Report of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

Management Oversight in Acquisition 

Organizations 

March 2005 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal Advisory 

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- iii - 

- v - 
- vi - 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................1 

II. BACKGROUND.........................................................................................................................5 

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................5 

The Case Study of Darleen Druyun.............................................................................................6 

The Acquisition Process ................................................................................................................8 

III. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................11 

Theme 1: Addressing the Immediate Issues 

Processes...............................................................................................................................11 

Oversight ..............................................................................................................................13 

Theme 2: Ensuring Enduring Change 

Leadership............................................................................................................................14 

People....................................................................................................................................16 

IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................19 

Contracts for Services ..................................................................................................................19 

Overachieving Recommendation...............................................................................................19 

V. SUMMARY..................................................................................................................................21 

APPENDICES............................................................................................................................23 

A. Terms of reference...............................................................................................................23 

B. Task Force members and advisors....................................................................................25 

C. Briefings received ................................................................................................................29 

D. References.............................................................................................................................31 

E. Acronyms .............................................................................................................................35 
- vii - 
- 1 - 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recent events in the Air Force surrounding the illegal actions of former Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Darleen Druyun highlighted the need to review the management and 

oversight structure of acquisition activities in the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD, through 

the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 

established the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Management Oversight of 

Acquisition Organizations to examine its acquisition structures and processes; survey and assess 

best practices; and recommend changes to improve checks and balances to better ensure 

acquisition integrity. The Task Force was also asked to consider whether: (1) structural problems 

exist that place too much decision authority in one individual or at a level without adequate 

oversight; and (2) a simplified acquisition structure could improve both efficiency and oversight.1 

The Task Force was co-chaired by two members of the Defense Science Board. Task Force 

members and key contributors included former Defense Department and other Federal 

Government officials, as well as members of industry and academia.2 During the course of its 

work, the Task Force reviewed a wide array of written materials and heard from experts in the 

fields of acquisition, procurement, ethics and integrity, human resources, leadership, 

organization, oversight, and best practices.3

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force identified a confluence of contributing factors in the case of Darleen Druyun: 

• Exceptional expertise in contracting; 

• Long tenure in her position; 

• Gradual accretion of acquisition and personnel management authorities; 

• Little oversight because of no immediate supervisor (or her supervisor delegated 

acquisition authorities to her); 

• Abusive behavior to subordinates and contractors that was not apparent, or viewed as 

“tough, but fair” by supervisors; 

• “Behind closed doors” decisions; 

• Employment of her daughter and future son-in-law by Boeing. 

In the case of this individual, too much control and management of too many functions with 

insufficient oversight resided in one person. Practices within the other defense components with 

acquisition authority in DoD and the recent process and structural reforms of the Air Force make 

the likelihood of a recurrence of a similar situation remote. The Task Force found, however, that 

there is nothing in the current general acquisition structure or policies of the Department to 

prevent it from happening again. 

The Task Force concluded that the Department of Defense can and should not only avoid a 

recurrence of a similar situation, but also move to a “best in class” high integrity organization to 

mitigate a number of the ethical issues associated with, but not unique to, this case. To do so, it 

 

1

 See Appendix A for a complete copy of the Terms of Reference. 

2

 Appendix B provides a listing. 

3

 Appendices C and D list the reference materials and speakers brought in by the Task Force, respectively.
- 2 - 

must address issues for the immediate future, as well as ensure enduring change. The Task 

Force’s recommendations are divided into four areas of focus within those two themes. 

THEME 1: ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES—

PAY ATTENTION TO PROCESSES AS WELL AS PROGRAMS

A. Processes 

Encode best practices into policy for major procurements. 

The USD(AT&L) should require: 

• An open, deliberative source selection process between DoD Service or Agency teams 

and source selection authorities; 

• Written documentation of the source selection recommendations by all team members; 

• Written justification of source selection decision by the source selection authority; 

• Distribution of delegated acquisition responsibilities among qualified acquisition 

personnel; 

• Effective feedback to all bidders; 

• Additional avenues for voicing concerns; e.g., ombudsmen and ethics offices. 

B. Oversight 

Oversight of processes and practices is as important as oversight of programs.

USD(AT&L) should: 

• Identify and share best practices, and question unusual practices and structures; 

• Use mistakes and failures as case studies, and communicate them broadly; 

• Require periodic self-assessments of acquisition organizations, practices, and processes, 

and expect continuous improvement; 

• Monitor senior acquisition personnel performance and tenure. 

THEME 2: ENSURE ENDURING CHANGE—

DRIVE THE CULTURE TO A HIGHER STANDARD

C. Leadership 

Leadership is at the center of high integrity organizations. Leadership in DoD should be more proactive to 

ensure that values and ethics are the foundation for all employee actions.

DoD should: 

• Articulate DoD values and vision from the top down; 

• Expect the highest integrity from its partners in industry; 

• Place ethics at the forefront of Department communications: it’s more than just 

compliance; 

• Expand orientation programs in ethics and continual learning; 

• Ensure flow-down to every employee. 
- 3 - 

D. People 

”Best in class” high integrity organizations ensure leaders, not just skilled practitioners, for senior 

positions. 

DoD, the Administration, and Congress should: 

• Work together to streamline nomination and confirmation processes; 

• Avoid more restrictions limiting recruitment of experienced personnel. 

DoD should: 

• Modernize the Senior Executive Service (SES) performance management system by 

- Instituting 360° feedback; 

- Implementing a rotation policy; 

- Removing impediments from bonus and development systems, especially for those 

willing to rotate. 

OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION 

The Task Force was not charged with assessing the overall acquisition process, but the 

many sources of information received pointed to an extremely complex system requiring many 

inputs from many organizations with many people who can say “no” but few who can say ”yes.” 

This diffusion of authority enables those who master the system to gain power. Secondly, it 

appears to the Task Force that an excessive amount of resources is devoted to thwarting or 

uncovering relatively rare cases of fraud and abuse. The result is growing delays in acquiring 

important, even critical, capabilities for the warfighter. A better balance needs to be struck. The 

Task Force therefore recommends that the Department undertake a top-down internal 

assessment to simplify and streamline the system and better align the workforce as a result. 

SUMMARY 

Among the ranks of acquisition professionals, the task force believes that the overwhelming 

majority is ethical and hard-working. These people, individually and collectively, operate in a 

complex and, at times, conflicting world of law, regulations, and practices that is demanding and 

time-sensitive. They should not be encumbered with more rules and regulations since that would 

still not prevent a determined insider from illegal behavior. Their efforts should be enabled by a 

work environment that encourages and rewards integrity and mutual respect. Processes and 

oversight that reinforce key principles such as open communications, distribution of authorities, 

and ethical and respectful behaviors will not only assist in fairness to all, but will encourage the 

sharing of best business practices, improve decision making, and create and environment within 

which transgressions will be more difficult to hide. 

