LINE. Thisdefensive position began in the west near the mouth ofthe Imjin River, some 20 miles north of Seoul, andran across the breadth of Korea to Yangyang on the eastcoast. Preliminary peace discussions began in July atKaesong, followed by more extensive armistice negotiations in November at Panmunjom, five miles to the east.

 Hill fighting marked the conflict thereafter. In a

prolonged series of limited engagements and seesawbattles for Korea’s high ground, hills with names such asBloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, Pork Chop Hill, andOld Baldy came to symbolize the Korean experience formany American fighting men. Because of the terrain,engineer units sometimes used aerial tramways to get menand materiel to the ridges. Although limited in objective, the punch and counter-punch engagements forposition often involved savage fighting and persisted untilthe cease-fire was signed on 27 July 1953.

During the years of fighting, the extreme weather

conditions and rugged topography placed a severe strainon the men and their equipment. The engineers’ oralhistories are peppered with references to the dusty Korean “roads,” and the Herculean efforts required keep- ing those same roads open during the monsoon season. Starting in mid-June and lasting for six or seven weeks, the monsoon season, with its torrential downpours, turned roads covered in dust “like talcum powder” into muddy tracks. Trucks and heavy equipment would sink down and become hopelessly stuck. Consequently, con- siderable engineer energy was devoted to improving the drainage and slope of the roads. Travelling mostly on foot with limited armor, the enemy did not find the rains as worrisome. Over the years, most of the trees had been cleared from the Korean hills. When it rained heavily on these defoliated hillsides, the ground was not able to absorb the rainfall. The waters swelled the rivers much more quickly than under normal conditions, often causing unanticipated flooding in the valleys. In only a matter of hours, a dry streambed might be transformed into a river filled with eight to ten feet of rushing water. The harsh winters also were a shock. Several of the officers commented on the frigid temperatures, even those accustomed to colder regions in Europe and the United States. Military planners did not take the cold into consideration, so winter clothing was not available for most of the troops that first year. Moreover, the troops were expected to be home no later than Christmas 1950. The arctic temperatures caused some of the equipment to freeze up and certainly compounded the difficulties
433

 The engineers who were build

pend considerable time in icy

n to the harsh elements and

more unpleasant. Sometimes,

ed movement across a frozen

thout a bridge.

 flooding rivers impeded the

tate the movement of men and

ted lowlands and the rocky up

ng and maintenance difficult.

Korea’s rivers to rage and flood

are. Three years of adapting to

n of Korea burned the names of

ng, Kum, Han, Imjin, Twinnan,

mories of those who served.

erican military entered the Ko

hat Korea’s rudimentary roads,

incapable of handling the needs

ngineers were charged with the

ngthening, maintaining, and

the ports of arrival to the front

ts, the routes often ran across

hrough minefields, and up into

 and supplies arrived by ship.

r at Pusan, loaded with engi

r months to be unloaded. Re

nes from the ports was largely

an engineer responsibility. Engineers also assisted inthe unloading process, moving the supplies to shoreand using cranes for heavy lifts from landing crafts.The 50th Engineer Port Construction Company builtport facilities and also laid miles of underwater pipeline to bring fuel ashore from tankers. Their masterdivers also were valuable in assisting with underwatership repairs. Consequently, the engineers had significant responsibilities in the ports during both landingsand evacuations.

Once the ships were unloaded, the Korean railway

system strained to distribute the supplies. The rail system both in North and South Korea quickly becameoverburdened when it became the principal method ofclearing cargo from the ports of Pusan and Hungnam.Repairing damaged rail lines, especially between Pusanand Seoul, became critically important, and that taskfell largely to the engineers.

Faced with a torrent of incoming materiel, the

depots quickly became swamped and did not have thecapacities to absorb the supplies. In the first year of theconflict, so many supplies accumulated in the depotsthat finding the necessary items involved searchingthrough piles of materiel that had not been organized orsorted. After awhile, engineers built additional depotsto house the materiel. The depot system became moreorganized over time, and workers were held more accountable for the supplies.
Remembering the Forgotten War

Korean roadways, which were mostly unpaved,

were not built to carry the military’s heavy equipment.The engineers were tasked with adding a gravel base onthe roads. This responsibility often included quarryingand crushing the rock as well as spreading it on the roads.Putting in proper culverts and drainage to control waterrunoff also was an important and time-consuming partof roadwork.

Because of the fluid nature of the fighting during

the early stages of the war, bridges, often crucial forthe MSR, had to be designed, built, destroyed, andthen rebuilt. Several different types were used, including treadway bridges, Bailey bridges, aerial tramways,and ponton bridges. Engineers had to determine whichtype of bridging would suit each particular crossingand consider its use as well as cope with the availablebridging supplies. At times, the engineers providedferry service for river crossings. Demolition often wasnecessary so as not to leave things behind thatmight be useful to the enemy. Of course, there werethe “pitfalls of over-destruction.” Some things thatthe engineers had been ordered to blow up were neededlater, so engineers had to build a few bridges over andover again.

Keeping the supply route open would have been

difficult under advantageous conditions. The job becamefar more challenging in a combat situation with thehazards of mines, mortar attacks, and enemy fire.

