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ISBN 1-930831-06-4
Western Unity 

and the Transatlantic 

Security Challenge

By Peter van Ham 

and Richard L. Kugler

Dr. Peter van Ham is a Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands 

of International Relations “Clingendael,” The Hague, and 

Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium.

Dr. Richard L. Kugler is a Distinguished Research Professo

Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense Univ

Washington, DC.

Foreword

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies tak

pride in presenting this fourth edition of the Marshall Center Papers. It 

many pressing issues for the international community, as NATO prepare

October summit in Prague. President George W. Bush has remarked that N

headed toward a decisive effort to invite in "all of Europe's democracies 

ready to share in the responsibilities NATO brings." NATO has also signe

agreement with Russia, giving Moscow a role in alliance decision mak

further transcends the old divide between East and West.

Yet, in spite of these accomplishments, some observers worry that th

States and Europe are drifting apart. After a brief burst of cooperatio

aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States, there is a rising choru

old and new complaints. Many Europeans criticize the United States for d

much on its own, becoming overly focused on the Global War Against T

and ignoring legitimate European concerns. Americans respond that the E

are spending too little on defense, failing to implement the "Revolution in 

Affairs," and pursuing narrowly European defense initiatives that may un

NATO capabilities. 

This Marshall Center Paper seeks to clarify such issues by presenting tw

different views. Peter van Ham, writing from the European perspective, 

that the transatlantic relationship suffers from the fact that it is asymmetri

United States is confident and strong—as the world's only remaining Super

while Europe is confused and indecisive, still searching for its own 

identity. He warns that it may be increasingly difficult for the United S

Europe to act together as a cohesive and unified "West." Even so, he arg

U.S.–European cooperation is essential not only to counter new thre

international terrorism by non–state actors, but mainly to tackle the chall

globalization for both continents. 

Richard L. Kugler provides an incisive American view. He appl

European dream of unifying an entire continent under the mantle of dem

economic integration, and multilateral cooperation, but he warns that Euro

not wall itself off from the rest of the world. Globalization is nurturing v

anti–Western ideologies, nihilistic terrorists, and menacing countries. Th

threats are merging together, gaining access to modern information syst

technologies that allow them to inflict violence at very great distances. T
also bringing further turmoil to unstable regions. In many places, the resul

boiling primordial stew that endangers common Western interests, security

values. To deal with these new threats, Kugler proposes a specific agen

improvements in NATO and European military capabilities. 

It seems clear that the international community faces many tough questions

the United States and Europe work together to conduct the Global Wa

Terrorism? Are the Europeans ready to modernize their forces and close 

technological gap that limits their capability for distant, joint, and com

operations with the United States? What concrete steps can NATO take to pr

for tomorrow's threats, perhaps involving rogue states or terrorists armed 

Weapons of Mass Destruction? And, finally, what are the implication

Globalization, not simply for NATO and Europe but for all the democratic coun

of the world? 

Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler provide answers to all of these ques

that go beyond mere diagnosis of the current tensions. They propose coh

solutions that are sometimes controversial but always insightful. Their view

essential reading for anyone who seeks to strengthen the international comm

and defend it against attack. 

Robert Kennedy, PhD

Director

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

iv
Western Unity and the

Transatlantic Security Challen

Europe and the Transatlantic

Relationship in the Shadow of 

Tomorrow 

by Peter van Ham p. 

National Security in a Globalizing

World of Chaos: The United States

and European Responses

by Richard L. Kugler p. 

Europe and the Transatlantic

Relationship in the Shadow of Tomor

by Peter van Ham

Executive Sumary 

After the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, E

has shown itself a loyal ally of the United States. NAT

keen to activate the mutual assistance clause of Article 5 

Washington Treaty, declaring that the terrorist attacks w

only aimed against New York and Washington DC, but a

the free and democratic West as a whole. Interna

terrorism was seen as the new glue keeping the transa

relationship together, replacing the ideological ties of th

Unfortunately, these positive developments were short–

This paper examines the current state of the transa

relationship and assesses the possibilities for 

US–European cooperation. It argues that transatlantic re

are troubled and will remain so for the foreseeable 

Many Europeans believe that the United States is not 

into account the views and interests of its traditional allie

emerging transatlantic division of minds will only inten

the US decides to invade Iraq to topple Saddam Hussei

These political problems are aggravated by a m

increase in the US defense budget, accelerating a Revo

in Military Affairs (RMA) that will, in turn, widen th

between American and European military strategie

capabilities. In addition, a so–called value–gap seems 

opening, illustrated, for example, by the refusal of Eu

countries to extradite suspected terrorists to the United 

because America allows the death penalty. 

The events of 9/11 have underscored that Europe still 

to go before it will be a military actor of any real signifi

Thus, Europeans will find it difficult to remain mi
2

relevant to the United States for the foreseeable future, gi

Washington's key priority: fighting international terror

Europe will also have to pay a serious price to keep NATO 

transatlantic cooperation alive and well. Europe's m

challenge will be to transform itself from a quantité néglige

to a partner that the United States will take seriously. 

The current transatlantic relationship is dangerou

asymmetrical. A confident and strong United States — as 

world's only remaining Superpower — faces a confused 

indecisive European continent still in search of its own 

and identity. A consolidated Western approach to glo

problems is essential and is only possible when current al

see eye to eye. Some Europeans believe that the polit

climate in Washington does not allow constructive criticism 

breach the wall of assurance built by post–9/11 patriotism, e

if it comes from European allies. Thus a crucial questio

whether transatlantic cooperation will be ad hoc or coordina

Clearly, the US–European relationship is once again 

crossroads. It may become increasingly difficult for the Un

States and Europe to act as a cohesive and unified "We

Politically, strategically, and culturally, the United States 

Europe appear to be slowly drifting apart. Now that Cold W

discipline no longer keeps them together, NATO memb

must reconsider the strategic purpose and underlying valu

their Alliance. Europe faces the dilemma of either accep

American supremacy, or developing and implementing 

own, independent policy course — realizing that the latter 

most certainly result in transatlantic acrimony. 

The only way to keep the transatlantic partnership fr

sliding into irrelevance is for Europe to become a seri

partner of America. In the coming years, the fight aga

international terrorism will remain the key point on the We

security agenda. But, the main danger will not come fr

extremists with dirty nuclear devices. The main problem 

be that "the West" as a cohesive bloc and single–min

political force may cease to exist. !
Europe and the Transatlantic Relation

in the Shadow of Tomorrow

Introduction1

After the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, E

has shown itself a loyal ally of the United States. 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries were k

activate the mutual assistance clause of Article 5 

Washington Treaty, declaring that the terrorist attacks w

only aimed against New York and Washington DC, but a

the free and democratic West as a whole. The day afte

the European Union (EU) declared that: 

. . .[t]his barbaric attack was directed against

the free world and our common values. It is a

watershed event and life will never be quite the

same again. European institutions and

Governments will work closely together with

our American friends and partners in the

defence of freedom. . . . In the darkest hours of

European history, the Americans stood by us.

We stand by them now. 2

Forgotten were the transatlantic quarrels over issues l

Kyoto Protocol, the future of the Anti–Ballistic Missile (

Treaty, and the role of the International Criminal Court 

For a moment, all attention was focused on the fight ag

common enemy challenging the fundamentals of w

civilization. The post–Cold War era seemed to have 

found a new name and paradigm, since the remainder 

21st century would be colored by the fight a

international terrorism.

This threat was seen as the new glue keepin

transatlantic relationship together, replacing the ideo
4

ties of the past. Moreover, it 

suggested that NATO could pl

central role in the fight aga

terrorism, turning itself into a 

institutional platform 

transatlantic cooperation. NA

Secretary General Lord Robert

argued that "the world's largest 

most effective permanent coali

[NATO], will be central to 

collective response of 

international community to terrorism, both now and in 

long–term." He referred to NATO's unique capabilities (

interoperability, joint training, compatible communicati

and logistics that flow from NATO's military structure"), 

suggested that "for the moment, NATO is the best — ind

the only — game in town." The EU's European Security 

Defence Policy is in its (too) early stages, Lord Robert

claimed, whereas the United Nations (UN) and 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OS

lack the "unique composition, strength, cohesion and spee

delivery of NATO."3

The moderate and smart response of US President George 

Bush's administration after 9/11 seemed to make the Un

States aware of the need for a more multilateral foreign po

stance. Going it alone would be counterproductive to confron

this new menace. The United States agreed to pay its Un

Nations (UN) dues, indicating that Washington perceived the 

to be of an increased strategic importance. Unfortunately, th

positive developments were short–lived. America's qu

military success seemingly proved that superior military m

was an excellent basis for US security. Critical voices f

Europe were soon discarded as pitiful moans from a sidel

"axis of petulance."4 Today, US–European relations are strai

with only a few signs of possible improvement.

9/11 forever altered

the tenets of

national security —

The new focus is

on the common

enemy of the

fundamentals of

Western civilization
This paper maps out the current

state of the transatlantic relationship

and assesses the possibilities for

future US–European cooperation.

Since September 2001, European

countries largely perceive

themselves to be ignored by a

United States that does not appear

to have taken into account the views

and interests of its traditional allies. These political pro

are aggravated by a massive increase in the US d

budget, accelerating a Revolution in Military Affairs (R

which will in turn widen the gap between America

European military strategies and capabilities. In add

so–called value–gap seems to be opening, illustrated 

shock with which Europe received the initial imag

Al–Qaida suspects interned at Camp X–Ray in Guant

Bay and by the fact that European countries are also re

to extradite suspected terrorists to the United States b

America allows the death penalty. 