Leadership drives “best-in-class” high integrity organizations. As such, skills for ethical 

leadership and management of people must be emphasized, and articulation of ethical 

management principles, from the top down, is critical. In the long run, the highest ethical 

standards and respect for each other will produce the best business practices. 

Emphasize ethics and respect for people, and good 

business practices will follow
- 4 - 
- 5 - 

TERMS OF

REFERENCE

• Assess oversight to ensure the 

integrity of all acquisition 

decisions 

• Examine and assess acquisition 

structures and processes 

• Survey best practices 

• Recommend changes to improve 

checks and balances and better 

ensure acquisition integrity 

• Consider structural problems 

and simplification 

II. BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

In November 2004, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], requested that the Chairman of the Defense 

Science Board (DSB) establish a “Task Force on Management Oversight in Acquisition 

Organizations.” The Task Force met during December 2004 and January 2005. In early 

February 2005, the Task Force chairpersons presented the panel’s draft findings and 

recommendations to USD(AT&L), the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Science Board, 

the Office of Management and Budget/Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and to 

members of the House Armed Services Committee staff and the Senate Armed Services 

Committee staff. This report incorporates both the original insights and observations of 

the Task Force, as well as additional ones collected during these briefings. 

In the Task Force Terms of Reference, USD(AT&L) noted that “Recent events have 

highlighted a need to review the management and oversight structure of the acquisition 

activities in DoD. The Department must ensure that there is effective oversight to ensure 

the integrity of all acquisition decisions.”4 To this end, the Task Force was directed to: 

 

• Examine and assess DoD acquisition structures and processes across all 

departments, agencies, and commands with Title 10 acquisition authority; 

• Survey and assess best practices across these same organizations; and 

• Recommend changes to the structures, processes, and practices in order to 

improve checks and balances and better ensure acquisition integrity. 

Two related issues were also raised for Task Force consideration: 

• Do “structural problems exist that place too much decision authority in one 

individual or at a level without adequate oversight”? 

• Could a simplified acquisition structure “improve both efficiency and 

oversight”? 

To meet the challenge outlined in the Terms of Reference, the DSB assembled an 

expert panel representing broad acquisition knowledge and experience across a variety 

of military, government, industry, and academic organizations.5 The Task Force engaged 

acquisition experts, practitioners, and observers from government, industry, and 

academia.6 In addition, the Task Force reviewed documents, memos, and reports relevant 

to the Terms of Reference and its mandate.7 In general, the Task Force sought to gain as 

broad and timely a view of current acquisition issues as possible. 

 

4

 See Appendix A for a copy of the original Terms of Reference. 

5

 See Appendix B for a listing of Task Force members and key contributors. 6

 Appendix C lists the presentations to the Task Force. 7

 Appendix D lists these sources. 

T ASK F ORCE

MEMBERSHIP

Chairpersons: 

• Dr. Miriam John 

• Dr. Ronald Kerber 

Executive Secretary: 

• Ms. Lisa Davis 

Members: 

• Mr. Irving Blickstein 

• Mr. Stephen Conver 

• Dr. Robert Howard 

• ADM (Ret.) Donald Pilling 

• GEN (Ret.) Louis Wagner 

Key Contributors: 

• Dr. Allan Burman 

• Mr. Steven Schooner 

Government Advisor: 

• Dr. Gerald Abbott 
- 6 - 

THE CASE STUDY OF DARLEEN DRUYUN

The catalyst for the study was the admission by Darleen Druyun of her favorable 

treatment of Boeing Corporation in key contract awards and negotiations. The Task Force 

spent time understanding the environment and decisions that enabled her to do those 

things as a basis for separating the unique aspects of her case from more systemic issues. 

From 1993 until her retirement in November 2002, Ms. Druyun was Deputy or 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Management. 

During periods when the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 

(her immediate supervisor) was unfilled, she also served in an acting capacity in that role. 

In her signed plea to the court and post-plea admissions,8 Ms. Druyun admitted to job 

discussions with Boeing while still actively involved in negotiating a major Air Force 

contract with that company. She also admitted favoring Boeing in earlier contract decisions 

in order to further employment opportunities for her daughter and future son-in-law. 

The Task Force discovered a confluence of factors that created a high risk situation 

which Ms Druyun took advantage of. She had personal responsibility for a wide range of 

activities including source selection, contract negotiations, fee determinations, and 

personnel actions. In the other Services and defense components with Title 10 authorities, 

these activities are normally delegated to, or shared with, other officials. In addition, she 

received little oversight or supervision from political superiors in the Air Force or the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). She was given these authorities over time by her 

civilian leadership, in spite of concerns expressed by many of the senior military officers in 

the Air Force. 

This situation appears to have resulted from: (1) her highly regarded capabilities, especially 

in contracting, and well recognized knowledge of the system; (2) her lengthy tenure as the 

Air Force’s leading acquisition professional; and (3) the absence during much of her tenure 

of an appointed Assistant Secretary for Acquisition who would have served as her 

immediate supervisor. Also, by virtue of her considerable influence over careers and 

promotions of both military and civilian personnel, she appeared able to control 

subordinates and suppress criticism and dissent. Finally, employment at Boeing for her 

daughter and future son-in-law, in the context of her position and authority, should have 

raised concerns, at least to assure that no conflict of interest or favoritism had been in play. 

Figure 1 summarizes the chronology of Ms. Druyun’s tenure as Air Force Acquisition 

Executive coincident with her personal dealings with Boeing. In particular, it indicates: (1) 

the absence of an appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition during 

much of her tenure; (2) the successive accumulation of responsibilities that were assigned 

to Ms. Druyun over this time; (3) the potential for conflict-of-interest arising from the 

employment by Boeing of her daughter and future son-in-law; and (4) her discussions with 

Boeing about possible employment prior to recusing herself from dealings with Boeing. 

 

8

 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Criminal No. 04-150-A, Supplemental 

Statement of Facts and Supplemental Plea Agreement, July 2004. 

T HE D ARLENE DRUYUN 

CASE : A CONFLUENCE OF 

F ACTORS

• Perceived as having exceptional 

expertise 

• Long tenure in the job 

• Gradual accretion of more 

authority, endorsed by civilian 

AF leadership 

• Source selection, contract 

negotiation, fee determination, 

personnel management, even 

occasional influence in 

requirements 

• Little oversight 

• Tough, but fair (superiors) vs. 

abusive (subordinates and 

contractors) 

• Independent operator with 

many decisions made “behind 

closed doors” 

• Employment of daughter and 

future son-in-law 
- 7 - 

FIGURE 1: Darleen Druyun chronology 

Legend: 

Tenure of political appointees: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition Mrs. Druyun Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Mrs. Druyun Principal Deputy Assistant (Acq and Mgt) — Title Change only in May 1994 Mrs. Druyun senior Air Force acquisition civilian (4 times, ~ 47 months). Mrs. Druyun served from Feb. 1993 to Nov. 2002 (118 months) 
- 8 - 

THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

The immediate results of the Druyun case have been a loss of confidence in the 

acquisition system, a decline of morale in the acquisition workforce, potential program 

delays, and possible increased costs due to potentially tainted contracts, time consuming 

investigations and review, and pressures for yet more legislative and administrative 

restrictions that could be wasteful and counter-productive. 