At the beginning of the war, the Army Corps

of Engineers’ officers felt the lack of readiness acutelyin the areas of equipment and supplies. Much of theirequipment was old and worn, dating from WorldWar II. Reclaimed from the Pacific area through the“roll-up” plan of the Far East Command, many vehicleswere in bad repair and some were even towed as theywere loaded up to be sent to Korea. Chronic part shortages and maintenance problems also plagued manyof the engineers.

A number of officers in charge of maintaining the

roads emphasized the shortages of bulldozers,angledozers, and cranes, especially the first year. To makematters worse, there also was a severe shortage of spareparts to repair trucks and broken equipment. Becausethe equipment and parts were not generally standardized, and units received a variety of different types andmodels, the problems were magnified.

Shortages of materiel often were felt in one area

but not in another. One engineer described havingshiploads of barbed wire while another officer wasdesperate for wire. Another officer’s requirement forconcrete was filled until he had concrete “coming outof his ears.” One unit traded homemade ice cream forbadly needed nails. The lack of functioning generatorsand the necessary spare parts caused great frustration,especially since so many other pieces of equipmentdepended upon them.
435

e builders complained there was

lumber, bent connections for

pile-driving equipment. As one

was never enough bridging!

ope with their situations as best

uring that hectic first year. Parts

ed from several vehicles in or

 run. “Scrounging,” the term

king around depots and other

g that was useful, was another

ged. Sometimes, this meant ac

 equipment belonging to other

oy Network” served as an infor

s of meeting the needs of some

nd abandoned equipment was

ng the shortages.

ure to keep strict accountabil

of large quantities of materiel

ilitary personnel and Korean

 a pervasive problem, which

earance of whole trainloads of

fering. Many of the stolen items

market, which thrived during

ns even resorted to using the

 of supplies when the normal

atic supply system determined

 to Korea. Further complicating the situation, engineer equipment was shipped to Korea without real consideration for its condition or usefulness. By the spring of 1951 the engineers had a better understanding of their requirements and began evacuating some of the inoperable equipment from Korea. They began requisitioning specific types of heavy construction equipment and improving the facilities at the supply depots. With the help of thou- sands of Korean laborers, engineers built roads and bridges that facilitated the movement of men and mate- riel. A heightened awareness of the situation in Korea helped the military supply people back in Tokyo respond to the requests more effectively. The UN’s quick offensive into North Korea in the fall of 1950, followed by the rapid retreat a few months later, left men on the front lines short of necessary sup- plies. The bitter cold of the Korean winter made the lack of sufficient winter clothing a particular hardship, and the sub-zero temperatures wreaked havoc on the equip- ment that first winter. During the fall of 1951 the fighting was more static, making the distribution of supplies easier. By then, items of winter clothing were widely available even though the frigid tempera- tures continued to hamper the men and their opera- tions. As the engineers became more aware of the opera- tional realities of building and fighting in Korea, they were able to make appropriate modifications to their equipment and supplies. Over time, they were able
Remembering the Forgotten War

to allevi-ate many of the materiel problems they had originally experienced. Nevertheless, problems with the supply system continued to some extent for the duration ofthe Korean Conflict.

The resilience and ingenuity of the engineers themselves were key ingredients of their success. The engineers made do with what they had. When roadwork required huge numbers of sandbags, the men simply filled

straw rice bags, which were readily available, with sand.When faced with the awesome challenge of bridging achasm during the retreat from the Changjin (Chosin)Reservoir, Army engineers figured out a way to air dropa bridge, and the Marines on the ground wrestled it intoplace. Without other means of communication, one engineer, stranded on a beach, spelled out “HELP! USTROOPS” in powdered milk on a runway to hail a planeflying above. In short, the actions of these men and manyothers testified to the fundamental resiliency and resourcefulness of the American soldier.

Training for the men serving in Korea, however,

was not always adequate. A number of second lieutenants, members of the West Point Class of 1950, werethrust into combat without attending their designatedbranch basic course. For other engineer officers, the Korean War meant working with enlisted men whose skilllevels and technical expertise varied widely, often depending upon whether or not these men had experience inWorld War II. More than one of the officers commented

on the need to improvise training sessions and on-thejob training opportunities, for in Korea the men grappledwith unfamiliar and difficult engineering tasks, especiallyin such areas as road building and bridging.

Several engineer officers believed that the troop

rotation policy had a negative effect on morale, and addressed the problem of securing adequate troop replacements. Other officers discussed the unfairness of callingup individual inactive reservists instead of entire ReadyReserve units.

Other personnel issues impacted performance

and could not be ignored. Race relations in Koreawere not always smooth and the underlying tensionswere exacerbated under the stress of combat. In May 1951Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway formally requested authority to abolish segregation in Eighth Army. Integrationfollowed, and although it was not without its awkwardmoments, it was generally successfully. First LieutenantFloyd Wright’s 573d Engineer Ponton Bridge Company was the last segregated Army unit in Korea. Theinterviewees frankly discuss the issues integration raised.Other engineers described their experiences workingwith Korean laborers. KATUSAs and other Koreanworkers performed much of the physical labor, andseveral of the engineers relied heavily on their efforts.