These are indicators that it may become increa

difficult for the United States and Europe to act as a co

and unified "West." Politically, strategically, and cultura

United States and Europe appear to be slowly drifting 

Europe now faces the dilemma of accepting Am

supremacy, or developing and implementing its 

independent policy course, realizing that the latter wil

certainly result in transatlantic acrimony and worse

implication is that the US–European relationship i

crossroads — once again. But, now that Cold War dis

no longer keeps them together, NATO and its member 

have to reconsider the strategic purpose and underlying 

of their Alliance. This paper argues that US–Eu

cooperation is essential not only, or even mainly, to c

new threats like international terrorism, but, first and for

European 

countries 

perceive

themselves 

to be ignored 

by the United

States
6

to tackle the globaliza

challenges both continents face. 

case will be made for a consolid

Western approach to glo

problems, only possible as long 

current allies see eye to eye. On

the crucial questions is whether 

cooperation will be ad hoc 

coordinated. This paper will also deal with the asymmetr

quality of the current transatlantic relationship, sinc

confident and strong United States — as the world's o

remaining Superpower — now faces a confused and indeci

European continent still in search of its own role and iden

This makes relations between the United States and "Euro

all the more complicated.

Moreover, when we speak of "Europe," or the "Europe

view, or policy, we are actually combining fiction and rea

overlooking the fact that in contemporary Europe we 

cannot really assume a Common Foreign and Security Po

(CFSP) nor a European Security and Defence Policy (ESD

worthy of their acronyms. The CFSP and ESDP are 

attempts by the EU to consolidate a European identity of s

in the security and defense fields, but these efforts are o

half–baked in theory and even less palatable in practice. 

events of 9/11 have underscored that this "Europe" still has 

to go before it will be a military actor of any real significa

Thus, Europeans will find it difficult to remain milita

relevant to the United States for the foreseeable future, gi

Washington's key priority: fighting international terror

Europe will also have to pay a serious price to keep NATO 

transatlantic cooperation alive and well. The main challe

will be to transform itself from a quantité négligeable t

partner that the United States will take seriously. This pa

will conclude with suggestions on how Europe may bec

that serious partner, acknowledging that to do so is the o

A confident and

strong United

States faces a

Europe still

searching for its

identity
way to keep the transatlantic partnership from slidin

irrelevance.

Washington's Paradigm Shift

Even in Europe one notices an unease, albeit still m

with America's leadership and its ways of dominati

economic, political, and military global agenda. After an 

wave of compassion and solidarity for the United St

response to the terror attacks, we now see a steady redir

toward anti–Americanism. Criticism from Eur

politicians has become louder. Christopher Patten, respo

for External Relations in the Commission, for example, 

in February 2002 that "however mighty you are, even if 

the greatest superpower in the world, you cannot do it 

your own." The European approach is quite different, 

argued, since in the fight against international ter

"smart bombs have their place but smart develo

assistance seems to me even more significant. . . . Th

more to be said for trying to engage and to draw 

societies into the international

community than to cut them off."5

Similar ideas and points of criticism

could be heard from French

Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert

Védrine and his German

counterpart, Joschka Fischer.6 Many

European politicians have also —

mainly informally — aired their

concern with the Manichean and

military approach the United States is taking in its "war" a

international terrorism.

This criticism should be heeded by American policym

Unfortunately, the political climate in Washington do

allow critical notes to breach the wall of assurance b

America’s

challenge is to

listen to Europ

Europe’s chall

is to become a

serious partne

the United Stat
8

post–9/11 patriotism, even if they come from European al

It is, of course, difficult to apply some grey tones and nuan

to the black and white worldview of "you're either with us

against us," which President Bush officially adopted 

September. In this context, European criticism, however m

and constructive, is not seen as positive involvement, bu

just another sign of weakness and lack of loyalty. This 

become a serious obstacle to keeping the transatla

relationship healthy. Before we examine the specific probl

between the United States and Europe, it is essential to g

how 9/11 has changed the American outlook on the world, 

especially how this differs from the "world according to Euro

Patriotism

Post–9/11, the United States is experiencing an upsurg

patriotism, illustrating that there is indeed a "war" aga

terrorism. Many Europeans look upon this "rally around 

US flag" with a certain sense of wonder, but also with s

admiration. The seemingly narcotic effect on the Amer

people of all this patriotic rhetoric and flag–waving turns 

9/11 experience from a possible defeat into a moral 

political victory. An atmosphere of righteous indigna

continues to color US foreign and security policy. It 

affects the transatlantic relationship in a detrimental way.

In his State of the Union address of January 30, 20

President Bush proposed an assertive policy 

interventionism to neutralize the so–called "Axis of Evil" — 

group of anti–western countries comprised of Iran, Iraq, N

Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Libya. Bush made it clear that 

would be a tough and protracted battle where the suppor

America's allies was not assured: "But some governments 

be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about i

they do not act, America will."7 In the same mood, Presid

Bush earlier pushed through Congress the USA Patriot Ac
series of tough anti–terrorism laws, which have raised s

questions among citizens' rights organizations.8 The 

administration's new FY 2003 defense budget was acce

$379 billion. This was the most dramatic rise — mor

14% — in the defense budget in 20 years.

All of this illustrates that the United States 

beleaguered, more vulnerable than ever, and at the sam

readier than ever to approach the new challen

international terrorism head–on. It could hardly have co

a surprise that President Bush labelled the fight a "cru

with the United States as the leader of the "civilized 

fighting against "Evil." Since European politicians 

support this black and white outlook, their effo

accommodate countries like Iran, Syria, or Libya are 

upon with suspicion. The same applies to Tokyo w

doubts about the wisdom of confronting and antago

North Korea.

Principled Leadership

In this tense political atmosphere, there is hardly roo

diplomatic nuances. America accepts its allies on a pra

basis: whoever is ready to offer concrete support to the 

of fighting international terrorism is welcomed as long 

accept US leadership. US Deputy Secretary of Defens

Wolfowitz has stated that "the mission must determi

coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission. 

a corollary, there will not be a single coalition, but 

different coalitions for different missions."9 The Am

modus operandi is, therefore, first to determine the m

and the goal, and then to decide upon the most effecti

flexible coalition for success. 

This approach certainly has its advantages, but it i

that NATO is no longer the privileged and natural institu
10

platform for the coordination of Western anti–terrorism pol

It also means that European allies play a minor, even marg

role. Irwin Stelzer formulated this view as follows: "In sh

those who matter [in Washington] are convinced of two thin

the important business of the world will be done by Amer

which will not let any coalition dictate its mission; and Eur

is largely irrelevant to our efforts to make America safe fr

further harm."10 Through American eyes, this approach sta

for US principled leadership. Clearly, it's not that difficu

envisage worse scenarios. As Charles Krauthammer argue

an essay in Time: "America rules: Thank God. Who 

should call the shots? China? Iran? The Russian mafia

What is worrying, however, is that Europe seems to rea

that while it will continue to provide commentary on v

issues, it no longer has the influence to alter Washingto

foreign policy. Especially now that the EU is in the proces

defining its identity as an independent international actor, 

is disconcerting and strains the transatlantic relationship.

Bush's State of the Union address, with its emphasis 

coercive diplomacy and preemptive strikes, indicates 

American unilateralism has gained the upper hand 

Washington. Policymakers like Vice President Rich

Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld see 

reason why the United States should compromise its natio

interest to accommodate the qualms and concerns of 

European allies. Since the United States is the world's o

Superpower, it should use its unique position to rid the w

of security threats. With the Bush administration, a n

attitude has taken over. Gone are the Clinton days when 

inclination was to remain friends with everybody, includ

European allies. The current Republican leadership has u

9/11 to break away from this proclivity for multilateral

Republicans do not want to repeat the frustrating experienc

the Kosovo campaign, where US armed forces had to f

"with one arm behind their back," and were subject to N
Atlantic Council (NAC) criticism — mainly by the Fre

concerning targeting lists and other tactical decision

United States has embarked upon an American war agai

terrorists who attacked America. This war will be fought 

American leadership and according to American ru

engagement.

It is important to stress, however, that 9/11 can only p

explain the new mood of Washington's policymaking 

The terrorist attacks are as much a useful excuse as a cau

America's new assertive

unilateralism. Even before 9/11,

Washington had started to cut the

legal and political ties that would

limit its room to maneuver. This is

testified to by the refusal to ratify

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT), the decision to do away

with the ABM Treaty, and the

opposition and obstruction of the

Kyoto Protocol and the ICC.

Europe, Russia, and the rest of the

world are confronted with an

America unwilling to take into

account the concerns of others, now that it sees it

survival as a free and prosperous country at stake

American Gulliver has used 9/11 to cut the many multi

ropes that restrain its power, and the Lilliputian onlooke

huff and puff, but they will have to accept this reality a

accompli. 

The Evil Outside

The problem may be, therefore, that what the United 

considers legitimate and principled leadership, others m

as American hegemony and overbearing behavior. It 

The American

Gulliver has us

9/11 to cut the

multilateral rop

that restrain its

power — the

Lilliputian

onlookers may 

and puff, but th

will have to ac

the fait accomp
indeed, seem hardly justifiable that a single country should 

as the world's political leader, police agent, judge, and, in 

end, Grand Executioner. Although the United States can 

count on plenty of sympathy and goodwill around the wo

especially now that it has suffered terrorist atrocities, suspic

is gradually building and may escalate in all–out discord

America takes military action against Iraq. "Iraq" is 

Rubicon that the United States should think about three tim

before crossing.