Figure 2 depicts the general structure for the oversight and execution of major 

defense acquisition programs.9 Although all procurement authority is exercised and 

overseen as depicted on the right side of the chart, many procurements are executed 

directly in support of customers and requiring activities (e.g., military construction, base 

support services, general supplies) and are not part of major acquisition programs. 

 

 FIGURE 2. DoD Acquisition Process 

All procurement and acquisition program oversight authority resides with the 

USD(AT&L) by virtue of statute and delegation from the Secretary of Defense. The 

acquisition and procurement management responsibilities of USD(AT&L) are generally 

supported by the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (D, DPAP), 

 

9

 There are some exceptions, such as space programs, which are managed by the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force by designation of the Secretary of Defense. 

SecDef 

USD(AT&L)

DAE 

MIL DEPT 

SEC’Y 

D,DPAP 

SAE 

HCA 

PM 

PEO 

PM PM 

HCO 

KO 

K Spec Proc Asst 

Program management

Services 

OSD 

Procurement 
- 9 - 

while program management is supported by the Director, Defense Systems. The Under 

Secretary is authorized by statute and by the implementing DoD Directive to direct the 

Secretaries of the Military Departments and the heads of other DoD components in 

matters within his responsibility. 

Within the Military Departments a similar structure exists. An Assistant Secretary 

serves as the Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE) and is responsible for both program 

management and acquisition oversight by delegation from the Military Department 

Secretary and by delegation in agency-wide directives and regulations. Below the level of 

the assistant secretary, the two functions separate, with program management 

responsibilities exercised by Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Program Managers 

(PMs), and procurement responsibilities exercised by Heads of Contracting Activities 

(HCAs). The Defense Agencies generally replicate the structure of the Military 

Departments with program management and procurement functions merged in the 

directors, but separated below the level of the directors.10 The Director of Defense 

Procurement and Acquisition Policy serves as the “head of the agency,” as the term is 

used in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, for the defense agencies. 

The separation of program management and procurement functions is reinforced 

by policy of the USD(AT&L), first issued in 1993 and reissued on November 23, 2004. The 

policy provides for contracting officers to be independent of the program management 

structure in order to ensure independent business and professional judgment. Some 

functions supporting acquisition, such as Source Selection Authority and membership on 

Source Selection Evaluation Boards and Source Selection Advisory Boards are assigned 

for individual acquisitions and may include participation of program management 

personnel, acquisition personnel, and user representatives. 

The structure supports common oversight of the procurement and program 

management functions yet separates the functions for program and procurement 

execution. Checks and balances are built into the structure, so long as the separation is 

maintained not only between program and procurement execution, but also between 

execution and oversight. 

Darleen Druyun sat at the apex of the two branches of Figure 2 as deputy or 

principal deputy to the SAE and for extended periods of time, served as the acting SAE in 

the Air Force acquisition organization. Over the years of her tenure, she accumulated and 

exercised her authority along both lines, but the abuses in question were principally 

along the procurement track of the right hand branch, and it is on this branch that the 

Task Force focused its attention. The Air Force procurement process grew increasingly 

centralized during her tenure, and in this sense it differed from the procurement 

processes in either the Navy or the Army. Interestingly enough, at the time, the Air Force 

process was often praised as representing a better, more streamlined way of doing 

business. 

 

10 MDA is an exception. 
- 10 - 

While Figure 2 provides the general model for acquisition in DoD, there is 

considerable flexibility available in the delegation and implementation of the authorities 

below the dotted line, and practices vary among the military departments and defense 

components. Although a concentration of authorities delegated in a single individual is 

unusual—as was the case with Ms. Druyun—it could still occur in any of the acquisition 

defense components in the absence of appropriate oversight and built-in checks and 

balances. 

In addition, the simplicity of Figure 2 belies the complex environment within 

which the DoD acquisition system operates: 

• The efficient and effective operation of the system is challenged by an array of 

competing priorities and conflicting requirements, e.g., rapid delivery of 

essential equipment versus risk avoidance, best value versus adherence to 

legislated imperatives supporting protected groups of suppliers, etc. 

• Because of the complexity of the acquisition system and its regulations, the 

temptation to rely increasingly on experts who can master the details of the 

system (as was the case for Ms. Druyun) exists. 

• Burdensome reporting requirements exist, and excessive resources are aimed at 

uncovering relatively rare cases of fraud and abuse. The compliance focus of the 

system has continued to result in growing delays in providing the warfighter 

with the best capabilities available. 

• Instabilities in funding and program requirements result in additional waste and 

inefficiencies. 

• Because a shrinking supplier base is competing for fewer major programs, there 

may in the future be increased temptation for unethical, if not illegal, behavior. 

It is in the context of these challenges and complexities that the Task Force 

recommends actions which can be taken to inhibit the likelihood of recurrence of a 

similar situation while mitigating further system complexities and oversight.
- 11 - 

III. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the process of formulating the findings and recommendations, the Task Force 

came to believe that DoD should address near term, as well as longer term, more 

systemic issues. 

To deal with the immediate issues, there are several process and oversight gaps 

brought to light with the transgressions of Ms. Druyun that once addressed, should 

mitigate the recurrence of the factors which could create a similar situation in the future. 

At the same time, the Task Force recognized that no amount of added rules, processes, 

and/or legislation can prevent illegal or unethical behavior by a determined individual. 

There are, however, positive steps that can be taken to “raise the bar” to a higher 

standard of ethics that would further inhibit such behaviors in the future—and lead to a 

better managed and operated organization. These steps come in the form of leadership 

actions and people management policies and practices for assuring enduring change for 

the longer term. 

 

The full set of recommendations serves to reinforce what the Task Force believes is 

the principal mission of acquisition: to provide the warfighter with world-class capabilities, 

effectively and efficiently, without sacrificing legal or ethical behavior. The Task Force was 

continually impressed with the number of people interviewed who were motivated not 

only to do things right, but also to do the right thing. That ethos provides the solid 

foundation on which DoD can build. 

THEME 1: ADDRESSING THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES—

PAY ATTENTION TO PROCESSES AS WELL AS PROGRAMS 

PROCESSES

Findings: The Task Force reviewed the acquisition processes and structures, with 

attention to checks and balances, of a wide range of organizations within DoD. These 

included all the Services, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the 

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) program, the Joint Rapid 

Acquisition Cell (JRAC), and the Special Access Programs (SAP). The Task Force also 

reviewed a specific program from each organization, presented by the PEO, to better 

understand implementation of the advertised process. 