The experiences of the engineers varied considerably. As in the wars before and after Korea, the burden

felt by the individual soldier depended largely on where
437

expected to do. Naturally, the

yman in front-line combat was

man in the rear areas of Korea.

s were shared, their stories about

od, and fighting varied consid

neer serving in the 2d Engineer

h lost all of its equipment and

casualties, had a far different

ng in a unit where conditions

 peacetime assignments.

 the fundamental personnel

War was how engineer troops

ngineers routinely be used as

e broad mission of U.S. Army

n to facilitate the deployment

 forces, while impeding the

 This dual mission was central

ences in Korea, and in that

no different than the nation’s

 of the interviews make clear,

mission often meant that engi

d as infantry. Generally, expedi

 the war dictated their roles

and skill designators.

ide of the coin, where engineer

h infantry soldiers? And how

be used—as a distinct engineer

ning together, or as companies,

scattered amongst the division’s infantry regiments?The oral histories reveal that both arrangements wereused in Korea, and the question remained unresolvedat the end of the conflict.

 Whatever their assigned roles, the engineers battled

the enemy in a hostile environment, faced challenging personnel issues, and devised innovative ways tocope with their missions. The ebb and flow of the fighting made the engineers’ job more difficult. The fluidnature of the fighting front would not be matched untilthe Vietnam conflict. With the cessation of hostilities, the sense of total victory that came with the end ofWorld War II was absent in Korea. Army engineersfelt the same understandable frustrations as otherAmerican and allied servicemen who did their dutyand then simply went home.

During the three-year conflict on the peninsula,

the engineers contributed, disproportional to theirnumbers, to the effectiveness of the regimental andcorps units they supported. As one officer noted, the engineers were clearly a “force multiplier” for UN forcesthroughout the conflict, and in doing so they addedanother proud chapter to the history of the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers. The interviews in this volume provide a real and very personal glimpse of a few of theofficers whose skill, courage, and dedication were thehallmarks of the engineers’ contribution to America’s“forgotten war.”

439

Biographies

eneral Joseph K.

 and

T. Greenwood

h Bratton was born in 1926 in

graduated from the U. S. Mili

a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engi

ater attended the Engineer Of

he Command and General Staff

States Army War College, and

e in nuclear engineering from

f Technology. Besides Korea, his

ber of overseas assignments in

 served in a number of capaci

ng as Chief of Engineers. He

olonel Charles M.

Firefight at Yechon,

G. Fisch, Jr.

les Bussey was born in 1921 in

He studied engineering at Los

d in 1941 volunteered for the

d pilot training at the Tuskegee

d flew with the 332d Fighter

Bussey later attended the Uni

ornia and San Francisco State

University, completing his bachelor’s degree. In August1948 he returned to active duty with the 74th EngineerBattalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. In 1950 he was reassigned to the U.S. Army of Occupation in Japan, serving first with the 538th Engineer Service Battalion, before assuming command of the 77th Engineer CombatCompany. The 77th Engineer Combat Company transferred to Pusan, Korea, in July 1950. Colonel Busseylater returned to flight status, serving at several bases inthe United States and Germany.Cochran, Colonel Harrington W., Jr.

Interviewed in March 1987 by Herbert HartColonel Harrington Cochran, Jr., was born in 1919 inSan Diego, California. He graduated from the U.S.Military Academy in 1941, receiving his commissionin the Coast Artillery Corps. He transferred to the Corpsof Engineers in 1948. He later received a Master ofScience degree in civil engineering from Texas A&M,and an MBA from The George Washington University.In addition to his tour in Korea, he served in a number of other overseas assignments in the Pacific andEurope. His stateside assignments included an assignment as District Engineer for West Virginia. He retiredin 1971.

Korean Service Campaign Medalwith seven Campaign Stars
Remembering the Forgotten War

Davidson, Lieutenant General Garrison H.Interviewed in November 1980 by Dr. John T. GreenwoodLieutenant General Garrison Davidson was born in 1904in New York, New York. He graduated from the U.S.Military Academy in 1927 as a 2d lieutenant, Corps ofEngineers. General Davidson also holds Honorary Doctor of Law degrees from Williams College and the University of Akron. In addition to his service in the KoreanWar, General Davidson’s overseas assignments includedWorld War II service in North Africa and Europe. Hecommanded Seventh Army, 1960-62. His stateside assignments include service as superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, 1956-60; and commanding general, FirstUnited States Army, 1962-64.Dawson, Brigadier General Miles M.Interviewed in May 1980 by Dr. Laurence SuidBrigadier General Miles Dawson was born in 1902 inViroqua, Wisconsin. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1925 as a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engineers. He later earned a degree in civil engineering fromCornell University and a Master of Science degree fromthe University of Iowa. In addition to his overseas dutyin Japan, General Dawson served in a wide variety ofassignments in the Pacific and in Europe. His extensivestateside assignments included service as commandinggeneral, Granite City Engineer Depot, Granite City, Illinois, 1954-56. He retired in 1956.

Elder, Lieutenant General John H., Jr.