Although the Middle East crisis detracts media atten

from US policy toward Iraq, the military option for dea

with Iraq remains open. On February 12, 2002, Secretary 

State Colin Powell argued that "[w]ith respect to Iraq, it 

long been, for several years now, a policy of the United St

government that regime change would be in the best interes

the region, the best interest of the Iraqi people. And we 

looking at a variety of options that would bring that abou

Only one day later, it was announced that the Pentagon and 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were making preparati

for a possible invasion of Iraq by American troops.13 In 

spring of 2002, US media w

busily speculating about the ex

timing of a US ground and air 

against Saddam Hussein. At 

time, the consensus was that "

offensive would probably 

delayed until early next year [2003], allowing time to cr

the right military, economic and diplomatic conditions."14

The United Kingdom may participate — politically 

militarily — in the US campaign against Iraq. But, o

European countries will either remain neutral or condemn s

a military action outright. It is unlikely that the EU will mu

the political will and cohesion to support the United State

any serious way. It is also unlikely that Europe will be cap

12

The EU is not 

likely to support a

campaign 

against Iraq
of producing an alternative plan for dealing with "rogue 

to avoid US military action. This will be discussed l

more detail.

Russia will balk at the prospect of a US–led military 

against any of the "Axis" countries, especially Iraq. Pre

Vladimir Putin already has enough problems convinci

skeptical public and elite that his constructive pol

support the United States in the fight against intern

terrorism is in Russia's national interests. NATO has m

effort to give Moscow more influence on policymaking 

the Alliance. The NATO summit of November 2001 o

the door to Russia, if only a little bit. Prior to the su

British Prime Minister Tony Blair distributed a letter 

NATO colleagues pleading for a more prominent Russi

inside NATO, as a kind of "reward" for Putin's support 

around Afghanistan during the heat of the battle again

Al–Qaida movement. Blair suggested that Russia shoul

some influence in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 

areas of mutual concern (to include crisis manag

non–proliferation, and certain military aspects of the 

against international terrorism). A reluctant Pentagon b

Russia's participation and a NATO communiqué of Dec

6 simply declared that means should be found in the c

months to include Russia in exploring, developing

"building on the [NATO-Russian] Founding Act, 

effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation

decision, and coordinated/joint action." 

At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik o

14–15, 2002, the hatchet of the Cold War finally seeme

buried. A formal agreement was reached between NAT

Russia to jointly combat terrorism and other common s

threats. The long expected NATO–Russia Council, 

started its work at the Rome meeting of May 28, 2002, w

joint policy on specific issues, including counterterroris
14

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), mis

defense, peacekeeping, and the management of regional cri

This would mean that on many occasions NATO would m

"at 20, " i.e., with a representative of Russia at the N

Atlantic Council's deliberations. It was declared that in 

new Council, "NATO member states and Russia will work 

equal partners in areas of common interest, while preserv

NATO's prerogative to act independently. "15 This implies 

NATO maintains absolute autonomy in its "core business

collective defense, but that on most so–called "Article 

issues (dealing with political consultation), Russia's inter

and points of view would be taken into account. 

It remains unlikely that this will remove Russia's moun

displeasure with America's foreign policy. It is often as

why the United States has positioned its armed forces aro

Afghanistan (e.g., in Geor

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Rus

nationalists consider 9/11 as hav

been heaven–sent to the Un

States, offering it an excuse to 

control over the transport route

Caspian oil. Moreover, many of 

"rogue states" are, or were, Rus

strategic allies and trading partn

with whom it will be difficul

break suddenly and complet

Moscow feels that it is not be

taken seriously, is not being heard, and lacks any seri

influence on the policy shaping process in the B

administration and Congress. Whereas Europe has b

marginalized, Russia has de facto been dropped from 

strategic map of those who count in Washington. This w

obviously, make US–Russian cooperation complicated 

bothersome.

Three transatlantic

problems:

– NATO’s 

dwindling

power

– US quantum 

leap in the RMA

– Struggle to retain

the same world

vision
All these critical voices are registered in Washingto

they are certainly not appreciated. Secretary Powe

instance, argued that his European colleagues should 

critical of Iraq as they were of President Bush and his f

policy. The American Ambassador to the EU, Ro

Schnabel, argued that "as time goes on, we believe it w

more difficult to work together as partners."16 Wash

reads European criticism as "whining" and as a sh

weakness and indecisiveness. This incompatibilité d'h

constitutes one of the most serious problems betwe

United States and Europe (and Russia as well). It makes 

and open communication difficult, if not alto

impossible. One of the main challenges is to turn this 

around. However, the dilemma is that if Europe were to 

US leadership without any criticism, it would not enc

the long overdue process of American introspection. O

other hand, if Europe continues to criticize w

simultaneously offering credible policy suggestions, 

undermine the already crumbling basis of transa

solidarity and trust. Both options are equally unattract

there no way out?

The Crumbling Transatlantic Foundation

The problems between Europe and the United Sta

threefold:

1. NATO no longer constitutes the exclusive

institutional platform for dealing with

American and European practical security

problems;

2. The United States is taking a quantum leap in

the Revolution in Military Affairs, leaving their

European allies behind. This implies that in the
16

future NATO allies will no longer be able to

conduct military operations on an equal basis; and,

3. The United States and Europe no longer

share the same vision when dealing with the

world's most urgent problems and threats. They

also often disagree on the definition of these

problems and threats.

Given the serious existential problems facing the Allian

one should ask how "the West" can remain relevant a

strategic actor in the years ahead? Clearly, even the Amer

"hyper power" — as the United States is often called in Fra

— cannot do everything on its own and needs support, b

political and practical. Terrorism and the proliferation 

weapons of mass destruction have no quick fixes, but call 

a broad, concerted multilateral approach to be successful in 

long–term. To understand the nature and depth of the cur

transatlantic imbroglio, we need to examine these th

problems in some detail.

A Redundant NATO?

Only 24 hours after the fall of the Twin Towers, NATO mem

states invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This was a v

emotional period during which European allies declared t

"unrestricted solidarity" with the US government and 

American people. A headline in Le Monde even stated: "n

sommes tous Américains" (we are all Americans).17 This perio

solidarity lasted a mere five months. In February 2002, NA

dusted off and posed again the timeworn questions concernin

future: What is the strategic relevance of NATO? How can 

problem of burden sharing between the allies be addressed? 

the United States and Europe have to reconsider invigorating t

Alliance, perhaps by broadening their cooperative efforts 

introducing a new transatlantic "Grand Bargain"?
After 9/11, NATO played a useful role, but not a pivo

alone a vital, one. On top of activating Article 5, Eu

allies offered the US unrestricted overfly rights an

AWACS radar planes to help guard American air

Moreover, NATO has provided a value, albeit not that o

or visible, that is often overlooked: the long years of i

and effective cooperation, political and military, among N

member states and Central European and Central 

countries within the Euro–Atlantic Partnership C

(EAPC) that greatly facilitated the coalition building es

to the 9/11 response. In addition, it was relatively ea

European countries to participate in the International S

Assistance Force (ISAF) — which has created the illus

law and order in and around Kabul since January 2

because they could fall back on their shared N

background and experience. And, NATO has its own W

of Mass Destruction Centre, which focuses on the pro

of civilians and soldiers from nuclear, chemical, and bio

weapons. All this should be appreciated and not played 

But, still more was, and is, expected from the Alliance

hoped that Lord Robertson's rhetoric would become reali

that NATO would, indeed, turn itself into the central pl

Western efforts to come to terms with this new challe

catastrophic terrorism. This has not happened. Sweden's 

Prime Minister Carl Bildt asked recently: "Will the Ame

ever fight a war through NATO again? It's doubtful. The 

States reserves the right to itself to wage war, and dum

others the messy, expensive business of nation–buildin

peace–keeping."18 And, US Senator Richard Lugar (India

declared that "[i]f NATO does not help tackle the most p

security threat to our countries today — a threat I bel

existential because it involves the threat of weapons o

destruction — it will cease to be the premier alliance it ha

and will become increasingly marginal."19
18

Lord Robertson has stated very clearly that terrorism wil

the key security challenge in the 21st century. Since terror

is global in nature, NATO's response must be global as w

Lord Robertson's conclusion is straightforward: "NATO 

its members must expand its responsibility as an essen

platform for defence cooperation to become the prim

means for developing the role of armed forces in helpin

defeat the terrorist threat." He further identified four ar

where NATO could play such a role: 1) in the tim

identification and detection of terrorist threats; 2) in 

protection of civilian and military infrastructure 

populations; 3) in the management of the consequences 

possible future terrorist attacks; and 4) by preparing 

preemptive military action. This last element is essential, L

Robertson stressed, since "[t]hose who set out to die in supp

of their ill–conceived causes are unlikely to be dete

through traditional means. Military strikes against terror

and their networks are often the only effective option 

prevent further damage."20 US military action in Afghani

has proven this point for NATO to emulate.

This is an ambitious program and it is unlikely to be adop

and implemented in the foreseeable future. For NATO to g

dramatically "out of area" and preemptively attack poss

threats remains improbable. Not only will the United State

unwilling to limit its room for maneuver by coordinating 

own military policy within the NAC, several NATO memb

will not accept such actions without a clear mandate of the 

Security Council. Since Lord Robertson's other focus po

for the Alliance are political in nature, NATO's di

"military" use in the fight against international terrorism 

likely to remain minimal.

From a political perspective things look brighter. NATO 

using the anti–terrorism campaign to strengthen ties w
partners within the EAPC, and with

Russia in particular. Although

Moscow has its own, very specific

interests in, and definition of,

combating terrorism (i.e., its policy

toward Chechnya), NATO now

seems engaged in an appealing

striptease, shedding its Cold War

clothes while moving toward a

system based on cooperative

security. This is a courageous decision, that is not with

own risks. Giving Russia more influence in the NA

especially if taken together with an enlargeme

approximately five to seven countries at the Prague s

this coming November — will alter the nature and role 

Alliance from a classic, transatlantic, collective d

organization, to something of a totally different quality. 

way, 9/11 has altered NATO forever. 