Although the Task Force found a wide variety of structures and approaches 

adapted to the needs of individual organizations and programs, some general 

observations became evident. With respect to checks and balances, organizations (other 

than the Air Force during Ms. Druyun’s tenure) separate authority for source selection, 

contract negotiation and/or renegotiation, and program execution where appropriate – 

most especially for larger programs. They also exercise internal review, oversight, and 

communication mechanisms that provide a high level of organizational visibility into key 

decisions. While not the case under Ms. Druyun’s tenure as Principal Deputy, the Air 

F OUR I SSUES

Immediate issues: 

• Processes 

• Oversight 

Issues for enduring change: 

• Leadership 

• People 

FINDINGS : PROCESSES

• Processes and structures vary 

among defense components, 

but... 

- They follow most of the same 

general principles to assure 

checks and balances 

- AF, under Druyun’s later 

tenure, operated differently 

from the rest 

• AF has recently made 

acquisition organizational 

changes and appears to be 

executing more in line with 

peers 

• Some added checks and balances 

are needed to guard against a 

repeat of Druyun situation 
- 12 - 

Force has made recent changes to better assure execution of acquisition functions 

consistent with these same general principles. It is important to note, however, that the 

Task Force could find no set of policies that underpinned such practices, so that in 

theory, at least, a recurrence of a “Druyun” situation would be possible. 

One of the contributing factors to Ms. Druyun’s ability to make the favorable 

award decisions to Boeing she has claimed appears to be the accumulated authorities that 

she garnered for source selection, contract negotiation, and fee determination. While she 

appears to have rarely exercised that full suite of options, she was able to do it when she 

chose. In addition, the fact that she controlled the personnel actions and performance 

reviews of all senior acquisition professionals in the Air Force, both civilian and military, 

meant that few openly questioned her decisions. 

A final finding regarding processes relates to the awareness of Ms. Druyun’s 

unprofessional behavior and questionable practices with personnel reporting to her and 

the contractors with whom she dealt. The Task Force was given conflicting information 

about complaints to the Inspector General (IG) - from seldom reported, on the one hand, 

to the most cited senior executive in the Department, on the other. Regardless, her 

behavior was interpreted by her superiors as “tough, but fair.” Other avenues for 

reporting besides the formality of an IG inspection are common in the private sector (e.g., 

ombuds, ethics offices, etc.). The Task Force did not see that these avenues proved 

effective for surfacing her questionable behaviors. 

Recommendations: The Task Force recommends that some key aspects of the 

sound practices of the Services be documented in policy to assure their continuation 

through successive leadership changes in each organization. As a first step, the Task 

Force recommends that for major procurements, USD(AT&L) require each of the key 

acquisition authorities in the department to codify the following: 

• Advisory bodies (the Source Selection Evaluation Board and the Source 

Selection Advisory Board) to the Source Selection Authority (SSA) should 

provide a written report of their assessment and recommendations to the SSA. 

The ideal process would have a periodic and open dialogue between the SSA 

and his/her advisory bodies to create an assessment as complete as possible 

and to ensure that dissenting views are surfaced and addressed. 

• The SSA should be required to document his/her decision and rationale, 

whether he/she agrees with - or differs from - the recommendations of the 

advisory bodies. That decision should be reviewed through the established 

mechanisms of the organization. 

The Task Force also found a high degree of variability in the feedback approaches 

to bidders and recommends that meaningful processes be put in place.11 This would have 

the advantage of improving the overall quality of the bids, if executed not only at the end 

of the process, but at interim points, and of minimizing protests once the decision is 

made. 

 

11 The Task Force learned of an excellent example practiced by the Navy in its Littoral Combat 

Ship program.

RECOMMENDATIONS : 

PROCESSES

• For major procurements, 

USD(AT&L) codify best 

practices into policy 

- Written recommendations by 

advisory bodies to the source 

selection authority (SSA) 

- SSA documentation of 

decision and rationale 

• USD(AT&L) ensure process for 

meaningful feedback to bidders 

• USD(AT&L) ensure 

distribution of delegated 

acquisition responsibilities for 

major procurements 

• Oversight, source selection, and 

contract negotiations should not 

all reside in one person 

• Provide many avenues for 

voicing concerns
- 13 - 

FINDINGS : OVERSIGHT

• More rules and restrictions are 

not the solution (this doesn’t 

work well, even with this 

wording change) 

• Environment does not support 

critical self-assessment 

• USD(AT&L) has not exercised 

authorities to oversee processes 

(structure, policies, and 

practices) as fully as programs of 

acquisition organizations 

To address the issue of accumulated authorities in one individual, USD(AT&L) 

should require that each Senior Acquisition Executive put in place the policies and 

process checks to ensure that such an accumulation not be allowed to occur among the 

SES professionals, and that major award decisions not be made repetitively by the same 

individual. 

As a foundational element for creating enduring change, the Task Force 

recommends that DoD benchmark organizations where additional avenues for 

addressing questionable behaviors and practices, such as ombuds and ethics offices, are 

effectively utilized, and adapt those models throughout the Department. 

OVERSIGHT

Findings: The Defense acquisition system is extremely complex and is a major 

management challenge for senior acquisition officials. Developing more rules and 

regulations to address the acquisition abuses that catalyzed this study is not a good 

solution. It would make an already difficult system even more complex and could lead to 

further abuses by decreasing the number of individuals who are sufficiently skilled in 

mastering the system. 

In conjunction with this observation, it was evident to the Task Force that the 

internal and external oversight environment within which Defense acquisition 

organizations operate inhibits critical self-assessment. This became acutely apparent 

when the Task Force asked each of the Title 10 organizations it reviewed to provide such 

a self-assessment with consideration to the question of whether a single person could 

abuse his or her authority as Ms. Druyun had. The answer from all (including the 

reformed Air Force) was that it could “never happen here.” The Task Force believes this 

answer naïve given their reliance on practice vs. policy. More significantly, the positive 

“spin” provided to the Task Force can be viewed, in retrospect, as an expected product of 

an environment which focuses on compliance and laying blame vs. one of continuous 

self-improvement. As one applies this observation to the particulars of the Druyun case, 

current practices would likely prohibit the opportunity for repeated favorable treatment 

of a single contractor, but there is no policy that explicitly deals with such a situation. 

Based on the input of many former and current senior officials in USD(AT&L) 

organizations, the Task Force came to the conclusion that USD(AT&L) has not exercised 

his/her full authorities to oversee processes (structure, policies, practices) as fully as 

programs of the acquisition authorities throughout the Department. Perhaps the most 

remarkable example of this point was the failure to engage USD(AT&L) in issuing the 

March 1998 Secretary of the Air Force memo which consolidated essentially all 

acquisition authorities, oversight, and management with Ms. Druyun. Clearly this was a 

major change to the Air Force’s acquisition process, but the senior acquisition executive 

in the DoD, USD(AT&L), was not consulted. Had that happened, it would have been 

immediately apparent that the Air Force acquisition structure and process were 

becoming very different from those of the other two military departments, and the 

consolidation of authority in a single individual demanded checks and balances not 

evident in the arrangement. It is imperative that the USD(AT&L) be actively engaged in 

reviewing the structure, policies, and practices of each of the Defense acquisition
- 14 - 

organizations to ensure a proper balance of authorities and to avoid the potential for 

internal abuses. 