Interviewed in July 1982 by Dr. Lynn SimsLieutenant General John Elder, Jr. was born in 1920 inRichmond, Virginia. He graduated from Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia, in 1941, witha bachelor’s degree in civil engineering and was commissioned as a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engineers Reserve.He was called to active duty 1 August 1941. His overseas assignments included service in France, Germany,Korea, and Vietnam, where he commanded the 18thEngineer Brigade. General Elder’s stateside assignmentswere numerous and varied and included service as Chiefof Plans & Programs, J-5, and Office of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, Washington, D.C.Farnum, Colonel Lawrence B.Interviewed in May 1997 by Dr. Barry W. FowleColonel Lawrence Farnum was born in 1921 in Ashley,Michigan. He began his military career at MichiganCollege of Mining & Technology where he enrolled inthe ROTC basic course for two years. He graduated witha bachelor’s degree in mining engineering. He later received a master’s degree in mining from the College ofMines, University of Washington, and a master’s degreein civil engineering from the University of Illinois. Heserved in the Air Corps during World War II. He received his Regular Army commission in the Corps ofEngineers in 1950. In addition to Korea, his other over-
441

merous Pacific and European

e assignments included serving

Engineer, HQ, U.S. Army Stra

ommand, Washington, D.C.,

ona.

rt M.

y Dr. Barry W. Fowle

was born in 1924 in Fannin

ded Texas A&M and graduated

Academy in 1945 with a com

t, Corps of Engineers. He later

n civil engineering from Texas

degree in international affairs

ngton University. In addition

Colonel Fowler’s other overseas

ty with engineer units in Eu

stateside assignments included

f Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff

d in 1972.

B., Jr.

Thomas Tulenko

 was born in 1926 in George

high school, he served three

and military policeman, and

52 at the Engineer Officer Can

oir, Virginia. Colonel Gray attended Louisiana Polytechnic Institute and received a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from the Missouri School of Mines. He later received a master’s degree in international relations from Boston University, and a master’s in civil engineering from Iowa State University. Besides Korea, his overseas service ranged from Greenland to Vietnam to Saudi Arabia. His stateside assignments included service as Deputy Director for Plans, Require- ments, and Technology at the Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center. Hoskins, Colonel Harry D., Jr. Interviewed May-July 1995 by Dr. John T. Greenwood Colonel Harry Hoskins, Jr., was born in 1914 in Trinidad, Colorado. He graduated from the Colorado School of Mines and received an ROTC commission as a 2d lieu- tenant in the Army Reserve. He entered military service in 1942 and served in the Pacific, North Africa, and Italy. He was heavily involved in establishing the engineer spe- cial brigades in the South West Pacific. Following his tour in Korea, Colonel Hoskins served in a variety of assignments stateside and in Europe. He retired in 1963. Hyzer, Brigadier General Peter C. Interviewed in December 1984 by Herbert Hart Brigadier General Peter Hyzer was born in 1914 in Rockford, Illinois. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1937 as a 2d lieutenant, Infantry, and later United Nations Korean Service Medal
Remembering the Forgotten War

received a master’s degree in civil engineering from theMassachusetts Institute of Technology. He served inEngland, France, and Germany with the 5th InfantryDivision during World War II. In Korea, he was battalion commander, 3d Engineer Combat Battalion, 1950-51. He later served in a variety of other assignments inthe Pacific and in the United States. He retired in 1967.Itschner, Lieutenant General Emerson C.Interviewed in July 1977 by Dr. Frank SchubertLieutenant General Emerson Itschner was born in 1903in Chicago, Illinois. He was appointed to the U. S. Military Academy, and in 1924 was commissioned a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engineers. In 1926 he received abachelor’s degree in civil engineering from Cornell University. General Itschner’s overseas duties included a variety of engineer and command assignments in Europeand Asia. His stateside assignments included service asChief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1956-61.Johnson, Major General James A.Interviewed March-April 1993 by Dr. Charles HendricksMajor General James Johnson was born in 1924 inStoughton, Wisconsin. He graduated from the U.S.Military Academy in 1947, and was commissioned a 2dlieutenant, Corps of Engineers. He later received a Master of Science degree from Stanford University. GeneralJohnson served in a variety of overseas and stateside engineer and command assignments, and retired as Deputy Chief of Engineers, 1979-80. Love, Colonel Robert W. Interviewed in April 1994 by Dr. Barry W. Fowle Colonel Robert Love was born in 1916 in Madisonville, Tennessee. He attended Vanderbilt University for one year because he was too young to go to the U.S. Military Academy. He graduated in 1938 from the Academy as a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engineers. Colonel Love later attended Harvard University Business School and re- ceived a master’s degree. In addition to his assignment to Korea, Colonel Love’s other overseas assignments in- cluded duty in Latin America, Europe, and the Pacific. His stateside assignments included service as Division Engineer, Missouri River Division. He retired in 1968. McIntyre, Brigadier General Kenneth E. Interviewed in October 1984 by Dr. Martin Reuss Brigadier General Kenneth McIntyre was born in 1926 in Randolph, Vermont. He attended the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned a 2d lieutenant in 1949. Further education included a Master of Science degree in civil engineering from Harvard University, and a Mas- ter of Science degree in business administration from The George Washington University. In addition to his ser- vice in Korea, his other overseas service included com- mand assignments in the Pacific and Vietnam. His nu-
443

included service as Division

Division, 1976-79.

ter S.