By invoking Article 5, and because the United States r

to make full use of NATO, NATO has lost its m

character. Article 5 now stands for a glorified declarat

solidarity, but without the automaticity and ironclad gua

of the past. This means that 9/11 has reinforced N

already existing political role, and diminished its m

function. Thus, NATO's prospective enlargement will b

less complicated and less controversial. Fully involved 

workings of the Alliance, Russia will have fewer qualms 

NATO "encroaching" upon its former sphere of inte

more political NATO will, therefore, play a positive 

changing Europe's strategic landscape, but witho

dominant military component of its past. In this sense, N

is not redundant at all, but is likely to remain releva

transatlantic security in a new political environment.

Political 

Bright Spot:

NATO using

anti–terrorism 

strengthen ties

with EAPC

countries,

especially Rus
20

The Military Gap

At the moment, the United States is engaged in an arms 

with itself. Obviously, the United States will win this "ra

but it may meanwhile seriously harm the transatla

relationship. This is the political collateral damage 

America's RMA. 

Much has been written and made of this technolog

revolution, which, according to Gordon Adams, deals w

"sophisticated command, control, communication, compu

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), 

links, and precision guided munitions. This package 

technological capabilities is one of the great force multipl

of the 21st century and its impact on military operations 

only increase."21 Only the United States is making the mos

the RMA. In May 2001, Secretary Wolfowitz was alre

arguing that US military strategy would in the future 

"capabilities–driven," rather than "threat–driven." This imp

that the RMA will develop a dynamic of its own, since 

increased defense budget and a focus on new mili

technology will bring the US armed forces into a league o

own within a decade or so. This is in stark contrast to the 

that most European defense budgets are shrinking and the E

recently established ESDP shows only mod

accomplishments. Even after two decades of discussion 

planning, the European defense industrial base rema

fragmented and political coordination (in the field of strat

planning and procurement) is ad hoc and slightly chaotic. 

transatlantic military gap is perhaps best reflected by the 

that the United States spends $28,000 per annum per soldie

Research and Development (R&D) — approximately f

times the European average.

Two questions should be asked. First, how does 

American RMA affect the practical possibilities 
transatlantic cooperation? Second, what are the implic

for political cooperation among the allies?

The military operation in Afghanistan has shown 

future warfare may look like: specially trained com

units using their laptop computers and laser and s

telephones to trace targets that will be destroyed by n

B-1s, B–2s, B–52s, or fighter aircraft in half an hour'

The commandos will move around on horseback, if ne

illustrating the famed flexibility of the US armed fo

postmodern warfighting scenarios.22 During the Afgha

campaign, the B–52s operated from the island of Diego 

(in the Indian Ocean), whereas the B–2s started from Mi

flying back and forth within 44 hours. Important here 

these technological advancements make the United Stat

dependent on its allies to "do the job." Allies are view

politically convenient, but militarily unnecessary, and 

likely to detract from the operation's efficiency and chan

success. Within the Pentagon, even European allies are 

as "deficit contributors," who cannot expect to wie

political influence of importance.

In Afghanistan, US armed forces "tested" more than 3

military technologies, including the Predator unm

aircraft, which actually destroyed its target — a tank — 

Hellfire missiles. A thermobaric bomb was used, as w

new microwave weapons that do not kill, but 

temporarily incapacitate. For those aware of the tec

details of the RMA, the difference between reality and s

fiction becomes blurred. Secretary Rumsfeld announce

the commando units in Afghanistan were so successfu

these flexible, high–tech brigades will be developed 

priority. This is just another step toward Network C

Warfare (NCW), which gives the United States more c

over factors like space and time, offering str

operational, and tactical opportunities during warfightin
Here, too, the implications 

NATO are dire. Lord Robert

argued in February 2002 that 

"huge additional investment 

United States] is making in defe

will make practical interoperab

with Allies, in NATO or in coalitions, impossible. The 

between American forces on the one hand and European 

Canadian forces on the other will be unbridgeable. 

Washington, the choice could become: act alone or not at 

And that is no choice at all."23 Robertson offered two soluti

First, European countries have to spend more on security 

defense, both individually and within the ESDP. For Euro

he argued, the choice should be clear: "modernisation 

marginalisation." Second, the US government should relax 

its European allies the stringent export control regulations 

technology transfers, offering them at least part of the bene

of the American RMA.

All in all, it is questionable whether European countries 

be able, and willing, to catch up with the American RM

Europe has failed to invest in the newest development

military technology and has already cashed its post–Cold W

peace dividends. Europe lags behind in two main fields. F

it has only recently established the large "system integra

defense contractors" who play such a key role in adap

commercial high–tech to military purposes. The Europ

Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), set u

1999, has the required format to function as such 

intermediary between commercial and military technolog

developments. Second, and perhaps even more serious, Eur

has not formulated and integrated a joint military strat

based on these high–tech defense capabilities. The Un

States is adapting its strategic thinking rapidly, e.g., in N

or Information Warfare, all the way through to train

exercises, and tests. Europe remains far removed from the 

22

Europe faces

military

modernization or

marginalization
level of sophistication, which explains why Richard 

chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, argu

Europe's armed forces are "atrophied to the point of 

irrelevance."24

The American RMA has major implications for N

making it more difficult, and, therefore, less likely f

United States and Europe to work together effectively i

military operations. Since the

United States has access to more

intelligence in real time, has more

advanced military technology at its

disposal, and has a different

perspective on the use of force,

NATO has de facto been dethroned

as the privileged military

instrument for Atlantic cooperation

and action. Moreover, and perhaps

more worrying, the old concept of

burden sharing is acquiring new meaning: The United St

the peace enforcer, whereas Europe specializ

peacekeeping and post–conflict reconstruction. As S

Lugar argued in March 2002, "[t]oday there are 

Europeans on the ground in Afghanistan than American

it is Europe, not America, that is going to foot much of t

for Afghan reconstruction. In these areas, they have 

exceptional allies."25 The same could be said for the divi

labor among allies in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Washington has made it clear that its armed forces ar

to "do the windows," i.e., to take on the more mundane 

of peace making and peace building. However, this conv

division of labor is certainly not politically accepted, s

may well exacerbate the diverging strategic perspe

among allies and hence damage the feelings of solidari

limit the possibilities for practical cooperation. But, as l

Balanced milit

cooperation is

difficult if the

United States i

prepared to do

peace making 

Europe is not

prepared to do 
24

the United States is not prepared to "do windows," and 

Europeans are not prepared or capable to "do war," balan

military cooperation remains difficult, and the best to hope 

is a closely coordinated transatlantic approach to solv

global problems.

The political implications for the transatlantic relation

are, therefore, mixed, at best. The new burden sharing sta

quo may for the time being be convenient, but it will in the 

undermine a balanced and functional Alliance. The problem 

not only — or even mainly — the differences in mili

capabilities between the United States and Europe, but 

simple fact that these capabilities are a reflection of the w

the United States and Europe each see the world and 

world's problems. In his essay on US strategic culture, Coli

Gray aptly remarked that "[f]or better or for worse, the Un

States is a society with a low tolerance for lengthy investm

with distant payoffs. . . . Americans do not resort to f

quickly, but when they do, as citizens of the exceptional po

they expect a thumping triumph."26 Europe's strategic cult

meanwhile, has preferred compromise and "appeaseme

since EU integration has undermined any illusion of abso

sovereignty and invulnerability. 

This means that the American RMA is a reflection of a "

do" strategic culture. It is an option which remains open 

Europe as well, but one which is not chosen for a variety 

practical and cultural reasons. Surely, if EU member st

would join efforts and pool financial and other resource

"European" RMA would be possible. Europe does not lack 

money or political maturity to take such a step. But, since m

European countries do not think it strategically opportun

has not happened. In both elite and public opinion, 

necessity to spend much more on defense — in compariso

health care, development assistance, etc. — is not recogni

The widening transatlantic military gap, therefore, mirro
concomitantly widening political and strategic gap

question now is how serious is this latter divide, and w

the trend is toward a narrowing or a widening of the ga

It would be no exaggeration to reframe the quest

asking what role Europe should play during an em

period of American global dominance. International ter

may try to undermine American power with "asymm

warfare." They do not, therefore, by definition, challen

United States as an equal opponent. The United States w

the world's only Superpower for the foreseeable future

quite recently, this would have left most Europeans rea

that they could continue to take a free ride on US pow

benefit from the collective goods that accompany it: 

freedom, and prosperity. Historically, US power ha

beneficial for Europe. As Krauthammer said, "who else 

call the shots?" However, confidence in the benign nat

US power is rapidly dwindling. 

Recent American behavior has caused the world to qu

the comfortable assumption of US power. Whereas Eur

bloc supports the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC, the Ottawa 

(banning anti–personnel landmines), and the ABM Trea

United States does not. When the United States se

considers using low yield tactical nuclear missiles a

WMD threats — as was suggested in the Nuclear P

Review Report, leaked in March 2002 — this goes agai

spirit of the Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and wil

likely sound the death knell of the CTBT and other re

limiting the testing, and hence development, of WMD

United States were to use military force against an 

country — most likely Iraq — in a preemptive strik

would set a precedent for others to follow suit in situatio

are less clear (e.g., China against Taiwan; Russia a

Georgia, etc.), possibly opening a Pandora's Box of 

anarchy. When these were "mere" differences of o
among equal partners, this could be ignored. The problem 

that where Americans expect deliverance from the m

multilateral ties and treaties in order to free their power 

open up room for maneuver, Europeans witness this w

suspicion and trepidation. America's "liberation" is viewe

Europe as an erosion of the international legal order aro

which most of Europe's security is built.

On this point, Josef Joffe has suggested that "[a]s long as 

United States continues to provide international public go

while resisting the lure of unilateralism, envy and resentm

will not escalate into fear and loathing." His advice 

Washington would therefore be: "Pursue your interests 

serving the interests of others. Transform dependents 

stakeholders. Turn America the Ubiquitous into America 

Indispensable."27 Unfortunately, many Europeans have be

to question whether the emerging Pax Americana serves t

interests, now that the United States fails to take Europ

political concerns into account. Europeans know fr

historical experience that only a strong and rob

international legal system stands between order and the law 

the jungle based on military power. Being in the driver's s

the United States is relaxed about such a scenario. Europe

do not have this luxury.