Recommendations: The sidebar lists specific actions USD(AT&L) should take to 

address the oversight issues identified above. Each action provides the USD(AT&L) an 

opportunity to ensure appropriate policy consistency across Defense acquisition 

organizations and represents new ways to achieve it. As a set, the actions are closely 

aligned with processes practiced by many defense contractors with strong ethics 

programs. 

The need for critical self-assessment cannot be overemphasized. The Pentagon is 

not an environment in which time is taken to do such assessments (the military safety 

communities being the principal exceptions). The acquisition work force is focused on 

delivering quality instruments of war to the warfighters, and successful individuals—

both military and civilian—are rewarded with even more responsibility when they 

succeed. However, they focus on the acquisition program(s) which they manage or 

oversee, not on the process or potential process improvements. Adding this extra 

dimension of self-assessment and sharing best practices is needed, and the USD(AT&L) 

must lead the implementation of changes to support self-assessment and continuous 

improvement within DoD. 

An additional oversight improvement relates to oversight of the senior personnel 

themselves. A periodic review of key metrics such as tenure on the job, performance 

evaluations, recent program awards in which they played a role, etc., is important for 

implementing the principal recommendations that follow in a later section for “people,” 

especially to support rotation and career development. 

THEME 2: ENSURE ENDURING CHANGE–

DRIVE THE CULTURE TO A HIGHER STANDARD

LEADERSHIP

Findings: The Task Force observed in discussions with industry and respected 

academics that ethical behavior is, first and foremost, a function of leadership. In those 

organizations where ethics has become a part of the culture, the commitment of the 

organization’s leadership is clearly visible. While DoD has a number of the pieces for the 

ethically grounded organization, the Department lags behind the ”best in class” in 

creating a systematic, integrated approach and in demonstrating the kind of leadership 

necessary to drive ethics to the forefront of organizational behavior. 

The Task Force also determined that the defense industry has had an economic 

incentive to implement sound ethics programs through their Business Conduct 

Guidelines and Defense Industry Initiative (DII) programs while the DoD – and indeed 

most government agencies – has no such incentive. In fact, the DoD focus is almost 

entirely on compliance and is driven by the emphasis coming from many parts of the 

government on eliminating fraud and abuse, no matter the cost in oversight, auditing, 

FINDINGS : LEADERSHIP

• Leadership is at the center of 

high integrity organizations 

• DoD has some of the pieces for 

the ethically grounded 

organization, but not all 

• DoD lacks the systematic, 

integrated approach of “best in 

class” 

RECOMMENDATIONS : 

OVERSIGHT

USD(AT&L) should oversee 

processes as well as programs 

• ID and share best practices 

• Question unusual practices 

and organizational structures 

• Use mistakes and failures as 

case studies, and communicate 

them broadly 

• Require defense components to 

perform periodic critical selfassessments and demonstrate 

continuous self-improvement 

• Develop and periodically 

review metrics roll-up on 

senior acquisition leaders 
- 15 - 

RECOMMENDATIONS : 

LEADERSHIP

• DoD should articulate more 

explicitly its vision and values 

as a high integrity organization 

and expect the same of its 

contractors 

• Secretary of Defense should: 

- Put ethics at the forefront of 

Department communications 

- Institutionalize an 

orientation program in the 

Office of the Secretary for 

incoming senior leadership 

that addresses: 

- The values and objectives of 

DoD and the Secretary 

- Importance of leadership to 

sustain an ethical culture 

- Performance expectations tied 

to both of the above 

• Senior DoD leadership ensure 

flow-down 

ATTRIBUTES OF 

MODEL CULTURES

• More than just compliance; e.g., 

- Senior leaders accept primary 

responsibility 

- Standards enforced 

consistently, effectively, fairly

- Organization is self-policing 

• Transgressions are openly 

discussed 

and reporting. The ethical organization prominently supports not only “doing 

things right,” but also “doing the right thing.” 

The Task Force observed that organizations known as role models share a number 

of common characteristics. Ethics is treated as more than a “check the box” activity. 

Senior executives emphasize ethics in their interactions and presentations to employees, 

they accept personal responsibility for maintaining ethics in the corporate culture, and 

they are almost obsessive in reiterating the company’s values upon which “doing the 

right thing” is based. Executive leadership is supported by a senior colleague responsible 

for the ethics programs of the organization. That executive typically reports to the CEO, 

with parallel reporting to the Board of Directors. 

Expectations for ethical behavior extend to everyone in the organization. Rewards 

and recognition reinforce the commitment to ethical behavior. Standards and norms are 

well understood and enforced consistently, effectively, and fairly – accompanied by 

frequent communication to highlight both exemplary and unacceptable behaviors. 

Transgressions are dealt with promptly, with actions and interventions targeted to deal 

with specific root causes, as well as with the individual transgressor(s). Timely selfdisclosure of transgressions to customers and stakeholders is the norm. Leadership 

engages in open discussion about transgressions, supporting employees in making sense 

of it and in “recovering.” 

Recommendations: The Task Force recommends that the Department, under the 

leadership of the Secretary of Defense, explicitly articulate its vision and values as an 

ethically grounded organization, in much the same fashion that the Department expects 

of its contractors. 

Specific actions for the Secretary of Defense include putting ethics at the forefront 

of DoD communications. He should also institutionalize an orientation program in the 

Office of the Secretary for incoming senior leadership that addresses the values and 

national security objectives of DoD and the incumbent Secretary, emphasizes the 

importance of leadership to sustain the ethical culture of the Department, and makes 

clear the performance expectations for each individual in supporting both achieving the 

objectives and promoting the ethical environment. 

In turn, senior DoD leadership must ensure the flow-down to all individuals. This 

includes both promoting ethical behavior and emphasizing the organization and 

personal consequences of transgressors. Care must be taken to encourage prudent 

business risk-taking, distinguishing it clearly from illegal or unethical behaviors. A 

tolerance for, and learning from, honest mistakes should be the norm.
- 16 - 

PEOPLE

Findings: The Task Force identified several issues at senior levels that can 

compromise overall performance of the acquisition process. One is the difficulty in 

filling confirmed positions. A contributing factor to Ms. Druyun’s accretion of authority 

was that the position of Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition remained unfilled 

for extended periods. While this situation was not the cause of Ms. Druyun’s misconduct, 

it did provide an opportunity for her to abuse her power. 

A second issue is that Senior Executive Service (SES) performance evaluations and 

personnel practices are not on a par with those for military officers or senior executives in 

many corporations. 

• The current evaluation system does not address behavioral problems to any degree. 