7 by Dr. Barry W. Fowle

g was born in 1922 at Jefferson

ouri. He graduated from Cen

phis, Tennessee, in 1940. He

erve Corps and was called to

aining and Officer Candidate

ated from OCS in April 1943

2d lieutenant, Corps of Engi

n included a bachelor’s degree

 a master’s degree in sanitary

nia Polytechnic Institute and

vely. In addition to his assign

neer Combat Battalion, other

cluded duty in Asia, Europe,

ca. His stateside assignments

ions and Intelligence Officer,

on Battalion, Fort Bragg, North

 Harold R.

y Dr. Charles Hendricks

arfitt was born in 1921 in Coal

attended Kutztown State Col

ory School, Washington, D.C.,

and the U.S. Military Academy, where he was commissioned in 1943 as a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engineers.He later received a master’s degree in civil engineeringfrom the Massachusetts Institute of Technology andattended the Advanced Management Program of theHarvard Business School. As part of the 6th EngineerSpecial Brigade, he was wounded on D-day during anamphibious landing on Omaha Beach. In September1950 he was assigned to the 2d Engineer CombatGroup, Korea, and later became commanding officer ofthe 8th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. Among other assignments, he later served ascommanding general, U.S. Army Engineer School,Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and as the last governor of theCanal Zone. He retired in 1979.Pickett, Lieutenant Colonel Evan S.Interviewed in June 1993 by Dr. Barry W. FowleLieutenant Colonel Evan Pickett was born in 1920 inSt. George, Utah. He attended Dixie College in St.George. In 1939, the Utah National Guard organized CCompany, 115th Engineer Combat Battalion at St.George, Utah, and Pickett became an original member. The unit was called to active duty, and he appliedfor Officer Candidate School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia,graduating in 1942 as a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engineers. In addition to his assignment to Korea as battalion commander of the 73d Engineer Combat Battalion,

Republic of KoreaPresidential Unit Citation
Remembering the Forgotten War

Colonel Pickett’s overseas tours included North Africa andItaly with the 1108th Engineer Combat Group, and dutyin the Philippines, Japan, and Turkey. His various stateside tours included serving as commanding officer, 73dEngineer Combat Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas.Roberts, Colonel Claude L., Jr.Interviewed in March 1997 by Dr. Barry W. FowleColonel Claude Roberts, Jr., was born in 1924 in Birmingham, Alabama. He attended Alabama PolytechnicInstitute, now Auburn University. He enlisted in the U.S.Army in 1943 and served as a corporal in the 417th Infantry Regiment, 76th Infantry Division, in Europe. Released from active duty, he returned to Auburn and in1948 received a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering. Helater earned a master’s degree in civil engineering fromIowa State College. He returned to active duty in 1950and was commissioned in the Regular Army. In additionto his tours in Korea, and in Europe during World War II,his other overseas tours included assignments in Germanyand Thailand. His stateside assignments included serviceas Engineer and Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, U.S.Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.Roush, Brigadier General Maurice D.Interviewed in February 1983 by Fred C. BohmBrigadier General Maurice Roush was born in 1928 inDouglas, Wyoming. He graduated from the U.S. Military

Academy in 1950 and was commissioned in the Corpsof Engineers. He was assigned to the 13th EngineerCombat Battalion (ECB), 7th Infantry Division, andhelped prepare the unit for movement to Korea. Helanded at Inch’on on D+2 with the 13th Engineer Combat Battalion. General Roush also served overseas inVietnam and Turkey. Stateside, General Roush commanded an engineer battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington, and a brigade at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.He also served as a Tactical Officer at the EngineerOfficer Candidate School, the U.S. Military Academy,and the U.S. Naval Academy.Rowny, Lieutenant General Edward L.

Interviewed 1986-93 by Dr. Barry W. FowleLieutenant General Edward Rowny was born in 1917 inBaltimore, Maryland. He graduated from Baltimore Polytechnic Institute, Johns Hopkins University, and, in1941, from the U.S. Military Academy. He later earnedtwo masters’ degrees from Yale University. Both beforeand after Korea, General Rowny served in a variety ofoverseas tours in Africa, Europe, and Asia, and in numerous stateside assignments. He retired in 1979 andsubsequently served as Chief Negotiator, Strategic ArmsReduction Talks (START) and special advisor to the president with the rank of ambassador.
445

eral Paschal N., Jr.

4 by Dr. Paul K. Walker

al Strong was born in 1901 in

e was appointed to the U.S.

ommissioned a 2d lieutenant,

e transferred to the Corps of

ater. General Strong attended

re he earned a degree in civil

ong was assigned as Engineer,

my, Japan, 1949-50. He con

Engineer when Eighth Army

ther overseas assignments in

lippines and the United King

Strong served in a variety of

s, culminating with duty as

vision, before retiring in 1954.

veral books and articles, how

ork was the radio serial, “Jack

rican Boy,” which broadcast

40s.

rge, Jr.

Dr. Barry W. Fowle

art, Jr., was born in 1927 in

e received an appointment to

my under the category “Sons

I Veterans.” Stukhart graduat

ned a Master of Science degree

from New York University and a doctorate from theUniversity of Ohio. In addition to his tour in Korea,Colonel Stukhart’s other overseas assignments includedtours in Okinawa, France, Italy, and Vietnam, and another tour in Korea. His various stateside tours includeda final assignment in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1972, before retiring.Trayers, Colonel James L.Interviewed February-March 1996 by Dr. Barry W. FowleColonel James Trayers was born in 1927 in Providence,Rhode Island. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1950 as a 2d lieutenant, Corps of Engineers. Colonel Trayers subsequently received a master’s degree in civilengineering from Iowa State and a master’s degree in mathfrom the University of Missouri. His initial assignmentin the Army was to the 8th Engineers, 1st Cavalry Division. Other overseas tours included service in Germany,Iran, and Vietnam. His stateside duty included numerous engineering assignments, such as Director, CoastalEngineering and Research Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia,and a tour with the Office of the Chief of Engineers in1979. He retired in 1980, but returned to active duty forthree years as commanding officer of the Engineer Activity, Capital Area.