Working Toward Global Governance

During the coming years, the fight against internatio

terrorism will remain the key point on the West's secu

agenda. But, the main danger will not come from extrem

with dirty nuclear devices. The main problem will be that 

West" as a cohesive bloc and single–minded political f

will cease to exist. Due to the increasing political div

between the United States and Europe, "the West" may — 

different reasons than Marx anticipated — become the vic

of its own internal contradictions. This will happen during 

26
era that requires a united West as a

powerful initiator of global

governance. Since globalization

limits the possibilities of individual

states to control economic,

financial, political, security, and

cultural forces that affect them

directly, cooperation among states and non–state actors — 

as non–governmental Organizations (NGOs), the EU

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other intern

financial institutions — is all the more necessary. What c

can really cherish the ambition to control international 

the spread of diseases, climate change, the spre

international terrorism, or massive international capital fl

itself? The West's motto should be that if the United St

Europe act alone, they will likely hinder each other, but 

work together, there is little that cannot be achieved or so

This is, of course, nothing new. It may even sou

self–evident to repeat. But, compared with the lack of 

transatlantic cooperation — and even at times open disagre

— on many important areas, the difference between w

thinking and reality becomes painfully obvious.

Europe is all too aware that to be prosperous and se

needs the United States. In the United States the "nee

good relations with Europe is not always as c

appreciated. America should not forget that whereas E

may be an unconvincing ally in the military field, it re

America's best partner in the area of economics and tra

an annual basis, the United States and Europe inves

billion in each other's economies, generating some 6 m

jobs (3 million each in the United States and the EU).2

is more, the EU's new single currency — the Euro 

already developing into a convincing competitor to t

dollar, putting more pressure on the United States and t

If the United S

and Europe wo

together there 

little that canno

achieved
to work together to better manage their monetary policies

times, Washington has even had to bend to EU rulings 

laws, for example in June 2001 when the Europ

Commission ruled against the merger of two Amer

technology giants, General Electric and Honeywell.

Economic relations between the world's two largest trad

blocs have, in fact, recently deteriorated with the March 2

decision of President Bush to impose tariffs of up to 30% 

many steel imports, causing anger in Europe as well a

many other parts of the world. The EU has appealed to 

World Trade Organization (WTO) and has even threatene

impose retaliatory sanctions on specific American expo

Since European leaders maintain that President Bu

protectionist policies were intended to strengthen support 

the Republican Party in several key states for the Novem

2002 Congressional elections, the EU has carefully selected 

retaliatory sanctions against the United States to exactly h

these politically sensitive states. Clearly, this does 

contribute to a healthy transatlantic relationship, and no do

spills over into the areas of foreign and security policy 29

But, the EU's economic clout goes beyond trade, and 

clear security implications. Especially in the fight aga

international terrorism, the EU's economic and polit

influence is important to the United States. For example, 

EU has introduced a Europe–wide search and arrest warr

new extradition procedures, agreements on data sharing, 

more prominent roles for Europol (the EU's nascent 

enforcement organization) and Eurojust (the future Europ

unit for cooperation between national prosecu

authorities).30 The United States has requested, and gener

received, EU assistance in the areas of police and judi

cooperation, in particular regarding regulations on extradi

and police surveillance. Washington is also interested 

28
obtaining more direct access to the EU's Schengen Inform

System (SIS). The European Commission intro

EU–wide standards to improve security for air travel

well as emergency legislation to "freeze" more than 

million worth of assets belonging to people suspec

terrorism. The Commission also tabled proposals 

common definition of terrorism and for a system of EU

penalties for terrorist offenses. It proposed measu

reinforce the security features of a common visa system 

exploring how existing EU legislation on the issu

financial markets and asylum can be made "terrorism p

The EU further earmarked over €310 million to relie

suffering of the Afghan people. As an immediate reacti

Commission released €5.5 million in emergency ai

additional €6 million food aid has been released to the 

Food Program. Taken together, the United States has as 

to lose "economically" from a souring transa

relationship as Europe. Further, the EU's nonmilitary 

have significant security implications that are 

underestimated, especially because they do not receiv

credit in the mass media.

Euro–American policy coordination may 

underdeveloped, but certainly is no tabula rasa. A m

institutional infrastructure is already in place to fa

coordination. In 1995, the United States and Europe set 

so–called New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) to solve eco

as well as — less prominently — political issues. Duri

June 1999 NTA meeting in Bonn, it was even agreed th

sides would strive toward a "full and equal partnership" 

economic, political, and military fields. Unfortunately

have remained empty words. The NTA has not gain
political weight to shape the transatlantic agenda and influe

US and EU policy. In this respect, there remains much ro

for improvement.

Given the basis of trust and mutual understanding that 

exists between the United States and Europe, a revitaliza

of the transatlantic relation

remains possible, but will not t

place spontaneously. All too of

both American and Europ

policymakers assume that 

"transatlantic community" i

given, a resource to draw upon, 

not one to invest too much in, 

alone cherish. This is a huge and potentially danger

mistake. The United States and Europe need each ot

perhaps now more than ever. But, whereas the EU ha

so–called "common strategy" — a well thought thro

approach comprising all policy areas to which EU mem

states are supposed to orient their national policies — tow

Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean, there is no such j

European approach toward the United States. The s

applies to the United States, where it is all too easily and o

assumed that European allies can be counted upon to stand 

Washington's side. But, now that the Cold War transatla

glue has long dried up, a different cement has to keep 

Alliance together. This new cement needs to consist o

common concern and interest in a united effort for glo

governance. The following suggestions are offered on how 

may be achieved.

American Power ("Hard" and "Soft")

America's military dominance is beyond dispute. 

United States has no equals, not even serious challenger

this respect. But, the time when power was derived only fr

30

A new transatlantic

cement requires a

common concern

and interest in a

united effort for

global governance
the barrel of a gun — however sophisticated and laser–

— is gone. Richard Haass, the US State Department's D

of Policy and Planning, wrote earlier that the United 

should assume "the role of international sheriff, on

forges coalitions by posses of states and others for s

tasks."31 But, this American sheriff will be in need of m

loyal deputy, and his authority will only be accepted i

perceived to work for the common good, and not for li

short–term US self–interest. For the United States to es

its authority, it needs its "soft power," i.e., the politic

cultural assets that make it attractive to outsiders — r

from the still vibrant "American Dream" to the pull of B

Spears and McDonald's — as much as its "hard po

Without its "soft power," America's "hard power" wo

less accepted and most likely even violently rejected. 

The United States needs to acknowledge the importa

its "soft power," and make it work to its advantage. Th

now dawned upon the US State Department, which has 

to work more consistently on America's image abroad

effort to fix some of its "soft power" problems, in O

2001 it appointed Charlotte Beers — the former chairm

the advertising agencies J. Walter Thompson and Og

Mather — as the new Under Secretary of State for 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Just as the Pentago

enlisted the help of Hollywood's creative think

brainstorm both possible scenarios that future terrorist a

might take and solutions to these attacks, Beers has 

former Madison Avenue advertising colleagues to he

rebrand and "sell" Uncle Sam to a hostile Muslim wo

America's new struggle for sympathy and support acro

globe, media, public relations, and marketing specialists 

longer a side–show to hard–nosed, classic power politi

diplomacy. As Secretary Powell defined American diplo

"We're selling a product. That product we are sell

democracy."33
This is a crucial struggle for the United States to win. 

its efforts should not be simply focused on "sel

democracy." It should make an effort to sell to all of Eur

the idea of "the West" as a viable and even pivotal concept. 

doing so will sow the seeds of mistrust and concern, wh

will undermine the legitimacy of the US sheriff and will, o

time, make the formation of a Western "posse" against fu

security threats unlikely. However, if the United States ta

Europe seriously and gives the EU the credit and voic

deserves, on the basis of its historical record and econo

value for America's prosperity, much is to be gained.

Europe's Practical Contribution

Most of the work required to keep the transatla

relationship afloat and relevant will have to come fr

"Europe," both in its institutional guises as the EU and NA

and as a joint effort of all European countries that cons

themselves a part of "the West." Three guidelines for fu

policy are of importance.

First, Europe should not only criticize the United St

for real and imagined mistakes, but should offer pract

alternatives, that may even be acceptable to Washing

Europe has to make a better case for its policy approac

toward, for example, Iraq and clarify what other options 

available versus outright military intervention. Europe sho

work harder to influence the policy shaping process 

Washington, supporting the factions and arguments that ar

its own interests. All too often, the United States and Eur

have the same objective and goal in mind, but di

substantially on the preferred road to get there. Like the Un

States, Europe would prefer regime change in Baghdad, bu

long as the EU does not have a credible, alternative "ro

state" plan, complaining about US unilateralism 

interventionism vis–à–vis Iraq will just not do. Europe 

32
lose whatever is left of its influence in the United Stat

gets the reputation of being just another "Mr. Nyet," ho

undeserved such a reputation may actually be. This mea

"Europe" has to adopt a more geostrategic outlook a

willing to engage in security issues that are beyond i

direct political horizon, including issues ranging from 

Korea and Taiwan to the Middle East and the still unre

question of dealing with so–called "failed states" 

Somalia, Yemen, etc.).

Second, Europe must work harder to clarify that the 

at stake go beyond petty intra–Alliance policy differenc

may well determine the future of transatlantic relations 

decades to come. Critics of NATO have "cried wolf" for 

years and we have become

accustomed to an up–and–down

Alliance. Yet, for reasons indicated

above, the emerging transatlantic

gap is becoming too wide and deep

for comfort. Unless the transatlantic

divide is bridged, irreparable

damage may be done to the

effectiveness of "the West" as a

political actor, affecting not only NATO, but also other 

institutions where western states dominate the agenda (s

the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, and the G–7). It sho

clear that this would have a detrimental effect on the 

States and Europe, both economically and politically.