Hence, it apparently did not come to the attention of Ms. Druyun’s superiors that she 

was allegedly hostile to subordinates and corporation representatives who dealt with 

her. Given her personnel authorities, subordinates have admitted that fear of 

retribution was certainly an inhibitor to reporting her conduct. 

• Rotation of SESs in key positions is rare because their superiors tend to depend on 

them for their expertise and are reticent to bring in a new individual. The SESs who 

master the intricacies of the complex DoD acquisition system can make themselves 

invaluable because of this knowledge. 

• While there are detailed guidelines for the career development of acquisition 

personnel below the SES level, education, training and career development for SESs 

is largely at local discretion, and more often than not, senior oversight managers of 

SESs seem to believe SESs no longer need continuous education and training. 

Another important issue is that senior military acquisition officers are rotated 

much more frequently than their civilian counterparts. This has two adverse effects 

in the acquisition environment. First, the military find it difficult to become experts in 

their jobs before they are transferred. Second, SESs can gain much more power 

because of longevity in their positions. 

The Task Force does not dispute that the principal reason for the rapid 

turnover of military acquisition personnel is to assure that they remain competitive 

with their peers inside and outside the acquisition community. However, the 

Assistant Secretaries or their SAE equivalents in agency acquisition positions must 

take care that the military officers do not become overly dependent on SESs with 

detailed knowledge of acquisition, nor that either side creates unhelpful tension over 

“who’s in charge”. The goal must be a partnership to achieve the best acquisition 

decisions that combine the expert process knowledge of the civilians and the 

understanding of warfighter requirements of the military. 

FINDINGS : 

P EOPLE

• People issues at senior levels 

compromise performance 

• Senior appointed acquisition 

positions go unfilled for far too 

long 

• SES performance management 

lags best practices 

• Senior military personnel in 

acquisition positions rotate 

frequently 
- 17 - 

RECOMMENDATIONS : 

P EOPLE

• SecDef place priority on filling 

appointed acquisition positions 

- Champion reforms to 

streamline nomination and 

confirmation processes 

- Institute a succession 

planning process 

- Avoid more restrictions that 

would limit interest by 

experienced personnel 

• USD(P&R) modernize SES 

performance management 

practices 

- Institute 360o feedback 

- Implement 5-year DoD-wide 

rotation policy 

- Revise bonus and reward 

system 

- Require continued leadership 

development 

• Standards of Conduct add 

disclosure requirement for 

employment of majority children

Recommendations: The Secretary of Defense should place additional priority on 

filling appointed acquisition positions in the Department. It is understood that the 

difficulty in filling these positions is not totally under the control of DoD. However, the 

recommendations of the Volcker Commission12 and Congressmen interested in reform 

are providing an opportunity to be acted upon. 

• Reforms are needed in both the nomination and confirmation processes. The vetting 

process takes entirely too long. Confirmation can be held up in the Senate because of 

questions unrelated to the candidate. A high priority should be assigned to working 

with the Administration and the Senate to streamline and accelerate the process. 

• While it is often difficult to predict when a vacancy will occur, the Secretary of 

Defense should establish a succession list so that the vetting process can be started 

before the vacancy occurs. In addition, the Secretary should solicit 

recommendationsfor probable candidates from industry CEOs and from the many 

advisory boards for the Department, whose members have already had some degree 

of vetting. To prevent later problems, it may be helpful to undertake a more 

comprehensive vetting with the help of the FBI, especially for high level positions 

that should not go unfilled. It would also help if some of the more onerous 

requirements were examined for their validity. 

The Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [USD (P&R)] should 

modify the SES performance management system to bring it more in line with that of 

military personnel and senior personnel in the private sector. In particular, USD (P&R) 

should: 

• Institute a 360-degree feedback technique to help prevent behavior such as that 

apparently exhibited by Ms. Druyun. Input from subordinates, peers and industry, if 

the individual interfaces with them, should be included. “Safe” environments must 

be created for the feedback to be given and addressed. Retribution must be carefully 

monitored. 

• Establish a 5-year DoD SES rotation policy with a one-time only waiver of two years 

or less. In the case of senior acquisition SESs, the USD (AT&L) should approve the 

waiver. The rotation policy will only work if procedures are established to assure 

that SESs do not lose bonuses because of rotation. This could be accomplished by a 

number of means, e.g., assure that the rotated individual receives no less than their 

previous year’s bonus, or that their allocation transfers with them. 

• Require that SESs participate in continuing professional development to help mature 

them into leaders in the same manner that the military requires of their officers. 

Finally, the Standards of Conduct should be examined to determine the 

requirements that prevent individuals from wanting to work for the Government. It 

should delete requirements that do not add to sound ethics, but amend the standards to 

include employment disclosure on majority children and their spouses. 

 

12 “Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century,” 

report of the National Commission on Public Service, January 2003. 
- 18 - 
- 19 - 

S ERVICE CONTRACTS

• Service contracts are now 

greater than 50 percent of DoD 

procurements 

• DoD needs to closely monitor 

new defense component services 

acquisition oversight processes 

as they mature 

- To assure their effectiveness 

- To avoid the creation of more 

bureaucracy 

ACQUISITION WASTE

• DoD leadership undertake topdown assessment 

- Revisit prior commission and 

study recommendations and 

intervening legislation 

- Scrub process and reporting 

requirements, eliminating 

those not needed 

- Promulgate best practices for 

more rapid acquisition 

- Seek legislative relief where 

needed 

• Match acquisition workforce to 

new streamlined processes 

IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES

In reviewing the procurement process, the Task Force found that the procurement 

of service contracts represents more than 50 percent of the total DoD procurement. The 

Task Force is certain that many of these contracts are supporting our warfighters in the 

field and that others represent the smart use of DoD funds to outsource some non-critical 

functions. However, the Task Force recommends that USD (AT&L) closely monitor the 

new defense component services acquisition oversight processes as they mature to assure 

the effectiveness of the processes, especially in confirming that these contracts represent 

the best use of DoD resources. The Task Force is concerned that a significant portion of 

these funds are supporting hidden administrative functions for a department already 

high on overhead.13

OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION: 

FOCUS ON WASTE IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

While a comprehensive review of the acquisition process was well outside the 

scope of this study, the Task Force was astounded by the complexity of the process and 

the length of time required to develop and field materiel. Development times have been 

decreasing in the private sector over the past decade by at least a factor of two, while 

development times in DoD are increasing. Several studies and commissions have looked 

at this process but it only seems to get worse. The Task Force believes that real and 

effective change can come only from within the Department. This requires a prolonged 

and sustained effort by senior leadership to improve the process and remove 

bureaucracy and redundancy of various organizations. Although almost all of the people 

involved are well intentioned, they tend to represent a narrow organizational interest. 

There are many who can say no but few with the authority or willingness to say yes. 

What seems to be missing is the understanding that delays result in denying our troops 

in the field equipment to help do their jobs better and more safely. In addition, such a 

complex process adds power to those in a position that master it, a fact that the Task 

Force believes clearly contributed to the central issue addressed by this study. 