Korean Service Campaign Medalwith seven Campaign Stars
Remembering the Forgotten War

Wells, Major General Richard M.Interviewed in June 1991 by Dr. John T. GreenwoodMajor General Richard Wells was born in 1929 in WalterReed Army Hospital, Washington, D.C. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned a 2d lieutenant in the U.S. Army in 1951. General Wellsearned a Master of Science degree from the University ofIowa and attended the Naval War College. In addition toservice in the Korean War, other overseas service includedan additional tour in Korea and other assignments inVietnam and Saudi Arabia. His stateside service includeda variety of engineer and command assignments, culminating with duty as Director, Defense Mapping Agency,and Deputy Chief of Engineers. He retired in 1984.Williams, Colonel Charles T.Interviewed in February 1985 by Thomas TulenkoColonel Charles Williams was born in 1926 in St. Paul,Minnesota. He was the son of the late Colonel Charles F.Williams, U.S.A. (CE, Ret., USMA 1913). Colonel Williams graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1946and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. He subsequently received his master’s degree in civil engineering from the University of California, Berkeley. ColonelWilliams served in Korea with the 73d Engineer CombatBattalion and the 8224th Engineer Construction GroupHeadquarters. His other overseas tours included variousengineer and command assignments in Europe and Asia.

His last overseas tour was in Leghorn, Italy, as Mediterranean Division Engineer. His stateside tours includedservice as Chief, Special Weapons Division, Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Office of the Chief of Engineers,Washington, D.C., and District Engineer, Memphis.Wright, Colonel Floyd D.

Interviewed in September 1994 andSeptember 1995 by Dr. Barry W. FowleColonel Floyd Wright was born in 1923 in Asheville,North Carolina. He reported to the 6th Officer Candidate School Class at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In 1942, atthe age of 19, he was commissioned a 2d lieutenant inthe U.S. Army and assigned to the 51st Engineer Combat Regiment. He stayed with the 51st as it changed to agroup, and its 1st Battalion became the 51st EngineerCombat Battalion, and went to Europe during WorldWar II. He subsequently graduated with honors fromClemson University and received a Regular Army commission. He earned a master’s degree in applied sciencefrom Montana State University and a master’s degree instructural design from the University of Illinois. Besidesthe European battlefields of World War II and theKorean War, Colonel Wright’s other overseas assignments ranged from Tokyo, Japan, to the Canal Zone.His various stateside assignments included service asthe commander, 575th Engineer Construction Battalion,Fort Stewart, Georgia.
447

Bibliographic Essay

s and ’60s, certain participants

eavored to describe their ex

nment agencies published offi

umber of popular battlefield

ough the conflict never quite

imagination the same way

I did. The 50th anniversary of

ed a renewed interest and cer

tional titles. Compared to the

f the conflict, however, the en

s not been broadly described.

erpted oral interviews in this

ortant.

Allan R. Millett’s “A Reader’s

ar,” in The Journal of Military

 583-97 is a fairly compre

of literature on the war. Inter

n his review essay subsections

ses of the War,” “Logistics and

d “Special Operations,” but

tions. Other bibliographies of

aspects of the war—are worth

owledge. These include Carroll

War Bibliography and Maps of

ean Conflict Research Founda

dwards, The Pusan Perimeter:

An Annotated Bibliography (Westport: 1993); Keith D.McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography(N.Y.: Garland, 1986); and Bernard S. Silberson, Korean Conflict: A Collection of Historical Manuscripts on

the Korean Campaign Held by the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History (Washington: Library of CongressPhotoduplication Service, 1975).

The following bibliographic overview is not inclusive. The intent here is to highlight, wherever possible, books describing U.S. Army Engineers’ activities

in Korea, without overlooking the important general histories of the war.Official PublicationsThe overview of the war from the level of the Secretaryof Defense is contained in Doris Condit’s The Test ofWar, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office,Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988). The Army’sofficial history of the Korean War, set forth in theU.S. Army Center of Military History’s (CMH)“black books,” contains numerous but scattered references in each of the four volumes to Corps of Engineers’ contributions: Roy E. Appleman, South to

the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November1950) (Washington: CMH, 1961); James F. Schnabel,Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington:CMH, 1972); Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow,November 1950-July 1951 (Washington: CMH, 1990);
Remembering the Forgotten War

and Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front(Washington: CMH, 1966).

Another very useful official publication is John G.

Westover’s Combat Support in Korea (Washington: CMH,1955). Originally copy protected by the Association ofthe U.S. Army (AUSA), and since reprinted more thanonce by CMH, this collection of Army officer andenlisted interviews includes 39 pages devoted to U.S.Army Corps of Engineers personnel.

Students of the Army Corps of Engineers in Korea

certainly will want to look at William R. Farquhar, Jr.,and Henry A. Jeffers, Jr., Bridging the Imjin: Construction of Libby and Teal Bridges During the Korean War(October 1952-July 1953) (Fort Belvoir, Va.: OCE History Office, 1989) edited by Charles Hendricks.