Last, Europe has to convince America that its eff

shape a credible CFSP and ESDP — both of whi

required for the EU to take on more responsibility 

foreign policy, security, and defense areas — are not m

"balance" America in any way, but are mainly to es

Europe as a credible and useful ally of the United 

working toward a generally shared goal, but occas

Europe needs 

establish itself 

credible and u

ally of the Unit

States working

toward a gener

shared goal
taking different routes. At times friction and mod

disagreement will occur, but such a strong European voic

required to keep "the West" both dynamic and credible to 

rest of the world. Europe has to think for itself and be hon

in its relationship with the United States. The result, inevita

will be a more balanced NATO and a United States willin

listen to its traditional allies, not with aversion and displeas

but as the useful and constructive voices that they are, o

least should strive to become. !

Endnotes

1.An earlier version of this paper was published as Europa en de 

Americana. Het transatlantisch bondgenootschap in de schaduw 

morgen, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relat

"Clingendael," April 2002.

2.European Commission President Romano Prodi, statement on the att

against the United States, Brussels, September 12, 2001. 

3.NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "Attack on Us All: NA

Response to Terrorism," Atlantic Council of the United States, Washin

DC, October 10, 2001.

4.Charles Krauthammer, "The Axis of Petulance," The Washington 

March 1, 2002.

5.Quoted in Jonathan Freedland, "Patten Lays into Bush's America," 

Guardian (Manchester), February 9, 2002.

6.International Herald Tribune, "France Upbraids U.S. as 'Simplis

February 7, 2002, and Die Welt (Berlin), "Wir sind keine Satelli

February 12, 2002.

7.US President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 

2002.

8.Ronald Dworkin, "The Threat to Patriotism," The New York Revie

Books, February 28, 2002.

9.Paul D. Wolfowitz, lecture at the 38th Munich Conference on Sec

Policy (Wehrkunde Tagung), February 2, 2002.

10.Irwin Stelzer, "Bush Turns Away from the Weaklings of Europe," 

Times (London), February 19, 2002.

34
11.Time Magazine, August 4, 1997.

12.The New York Times, "Powell says U.S. is Weighing Ways to 

Hussein," February 13, 2002.

13.The Guardian (Manchester), "US Targets Saddam," February 1

14.Thom Shanker, "Pentagon Sees Attack on Saddam Next 

International Herald Tribune, April 29, 2002.

15.Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North 

Council, Reykjavik, May 14, 2002.

16.Quoted in "Solana Seeks to Soften Europe's Anti–US 

International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2002.

17.Jean-Marie Colombani, "Nous sommes tous Américains," Le 

(Paris), September 12, 2001.

18.Quoted in Peter Beaumont and Ed Vulliamy, "Armed to the teet

Observer (London), February 10, 2002.

19.Senator Richard G. Lugar, "Lugar says NATO Must Join 

Terrorism," January 17, 2002. Online: http://www.senate.gov/~lug

20.NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "NATO–Russia Coo

in Combating Terrorism: A Good Idea Whose Time has Come," 

address to NATO Defense College, Rome, February 4, 2002.

21.Gordon Adams, "Convergence or Divergence? The Future 

Transatlantic Defence Industry," in Simon Duke, ed., Between Vis

Reality: CFSP's Progress on the Path to Maturity, Maastricht: E

Institute of Public Administration, 2000, p. 180.

22.Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Confli

York: The Guilford Press, 1997.

23.NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "NATO: Enlarg

Redefining Itself," Lecture at the Royal Institute of International 

London, February 18, 2002.

24.Quoted in "Transformation Postponed," The Economist, February 1

25.Senator Richard G. Lugar, "NATO after 9–11: Crisis or Oppor

March 4, 2002. Online: http://www.senate.gov/~lugar/.

26.Colin S. Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United 

1945–1991," in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and 

Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, an

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 593, 597.

27.Josef Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?" The National Interest, 

Summer 2001, p. 52.
28.Roy Denman, "Trans–atlantic Trade: So Much is at Stake," Internati

Herald Tribune, January 19, 2001.

29.The Economist, "Transatlantic Tensions," May 1, 2002.

30.See Joanna Apap, "Common European Instruments to Ta

Terrorism," CEPS Commentary, September 2001. On

http://www.cepts.be/Commentary/September01/terrorism.htm.

31.Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After 

Cold War, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997, p. 6

32.Joseph Nye recently (re)defined "soft power" as "the ability to get ot

to want what Americans want." In Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. N

Jr., "Introduction," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue, eds., Govern

in a Globalizing World, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000, p. 8.

33.Foreign Policy, "Brand U.S.A.," No. 127, November/December 2001, p

36
National Security in a Globalizing 

World of Chaos: The United States 

and European Responses

by Richard L. Kugler

Executive Summary

Globalization has lost its initial image as a source of 

and progress, giving way instead to an ugly time of 

turmoil, and violence. NATO's old distinction be

"Article 5 threats" and "Article 4 threats" is becom

anachronism because the new threats are often both 

same time. The United States today lives under sieg

Europe may not be far behind. If biological or n

weapons are used in the future, they could take many 

than the 3,000 lives that were lost on 9/11.

For all these reasons, national security has been reborn 

new definition and a new face. The defining issue of th

century will be whether the democratic community can c

mounting chaos along the "southern strategic arc" stre

from the Middle East to the Asian littoral. The United Sta

Europe are increasingly vulnerable in a world where d

from geopolitical hotspots can no longer guarantee safety

must cooperate together, for if the United States and E

stand apart, neither will succeed and both may fail disastr

Today, global terrorism is the main threat. A few yea

the main threat was failed states and ethnic w

Tomorrow the main threat may be the proliferation of we

of mass destruction and aggression by rogue states. 

surprises likely lie ahead, and many of them may be 

unpleasant.
38

The United States will lead the endeavor in the secu

arena, but it cannot carry the burden alone, nor should i

expected to do so. As Europe's premier security institut

NATO is the natural vehicle for helping prepare Euro

contribution. The upcoming Prague Summit needs to defin

new NATO agenda for defense preparedness. The cur

"Defense Capabilities Initiative" could be replaced wi

transformation effort aimed at swift power projection 

high–technology strike operations with US forces. 

Initially, NATO might create a small European "spearh

force": a truly networked, joint force of 25,000–50,000 tro

It should include several fighter squadrons with sm

munitions, ships with cruise missiles, and one or two hig

mobile ground brigades. It should be kept at high readin

with enough transport and logistic assets to deploy in a 

days. This spearhead force would be equipped with 

modern, high–technology weaponry needed 

interoperability with US forces in expeditionary, str

operations.

This small, elite force could be embedded in larger, n

NATO "strategic response forces" to provide broader assets 

new–era threats and missions, even at great distances out

Europe. The spearhead force could also provide outreac

the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force. NATO wo

gain a usable, affordable capability for high–technology st

operations, and the EU would have a similar force 

Petersburg tasks. The two postures would be natural partn

that would re–cement the transatlantic bond, give the Un

States a strong reason to stay involved in Europe, and bol

the EU in a manner that preserves a healthy role for NATO
National Security in a Globalizing 

World of Chaos: 

The US and European Response

Introduction

Only a short while ago, globalization was heralded 

stepping–stone to growing wealth for people every

Likewise, national security was

viewed as a matter of diminishing

importance — as a natural

byproduct of a world on autopilot,

allegedly headed toward universal

democracy and peace. Owing to the tragic events of Sept

11, 2001 and their aftermath, this comforting view has g

in smoke. Globalization is not the direct cause of the 

Afghanistan or the crisis in the Middle East, both of 

stem from deeper causes. But indirectly, globalization se

have contributed its fair share to today's troubles and 

sense of mounting worry about the future. Beyond qu

globalization has gained power as an irresistible trend 

information age. But simultaneously, it has lost its att

image as a purveyor of peace and progress.

Whether because of globalization, or in spite of it, the 

of the early 21st century is proving to be a dangerous 

full of such new–era threats and dangers as global te

networks, savage ethnic wars, failing states, regional b

proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD

geopolitical rivalries. The earlier faith in progress is r

being replaced by worry that a cultural clash with I

fundamentalism, or other such calamities, may lie 

Indeed, some analysts are beginning to call the 21st cent

Globalization i

longer about p

and progress
new "Hundred Years’ War" — an ugly time of chaos, turm

and violence in many places. Perhaps these pessimists are 

glum, but they are a sobering antidote to yesterday's b

optimism. 

The truth is that nobody knows where the future is head

for good or ill or a combination of both. What can be sai

that for both the United States and Europe, national secu

can no longer be taken for gran

Their physical safety, their v

interests outside their borders, 

their democratic values 

seriously endangered by new–

threats arising in distant places. 

over 50 years, North Atlantic Tr

Organization (NATO) memb

could clearly distinguish betw

two types of threats. According to the Washington Treaty 

1949, "Article 4" threats meant that NATO members wo

consult if any one were threatened, while "Article 5" thr

obliged each NATO member to assist the party or parties un

attack, according to the principle that an attack on one is 

attack on all. However, since 9/11, NATO's old distinc

between "Article 5 threats" and "Article 4 threats" is rap

becoming an anachronism because the new threats are o

both at the same time. The terrorist attack on 9/11 killed o

3,000 people: more than were lost at Pearl Harbor in 1941

biological or nuclear weapons are used in the future, t

could kill many more. Today the United States lives un

siege. Can Europe be far behind? 