 

13 See also a recent report that addressed this issue in more depth: “Recent Large Service 

Acquisitions in the Department of Defense: Lessons for the Office of the Secretary of Defense” 

Frank A. Camm, Irv Blickstein, Jose Venzor, RAND document no. MG-107-OSD, 2004. 
- 20 - 
- 21 - 

MOVING TO 

“ BEST IN CLASS ” 

• Addressing the immediate 

issue: Pay attention to processes

as well as programs 

- Processes: Greater 

transparency, assured 

distribution of 

responsibilities, simplification 

and streamlining

- Oversight: Processes, as well 

as programs; achieving 

insight with oversight 

• Ensuring change for the long 

term: Shift the culture

- Leadership: More proactive 

to ensure that values and 

ethics are the foundation for 

all employee actions

- People: Ensuring the 

placement and development of 

leaders, not just skilled 

practitioners

V. SUMMARY

The Task Force believes that DoD, with the sound compliance basis it already 

possesses, coupled with the commitment of its workforce to the mission of the 

Department, can become the standard for “best in class” in creating the ethical climate for 

a federal organization. 

The first steps are to address process and oversight improvements to assure that 

the probability of another situation similar to Ms. Druyun’s is highly unlikely. Regarding 

processes, encoding current practices in policy to assure organizational openness and 

review in source selection, and distribution of acquisition responsibilities, is needed, 

along with simplification and streamlining. Oversight, currently heavily focused on 

program execution, should be better balanced to address both processes and programs. 

At the process level, it should extend beyond the current focus that audits only against 

stated processes to include an examination of whether those stated processes reflect best 

practices for efficiency and responsible stewardship. Such a shift can lead to positive 

outcomes as best practices are shared and recognized. 

The longer term steps should aim to adapt at the federal level the best of the 

private sector. Success requires first and foremost the sustained attention of DoD’s 

leadership, starting with the Secretary of Defense, to articulate the values of the 

Department and to assure that the reward system of the Department reinforces the 

importance of ethical behaviors as well as excellence in delivering products. For 

leadership to succeed, however, some key changes in the performance management 

processes of the Department, especially for the SES workforce, are required—changes 

that will develop leaders, not just highly skilled practitioners. 
- 22 - 
- 23 - 
- 24 - 
- 25 - 

B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CHAIRPERSONS

Dr. Miriam John

Current: - Vice President, Sandia National Laboratories 

- Senior Executive for Sandia’s Homeland Security Strategic 

Management Unit 

Former: - Director of the Center for Exploratory Systems and 

Development, Sandia National Laboratories 

- A number of managerial and technical roles at Sandia 

Dr. Ronald Kerber 

Current: - Consultant 

Former: - Executive Vice President and Chief Technical Officer, 

Whirlpool Corp. 

- Vice President for Technology and Business Development, 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

- Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Advanced Technology 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Ms. Lisa Davis 

Current: - Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics 

Former: - Contracts Manager for the Advanced Amphibious Assault 

Vehicle (AAAV) program, General Dynamics 

- Various positions in the offices of the Secretary of Defense, 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, 

and Acquisition), Headquarters United States Marine 

Corps, and Department of the Army Tank Automotive 

Command 
- 26 - 

MEMBERS

Mr. Irving Blickstein 

Current: - Senior Military Research Analyst, RAND 

Former: - ADCNO (N8B) for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and 

Assessments 

- Director, Acquisition Program Integration in the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 

Technology 

Mr. Stephen Conver 

Current: - Partner and Account Leader, IBM 

Former: - Several executive positions with Lockheed Martin and 

Martin Marietta 

- Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, 

Development, and Acquisition 

- Minority Staff Director for the House Armed Services 

Committee 

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

Dr. Robert Howard 

Current: - Consultant 

Former: - Associate Director for National Security and International 

Affairs, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

- Visiting Professor at the National Defense University and 

Adjunct Professor in the National Security Studies 

Program at Georgetown University. 

ADM Donald Pilling, USN (Ret.) 

Current: - President and CEO, LMI 

Former: - Vice President for Strategic Planning, Battelle Memorial 

Institute 

- Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

- Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare 

Requirements and Assessments (N8) 

- Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet 
- 27 - 

GEN Louis Wagner, USA (Ret.) 

Current: - Consultant 

Former: - Commander, Army Materiel Command 

- U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, 

Development and Acquisition 

- U.S. Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

and Plans, Force Development 

- Chief of Armor and Commanding General of the Armor 

Center at Fort Knox 

KEY CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Allan Burman 

Current: - President, Jefferson Solutions, a division of Jefferson 

Consulting Group 

Former: - Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, OMB 

- Various positions in OMB’s National Security Division 

Mr. Steven Schooner 

Current: - Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the 

Government Procurement Law Program at the George 

Washington University Law School 

Former: - Associate Administrator for Procurement Law and 

Legislation (a Senior Executive Service position) at the 

Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in OMB 

- Trial and appellate attorney in the Commercial Litigation 

Branch of the Department of Justice 

GOVERNMENT ADVISOR 

Dr. Gerald Abbot 

Current: - Director of the Industry Studies Program, National Defense 

University (NDU) 

Former: - Various roles, positions, and responsibilities at NDU 
- 28 - 
- 29 - 

C. BRIEFINGS RECEIVED

1 Dec. 2004 

Ethics in Procurement Matters Mr. Jeff Green OSD 

Senior Executive Service Personnel Policies Ms. Jeanne Raymos OSD 

Legal Perspective on Acquisition Process Mr. Doug Larsen OSD 

DoD Procurement Overview: Source Selection 

Oversight 

Ms. Deidre Lee OSD 

Defense Acquisition Board Dr. Nancy Spruill OSD 

17 Dec. 2004 

SOCOM Business Principles and Practices Dr. Dale Uhler SOCOM 

MDA—Program: Kinetic Energy Interceptors Mr. Terry Little MDA 

Air Force—Programs: Settlement of the H-22 

Clause/Global Sustainment Partnership 

Dr. Marvin Sambur USAF 

Army—Program: Joint Common Missile Program Mr. James Inman USA 

Navy—Overview of Policy and Procedures Mr. Tom Essig USN 

Navy—Program: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

Program 

RADM Hamilton USN 

10-11 Jan. 2005 

Business Ethics at General Electric Mr. Tom Cooper GE 

Acquisition Structure Mr. Paul Schneider Former PDASN 

(RDA) 

Acquisition Workforce Ms. Mary Thomas OUSD(AT&L) 

Briefing and discussion Dr. Sheila Widnall MIT 

DoD IG Investigations/Timeline Mr. Tom Gimble OSD 

Good Ethics, Good Procurement, and Integrity and 

Transparency 

Professor Alec 

Horniman 

University of 

Virginia 

Management Oversight in Acquisition and 

Technology Organizations 

Ms. Sue Payton OSD 

Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) Mr. Bob Buhrkuhl JRAC 
- 30 - 