Less valuable is Russell A. Gugeler’s Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: CMH, 1970), a revised edition of a 1954 publication. Gugeler captures the cold,

the mud, and the harsh terrain of Korea in a series ofsmall unit actions, but without treating the engineer contribution specifically.

Other official writings that capture aspects of the

build-up in Korea, the subsequent engineer supply problems, and the early fighting include: James A. Huston,The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953 (Washington: CMH, 1966), and William Glenn Robertson,Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, Leavenworth Paper13 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1985).Finally, for the years of the conflict and immediatelythereafter, the periodical The Military Engineer contains

a number of articles about the engineers in Korea (see,for example, vols. 43 and 44, 1951-52, for three articleson bridging by Delbert Fowler). Contact The MilitaryEngineer for information on reprints.

For a perspective on the African-American experience in Korea, see William T. Bowers, William M.

Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, Black Soldier,White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea (Washington: CMH, 1996). This study contains valuable references to both the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion andthe 77th Engineer Combat Company.Secondary WorksVery likely, the best-known books on the Korean Warare S.L.A. Marshall’s The River and the Gauntlet (N.Y.:

Morrow, 1953), and T.R. Fehrenbach’s This Kind of War:A Study of Unpreparedness (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1963).This last book, as the subtitle suggests, is not only acombat narrative, but also a cautionary tale. Fehrenbach elaborated further in The Fight for Korea: Fromthe War of 1950 to the Pueblo Incident (N.Y.: Grosset &Dunlop, 1969). In his later years, once his turn at “official history” was completed, Roy E. Appleman continued to add to the literature about Korea. Four criticalworks, East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout inKorea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in

Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: TheChinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and RidgwayDuels for Korea (1990) all were published by TexasA&M University Press.
449

s, Firefight at Yechon: Courage

 War (Lincoln, NE: University

, 2002) is one African-Ameri

n of perceived bias in official

ted 24th Infantry Regiment.

side for the moment, Bussey’s

nsights into at least one engi

Korea.

tory of the 8th Engineer Com

gineer Lt. Frank H. Armstrong

nal original material, and the

rong, The 1st Cavalry Division

 Korea (South Burlington, Vt.:

c., 1996).

ributed a logistics volume spe

ns and Butter, Powder and Rice:

Korean War (Selingsgrove, Pa.:

Press, 1989). Well researched

now out of print.

oral histories are worth men

nto the individual soldier or

ough none deal specifically with

ntain gripping accounts of the

 the sense of terror, cold, and

dividual soldier. Two of these

nox, The Korean War, Pusan to

ory (N.Y.: Harcourt Brace

The Korean War, Uncertain Vic

ume of an Oral History (1988)

blisher after Knox’s death. These

books have been justifiably popular. More recently, RudyTomedi’s No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of theKorean War (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993) isa good read that includes individual accounts, notonly by soldiers, but also by Navy and Air Force airmen, a British soldier, and a Marine Corps general. Military historians will recognize the names of at least twoof the contributors, Edwin Simmons, and Harry G.Summers, Jr.

Several other older books about Korea have a

broader scope or focus on issues too specific to be instructive on the engineers’ role. These include Joseph C.Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (N.Y.: Times

Books, 1982), a readable book with an almost ironicsubtitle, given the author’s borrowings from Appleman’sofficial history; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War(N.Y.: Da Capo Press, 1967); Callum A. MacDonald,Korea: The War Before Vietnam (N.Y.: The Free Press,1986); and British author Max Hastings, The Korean War(N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

One final title is of real value to students of the

engineers in Korea: The Korea War, An Encyclopedia,edited by Stanley Sandler (N.Y.: Garland Publishing,1995). This reference work has a good four-page sectionon the engineers in Korea, a photograph, betweenpp. 200-201, of one of the engineers’ bridge construction efforts, and an excellent 28-page bibliography ofthe war.
Remembering the Forgotten War

The photographs that appear in the text are a crucialpart of this anthology, for they poignantly depict manyof the people, places, and events mentioned in theinterviews. The pictures provide a human dimensionto the conflict, and the images offer mute testimonyto many of the hardships the engineers, and the Koreanpeople, endured during three long years of war. Thepictures, however, are not all grim—many reflect thelighter side of the engineer experience includingsnapshots of friends and family, scenes from camp life,as well as a myriad of images that reflect the dayto-day working life of engineers in theater. When viewedin their entirety, these images will provide readers witha much better understanding of the role U.S. Armyengineers played, and the life they lived, during theKorean War.

The editors collected the Korean War images from

a variety of sources. The interviewees themselves provideddozens of pictures, and those images are credited to theinterviewees’ personal collections. Two other Korean Warveterans, Maj. Jack B. Shotwell, USAR(Ret.) and Lt. Col.Leroy Weygand, USA(Ret.) graciously gave us access totheir personal collections of Korean War photographs,some of which appear in the book. Maj. Shotwell alsoprovided the Korean War medals that appear in the Biographies section at the end of the book.