The implication is clear: National security has been reb

to become once again a meaningful concept for guid

strategic policy, and an endangered goal to be pursued thro

40

Defining issue of

the 21st century:

Can the democratic

community control

mounting chaos in

vast troubled

regions of the

world
hard, sustained effort in troubled

times. Equally important, national

security is acquiring a new

definition and a new face. During

the Cold War, it was defined mostly

in terms of defending borders

against big military threats in a bipolar world. Now, t

military threats are gone, and bipolarity has passe

history. The new strategic situation is very different fro

Cold War, and it can be portrayed in a nutshell. The 

drama of the 20th century was democracy's struggle a

totalitarianism. The defining issue of the early 21st c

will be whether the democratic community can c

mounting chaos in the vast troubled regions outsi

borders, especially along the "Southern strategic 

stretching from the Middle East to the Asian littoral. 

Handling this formidable challenge will be the new f

national security. Beyond question, the United State

Europe will need to cooperate together in this endeavor

they stand apart, neither will succeed and both may 

ways that result in disastrous consequences. At a min

they will be increasingly vulnerable in a world where, 

to globalization, distance from smoldering geopo

hotspots and flaming threats is no longer a guarantee of 

New Threats and Dangers in a Bifurcated World

Any attempt to assess US and European security strate

this new era must begin with a clear–eyed appraisal o

these threats are developing. The direct answer is th

intentions of perpetrators who are willing to inflict m

destruction on their victims, including the United 

European nations, and other countries as well. But, th

National secur

essential to

strategic polic

has been rebo
reasons are wider and m

deep–seated. The new geopolitic

one reason: new forms of riv

among nation–states and polit

ideologies that transnational gro

such as terrorists, are joining

important ways, globalization is another reason. 

accelerating cross–border flow of trade, finances, technolo

and communications is drawing once–distant regions clo

together, creating webs of interdependent ties 

vulnerabilities. Earlier globalization was seen as wh

positive because it promised to bring economic growth 

democracy to all corners of the world. But more recen

globalization has emerged as hydra–headed. While it has m

good features and is a positive trend for the long haul, it 

strains regions unprepared for the information 

modernization, and stiff competition in global markets. 

Globalization is producing a bifurcated world. Y

globalization is making the already–prosperous democra

even wealthier, while helping others make progress. 

elsewhere, it is spawning not only winners, but also los

while leaving many societies, countries, and regions strugg

to keep their heads above water, not knowing how to reac

the changes rapidly unfolding around them. In this atmosph

of angst and confusion, globalization is nurturing venom

anti–Western ideologies and deeply angry actors — includ

nihilistic terrorists and menacing countries bent on acqui

WMD systems — that are willing to lash out against Wes

democracies and others that they blame for their fate.

These new threats are merging together in ways 

reinforce each other. They also are gaining access to 

modern information systems and technologies that allow th

42

Globalization is

producing a

bifurcated 

world
to inflict violence at very long distances, from one conti

the next. Beyond this, these threats are bringing further t

to unstable regions where great chaos is the byprod

already–existing conditions, including widespread eco

poverty, authoritarian governments, weak state

societies, criminal behavior, and a lack of collective s

institutions. At many places along the vast Southern a

result is a boiling primordial stew that is producin

threats in ways that menace not only local peac

progress, but common western Western interests, value

safety as well. 

Today global terrorism is the main threat. A few yea

the main threat was failed states and ethnic w

Tomorrow the main threat may be WMD proliferatio

aggression by rogue states. Who knows what the future 

Indeed, major surprises likely lie ahead, and many o

may be quite unpleasant. The key point is that we live 

increasingly dangerous world of multiple threats and s

dangers. Neither the United States nor its allies can af

remain passive in the face of them. 

Crafting a Political and Strategic Response

Globalization means that as the democracies shape 

foreign policy and national security strategy, they mu

think, and act in global terms. Doing so is nothing new 

United States, which has been a globally active pow

decades, with weighty involvements in virtually eve

region. But meeting this global challenge is decidedly n

Europe. Early in the 20th century, of course, many Eu

countries were heavily involved around the world. I

a number still possessed empires. But during the Cold 

European countries mostly withdrew from global aff

order to focus on their own battered and endangered con
Thankfully, this effort has succeeded in ways that o

seemed unimaginable. In a brief period, Europe has gone fr

being the cockpit of global calamity to become 

poster–child for democracy, unity, and peaceful progr

Over the next decade or so, Europe stands a good chance 

achieving a long–sought dream: the unification of the en

continent under the mantle of democracy, econo

integration, and multilateral cooperation through s

institutions as the European Union (EU) and NATO. But

Europe pursues this vision, it cannot afford to wall itself 

from the rest of the world, with a 21st century version 

Euro–isolationism. Europe's growing global econo

involvements make such a detac

stance implausible. Beyond th

brief look at the world map sh

that Europe is located next–doo

the most dangerous regions 

earth, within easy range of 

mounting threats there. 

Europe can no longer rely u

the United States to protect it fr

these dangers. Yes, the United States should continue to p

the role of global superpower and leader, and it should ref

from unilateralism when multilateralism is viable. But, Eur

must make a worthy and weighty contribution itself, 

genuine and co–equal partner of the United States. 

emerging strategic situation cries out for the United States 

Europe, the world's leading democracies and strongest pow

to work together in a strategic partnership aimed at ensu

that the 21st century does not go up in smoke. A n

transatlantic bargain is needed. It should join the United St

and Europe in an historic collaboration not only to comp

Europe's unification, but also to bring greater secur

44

A strategic

partnership

between the United

States and Europe

is needed to build

world security,

stability, and

progress
stability, and progress to distant regions whose gr

turmoil, if left unchecked, could greatly damag

democracies themselves. 

Are such a new transatlantic bargain and str

partnership possible? Today's cacophony of comp

flowing back–and–forth across the Atlantic sugges

Some Europeans are accusing the United States of ar

unilateralism, hyper–powerism, and warlike militari

return, some Americans are accusing the Europeans of 

inward–looking, incompetent free–riders, and comp

back–stabbers to boot. Hopefully, this error–fille

unproductive name–calling can give rise to something 

constructive. There are reasons for hoping that this can 

case. Often before, Americans and Europeans argued b

at times of impeding strategic change, and then surm

their disputes to reach common ground on behalf of p

that made sense to both of them. They need to do so ag

A new transatlantic bargain should neither as

Europeans to support US global policies in rote ways no

them a brake on assertive US–led

efforts. Instead, it should establish a

common framework for the United

States and Europe to act together in

energetic collaborative ways.

Harmonizing alternative views

requires patient dialogue, but this

approach has worked in the past,

and it can work again. The United

States and some European countries

may not always agree on specific

actions. But, their core interests and goals are compat

ways that normally will permit common perspective

Their strategy 

aspire to bette

governance,

market econom

and modernizi

societies, while

defeating glob

terrorism and 

proliferation
often will permit coordinated, mutually supporting acti

The core reality here is simple. The United States and Eur

share the same basic values and are menaced in simil

serious ways. Individually they lack the resources 

willpower to handle the world's problems, but together, t

possess ample amounts of both. They merely need to w

together in a spirit of partnership, not rivalry.

The United States and Europe need to launch a strong ef

that covers the full spectrum of policy instruments: milit

political, diplomatic, and economic. Clearly their strat

must be broader and more visionary than merely using mili

force to swat down new threats whenever they appear. T

strategy must aspire to bring better governance, ma

economies, and modernizing societies to poverty–stric

regions along the Southern arc and elsewhere, includ

Sub–Saharan Africa. Just as clearly, their strategy must aspir

defeat the twin threats of global terrorism and WM

proliferation — not only to protect themselves from direct att

but also because these threats must be quelled if long–t

efforts to bring progress to troubled regions are to succeed

today's world, the pursuit of security and progress must 

hand–in–hand. Indeed, the former often will be a precondi

for the latter. Democracy, economic markets, and multilat

cooperation cannot take hold until these dangerous threats 

checked and a climate of stable security affairs takes hold.

Making Use of NATO

The United States will lead the endeavor in the secu

arena, but it cannot carry the weight alone, nor should i

expected to do so. As Europe's premier security institut

NATO is the natural vehicle for helping prepare Euro

contribution, organize it, and harmonize it with US efforts

46
the aftermath of September 11, NATO rose to the occas

activating Article 5. It sent Airborne Warning and C

System (AWACS) aircraft to help defend US skies, as

naval forces to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean, inc

intelligence sharing, intensified law enforcement, and initi

inventory of national civil emergency

measures. When US forces

launched combat operations in

Afghanistan, British forces joined

them, other countries offered to

help, and NATO made its

infrastructure available. Later,

several European countries, including Germany and F

sent troops to lead multinational peacekeepi

Afghanistan and to help root out lingering Al Qaeda c

the countryside.

Now that the United States is widening the war on ter

to other regions and preparing to confront WMD prolife

the situation calls upon the Europeans and NATO to 

additional efforts in support. Exactly what role NATO 

play in future crises and missions is to be seen, but clear

Europeans cannot sit on the sidelines, complaining 

American actions but not helping. If the Europea

passive, the inevitable result will be the withering of N

because neither the Americans nor the Europeans will v

as relevant to the new era's security affairs. The dem

agenda ahead necessitates that even as NATO enlar

welcome new members and pursues a close dialogu

Russia, it cannot afford to become a loose, collective s

pact that lacks military teeth and strategic punch. In add

bolstering homeland defenses on both sides of the A

NATO must strengthen its capacity to launch dem

security operations well outside Europe, for it will not b

The United Sta

will lead. NATO 

the natural veh

to assist in

organizing

Europe’s powe
to cope with the new threats if it remains a border–defe

alliance. NATO should not become a "global alliance," bu

does need to become capable of acting strongly and wisel

other theaters.