17-18 Jan. 2005 

Briefing and discussion Ms. Eleanor Spector (Former Dir. of 

Defense 

Procurement) 

Air Force Materiel Command GEN G.S. Martin USAF 

Briefing and discussion Dr. Larry Delaney Titan 

Ethics in Military Organizations Dr. Martin Cook U.S. Air Force 

Academy 

Ethical Leadership COL George Reed U.S. Army War 

College 

Views of a Former Under Secretary Dr. Jacques Gansler (Former 

USD(AT&L)) 

Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and 

Conduct 

Mr. Dick Bednar Defense Industry 

Initiative 

Raytheon Ethics Program Ms. Patricia Ellis Raytheon 

Ethics and Business Conduct at Lockheed Martin Ms. Maryann Lazan Lockheed Martin 

Ethics at Boeing Mr. Matthew Frank Boeing 

Defense Contracts Management Agency Ms. Sallie Flavin DCMA 

DARPA Dr. Tony Tether DARPA 

27-28 Jan. 2005 

Special Access Programs (SAP) RADM Joseph Enright OSD 

Conference Call Briefing Dr. Norm Augustine LMCO 

Briefing and discussion Mr. Jack Welch Former Assistant 

SecAF 

(Acquisition) 
- 31 - 

D. REFERENCES

Guides 

Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, Standards of Conduct Office. Employee’s Guide to 

Standards of Conduct, October 2002. 

Laws and Legal Documents 

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986. 

United States of America versus Darleen Druyun, Defendant. “Statement of Facts,” filed in the U.S. 

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on 20 April 2004. 

United States of America versus Darleen Druyun, Defendant. “Supplemental Statement of Facts,” 

filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in October 2004. 

Memoranda and Letters 

“Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Senior Procurement Executive, and Head of Contracting 

Activity for Air Force Acquisition Programs,” Memorandum from Sheila Widnall to Darleen 

Druyun regarding functions required as Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, Senior 

Procurement Executive, and Head of Contracting Activity for Air Force Acquisition Programs, 

27 August 1993. 

“Assignment of Responsibilities in the Absence of an Assistant Secretary for Acquisition,” 

Memorandum from F. Whitten Peters to Lieutenant General Muellner and Darleen Druyun 

regarding responsibilities in the absence of an Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, 23 February 

1998. 

“Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct,” Letter to Hon. Michael Wynne from 

Richard Bednar regarding management and oversight of DoD acquisition activities, 31 January 

2005. 

Department of the Air Force, “Acquisition Organization and Process Self-Assessment,” 

Memorandum from Hon. Marvin Sambur to Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) on 

acquisition self-assessment, 17 December 2004. 

Department of the Army, “Acquisition Organization and Process Self-Assessment,” Memorandum 

from Hon. Claude Bolton to Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) on acquisition selfassessment, 17 December 2004. 

Department of the Navy, “Actions in Response to ‘Operation Ill Wind’ Investigation,” Memorandum, 

26 January 2005. 

Department of the Navy, “Acquisition Organizational Structure, Process, and Oversight SelfAssessment,” Memorandum from Hon. John Young to Acting Under Secretary of Defense 

(AT&L) on acquisition self-assessment, 16 December 2004. 
- 32 - 

Procurement Round Table Letter (draft) to Hon. Michael Wynne, Letter to Hon. Wynne from General 

William Tuttle, U.S. Army (Ret.) regarding acquisition and oversight process review, 24 

January 2005. 

“Further Assignment of Responsibilities in the Absence of an Assistant Secretary for Acquisition,” 

Memorandum from F. Whitten Peters to Lieutenant General Muellner and Darleen Druyun 

regarding further duties during the absence of an Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, 17 March 

1998. 

Missile Defense Agency, “Acquisition Organization and Process Self-Assessment,” Memorandum 

from Lieutenant General Henry Obering to Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) on 

integrity safety measures within the acquisition organization and process, 24 January 2005. 

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), “Acquisition Organization SelfAssessment,” Memorandum from Dr. Dale Uhler to Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) 

on SOCOM acquisition organization self-assessment, 27 December 2004. 

Publications, Papers, and Reports 

Report of the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, “Acquisition: The NATO 

AWACS Mid-Term Modernization Program ‘Global Solution,’” 14 April 2004. 

Commercial Activities Panel, Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Government, Final Report, April 

2002. 

Dillard, John. “Toward Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs: A Comparative 

Review of the Decision Framework from 1987-2003,” Naval Postgraduate School. 

Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: DoD Acquisition Workforce 

Reduction Trends and Impacts, Report No. D-2000-088, 29 February 2000. 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207, January 2005. 

Reed, George. “Toxic Leadership.” Military Review (July–August 2004): 67–71. 

Schooner, Steven L. “Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law” Public 

Procurement Law Review 11 (2002): 103-104. 

Druyun, Darleen. “Acquisition Reformed,” Los Angeles Air Force Association National Symposia, 27 

October 1995. 

The National Commission on the Public Service. Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal 

Government for the 21st Century [“The Volcker Report”], January 2003. 

Various news articles from The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The New 

York Times, Federal Times, The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, and POGO.org. 

Rudman, Warren, et al. A Report to the Chairman and Board of Directors of the Boeing Company 

Concerning the Company’s Policies and Practices for the Hiring of Government and Former 

Government Employees, 26 February 2004. 
- 33 - 

Yoder, Elliott Cory. “Engagement versus Disengagement: How Structural and Commercially-Based 

Regulatory Changes Have Increased Government Risks in Federal Acquisitions,” Acquisition 

Research Working Paper Series, Naval Postgraduate School, NPS-AM-05-001, 1 November 2004. 

Senate Transcripts 

U.S. Senate. Senator John McCain speaking on the investigation into the Air Force leasing of Boeing 

aerial refueling tankers, 108th Cong., Congressional Record, (19 November 2004), vol. 150, pp. 

S11536-S11542. 

U.S. Senate. Senator John McCain speaking on the Boeing 767 tanker lease, 108th Cong., Congressional 

Record (20 November 2004), vol. 150, pp. S11776-S11789. 
- 34 - 
- 35 - 

E. ACRONYMS

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

ADCNO Assistant Deputy of Naval Operations 

COCOM Combatant Command 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

DII Defense Industry Initiative 

DoD Department of Defense 

DSB Defense Science Board 

HASC House Armed Services Committee 

IG Inspector General 

JRAC Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

LMCO Lockheed Martin Corp. 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Programs 

NDU National Defense University 

OFPP Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OMB) 

OGC Office of (the) General Counsel 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PADUSD Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

PDASN (RDA) Principal Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 

Acquisition 

PEO Program Executive Officer 

SASC Senate Armed Services Committee 

SAE Senior Acquisition Executive 

SAP Special Access Program 

SecAF Secretary of the Air Force 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SES Senior Executive Service 

SOCOM Special Operations Command 

SSA Source Selection Authority 

TOR Terms of Reference 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

USN United States Navy 
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