The Korean War photographs taken by the Army

Signal Corps constitute the largest body of Korean Warimages used. The Signal Corps images are stored at theNational Archives and Records Administration’s Still Pic

on Photographstures Branch at the Archives II facility in College Park, Maryland. The National Archives arranges its documents and photographs into record groups (RG) and the Sig- nal Corps images are in RG 111, Records of the Chief Signal Officer. Other Korean War images came from the General Records of the Department of the Navy (RG 80), Records of the Marine Corps (RG 127), and the Records of the U.S. Information Agency (RG 306). We also obtained Korean War images from sev- eral institutions that have Signal Corps photographs in their collections. The Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Engineer School, Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, maintains a large collection of Signal Corps images that they have incorporated into their collection. We made extensive use of their holdings, and those images are credited to the Engineer School (ES). The Truman Presidential Library also has Signal Corps images in its collection, as does the Army’s Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl- vania, and the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland. Photographs from those institutions are attributed to them. To aid future researchers, detailed credits are pro- vided for each image. Photographs obtained from per- sonal collections are noted as such; images from the Engineer School and Truman Presidential Library are accompanied by individual negative numbers; and the citations for images from the National Archives in- clude the record group number, as well as the sub-series, and negative number.
451

Glossary

craft

 Division Commander

argo ship

ous tractor

ransport

k

without leave

g automatic rifle

r Officer’s Quarters

r General

ane

nist Chinese Forces

nding General

ntal United States

nd Post

ment of the Army

 Engineer Supply Officer

arized Zone

ous truck: (D=1942, year

ction; U=utility vehicle;

wheel drive;

rear-drive axles)

r Aviation Battalion

r Boat

EB&SR Engineer Boat and Shore RegimentECB Engineer Combat BattalionECC Engineer Combat CompanyECG Engineer Combat GroupEOAC Engineer Officer’s Advanced ClassERTC Engineer Replacement Training CenterESB Engineer Special BrigadeETB Engineer Treadway BridgeFECOM Far East Command1st Lt. First LieutenantFM Field manualFO Forward ObserversG-1 Personnel SectionG-2 Intelligence SectionG-3 Plans and PolicyG-4 Supply Officer (Logistics)GHQ General HeadquartersH&S Headquarters and ServiceH&HS Headquarters & Headquarters ServicesH&S Health and ServicesICAF Industrial College of the Armed ForcesIG Inspector GeneralI&R Intelligence and ReconnaissanceJCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
Remembering the Forgotten War

KATUSA Korean Augmentation

to the United States Army

KIA Killed in actionKMAG Korean Military Advisory GroupKSC Korean Service CorpsLCM Landing Craft, MechanizedLCU Landing Craft, UtilityLCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle-PersonnelLog LogisticsLSD Landing Ship, DockLSM Landing Ship, MediumLST Landing Ships, TankLSU Landing Ship, UtilityLSV Landing Ship, VehicleLt. Col. Lieutenant ColonelLt. Gen. Lieutenant GeneralMaj. MajorMaj. Gen. Major GeneralMASH Mobile Army Surgical HospitalMASTS Military Air/Sea Transport ServiceMIA Missing in ActionMIT Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyMLR Main line of resistanceMOS Military Occupational SpecialtyMP Military PoliceMSR Main Supply RouteMS&T Maintenance, supply, and

transportation

MSgt. Master SergeantNCO Non-commissioned OfficerNKPA North Korean People’s ArmyOCE Office of the Chief of EngineersOCS Officer Candidate SchoolOSHA Occupational Safety and

Health Administration

PCS Permanent Change of StationPOL Petroleum/oils/lubricantsPOM Prepare for overseas movementPOW Prisoner(s) of warPMS Professor of Military SciencePSP Pierced-steel plankPvt. PrivateRCT Regimental Combat TeamROK Republic of KoreaROTC Reserve Officer Training CorpsR&R Rest and relaxationS-1 AdjutantS-2 Intelligence OfficerS-3 Operations and Training OfficerS-4 Supply OfficerSCAP Supreme Commander,

Allied Powers

2d Lt. Second LieutenantSgt. Sergeant
453

List of Equipment

pelled (artillery)

 Arms Reduction Talks

Officer

Organization

ipment

n-target

oluene explosive

Nations

States

States Military Academy

nge (beams)

Officer
Remembering the Forgotten War

East Central Asia......................................................................................................................................................xvThe Pusan Perimeter, 4 August 1950 ........................................................................................................................ 2Korea ....................................................................................................................................................................... 4The Inch’on Landing, 15–16 September 1950 ........................................................................................................ 84Breaking the Cordon, 16–22 September 1950 ........................................................................................................ 86The Pursuit, 23–30 September 1950 ...................................................................................................................... 95Landing beaches and tidal basin at Inch’on, September 1950 ................................................................................ 103Advance of United Nations Command Forces, 20–24 October 1950.................................................................... 129The Chinese Intervene in the West, 25 October–1 November 1950 ..................................................................... 145Enemy Third Phase Offensive, The Opening Effort 26 December 1950–1 January 1951 ..................................... 167Battle of the Ch’ongch’on, 25–28 November 1950 ............................................................................................... 188The 2d Infantry Division at Kunu-ri, 29–30 November 1950 .............................................................................. 189X Corps Advances to the Yalu River, 25 October–26 November 1950 .................................................................. 212Withdrawal from the Reservoir, 6–11 December 1950 ......................................................................................... 217Iwon Beach Area, October 1950 ........................................................................................................................... 225X Corps Evacuation Plan, December 1950 ........................................................................................................... 235Operation Roundup, The X Corps Plan, 4 February 1951 .................................................................................... 256The Battle Lines, 10 July–31 October 1951 .......................................................................................................... 330The Eighth Army Front Line, 27 July 1953 .......................................................................................................... 423