NATO also must ensure that it continues to act as an allia

of equals. As during the Cold War, its future efforts in spec

areas may be carried out by coalitions of the committed 

able. Sometimes these coalitions may act outside the NA

structure, with NATO in support. But, NATO should s

away from any "division of labor" that divides the alliance 

separate blocs. This judgment applies to politics 

diplomacy, but it especially holds true for military operati

NATO should not expect the United States and Britain to 

as "bad cops" while other members act as "good cops" w

pursue peaceful reconciliation with adversaries. Nor sho

the United States and Britain carry out intense com

missions while other NA

members pursue peacekeeping 

the aftermath. Nor should 

United States perform high–t

bombing missions while ot

members fight on the ground

seamless sharing of duties, coupled with a flexible approac

the particulars, makes sense.

New Forces and Capabilities for New Missions

Finally, NATO and the Europeans must improve t

military capabilities for missions against the new threats. A

matter of growing urgency, this issue should be addresse

the upcoming Prague Summit, which needs to define a n

NATO defense preparedness agenda for the future. Tod

European militaries are larger and stronger than is commo

48

NATO needs a new

defense

preparedness

agenda for the

future
realized, with 2.4 million active duty troops and $150 

in annual defense spending. But, because they still fo

defending their borders, they lack the capacity to s

project power to long distances and to strike lethally a

the new threats. In addition, they are in danger of 

further behind the US military as it transforms itsel

new operational doctrines and technologies, inc

modern information systems, sensors, and munitio

today's interoperability gap

widens further, European and US

forces might not be able to fight

together even if Europe's political

leaders do not want to watch from

the sidelines, and even if the

Americans want them to be equal

partners.

The Europeans cannot be expected to match the 

States, but they must be able to contribute credibly t

missions when the need arises. While a crash defense b

is not necessary, the Europeans need to configure a por

their forces for swift power projection and high–tech 

operations with US forces. To help guide this effort, NA

Prague could replace its ongoing "Defense Capab

Initiative" with a tighter–focused transformation effort 

at acquiring high–priority forces and integrated capabil

this area. Initially, this effort might create a small Eu

"spearhead force": a truly networked, joint force compo

25,000–50,000 troops. This small, elite strike force 

include several fighter squadrons with smart munitions

with cruise missiles, and one or two highly mobile g

brigades, backed by the transport and logistics assets nee

move quickly. 

Europe cannot 

expected to m

the United Sta

militarily, but m

be able to

contribute cred
This spearhead force would 

maintained at high readin

capable of deploying in a 

days. It would be equipped w

the modern, high–tech weapo

needed for expeditionary st

operations in intense, demand

combat. It would be interopera

with US forces, capable of sim

battlefield missions. It would 

commanded by a standing joint task force that possesses 

requisite personnel and information networks to per

coordinated joint and combined operations that integ

air, naval, and ground forces. It would be a mo

European force, but properly configured US forces 

Europe could be affiliated with it, thereby expanding 

pool of spearhead capabilities available to NATO.

This spearhead force could be embedded in larger, n

NATO "strategic response forces" that provide broader as

for new–era threats and missions, including at long distan

outside Europe. For example, the spearhead force co

operate as a lead echelon for a medium–sized strike packag

six–nine brigades along with commensurate air and na

assets. While these numbers are illustrative, the key poin

that the small, elite spearhead force would deploy first 

distant crisis, thereby gaining early and forcible entry, and 

remaining strategic response forces would deploy somew

later, thereby providing the additional assets needed to c

the day. The exact force deployment, of course, would 

modular and scalable, capable of being tailored to deal w

the specific situation at hand. These forces could be used 

variety of different ways: e.g., under the integrated comma

as a separate "coalition of the willing," or assigned to 

50

A new

European/NATO

high-readiness, 

high-tech 

spearhead force

would be

interoperable with

US forces
command in distant situations where the United States 

lead country. 

Such a small spearhead force, backed up by the 

strategic response forces, would equip NATO with the 

needed to respond to crises similar to the recent interven

Afghanistan. Together, they would provide a flexib

adaptable posture, capable of handling a wide spectr

missions in a diverse array of

geographic locations. This posture

could also perform other critical

functions. It could serve as a

vanguard for promoting training,

exercises, and experiments with US

forces, thus helping the European

and American militaries pursue

transformation together. The

lessons learned about new–era

operations can be applied elsewhere

across NATO and European forces,

thus helping them transform as

well. This spearhead force also

could perform outreach to the EU's

European Rapid Reaction Force

(ERRF). With it, NATO would have a

usable force for high–tech strike operations, and the EU 

have a similar force for Petersberg (conflict prevention an

management) tasks. The two postures would be natural p

that would help NATO and the EU work together, rathe

drift apart as rivals. 

Is such an innovation affordable in today's clim

constrained resources? The answer is "yes." The c

A spearhead fo

would achieve 

3 key 

strategic goals

provide NATO 

Europe with ba

needed forces 

threats and

missions; 

re-cement the

transatlantic b

and contribute 

the EU’s growt

while preservin

healthy role fo

NATO
forces needed for this posture already exist. They merely n

to be organized and equipped properly. In theory, 

Europeans could fund this effort by reprioritizing their exis

defense budgets. While the Europeans arguably need big

defense budgets, this owes to larger reasons, not to any 

increase from funding this new posture. 

The bottom line is that this spearhead force, backed 

other strategic response forces, would help achieve th

key strategic goals: 1) It would provide NATO and Eur

with badly needed forces and capabilities for new thre

and missions; 2) It wo

re–cement the transatlantic b

in ways that provide the Un

States a strong rationale 

staying actively involved 

Europe; and 3) It would contrib

to the EU's growth in a man

that preserves a healthy role for NATO. Especially beca

this small force is readily affordable, it offers NATO, 

Europeans, and the Americans a golden opportunity 

enhance their alliance at Prague.

Conclusion

A new era of demanding security affairs thus has burst u

both the United States and Europe. The strategic challen

ahead can be properly interpreted only if they are seen aga

the backdrop of a world that is rapidly globalizing, produc

a rich mix of opportunities and troubles. Great changes 

taking place, but one thing hasn't changed: the need for 

52

Cooperation

between the United

States and Europe

is essential to the

strategic

challenges ahead
United States and Europe to cooperate together. This 

they won the Cold War, and it provides the best reci

coping with the 21st century as well.!
Acronyms

ABM – Anti–Ballistic Missile

AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy 

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CTBT – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

EAPC – Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council

EU – European Union

EADS – European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company

ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy

ERRF – European Rapid Reaction Force

ICC – International Criminal Court 

IMF – International Monetary Fund

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

NAC – North Atlantic Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCW – Network Centric Warfare

NGO – non–governmental Organization

NPT – Non–Proliferation Treaty

NTA – New Transatlantic Agenda

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe

RMA – Revolution in Military Affairs

SIS – Schengen Information System

UN – United Nations

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO – World Trade Organization

54
CThe George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies

Dr. Robert Kennedy

Director

MG (Ret.) Michael J. McCarthy, USAF

Deputy Director

MG (Ret.) Winfried Dunkel, GE

Deputy Director

Ambassador Victor Jackovich

Associate Director for International Affairs

College of International and Security Studies

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Dean

Dr. G. Paul Holman, Contributing Editor

Professor of National Security Studies

Dr. Detlef Puhl

Mr. John Kriendler

Mr. Richard Cohen

Editorial Review

Ms. Sara C. Holman

Editor, Marshall Center Papers

Mr. William L. Winkle

Distribution
The Marshall Center Papers

No. 1 - Europe’s New Defense Ambitions:

Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia 

by Peter van Ham

April 2000

No. 2 - The Transformation of Russian 

Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned 

from Kosovo and Chechnya 

by Alexei G. Arbatov

July 2000

No. 3 - Cooperative Security: 

New Horizons for International Order

by Richard Cohen and 

Michael Mihalka

April 2001
The Marshall Center Papers

Editorial Advisory Board

Prof. Evgeniy Bazhanov

Vice-President, Russian Diplomatic Academy

Prof. Dr. Wilfried von Bredow

Institut für Politikwissenschaft,Universität Marburg

Dr. Paul Cornish

Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Dr. Christopher Dandeker 

Head, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

Dr. Robert H. Dorff

Chairman, Dept. of National Security and Strategy, US Army War C

Prof. Dr. Heinz Gaertner

Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien

Prof. Dr. Ferenc Gazdag

Director, Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest

Dr. Thomas B. Grassey

Director, US Naval War College Press

Prof. Dr. Ali M. Karaosmanoglu

Chairman, Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent Universi

Dr. Jacob Kipp

Senior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office 

US Army Combined Arms Center

Dr. Charles A. Kupchan

Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington

Dr. Friedemann Müller

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

Dr. Frances Pilch

Political Science Department., US Air Force Academy

Dr. Andrew L. Ross 

Strategic Research Department, US Naval War College

Dr. Dmitri Trenin

Deputy Director, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow 

Dr. Thanos Veremis

Constantine Karamanlis Professor in Hellenic and Southeaste

European Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 

Tufts University

Prof. Dr. Peter M. E. Volten

Director, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groni

Dr. Stephen L. White

Department of Politics, University of Glasgow

CCooperative Security: Two Views
Transatlantic Security Challenge

by Peter van Ham, Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands 

of International Relations "Clingendael," and Richard L. K

Distinguished Research Professor, Institute for National 

Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC.

The defining issue of the 21st century will be whether th

democratic community can prevent chaos along the stra

stretching from the Middle East to the Asian littoral. This 

Center Paper presents two different views of how Europ

America should respond to terrorism, globalization, and 

proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Peter van Ham explores the growing gap between Euro

American military strategies, capabilities, and values. He 

that the United States should take Europe seriously and 

greater use of America’s "soft power," while Europe sho

establish itself as an effective ally of the United States a

engage in security issues on a global scale. 

Richard Kugler contends that national security has been 

although NATO is still the natural vehicle for harmonizing 

and European efforts. He contends that NATO must act 

alliance of equals, offering his own, original proposals fo

forces that NATO must create to deal with the emerging 

an increasingly dangerous world.

The Marshall Center Web Site:

http://www.marshallcenter.org

Designed and produced by VIB

June 2002